Stern, Robert_Did Hegel Hold and Identity Theory of Truth [1993]

8/17/2019 Stern, Robert_Did Hegel Hold and Identity Theory of Truth [1993]

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Did egel Hold an Identity Theory of Truth?

ROBERT STERN

In a recent paper (Baldwin 1991), Tho ma s Baldwin has discussed the role of the

identity theory of truth in the writings of Bradley, Moore and Russell. In the

course of that discussion, he strongly suggests that in defending this theory, Bra-

dley was following Hegel; and, in so far as Moore and Russell developed it fur-

ther, Baldwin claims that the identity theory m ight even constitute a Hegelian

origin of analytic philosophy (p. 49).

While applauding this attempt to find points of influence and continuity

between Hegel's thought and that of the ana lytic tradition, and accepting that

many such points do indeed exist, doubts must nonetheless be raised regarding

Baldwin's specific thesis. It will be argued that Baldwin has misunderstood

Hegel's conception of truth, and so is mistaken in the historical claim that he

makes for Hegel's influence in this matter.

According to Baldw in, the identity theory of truth is the thesis that the truth

of a judgement consists in the identity of the judgement's content with a fact (p.

35).

He attributes this theory to H egel in the following passage:

On the issue of the identity theory, I think, we can definitely say that

Bradley followed Hegel, at least to the extent of developing a line of

thought that is present in Hegel's Logic ... This is not the place to ex-

plore Hegel's position, but it will suffice for now to cite one character-

istic passage. Truth in the deeper sense , Hegel writes, consists in the

identity between objectivity and the notion , (p. 40)

The sentence quoted comes from the Zusatz (lecture note) to §213 of Hegel's

Logic (Part of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences) (1975, p. 276).

Why is it wrong to interpret this sentence as endorsing an identity theory of

truth? In order to see the mistake, let me first introduce a distinction used by Hei-

degger between propositional truth and m aterial truth (1977, pp. 118-22). Truth

is p ropositional when it is attributed to statements, judgements or propositions on

the basis of their accordance w ith the way things are. Truth is

ma terial

when it is

attributed to something on the basis of the accordance of the thing with its

essence. Thus, whereas propositional truth applies to our judgements or state-

ments, material truth app lies to things and their natures. The latter conception of

truth is one that has almost been lost sight of in contemporary discussions of the

concept, but is echoed in such locutions as God is truth , or He was a true gen-

tleman .

My claim is that while the identity theory of truth is essentially a theory of

propositional truth, Hegel's remark concerns material truth, and that it is a mis-

Mind Vol. 102 .408. October 1993 © Oxford University Press 1993

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D o wnl o a d e d f r om

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646 Robert Stern

take to equate the two. That this is so can be seen clearly when the passage from

which Baldwin derives his quotation is looked at in full:

Truth is at first taken to mean that I know how something is . This is

truth, however, only in reference to consciousness; it is formal truth,

bare correctness. Truth in the deeper sense consists in the identity be-

tween objectivity and the notion

[Begriff].

It is in this deeper sense of

truth that we speak of a true state, or of a true work of art. The objects

are true, if they are as they ought to be, i.e. if their reality conforms to

their notion. When thus viewed, to be untrue means much the same as

to be bad. A bad man is an untrue man, a man who does not behave as

his notion or his vocation requires. Nothing however can subsist, if it be

wholly devoid of identity between the notion and reality. Even bad and

untrue things have being, in so far as their reality still, somehow, con-

forms to their notion. Whatever is thoroughly bad or contrary to the no-

tion is for that very reason on the way to ruin. It is by the notion alone

that the things in the world have their subsistence; or, as it is expressed

in the language of religious conception, things are what they are, only in

virtue of the divine and thereby creative thought which dwells within

them. (Hegel, 1975, p. 27 6)'

There are several points to be noted about this passage. As the opening few sen-

tences suggest, Hegel is largely unconcerned with the question of truth as cor-

rectness , that is,

truth as consisting in some relation between our judgem ents and

the world (whether or not the relation is one of identity). Rather, Hegel's interest

is in material truth: in how far an object can be said to be true, in the sense of

conforming to its notion (Begriff), where by this he means its nature or essence.

As Heidegger observes, this conception of truth implies the Christian theologi-

cal belief

that

with respect to what it is and whether it is, a matter, as created (ens

creatum),

is only insofar as it corresponds to the idea preconceived in the intel-

lectus divinus,

i.e., in the mind of God, and thus measures up to the idea (is cor-

rect) and in this sense is 'tru e' (197 7, p. 120). Hegel himself is quite explicit

about this theological background to his account of truth at the end of the passage.

Thus, whereas Baldwin might be right in attributing an identity theory of truth

to Brad ley, he seems to be mistaken in reading such a theory back into Hegel: for,

Cf:

We

must however in the

first

place understand clearly what we mean by Truth.

In common life truth means the agreement of

an

object with our conception of

it.

We

thus presuppose an object to which our conception must conform. In the

philosophical sense of the word, on the other hand, truth may be described, in

general abstract terms, as the agreement of a thought-content with itself. The

meaning

is

quite different from

the one

given above.

At the same time the

deeper

and philosophical meaning of truth can be partially traced even in the ordinary

usage of language. Thus we speak of a true friend; by which we mean a friend

whose manner accords with the notion of friendship ... Untrue in this sense

means the same

as

bad, or self-discordant. In this sense a bad state is an untrue

state; and evil and untruth may be said to consist in the contradiction subsisting

between the object's determination or concept and its existence. Of such a bad

object we may form a c6rfect~represelitati6ri, but the import of such representa-

tion is inherently false. Of such correctnesses, which are at the same time un-

truths, we may have many in our heads. (Hegel, 1975, p. 41; translation

modified.)

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Did Hegel Hold an Identity Theory of Truth? 647

while Bradley is focusing on the issue of correctn ess and propositional truth,

Hegel is interested in the question of material truth, and it is with this alone that

Hegel's talk of identity is concerned. By identity between objectivity and the

notion he means that what exists is true only if it realizes its nature properly and

to the fullest ex tent. Clearly, this is a view of truth that takes us in a very different

direction, one from which the identity theory of truth in Baldwin's sense can

hardly be said to have derived.

Department of P hilosophy ROBERT STERN

University of Sheffield

Sheffield

5 7 0 277V

UK

RE F E RE N CE S

Baldwin, Thom as 1991: The Identity Theory of Truth . Mind 100, pp. 35 -52.

Hegel, G.W.F. 1975: Hegel s Logic, translated by William Wallace. Oxford:

Clarendon Press.

Heidegger, Martin 1977: On the Essence of

Truth ,

in his Basic Writings, edited

by David Krell. New York: Harper & Row.

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Stern, Robert_Did Hegel Hold and Identity Theory of Truth [1993]