Stability Operations Magazine Vol. 8, No. 3 (November-December 2012)

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 12 1

VOLUME 8 | N UMBER 3NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2012

ENGAGING PARTNERS GLOBALLY FOR STABILITY , PEACE & DEVELOPMENT

PUBLISHED BY

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 122

Interview

FromHeadquarters

Evolutions in SecuritySector Reform

ENGAGING PARTNERS GLOBALLY FORSTABILITY , PEACE & DEVELOPMENT

4 From the Editors Desk5 Presidents Message

28 ISOA Member News & Jobs Board29 ISOA Membership Directory

GlobalPerspectives

VOLUME 8 | N UMBER 3 NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2012

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8 Strategy, National Security, and SocialChangeExploring an Evolving Security EnvironmentDana Eyre, PhD

11 Mentoring with the Goal of StabilityLessons from Afghan National Army TrainingLee Mersek

13 Sandhurst in the SandBringing British Training to AfghanistanAlan Capps

18 Post-Conflict Law and OrderShort Takes from a Recent Stimson StudyFiona Mangan, Dr William Durch and Michelle Ker

24 Ending Human Trafficking in U.S. GovernmentContractsImplications for Federal ContractorsMichele Clark

26 A West African Time BombIslamic Jihadists Establish an Al-Qaeda Franchisein Northern MaliHerman J. Cohen

21 A conversation with Mark KroekerPolice Training in an Evolving United Nations

HF


ALL IS A TIME OF CHANGE. Leaves turn yellow and trees become bare. Students return toschool. Congress comes back in to session. At ISOA, we hold the Annual Summit. And this year, itwas truly a changeand definitely one for the better.

The 2012 ISOA Annual Summit took on a new shape and format, and tried out a new venue. With the themeLearn. Adapt. Grow. it embraced the many changes that we have seen over the past year, and anticipate inthe coming year. The focus on partnerships, business development, and strategic thinking was paramount,and the caliber of speakers across the board was unprecedented. In fact, the entire Summit proved to beunprecedented from a historical perspective as we broke registration and media coverage records.

But the real takeaway was not on the quantifiable side. The real success of this years event came straightfrom feedback from the attendees themselves, from industry leaders to field implementers to policymakers. Ipersonally heard comments from attendees that I had not heard before. Attendees were saying, Ive neverbeen able to have conversations with these types of people before, or Ive learned far more than Iexpected too. Thats when we, the ISOA staff, knew that we had hit the nail right on the heador at leastas close as we could get.

So how can we change post-Summit? Weve all heard the old adage, if it aint broke, dont fix it, and wewholeheartedly agree. But we are not satisfied with the status quo either. Using quantifiable data and surveyfeedback from the 2012 Summit, we look forward to creating a 2013 event that will be even better. Ourmembers and all of the attendees from the 2011 and 2012 Summits know that this event isnt just anotherconferenceits an opportunity. Some attend for the engagement and partnership building; some attend forbusiness development; and some attend to simply learn something. And the Summit provides a positive andconducive environment for all three of those goals. We plan to do it even better next year, and provide theopportunity for even more people from the wider stabilization, disaster relief and development community totake advantage of a substantive and valuable event.

For a full overview of the 2012 ISOA Annual Summit, see the Event Review on pages 16 and 17 of this issue.

Jessica Mueller is the Director of Programs & Operations at the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA)and the Editor-in-Chief of Stability Operations magazine. Contact Ms. Vogel at [email protected].

Reaching the SummitA Bi-Monthly Review of ISOAs Activities:September & OctoberJessica Mueller

From Headquarters | From the Editors Desk

Copyright 2012 International Stability Operations Association (ISOA).All rights reserved. The ISOA logo is a trademark of ISOA. StabilityOperations magazine (SO) and its logo are trademarks of ISOA.

STABILITY OPERATIONS MAGAZINE IS THE WORLDSONLY PUBLICATION EXPLORING TOPICS PERTINENT TOPUBLIC, PRIVATE AND NONGOVERNMENTAL SECTORACTORS PARTNERING IN PEACE AND STABILITYOPERATIONS. SO IS PUBLISHED 6 TIMES PER YEARBY ISOA, A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP OF PRIVATESECTOR AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONSPROVIDING CRITICAL SERVICES IN FRAGILEENVIRONMENTS WORLDWIDE.

Editor-in-ChiefJessica Mueller

Assistant EditorAlaina Monismith

Contributing EditorNaveed Bandali

PublisherDoug Brooks

Business ManagerJason Kennedy

ISOA welcomes submissions for all SOmagazine content. The editorial teamreserves the right to accept or rejectsubmissions for print and/or online use.

The opinions expressed herein or on peaceops.comdo not necessarily represent the opinions of ISOA, itsofficers, Board of Directors, members or affiliates.ISOA bears no responsibility for the editorial content.Views expressed in articles are those of the authors.

No part of this publication may bereproduced in any form without permissionin writing from the Editor-in-Chief.

ISOA members receive a limited number ofsubscriptions included in their membership package.Individual annual subscriptions are available for$30 (US & Canada) and $50 (International).

Advertising packages are available. Contact ISOA forpricing and information.

Formerly the Journal of International PeaceOperations (JIPO) and the IPOA Quarterly.

The Publication of theINTERNATIONAL STABILITY OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION

1634 I St. NW, Suite 800,Washington, D.C. 20006, [email protected] site..www.peaceops.comISSN 1933-8189

OS ENGAGING PARTNERS GLOBALLY FOR

STABILITY , PEACE & DEVELOPMENT

ISOA Congratulates our 2013 Board of DirectorsFall also means the annual Board of Directors election. Congratulations to Howie Lind of Fluor and Patrick

Garvey of Triple Canopy who begin new 2-year terms on 1 November 2012!

2013 ISOA Board of DirectorsChair: Pete Dordal, GardaWorldWill Imbrie, Dyncorp International

Tom Callahan, PAERob Hood, CH2M Hill

Jeff Grieco, IRDHowie Lind, Fluor

Patrick Garvey, Triple Canopy


LTHOUGH the Stability OperationsIndustry is best known for theservices it provides in support of

international operations in places likeAfghanistan, Somalia, the DR Congo and EastTimor, our industry provides invaluable servicesfor disaster relief operations as well. The Haitiearthquake, tsunami in Japan, floods inPakistan, and most recently HurricaneSandy in the United States.

Many people would be amazed at the numberof services and the range of capability theprivate sector has available to addressdisasters. Generators, heavy constructionequipment, modular housing, water purificationservices a million and one services that areas useful addressing domestic catastrophes asthey are serving war refugees and supportingpeacekeeping operations around the world.

The industry is called on for disaster relief forthe very same reason they are involved ininternational stability operations nogovernment or international organization hasthe capacity to address every contingency orpolicy need; especially on short notice. Ourindustry specializes in rapid deployment withscalable capabilities and services. Even better,a government does not have to spend decadespaying for services it may never need, but onlyfor their actual deployment and use. Obviously

some services are so vital and necessary thatgovernments prefer to ensure in-housecapabilities, but some hybrid models also allowgovernments to pay a small amount to fundcapacity within the industry that can be on-callat a moments notice, should the need arise.

This certainly does not bypass or minimize thecentral role of governments in disastermanagement. Our industry does not makepolitical decisions. Governments can be of realvalue when they make the vital preparations for

addressing current and future disas-ters. Governments decide priorities in disasterrelief, and fund private sector preparations forcapabilities and services so to be availablewhen disasters such as Hurricane Sandy hit.At the same time, poor governmentalmanagement or a lack of governmentalcapacity can have an extremely negative result,such as we saw in Haiti where billions of dollarsof international relief were wasted due topolitical insistence that a devastated Haitiangovernment be the sole decision-maker. Vastprivate sector resources activated in prepara-

tion for the relief effort were left unutilized,contributing to the suffering of the shatteredpopulation. Ultimately the private sectorresources used in Haiti were only a fraction ofthose typically utilized in international disasterssuch as the 2004 Southeast Asian Tsunami.Although some have argued that theinternational community needs to take charge insuch situations to temporarily direct andmanage emergency services, ultimately thedecisions will be governmental, not privatesector.

If nothing else, Hurricane Sandy is a powerfulreminder of how useful this industry can be as atool of policy. From supporting humanitarianefforts in New Jersey to assisting peacekeepingefforts in Mogadishu, their role is the same. Inthe end, the industry provides enormouslyvaluable, cost-effective services that supportinternational humanitarian policies. And asalways, the better we ensure a workingpartnership between government and theirindustry contractors, the better the humanitarianresult.

In the end, the industry provides enormouslyvaluable, cost-effective services that support

international humanitarian policies.

Doug Brooks is the President of the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA). Contact Mr. Brooks at [email protected].

From Headquarters | Presidents Message

Mogadishu to ManhattanAchieving Stability After DisasterDoug Brooks

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ong term stability in any context ismajorly impacted by the strength of thesecurity sectorcriminal justice

systems including national armies, police,correctional facilities, and public access to theservices that they provide. The struggle for atransparent, accountable, effective andsustainable security sector calls for constantinnovation paired with effective monitoring andevaluation of security sector reform (SSR)programs; especially amid increasingglobalization and an increasing number of highrisk security environments.

So what does this new security environmentlook like? Dana Eyre takes an innovative lookat the evolution of national security paradigmsfrom a broad view, asserting that securitychallenges worldwide are social change

problems. This new way of looking at securityas being rooted in sociological and psychologi-cal issues will help those working in SSR toprogram more effectively in the future.

Focusing on Afghanistan, Lee Mersekrecounts his experiences in training the AfghanNational Army. He emphasizes the importanceof tackling security challenges with a focus onsustainability, by training locals in basic projectmanagement, leadership, and operating withinrealistic means. Capacity building is the key tolong term stabilityin SSR, and any stabilityoperations programming.

Additionally, the Afghan National Army requiresextensive professional training in order to meetmany national security challenges. AlanCapps reviews the ongoing process to

establish a professional military training facilitymodeled after the UKs Sandhurst in Afghani-stan. An officer training program will allowAfghanistan to develop a professional army thatis sustainable beyond the 2014 withdrawaljust ask the ANA General who attendedSandhurst already.

The United Nations has an extensive role inSSR worldwide. Fiona Mangan, MichelleKer and William Durch review a recentStimson Center and UN study exploring theincreasing complexity of peace operationsmandates that include police, justice andcorrections components. The study finds thatfuture SSR programming must take in toaccount the unavoidable impact that theoperational environment has on the level ofeffectiveness and success of such programs.

Evolutions in Security Sector ReformTraining A New Generation for Sustainable Stability

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HE CHALLENGEIn the decades since the fall of theSoviet Union (a relatively recentevent that seems as lost in the mists

of time as the Middle Ages) and particularlysince 9/11 there has been substantial public,and professional, reflection and debate over acritical set of questions about the pursuit ofnational (or human) security. Who is the foeand what is his nature? What are the mosteffective policies for the conduct of struggle?Indeed, what is the fundamental nature of theproblem we face? What are "security" and"stability"? How do we attain them? Observersand critics have variously labeled thecontemporary environment and particularstruggles within it as the global war onterrorism, the long war, small wars, globalcounterinsurgency, fourth generation warfare,war amongst the peoples or the five frontwar. It seems that although there is noconsensus on the label for the situation there issubstantial agreement that its not the conflictthat the Western militaries now fightinganticipated fighting in the days before 9/11.This debate has only gotten more complicatedwith the evolution of the Arab Spring of 2011;events in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Mali, Syriaand throughout the region highlight thecomplexity of the contemporary securityenvironment. This problem only gets morecomplicated when the focus is expanded toinclude longer-term challenges, such asPakistan or most notably China, simultaneouslyAmerica's vital business partner, only realpotential military rival in the coming decades,and a land subject to enormous internal socialand political tensions. Whatever one's view onthe details, it's clear that the contemporarysecurity environment is definitely not a simpleone.

If there is no consensus on the label, there is atleast substantial consensus on the characteris-tics of the problems were facing. Its not 19thor 20th century conflict between states (anextended violent Olympics: France vsGermany, 1870, US vs Spain 1989, Japan vsRussia 1904, UK & France vs Germany(rematch) 1914, US, UK, France vs Germany,Italy & Japan (rematch) 1945, US vs USSR,1948-1989) but between a struggle over thenature of social order, both at the level of theworld (at least in the fantasies of some violentextremist organization believers) and at thelocal level in a variety of locations. Thecontenders are a complex amalgam of states(in an ever shifting mix of unilateral actions andformal and informal coalitions, with more than afew participants at least occasionally playingboth sides), nascent and developing states,social movements, factions, terrorists, guerillas,militias, bandits, robbers and psychopaths.International law, far from a "self-imposed,imperceptible limitation hardly worth mention-ing, is a central preoccupation in todaysoperational environment, and public opinion,always significant, is even more important in aworld in which international non-governmentalorganizations can conduct a by-name audit ofcivilian causalities in a major operation, asHuman Rights Watch first did during the NATOcampaign in Kosovo in 2000.

The most fundamental thing sought by ournational security efforts is not a discrete set ofobjectives, but a broadly functioning socialorder, a social system in which people - be theyin London, New York, Mumbai, Kabul, or Kirkuk can go about their daily lives in peace andstability. And the roots of the current challengecome not from sovereign states and massed

armies, but from a complex and chaotic mix ofhistory, social conditions, ideologies andmarginalized states of mind as likely to befound in individuals living in western democra-cies as they are under oppressive regimes andin the political and security vacuums arisingfrom failing states. It is a complex social-psychological emergent ecology of conflict inwhich concepts such as globalization, theyouth bulge, narrative and identity are ascritical to our understanding of the currentproblems as mutually assured destruction wasto the Cold War. The security problems we faceare in essence social change problems" theirorigins lie, and they can only be understood asthe complex product of social structures, socialdynamics, social and psychological causes.Addressing these challenges often requiresmilitary forces - the use of force and violence but they are much more than war.

Reflections on the Contemporary SecurityEnvironment

The dynamics of this environment can becaptured relatively simply, though they can't beaddressed with equal simplicity.

The problem is glocal, and narrative andemotional, at its core. The connection betweena preacher and his small church in a back-woods corner of Florida, USA, and a protestingmob in Afghanistan isnt physical; its narrativeand emotional. They are aware of each other(dimly, imperfectly) and act with regard to eachother, yet at the same time each operates intheir own local context. The conflict issimultaneously local and global. Thisphenomenon is clearly enabled by rapidlydeveloping communications technologies. Witha good story, a cell phone or a cheap camera,and 5 million YouTube hits anyone can be astar, or fuel the fire of a revolution on the otherside of the world.

The core dynamics are psychological andsociological. In an era where deliberatemartyrdom has become a calculated means ofconducting IO, killing our enemies provides

Dana P. Eyre, Ph.D. is a sociologist specializing in conflict transformation and strategic communications. He has worked in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and onprojects from Papua New Guinea to Somalia.

Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform

Strategy, National Security,and Social ChangeExploring an Evolving Security EnvironmentDana P. Eyre, Ph.D.


tactical advantage, but is unlikely to end theirstrategic campaign or organization. Ultimately,changing the conditions that generateextremists is the only long-term alternative to anendless drone-based game of whack-a-mole.We need to counter the enemy in the criticalpsycho-social space, but perhaps morecritically, we find our selves seeking to fosterchange in evolving social systems buildingfunctional, inclusive government, enablingeconomic growth, healing the wounds of warand the divisions of sectarian and ethnic strife.We cannot directly bring the world we desireabout through force, we must help partnersbuild that world for themselves.

These statements clearly imply that thevocabularies and theoretical frameworksnecessary to understand our problems are

psychological and sociological (in the broadestsense). These insights are not new everyconfrontation with insurgency or guerillawarfare offers another opportunity to relearnthis fundamental lesson. But they are moreurgent now, and more central, as thetechnology of mayhem (weapons of massdestruction, and the routine technologies ofeveryday violence explosives and firearms)becomes more widespread.

Social change is at the center of the problemand must be at the center of our thinking.

General David Petraeus has observed that wecannot kill our way out of this endeavor. (IraqCOIN Guidance, 21 June 2008). Clausewitzoffered the duel of the wrestlers as thefundamental metaphor for understanding war.

War is nothing but a duel on an extensivescale. If we would conceive as a unit thecountless number of duels which make up awar, we shall do so best by supposing toourselves two wrestlers. Each strives byphysical force to compel the other to submit tohis will: his first object is to throw his adversary,and thus to render him incapable of furtherresistance. War therefore is an act of violenceto compel our opponent to fulfill our will. Notea gap between the two statements. Whenothers make comments similar to GeneralPetraeus, such as noting that people are thedecisive terrain, they too are recognizing afundamental gap between the problems weface and the inherited vocabulary we employedto confront them.

The connection between a preacher and his small church ina backwoods corner of Florida, USA, and a protesting mobin Afghanistan isnt physical; its narrative and emotional.

Continued on page 10

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Traditional security vocabularies, of states andpolitics, planning and rational interests, fire andmaneuver, logistics and operations, defeat andvictory, offer at best fragmentary understanding;indeed these vocabularies are potentiallyprofoundly misleading when seeking tounderstand the core dynamics of the problemswe tackle, be it Afghanistan or China's futurestability and direction. Is there an alternativeframing, an alternative or supplementaryvocabulary and theory of our activities, thatgives us greater clarity on how to addressproblems in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Bahrain,Yemen, Somalia, the wider threat of terror, andthe general problem of failed states and ofbuilding positive peace? Here, in particular, wewould focus on the central question of social

change. If the problems we confront are rootedin psychological and sociological dynamics, ifthe solutions require people, and groups, tolearn new skills, to tell new stories, to changebehaviors, to cooperate in government, to rejectviolent ideologies, to embrace neighbors, andultimately to build peace, are the projects weare engaged in not more fruitfully conceptual-ized as social change, rather than as war?

The goals we have set for ourselves requirechange; we achieve success only if societieschange, and societies change only if peoplechange. We must therefore put the dynamicsof personal and social change at the center ofour thinking. People must think, feel, andpractice their way into new behaviors, newmodes of action. We need to redefine the

concept of victory or success. Stable,sustainable success must be rooted in a criticalmass of popular disapproval of our opponentsand the rejection of their ideology, as well as apositive will to reject them and to embracesustainable, stable peaceful forms of socialorder and governance.

Some may object to labeling what we are doingas social change noting that social changecannot be simply managed, that it is difficult, orthat it is not our job. We acknowledge all ofthese questions. But we would observe that thejobs we have undertaken, in response to thesecurity environment we have found ourselvesin, at the core require social change. Embracinga new government, rejecting an extremistreligious ideology, resisting recruitment toviolence, all are acts of individual and collectivechange. They do not become easier byignoring the dynamics of change.

Social change, particularly the form of mostinterest to militaries and their colleagues -conflict transformation (as a specialized form ofchange - moving violent conflict into non-violentpolitical conflict, as described in The Quest forViable Peace: Covey, Dzeidzic and Hawley,editors, US Institute of Peace), isnt easy, butits certainly easier to do if we have avocabulary that helps us understand thedynamics of the problem and articulatemeaningful solutions. Alfred North Whiteheadsobservation clearly articulates the challenge:the art of progress is to preserve order amidchange and to preserve change amid order. Iwould argue that were not engaged in the longwar but the long change.

References

Clausewitz, Carl von. 1989. On War. Reprint.Princeton University Press. P76

Human Rights Watch, Kosovo: Civilian Deaths in theNATO Air Campaign, 1 February2000, D1201, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a86b0.html [accessed 3 May2011]

Continued from page 9



N AN EFFORT to promote long-term stability in a failed or failing state, many stabilityoperations companies provide services that involve training and advising foreign counterparts.Even for the companies with functions that dont normally incorporate foreign advisory, there

always exists the potential to pass on knowledge and abilities to foreign partners. It often may beeasier to conduct our stability efforts without being hindered by untrained, ill-equipped localcounterparts, yet much of that hindrance may be attributed to the difficulty of undeveloped countriesto comprehend and maintain our more advanced concepts. We can actually overcome thesedifficulties and create sustainable solutions towards long-term stability by encouraging our hostnation partners to develop their own stability efforts, use locally available resources and takeresponsibility for implementing their own operations.

Local Development

A story was passed on to me in Afghanistan about a project conducted by a Western organization. Inone particular village, the women walked one hour to the nearest water source and then walkedanother hour on the return trip. The kindhearted Westerners built a well in the village to reduce thewomens burden, but when they returned to the village they received scornful looks from the women.What the organization didnt realize was that the two hours spent retrieving water was the time thatthose women used to socialize away from the men of the village, and where they often arrangedmarriages and resolved disagreements between families.

All concepts or programs that we conduct with host nation partners must be developed by themunder our mentorship. When we try to impart large budgets and advanced technologies on emergenteconomies and security services, we forget the progressive steps that our economy and security

Lee J. Mersek is currently working for New Century U.S., and is assigned overseas to conduct security stability operations.


Mentoring with the Goal ofSustainabilityLessons from Afghan National Army TrainingLee J. Mersek

services had to make in order to reach our ownadvanced capabilities. This inflexibility causesus to overlook inexpensive and simplisticsolutions that may better address instability,and may even prolong it when our operationslack local support.

Participation from our counterparts will ensurethat local capabilities and environmentalconsiderations we might otherwise ignore arefactored into the development of our stabilityoperations. This increases the sustainability ofour efforts because our host nation partnersare more likely to comprehend and accept aprogram that is developed at their skill leveland within their societys framework. Theseoperational concepts will thus be masteredmuch quicker than anything our counterpartshavent developed themselves. The finalproduct may not precisely mirror what weutilize in our own country, but it will be adaptedto our partners country, and will outlastconcepts not tailored to their political,economic and cultural environment.

Local Resourcing

As a U.S. Marine Corps embedded infantryadvisor to the Afghan National Army (ANA), myteams mission was to pass on knowledge andskills rather than funding and materials.However, other coalition forces made plans tobuild operations centers for the ANA. Thesebuildings, filled with computers and flat screentelevisions, would be paid for by the U.S.government. Although the Afghans agreed tothis plan, we later conducted a successfulbrigade-level mission with an operations centerconsisting of a carpet, a radio, a map, and apot of tea. Our counterparts gainedconfidence in their ability to conduct a large-scale mission with materials they could easilyrequisition themselves.

Utilizing local funding and readily availableresources can minimize the costs for moststability efforts while ensuring that our partners


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can sustain themselves. Our host nationcounterparts will more readily master a methodthat involves equipment they can procurethemselves, rather than struggle to operate andmaintain equipment beyond their means. Inmany impoverished societies, money serves tobe a distraction, and the fuel for corruption.Teaching our partners new concepts within theirown budget removes these distractions, limitsopportunities for corruption and increases theircommitment to the solutions they havedeveloped. Very often, the most basicconcepts prevent a reliance on foreignsubsidies, equipment and maintenance.

Local Implementation

In Afghanistan, the abilities of ANA leadersoften reflect the amount of responsibility that isassumed by their mentors. While some officers

have gained confidence in their abilities andauthority, others who have had impatientadvisors develop and execute solutions forthem lack this self-reliance. A common mistakeof some mentors is to focus on implementingtheir own perfectly envisioned plan rather thanfocus on developing their counterparts. This ofcourse raises the concern that some Afghanofficers may be unable to conduct their jobswithout foreign assistance.

The old adage of give a man a fish and he eatsfor a day; teach a man to fish and he eats for alifetime certainly holds true. Rather thanconducting stability operations ourselves,training a cadre of host nation supportersmultiplies our own efforts in that country withcounterparts who contribute to their ownstability. Host nation leaders learn basic projectmanagement and leadership through ourmentoring, while the work force involved in our

operations develops skills from our training.Encouraging our partners participation providesopportunities for them to assume responsibilityfor their countrys stability.

Once a capability has been developed with hostnation concepts and resources, our partnersmust implement it to break over-reliance onforeign support. The involvement, andownership, of our counterparts in stability effortsserves to improve their abilities as they learnfrom their mistakes. As they gain proficiencyand confidence, our partners can win supportand legitimacy from their own countrymen.Sustainability is achieved when our mentoringand training enables our partners to maintaintheir own stability.

Conclusion

The notion of developing sustainable solutionsis not limited to any particular stabilityoperations sector. A military or security servicemust first learn how to conduct missions on footbefore they can incorporate aircraft into theiroperations. Foreign medics must learn tooperate without advanced medical technology,and foreign construction companies must beable to work with tools and materials they canreadily supply. The ultimate goal may beimproved life-saving abilities and saferengineering standards, but a country facinginstability must first develop and maintain itsown methods in order to create the foundationfrom which to learn advanced techniques.

While a failed or failing states dependence onforeign assistance may promote business forstability operations companies, progressivelydeveloping host nation partners actually createsbusiness opportunities for advanced trainingand equipment. With open minds and a focuson training and mentoring, we may evendiscover new concepts from our partners andtheir methods. By developing tailored solutions,utilizing host nation resources and encouragingthe local implementation of those solutions, ourmentoring capabilities can increase thesustainability of our work and more effectivelyfoster long-term stability in foreign nations.




developing core military skills in Officer Cadets.

This is what Lt. General Sher MohammadKarimi, current Chief of the Army Staff of theAfghan National Army, remembers about histime at Sandhurst. He graduated in 1967following a two-year course, at that point intime only the second Afghan ever to attend theacademy. Now, 45 years later General Karimiwants his country to establish an officeracademy modeled on Sandhurst, a project thathas already acquired the sobriquet ofSandhurst in the sand.

Relating his experiences at Sandhurst to theDaily Telegraphs Kabul correspondent, BenFamer, in March of 2012, General Karimi said,:I sometimes joke with my non-commissionedofficers these days, I say I will believe in youwhen you have a yard stick in your hand likethose British NCOs and walk on the drill squareto measure the steps and give the command ofquick march! and slow march! The twinpillars of ceremony and tradition, still anomnipresent and integral part of the BritishArmy, also left their mark on General Karimi.We were not allowed to go to the dining hall inthe evening without a tie or proper jacket ofevening dress, he recalled. In the BritishArmy these traditions are very, very welldeveloped and well observed. Many peoplemay not like formalities and ceremonies, but Ilove to see it. Its part of the military life.

General Karimis idea initially won the approvalof American and British commanders with theInternational Security Assistance Forces(ISAF). U.S. Army General William B. Caldwell,who held the post of Commander, NATOTraining Mission Afghanistan, as well asCommanding General, Combined SecurityTransition Afghanistan from 2009-2011, wasa strong supporter of General Karimis goal.Commenting on the plan in a story in TheGuardian newspaper in May 2011, GeneralCaldwell said, General Karimi would verymuch love to build Sandhurst in Afghanistan.


O OFFICER CADET who has graduated from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst(RMAS) in the United Kingdom forgets his or her time at RMAS. Sandhurst creates, in thewords of Sir Arthur Bryant, the noted British historian and columnist, the martial habits of

discipline, courage, loyalty, pride and endurance. Its motto is Serve to Lead, and since itsestablishment in1947 as the British Armys newly re-organized post World War II officer cadetacademy, Sandhurst has continued a tradition and history of training the British Armys officer corpsthat dates back to 1741 when the original Royal Military Academy was first established.

The parade ground at Sandhurst has always been the great leveler. Regardless of whether a cadetcomes from royal lineage British or foreign or has a family history with a particular regiment, orincreasingly in recent years, enters RMAS with a university degree in -hand, no one escapes theeagle eyes of the Academy Sergeant-Major and his staff of experienced Warrant Officers and seniorNon-Commission Officers (NCOs). They form the bulk of the instructing staff and command afearsome reputation for their level of professionalism, experience, and abilities in teaching and

Alan Capps is currently writing his PhD dissertation in US History at George Mason University.

Sandhurst in the SandBringing British Training to AfghanistanAlan Capps

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Im supporting him. He thinks so highly ofSandhurst, he would love to model it and build ithere. The idea also won the approval ofAfghan Defense Minister, General Abdul RahimWardak, and subsequently President HamidKarzai.

During a trip to Afghanistan in late March of2012, UK Defencce Secretary Philip Hammondsigned a statement of intent with GeneralWardak on Britain taking the lead in establish-ing an Afghan National Officers Academy,which will be modeled on Sandhurst. The newacademy will be located in the Qargha district ofKabul and is currently planned to be operationalin 2013.

It is projected that at least two thirds of theinstructors, possibly up to 200 members of theBritish Army, will form the core of the initialinstructing staff. A budget for the project has notyet been disclosed. In an interview with BBCRadio, the Defence Secretary also pointed out

that this project continues to reaffirm Britainscommitment to an effective transition to Afghannational security forces, and that the UKs rolein officer training would continue after 2014, aswould financial support for the new facility toillustrate its commitment to Afghanistans long-term stability.

While no specific plans for any proposed coursestructure have yet been announced, it is fair tosay that the Commissioning Course atSandhurst will in all likelihood form the basis,albeit with modifications where appropriate, forthe Afghan National Armys new officeracademy course of study. The British Armyswebsite page on the Sandhurst course statesthat its purpose is to develop an OfficerCadets character, intellect and professionalskills. At the end of the course a newlycommissioned Officer will be qualified to leadand manage soldiers while at the same timeupholding the British Armys core values ofselfless commitment, respect for others, loyalty,integrity, discipline and courage.

The Commissioning Course is 44-weeks inlength and divided into three terms. The firstterm sees Officer Cadets acquiring basicmilitary skills with introductions to leadership,tactics, map reading, living in the field, weaponhandling and extensive physical training. Thereis also an emphasis on personal administrationsuch as polishing of boots and ironing kit, whichought to bring a wry smile to General Karimisface, as will the exposure of new Afghan OfficerCadets to the hallmark of Sandhursts trainingregime the Non-Commissioned Officerinstructors who are among the best in theBritish Army and bring with them uniqueexperience, skills and insights into the trainingof potential officers. The pressure is intensewith very little free time.

Apart from the daily rigors of the first term thefirst major hurdle to continuing on the course isthe drill test known as Passing Off the Square,which occurs at the end of Week Five. Theremainder of the term continues to build on thebasics of the first five weeks with a marked

Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector ReformPhoto:RoyalMilitaryAcademy,SandhurstCredit:Flickr/EwanM



emphasis on Adventure Training outside of theAcademy and physically testing exerciseswhere teamwork and confidence building arekeys.

Term Two revolves around an emphasis onbuilding leadership initiative and moving cadetsalong the path from being raw recruits tocommencing to gain an understanding of therole of an Army Officer. It is at this juncture thatacademics begin to be brought into the overallcurriculum with classroom subjects such asconventional war studies, international affairsand leadership being taught. Classroomassignments do not, however, mean alessening of the physical activities whichcontinue including physically demanding fieldexercises.

The third term sees Office Cadets beingassigned more responsibilities. There is also ashift towards topics such as unconventionalwarfare and counter-insurgency. The physicalactivities continue unabated although theemphasis is increasingly placed on theindividual to maintain the appropriate level offitness through personal exercise and teamsports. Arduous field exercises also continueincluding live-fire exercises. The termconcludes with the Passing Out Parade, knownat Sandhurst as the Sovereigns Parade, andthe awarding of a Commission.

From the perspective of the British Army aftercompleting the Commissioning Course all newofficers attend a Young Officers coursewherein they learn the disciplines and craft oftheir chosen part of the Army. Completion ofthis course results in the new officers going offto assume a Platoon Commander assignment.How this stage will be handled from theperspective of the Afghan National Army willhave to be thought through to decide whether itremains a separate course after commissioning

or is built into the overall CommissioningCourse. Equally, the selection process to gainentry to the proposed academy will also have tobe given a great deal of thought. Whether theBritish Armys well-honed three and a half dayOfficer Selection Board process will beemployed as a template, will have to bedecided upon.

General Karimi understands that to replicate aninstitution such as the RMAS with its richhistorical legacy, traditions, ethos and culture oftraining officers will be far from easy. General

Karimi also understands, however, frompersonal experience, that if the Afghan NationalArmy is to survive post-2014 and the finalwithdrawal of ISAF, the ANA must be a modernand highly professional force designed toenhance Afghanistans long-term stability andsecurity. That requires a professional officercorps whose motto must reflect that of RMASand one which General Karimi learned as ayoung officer cadet in the late 1960s; they mustServe to Lead.

General Karimi also understands, however, from personal experience, that ifthe Afghan National Army is to survive post- of ISAF, the ANA must be a modern and highly professional force designed

to enhance Afghanistans long-term stability and security.



ISOA Thanks all of the 2012 AnnualSummit Sponsors for supportingour most successful Summit yet! G

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HE 2012 ISOA ANNUAL SUMMIT washeld in mid-October at the National PressClub in Washington, D.C., bringing together

experts and practitioners in the stability operations,development, and foreign policy fields to discusslessons learned and challenges ahead. This yearsconference followed a unique two-track format, withone set of breakout sessions themed Policy &Strategy catering to CEOs, COOs, GeneralCounsels, Government Relations professionals, andCompliance Officers, , while the other track themedNew Realities & Demand focused on budgets,funding, cost and procurement topics, aimed atBusiness Development Directors and ContractOfficers.

The entire 2 day program encompassed poignantviews from more than 55 speakers, and gaveacademic, nongovernmental, public, and privatesector attendees the opportunity to network, shareexperiences from working in fragile environmentsworldwide, and discuss best practices. Notablespeakers included Dr. James Schear, DeputyAssistant Secretary of Defense for PartnershipStrategy and Stability Operations; Ambassador JohnNegroponte; Assistant Secretary General EdmondMulet of the UN Department for PeacekeepingOperations; and Ambassador Princeton Lyman,Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan. The range

of expertise and opportunity for dialogue at the 2012Summit would not have been possible without thesupport of the Summit sponsors, ISOA membercompanies, and industryleaders in attendance.Collectively, attendeesand speakers openlyshared their practicalknowledge to addresschallenges as well assuggest innovative ideas for future success in thestability operations community.

A RAINY OPENING LEADS TOBRIGHT DISCUSSION

The Summit kicked off with a rooftop networkingreception in downtown Washington, D.C. thatprovided attendees the opportunity to meetprofessionals from a variety of sectors within thestability operations community. Despite the inclementweather and inevitable downpour, attendees fromSouth Africa to the United Kingdom to just down thestreet in Virginia discussed partnerships andcommon goals.

The following morning, day one began with a keynoteaddress delivered by Dr. James Schear, in which helaid out key ingredients for improving stability

operations. These included supporting the civil affairscommunity, growing regionally aligned forces, andrefining law enforcement to fill critical gaps, among

others. The subsequent breakout panel ontransitions in development and security inAfghanistan was of particular interest tomany attendees looking to conduct newbusiness there, and boasted an impressivelineup of panelists including Undersecre-tary of State for Management, Patrick

Kennedy; Marc Grossman, Special Envoy toAfghanistan and Pakistan; and Mohammad HaneefAtmar, former Minister of the Interior for Afghanistan.Ambassador Kennedy praised the Afghan govern-ments use of private security contractors tostrengthen non-diplomatic missions as a symbol ofAfghan sovereignty. Mr. Atmar was not so optimistic,reminding the audience that all of the progress madeto date in Afghanistan is fragile and reversible, andthat good governance is crucial to continued growth.

The afternoon kicked off with a luncheon keynoteaddress from Ambassador John Negroponte, drawingfrom his over 50 years of experience in diplomacyand foreign policy. Subsequent breakout sessionswere held, discussing DCAA Compliance, andcongressional appropriations trends for foreignassistance and stability operations specifically, theadvantages and disadvantages of Lowest Price

SPONSORED SECTION: 2012 ISOA ANNUAL SUMMIT REVIEW


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Technically Acceptable (LPTA) versus Best Valuecontracting.

The afternoon wrapped up with a fascinating panel,Strategic Rebalancing: From the Arab Spring to thePivot to Asia. After a brief networking receptionencouraging more intimate discussion and reflectionon the days panels, Assistant Secretary General,Edmond Mulet, engaged Annual Summit Dinnerattendees on trends, challenges, and opportunities inUN peacekeeping missions.

LEARNING, ADAPTING, GROWING

Day two kicked off bright and early, with BreakfastWorkshops on the technical issues of Complianceand the ANSI PSC Standard.Afterwards, Jessica Mueller,ISOA Director of Programsand Operations, delivered anISOA Year-In Review,followed by an update on theISOA Middle East Chapterfrom Pete Dordal, SeniorVice President of ISOA Member GardaWorld andincoming ISOA Board Chairman, and TobiasBeutgen, President of ISOA Member American GlassProducts. Following these remarks, panelistsdiscussed the return on investment of stability

operations, especially for long-term economic growth.Jim Bullion, Director of the Task Force for Businessand Stability Operations at the Department ofDefense, summed up this goal well when he posed,Lets try to get Afghanistan off of the front pages andonto the business pages, a strong call for economicgrowth after over a decade of conflict. Subsequentbreakout sessions included a focus on lessonslearned and challenges ahead in Iraq, as well asprocurement needs for the UN and US government.

The lunch keynote address, delivered by AmbassadorPrinceton Lyman, Special Envoy to Sudan and SouthSudan, provided the audience with a comprehensiveoverview of the ongoing struggle between Sudan andSouth Sudan. Ambassador Lyman discussed how the

international community, threat ofeconomic downturn, and ongoingnegotiations backed by the AfricanUnion paved the way for dialogueto begin between Sudan and SouthSudan. He expressed optimismabout the opening of the borderbetween the two countries, which

gives people a unique prospect for better livelihoodsand promotes new business opportunities.

After lunch, breakouts focused on the future ofcontingency contracting, and assessing and

mitigating risk in frontier environments. The afternoonclosed with a unique debate-style panel featuring DanRunde, Co-Chair of the International Assistanceworking group for the Romney-Ryan Campaign, andDoug Wilson, Co-Chair of the Defense WorkingGroup for the Obama-Biden Campaign. Bothcampaign representatives gave their perspectives onU.S. policy for stabilization, development, potentialsequestration cuts, and foreign assistance in the nextpresidential administration.

LOOKING FORWARD TO 2013

This years panels fostered a dynamic discussionabout the most prominent topics facing the stabilityoperations community today. As we move forward,success in the industry will be drawn from the sharingof ideas and building of partnerships that isencouraged at the Summit, and elsewhere throughoutISOAs programming. Stability is derived from thepositive relationships built between governments,private companies, nongovernmental organizations,military professionals, academics, and the ultimatebeneficiaries of stabilization: citizens living in fragileenvironments. The ISOA staff looks forward to evengreater success for the stability operations communityand its beneficiaries in 2013, as we continue to learnfrom past experiences, adapt to current changes, andgrow for the future.

PHOTOS: NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, NATHAN MITCHELL

15-17 OCTOBER 2012NATIONAL PRESS

CLUBWASHINGTON D.C.


Photo:UNPOLonpatrolinHaitiCredit:UNPhoto/LoganAbassi

VER THE LAST DECADE OR SO, the UN Security Council has issued increasinglycomplex peace operation mandates for police support and development, assistingrestoration of criminal justice systems, and advisory support to corrections systems.

Growing complexity, however, has not always been matched by careful analysis of what approachesdo and dont work in these three areas, and under what conditions.

Stimson's Future of Peace Operations Program worked with the Office of Rule of Law and SecurityInstitutions (OROLSI) in the UNs Department of Peacekeeping Operations and, in particular, itsPolice Division and Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service, to begin to answer these questions(Durch et al. 2012). This article discusses some of its key findings. (The full report is available fromthe Stimson Center website.)

The study was set up to search for "minimum essential tasks" - those that 1) always seem needed incomparable ways across missions; and 2) seem to consistently have the desired effects on the hostcountry's approach to police, justice and corrections. It found that while certain tasks may always beneeded, their implementation often depends on characteristics of a mission's operational environ-ment, which the mission cannot exert direct control over. Missions face difficult dilemmas in being

asked to deploy quickly into places wherepolitics can prevent the quick actions thatpeacebuilding precepts dictate, or withresources inadequate to substitute for criticalpublic security capacities that governmentlacks. It is, in turn, difficult to attribute changeto particular actors where many have been atwork, but the study does identify areas wherethe imprints left by UN missions are larger thanthose of other players. How lasting thoseimprints may be is a separate question. Wedefined short-term impact for this study as anoutcome that persists while a mission isdeployed; long-term impact is an outcome thatpersists after a mission departs. Since most ofthe missions examined in the study are stilldeployed, most of the studys findings relate toshort-term impacts.

Factors Enabling or Inhibiting Impact

In post-conflict societies, governance mayhave severely eroded, presenting challengesfor UN peace operations to engage with centralgovernments, at the local level and withcustomary institutions. National and localownership of reform and rebuilding the state inthe wake of violent conflict are keys to long-term impact. However, ensuring localownership of new policies and processes canbe challenging when leaders are focused onshoring up power and control, balancing theinterests of competing groups, and trying tomanage instability and prevent violentoutbreaks.

Physical environments into which missionsdeploy often pose their own challenges.Decisions on mission resources are difficultand logistics are often stretched whereinfrastructure is limited, damaged or insecure.

UN Headquarters (HQ) support and missionrelations are important determinants of missioneffectiveness. HQ needs to upgrade its abilitiesto provide the right kind of support, analysesand tools to be most helpful to missions.Missions and HQ must ensure quality flow ofessential information and, smart systems tomanage knowledge, process data, provide

Fiona Mangan, Program Officer at United States Institute of Peace and former Field Analyst with Stimson Center, Dr William Durch, Director of Future of PeaceOperations Program at Stimson Center, Michelle Ker, Research Associate, Future of Peace Operations Program at Stimson Center.


Post-Short Takes from a Recent Stimson StudyFiona Mangan, Dr William Durch and Michelle Ker


helpful feedback, and track progress. Buildinginstitutional memory requires comprehensivehandover protocols and assignment overlaps,especially for positions with frequent turnover,such as UN Police (UNPOL) on six- to twelve-6-12 month rotations. Neither was apparent in themissions studied.

Police Components

UNPOL mandates have broadened significantlysince 1999, with mission responsibilities nowextending to all aspects of host state policedevelopment and elements of police operations.The resulting comprehensive picture of UNpolicing is of an enterprise that is overextended,under-resourced and lacking sufficientinstitutional support.

Police development often requires difficultdecisions and prioritizations, since limitedresources are competing with overwhelmingneed. Supporting the development of individualhost state police capacities fits within currentUNPOL capabilities, although Police Contrib-uting Countries (PCCs) have tended to secondgeneral-duty police officers to serve in UNoperations, rather than specialists in training orinstitutional development. Police withspecialized operational and training skills are inshort supply even within PCCs, so general-dutyofficers end up in complex roles as mentors andinstitution-builders. Secondments are often forsix- to twelve-6-12 month rotations and goodprocedures for capturing field experience andbuilding UNPOL institutional memory aregenerally lacking. The secondment system issimply not prepared or resourced to consistent-ly support either institutional capacity building orits essential counterpart, institutional integrity.

In the short term, UN Police Division and fieldcomponents need to address fundamentalissues of necessary skill sets and abilities toplan and manage support to host state policing.Some of this need has been met by creating

specialist civilian posts within some missionspolice components. But mission plans shouldfocus more on early support for institutionalintegrity building encouraging basic accounta-bility mechanisms through vetting, basic trainingand probationary periods for new officers andtransparency mechanisms for fundamentalssuch as budget and payroll.

Second, mission police components shouldsupport stronger foundations for institutionalgrowth. Research indicates that giving 500 hoststate officers quality, locally-driven, long-termbasic training has more likelihood of generatingsustained, positive impact than giving 2,000officers short-term training. Host state policealso need locally developed and maintainable,simple recordkeeping systems from the outset.

Third, the Police Division needs to find UNPOLleadership who support and enable adaptivechange in police components approaches tosolving the multiple and shifting problems thattheir people face daily. The success ofUNPOLs work depends on its ability to adapt tocontext, to return any temporary policingresponsibilities as soon as judged prudent andto accelerate that process with the regulartransfer of knowledge.

In the longer term, UN HQ needs to fundamen-tally rethink: a) its approach to recruiting anddeploying international police whether asindividual officers or as formed police units; b)the tools they provide to help UNPOL meetmandated goals, including strategic leadership,planning and models; and c) definitions,implications and limitations of UNPOL roles incomprehensive mandated tasks such asprotection of civilians and in advising andmentoring. In these areas, UNPOL must lowerits expectations as well as the expectations ofthe international community and host stategovernment and people regarding what can beachieved with the resources made available tomost peace operations in seven years, the

duration of the average contemporarypeacekeeping operation.

Justice and Corrections Components

Justice and corrections components in missionshave generally increased in size in the last fewyears as the UNs approach toward rule of lawhas grown ever more holistic. Although theytend to be mentioned and treated in the samespace, justice and corrections institutions havedifferent characteristics that strongly affect theirpredisposition to and interest in externallysuggested reform or advice.

The justice sector is relatively impermeable tointernational intervention, partly because itsstock in trade is confidentiality. Judges prizetheir independence and legal systemsformaland informalvary a great deal acrosscountries.

In most countries where the UN sendsmissions, investigative capacity is marginal atbest and the historical alternative has been self-incrimination by the accused. Post-conflictcriminal justice systems are often characterizedby combinations of arbitrary arrest, the absenceof concepts of bail or parole, poor recordkeep-ing, sluggish or dysfunctional case flow throughthe courts and prevailing assumptions thatarrest equals guilt. In most of the countriescovered by this study, such factors have led toprison populations with 80 percent or more inthe pre-trial and/or pre-charge phase.

Faced with decayed and overcrowded prisonsrun by untrained volunteers, political appointeesor prisoners themselves, alert UN correctionsadvisers have in a number of cases improvedprison conditions, helping to keep moreprisoners among the living. Several missionshave provided transport and logistical supportto mobile courts whose sittings inside prisonshave the potential to reduce prison populations,



since limited resources are competing with overwhelming need.


if they work expeditiously. Increasing thenumber of public prosecutors and defendershas had some success in improving rates ofcase flow. Ultimately though, it remains difficultto convince host governments to dedicateadequate resources to prisons when theiraverage citizen lives in poverty.

Strategic planning is an area where missionshave the potential to impact justice andcorrections systems. UN missions have accessto, and potential leverage with, senior politicalleadership, while being viewed as morepolitically neutral than other international actors.In countries where host state officials engagedin strategic planning and where a correspond-ing action plan was developed for timedprogram implementation, these practices wereobserved to diffuse across the broader nationalframework of government, as well as NGOs.

Support to legislatures and national reformcommissions is among the most difficult butpotentially most important elements of UNmissions support for rule of law. Law reformhas the power to provide long-term solutions toissues that host governments and missions findthemselves hard-pressed to address. Forexample, law reform can reach some of the root

issues in pre-trial detention and prisonovercrowding by introducing alternatives toincarceration, adjusting or tightening sentencingguidelines. However, the best technical advicecannot overcome political or proceduralobstacles to enactment of reformed laws nor isthe missions leverage alone likely to do so.

Mission programming to improve access tojustice mainly focuses on improving capacityand processes of the formal justice system. Itseems time that UN peacebuilding efforts paygreater attention to informal justice systems, asfunctioning customary justice reflects the socialties that bind communities and is the form ofdispute resolution that large majorities of thepopulations in mission countries use day to day.Customary justice may be the only remnant ofeffective governance left when the mission firstdeploys. The do no harm principle alonesuggests that greater time and effort bedevoted to understanding the post-conflict rolesof these institutions.

Finally, if donors could be made to overcometheir prisons-last mentality, prison assistanceoffers potentially big and reasonably quick winsfor UN operations. Investments in long-termprison guard training, in-house mentoringprograms, prison farms, mobile courts,

paralegal training programs and publicdefenders have led to improved prisonertreatment and substantial drops in prisonpopulations over time.

This article has given a snapshot of some of thefindings from Stimsons study of the impact ofpolice, justice and corrections in UN peaceoperations. The full report is available in PDFform on the Stimson website at http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/understanding-impact-of-police-justice-and-corrections-components-in-un-peace-operations/.

References

Durch, William J., Madeline L. England and FionaMangan, with Michelle Ker. Understanding Impact ofPolice, Justice and Corrections Components in UNPeace Operations (Washington, DC: The StimsonCenter, 2012), http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/understanding-impact-of-police-justice-and-corrections-components-in-un-peace-operations/.

Network of Networks on Impact Evaluation (OECD/DAC, UNEG, World Bank IEG, and the InternationalOrganization for Cooperation in Evaluation), NONIEGuidance on Impact Evaluation, 2009, http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/nonie/guidance.html.


Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector ReformPhoto:UNPOLtrainingsessionwithLiberianNationalPolice

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ark Kroeker is Senior VicePresident for Justice andRule of Law at PAE.

Following thirty two years of servicein the LAPD, Mark served as DeputyCommissioner of the InternationalPolice Task Force in the UNs Missionin Bosnia and Herzegovina. He laterbecame Portland Oregon's PoliceChief.

How has the quality of UN police trainingevolved over time?

Kroeker: The evolution has been significant.I have watched it for more than 20 years now,and I have seen a big shift. The major way Iwould describe this shift is from monitoring tomentoring, from a simple training to capacitybuilding. It has moved from peacekeeping inmissions, civilian police as part of the militarystructure, to a much more sophisticatedcapacity building, mentoring, advising andtraining in the broadest of functions.

Does the international community putadequate emphasis on police training?

Kroeker: It does and it doesnt. I would sayyes, in a certain way it does put emphasis ontraining. But, the problem is that it defines itimprecisely. In other words, sometimes wehave a tendency to measure all the wrongthings precisely. The measurement of trainingis not in the numbers of people trained or thenumbers of hours of training or the numbers ofcourses offered. But rather what is the state ofthe learner? What is the state of the institutionthe learner represents? Because we have atendency in post-conflict situations to want tobuild institutions very rapidly, we measure thewrong things, and we come to the things thatare most easy to measure. You can quicklymeasure what is the size of the police? What isthe size of the population? Theres a ratiothere. That is very deceiving. The other thingwe measure easily is how many people havebeen through a certain training. For example,Afghanistan. You read reports in thenewspapers saying we have trained this manypolice. And always behind that there is aquestion to be asked. To do what? How arethey doing?

What would be a better measurement?

Kroeker: The more relevant measurement inmy view comes from a more sophisticatedapproach to looking at the institution, at thepolice itself. What are the various competenciesof a police organization, and how are they doingin those competencies? How are the individualmembers of the organization performing as aresult of the training they are getting? Is thisperson who has been recruited, selected,

trained and deployed operating understandards of internationally approved lawenforcement capacity, or have we just made anassembly line where we put that person outthere and they leave the organization, theydont show up to work, they fail in somesignificant way, go back to old habits or reallyshow a clear failure to learn whatever is wasintended for them to learn?

How can the international community betterutilize private sector capabilities for security

sector reform?

Kroeker: As you consider the internationalcommunity, much of it is private, non-governmental organizations. The contractorsthat work there, the business interests thatseem to follow a conflict as contractors come in.The idea is not necessarily what sector isrepresented, but the authenticity of thepartnership involved. When we look ateveryone engaged, for example, the Depart-ment of State, the Department of Defense, theUnited Nations, the non-governmentalorganizations, contracting organizations, civilsociety, all of these have played different roles.I think sometimes people have a tendency todisparage any one of those. Disparage NGOs,disparage government, disparage contractors.All contractors are this. All DoD is that. AllNGOs are this. The fact is that every one ofthem, if working together on a commonpurpose, a common objective, with individual-ized lanes they can work to a common synergythat produces monumental results after war andafter the military engagement winds down.Unfortunately there is a tendency to pointfingers rather than join hands. Theres atendency to occupy very sequestered rolesrather than looking for ways to have mutualconsolidated objectives. When that happensthen we have dysfunction that has marked a lotof post-conflict situations in the history of the 20years or so that I have been watching it.

PAE, Inc. is a company that conducts contractual activities in a wide range of disciplines in 65 countries.

Q&A | A Conversation with Mark Kroeker

Police Training in an EvolvingUnited NationsA Conversation with Mark KroekerISOA Editorial Team

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Which do you think were the mostsuccessful police training programs, and

why were they particularly successful?

Kroeker: I think of Kosovo as a primeexample. The Kosovo police today, if you lookat them, are a fairly well-regarded policeorganization. As one police officer said to mewhen I was there on my last visit over theyears, this Kosovo police has earned therespect of their neighbors in the region. So youmight even say that they are the best policeorganization in the Balkans. That, I think, is asubstantial remark, although its not anempirical remark. Its an anecdote based onone police officer telling me something. But as Iobserved the Kosovo police and looked at itsvarious functions in the various times Ive beenthere, I concluded that there is something tothese observations. This is a very goodorganization. What Kosovo did was have anexecutive mission with the United Nationswhere the UN police was the police, and where

the Judicial arm and correctional arm was doneby international engagement. So internationaljudges were hired, and so forth. When thatexecutive function took over, and then a carefulphased transition to local ownership took place,while the construction was going on, the resultwas a phased ownership that today if you lookat Kosovo would still international engagementthere. To a substantial degree, the engage-ment is less and the local ownership is more.The capacity of that organization is strong. Oneof the reasons that they are strong is becausethe linkage was made right at the start betweenthe Kosovo Police Service and its rule of lawpartners, the correctional side and the judicialside.

Theres another one that stuck out in my mind.Ill give you the Liberia model. I happen to knowsomething about the Liberia model because Iwas police commissioner of the UN Mission inLiberia right after the war. That war took some250,000 lives and stretched over 14 years, andit rendered the police entirely dysfunctional and

all of their assets were looted during the war.When I arrived, we truly started from zero.With the launching of the UN mission, we hadfive police officers and me. That was the policecomponent. When I left, there were about1,100 or 1,200 UN police officers. That wasabout a year and a half later and we had gottenstarted. I was just there last week in Liberia,and I have seen the growth in the LiberianNational Police. I met with its Police Director,its Police Chief, and with several of the policeofficers. I saw the police academy that I helpedto start when I was there now under fullownership of the Liberian National Police. Iheard about the Judiciary operating morecapably. I heard of the various competencies ofthe police: salaries being paid, promotionsbeing made on the basis of merit. The secret tothat success was not only the military thathelped stabilize the nation that was part of theUN peacekeeping force, but we had foreignpolice units that arrived. The Formed PoliceUnits (FPU), under the UNs Police Componenthelped put out those disturbing civil unrestbrush fires that could have led to largerdisastrous effects. The Formed Police Unit thatcame later that I recruited when I was at the UNheadquarters was from India, an all-womanFPU. That FPU unit brought a lot of credit notonly to India, but to the idea of crowd control,the fact that an entire unit can be not only malebut all female and made significant points inthat arena. But the FPUs work across theyears stabilized the nation while law enforce-ment development capacity building policetraining was taking place, one of the reasonsLiberia National Police is on the right tracktoday. They are not what they should or couldbe, but incrementally the movement has beenvery positive and it has been substantial.

What have been the greatest impedimentsto successful police training?

Kroeker: Number one, I think, always iscorruption. Corruption is an impediment and itstands as a show-stopper, or slow down lever,on many different fronts: the political front, thegovernments front the legislative front, the ruleof law front, including the police, especially withlow salaries and a vacuum of leadership. Since


rather than join hands. Theres a tendency tooccupy vary sequestered roles rather than lookingfor ways to have mutual consolidated objectives.

Q&A | A Conversation with Mark KroekerPhoto:Afghanpolicetraining

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the first and most visible face of government islaw enforcement, where corruption is rampantin law enforcement, it is hard to produce thattransparency that we speak about, thecommitment to integrity that we train, and theabsorption of core values that we believe andtry to imbue. Its hard to institutionalize thesethings when the common enemy is alwayscorrupt power structures that present analternative to accountability to the community,to government, to peace and to ethicalstandards of police operation. Corruption is astrong impediment.

The other strong impediment is the internationalcommunity. As much as we like to think wework together and solve problems, sometimesthe dysfunction that we have as a communityserves to hold things back as impediments. Weoperate on different channels. We cant work inauthentic partnerships, we work against eachother. The result is not incentivized. We havea tendency to hold ourselves back by ourinability to work together toward a common

objective. I see the international donors, forexample, being in what I call a problem of donorinterference rather than donor support. In otherwords, Im going to give this particular productor this particular construction project and itdoesnt really fit with an overall plan.

In places like Afghanistan there is aconstant friction between those who

advocate focusing on military skills that will helpthe police survive in areas of conflict, and policeskills that make them effective and welcomedmembers of the community. How do you seethis tension?

Kroeker: Well I see the tension as tangible. Itis real. It is a tension that arises out of a classicdisparate view of post-conflict situations.Theres a tendency among the military to viewlaw enforcement as an exit strategy. So thequestion is how soon can we stand up a lawenforcement structure so that we can leave.The other view is that law enforcement capacitybuilding is generational. It cannot be done by

Christmas. It cannot be done by next year, or2013 in August. This is a generational sort of athing. Like raising your family. Its a 20 yeartransformational challenge. That doesnt meanthat significant things cant happen right away,but I think the most important thing in lawenforcement, and where the conflict exists, isthat law enforcement structures have to bedemilitarized. They have to be depoliticized.They have to move away from the political andmilitary dominance that seems to take place, orfrom warlords and handed over to thecommunities. Yes political oversight in thegood and proper way, but not politicalinterference in the corrupt way. So theres theconflict. The helpful effective members of thecommunity are not found in counterinsurgencyfighters. They are found in local police officerswho will provide access to justice, who willmake arrests of low level violators, who willsolve community problems together with thecommunity. That is a tension and it is thetendency in training to measure the numberstrained rather than the capacities built.

Q&A | A Conversation with Mark Kroeker


N SEPTEMBER 25, 2012,President Barack Obama signed anexecutive order designed to end

human trafficking among governmentcontractors overseas. This order, StrengtheningProtections Against Trafficking in Persons inFederal Contracts, together with pendingCongressional legislation, the End Trafficking inGovernment Contracting Act of 2012, changesthe way U.S. contractors do business overseas.

Federal contractors will be required front-loadhuman trafficking prevention programs into theirproposals before a grant is awarded. Theexecutive order ups the ante on monitoring andaccountability while the legislation strengthenscriminal sanctions against offenders. Now,prime contractors are liable for the actions oftheir subcontractors all the way down thesupply chain. These initiatives are timely andnecessary.

Background

The Trafficking Victims Protection Act(TVPA) of 2000 marked the United StatesGovernments official declaration of war againsthuman trafficking. Originally intended to guideU.S. foreign policy in combating humantrafficking internationally, and provideassistance to foreign victims inside the UnitedStates, the Act has been fine-tuned at each ofits three subsequent reauthorizations to keeppace with increasingly complex humantrafficking practices. Following the brutalkillings of twelve Nepalese contract workers inIraq and allegations of large-scale laborexploitation, the 2005 Trafficking VictimsProtection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA)introduced provisions related to extraterritorialjurisdiction over federal contractors, making

U.S. contractors working overseas liable foracts of sex and labor trafficking.

Unfortunately, little has changed. Reports fromthe Commission on Wartime Contracting andthe inspectors general of the Defense and StateDepartments provided detailed accountsindicating that Third Country Nationals (TCNs)in the employ of U.S. contractors notably in Iraq

and Afghanistan have been subject toexploitative treatment equating to debt bondageand human trafficking. The Commissiondelivered a resounding censure of anti-TIPmeasures currently on the books by declaringExisting prohibitions on such trafficking havefailed to stop it. In response to such criticism,the House Subcommittee on Technology,Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relationsand Procurement Reform held its first of twohearings on November 2, 2011. In hisintroductory remarks, Rep. James Lankfordstated that the goals of the hearing were toanswer two questions: Whether or not the U.S.Government has become an enabler of humantrafficking, or if we have knowingly turned ablind eye to trafficking? According to expertwitnesses, the answer was a resounding yesto both.

Liana Wyler, Senior Analyst with the Congres-sional Research Service of the Library ofCongress, outlined ten years of USG anti-trafficking legislation including the TraffickingVictims Protection Act (TVPA), threereauthorizations, a Zero-Tolerance Policy, anda Presidential Directive, and concluded bysaying that, Despite ongoing efforts to combathuman trafficking associated with governmentcontractors, recent annual reports on traffickingin persons by the U.S. Department of Stateacknowledge that government contractors andsubcontractors continue to be implicated inallegations of forced labor and sex trafficking.

Sustained Indifference

The primary reason for ongoing instances ofabuse is that contractors have not beendirected or expected to abide by the standardsof existing legislation. The numbers ofcontracts released without clear anti-traffickingclauses allows for endemic indifference toexploitative practices in the supply chain. NickSchwellenbach, Director of Investigations,Project on Government Oversight (POGO)remarked that The DoD IG has found that asubstantial percentage of the contracts theyhave audited do not have a mandatorytrafficking in persons clause. As one businessdevelopment specialist for a large contractortold this author, I remember seeing somethingabout trafficking in the solicitation, but we neverdid anything about it and no one asked for it. Itjust wasnt on the radar.

Another challenge is that many acts oftrafficking take place throughout a labyrinthinesupply chain, beginning with the recruitment ofTCNs in their home countries by third party andoften-unlicensed recruitment firms. Traditional-ly, the prime contractors have not been liablefor acts of trafficking at the end of the supplychain.

According to Sam McMahon, a formergovernment fraud prosecutor now focusing ongovernment contracting and corporate

Michele Clark is an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at the George Washington University and CEO of Third Space Creative, LLC, developers of web-basedlearning and training solutions with a focus on human rights, social change, and education.

U.S. Government ContractsImplications for Federal ContractorsMichele A. Clark

Photo:AnIraqimancarriesiceataworksite.Credit:Flickr,USAirForce


compliance, there has been no incentive inprevious years for the prime contractors to getinvolved. Doing nothing carried few riskswhereas reporting a human trafficking violationopened the door to complex investigations,rendered even more so by conflictinginterpretations of responsibility; if reprehensiblepractices were being carried out by subcontrac-tors and labor recruiters, the primes did not feelobliged to accept blame. Furthermore, theharm, as is the case in most instances ofhuman trafficking, was largely invisible. TNCswere housed in separate labor camps andaccess was heavily controlled. Language andculture created barriers of silence between theworkers and the rest of the base populations.Those military and contract personnel who didquestion certain practices often did not knowwhere to report allegations of abuse, or weretold to mind their own business if they tried.

New Requirements

On March 27, 2012, the same Subcommitteeon Technology, Information Policy, Intergovern-mental Relations and Procurement reform helda follow-up hearing, with a different cast ofcharacters. The purpose: to introduce the EndTrafficking in Government Contracting Act of2012.

The Executive Order and the legislation sharesimilar objectives. They both focus onprevention of trafficking and increasingaccountability among prime contractors andsubcontractors. The legislation also imposescriminal penalties beyond the scope of theexecutive order. The legislation provides forstronger enforcement mechanisms that expandthe criminal prohibitions against fraudulent labor

practices and make clear remedial actionsshould acts of trafficking occur. These includeremoving the employee from the exploitativeworking conditions, suspending paymentsunder the grant, terminating the contract fordefault or cause, or referring the matter to theagency for disbarment or suspension.

Contractors will now be required to takeproactive measures to prevent trafficking inpersons throughout their supply chain and todisplay evidence of such plans prior to receivingan award. These measures will indicate howthey intend to prevent all forms of trafficking, oracts that directly support or advance traffickingin persons. Contractors will be responsible forpreventing actions such as destroyingimmigration papers, failure to repatriate anemployee upon termination of employment,making fraudulent job offers, chargingexorbitant recruitment fees and providinginhumane living conditions.

Implementation carries with it many newchallenges including significant implicationsfor compliance, contract and human resourcesoffices with recruitment posing the mostimmediate problems. Industry is asking thequestion: How far does the accountability go?And the answer is: very far. All recruitment andrelated practices, including advertising ofoverseas positions, contracts in diverselanguages, wages, terms and scope of work,and transportation of workers must now besubject to intense scrutiny to ensure fairpractice and informed consent.

These new anti-trafficking initiatives establish aroad map for contractors to addressing humantrafficking in a systematic and effective manner.

Addressing the potential for noncompliance inthis new environment establishes the duty ofcontractors to set clear expectations throughouttheir subcontracting networks that a businessculture that tolerates trafficking will not survivefor long.

References

Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq andAfghanistan, Final Report to Congress: TransformingWartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, ReducingRisks, August 2011

Rep. James Lankford (R-Okla.): Are GovernmentContractors Exploiting Workers Overseas? ExaminingEnforcement of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act:Introductory remarks before the Subcommittee onTechnology, Information Policy, IntergovernmentalRelations and Procurement Reform of the Committeeon Oversight and Government Reform. November 2,2011

Liana Wyler (Senior Analyst, Congressional ResearchService): Are Government Contractors ExploitingWorkers Overseas? Examining Enforcement of theTrafficking Victims Protection Act.: Testimony givebefore the house Subcommittee on Technology,Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations andProcurement Reform of the Committee on Oversightand Government Reform. November 2, 2011

Nick Schwellenbach, Director of Investigations,Project on Government Oversight (POGO): AreGovernment Contractors Exploiting WorkersOverseas? Examining Enforcement of the TraffickingVictims Protection Act: Testimony give before theHouse Subcommittee on Technology, InformationPolicy, Intergovernmental Relations and ProcurementReform of the Committee on Oversight andGovernment Reform. November 2, 2011


SLAMIC JIHADISTS affiliated withAQIM, the Al-Qaeda franchise in NorthAfrica and the Sahel region, are in control

of northern Mali. Their intention is to spreadtheir control to the rest of Mali and then on toneighboring Mauritania and Niger. Everyoneagrees on what needs to be done. There mustbe a military intervention to defeat theinsurgents, known as Ansar Dine, who controlthe key towns of Kidal, Gao and Timbuctu.Negotiations are neither possible nor desirable.

The governments comprising the EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS)have identified 3,000 military personnel whocould participate in such an intervention. All ofthe governments have agreed that such anoperation must take place as soon as possible.But organizing to undertake the operation in anarea that is so far away from military bases, andso vast, with limited logistical capacity, appearsto be a daunting objective at the present time.

The French government, which maintains closeeconomic, diplomatic and military ties with theFrench-speaking countries in ECOWAS, has

openly expressed the intention to support anintervention by African forces, but has notoffered to put French fighters on the ground.

The United States administration has also ruledout any direct US involvement in a re-conquestoperation, but is apparently keeping the dooropen to intelligence and logistical cooperationvia its geographic command AFRICOM. Indeed,

we know that AFRICOM surveillance of AnsarDine is already taking place from temporarybases in neighboring Burkina Faso, a countrythat is also threatened by the Islamic Jihadistsnext door.

ECOWAS leader in military interventions in theWest African sub-region has traditionally beenNigeria. This oil rich country has the largestmilitary establishment. But the Nigerian armycurrently has its hands full with a home grownIslamist insurgency known as Boko Haramthat has been spreading terrorism in thecountrys northern Moslem majority states. Sofar, the Nigerian army has not yet gotten thesituation under control, and is therefore likely tohave neither the troops nor the commandstructures available for an operation in northernMali.

French military sources tell me that thefrancophone African countries have a way to gobefore they can gear up to intervene in northernMali, but they understand the necessity to actquickly.

Public statements by the American administra-tion have been somewhat ambiguous. On theone hand, the US recognizes the need to actmilitarily in northern Mali. On the other hand,the US wants to see the restoration ofdemocratic legitimacy in Mali as the highestpriority. In other words: democracy first,military intervention second.

What does the US administration mean by itsinsistence on the restoration of democraticlegitimacy to the government of Mali?

Back in February-March 2012, Malian Touaregfighters, who had been mercenaries in theLibyan army of Moamar Gaddaffi, came back toMali with their arms and vehicles after thesuccessful Arab Spring uprising in Libya. Innorthern Mali, they found the Malian armytotally unprepared for the defense of the threemain cities. They were able to take over thecities easily, with the Malian army retreating tosouthern Mali via the border town of Gao. TheTouareg fighters returning from Libya declaredindependence for their northern region as theRepublic of Azawad. Their political movementwas called the Movement for the Liberation ofAzawad (MNLA).

In view of their humiliation, which they blamedon their corrupt political leaders, youngerMalian army officers staged a coup in thecapital of Bamako on March 22, 2012 and tookover the government. President AmadouAmani Toure was forced to flee the country onemonth before a scheduled presidential electionin which he was not eligible to run. Underpressure from ECOWAS, the military officersagreed to turn over power to an interim civiliangovernment led by the democratically electedPresident of the National Assembly. However,it is clear that the military officers continue toexercise the real governmental power with thepoliticians as front men. Moreov

Documents

Stability Operations Magazine Vol. 8, No. 3 (November-December 2012)