EN BANC[A.C. No. 5580. June 15, 2005]SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC., as represented by REBECCA V. LABRADOR,complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS,respondent.D E C I S I O NPER CURIAM:This is a Petition[1]for disbarment against Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos for allegedly representing conflicting interests and for using the title Judge despite having been found guilty of grave and serious misconduct inZarate v. Judge Romanillos.[2]The facts are as follows:In 1985, respondent represented San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. (SJHAI) before the Human Settlements Regulation Commission (HSRC) in a case[3]against Durano and Corp., Inc. (DCI) for violation of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protection Act (P.D. No. 957). SJHAI alleged that Lot No. 224 was designated as a school site in the subdivision plan that DCI submitted to the Bureau of Lands in 1961 but was sold by DCI to spouses Ramon and Beatriz Durano without disclosing it as a school site.While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in requesting for SJHAIs conformity to construct a school building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased from Durano.When the request was denied, respondent applied for clearance before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in behalf of Montealegre. Petitioners Board of Directors terminated respondents services as counsel and engaged another lawyer to represent the association.Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who substituted for DCI in Civil Case No. 18014 entitled San Jose Homeowners, Inc. v. Durano and Corp., Inc. filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134. Thus, SJHAI filed a disbarment case against respondent for representing conflicting interests, docketed as Administrative Case No. 4783.In her Report[4]dated August 3, 1998, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) made the following findings: Respondent failed to observe candor and fairness in dealing with his clients, knowing fully well that the Montealegre case was adverse to the Complainant wherein he had previously been not only an active board member but its corporate secretary having access to all its documents confidential or otherwise and its counsel in handling the implementation of the writ of execution against its developer and owner, Durano and Co. Inc.Moreso, when Respondent acted as counsel for the substituted defendant Durano and Co. Inc., Lydia Durano-Rodriguez; the conflict of interest between the latter and the Complainant became so revealing and yet Respondent proceeded to represent the former.For his defense of good faith in doing so; inasmuch as the same wasnt controverted by the Complainant which was his first offense; Respondent must be given the benefit of the doubt to rectify his error subject to the condition that should he commit the same in the future; severe penalty will be imposed upon him.[5]The Investigating Commissioner recommended dismissal of the complaint with the admonition that respondent should observe extra care and diligence in the practice of his profession to uphold its dignity and integrity beyond reproach.The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, which we noted in a resolution dated March 8, 1999.Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent continued representing Lydia Durano-Rodriguez before the Court of Appeals[6]and this Court[7]and even moved for the execution of the decision.Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against respondent for violation of the March 8, 1999 Resolution in A.C. No. 4783 and for his alleged deceitful conduct in using the title Judge although he was found guilty of grave and serious misconduct.Respondent used the title Judge in his office letterhead, correspondences and billboards which was erected in several areas within the San Jose Subdivision sometime in October 2001.In his Comment and Explanation,[8]respondent claimed that he continued to represent Lydia Durano-Rodriguez against petitioner despite the March 8, 1999 Resolution because it was still pending when the second disbarment case was filed. He maintained that the instant petition is a rehash of the first disbarment case from which he was exonerated. Concerning the title Judge, respondent stated that since the filing of the instant petition he had ceased to attach the title to his name.On July 7, 2003, the matter was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.[9]Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. reported that respondent did not violate the admonition because it referred to future cases only and not to cases subject of A.C. No. 4783. Besides, petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondents continued representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez on appeal until the case was terminated.The Investigating Commissioner, however, believed that respondent was deceitful when he used the title Judge, thus creating a false impression that he was an incumbent.The Investigating Commissioner recommended thus:In view of the foregoing considerations, this Commissioner respectfully recommends the following penalty range to be deliberated upon by the Board for imposition on Respondent: minimum penalty of reprimand to a maximum penalty of four (4) months suspension. It is further recommended that in addition to the penalty to be imposed, a stern warning be given to Respondent in that should he violate his undertaking/promise not to handle any case in the future where the Complainant would be the adverse party and/or should he again use the title of Judge which would create an impression that he is still connected to the judiciary, a more severe penalty shall be imposed on him by the Commission.RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.The IBP Board of Governors approved with modification the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,with modification,the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A, and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Roberto Romanillos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months with a WARNING that should he violate his undertaking/promise a more severe penalty shall be imposed against him.Undoubtedly, respondent represented the inconsistent interests of SJHAI, DCI as substituted by Lydia Durano-Rodriguez and the Montealegres. Respondent was admonished yet he continued to represent Durano-Rodriguez against SJHAI.It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondents continued representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as the lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure. Incidentally, it is also misleading for respondent to insist that he was exonerated in A.C. No. 4783.We agree with the IBP that respondents continued use of the title Judge violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and from using any misleading statement or claim regarding qualifications or legal services. The quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring to himself as a judge is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to mislead the public into believing that the order was issued in his capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably stripped of the privilege.Respondent did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He resigned from being a judge during the pendency ofZarate v. Judge Romanillos, where he was eventually found guilty of grave and serious misconduct and would have been dismissed from the service had he not resigned.In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal solicitation and receipt of P10,000.00 from a party litigant. We ruled thus:Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Roberto B. Romanillos is hereby found guilty of grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and honesty. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal. However, respondent, in an obvious attempt to escape punishment for his misdeeds, tendered his resignation during the pendency of this case. Consequently, we are now precluded from dismissing respondent from the service. Nevertheless, the ruling in People v. Valenzuela (135 SCRA 712 [1985]), wherein the respondent judge likewise resigned before the case could be resolved, finds application in this case. Therein it was held that the rule that the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge in an administrative case renders the case moot and academic, is not a hard and fast rule. ACCORDINGLY, in view of our aforestated finding that respondent Judge Romanillos is guilty of grave and serious misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned during the pendency of this case, and it appearing that respondent has yet to apply for his retirement benefits and other privileges if any; the Court, consistent with the penalties imposed in Valenzuela (supra.), hereby orders the FORFEITURE of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which herein respondent Judge Romanillos may be entitled WITH PREJUDICE to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations.SO ORDERED.[10]The penalty imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits andprivilegesto which he may be entitled with prejudice to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations. Certainly, the use of the title Judge is one of suchprivileges.We have previously declared that the use of titles such as Justice is reserved toincumbentandretiredmembers of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan and may not be used by any other official of the Republic, including those given the rank of Justice.[11]By analogy, the title Judge should be reserved only to judges, incumbent and retired, and not to those who were dishonorably discharged from the service. As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the right to retain and use said title applies only to the aforementioned members of the bench and no other, and certainly not to those who were removed or dismissed from the judiciary, such as respondent.Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions.[12]It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character.[13]Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal profession.[14]To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the legal profession.[15]Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. We are mindful that the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, for only the most imperative reasons,[16]and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as a member of the bar.[17]This is not respondents first infraction as an officer of the court and a member of the legal profession. He was stripped of his retirement benefits and other privileges inZarate v. Judge Romanillos.[18]In A.C. No. 4783, he got off lightly with just an admonition. Considering his previous infractions, respondent should have adhered to the tenets of his profession with extra fervor and vigilance. He did not. On the contrary, he manifested undue disrespect to our mandate and exhibited a propensity to violate the laws. He is thus unfit to discharge the duties of his office and unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed on him as an officer of the court. His disbarment is consequently warranted.Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:SEC. 27.Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is DISBARREDand his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

A.M.No. P-06-2177(Formerly A.M. No. 06-4-268-RTC)April 19, 2007

RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTEDON THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO, CLERK OF COURT IV,REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ORAS, EASTERN SAMARR E S O L U T I O NCORONA,J.:In our resolution dated June 27, 2006, we found Atty. Raquel G. Kho, former clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar, guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to make a timely remittance of judiciary funds in his custody as required by OCA Circular No. 8A-93.[1]We ordered him to pay a fine ofP10,000 for his transgression. The matter did not end there, however. Because his malfeasanceprima faciecontravened Canon 1, Rule 1.01[2]of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we ordered him to show cause why he should not be disciplined as a lawyer and as an officer of the court. Atty. Kho submitted his explanation in compliance with our directive.We shall now resolve this pending matter and bring to a close this regrettable chapter in his career as a government lawyer.In his explanation, Atty. Kho admitted that his failure to make a timely remittance of the cash deposited with him was inexcusable. He maintained, however, that he kept the money in the courts safety vault and never once used it for his own benefit.Atty. Khos apparent good faith and his ready admission of the infraction, although certainly mitigating, cannot negate the fact that his failure to remitP65,000 in judiciary funds for over a year was contrary to the mandatory provisions of OCA Circular 8A-93. That omission was a breach of his oath to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities[3]and of his duties under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.RULE 1.01.A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.It is no accident that these are the first edicts laid down in the Code of Professional Responsibility for these are a lawyers foremost duties. Lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding the Constitution and obeying the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyers responsibilities under Canon 1 mean more than just staying out of trouble with the law. As servants of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing and maintaining the rule of law.They are expected to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation.[4]This, in fact, is what a lawyers obligation to promote respect for law and legal processes entails.The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in unlawful conduct.[5]By definition, any act or omission contrary to law is unlawful.[6]It does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although it is broad enough to include it.[7]Thus, the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.Atty. Khos conduct was not only far from exemplary, it was unlawful as well. For this, he must be called to account. However, his candid and repentant admission of his error, his lack of intent to gain and the fact that this is his first offense should temper his culpability considerably. Under the circumstances, a fine ofP5,000 should suffice.WHEREFORE, Atty. Raquel G. Kho is hereby foundGUILTYof unlawful conduct in violation of the Attorneys Oath, Section 20(a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.He is ordered to pay aFINEofP5,000 within ten days from receipt of this resolution.The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, is herebyDIRECTEDto deduct from Atty. Khos accrued leave credits as a former clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar the fines imposed in this resolution and in the resolution dated June 27, 2006.

THIRD DIVISIONA.C. No. 6296ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO, Complainant,- versus -ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA,Respondent. November 22, 2005x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xR E S O L U T I O NGARCIA,J.:In hersworncomplaint, as endorsed by the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija Chapter, Atty. Evelyn J. Magno charged Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba, a member of the same IBP provincial chapter, with willful violation of (a) Section 415 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and (b) Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant had with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping contract they had entered into. In a bid to have the stand-off between them settled, complainant addressed a letter, styled Sumbong,[1] to Bonifacio Alcantara, barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. At the barangay conciliation/confrontation proceedings conducted on January 5, 2003, respondent, on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the latter, accompanied by his son, Lorenzito. Complainants objection to respondents appearance elicited the response that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer inasmuch as complainant is herself a lawyer. And as to complainants retort that her being a lawyer is merely coincidental, respondent countered that she is appearing as an attorney-in-fact, not as counsel, of Lorenzo Inos. Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting documentation, tending to prove that respondent had, in the course of the conciliation proceedings before thePunong Barangay,acted as Inos Lorenzos counsel instead of as his attorney-in-fact. This is what complainant said in her complaint:[2]5. xxx Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an ocular inspection of the subject matter of the complaint. A heated argument took place because Lorencito Inos said that [complainants brother] Melencio Magno, Jr. made alterations in the lagoon . Afterwards Atty. Olivia Jacoba . . . returned to the barangay hall to have the incident recorded in the barangay blotter.... attached as Annex A 6. That on January 12, 2003, Lorenzo Inos appeared before the hearing also with the assistance of [respondent]. When the minutes of the proceeding (sic) was read, [respondent] averred that the minutes is partial in favor of the complainant because only her statements were recorded for which reason, marginal insertions were made to include what [respondent] wanted to be put on record. She also signed as saksi in the minutes . 7. xxx In a letter (answer to the "sumbong) sent to the Punong Barangay dated December 22, 2002, she signed representing herself as Family Legal Counsel of Inos Family, a copy of the letter is attached as Annex C . . . . (Words in bracket added.) In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP Director for Bar Discipline, directed the respondent to submit, within fifteen (15) days from notice, her answer to the complaint, otherwise she will be considered as in default.[3] The case, docketed asCBD No. 03-1061,was assigned to Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, who admitted respondents answer notwithstanding her earlier order of July 15, 2003, declaring respondent in default for failure to file an answer in due time.[4] In her Answer, respondent alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the Office of thePunong Barangay,instead of before theLupong Tagapamayapa,and heard byPunong BarangayBonifacio Alcantara alone, instead of the collegialLuponor a conciliation panel known aspangkat. Prescinding from this premise, respondent submits that the prohibition against a lawyer appearing to assist a client inkatarungan pambarangayproceedings does not apply. Further, she argued that her appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact. In her report dated October 6, 2003,[5]Commissioner Maala stated that the charge of complainant has been established by clear preponderance of evidence and, on that basis, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of her profession for a period of six (6) months. On the other hand, the Board of Governors, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, while agreeing with the inculpatory finding of the investigating commissioner, recommended in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-235,[6]a lighter penalty, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,with modification, and considering respondent's actuations was in violation of Section 415 which expressly prohibits the presence and representation by lawyers in the Katarungan Pambarangay, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is herebyADMONISHED. This resolution is now before us for confirmation. Section 415 of the LGC of 1991[7], on the subjectKatarungang Pambarangay, provides: Section 415.Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang pambarangayproceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of the counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties inkatarungan pambarangayconciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative. The rationale behind the personal appearance requirement is to enable theluponto secure first hand and direct information about the facts and issues,[8]the exception being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties. There can be no quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues.[9] Worse still, the participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills and legal knowledge tend to prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case. The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings was not, to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not apply since complainant addressed herSumbongto the barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state that complainant wrote herSumbongwith the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay justice. That she addressed herSumbongto the barangay captain is really of little moment since the latter chairs theLupong Tagapamayapa.[10] Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to allkatarungan barangayproceedings. Section 412(a)[11]the LGC of 1991 clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either before theluponchairman or theluponorpangkat. As what happened in this case, thepunong barangay, as chairman of theLupon Tagapamayapa, conducted the conciliation proceedings to resolve the disputes between the two parties. Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in its determination that respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in Section 415 of the LGC. However, its recommended penalty of mere admonition must have to be modified. Doubtless, respondents conduct tended to undermine the laudable purpose of thekatarunganpambarangay system. What compounded matters was when respondent repeatedly ignored complainants protestation against her continued appearance in the barangay conciliation proceedings.WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is herebyFINEDin the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for willful violation of Section 415 of the Local Government Code of 1991 withWARNINGthat commission of similar acts of impropriety on her part in the future will be dealt with more severely.

. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put short;their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girlat the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents is theindubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father.This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for bothrespondents Eala and Moje have not denied,in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.Citing the ruling inPangan v. Ramos,46viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law.Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case47(Italics in the original),this Court inGatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48held:Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they mayproceed independently of civil and criminal cases.WHEREFORE, the petition isGRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines isANNULLEDandSET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, isDISBARREDfor grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.This Decision takes effect immediately.SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION[A.C. No. 6491. January 31, 2005]BENILDA M. MADDELA,complainant,vs. ATTY. ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO,respondent.R E S O L U T I O NDAVIDE, JR.,C.J.:Complainant Benilda Madella is a Clerk in the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, while respondent Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court andEx-OfficioProvincial Sheriff of the RTC, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. Their offices are both housed at the Dumlao Hall of Justice within the Capital Compound in Bayombong.In an affidavit-complaint dated 7 February 2003, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and docketed as CBD No. 03-1060, the complainant prays for the disbarment of the respondent for acts unbecoming a public servant and a lawyer, grave misconduct and slander.On the basis of the same affidavit-complaint, the complainant filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an administrative complaint, which was docketed as OCA IPI No. 03-1554-P. The complaint was referred to Executive Judge Jose Godofredo M. Naui of the RTC of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, for investigation, report, and recommendation.In her affidavit-complaint, the complainant alleged that sometime in July 1999, she received the amount ofP40,000 from the respondent by way of a loan at an interest of 5% per month. In November 2001, since part of the loan remained unpaid, the respondent went to complainants office and took complainants cash gift check amounting toP5,000 in her absence and without her knowledge. There, the respondent uttered unsavory and humiliating words against her (the complainant). The respondent was able to encash the check even without her endorsement and applied the proceeds thereof to the interest of complainants loan. From January to November 2002, the respondent, based on complainants promissory note, had been collecting from the complainant an amount equivalent to one-half of the face value of the checks she received as benefit from the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 10 December 2002, the respondent went again to the office of the complainant and demanded one-half of the value of the check representing a cash gift ofP5,000. The complainant refused, reasoning that it was a cash gift, not a JDF check and, therefore, not covered by their agreement. Complainants refusal to part with the amount angered the respondent, prompting the latter to raise her voice, utter unsavory remarks against the complainant, and bang her fist on top of the complainants table, causing the glass top of the table to break. Several people witnessed this incident and heard the accusations hurled by the respondent against the complainant with regard to her failure to pay her debt.To support her bid to have the respondent stripped of the privilege to practice the noble profession of law, the complainant attached to her affidavit-complaint a copy of a confidential letter-complaint of one Benjamin Rilloraza dated 3 May 2001 addressed to Atty. Ma. Cristina Layusa of the Office of the Bar Confidant, opposing the respondents admission to the Bar in view of her acts of notarizing documents outside the area of her commission. Mr. Rilloraza claimed that the respondent, although not yet a lawyer, was issued a notarial commission for Kayapa or (Kasibu), Nueva Vizcaya. However, the respondent notarized documents in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, outside the area of her commission. To prove his allegation, he attached to the said letter-complaint photocopies of a Deed of Sale of Motor Vehicle dated 31 January 2001 and an Affidavit dated 3 May 2001, both indicating that they were notarized by the respondent in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and that the respondents commission as a Notary Public was for Bayombong. Mr. Rilloraza likewise alleged that despite her husbands death, the respondent continued to receive and encash for at least three months checks corresponding to her husbands salaries asEx-OfficioSheriff of the Office of the Clerk of Court of Nueva Vizcaya. He also pointed out that the respondent even continued to claim the higher allowable deductions as a married individual despite the death of her husband.The complainant also presented a Certification issued on 6 May 2003 by Judge Jose B. Rosales of Branch 27, RTC, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in his capacity as Executive Judge, stating that the respondent was never appointed as a notary public for Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, during the period from 1 January 1997 to December 2003.For her part, the respondent denied that she is engaged in the business of lending money, the truth of the matter being that the complainant approached her sometime in November 1998 begging that she lend her some money. She then informed the complainant that she knew of somebody who had money. Out of pity and compassion, she agreed to be the guarantor to facilitate her loan. To prove her claim, she presented an affidavitof Mr. Josue B. Liclican dated 10 March 2003 stating that he is the creditor of the complainant and that the respondent merely brokered the loan agreement and acted as a guarantor in favor of the complainant. Mr. Liclican also claimed that by reason of complainants failure to pay her obligation after the lapse of more than four years, he tried to collect the loan from the respondent, who acted as a guarantor.As regards complainants allegation that she did not authorize the respondent to obtain the cash gift in November 2001, the respondent averred that she had a verbal agreement with the complainant authorizing her to obtain the check. She also presented an authorization signed by the complainant on 8 January 2002 authorizing the respondent to receive the formers JDF checks and to apply half of the amount as installment payment of her loan, with the obligation to return the other half to the complainant. To refute the allegation that she continued to obtain the checks of her deceased husband, the respondent presented a letter dated 2 May 1998 informing the OCA of the death of her husband on 3 April 1998 with a request to stop sending checks issued in his name. She likewise presented her Income Tax Return (ITR) for 1998 filed on 11 January 1999, which showed that she declared herself as head of the family and not as a married individual. She forwarded the said ITR to the OCA on 10 March 1999, and informed the latter of her change of status for purposes of taxation.Anent the allegation that she notarized documents in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, outside of the area of her commission, the respondent explained that she did it to accommodate the parties thereto, who were her relatives, and that she did not derive profit from such act.Respondents motion to suspend the proceedings in CAD No. 03-1060 in view of the pendency of OCA IPI No. 03-1554 was denied.On 20 February 2004, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted her report and recommendation. She found that the respondent has proved that she is not the creditor of the complainant and that she had promptly informed the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Supreme Court of the death of her husband, precluding any occasion where she could unlawfully claim her husbands salary and avail herself of the higher allowable tax deductions even after his death. However, Commissioner Maala recommended that for the acts of notarizing outside the area of her notarial commission and obtaining the JDF checks of the complainant from the cash clerk in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 27-2001, the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months.On 16 April 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-227 in CBD No. 03-1060, annulling and setting aside Commissioner Maalas recommendation; dismissing the administrative complaint against Atty. Galicinao with respect to the charge of violating a Supreme Court Circular for collecting a loan for which she acted as a guarantor; and imposing upon the respondent the penalty of reprimand for her act of notarizing documents outside the area where she was commissioned as a notary public.We affirm the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the IBP dismissing the administrative complaint against the respondent to the extent covered by the complaint in A.M. No. P-04-1890, formerly OCA IPI No. 03-1554-P. It must be pointed out that as an employee of the Judiciary and a member of the Bar, the respondent is subject to our disciplinary authority. Under our Resolution in A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which took effect on 1 October 2002, an administrative case against a court official who is a lawyer, based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar, shall be considered as disciplinary proceedings against such official both as a court official and as a member of the Bar. Thus, in our Resolution of 20 September 2004 in A.M. No. P-04-1890, we severely reprimanded the respondent for simple misconduct, with a warning that a repetition of the same act in the future shall be dealt with more severely, and we ordered her to replace the broken glass top with a new one.Hence, the only remaining issue is respondents liability for her act of notarizing documents outside the area of her commission as a notary public. Although such act was not one of the grounds relied upon in complainants affidavit-complaint, we cannot turn a blind eye thereto considering respondents admission that she did such act. For that, as correctly held by the IBP, the respondent must be disciplined. The penalty of reprimand recommended by the IBP is, however, too light.We have declared on several occasions, that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof (Nunga v. Viray, A.C. No. 4758, 366 Phil. 155, 160 [1999]).Thus, we are not satisfied with respondents explanation that she notarized documents outside of the area of her notarial commission as a favor to her relatives and for free. Whether the respondent derived profit from her act of notarizing outside the area of her authority is of no moment. The fact remains that she notarized outside the area of her commission. Considering, however, that her misconduct as a notary public was committed while she was not yet a lawyer, she could not be disciplinarily dealt with as a lawyer. The penalty that should be meted to her should, therefore, be as a notary public before she was admitted to the Bar. The penalty of fine would be a sufficient sanction.WHEREFORE, the Court hereby MODIFIES the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors and hereby imposes on respondent ATTY. ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) for misconduct as a notary public.Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, all the courts of the Philippines, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

GUERRERO vs. BIHIS (ORIGINAL SCRA)

THIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 156310 July 31, 2008XERXES A. ABADIANO, Petitioner,- versus- SPOUSES JESUS and LOLITA MARTIR, Respondents.DECISIONNACHURA,J.:Before this Court is a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) datedMarch 14, 2002and its Resolution[2]datedNovember 21, 2002in CA-G.R. CV No. 51679. The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental[3]declaring respondents as the owners of the property in question.The case stemmed from an action for quieting of title and/or recovery of possession[4]of a parcel of land filed by herein respondents against Roberto Abadiano, Faustino Montao, and Quirico Mandaguit. Petitioner Xerxes A. Abadiano intervened in that case.Lot No. 1318 of the Kabankalan Cadastre consists of 34,281 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20461 issued on November 19, 1923 in the name of the spouses Inocentes Baares and Feliciana Villanueva. Before the issuance of OCT No. 20461, however, Inocentes and the heirs of Feliciana Villanueva (who had predeceased her husband) executed an Agreement of Partition datedJune 1, 1922over Lot No. 1318. The lot was partitioned and distributed as follows: (1) 14,976 sq m denominated as Lot No. 1318-A, in favor of Demetrio Baares; (2) 10,125 sq m denominated as Lot No. 1318-B, in favor of Ramon and David Abadiano (grandchildren of Inocentes and Feliciana); and (3) 10,180 sq m denominated as Lot No. 1318-C, in favor of Amando Baares. The partition is embodied in a Deed of Partition executed onJune 1, 1922and notarized the following day by Notary Public Jose Peralta with notarial inscriptions Reg. No. 64, Pag. 69, Libro III.[5]OnSeptember 30, 1939, David Abadiano, who was absent during the execution of the Agreement of Partition, executed a Deed of Confirmation acknowledging and ratifying the document of partition.[6]OCT No. 20461 was administratively reconstituted onFebruary 15, 1962and in lieu thereof OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) was issued over Lot No. 1318, still in the name of Inocentes Baares and Felicidad Villanueva. Annotated at the back of the reconstituted title were the Agreement of Partition and the Deed of Confirmation.[7]OnJune 14, 1957Demetrio Baares sold his share of the lot to his son, Leopoldo. The same was annotated at the back of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461).[8]Subsequently, onFebruary 21, 1962, Leopoldo Baares filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental anex-partepetition praying for: first, the confirmation of the Agreement of Partition, the Conformity executed by David Abadiano, and the Deed of Sale between him and his father; and second, the cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and, in lieu thereof, the issuance of a new certificate of title over the property. In an Order datedFebruary 22, 1962, the court ordered the cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of Dr. Leopoldo Baares, Amando Baares, and Ramon and David Abadiano. Pursuant thereto, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31862 was issued by the Register of Deeds for Negros Occidental.[9]Petitioner insists that this is still the valid and subsisting title over Lot No. 1318 and that no sale of the portion pertaining to Ramon and David Abadiano ever took place.[10]On the other hand, respondent spouses alleged that, prior to the issuance of TCT No. T-31862, Ramon Abadiano, for himself and on behalf of David Abadiano, had already sold their rights and interests over Lot No. 1318-C[11]to Victor Garde. The sale was allegedly evidenced by a document of sale (Compra Y Venta) dated June 3, 1922 and acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Peralta and bearing notarial inscription Doc. No. 64, Pag. No. 60, Book No. III, series of 1922. The sale was allegedly affirmed by David Abadiano in a document datedSeptember 30, 1939.[12]They further alleged that from the time of the sale, Victor Garde and his heirs were in continuous, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession and occupation in the concept of an owner of Lot No. 1318-C.[13]On December 29, 1961, the heirs of Victor Garde sold their rights and interests over Lot No. 1318-C[14]to Jose Garde, who immediately took possession thereof. Jose Garde continuously planted sugarcane on the land until he sold the property to Lolita Martir in 1979.[15]After acquiring the property, respondent spouses continued to plant sugarcane on the land. Sometime in March 1982, after respondent Jesus Martir harvested the sugarcane he had planted on Lot No. 1318-C, defendant below Roberto Abadiano (son of Ramon) allegedly entered the property and cultivated the remaining stalks of sugarcane and refused to vacate despite demands to do so. The following year, defendants Roberto Abadiano, Faustino Montao, and Quirico Mandaguit again harvested the sugarcane on Lot No. 1318-C.[16]Further, the defendants also entered the property and harvested the sugarcane on Lot No. 1318-B,[17]which by then had been acquired by Lolita B. Martir from her adoptive father, Amando Baares.[18]Thus, in April 1982, herein respondent-spouses filed the Action to Quiet Title and/or Recovery of Possession with Damages before the then CFI of Negros Occidental.In their Answer with Counterclaim,[19]defendants denied that the subject property was ever sold by Ramon and David Abadiano, and that, consequently, defendant Roberto Abadiano had inherited the same from Ramon. They also alleged, by way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, that the subject land still belonged to the estate of Ramon and David Abadiano and was never alienated. They alleged further that the act of spouses Martir in planting sugarcane on the land was without Robertos consent; that Roberto had demanded that the spouses Martir pay him reasonable rental for the land but that they had persistently refused to do so; and that sometime in March 1981, Roberto and the spouses Martir came to an agreement whereby the defendant continued to cultivate the remaining stalks of sugarcane left by plaintiffs and that until the harvest of said sugarcane, plaintiffs never posed any objection thereto.Xerxes Abadiano intervened in the proceedings before the trial court alleging likewise that his predecessor Ramon Abadiano never sold their share of the property to Victor Garde.[20]After trial, the court issued a Decision[21]datedJune 23, 1995,ruling in favor of the spouses Martir, thus:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants declaring plaintiffs spouses Jesus and Lolita Martir as the true and legitimate owners of portions of Lot No. 1318 Kabankalan Cadastre denominated as Lots 1318-B and 1318-C and ordering:(1)That the defendants Roberto Abadiano and the intervenor Xerxes Abadiano shall surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862 to the Registrar of Deeds of Negros Occidental who is directed to partially cancel said title and issue new Certificate of Title corresponding to Lots 1318-B and 1318-C in the names of the spouses Jesus and Lolita Martir;(2)That the defendants shall jointly and severally pay to the plaintiffs the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos representing the value of the sugarcanes of plaintiffs which defendants harvested and milled with SONEDCO and;(3)To pay the costs of this suit.SO ORDERED.[22]The trial court rejected therein defendants contention that theCompra Y Ventawas null and void because the co-owner, David Abadiano, did not sign the same. It held that the Supreme Court has ruled to the effect that the sale by a co-owner of the entire property without the consent of the other co-owners was not null and void but that only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, making the buyer a co-owner. The trial court also held that although theCompra Y Ventawas not annotated either on the OCT or on the reconstituted OCT, the validity of the sale was not vitiated. The registration or annotation is required only to make the sale valid as to third persons. Thus, the trial court concluded that theCompra Y Ventawas valid between the parties, Ramon Abadiano and Victor Garde.The trial court also brushed aside the defendants contention that theCompra Y Ventacontained the same notarial inscription as the Deed of Partition. It said that assuming this to be true, this may be considered an error which did not nullify theCompra Y Venta;at most, the document would be non-registrable but still valid.On the contention that the alleged confirmation executed by David Abadiano was for the Deed of Partition and not for theCompra Y Venta, the trial court agreed. It, however, interpreted the same to mean that David Abadiano must not have authorized his brother to sell his share in Lot No. 1318-C. The effect was that David Abadiano continued to be one of the registered owners of the property and his heirs stepped into his shoes upon his death.However, the trial court found that the plaintiffs (respondents) claim that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property for more than sixty (60) years was duly established. In contrast, the court found that defendants and intervenor, and their deceased parents, had not been in possession of their share in the property. It held that the defendants and intervenor were guilty of laches for failing to avail of the many opportunities for them to bring an action to establish their right over Lot No. 1318-C.Defendants appealed to the CA. However, the same was summarily dismissed in a Resolution datedFebruary 11, 1997due to defendants failure to pay the required docket fee within the period set. Nonetheless, the records were retained for the appeal of Xerxes Abadiano, intervenor in the trial court.OnMarch 14, 2002, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the Decision of the RTCin toto.[23]Xerxes Abadiano now comes before this Court raising the following arguments:ATHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, BASED ON ITS MISAPPREHENSION AND/OR OMISSION OF THE FACTS, IN DISREGARDING THE PRIMORDIAL ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OFSALE(COMPRA Y VENTA) IS A SPURIOUS DOCUMENTBTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF LACHES OVER REGISTERED LAND[24]The Petition is impressed with merit. We believe the trial court and the CA erred in ruling for the respondents. Accordingly, we reverse the assailed Decision and Resolution.It is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal. Such findings are binding and conclusive on the Court. Further, it is not the Courts function under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented.The jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 is limited to reviewing only errors of law. Unless the case falls under the recognized exceptions, the rule shall not be disturbed.[25]However, this Court has consistently recognized the following exceptions: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[26]In the present case, we find that the trial court based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts, as well as on the supposed absence of evidence which is contradicted by the records.In appreciating the allegedCompra Y Ventapresented by respondents, the trial court concluded that [t]he parties have no quarrel on the existence of a Deed of Sale of a portion of Lot No. 1318 executed by Ramon Abadiano for himself and as representative of David Abadiano, dated June 3, [1922] in favor of Victor Garde.[27]The trial court erred in its conclusion.Borne very clearly by the records is the defendants repudiation of the existence of the sale in their Answer with Counterclaim. They stated:2. That defendants admit plaintiffs allegation in paragraph 4 that there has been no particular designation of lot number (sic) for each of the co-owner (sic) of Lot No. 1318 but specifically deny under oath the other allegations thereof the truth being that the property referred to here as Lot No. 1318 remains undivided to this day that the owners thereof as shown by the TCT No. 31862 co-own the same pro-indiviso;3. That defendants have no knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in paragraph 5[28]and thereforespecifically deny the same under oaththe truth being that Ramon Abadiano and David Abadiano had not sold the land at bar to anyone and that consequently, defendant Roberto Abadiano had inherited the same from the former; x x x.[29](emphasis supplied).Likewise, petitioner specifically denied the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Complaint. He alleged that the lot had never been sold or alienated and the same still remains intact as the property of the Intervenor and his co-owners by operation of law.[30]This was testified to by Roberto Abadiano during the trial, thus:Q:During the lifetime of your father, do you know if your father has ever sold to any party his share on Lot No. 1318?A:He has not sold his share.[31]These statements were enough to impugn the due execution of the document. While it is true that this Court had previously ruled that mere denials would not have sufficed to impeach the document, in this case, there was an effective specific denial as contemplated by law in accordance with our ruling that -defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.[32]It was error then for the RTC to have brushed aside this issue and then make so sweeping a conclusion in the face of such opposition. In light of this challenge to the very existence of theCompra Y Venta, the trial court should have first resolved the issue of the documents authenticity and due execution before deciding on its validity. Unfortunately, the CA did not even discuss this issue.We are cognizant, however, that it is now too late in the day to remand the case to the trial court for the determination of the purportedCompra Y Ventas authenticity and due execution. Thus, we will resolve this very issue here and now in order to put an end to this protracted litigation.There is no denying that TCT No. 31862 is still the subsisting title over the parcel of land in dispute. It is also a fact that the purportedCompra Y Ventawas not annotated on TCT No. 31862 until April 1982, shortly before the complaint was commenced, even though the deed was allegedly executed in 1922.Considering that the action is one for quieting of title and respondents anchored their claim to the property on the disputedCompra Y Venta, we find it necessary to repeat that it was incumbent upon the trial court to have resolved first the issue of the documents due execution and authenticity, before determining its validity.Rule 130, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the part of the offeror;(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.Respondents attached only a photocopy of theCompra Y Ventato their complaint. According to respondent Lolita Martir, the original of said document was in the office of the Register of Deeds. They allegedly tried to obtain a copy from that office but their request was refused. No other evidence but these bare assertions, however, was presented to prove that the original is indeed in the custody of the Register of Deeds or that respondents due and diligent search for the same was unsuccessful.The Rule states that when the original document is unavailable,has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.[33]In the case at bar, respondents failed to establish that the offer in evidence of the document was made in accordance with any of the exceptions allowed under the abovequoted rule, and yet, the trial court accepted the document as genuine and proceeded to determine its validity based on such assumption.The trial court likewise brushed aside the apparent defect that the document presented contained the same notarial inscription as the Agreement on Partition. Indeed, the Deed of Partition and theCompra Y Venta, though executed on different days, were notarized on the same day, and both documents contained the signatures of the same witnesses and the same notarial inscription.This notwithstanding, the court concluded, Assuming this to be true, same could be considered an error which did not nullify, (sic) the Deed of Sale orCompra Y Venta. At most, the document would be a non-registrable, but valid document.[34]We stress that a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor the presumption of regularity.[35]In this case, while it is true that the error in the notarial inscription would not have invalidated the sale if indeed it took place the same error would have meant that the document cannot be treated as a notarial document and thus, not entitled to the presumption of regularity. The document would be taken out of the realm of public documents whose genuineness and due execution need not be proved.[36]Accordingly, respondents not having proven the due execution and genuineness of the purportedCompra Y Venta, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of petitioner.Next, we determine if petitioner is guilty of laches. On this issue, we rule in the negative.Under theProperty Registration Decree,[37]no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.[38]Indefeasibility and imprescriptibility are the cornerstones of land registration proceedings. Barring any mistake or use of fraud in the procurement of the title, owners may rest secure on their ownership and possession once their title is registered under the protective mantle of theTorrenssystem.[39]Nonetheless, even if aTorrenstitle is indefeasible and imprescriptible,[40]the registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches.[41]Laches has been defined as neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a delay in the assertion of a right which works disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations of the property or parties. It is based on public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim.[42]The four basic elements oflachesare: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held to be barred.[43]The reason for the rule is not simply the lapse of time during which the neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the changes of condition which may have arisen during the period in which there has been neglect.In other words, where a court finds that the position of the parties will change, that equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect.[44]Though lachesapplies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved positively.Laches is evidentiary in nature and cannotbe established by mere allegations in the pleadings.[45]Based on the foregoing, we hold that petitioner is not guilty of laches. The evidence on record does not support such finding.Petitioner had reasonable ground to believe that the property, being still in the name of his predecessor in interest, continued to be theirs, especially considering that the annotation of the purported sale was done only in 1982. According to petitioner, his father had told him that his (the fathers) inheritance was in the possession of their uncle, Amando Baares who knew likewise that the property was theirs.Thus, Roberto Abadiano testified:Q:Before Amando Baares died, did you know that your father is a part owner of Lot No. 1318?A:Yes, Sir.Q:And did you not complain to Amando Baares that your father is a pert owner of that lot?A:No, Sir. We did not complain because he was our grandfather and when he dies, the property will go back to us.[46]And herein petitioner testified:Atty. Garaygay Q:Before the war who was occupying this lot which you claimed belonging (sic) to your father?A:The uncle of my father, Amando Baares, Sir.Q:As a matter of fact, before and after the war and during the lifetime of Amando Baares, he was the one in possession of Lot No. 1318?A:Yes, sir.Q:What was the condition of the lot under the possession of the lot under the possession of Amando Baares was it under lease?A:As far as I can remember, my father told me that his inheritance was with Amando Baares, his uncle.[47]From the testimonies of petitioner and the defendants during trial, it would appear that they were unaware of any of respondents actions in relation to the property until the death of their grandfather, Amando Baares. When they did find out that respondents were occupying the land, they immediately took action to occupy what they believed was still rightfully theirs.On this point, petitioner testified, thus:Q:When did you initiate the move to claim Lot No. 1318-B as your inheritance from your late father?A:It was shortly after the death of Amando Baares.Q:Who were these, who initiated the move to claim Lot No. 1318-B?A:I advised my brothers here in Kabankalan to take action to possess the land which was then occupied before by our (sic) great uncle, Amando Baares.Q:When was that, in what year, because we do not know when did your uncle (sic) die?A:It was after the death of Amando Baares sometime in 1973 or 1974.Q:Why did it take you that long before you initiated the move to claim the inheritance?A:Considering that relatives were involved and the fact we understand that our late parents revered our uncle so, we cautiously tried to take action shortly after his death, so as not to antagonize our relatives.Q:What did you do in order to claim your inheritance?A:Now, after learning that it was being farmed by Lolita Martir, I advised my brothers here in Kabankalan to go toBacolodCityto seek the intercession of the Philippine Constabulary Commander in order to thresh out the matter in a way that there will be no hostility or adverse reaction.Q:What other reactions did you take, if any?A:Well, I told my brother that they have a confrontation in the Office of the PACLAP known as the Presidential Action Commission on Land Problems.

Q:Besides that confrontation at the PACLAP, what other action did you personally take as an heir of Lot No. 1318-B?A:After that confrontation, I advised my brothers to occupy the land in question to farm it because it belongs to us.Q:With respect to the Transfer Certificate of Title, what action, if any, did you undertake?A:Well, we drew out a Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication and after it was approved by the Court, it was annotated at the back of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862 and we were given a co-owners copy of the said title by the Register of Deeds.x x x xQ:Mr. Witness, when did you and your co-owners executed (sic) this Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication overLot1318-B?A:That was on July 17, 1976.Q:Was that before or after the plaintiffs have filed this present case?A:That was almost 6 or 7 years before this present case was filed.[48]On the other hand, Roberto Abadiano testified:Atty. Garaygay Q:Now, according to you, your father is the co-owner of Lot No. 1318. Prior to the death of your father, who was in possession of Lot No. 1318?Witness A:What I know is it was Amando Baares.Q:You mean to say that when your father was still alive, it was Amando Baares who was in possession of Lot No. 1318?A:Yes, sir.Q:And until when did you know that Amando Baares has been in possession of Lot No. 1318?A:Up to 1976 when he died.Q:After his death in 1976, who was in possession of the said lot?A:I made a verification in the Office of the Register of Deeds, and when I went to the said lot, it was vacant.Q:When was that?A:In 1976-1977, and I have it planted in 1978.[49]That petitioner and his co-heirs waited until the death of Amando Baares to try and occupy the land is understandable. They had to be careful about the actions they took, lest they sow dissent within the family.Furthermore, they knew that their parents revered Amando.[50]The Court has recognized that this reaction cannot be characterized as such delay as would amount to laches, thus:in determining whether a delay in seeking to enforce a right constitutes laches, the existence of a confidential relationship between the parties is an important circumstance for consideration, a delay under such circumstances not being so strictly regarded as where the parties are strangers to each other. The doctrine of laches is not strictly applied between near relatives, and the fact that parties are connected by ties of blood or marriage tends to excuse an otherwise unreasonable delay.[51]In addition, several other factors militate against the finding of laches on the part of the petitioner.When the Original Certificate of Title was reconstituted on February 15, 1962, no annotation therein was made of theCompra Y Ventaor of the Deed of Sale between Ramon Abadiano and Victor Garde. Only the Agreement of Partition, the Confirmation by David Abadiano, and the sale from Demetrio to Leopoldo Baares were annotated therein.[52]Neither does the Deed of Sale of Demetrios share in favor of Leopoldo, executed in 1957, mention that the property belonged to anyone other than the parties to the Deed of Partition.[53]Likewise, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862, which was issued in 1962 pursuant to an Order of the Kabankalan CFI, was issued in the names of Leopoldo Baares, Amando Baares, and Ramon and David Abadiano. Even at the time of the issuance of said TCT, there was no annotation of the alleged sale to Victor Garde, which according to respondents took place in 1922.If respondents contention were true, the TCT should not have been issued in April 1962 in the name of Ramon and David Abadiano, but in the name of Victor Garde or Jose Garde who by then had supposedly acquired the property by virtue of the Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Sale executed on December 29, 1961.[54]As it is, neither respondents nor any of their predecessors in interest participated in any of the proceedings for the issuance of the OCT, the reconstituted OCT, or the TCT.The petitioners testimony on the matter is revealing:Q:Based on your investigation, did you find records of the proceedings of the reconstitution of title ofLot1318 or any evidence as to the participation of the plaintiffs in this Reconstitution Petition?A:Based on the existing records, they did not participate.Q:How about in the Reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. (sic) did the plaintiffs participate therein?A:They did not also.Q:How about in the issuance of the new Transfer Certificate of Title, did the plaintiffs participate therein?A:No, sir.[55]Again, the TCT bears out the fact that the purportedCompra Y Ventato Victor Garde was annotated thereon only on April 23, 1982. On the other hand, several entries made in 1981 evince that petitioner and his co-heirs took steps after Amandos death to assert their rights over the property.[56]In 1976, the heirs of David Abadiano executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Roberto Abadiano giving the latter authority to act, sue, and/or represent them in any suit or action for recovery of possession or of whatever kind or nature.[57]For their part, the heirs of Ramon Abadiano executed a Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication over the part of Lot No. 1318 pertaining to their predecessor.[58]Ranged against these positive steps, respondents only have their bare assertions to support their claim that they indeed had possession of the land through their predecessors in interest, which are insufficient to overcome the testimony that it was Amando Baares and not Victor Garde who had possession of the property during the formers lifetime, or that after Amandos death, the lot remained unoccupied.In sum, we find that petitioner is not guilty of such neglect or inaction as would bar his claim to the property in question. In contrast, it is most telling that respondents, who are claiming to have been in possession of the property by virtue of an alleged duly constituted sale for almost 60 years, have themselves failed within that long period to have the same property transferred in their name or even only to have the sale annotated on the title of the property.Finally, we come to the issue of damages. Petitioner prays that respondents be made to pay actual damages of not less thatP30,000.00 plus rentals on the property from the time of the latters occupation, moral damages amounting toP100,000.00, and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees.The record shows that petitioner testified on the prevailing rate of rentals on the subject property from the time of Amando Baares death in 1976 until the time of the trial. According to petitioner, the rental rate from 1976 until 1985 wasP3,000.00 per hectare, while from 1985 until the time of his testimony in 1994, the rental rate wasP5,000.00 per hectare. We thus rule that the actual damages that may be awarded shall be based only on these rates.[59]Considering, however, that petitioners co-heirs (defendants Roberto Abandiano, et al.) were able to enter the property and harvest the sugarcane therein in 1981 and, thereafter, the land remained unoccupied, the rent must be reckoned only from the time respondents actually occupied the land until March 1981.The claims for moral damages must be anchored on a definite showing that the claiming party actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings.[60]In this case, we find that petitioners testimony that he suffered from sleepless nights from worrying about this case and considering the great distance he had to travel from his home in Tacloban to see the case through are enough bases to award him moral damages. With the award of moral damages, exemplary damages are likewise in order.[61]Attorneys fees are recoverable when exemplary damages are awarded, or when the court deems it just and equitable.The grant of attorneys fees depends on the circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion of the court.[62]Given the circumstances of this case, we grant the prayer for attorneys fees.WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition isGRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals inCA-G.R. CV No. 51679 areREVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered:(1)reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 1331;(2)declaring the heirs of Ramon and David Abadiano as the lawful owners ofLotNo. 1318-B, a portion of Lot No. 1318 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862, Kabankalan Cadastre,NegrosOccidental; and(3)ordering respondents to pay petitioner and his co-heirs rentals at the rate ofP3,000.00 per hectare per year, from the time of actual occupation of the land in 1976 until March 1981, moral damages in the amount ofP100,00.00, exemplary damages in the amount ofP30,000.00, and attorneys fees in the amount ofP10,000.00.

EN BANCG.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,vs.VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.R E S O L U T I O NCASTRO,J.:Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, theManila Timespublished statements attributed to him, as follows:Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the tribunal's"unconstitutional and obnoxious"practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.Because of the tribunal's"short-cut justice,"Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.xxx xxx xxxThere is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition,"where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.xxx xxx xxxHe expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court"will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)Atty. Almacen's statement that... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunitywas quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of theManila Chronicleof September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitledVirginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision inManila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co.,L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging thatManila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citingRepublic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that ofManila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co.,G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case,Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.In the case ofRepublic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. ThereforeRepublic vs. Venturanzais no authority on the matter in issue.Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654,Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: "Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes.""Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."xxx xxx xxxYour respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.xxx xxx xxxRespondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...xxx xxx xxxTo all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.xxx xxx xxxNow that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."xxx xxx xxxWe condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.xxx xxx xxxThe INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our Presiden