short article proposal: the metaethics of computer ethics

A META VIEW OF INFORMATION ETHICS

Charles R. Crowell

Department of Psychology and Computer Applications Program

University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556

Phone: 574-277-4774

Fax: 574-271-2058

Email: [email protected]

and

Robert N. Barger

Computer Applications Program

University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556

Phone: 574-289-8939

Fax: 574-289-2039

Email: [email protected]

Running Head: META VIEW OF INFORMATION ETHICS

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

META VIEW OF INFORMATION ETHICS 1

A META VIEW OF INFORMATION ETHICS

Abstract

This article describes how a person's view of reality (i.e., one’s metaphysics or worldview or

weltanschauung) influences that person's view of morality (i.e., one’s ethics). This possibility has

broad implications for understanding personal ethics in general and computer ethics in particular.

Four worldviews were revealed in a survey of college students: They were Idealism, Realism,

Pragmatism, and Existentialism. Idealism is the view that reality is ultimately grounded in the

perfect, abstract, ideal world—the world of spirit and ideas. Realism emphasizes the ultimate

importance of the natural world, that is, the physical, material, sensible universe. Pragmatism

suggests that reality is not static in the sense of depending on absolute ideas or matter, but rather

is ultimately "in process" and must be constantly probed and determined by social

experimentation. Existentialism holds that reality is not objective, rather it is subjective and

must be constructed by each individual. The implications of these worldviews for three

examples of ethical dilemmas relating to information technology, those concerning piracy,

privacy, and authority-decption are described and discussed.

Keywords: Metaethics, Information ethics, Idealism, Realism, Pragmatism, Existentialism,

piracy, privacy, authority-deception


INTRODUCTION

"Metaethics" is a term which is subject to potential misunderstanding. Halverson (1981)

regards metaethics as the generic name for inquiries that have as their object the language of

moral appraisal. This definition reflects the viewpoint of a branch of philosophy known as

Linguistic Analysis. It does not, however, reflect a universal understanding of the term.

Consistent with the tenants of systematic philosophy metaethics can be defined more broadly as

the generic name for inquiries about the source of moral judgments (i.e., about their basis) as

well as about how such judgments are to be justified (Barger, 2001a). Taken in this sense,

metaethics is not about isolated individual judgments concerning whether certain actions are

right or wrong. It is about how a particular worldview -- or more precisely, a weltanschauung --

is propaedeutic to the formulation of such ethical judgments.

The essential idea here is that before one can make a judgment on whether a particular action

is right or wrong, one must have adopted a basic understanding of what reality is about; morality

then becomes a question of whether or not the action in question is in harmony with this

understanding. In philosophy, one’s understanding of reality is called metaphysics. A person's

preferred metaphysics is basically a statement of belief about fundamental reality. It is a "belief"

because it cannot be proven or verified. Rather, one’s metaphysics is simply a fundamental

assumption one makes about how things are (Barger, 2001a).

Aristotle called metaphysics "first principles" (McKeon, 1968) in deference to the notion that

a foundation of meaning is prerequisite to the interpretation of any particular events or actions

within the larger universe of that meaning. The reason that more than one metaphysics exists is

that different people adopt different personal explanations of reality. Once a personal

metaphysical world view is adopted, that view inevitably influences, if not governs, personal

Chuck Crowell, 01/03/-1,

Need page.


Who could we cite here? Barger, 2001a doesn’t mention this.


Is anyone in particular identified with this term?


decisions about ethical matters (Barger, 2001a). It is in this sense, then, that a person's view of

reality is propaedeutic to one’s stand on value questions.

OBJECTIONS FROM LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS

It is here that proponents of Linguistic Analysis (e.g., Wittgenstein, 1961) might take issue

with our more liberal interpretation of metaphysics. Adherents to Linguistic Analysis believe

(and we again use the word “belief” in the sense noted earlier) that statements about reality can

be verified or validated in only one of two ways. Those ways are by application of the rules of

logic, or by application of sense observation. Thus, from this standpoint, anything not open to

logical analysis or to observation by the senses is not “real.”

Linguistic Analysts argue that, by definition, a weltanschauung or worldview is an

interpretation of ultimate reality and is not subject to examination by logic or sense observation

(Barger, 2001a). Adherents to this view therefore argue that ethics, the moral implications of a

metaphysical worldview, also are not themselves subject to verification by logic or sense

observation. Hence, linguistic analysts say that ethical questions simply cannot be talked about in

any reasoned way because they are beyond the bounds of verification. Linguistic analysts would

admit that there are indeed questions of morality, but such questions are purely emotional and

subjective in nature. Thus, for these thinkers, no determination is possible about whether

something is objectively good or bad. As Wittgenstein (1961) himself has said: "The solution of

the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time, (6.4312)" and further, "We feel

that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain

completely untouched" (6.52).


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Should these be labeled as sections?


THE MAJOR METAPHYSICAL POSITIONS AND THEIR RESULTANT ETHICS

However, even if we grant that the basic tenets of any particular metaphysical worldview

cannot themselves be verified objectively, the existence of different metaphysical positions

across people can be documented and catalogued. For example, in some research done on a

random sample of 347 students at a Midwestern regional/comprehensive university, Barger and

Barger (1989) found that that there were a limited number of distinguishable metaphysical

positions among the students despite their diversity of majors and backgrounds. The worldviews

revealed in this research were the traditional systematic philosophies of Idealism, Realism,

Pragmatism, and Existentialism (some could argue that Existentialism cannot be described as

either "traditional" or "systematic," but in the interests of space we will forego a response to that

argument here). Idealism and Realism might be characterized as absolute or objective

philosophies, while Pragmatism and Existentialism could be described as relative or subjective

philosophies.

Idealism

The metaphysical position of Idealism, dating back to the Greek Philosophers Socrates and

Plato, is that reality is more in the spiritual than the physical. The Idealist derives greater

meaning from ideas than things. Ideas do not change, so reality is basically static and absolute.

Perhaps the most famous modern Idealist philosopher, Immanuel Kant, used what he called the

“Categorical Imperative” to assess the ethics of any action. The first form of his Categorical

Imperative states: "Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should

become a universal law" (Kant, 1933). In other words, if you wish to establish (or adhere to) a

particular moral or ethical standard, you must be willing to agree that it would also be right for

anyone else to follow that standard. It seems, then, from an Idealist perspective that the originally


intended purposes of things (i.e., the ideas upon which they were based) would weigh heavily in

ethical judgments and actions.

Once the metaphysical view that reality is found in the idea is assumed, the ethical position

that goodness is to be found in the ideal (that is, in perfection) automatically follows. Goodness

is found on the immaterial level, that is, in the perfect concept, or notion, or idea, of something.

Thus, perfect goodness is never to be found in the material world. Evil, for the Idealist, consists

of the absence or distortion of the ideal. Since ideals can never change (because they are a priori

and absolute), moral imperatives concerning them do not admit of exceptions. That is, these

imperatives are stated in terms of "always" or "never." For example: "Always tell the truth" or

(put negatively) "Never tell a lie." Since truth is the knowledge of ideal reality and a lie is a

distortion of that reality, truth must always be told and lying can never be justified.

Realism

A Realist believes that reality is basically matter, rather than spirit. For the Realist, things take

precedence over ideas. Whatever exists is therefore primarily material, natural, and physical. As

such, reality is quantitative and measurable. It exists independently of any spirit or idea and is

governed by the laws of nature, primary among which are the laws of cause and effect. The

universe, according to the Realist, is one of natural design and order. Aristotle was an early

representative of this view. B.F. Skinner, the behavioral psychologist, was a more modern

representative.

The resultant ethical position that flows from a Realist metaphysics is one that views the

baseline of value as that which is natural (that is, that which is in conformity with nature). Nature

is good. One need not look beyond nature to some immaterial ideal for a standard of right and

wrong. Rather, goodness will be found by living in harmony with nature. Evil, for the Realist, is


a departure from this natural norm either in the direction of excess or deficit (i.e., having, or

doing, too much or too little of something which is naturally good).

Pragmatism

For the Pragmatist, metaphysics is not so simple a matter as it is for the Idealist and Realist.

The Pragmatist finds meaning neither in ideas nor things. It would be a mistake to view reality as

either a spiritual or physical "something." Rather, the Pragmatist believes that reality is a process.

It is a dynamic coming-to-be rather than a static fixed being. It is change, happening, activity,

interaction...in short, it is experience. Reality is more like a verb than a noun. It is flux and flow

where the concentration is not so much on the things as on the relationship between the things.

Since everything changes - indeed, the Pragmatist would say that change is everything - nothing

can have any permanent essence or identity. Heraclitus, an ancient Greek Pragmatist, used to say

in this regard: "You can't step in the same river twice." For the Pragmatist, everything is

essentially relative. The only constant is change. The only absolute is that there are no absolutes!

The Americans Charles Sanders Pierce, William James, and John Dewey are representatives of

this view.

Pragmatism might therefore be regarded as a more expedient approach than, say,

Idealism. Since this philosophical view holds that everything can change, there is no permanent

essence or identity. In terms of ethical behavior, this outlook implies that all moral values must

be tested and proven in practice since nothing is intrinsically good or bad. If certain actions work

to achieve a socially desirable end, then they are ethical and good (Barger, 2001a). This is so

because meaning is inherent in the consequences of actions. In the Pragmatist's view, things are

value-neutral in themselves. There is nothing that is always good, nor is there anything that is

always bad. The value of anything is determined solely in terms of its usefulness in achieving


Who?


some end. In answer to the question, ‘Is that good?’, a Pragmatist would probably reply, "Good

for what?" Thus, the Pragmatist believes that the end justifies the means. That is, if an act is

useful for achieving some laudable end or goal, then it becomes good. In other words, a means

gets its positive value from being an efficient route to the achievement of a laudable end (a

laudable end is one that brings about the greatest good for the greatest number of people).

Accordingly, a means is not valued for its own sake, but only in relation to its usefulness for

achieving some valuable outcome.

Results or consequences are the ultimate measure of goodness for a Pragmatist, since the

usefulness of a means to an end can only be judged after the fact by its effect on the end. Thus,

for the Pragmatist, there can be no assurance that something is good, at least until it is tried. Even

then, it is only held tentatively as good since a thing is good only as long as it continues to work.

There can, however, be a dispute about which means are more effective for achieving an end.

Indeed, there can be a dispute about which ends should, in fact, be pursued. Thus, the Pragmatist

looks for guidance from the group. The reasons for this are metaphysical: reality is experience,

but it is the experience of the whole. For the Pragmatist, the whole is greater than the sum of its

parts. This means that the whole is more valuable than any of its parts. In the realm of value

judgments, the group's wisdom is more highly esteemed than the wisdom of any individual

within the group.

Existentialism

The Existentialist joins with the Pragmatist in rejecting the belief that reality is a priori and

fixed. But, unlike the Pragmatist who believes that reality is a process whose meaning is defined

primarily by the controlling group, Existentialist metaphysics holds that reality must be defined

by each autonomous individual. The Existentialist notions of “subjectivity” and


“phenomenological self” emphasize that the meaning or surdity of an otherwise "absurd"

universe is individually determined. Any meaning attached to the world must be put in it by the

individual, and that meaning or value will hold only for that individual. Thus, each person's

world, as well as each person's own identity, is the product of that person's own choices. In a

sense, each person can be defined as the sum of that person's choices. So, too, reality is different

for each individual. We each live in our own world and we are who we choose to be. Soren

Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul Satre are frequently mentioned as representatives of this view.

The Existentialist worldview leads to an ethics in which the individual must create his/her

own value. There is no escape from the necessity of creating values. Just as the world is defined

by the choices an individual makes, so, too, the individual expresses her/his own preferences in

making those choices, which in essence defines a person’s values and underscores their

responsibilities. The individual cannot deflect praise or blame for personal choices onto others. If

personal choices were freely made, then responsibility for them must be accepted. While groups

might influence what choices an individual makes, there is a zone of freedom within each

individual that cannot be conditioned or predetermined. While emphasizing a highly

individualized choice of values, an Existentialist is not necessarily a non-conformist, but if an

Existentialist does conform to the values of a group it will be because that person has freely

chosen to do so -- not because they have been pressured to do so by the group.

THE PROBLEM OF CONSISTENCY

The above summary of metaphysical views might appear to oversimplify the basis for ethical

decision-making that might stem from these positions. No doubt ethical decision-making in real

time is a much more complex process than the above characterizations might imply. For

instance, in their research Barger and Barger (1989) found that while most of the students


Probably should cite their major works.


Citations?


surveyed had primary leanings toward one of the four worldviews described above, students also

had simultaneous secondary leanings toward one or more of the other three positions. In other

words, nobody in their sample was fully and completely an Idealist, Realist, Pragmatist, or

Existentialist.

This means that simply knowing a person's primary metaphysical position will not guarantee

accurate prediction of how he or she might behave in response to a given ethical dilemma. It

should be acknowledged that this predictive inaccuracy happens for at least two reasons: 1) the

one just stated, that strong sympathies with other philosophical positions besides one's primary

view might end up influencing action in any particular case; and 2) the fact that people do not

always conscientiously act in a manner consistent with their beliefs, no matter how primary or

dominant those views may be. That is, for various reasons, they might fail to follow through with

what they believe is the right thing to do in a particular situation.

Parker (1991) provided some guidelines for resolving ethical dilemmas which seem to reflect

the fact that everyone is at least a little Idealistic in their Worldviews. Most of his guidelines

appear to be fashioned from the "Kantian Universality Rule." This Rule states: "If an act or

failure to act is not right for everyone to commit, then it is not right for anyone to commit"

(Parker, 1991, October 14). Of course, this Rule is just an alternate formulation of Kant's

Categorical Imperative noted above. Alongside this Idealistic guideline, Parker proposes what

appears at first glance to be a Pragmatic one ("The Higher Ethic"): "Take the action that achieves

the greater good" (Parker, 1991, October 14). While this maxim may seem to be an instance of

the Pragmatic motto: " Do the greatest good for the greatest number,” it may also have

something of an idealist flavor. Rashdall (1907) attempted to synthesize Idealism and

Pragmatism by holding that the right action is always that which will produce the greatest


amount of good on the whole." Whatever the exact philosophical analysis of Parker's guidelines

may be, the fact that they may be representative of more than one fundamental metaphysical

viewpoint could enhance their usefulness in the area of practical ethical decision-making.

METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THREE COMPUTING-RELATED ETHICAL

DILEMMAS

The different worldviews noted above seem to offer divergent solutions for many possible

ethical computer-related dilemmas. We select but three here for purposes of illustration. They

have to do with piracy, privacy, and authority-deception. Our argument here is that this

divergence can be traced rather directly to the different ethical standards associated with each

view. In the interest of brevity, we will consider only two alternatives for each dilemma: an

"absolutist" type of solution which is characteristic of the Idealist and Realist views; and a

"relativist" solution which is characteristic of the Pragmatist and Existentialist views. Finer

distinctions could be made within each of these main solution categories to separate the four

distinct worldviews.

Piracy

First consider piracy, a common ethical dilemma in today’s digital world involving wrongful

appropriation of computing resources. As an example, suppose someone uses a personal account

on a university's mainframe computer for something that has no direct relation to University

business. Such use could involve anything from sending a personal e-mail message to a

hometown friend, to conducting a full-blown private business on the computer (billing, payroll,

inventory, etc.). Is there anything unethical about such computer usage? The absolutist position

would likely say that the above-described activities are indeed unethical—whether only the e-

mail message is involved, or the larger-scale business activities (although the absolutist would


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recognize a difference between the two in the amount of wrong being done)—provided that such

use is prohibited by the University’s published computer utilization policy. The guiding principle

here would be based on the purposes for which the University (i.e., the computing-resource

owner) intended the computer to be used. Any utilization for purposes other than what was

intended, as specified in the usage policy, would be unethical. A similar argument would apply

to the “misuse” of any other computing resource or digital property for which ownership and an

owner’s wishes for those resources/materials could be established, explicitly or implicitly.

On the other hand, a relativist might say that only the full-scale business activities really

were unethical because they tied up too much memory and slowed down the machine's

operation, thereby depriving other legitimate users of access to, or reasonable performance of,

the computing resource in question. However, the personal e-mail message wasn't unethical

because it represented no significant drag on operations or no deprivation of

services/performance for other legitimate users. The guiding principle here is consequences or

harm: no harm, no foul.

Privacy

Next consider a dilemma having to do with privacy. Suppose a student enters a public

computer lab on campus and encounters a machine still logged into a student’s account who

forgot to log off when she left. The student then decides to get nosey and accesses the personal

files that are available on the system belonging to the account owner. Is this behavior unethical?

An absolutist position would maintain that the behavior was unethical because the only person

who is entitled to access someone’s personal files is the owner of those files, unless the owner

knowingly grants permission to others.


A relativist position would be based on the consequences. If the nosey student logged the

owner off after snooping around and never revealed to the owner or anyone else any confidential

information he or she may have seen, then no harm would accrue to the account owner. The

intrusion would thus not be considered unethical. But, if the nosey student passed on any

personal or confidential information about the account owner, or failed to log the owner’s

account off after looking at it, then unethical action might be involved since potential harm could

result.

Authority-Deception

Finally, let’s look at a dilemma involving what may arguably be regarded as an abuse of

power by authority, but certainly involves an instance of deception. A student is strongly

suspected by his University of a major “fair-use” computer-policy violation involving a hoax

email allegedly being sent by the student under the name of a prominent administrator. This

email proved to be exceedingly disruptive to student affairs until it was identified as fraudulent.

The student suspect, though not a professional hacker, was adept enough to cover his electronic

tracks well. However, the administration decided to confront the student and falsely inform him

that they had hired an outside expert whose skills were sufficient to uncover electronic evidence

of the student’s involvement in the hoax. The suspect was essentially being lied to in an effort to

coax an admission, which he eventually provided. Did the administration behave unethically in

this instance?

An absolutist position would maintain that lying under any circumstances is wrong. This

follows, of course, from an Idealist emphasis on the universal importance of truth. A relativist

could argue, however, that the “end justified the means” in this case. The “greater good” was


being served by any means used to identify the perpetrator, dispense a severe penalty, and

hopefully deter future instances of similar computer-use violations.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE TRENDS

The skeletal cases we have just presented are not meant to suggest that ethical solutions to

computing dilemmas can be easily generated. Indeed, just the opposite is true. In the present

world of computing, where ethical dilemmas are becoming ever more complex, the hope of

finding a single normative code which would contain standards with which everyone would

agree seems dim. That does not mean, however, that such an effort is futile. For example, it is

possible for people of different philosophic worldviews to agree upon the same standards–

although for different reasons.

There is little doubt that technology use will continue to escalate. As it does, so will the

potential for ethical dilemmas arising from such use. While there is some controversy about

whether technology-based ethical dilemmas are unique, or merely instances of age-old moral

questions (Barger, 2001b; Barger & Crowell, 2005), it is clear that morality and ethics must be

an ever increasing focus of our educational system at all levels. Moreover, it is important to

continue to explore how Metaethical analysis may be helpful in understanding and promoting

moral education and development.


References

Barger, R. N. (2001a). Philosophical Belief Systems. Retrieved January 26, 2006, on the World

Wide Web: http://www.nd.edu/~rbarger/philblfs.html

Barger, R. N. (2001b). Is computer ethics unique in relation to other fields of ethics? Retrieved

January 25, 2006, on the World Wide Web: http://www.nd.edu/~rbarger/ce-unique.html

Barger, R. N., & Barger, J. C. (1989). Do Pragmatists Choose Business While Idealists Choose

Education?. Charleston: Eastern Illinois University. (ERIC Document Reproduction Service

No. ED 317 904)

Barger, R. N., & Crowell, C. R. (2005). The ethics of parasitic computing: Fair Use or Abuse of

TCP/IP Over the Internet? In L. A. Freeman, & A. G. Peace (Eds.). Information Ethics:

Privacy and Intellectual Property. Hershey, PA: Idea Group, pp. 143-161.

Halverson, W. H. (1981). Introduction to Philosophy (4th ed.). New York: Random House.

Kant, I. (1993). Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings. (L.W. Beck, Trans.). Chicago:

University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1788).

McKeon, R. (ed.). (1968). The Basic Works of Aristotle. New York: Random House.

Parker, D. B. (1991, October 14). Computerworld.

Rashdall, Hastings. (1907). The Theory of Good and Evil. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1961). Tractatus Logico-philosophicus (D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness,

Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd. (Original work published 1921).


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short article proposal: the metaethics of computer ethics