Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Southern Regional Model United Nations
Ensuring Peace and Security in a Turbulent Global
Environment: Fostering Prosperity and Forward Movement
April 10-12, 2014
Charlotte, NC
Email: [email protected]
Dear Delegates,
It is an honor to welcome you to the League of Arab States (LAS) for the 2014 Southern Regional Model
United Nations (SRMUN) conference in Charlotte, North Carolina. My name is Michael Oleaga, and I
have the privilege to serve as the Director for the LAS at SRMUN Charlotte 2014. With Assistant Director
Angel Truesdale, we have collaborated and worked to provide a background guide that will serve as a great
resource for delegates to utilize in preparation for committee. Angel and I have strong hopes for the
delegates involved in the LAS, from comprehending the background guide, to writing position papers, and
developing documents during committee.
The LAS was established in 1945 with the mission to represent a united Arab cooperation while respecting
and supporting Member States’ welfares financially, politically, and socially. The League, consisting of 22
delegations, has worked to protect Arab Member States’ common interest despite pressures from the
international community. Since its founding, the LAS has collaborated with the United Nations (UN) and
its multiple organs such as the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, and Security Council to
achieve an international or regional approach to numerous issues, whether alleviating poverty, improving
education, or combatting violence, to name a few. With the aforementioned noted, and with the concept of
the conference's theme of "Ensuring Peace and Security in a Turbulent Global Environment: Fostering
Prosperity and Forward Movement," two topics have been developed for the LAS at SRMUN Charlotte
2014:
Topic I: Bridging the Gap: New Horizons for Arab and Western States;
Topic II: The Impact of Terrorism in the League of Arab States.
Each delegation in the LAS committee is required to submit a position paper that addresses and outlines
their Member State's policies based on the two aforementioned topics. The position papers should include
insight to the respective Member State's policies and positions from the past, present, future, and
recommendations. The position papers can serve as a critical document for delegations in preparation for
the conference. Delegates should follow SRMUN's policies regarding position papers, which include
format and style structure. For specific details on formatting or if you need help in shaping a position paper,
please visit the SRMUN website (www.srmun.org). All Position papers MUST be submitted by 11:59
p.m. EST on Friday March 21, 2014, via the online submission system on the SRMUN website.
Angel and I look forward to the prospects delegates have to offer in the LAS committee. We are eager to
see each delegation's ideas and research come into reality for the Arab community. Angel and I also send
the best regards as delegations prepare for the 2014 SRMUN Charlotte conference and look forward to
meeting you all in April. Please feel free to contact Deputy-Director General Devin McRae, Angel, or
myself if you have any questions.
Michael Oleaga Angel Truesdale Devin McRae
Director Assistant Director Deputy-Director General
Committee History for the League of Arab States
The League of Arab States (LAS) is one of the oldest regional and international organizations with the
purpose of building relations among Member States with interests in cultural, financial, and national
affairs.1 While the Arab League was officially established on March 22, 1945 with the signing of the LAS
Charter, the Alexandria Protocol served as the precursor to this significant organization.2 In 1942, at the
invitation of Egypt, six Arab Member States (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen)
along with a Palestinian delegation collaborated together in Alexandria, Egypt in a phase commonly known
as the Arab Unity Consultations.3 While the Arab Heads of State agreed to respect sovereignty, the leaders
created a cohesive body to combat non-Arab influences and an Israeli state.4 By October 22, 1944, the
Alexandria Protocol was drafted and signed, representing a united Arab perspective and the foundation of
the LAS.5
The structure of the LAS is outlined in the Arab League Charter.6 The primary body of the LAS is known
as the Council and specific subcommittees to provide attention to detailed areas of focus include: economic
and financial matters, communication infrastructure, cultural matters, and execution of international affairs,
social welfare, and health concerns.7 As noted in Article I of the LAS Charter, any independent Arab State
may submit a request to join the League, which must be delivered to the Permanent Secretariat General of
the organization.8 Article II explicitly details that each Member State maintains and upholds their
individual sovereignty, aligning with a common Arab sentiment.9
Decisions made within the League are determined by a majority ruling on Council matters, with each
Member State receiving a single vote regardless of the number of representatives from the respective
Member State.10 Member States who are a signatory to a decision are bound by that decree.11 In order for a
ruling to have binding force across all Arab Member States, decisions must be voted on unanimously.12 The
direct implementation of the ruling within the Arab State is to be determined by the governing body of that
Member State in order to reflect the working structure of that government.13 Amendments made to the LAS
Charter require a two-thirds majority vote, which if passed, are binding to all Member States regardless of
their casted vote.14
Leadership within the Arab League follows a similar structure as the United Nations (UN), including a
permanent General Secretariat comprised of the Secretary-General, the Assistant Secretaries, and
officials.15 The current Secretary General, Nabil Elaraby of Egypt, was appointed in May 2011 by a two-
thirds majority vote of the Council.16 The Secretary General is responsible for appointing the Assistant
Secretaries and officials with the approval of the Secretariat Council. Among the duties of the Secretary
1 Charter of the Arab League, League of Arab States, March 22, 1945. http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ab18.html 2 “About the League of Arab States: Highlights in the LAS’ History,” Museum with No Frontiers,
http://www.museumwnf.org/league-of-arab-states/?page=LAS-highlights-in-history.php 3 Ibid. 4 Alexandria Protocol, Council on Foreign Affairs. http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/alexandria-
protocol/p9030 5 The Alexandria Protocol, International Democracy Watch,
www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/263_The%20Alexandria%20Protocol.pdf 6 Charter of the Arab League, League of Arab States, March 22, 1945. http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ab18.html 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 "Timeline: Arab League," BBC News, November 15, 2011,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/1550977.stm
General, is the drafting of the LAS’ budget, which is approved and distributed by the Council to Member
States as appropriate.17
In 1950, just five years after its establishment, LAS made a monumental step toward greater cooperation.
The Treaty for Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation between the States of the Arab League declared
that all Member States would come to the protection of another Member State either individually or as a
collective.18 Additionally, the agreement sought to provide a “means of welfare and development in the said
Member States.”19 The collective security agreement promoted collaboration with the UN Security Council
and created the Joint Defense Council body that would oversee a Permanent Military Commission of the
League of Arab States.20 Concurrently, the Economic Council (now termed The Economic and Social
Council) was formed to propose actions that could impact Member States on those matters.21
The Arab League has been responsible for protecting the interests of Member States, not only among
themselves, but also within the international realm. The protection of Member States included shielding
domestic economics from the influence of European markets in the name of independent development
within the Arab community.22 Increasingly, this protection meant promoting and defending the creation of
Arab states in the midst of growing Israeli and European pressures.23
The Arab League utilized the influence of the UN to move toward Palestinian statehood. In the wake of the
1967 Six-Day War, in which Israel launched an attack into Egypt and initiated conflicts resulting in the
Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, West Bank, and Golan Heights, the Arab League
passed the Khartoum Resolution, which dictated how the Member States would regard Israel.24 The Arab
Member States agreed to consolidate all efforts to "eliminate" effects caused by aggressors on occupied
lands that are Arab land. 25 The Khartoum Resolution also built the framework for Arab States to abide by,
which included no negotiation, recognition, and "no peace" with Israel based on the assertion that the
Palestinian people have the rights to their own land.26 The Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 sought to build off
from the 1996 Cairo Extra-Ordinary Arab Summit and normalize relations with Palestine and Israel as long
as Israelis withdrew from the seized Palestinian lands.27 The initiative sought to use the influence of the
many Member States acting together under one opinion and utilizing their relationship with the UN to
garner international support.28
The LAS has endured its share of controversy and criticism. Egypt was suspended for signing a peace
agreement with Israel resulting in the Arab League’s headquarters being temporarily relocated to Tunis
1979-1990.29 In 1987, the LAS supported Member States to have “diplomatic ties” with Egypt and was
accepted back into the League amidst protest still surrounding the “peace” made with Israel in 1989.30 In
2011, Libya was suspended from the LAS for reasons stemming from the use of armed force against Arab
17 Charter of the Arab League, League of Arab States, March 22, 1945.
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ab18.html 18 “Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League, June 17, 1950,”
International Democracy Watch, June 1950,
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/265_Treaty%20of%20Joint%20Defense%20and%20Econo
mic%20Cooperation%20Between%20the%20States%20of%20the%20Arab%20League.pdf 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 "Arab Peace Initiative: Full Text," The Guardian, March 28, 2002, www.theguardian.com/world/2002/mar/28/israel7 23 Ibid. 24 "League of Arab States; Khartoum Resolutions," United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine,
September 1, 1967, http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/1FF0BF3DDEB703A785257110007719E7 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 "Arab Peace Initiative: Full Text," The Guardian, March 28, 2002, www.theguardian.com/world/2002/mar/28/israel7 28 “Analysis of the Arab League ‘Peace Plan,'" Jewish Virtual Library,
www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/arabplan1.html 29 "Arab League," The New Funk And Wagnalls Encyclopedia Year Book, 1955,
http://archive.org/stream/newfunkandwagnal011851mbp/newfunkandwagnal011851mbp_djvu.txt 30 “Egypt Welcomed Back Into Fold On Eve of Arab Summit,” Los Angeles Times, May 22, 1989,
http://articles.latimes.com/1989-05-22/news/mn-456_1_egypt-s-return-arab-league-summit-arab-leaders
civilians during the Arab Spring uprising that began in February of that year.31 Libya’s return to the Arab
League came in August 2011 and meaningfully identified the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the
true representation of the Libyan people.32 Furthermore in November 2011, the League voted to suspend
Syria’s seat on a similar basis of unwarranted attacks on individuals involved in another uprising and its
civilians.3334 In March 2013, the Arab League gave the suspended Syrian seat to the Syrian National
Coalition (SNC) after the LAS gave recognition to the SNC in November 2012.3536 The LAS recognizes
that its purpose is to strengthen cooperation and relations among its Member States but current issues may
be assessing the League's capabilities. Of the numerous challenges the LAS encountered, such as the
situations in Libya and Syria, the League has prospered in maintaining and providing a voice for Member
States to address affairs and concerns as noted in the organization’s Charter.
The current members of the League of Arab States:
ALGERIA, BAHRAIN, COMOROS, DJIBOUTI, EGYPT, IRAQ, JORDAN, KUWAIT, LEBANON,
LIBYA, MAURITANIA, MOROCCO, OMAN, PALESTINE, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA, SOMALIA,
SUDAN, SYRIA TUNISIA, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, YEMEN.
Topic I: Bridging the Gap: New Horizons for Arab and Western States
“The Arab spring didn’t only affect the Arab League but also abroad, they are now more interested in
cooperating with the Arab League as an organization that does not only represent governments but people
in the region as well, because without being close to the people nothing will change.”37
- Ambassador Omnia Taha, Director of the European Department of the League of Arab States
Introduction
The Arab-Muslim incursion into southern Europe via the Ottoman Empire, and later after the European
surrender of their colonial pursuits in the last century combined, left an apprehensive approach toward the
Arab region.38 In a 2006 survey, Arab perception of the West, notably the US, was not colored by religious
terms but by a variety of issues such as innovations in technology, education, medical advancements, and
professional development.39 When it came to Arab sensitivity toward the West, it was simply a critical view
of American foreign policy of the last century.40 Western perceptions of Arabs have been negatively
colored by a sense that the Arab community often protest or acquiesce based solely on Islam.41
31 "Arab League, Egypt back rebels in Libyan endgame," Reuters, August 22, 2011,
www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/22/us-arabs-libya-idUSTRE77L6TZ20110822 32 “Arab League Recognizes Libya’s NTC,” France 24, August 25, 2011, http://www.france24.com/en/20110825-arab-
league-recognises-libya-national-transitional-council 33 "League of Arab States," Organization of American States, April 24, 2013,
www.oas.org/en/ser/dia/institutional_relations/Documents/Profiles/League_of_Arab_States.pdf 34 "Timeline: Arab League," BBC News, November 15, 2011,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/1550977.stm 35 “Arab League recognizes new Syrian opposition coalition,” CNN, November 13, 2012,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/12/world/meast/syria-civil-war/index.html 36 “Opposition takes Syria seat at Arab League Summit,” BBC News, March 26, 2013,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21936731 37 “Citizens for the Mediterranean launch action on renewed Euro-Med Partnership” Anna Lindh Foundation, April,
2013.
http://www.annalindhforum.org/news/citizens-mediterranean-launch-action-renewed-euro-med-partnership 38 Helmut Anheier and Yudhishthir Raj Isar, “The West Versus the Arab World: Deconstructing the Divide,” Conflicts
and Tensions, The Culture and Globization Series (2007),
http://www.upf.edu/iuhjvv/_pdf/arrels/dossier/corm/corm2.pdf 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Mohamed Zayani. “Courting and Containing the Arab Street: Arab Public Opinion, the Middle East and U.S. Public
Diplomacy,” Arab Studies Quarterly (2008): 45-64.
Prior to the 1950s, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region experienced “socioeconomic”
challenges such as industry diversification, low concentration in education, and quality of life assistance
partially due to the lack of modernization in the region.42 The oil industry of the 1960s shaped a major
investment by Arab governments in the region that continued throughout the 1970s.43 Oil rich MENA
States began to devote a considerable amount into welfare systems and concurrently other States
experienced a boom in employment opportunities.44 With the boom in the oil market following World War
II, the MENA States invested heavily back into their citizenry, making governments more favorable.45 As
Western powers set up new political systems, or as Member States began to form, the goal was to empower
the new “citizens” of Member States. Many MENA States, between the 1950s and 1970s, were
experiencing a rise in government devotion to political, economic, educational, and social well being of
civilians, therefore creating an environment of growth that instituted a sentiment of trust in governing
bodies/structure.46 Member States began to build up military power supported by the people and
consequently gave more power to a more rigid authority.47
The LAS was primarily created out of a sense of Arab Unity and the organization has upheld many of the
original principles of its inception.48 After an unsuccessful war with Israel and the subsequent signing of a
peace treaty with Egypt, pan-Arab sentiments began to deteriorate significantly; directly preceding the
“Islamist” Movement.49 The Arab League created a sense of non-interventionist action and developed a
compromise: “As a result of the June War in 1967, the Arab Member States agreed to abandon their
previous policies of exporting their national revolutions to the monarchies in exchange for the Gulf oil-
exporting Member States’ readiness to support the budgets of the financially challenged republics.”50 While
the pan-Arab movement was nationalist in nature, and not inherently anti-West but simply anti-
Interventionist, the foundation of the LAS was not defined by the involvement of the West.51 Therefore, the
prevailing theme in the region is that Arab leaders will take care of Arab matters, whether the Arab League
or a particular Member State has control over the situation or not. That is juxtaposed with the anti-West
sentiment of the Islamist movement that has taken center stage since the 1970s where the West is seen as a
“secular” imposing entity.52
Current Arab League Secretary General Nabil Elaraby instituted a “responsibility to protect” initiative,
based on his United Nations (UN) background and is focusing the organization on a more humanitarian
approach.53A transitory spirit of “…democracy, human rights, and social justice” has developed in the Arab
World recently and the call for the Arab League to correctly address them is increasing.54 The current trend
of the Arab League is to protect Arab interest and cautiously give up some control in order to seek
diplomacy.
Politics and Diplomacy
The Arab political establishment has seen a great ebb and flow of reform throughout the last century with
the fall of an Empire, the subsequent seizure of power by both Britain and France that later dissolved after
42 Tarik M. Yousef, “Development, Growth and Policy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa since 1950”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, (2004), http://faculty.nps.edu/relooney/JEP_ME_3.pdf 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 “About the League of Arab States: Highlights in the LAS’ History” Museum with No Frontiers.
http://www.museumwnf.org/league-of-arab-states/?page=LAS-highlights-in-history.php 49 Mohamed Zayani. “Courting and Containing the Arab Street: Arab Public Opinion, the Middle East and U.S. Public
Diplomacy,” Arab Studies Quarterly (2008): 45-64. 50 Martin Beck, “The Arab League: A New Policy Approach in the Making?,” Center for Middle East Studies (Center
for Mellemøststudier) University of Southern Denmark (Syddansk Universitet), 2013.
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles//F/4/3/%7BF43B7F61-D629-4378-BBE0-9F6450510585%7DMB0413.pdf 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 “ EU-League of Arab State Relations: Prospects for closer parliamentary cooperation,” European Union, 2013.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=93190 54 Ibid.
World War II, and the wave of Arab Nationalism (predominantly secular and liberal in nature) in the first
half of the twentieth century.55 Once the ideals of the 1950s movement, Pan-Arabism began to shape Arab
States into centers of political power with one central governing body and economy, reform swept again in
the 80s and 90s of an economic, yet, Islamist nature.56 In the post 2001 world, Arab States once again have
committed to reforms within the Arab League and with external partners in regards to liberalization.57
European Union
The Arab Spring ushered in a new era of relations between the LAS and the European Union (EU) that
emphasized a serious discussion on political factors and a guarantee to meet consistently and work
collaboratively.58 The amplified interaction can be simplified by the fact that the LAS and EU are regional
partners and neighbors.59 The relationship was solidified with the Cairo Declaration in 2012, which focused
on “…diplomatic training, election observation, human rights, civil society, women’s empowerment, and
energy efficiency.”60 A clear example of the new cooperation is the EUs creation and partial funding of an
“Arab League Crisis Room,” which is subsequently tied to their “early warning system.”61 The EU’s
prominent obstacle is the implementation of initiatives and reconciling with each Arab Member State as
well as the current dominance of Saudi Arabia and Qatar.62 Through the European Neighborhood Policy
(ENP), Europe has allocated funds (through the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument) to
MENA States that have joined the agreement such as Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco.63
Arab Peace Initiative
The LAS came to prominence when it facilitated the Arab Peace Initiative (API) in 2002. The API was
seen as “innovative” as it included the Arab leaders “explicitly and unrestrictedly” offering “normalization”
to Israel.64 The API, however, asked in exchange for Israel to end its occupation of Palestine.65 The API was
an effort to bring peace to the Palestinian and Israeli situation as well as normalize relations between Arab
States and Israel.66 The measure was initially an appeal to the Israeli people and not the government,
primarily because the API included the UN Resolution on the Palestinian “right of return” but the initiative
was declined.67 The API mainly wanted to restore pre-1967 borders, including occupation in Syrian Golan
Heights and South Lebanon, resolution of Palestinian refugees based on UN Resolution 194 - often termed
“right of return” - and the establishment of an independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as the
recognized capital.68 Countering the requests, Arab States would enter into peace with Israel with an
agreement to assure security of the region, and normalize affairs.69 Promises of fair negotiations with
individual Arab States and international support, especially from the EU, UN, Russian Federation, and the
55 Amy Hawthorne, “Political Reform in the Arab World: A New Ferment?,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2004. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_52%20Hawthorne.pdf 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 “EU-League of Arab State Relations: Prospects for closer parliamentary cooperation,” European Union, 2013.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=93190 59Ibid. 60“EU-League of Arab State Relations: Prospects for closer parliamentary cooperation,” European Union, 2013.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=93190 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Kristin Archick Derek E. Mix, “The United States and Europe: Responding to Change in the Middle East and North
Africa,” Congressional Research Service, June 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43105.pdf 64 Martin Beck, “The Arab League: A New Policy Approach in the Making?,” Center for Middle East Studies (Center
for Mellemøststudier) University of Southern Denmark (Syddansk Universitet), 2013.
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles//F/4/3/%7BF43B7F61-D629-4378-BBE0-9F6450510585%7DMB0413.pdf 65 Ibid. 66Jerome Segal, “The Arab Peace Initiative under review.” Foreign Policy, December 2012
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/12/the_arab_peace_initiative_under_review#sthash.cBSV7Mcg.d
pbs 67 Ibid. 68 A/RES/194. "194 (III). Palestine -- Progress Report of theUnited Nations Mediator," United Nations General
Assembly. December 11, 1948. http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/C758572B78D1CD0085256BCF0077E51A 69 Gawdat Bahgat, “The Arab Peace Initiative: An Assessment” Middle East Policy Council, Spring 2009,
http://mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/arab-peace-initiative-assessment
US, were presented as a part of the peace process as well.70 Israel’s consistent response is one of
appreciation for the measure but complete rejection of the stated terms.71
The LAS has re-affirmed the API twice with Arab League summits in Khartoum in 2006 and Riyadh in
2007.72 The Qatari facilitated discussion between Fatah and Hamas in October 2006, and later actions taken
by a joint Saudi and Egyptian lead unit in 2007 and 2011.73 Recently, Doha and Cairo have tried to blend
both sides cohesively to come to the table.74 Qatar hosted the Arab League Ministerial Council to assess the
Arab Peace Initiative, and the Qatari Prime Minister made a statement that the Arab Peace Initiative may be
taken off the table, which was expressed to the Palestinian President’s dismay.7576 The Arab Peace Initiative
cannot be resolved between the two parties alone and the opportunity for another actor to mediate is
necessary.77 Moving forward the opportunity to include Egypt, as a key player could be considered because
of the US facilitated peace treaty they hold with Israel.78
Democracy
In a survey that measured Arab perceptions of the West, responses were positive toward democratic ideals
often voiced by Western dignitaries.79 While reform seems to be ever present in Arab States, established
authoritarian rule presents the Arab World as “the least free and democratic region of the world.”80
Democratic institutions were considered and implemented in many Arab States, only to be modified to fit
back into a rigid model of governance.81 Arab States began to feel the weight of international
modernization with Western emphasis and domestic pressure on the involvement of citizens in the political
process as well as economic reform; therefore by the 1990s, many elections, not necessarily democratic in
nature but in appearance, took place across the region.82 Arab Democracy supporters maintain that the
concept of “democracy” is not a new and foreign implant but rather a system that has always existed in the
Arab community, but the recent embracing of democracy can be one of “…gradual change carried out in
accordance with the circumstances and culture of each country,” therefore, upholding a key foundation of
the Arab League.83
Since the 1950s, the Arab League often considered the idea of direct representation within Arab League
matters and providing a targeted voice to the Arab population.84 However, the measure would be in direct
violation of the ‘founding’ Arab League Charter that implicitly excluded any mention of representation of
citizens.85 The Parliaments of several Arab States created a body that would address this very issue.86 The
70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Jacinta Leyden, Monica Matumoto, and Sevita Rama,“Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Roles of the United
States and Qatar” James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, 2013.
http://bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/b3908f7c/pdgp_pub_houstonreport_080613_2.pdf 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Jerome Segal, “The Arab Peace Initiative under review.” Foreign Policy, December 2012
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/12/the_arab_peace_initiative_under_review#sthash.cBSV7Mcg.d
pbs 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Fares Braizat,“How Do Arabs Percieve the West?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,(2006),
http://www.mafhoum.com/press10/290C31.pdf 80 Amy Hawthorne, “Political Reform in the Arab World: A New Ferment?,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2004. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_52%20Hawthorne.pdf 81 Ibid. 82 Mohamed Zayani. “Courting and Containing the Arab Street: Arab Public Opinion, the Middle East and U.S. Public
Diplomacy,” Arab Studies Quarterly (2008): 45-64. 83 Amy Hawthorne, “Political Reform in the Arab World: A New Ferment?,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2004. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_52%20Hawthorne.pdf 84 “Background: The Arab Parliament” European Union, 2009,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dmed/dv/5b_arabparliame/5b_arabparliament.pdf 85 Ibid. 86 “EU-League of Arab State Relations: Prospects for closer parliamentary cooperation”, European Union, 2013,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=93190
Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union (AIPU) was created in 1977 with the primary function to coordinate efforts
between Arab States.87 The AIPU was not created within the Arab League parameters, but later in the
1980s, the two bodies agreed to merge and subsequently created the Arab Parliament as a new agency of
the LAS (2005).88 The Arab Parliament became a permanent function of the LAS in 2012, and the primary
purpose of this new body is to “…give citizens of the Arab world a voice that complements that of Arab
governments, thereby strengthening the democratic decision-making process.”89 The Permanent Arab
Parliament was officially created in the Baghdad Declaration in 2012.90 Article 7 of the Baghdad
Declaration created the body with democracy as a response to Arab citizen’s appeals to their government.91
In 2012, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a point to devote US support and aid to any
“democratic transitions that may occur as a result of Arab Spring Uprisings.92 Further, the EU hopes to
increase cooperation with the Parliaments of Arab States and the LAS that a future “Joint Euro-Arab
parliamentary work programme” can be created.93 Recently the EU has created the European Endowment
for Democracy modeled after the US’s National Endowment for Democracy, and the EU has committed
through the European Neighborhood Policy that funds will be allocated to States that promote democratic
ideals.94
Collective Security and the Arab Spring: The Acceleration of Reform
The Arab Spring officially began in 2010, and has brought about reform, primarily dealing with issues of
Human Rights, political stability, and economic development.95 The Arab League in the past has endured a
low success rate of intrusion in domestic and regional conflicts.96 While the Arab League has a collective
security agreement and an understanding to aid Member States in crisis, the tradition has been to intervene
only as mediator.97 The LAS continues to be the prominent force for Member States “…to promote mutual
understanding, resolve conflicts, negotiate policies, and enhance further cooperation.”98 Further, the LAS
has turned its focus to the discussion of peace and security among other international entities when the
matter involves Member States.99
The Arab League has revealed a new stance on intervention in Member States through the endorsement of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) engagement in Libya and the appointment of sanctions on
the Bashar al-Assad led Syrian regime offered a look at the “new” Arab League.100 Qatar and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) offered a small force of their air forces to aid NATO.101
87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 “The Arab Summit Conference: The Baghdad Declaration” European Union, 2012,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-iq/dv/d-iq20120529_05_/d-iq20120529_05_en.pdf 91 Ibid. 92 “Clinton Pledges Increased Support for Democratic Transitions” Wilson Center, 2012,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/islamists/article/clinton-pledges-increased-support-for-democratic-transitions 93 “EU-League of Arab State Relations: Prospects for closer parliamentary cooperation”, European Union, 2013,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=93190 94Kristin Archick Derek E. Mix, “The United States and Europe: Responding to Change in the Middle East and North
Africa,” Congressional Research Service, June 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43105.pdf 95 Uri Dadush and Michele Dunne, “American and European Responses to the Arab Spring: What’s the Big Idea?,”
Center for Strategic and International Study, The Washington Quarterly, Fall 2011,
http://csis.org/files/publication/twq11autumndadushdunne.pdf 96 Farah Dakhlallah,“The Arab League in Lebanon: 2005-2008” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, (March
2012): 53-74. 97 Ibid. 98 Wanli Chen & Jun Zhao,“The Arab League’s Decision-making System and Arab Integration” Journal of Middle
Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia), 2009,
http://mideast.shisu.edu.cn/picture/article/33/d9/c8/f5ff0a8943d3af3ce9d4046f2171/5c3648aa-a7fc-476b-8480-
e4926734174c.pdf 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman,“The Arab League Comes Alive” Middle East Quarterly, 2012,
http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3309.pdf
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) bloc within the LAS has been identified as “pro-Western, oil-rich,
tribally-based, geopolitically vulnerable monarchies,” referring to Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and they flexed considerable muscle, both politically and vocally,
during the Arab Spring.102 After witnessing strong allies topple and unrest that began to stir in their
respective borders, a lot of money was spent and focus shifted toward Bahraini, Libyan, and Yemeni
Member States.103 At one point during the Arab Spring, a clear majority did not support the GCC.104 With
an appeal to the UN Security Council for military aid to Bahrain, contribution to NATO forces, and calling
the LAS meeting.105 The GCC effectively brought the LAS into the forefront of the Arab Spring, and Arab
League Member States began to ride the surge of international recognition during this time.106 Iran
expressed support for uprisings in neighboring Bahrain in an attempt to extend Tehrani power and that
move effectively got Saudi Arabia’s attention.107 Bahrain accepted help from fellow GCC States in order to
suppress unrest and discounted advice from the US to listen to the dissent.108 However, Yemeni Vice
President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi replaced President Ali Abdullah Saleh.109110 Alternatively, the GCC
States actively supported the Libyan unrest due the lack of respect and condescension from Libyan ruler
Muammar Qaddafi.111
Libya’s subsequent suspension from the LAS was the first time any action had been taken against a
Member State that enacted force against civilians within their own borders.112 It is substantial that using the
primary issue of Human Rights as a reason to intervene in another Member State was lead by Arab League
strongholds Saudi Arabia and Qatar, because both States are authoritarian.113 Saudi Arabia and Qatar have
become the dominant Member States in the League and while the Arab Spring has been tumultuous for the
region, the LAS has surfaced “…as an address for regional diplomacy with … Western approval.” 114
“NATO’s unified platform in addressing the Libyan conflict is an important model from which other
nations can base future actions for similar conflicts.”115
Early on during the Syrian protests, newly appointed LAS Secretary-General Elaraby condemned any
interaction and warned that the US overstepped by criticizing Assad’s “legitimacy.”116 Assad presented a
plan of reform and the Arab League wanted to see implementation before any further criticism was directed
at Syria.117 LAS Member States quickly recognized that the crisis in Syria could potentially put in power a
Sunni government that would be more favorable to Western influence and that therefore, Iran was now
actively supplying the al-Assad regime with military forces and more aid.118 The Arab League’s decision to
act in Syria in an 18 of 21 vote, with Syria excluded, proved, “It is permissible now for Arab Member
States to meddle in the internal affairs of other Arab states, when there is a clear moral or political reason to
102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 Laura Kasinof, “Yemen’s Election Ensures Leader’s Exit” The New York Times, February 21, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/world/middleeast/yemen-votes-to-remove-ali-abdullah-saleh.html?_r=0 111 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman,“The Arab League Comes Alive” Middle East Quarterly, 2012,
http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3309.pdf 112 Ibid. 113 Martin Beck, “The Arab League: A New Policy Approach in the Making?,” Center for Middle East Studies (Center
for Mellemøststudier) University of Southern Denmark (Syddansk Universitet), 2013.
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles//F/4/3/%7BF43B7F61-D629-4378-BBE0-9F6450510585%7DMB0413.pdf 114 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman,“The Arab League Comes Alive” Middle East Quarterly, 2012,
http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3309.pdf 115 Jacinta Leyden, Monica Matumoto, and Sevita Rama,“Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Roles of the United
States and Qatar” James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, 2013.
http://bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/b3908f7c/pdgp_pub_houstonreport_080613_2.pdf 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid. 118 Ibid.
do so that reflects the sentiments of a majority of Arab public opinion.”119 The LAS instituted economic
sanctions that included a variety of trade bans but with little to no effect on the crisis.120121
The West and the Arab Spring
While Western powers have had a considerably different approach to the crises in Syria and Libya, the
Arab League has had the most consistent response.122 In both cases, negotiations were tested and when the
League assessed the threat to the Arab people with the Member States of Libya and Syria, the opposition
was quickly favored (with special note that the process with Syria was a longer timeline).123 Western States,
especially European Member States have taken special interests in the outcome of the Arab Spring. The
potential fallout and risks that could result from one, or sometimes more), MENA States diminishing into
ruin would affect regional, or even global, political stability, security, energy exchanges, and create a
vigorous immigration stream to Europe.124
Twenty-one EU Member States are a part of NATO and France along with the UK were the primary
providers of air support while Germany abstained from the UN Security Council vote and subsequently did
not join the military effort to oust Gaddafi in Libya.125 The EU provided more than 150 million euros in
humanitarian aid and established a cooperative office to endorse Libya’s Transitional National Council
(TNC).126 Western States, prominently France, the UK, and the US, were more hesitant in the case of
Syrian aid based on politics and domestic spending viewpoints.127 In 2011, top leaders in France and the US
were considering re-election costs, and all the Western States that were involved were worried about
spending more money on the Arab Spring conflicts since the world economic crisis affected a lot of
business decisions at the time.128
The US assisted in the Arab Spring uprisings through its State Department’s existing Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the US Agency for International Development’s Office of Transition
Initiatives (USAID-OTI) with hopes of providing “…diplomatic outreach, political engagement, and
foreign aid.”129 Further, the US created the Office for Middle East Transitions through the State Department
as well to coordinate the different efforts made by the US and with allies in the particular Member States
that have had a change in government (or significant regime reforms).130 “Common US and European
concerns in the region include: countering terrorism, weapons proliferation, and transnational crime;
curtailing Islamist extremism; ensuring a reliable flow of energy exports and commercial transit; and
ensuring Israel’s security and advancing peace negotiations with the Palestinians.”131
119 Rami Khouri, “The Arab League Awakening,” Agence Global, November 6, 2011
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21511/arab_league_awakening.html 120 Martin Beck, “The Arab League: A New Policy Approach in the Making?,” Center for Middle East Studies (Center
for Mellemøststudier) University of Southern Denmark (Syddansk Universitet), 2013.
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles//F/4/3/%7BF43B7F61-D629-4378-BBE0-9F6450510585%7DMB0413.pdf 121 “Syria Unrest: Arab League adopts Sanctions in Cairo.” BBC News, November 27, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15901360 122 Charles Simpson, “Assessing the Arab Spring in Libya and Syria: A Compilation of Varying Statements from Key
Actors,” The Quarterly Journal, (Winter 2011): 56-68. 123 Ibid. 124 Danya Greenfield,“A US-EU Action Plan for Supporting Democratization: Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia,”The Polish
Institute for International Affairs, 2011
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/files/publication_pdfs/403/112111_ACUS_USEUAction.PDF 125 Kristin Archick Derek E. Mix, “The United States and Europe: Responding to Change in the Middle East and North
Africa,” Congressional Research Service, June 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43105.pdf 126 Ibid. 127 Charles Simpson, “Assessing the Arab Spring in Libya and Syria: A Compilation of Varying Statements from Key
Actors,” The Quarterly Journal, (Winter 2011): 56-68. 128 Ibid. 129 Kristin Archick Derek E. Mix, “The United States and Europe: Responding to Change in the Middle East and North
Africa,” Congressional Research Service, June 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43105.pdf 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid.
Economics and Trade Relations: Reform Desired
Many of the Middle East economies that emerged in the last half of the twentieth century were heavily
dependent upon the State only. A sense of internal cooperation was upheld as opposed to acclimating to the
modern international system of international cooperation.132 By the end of the 1980s and into the early
1990s, the MENA governments were compromising their governments with the downturn of oil
expenditures.133 Therefore many State-owned economic entities began to privatize and economic reform
instituted the creation of the private sector with markets.134 The West has made many economic deals with
Arab Member States, strengthening particular regimes, and later denouncing the actions of those particular
governments.135 This standard of business continues throughout the region mainly because government
officials behave as businessmen rather than as representatives.136 “In other words, the connection between
democracy, improving public spending transparency, enhancing good governance, foreign aid, and
investment became relevant only when spotted by the media, or when used to discredit and weaken
governments or leaders.”137 Western powers are consistently urged to advance “…enhanced trade
agreements that not only promote market access, but even more importantly maximize competitiveness
enhancing and job-promoting reforms…” in Arab States.138
The Role of the United Nations
The LAS, the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), and other interested parties such as the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC), and the Council of Europe (COE), to name a few, united in an effort to build
upon the Intercultural Dialogue and Cooperation for the Mediterranean, in 2010.139 The primary goals
include five objectives and ten priority domains for action that include “…protection and respect of cultural
diversity; religious freedom and pluralism; promotion of dialogue; and fight against intolerance.”140
Engagement items that they hope to address by 2015 are “human rights, gender equality, regime alliances
in respect to education and culture, cross cultural education, international exchanges among the youth
(teaching tolerance), increase interaction of non-state actors, independence of media outlets, cultural
diplomacy with an arts emphasis, city diplomacy, and last sports diplomacy.”141142 The conciliatory
agreement anticipates more “transparency” and to advance new social, political, and humanitarian norms.143
Conclusion
The Arab League has been faulted for not truly committing to implement and assimilate the ideals that fall
in line with an international organization. While Member States continually strive to promote the concepts
132 Tarik M. Yousef, “Development, Growth and Policy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa since 1950,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2004, http://faculty.nps.edu/relooney/JEP_ME_3.pdf 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid. 135 Ibrahim Saif, “Arab Leaders and Western Countries: Swapping Democracy for Business Interests,” The Heinrich
Böll Foundation, http://www.ps.boell.org/downloads/Perspectives_02-16_Ibrahim_Saif2.pdf 136 Ibid. 137 Ibrahim Saif, “Arab Leaders and Western Countries: Swapping Democracy for Business Interests,” The Heinrich
Böll Foundation, http://www.ps.boell.org/downloads/Perspectives_02-16_Ibrahim_Saif2.pdf 138 Uri Dadush and Michele Dunne,“American and European Responses to the Arab Spring: What’s the Big Idea?,”
Center for Strategic and International Study, The Washington Quarterly, Fall 2011,
http://csis.org/files/publication/twq11autumndadushdunne.pdf 139 “The Alliance of Civilizations’ Regional Strategy on Intercultural Dialogue and Cooperation for the
Mediterranean,” United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, http://www.unaoc.org/wp-content/uploads/MALTA-
REGIONAL-STRATEGY-FOR-THE-MEDITERRANEAN-6-nov-Final-document-2010.pdf 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 “A new era for Arab-West relations: social transformations, media freedom, and bridging the gap in mutual
perceptions,” United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, http://www.unaoc.org/wp-content/uploads/Dr_Sampaio-
CairoApril-2011-def-6-april.pdf 143 “A Forum Discusses Bridging the Gap in Mutual Perceptions” Egypt Daily News, April 6, 2011,
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/04/06/forum-discusses-bridging-the-gap-in-mutual-perceptions/
of the LAS, there have been tensions between Member States and within their borders.144 Arab League
Member States practice of “commonality” supersedes necessity and that model is not sustainable for future
entanglements, which is ever present with the different outcomes of the Arab Spring.145
Previously, Member States were the “actors”, as opposed to the League itself, becoming the dominant actor
in situations; different Member States were highlighted instead of the League as a unit, especially in
Economic and Security matters.146 Moving forward the LAS could attempt to create a structured response to
security measures where there are regular invitations to “dominant” powers but caution must be raised to
those powers, so that the LAS will handle the level of intrusion.147 LAS Secretary General Elaraby’s
“responsibility to protect” approach has been criticized for not being employed in every Member State that
has humanitarian concerns especially where governments have been the major culprits of the atrocities
committed.148
The EU has shown that it considers the Arab League the principal regional body, willing and ready to make
reforms that will enhance the region.149 The creation of the Arab Parliament presents the Arab region with a
new promise of a democratic future; the members are not directly elected but rather nominated from
Member States parliaments.150 The situation in Syria changed the international game for the Arab League
moving forward.151 The actions during the Arab Spring constitute a major shift in focus to the Human
Rights and the well being of Arab citizens with little hesitation to intervene. These new Arab League
measures were only previously directed at Israel.152 The successful engagement of Europe and the US could
usher in a new cooperation model for Arab-Western relations and provide key support to MENA States that
are transitioning now and may transition in the future.153
Committee Directive
The Arab League, as a regional and international institution, has a very unique position in world politics
today. Arab States continue to become prominent actors on the international stage allowing the League to
accomplish the bridge that is necessary for successful completion. Issues of security, political transitions,
economic reform, and humanitarian advances have become even more central because of the Arab Spring.
Reforms, agreements with the West, and regional cooperation between Arab States have already begun to
come to fruition. What the Arab League must now consider is how to shape the scope of reform and create
a model for future incidents.
The LAS is in a state of flux and many of the initiatives to increase diplomatic relations have primarily
come from the West. What can the Arab League devise that will be distinctly Arab in nature as well as
address the impact from Western States? Delegates must go further in their research to determine what
144 Wanli Chen & Jun Zhao,“The Arab League’s Decision-making System and Arab Integration” Journal of Middle
Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia), 2009,
http://mideast.shisu.edu.cn/picture/article/33/d9/c8/f5ff0a8943d3af3ce9d4046f2171/5c3648aa-a7fc-476b-8480-
e4926734174c.pdf 145 Wanli Chen & Jun Zhao,“The Arab League’s Decision-making System and Arab Integration” Journal of Middle
Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia), 2009,
http://mideast.shisu.edu.cn/picture/article/33/d9/c8/f5ff0a8943d3af3ce9d4046f2171/5c3648aa-a7fc-476b-8480-
e4926734174c.pdf 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid. 148 “EU-League of Arab State Relations: Prospects for closer parliamentary cooperation,” European Union, 2013.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=93190 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 151 Martin Beck, “The Arab League: A New Policy Approach in the Making?,” Center for Middle East Studies (Center
for Mellemøststudier) University of Southern Denmark (Syddansk Universitet), 2013.
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles//F/4/3/%7BF43B7F61-D629-4378-BBE0-9F6450510585%7DMB0413.pdf 152 Ibid. 153 Uri Dadush and Michele Dunne,“American and European Responses to the Arab Spring: What’s the Big Idea?,”
Center for Strategic and International Study, The Washington Quarterly, Fall 2011,
http://csis.org/files/publication/twq11autumndadushdunne.pdf
Arab League Member States are doing individually or within alliance blocs. What level of cooperation will
the Arab League allow in order to involve the US, EU, UN, and external State actors? What inter-Member
State based policies can be used as a cooperation model? Can the Arab League mold a model from the
preeminent body such as the EU with the understanding that the EU has effectively inspired a sacrifice of
sovereignty in order to produce an International Organization that has considerable authority in the
international arena?154 Delegates should be steady to keep in mind measures in the region that can foster
innovative measures in culture, economics, security, and political inclusion.
II: The Impact of Terrorism in the League of Arab States
"[Terrorism] completely violates Islam, which holds human life in high regard, while terrorism treats it
cheaply.”155
- Saudi Interior Minister Nayif ibn Abdulaziz
Introduction
Terrorism is a threat in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region, and the League of Arab
States recognizes the difficulty of confronting the problem. Although established in 1945 with the mission
to improve collaboration among Arab Member States, it would be approximately 53 years until the topic of
terrorism was discussed in-depth.156157 On 22 April 1998, the 22 Member States agreed to define terrorism
as any act or threat of violence regardless of the intention or purpose by the person committing the
action.158 The League further noted terrorism could occur due to an individual or group’s mission to
progress an agenda.159 Additionally, terrorism causes fear to people, and “[places] their lives, liberty or
security in danger.”160
The LAS definition of terrorism was detailed in the 42-point Arab Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism.161 This marked the first time interior and justice ministers gathered to combat terrorism and its
related forms, specifically radical and fundamentalist terrorism.162 The Egyptian government initiated the
development of the accord in 1996.163 Member States were cautious that the Arab Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism would not infringe on Islamic Sharia Law, Member State's sovereignty, or human
rights.164 In addition, they adhered to the rules set forth by the LAS and United Nations (UN) charters in
effort to bring peace and security.165
154 Wanli Chen & Jun Zhao,“The Arab League’s Decision-making System and Arab Integration” Journal of Middle
Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia), 2009,
http://mideast.shisu.edu.cn/picture/article/33/d9/c8/f5ff0a8943d3af3ce9d4046f2171/5c3648aa-a7fc-476b-8480-
e4926734174c.pdf
155 John Daniszewski, "Arab League States Sign Treaty to Combat Terrorism," Los Angeles Times, April 23, 1998.
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/apr/23/news/mn-42254 156 "The Arab League," Council on Foreign Relations, January 26, 2012. www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-
africa/arab-league/p25967 157 John Daniszewski, "Arab League States Sign Treaty to Combat Terrorism," Los Angeles Times, April 23, 1998.
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/apr/23/news/mn-42254 158 "The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism," The League of Arab States, April 22, 1998.
www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/conv_arab_terrorism.en.pdf 159 Ibid. 160 Ibid. 161 “Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism," League of Arab States," April 22, 1998.
www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e4984.html 162 "Arab League States sign an accord to fight Terrorism and Extremism," International Institute for Counter-
Terrorism, April 23, 1998. http://212.150.54.123/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=29 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid.
Based on the 1998 convention to suppress terrorism, members of the LAS noted they should refrain from
allotting their land as a dwelling to plan, organize, and fulfill crimes.166 The Arab Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism also strengthened communication among Member States as the accord called for
exchanging information, conducting training courses, and addressing arrests while upholding national
laws.167 The convention called on Arab States to coordinate plans with a fellow Member State that shares a
common border.168
The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism had to differentiate between combatting terrorism
and classifying the struggles against foreign occupation, case in point, the situation between Israel and
Palestine.169 Israel and Palestine have been in conflict since the UN General Assembly voted on the original
partition of land for Israel in 1947.170 Since the establishment of the partition, Israel rejects to recognize
Palestine as a State while surrounding Arab States deny Israel's validity as a Member State.171 With Israel
occupying Palestinian territory, notably from the 1967 Six-Day War, the Arab League dealt with the issue
and how it related to terrorism.172
The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism’s definition of terrorist offenses is lifted when a
struggle occurs by “foreign occupation and aggression” and the "liberation and self-determination" of an
Arab Member State is threatened.173 The aforementioned provision’s reference of “foreign occupation and
aggression” is associated to Israel while the Arab Member State that has their “liberation and self-
determination” at risk insinuates Palestine. The accord’s provision would not be applied if the "territorial
integrity" of an Arab League Member State were at risk.174
The proponents of the accord have reportedly hoped the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
would halt Western Member States giving asylum status to suspected terrorists who are either funding or
planning such activities.175 Arab ministers have also stated the convention should counter Western media's
negative depictions of Islam and terrorism.176 Arab media have reported the accord wanted to pursue
Western governments from barring exiled Islamic extremists from using their land in order to recruit or
propagandize terrorism.177 The pan-Arab newspaper Al Quds Al Arabi wrote, "there are no terrorist training
camps in Britain as there are in so many Arab countries."178
With the 1998 accord, six international conventions were highlighted, including The Tokyo Convention on
offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft of 1963, The Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents of 1973,
and The Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.179 The six
international conventions served as precursors for the established of the Arab Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism.180
166 “Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism," League of Arab States," April 22, 1998.
www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e4984.html 167 Ibid. 168 "Arab League States sign an accord to fight Terrorism and Extremism," International Institute for Counter-
Terrorism, April 23, 1998. http://212.150.54.123/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=29 169 Ibid. 170 "Israel, Palestine and the Occupied Territories," Global Policy Forum. www.globalpolicy.org/security-
council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/israel-palestine-and-the-occupied-territories.html 171 Ibid. 172 Ibid. 173 “Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism," League of Arab States," April 22, 1998.
www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e4984.html [accessed 24 July 2013] 174 Ibid. 175 John Daniszewski, "Arab League States Sign Treaty to Combat Terrorism," Los Angeles Times, April 23, 1998.
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/apr/23/news/mn-42254 176 Ibid. 177 Hillary Mann, "Arab Anti-Terror Efforts:Assessing an Arab League Initiative," Washington Institute,
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/arab-anti-terror-efforts-assessing-an-arab-league-initiative 178 Ibid. 179 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism," League of Arab States," April 22, 1998.
www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e4984.html [accessed 24 July 2013] 180 Ibid.
The March 2010 summit saw the Council of the League adopt resolution No. 525, which addressed
international terrorism and efforts to suppress it.181 The LAS continued to call for international cooperation
as the resolution included collaboration with the UN Security Council's counterterrorism committees.182
The LAS Council of Arab Ministers of Justice adopted resolution No. 788, which aimed to strengthen
existing works in counterterrorism between the Council's technical secretariat and fellow international and
regional organizations such as the UN's counterterrorism committees and the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC).183
Current Situation
Al-Qaida
The LAS has denounced terrorism and all its forms, but it has not eradicated such acts from taking place in
numerous Arab Member States.184 According to the Arab Convention of the Suppression of Terrorism, LAS
recognizes the moral and religious principles, as represented in the Islamic Sharia Law, to reject
terrorism.185 Despite acknowledging the role of Islamic Sharia Law, militant groups such as al-Qaeda have
maintained a presence in the MENA Member States. Affiliates of the al-Qaida franchise have been
recognized in a number of MENA Member States, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, to name a few.186
The conflicts within Arab Member States have raised new alarms regarding to role of al-Qaida in the
region. The UN has condemned the violence caused by the terror organization on a number of occasions.187
In Afghanistan, an attack in the Faryab and Uruzgan provinces resulted in nine development workers'
death.188 With the nine deaths, 237 humanitarian assets, facilities, and personnel have been attacked in
Afghanistan during 2013.189 The UN Security Council addressed the attack by reiterating their concerns by
threats by al-Qaida.190
Al-Qaida issued their support of the Syrian rebels in order to oust Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.191 The
Syrian government has blamed the revolts on terrorists.192 An al-Qaida leader has called on Arabs in
Member States, such as Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon - which share borders with Syria - to assist rebels and
overthrow al-Assad.193 According to an Iraqi security official, intelligence information has located al-
Qaida-linked members in the Iraqi city of Mosul.194 Local leaders of al-Qaida have been killed in Syria.
According to a Syrian state-run news agency, troops killed a leader of an al-Qaida affiliate with a base in
Iraq.195 Al-Qaida's Ayman al-Zawahri has called Syrians to oppose assistance from the LAS.196 The
181 www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/SGReport_Terrorism/Docs%202010/1st%20Cttee%20-%20IO%20replies%20-
%202010/League%20of%20Arab%20States%20-%20English%20%20-%20post.pdf.. 182 Ibid. 183 Ibid. 184 "The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism," The League of Arab States, April 22, 1998.
www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/conv_arab_terrorism.en.pdf 185 Ibid. 186 "The state of al-Qaeda: The unquenchable fire," The Economist, September 28, 2013,
www.economist.com/news/briefing/21586834-adaptable-and-resilient-al-qaeda-and-its-allies-keep-bouncing-back-
unquenchable-fire 187 "Security Council strongly condemns recent attacks on aid workers in Afghanistan," UN News Centre, December 3,
2013, www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp/realfile/story.asp?NewsID=46660&Cr=afghan&Cr1=#.UqtdnZH3E_4 188 Ibid. 189 Ibid. 190 Ibid. 191 "Arab League wants UN peacekeepers in Syria," CBS News, February 12, 2012, www.cbsnews.com/news/arab-
league-wants-un-peacekeepers-in-syria/ 192 Ibid. 193 “Al Qaeda urges Muslims to help Syria rebels," Associated Press, February 12, 2012, www.cbsnews.com/news/al-
qaeda-urges-muslims-to-help-syria-rebels/ 194 Ibid. 195 “Syrian opposition leader meets with Arab League chief," CTV News, November 2, 2013,
http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/syrian-opposition-leader-meets-with-arab-league-chief-1.1525309#ixzz2nO3REOkn 196 Al Qaeda urges Muslims to help Syria rebels," Associated Press, February 12, 2012, www.cbsnews.com/news/al-
qaeda-urges-muslims-to-help-syria-rebels/.
announcement of al-Qaida's support of the Syrian rebels created new obstacles as the Arab League had
suspended Syria and later allocated its representation to a new coalition.197
Hezbollah
The role of the Lebanon-based political group Hezbollah has brought various concerns to the Arab region
and international community. Hezbollah has viewed itself as a resistance group opposed to Western
involvement and Israeli claims in the Arab region.198 Hezbollah was established during the Lebanese civil
war between 1975 and 1989, notably following the Israeli invasion of 1982.199 Along with the end of Israel,
Hezbollah published its manifesto in 1985, which called for the removal of Western Member States such as
France and the US from Lebanese land.200 Periodically, Hezbollah and Israeli forces have clashed and
resulted in the month-long war during the summer of 2006 when thousands of rockets were launched into
Israeli territory.201 The UN issued a cease-fire in August 2006, ending the violence although tension still
remains.202
In 2013, Hezbollah leaders have pledged to support the Syrian government led by al-Bashir.203 Towns near
the Lebanese border have reported "heavy bombardment" by Hezbollah combatants during the Syrian Civil
War.204 According to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, the Lebanese-based political group will not align
with Syrian rebels who are supported by Israel and the US205 According to US Secretary of State John
Kerry, thousands of Hezbollah militants have contributed to the violence in Syria.206
Numerous Member States and international organizations have classified Hezbollah as a terrorist
organization, with the United States adding Hezbollah to the Foreign Terrorist Organizations in 1997
believing the group facilitates terrorist cells in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America.207208 The European
Union (EU) to label the militant wing of the Hezbollah in July 2013, which was a decision based on the
Lebanese organization's role in the Syrian war and a bus bombing in Burgas, Bulgaria, which killed five
Israelis.209210 Hezbollah has denied involvement in the bus bombing.211 According to the United Kingdom
(UK) government, the military wing of Hezbollah "supports terrorism in Iraq and the Palestinian
territories."212 As a result, the UK government has also labeled Hezbollah’s militant wing as a terrorist
organization. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) unanimously declared Hezbollah as a terrorist
organization.213 The GCC stated its Member States have tried to improve diplomatic relations with Member
States that have ties with Hezbollah but claimed internal affairs in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia were infringed
during the process.214
197 "Arab League wants UN peacekeepers in Syria," CBS News, February 12, 2012, www.cbsnews.com/news/arab-
league-wants-un-peacekeepers-in-syria/. 198 "Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu'llah)," Council on Foreign Relations, July 22, 2013,
www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155 199 Ibid. 200 Ibid. 201 Ibid. 202 Ibid. 203 "Hezbollah leader Nasrallah vows victory in Syria," BBC News, May 25, 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-22669230 204 Ibid. 205 Ibid. 206 Ibid. 207 "Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)," United States Department of State, October 11, 2005,
http://web.archive.org/web/20060712173350/http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm 208 "Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu'llah)," Council on Foreign Relations, July 22, 2013,
http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155 209 Ibid. 210 "EU adds Hezbollah's military wing to terrorism list," Reuters, July 22, 2013,
www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/22/us-eu-hezbollah-idUSBRE96K0DA20130722 211 Ibid. 212 “Proscribed Terrorist Organisations," Gov.UK, November 4, 2013,
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/254860/List_of_proscribed_organisations_Nov
_2013.pdf 213 "GCC: Hezbollah terror group," Arab News, June 3, 2013, www.arabnews.com/news/453834 214 Ibid.
The UN Security Council has called on "Lebanese parties" to cease involvement in Syria.215 The Security
Council did not explicitly name Hezbollah in the statement due to objections by other Member States, but
reports stated it was a clear message for Hezbollah.216 The Security Council continued to note Lebanese
parties should focus on national affairs that have to be addressed such as support for its judicial and
security authorities.217 The UN organ did commend Lebanon's "generous efforts" in assisting refugees from
ongoing conflicts in Palestine and Syria.218
Hezbollah’s presence in the international community could eradicate peaceful progress as intended by the
unanimously supported Arab Peace Initiative by the LAS.219 The Arab League has addressed the actions
committed by Hezbollah. According to LAS Secretary General Nabil Elaraby, the League expressed a
"strong condemnation" of all forms of foreign intervention in Syria, notably by Hezbollah. 220 Unlike the
Arab League, Bahrain has categorized Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.221 Bahrain's Foreign Minister
Sheikh Khaled bin Ahmed al-Khalifa has further addressed the role of Hezbollah and named the Lebanese-
based organization’s Nasrallah as a “terrorist.”222
Actions Taken by the United Nations
Definition of Terrorism Disputes in the UN
Following a series of bombings in Egypt and the UK, then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan pushed for
the UN Member States to issue a definition for terrorism.223 Defining terrorism within the UN, however,
has been considered as a "sensitive" issue since 2000 when the organization began to develop the
Comprehensive Convention Against Terrorism.224 Delegations have stated that until all Member States
agree on the UN's definition, the convention cannot get passed.225 Member States claimed the proposed UN
definition of terrorism must not be associated to a particular religion and recognize the right to self-
determination.226
The text of the proposed UN definition on terrorism include, “We strongly condemn terrorism in all its
forms and manifestations, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and
security.”227 The proposed definition continued:
215 SC/11056, "Increasingly Concerned at Impact of Syrian Crisis on Lebanon, Security Councilseeks Recommitment
to Dissociation Policy to Avoid ‘Slide Into Conflict," United Nations Security Council," July 10, 2013,
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11056.doc.htm 216 "U.N. calls on Lebanon's Hezbollah to stop involvement in Syria," Reuters, July 20, 2013,
www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/10/us-lebanon-syria-un-idUSBRE9690UG20130710 217 SC/11056, "Increasingly Concerned at Impact of Syrian Crisis on Lebanon, Security Councilseeks Recommitment
to Dissociation Policy to Avoid ‘Slide Into Conflict," United Nations Security Council," July 10, 2013,
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11056.doc.htm 218 Ibid. 219 "Assessing the Strength of Hizballah," United States Department of State, June 8, 2010.
www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/142857.htm 220 "Arab League condemns Hezbollah's role in Syria," Reuters, June 5, 2013, www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/05/us-
syria-crisis-arabs-idUSBRE9541A320130605 221 Ibid. 222 "Bahrain calls Hezbollah head a terrorist, says must be stopped," Reuters, May 26, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/26/us-syria-crisis-bahrain-idUSBRE94P08G20130526 223 Thalif Deen, "POLITICS: U.N. Member States Struggle to Define Terrorism," Inter Press Service, July 25, 2005.
www.ipsnews.net/2005/07/politics-un-member-states-struggle-to-define-terrorism/ 224 Ibid. 225 GA/L/3276. Agreed Definition Of Term ‘Terrorism’ Said To Be Needed For Consensuson Completing
Comprehensive Convention Against It. United Nations General Assembly.
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/gal3276.doc.htm 226 Ibid. 227 "Text: UN proposals on terrorism," BBC News, July 26, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4717687.stm
“We recognise that international co-operation to fight terrorism should be conducted in
conformity with international law, including the United Nations charter and relevant international
conventions and protocols. States should adhere to the principles of good governance, respect for
human rights, and the rule of law in the fight against terrorism.”228
The LAS have disputed the suggested definition in the UN. 229 The Arab League believes the UN has to
distinguish "terrorist organization" and "liberation movement," as well as what composes "state terrorism"
and self-determination, which is a matter the LAS addressed in the Arab Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism in 1998.230 The LAS and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) stated the proposed UN
definition has to exempt Member States in conflict against "foreign occupation," which is a reference on
Israel. The LAS and OIC identified themselves and liberation movements such as the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) and Lebanon-based Hezbollah, both who have fought against Israeli occupation, ought
to be exempt from the proposed definition.231Annan has made it clear that terrorism is not linked to any
religion.
Although Arab States voiced their concerns about the proposed UN definition, then-Arab League Secretary
General Amr Moussa endorsed the UN definition on terrorism.232 According to Moussa, the proposed UN
definition on terrorism can serve as the "basis for consensus" among Member States.233 He continued to
state that "resisting occupation is a different issue altogether."234
The OIC submitted a proposal for the UN definition on terrorism to an ad hoc committee established by a
General Assembly resolution (A/51/210).235 The proposal by the OIC included:
“The activities of the parties during an armed conflict, including in situations of foreign
occupation, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are
governed by that law, are not governed by [the Comprehensive Convention Against Terrorism
(Convention)].”236
“The activities undertaken by the military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties,
inasmuch as they are in conformity with international law, are not governed by this
Convention.”237
The UN and the Arab League have yet to come to terms on a final definition on terrorism.
Countering Illicit Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Terrorism
The Arab League collaborated with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for a
regional program framework in 2010 regarding drug control, crime prevention, and criminal justice
reform.238 The partnership with the UNODC was also made to respond to threats within Arab States while
"promoting the rule of law and sustainable development.”239 The regional framework was developed based
on "extensive consultations" with national and regional groups during a meeting between April 27 and 29,
228 Ibid. 229 Thalif Deen, "POLITICS: U.N. Member States Struggle to Define Terrorism," Inter Press Service, July 25, 2005.
www.ipsnews.net/2005/07/politics-un-member-states-struggle-to-define-terrorism/ 230 Ibid. 231 Ibid. 232 "Arab chief clears terrorism definition," Al Jazeera, July 25, 2005.
www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/07/200841011182583302.html 233 Ibid. 234 "UN seeks definition of terrorism," BBC News, July 26, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4716957.stm 235 A/57/37. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December
1996 (Annex IV). United Nations www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/57/a5737.pdf 236 Ibid. 237 Ibid. 238 "Regional Programme Framework," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
www.unodc.org/middleeastandnorthafrica/en/regional-programme-framework/regional-programme-framework.html 239 Ibid.
2010.240 Arab League Member States sent their delegates from the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Health
to participate at the Cairo meeting.241
The result of the Cairo meeting is the five-year program known as the Regional Programme on Drug
Control, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform in the Arab States 2011-2015. The regional
program composes of three pillars, which includes the promotion of integrity and building justice, drug
prevention and health, and combat organized crime and terrorism.242 The UNODC and LAS, with the
support of the latter’s special councils - Arab Ministers of Interior and the Council of Arab Ministers of
Justice, officially launched the regional framework on 8 December 2010.243 NODC Executive Director
Yury Fedotov stated the cooperation with the LAS is a "major step forward" for the Arab Member States as
the region made a starting pledge US$35 million to fund the program.244 In return, the UNODC increased
its operations in the Arab region by setting two sub-regional offices in Tripoli, Libya for the Maghreb
region and in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates for Member States along the Gulf.245 The UNODC has
existing offices in Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Qatar, and Sudan.246 The indicative budget for all five years
is estimated to be USD $100 million.247
The regional framework's pillar on countering illicit trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism has a six-
steps such as building capacity to counter transnational organized crime, combatting money laundering and
the financing of terrorism as a regional approach, and strengthening the Arab States’ approach to prevent
terrorism, to name a few.248 According to the UNODC, Arab League Member States need to promote
international cooperation especially on criminal matters.249 With improved cooperation on dealing with
crime, Member States can encounter "successful prosecutions" of "complex and serious" cases ranging
from corruption, firearms and human trafficking, organized crime, and notably terrorism.250
The five-year framework outlined that a comprehensive and effective method of anti-money laundering
across the MENA region would hinder the growing threat of terrorism for Member States in the LAS.251
Based on conferences and workshops held across several Arab States, the need to enhance the efforts to
combat the financing of terrorism was evident.252 According to the LAS and UNODC's Regional
Programme on Drug Control, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform in the Arab States, legislation
and regulatory channels were "not in full compliance" set by international standards.253 The UNODC has
volunteered in drafting national projects based on specific Member State's needs in order to help meet
relevant international requirements pertaining to anti-money laundering and financing terror.254
The five-year regional framework is not the first time the Arab League collaborated with the UNODC. A
regional workshop was held from 18-20 November 2008, on new international instruments on the
240 Ibid. 241 Ibid. 242 "UNODC and League of Arab States launch US $ 100 million five-year regional programme," United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2010/December/unodc-and-league-of-arab-states-
launch-us-100-million-dollar-regional-programme.html 243 "Regional Programme Framework," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
www.unodc.org/middleeastandnorthafrica/en/regional-programme-framework/regional-programme-framework.html 244 "UNODC and League of Arab States launch US $ 100 million five-year regional programme," United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2010/December/unodc-and-league-of-arab-states-
launch-us-100-million-dollar-regional-programme.html 245 Ibid. 246 Ibid. 247 "Regional Programme on Drug Control, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform in the Arab States," United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and The League of Arab States, www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/WG-
GOVandFiN/Regional_Programme_for_the_Arab_States.pdf 248 "Regional Programme on Drug Control, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform in the Arab States," United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and The League of Arab States, www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/WG-
GOVandFiN/Regional_Programme_for_the_Arab_States.pdf 249 Ibid. 250 Ibid. 251 Ibid. 252 Ibid. 253 Ibid. 254 Ibid.
prevention and suppression of terrorism.255 The legal instruments to combat terrorism were developed since
1963 and have increased in number based on specific terrorist incidents or threats, such as aircraft
hijacking, maritime navigation safety, hostage taking, terrorism funding, and terrorist bombings, to name a
few.256 The implementation of the instruments has been recognized as an "urgent priority," and the UN
Security Council called on all Member States to ratify the instruments.257
Case Studies
Syrian Civil War
The crisis in Syria has been an issue of concern within the Arab League as terrorists have attacked Syrian
homes, military checkpoints, and government buildings.258 Government officials in Damascus had
originally rejected the Arab League's solutions such as denying international peacekeepers from entering
Syria in hopes to "oversee the implementation of a ceasefire.”259 The Syrian government had also rejected
calls for an immediate ceasefire and start of negotiations proposed by the People's Republic of China.260 By
late March 2012, Syrian President al-Assad accepted a joint plan by the Arab League and UN.261 Al-Assad
welcomed the joint plan but said "terrorism" must stop in Syria as well.262
Al-Assad’s welcome of the joint plans came a few months after the LAS issued its first sanctions against a
fellow Arab State. The LAS held a meeting at the ministerial level on 27 November 2011, to further
address the situation in Syria, and passed Resolution 7442. 263 The Arab League's sanctions include a
travelling ban for top Syrian officials to other Arab Member States and freezing their finances.264
Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan assisted in the idea of the joint plan with the LAS and UN.265
Annan served as the UN-LAS Joint Special Envoy for Syria, but resigned from the position in August
2012.266 Before his resignation, Annan helped advise a six-point plan that would include the UN monitoring
the conclusion of the fighting, have troops removed from opposition areas, and access for humanitarian
services.267268
The Arab League and the UN appointed a joint special representative to determine the scope of the Syrian
crisis after Annan’s departure.269 According to new Joint Special Representative Lakdar Brahimi, he
255 "Delivering Counter-Terrorism Assistance," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, March 2009,
www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica//terrorism/DELIVERING_COUNTER-
TERRORISM_ASSISTANCE_-_March_2009.pdf 256 Ibid. 257 Ibid. 258 "Syria rejects new Arab League resolutions," RT, February 13, 2013, http://rt.com/news/syria-rejects-arab-league-
resolution-139/ 259 "Ibid. 260 "Who supports state terrorism in Syria?," Al Arabiya News, March 12, 2012,
http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2012/03/12/200166.html 261 "Arab League backs Annan's Syria plan at Baghdad summit," BBC News, March 29, 2012,
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17544431 262 Ibid. 263 "Full text of Arab League resolution against Syria," Open Briefing, November 28, 2011,
www.openbriefing.org/regionaldesks/middleeast/resolution7442/ 264 Ibid. 265 "Arab League backs Annan's Syria plan at Baghdad summit," BBC News, March 29, 2012,
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17544431 266 "New York, 2 August 2012 - Statement by the Secretary-General on the Joint Special Envoy for Syria," United
Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, August 2, 2012, www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=6223 267 "Arab League backs Annan's Syria plan at Baghdad summit," BBC News, March 29, 2012,
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17544431 268 "Kofi Annan's six-point plan for Syria," Al Jazeera, March 27, 2012,
www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/03/2012327153111767387.html 269 "Joint UN-Arab League envoy and Syrian President discuss worsening crisis," UN News Centre, September 15,
2012, www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42898#.UnNKQJH3E_5
believes al-Assad is "more aware" than the representative on the "seriousness" of the crisis.270 Brahimi
stated he informed al-Assad that the UN and LAS will "exert every effort, present ideas and mobile
capacities and potentials" needed in order to provide the best for the Syrian population.271 According to
state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), despite the presence of the LAS and UN, al-Assad wants to
hold terrorists accountable for the violence on Syrians.272 SANA added that while al-Assad supports the
efforts of the LAS and UN whilst "respecting Syria's sovereignty and rejecting any foreign interference,"
initiatives to solve the crises should be based on the "principle to halt terrorism" and the Member States
arming and supporting terrorists in Syria.273
The Arab League and UN envoy, however, has not held direct talks with al-Assad since December 2012.274
Brahimi and al-Assad resumed face-to-face talks in Damascus on 29 October 2013, nearly 10 months after
their previous direct contact.275 Brahimi has been putting efforts to advice an international peace conference
in Geneva in regards to the violence in Syria.276 The Syrian opposition is reportedly "divided" on attending
the peace conference while the Syrian government "refuses" to be in the company of the armed
opposition.277
Al-Assad has continued to claim opposition as "terrorists" and being supported by terror-affiliated
groups.278 According to al-Assad, a solution in Syria can only take place by the Syrian people and not
foreign intervention.279 The Russian Federation and the United States of America (US) have supported the
idea of the peace conference, but it has been postponed on numerous occasions over which parties and
Member States should participate.280 Since March 2011, the conflict in Syria has resulted in more than
100,000 deaths and more than two million forced to flee their homes.281
Unrest in Iraq
The Arab League has welcomed Iraq to the regional organization despite the ongoing terrorism and
violence.282 Iraq has made the effort to present itself outside of the violence by hosting an Arab League
summit in Baghdad in March 2012.283 With the Arab League summit, more than 100,000 security forces
were deployed with airspace closed across the city.284 The purpose of the Baghdad meeting was to address
Syria, but it was also seen to test how the Iraqi government responds to the increasing number of terror
attacks in recent years and after the US withdrew their troops in December 2011.285 Iraqi Foreign Minister
Hoshyar Zebari described the Arab League summit in Baghdad as "the most important event for Iraq,"
however; terrorism still lingered for the Member State.286 The Arab League summit was scheduled for
270 Ibid. 271 Ibid. 272 "Syrian president tells envoy that support of 'terrorists' must stop," CNN, October 21, 2012,
www.cnn.com/2012/10/21/world/meast/syria-brahimi-assad-meeting/ 273 Ibid. 274 "Arab League-UN Envoy Meets With Syria's Assad," Associated Press, October 29, 2013,
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/envoy-meets-syrian-opposition-figure-20711684 275 Ibid. 276 Ibid. 277 Ibid. 278 "Assad: backing rebels must stop for peace to take place," AL Arabiya, October 30, 2013,
english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/10/30/U-N-Arab-league-envoy-Brahimi-to-meet-Assad-.html 279 Ibid. 280 Ibid. 281 "Arab League-UN Envoy Meets With Syria's Assad," Associated Press, October 29, 2013,
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/envoy-meets-syrian-opposition-figure-20711684 282 "What the Arab League can learn from Iraq," BBC News, March 28, 2012. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-17526102 283 Shashank Joshi, "Can Arab League bridge its divisions?," BBC News, March 27, 2012,
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17522695 284 "Huge security operation in Baghdad for Arab summit," BBC News, March 26, 2012, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-17510663 285 Ibid. 286 "Arab League summit aims to showcase 'the new Iraq,'" CNN, March 26, 2012,
www.cnn.com/2012/03/26/world/meast/iraq-arab-summit/
2011, but was postponed due to unrest in Iraq.287 Militant groups with links to al-Qaeda have claimed
responsibility on several bombings aimed to undermine the summit.288 Despite the summit, terrorism has
claimed more lives in Iraq. The LAS has issued condemnation statements on terror attacks in Iraq
regardless of the number of deaths and injured.289290
Conclusion
The LAS has agreed terrorism can take many forms such as an act or threat of violence.291 The Arab
League recognizes terrorism can occur to an individual or group with the premise to advance an agenda.292
The 22 Arab League Member States have specified people’s “lives, liberty, or security” may be put in
danger due to terrorist acts.293 While the UN has not provided a definition for “terrorism” the LAS has acted
and defined the term in 1998 with the 42-point Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism294
Terrorism, however, still remains on across the MENA for various reasons ranging from human rights, the
role of Israel, and nationalism, to name a few. The Arab League has been on point when tackling terrorism
and how it may be defined. An example is the role of “foreign occupation” and “self-determination” in an
Arab Member State.295 The LAS has detailed when aggression may be accepted, highlighting Israel’s
“foreign occupation” in Palestine, which the latter has the right to act if “territorial integrity” is as risk.296
Within recognized Arab Member States, groups linked to terror-affiliated acts have brought concern from
the LAS. The Arab League has addressed numerous acts of violence inflicted on Arab citizens across the
MENA by either documented terror organizations or local-known affiliates. Such terror organizations have
resulted in collaboration with the UN, either for the entire Arab region or specific Member States within the
LAS, such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. While the topic of terrorism was not discussed until decades
after its establishment, the LAS has concentrated on identifying and preventing terrorism amidst growing
conflicts, or springs, occurring in the past decade.
Committee Directive
In order to thoroughly collaborate and convey the impact of terrorism with the LAS, delegates should be
familiar with their Member State’s assessment, achievements, and response in combating terrorism. It may
also be beneficial for delegates to understand their Member State’s approach to counterterrorism in both
domestic and international fronts. The delegations within the LAS committee are expected to grasp the
policies their Member State ratified within the Arab League regarding all forms of terrorism. The effects of
terrorism against the Arab League among various fields such as economical, medical, political, and social,
to name a few, should be comprehended by the delegates. The positions of groups such as al-Qaeda and
Hezbollah by the Member State should be familiarized as well as any additional terror-affiliated
organizations. Has the Member State independently enacted on eradicating terrorism, and if so, how? Could
such actions be implemented with fellow LAS Member States in order to foster prosperity and ensure
security? In addition, delegates should have an understanding of any bilateral or multilateral efforts,
notably with fellow Arab League Member States.
287 Ibid. 288 Ibid. 289 "Arab League denounces terrorist attacks in Iraq, " All Iraq News, April 16, 2013,
www.alliraqnews.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32236:arab-league-denounces-terrorist-
attacks-in-iraq-&catid=35:political&Itemid=2 290 "Arab Parliament denounces terrorism in Iraq," Egypt Independent, September 25, 2013,
www.egyptindependent.com/news/arab-parliament-denounces-terrorism-iraq 291 "The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism," The League of Arab States, April 22, 1998.
www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/conv_arab_terrorism.en.pdf 292 Ibid. 293 Ibid. 294 “Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism," League of Arab States," April 22, 1998.
www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e4984.html 295 Ibid. 296 Ibid.
Technical Appendix Guide (TAG)
Topic I: Bridging the Gap: New Horizons for Arab and Western States
Citino, Nathan J, The ‘crush’ of ideologies: The United States, the Arab world, and Cold War
modernization, Cold War History, 2012.
When discussing heavy concepts between the United States (US) and Arab population, there are many
factors that have effected relations over the years. Historian Nathan Citino gives the Cold War perspective
and a really insightful view on the subject. Issues of Arab modernization, the politics of Islam, and cultural
sensitivity are explored and provides great context to the relationship between the US and Arab Member
States.
Khader, Bichara, The European Union and the Arab World: From the Rome Treaty to the Arab Spring,
European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2013.
http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/sites/default/files/attachments/papersiemed17.pdf
Bridging the Gap between the West and the League of Arab States (LAS) heavily delves into the
involvement of the European Union (EU) as a major player in Western affairs. This paper explores many
aspects of the EU’s involvement with Arab Member States and the geopolitical status that this unique
relationship has endured over the years. The Mediterranean region is a vast mix of cultures and historically
the EU has pursued human rights as a priority in agreements. However true political reform through policy
alliances has been fleeting and Professor Khader offers a detailed background on the subject.
Khatib, Lina, Qatar’s Foreign Policy: The Limits of Pragmatism, International Affairs, 2013.
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/24060/INTA89_2_10_Khatib.pdf
One of the key players in the Arab League is Qatar and the relationship between Qatar and the US provides
a great framework. Dr. Khatib offers much more detail on Qatar and the distinct role that this Arab country
maintains in the region. The significance of Qatar’s claim to strength and the consequence that has had on
both the LAS and US is an important factor is this discussion.
Lewis, Bernard, Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle East. Foreign Affairs. Council on Foreign
Affairs. 2005.
http://www.ndu.edu/nesa/nesanetwork/documents/seminar_guides/ES0208/readings/ss38_governance_cha
nging_world/ss38_03_Lewis_freedom_justice.pdf
The issue of democracy in the Middle East has long been a debate of whether the political system is an
external force or intrinsically internal. Noted Historian Bernard Lewis, provides a cultural and religious
argument towards political reform through Islam. Because Islam colors Arab society in a general sense, this
text can give a perspective on an approach to embrace democracy.
Travis, Hannibal, Wargaming the "Arab Spring": Predicting Likely Outcomes and Planning U.N.
Responses, Cornell International Law Journal, 2013.
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/ILJ/upload/Travis-final.pdf
The Arab Spring encompassing so many levels of diplomacy and politics, that the scope can be reach very
wide. Professor of Law Hannibal Travis presents an overview of both the United Nations (UN) and US
response (and a possible approach). Reconciling the governments of the Arab world with the ambitions of
the US, as well as the UN, is a lofty attempt, which Hannibal approaches in detail.
II. The Impact of Terrorism in the League of Arab States
"Arab League discusses Syria crisis," Al Jazeera, September 1, 2013.
www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/2013831225922651174.html
With the Syrian Civil War still ongoing, the LAS held a closed-door meeting in Cairo, Egypt to address the
topic. The meeting was said to include a speech by the head of the Syrian National Council (SNC), who are
representing Syria within the League instead of the Bashar al-Assad-led government. The SNC called for
military intervention in Syria, which is a move correspondents stated the US government favored. Some
Arab League Member States, however, expressed their opposition to military opposition in Syria.
"Background Briefing By Senior Administration Officials on Iran, the IRGC, and Hezbollah's Increased
Terrorist Activity Worldwide," United States Department of State, May 31, 2013.
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/210145.htm
A senior administrative official with the US Department of State issued a special briefing that referenced
the Lebanese-based political group Hezbollah as the US released its annual Country Reports on Terrorism.
The senior administrative official noted a "marketing resurgence of terrorist activity" by Hezbollah. The
briefing included statements of how and the results of Hezbollah in Syria has caused. The Arab League is
noted in the US Department of State's briefing, and its stance on Hezbollah during the Syrian Civil War.
"Regional Programme on Drug Control, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform in the Arab States
2011-2015: Steering and Follow Up Committee Meeting," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
May 2012. https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica//arab-league-steering-
committee/Steering_Committee_Masood_Karimipour_Opening_Statement.pdf
Regional Representative of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Regional Office for
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Masood Karimipour delivered a speech to the organization,
which was hosted by the LAS. According to Karimipour, the UNODC and its regional office in the MENA
has aimed to adapt challenges set forth by the UN such as helping Member States prevent terrorism and the
threat of transnational organized crime. The representative acknowledged how efforts to eradicate terrorism
have been proposed while upholding the rule of law and promote accepted criminal justice practices. The
regional program was adopted by the councils of the LAS and launched by the Arab League Secretary
General and UNODC Executive Director on December 8, 2010.
“Summary of the most important efforts made by the League of Arab States to prevent terrorists from
obtaining weapons of mass destruction," United Nations.
www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/SGReport_Terrorism/Docs%202010/1st%20Cttee%20-
%20IO%20replies%20-%202010/League%20of%20Arab%20States%20-%20English%20%20-
%20post.pdf
The LAS' counterterrorism efforts continued in March 28, 2010, as the Council of the Arab League
confronted nuclear weapons. During the council meeting, the LAS reaffirmed their stance on the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, which all Members States of the LAS signed. The reaffirmation requested for the
international community to immediately eliminate their nuclear weapons as a method to prevent terrorists
from obtaining the weapons of mass destruction.
"Syria crisis: Kofi Annan resigns as peace envoy," The Guardian, August 2, 2012.
www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2012/aug/02/syria-crisis-damascus-massacres-live
A timeline of the crisis in Syria was outlined by The Guardian newspaper highlighting the steps leading up
to and after former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan resigned as a mediator of conflict in the Arab
Member State. The timeline features statements by Annan, current UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon,
and reactions from the international community and organizations. The article also noted developments and
events that have taken place in Syria including local news reports and video.
