SPECIAL FEDERATION NUMBER || Political Aspects of Federation

Political Aspects of FederationAuthor(s): Morley AyearstSource: Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, SPECIAL FEDERATION NUMBER (JUNE,1957), pp. 247-261Published by: Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies, University of the WestIndiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27851103 .

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Political Aspects of Federation

By

MORLEY AyEARST

In discussing the politics of federation one is tempted to indulge in political prophecy. This is a risky business because it is impossible to know all per tinent facts in the existing situation, still less to estimate with precision the direction and speed of economic and social change which is sure to have

political repercussions. The following essay, therefore, makes no attempt at exact prognosis but may serve simply to call attention to some aspects of the political scene in the British West Indies likely to influence the politics of the nascent federation.

One is tempted also to compare the West Indies federation with other federal parliamentary systems as in Australia and Canada, as well as such recent arrangements as those of Nigeria, and the abortive federation of the

Republic of Indonesia. These comparisons must be made with caution for in few respects are there precisely parallel conditions in the federation of the West Indies and another federation. In a number of respects the West Indians start with advantages seldom possessed elsewhere. In the first place there is a high degree of homogeneity of background and of patterns of popu lation in the several colonies. There is nothing like the Nigerian problem of a Muslim North and a "pagan" South. Although there are great differences in size and population of the federal units, and although they are widely separated in some cases, as in Indonesia, cultural differences are relatively unimportant in the British West Indies and it is doubtful if wide variation in size is by itself of much significance. As Madison noted in the Philadelphia debates in 1787, the truly serious problems in interstate relations arose not because some states were larger than others but out of clashing economic interests (6). Economic clashes of such magnitude do not exist in the West Indies where all units have agricultural export economies, in some cases aided

by extractive industries. West Indian interests versus the rest of the world are

capable of being handled co-operatively and should not, at present, cause serious differences to arise between the members of the federation. Indeed, it is in this field that the Federal Government can make its most important con tribution to the general prosperity of the area. In time, of course, certain units

may be able to develop a far greater amount of industry than is possible in the smaller islands. This will lead to tariff disputes and to the thorny issue of a federally supported agricultural subsidy. Politico-economic questions of this kind may prove to be, at some future date, a source of inter-island fric tion.



248 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES

Another possible source of future political differences is to be found in

the federal constitution. Constitutional aspects of federation are treated else where but it may be noted in passing that disagreements over proposed con

stitutional changes or over the interpretation of existing provisions can be a

political irritant in a federal system. No constitution can be unalterable be cause it must grow with the changing needs of the society it serves. Even if the formal amending arrangements are simple and easy to use, informal

growth is certain to occur. The daily business of all branches of government requires constant interpretation and application of the constitution. There are sure to be border-line cases where there is room for honest difference of

opinion as to the correct location of power. If the Federal Government chooses to take action in areas where its constitutional authority to act is debatable, the "states' rights" cry may be voiced in islands which oppose the federal action. What may appear at first glance to be purely legal questions of con

stitutional interpretation thus can become burning political issues.

We may observe that, at the moment, pro-federation opinion in the West

Indies seems to be more concerned with federation as a means of rapid poli tical advance than with its economic imputations. It would appear that a

majority of mterested West Indians believe with the Colonial Office that only in a federal union can the West Indies hope to achieve complete self-govern

ment. Naturally, the basis for this political optimism is economic, for only when a measure of economic self-sufficiency has been attained which will

permit the permanent cessation of Treasury assistance can Dominion status be granted.a The non-political "man in the street" is interested in federation

only mildly and in so far as he is concerned, thinks in terms of its possible effect upon his personal economic situation. His attitude doubtless was re

flected accurately in a Daily Gleaner cartoon which had him say: "Well, hope something in it for me". His future attitude will depend not only upon such

improvement in general prosperity as can be attributed to the Federal Govern ment's policies but also to the kind of guidance he gets from his political leaders. It seems to be the case that while there may be much indifference toward federation, vigorous and vocal opponents of union are few in num

ber. The new federation will be able to start with the relative advantage of a public which is either favourably disposed or suspending judgment until the system has had time to prove its worth.

Another fortunate circumstance is that the birth of the West Indies federa tion does not involve the problem of "political institutional transfer". Pro fessor Apter used this phrase to describe the acceptance by Gold Coast natives of British parliamentary institutions altogether different from their in herited tribal government, requiring a new kind of leadership, and adapting these exotic institutions to their own society (1, p. 9). In the case of the

West Indies federation the parliamentary and legal institutions of the union alt will be remembered that Newfoundland, proud in its claim to have become "the first

Dominion", reverted to Crown colony status for a time because economic distress compelled its government to accept Treasury aid and consequent controls.



THE POLITICAL ASPECTS 249

are identical with those already familiar within the various units. To be sure, some of the obstacles to successful self-government as Apter observed them in West Africa (1, pp. 5-7) are also present to some extent in the West Indies.

The colonies of the B.W.L, despite their long history of a common British

connection, have never experienced unification. The unpopularity of the for mer Leeward Federation is not encouraging. The need for additional civil servants to staff the federal establishment will be hard to meet with properly trained administrators who are already in short supply. Some bad adminis trative practices which exist at the colonial level may recur in the federal ad

ministration to the disadvantage and public discredit of the latter.a Another advantage possessed by the West Indies federation is the relative

absence of linguistic barriers within its area. Even in the former French is

lands where patois is still spoken it is now the sole language of a small

minority. Nearly everyone has some familiarity with English, including the "East Indians" of Trinidad and British Guiana. The post-war phenomenon of "Indian" patriotism in Trinidad and the growing number of Hindi-language schools can scarcely change this picture. Hindi is bound to remain a second

tongue for those who speak it because almost all business enterprise requires a knowledge of English. The country dialects of the various islands can tend

only to diminish as education and literacy increase.

Although the teaching of Hindi has little significance so far as the univer

sality of English is concerned, it is evidence of the phenomenon of racial com munalism which may create political problems. It has been observed in the

press that the political leaders of the East Indian community in Trinidad have taken generally a cool or even hostile attitude toward federation.15 This has been true also in British Guiana, although the most vocal opposition to union in that colony has come from non-Indian sources. It would appear that the East Indian community, soon to become a majority of the population in both Trinidad and British Guiana, does not welcome the status of permanent minority in the federation. Communalism, whether based on race, language, religion or some other bond, results from the individual identifying himself and his interest with his subnational community so completely that this identi fication transcends all other considerations in his political and often in other social activities. When a nation is split along communal fines the result can be disastrous for the success of representative democracy, particularly if it be of the parliamentary type. When the members of the various communities within the political entity will vote only for fellow-members and especially

aApter notes that nepotism is not only normal but socially obligatory in tribal society. The same behaviour is highly objectionable in an impersonal, secular civil service where it results in the formation of personal cliques and in corruption.

bThe Trinidad Legislative Council voted on the London plan in December, 1954. Press re ports indicate that one member of the Ministry, the Honourable Ajodhasingh, declared himself opposed, but rather than resign his ministerial post, left the chamber before the vote. Of thos? who voted against acceptance of the plan, two were Creole members of the Opposition Bloc, T. U. B. Butler and Pope McLean. The others were all East Indians: Mitra Sinanan, Stephen Maharaj, Ranjit Kumar, Bhadase Sagan Maraj. Chanka Maharaj did not vote nor did Ashford Sinanan (presiding as Deputy Speaker.)




for those who stress the separate existence and special interests of their own

community, it becomes difficult to develop national parties along lines of

broad policy differentiation. A minority group which votes solidly for communal representatives some

times is able to exert an influence upon governmental policies out of all pro

portion to its voting strength. This happens in a parliamentary system when

the government depends for its continued existence upon the votes of the communal representatives. The latter may form a distinct party and compose

part of the government coalition or they may wear the same party label as

other government supporters but refuse to follow the party leadership in

policies that go counter to communal prejudices. A case in point would be

the Southern wing of the American Democratic Party. The communal repre sentatives are not afraid to oppose the party leadership in this way because their political careers depend upon an accurate reflection of communal feelings rather than party designation. The political power of a communal group de

pends not only upon the strength of its community feeling but also upon the

physical location of its members. If they are widely scattered throughout the

whole political unit they may be unable to elect communal representatives except under a system of proportional representation. If concentrated within

certain constituencies they may continue to elect their spokesmen regardless of party changes in the rest of the political unit.

Examples are numerous. The Irish members at Westminster were able to

bring pressure upon Gladstone in return for their support. A recent example is the effective compulsion upon the Ben-Gurion government of Israel by the

Religious Bloc parties to espouse policies highly distasteful to the Prime Min

ister. Political communal action similarly based upon religious fanaticism has

operated in Pakistan to complicate the efforts of the government to establish a modern, secular state. In Canada, the French Canadians, as a result of their

tendency not only to vote communally but to vote solidly for a single party in

federal elections, have long exercised powerful influence amounting to a kind

of pre-veto on the policies of any government dependent upon their support. In contrast with the East Indian communities of Trinidad and British Guiana it may be noted that the French Canadians are ultra-nationalists, lukewarm

about the Commonwealth connection and, for religious and historic reasons,

having no feeling of identity with post-revolutionary France. Their sense of

belonging to a special community is based upon bonds of language, religion and ancestry. They speak of "notre rac?' as a distinct Canadian entity and

feel that Anglo-Canadians are not truly Canadian. The West Indian "East

Indians", on the other hand, are sometimes lukewarm in their attachment to

the West Indian national entity and feel more strongly attached to Mother India as their spiritual as well as their ancestral homeland. This feeling is

stimulated by a variety of means including the activities of the Indian gov ernment through the Indian Commissioners and otherwise, the Hindi-language schools, religion, and the constant reminders of their cultural heritage in the




speeches of politicians whose careers depend upon the Indian communal vote.

Fortunately, this communal feeling is not likely to be reinforced by cleavage along economic lines. The East Indians are now engaged in all occupations and are, like the rest of the population, largely dependent upon agriculture and mercantile enterprise. Political questions that might lead to division along communal lines include: immigration, aid to education, secular versus religious education, marriage and divorce, the enlarging of federal powers at unit

expense. Of course the East Indian communities of Trinidad and British Guiana (if the latter decides to enter the federation) are not large enough to impose their will upon the Federal Government except in a situation in

which they hold the balance of power between government and opposition ? a situation which in fact may not occur.

It has been noted that French Canadians who have left the small rural communities and have become urbanized are much less likely to think and vote communally. Presumably the East Indians of the West Indies will also become more completely assimilated to the general community as they tend to leave the rural villages now occupied exclusively by them. But race and

religion with their accompanying traditions, including the remnants of caste with its requirement of endogamy, may suffice to keep traces of Indian com

munalism alive for a long time to come.

Deep and permanent communal divisions within a political unit are poten tially dangerous to the general welfare and even to the continued existence of the state. The communalism of one group stimulates a counter-commun alism on the part of those who do not belong to it. The legislature may come to reflect little more than communal divisions and its composition will tend to remain much the same over long periods, varying only with shifts in

strength of the competing communities. Governments will be of similar com

position year after year because the formula upon which they are constructed will represent the best possible compromise between the communal delega tions. Important questions may be sidetracked or confused with irrelevant com

munal prejudices. In the end the electorate are likely to lose respect for and confidence in their government because it cannot solve urgent problems or

provide firm leadership. Fortunately, communalism is little more than an incipient problem in some

colonies and virtually non-existent in others. Negro racial communalism is un

important. It is true that entirely white ancestry is a disadvantage to a can didate for elective office in some islands. But it is equally true that many whites are unable to identify themselves with the aspirations, social, economic and political of the black and coloured majority. Even if they have become

totally identified with the entire community, it may be hard to convince the electorate of their sincerity. This, rather than racial communalism may explain the difficulties faced by the white politician in some places. There is some evidence that following their acceptance of universal suffrage and a large measure of local self-government as inevitable, and with complete self-govern




ment a prospect in the near distance, white West Indians are more inclined than they have been in the recent past to become active candidates for elec tive office. Certainly the elimination of any group on a racial basis without

regard to personal merit or policies is wasteful of potentially valuable poli tical talent.

Some genuine Negro communalism has emerged in British Guiana in re

sponse to the East Indian "threat". Formerly, along with the tiny white min

ority, Negroes and coloured people enjoyed a monopoly of prestige positions in the professions and civil service. East Indians have broken this monopoly and the Negro response is understandably that of a group which sees its

social status threatened, based as this status was, largely upon the enjoyment of educational opportunities not available to the Indian indentured servant.

Fanatical Negro communalism of the "Ras Tafari" and "Coptic" groups is of

small moment politically, and, it may be assumed, will diminish rapidly if the local and Federal Governments are able to effect a real improvement in the education and economic well-being of the population.

A certain amount of communal feeling among people of similar race, reli

gion or culture is inevitable. This may exist without any unfortunate political results so long as the loyalty to the partial community (the religious, racial or other community) remains always subordinate to the loyalty felt for the

total community (the nation-state). There is likely to be an additional com

plicating factor in federal systems: the loyalty to the local unit. Local com

munalism can become a serious matter as exemplified tragically in the Amer

ican Civil War. All kinds of states including federal unions must rest upon what Professor

Maclver has called "the will for the state". The people must want the union

and develop a loyalty to it. Dicey's classical analysis will be remembered.

He noted that the creation of a federal system requires two conditions: there

must exist ... "a body of countries ... so closely connected by locality, by

history, by race or the like, as to be capable of bearing, in the eyes of their

inhabitants, an impress of common nationality." The other condition is the

people of these federating countries . . . "must desire union and must not

desire unity" (4). Federal unions thus involve a dual loyalty, to the unit (state,

province, colony) and to the union. In the case of Commonwealth countries

there is a further less precise kind of loyalty to the Commonwealths

The dual loyalty of a federal state is not always easy to achieve, especially in the earlv history of a federal union when the units that compose it have

had a long history of separate existence. It is only with the passage of time

and a history of actions taken as a united people that a strong and permanent

loyalty to the union is likely to become universal among the population. The

threat of outside aggression has proved to be a powerful bond of union in

aFormerly it could have been said that the Crown provided a bond throughout the entire

Commonwealth, purely formal but of great importance. There was a common British nationality which had as much emotional as legal significance. This still has meaning for several of the

older Commonwealth countries although it docs not apply to the new Asiatic members.




a number of cases. Switzerland is a notable example of this. The Swiss can

tons with their diversity of language, religion and political traditions could

hardly have united in the first place or remained united but for the existence of powerful and aggressive neighbouring states. Even in the case of the Can adian federation the bare possibility that the Grand Army of the Republic might be used to undertake the conquest that had failed in 1812-14 was a

decisive consideration in the minds of some Canadians not otherwise en thusiastic about union.

The British West Indies face no threat of military conquest, but, given time, the necessary loyalty to the union should develop without insuperable difficulty. A degree of West Indian community feeling exists already. Physical distance, local regulations and scanty communication facilities have made

inter-colonial travel difficult, especially between Jamaica and the eastern

group. Nevertheless, the term West Indian" has some real meaning for those

who thus designate themselves. There exist already a rather impressive list

of inter-colonial institutions. Political leaders from the various colonies are

well acquainted with each other and have often met in conferences at home as well as in London. In days to come many of these leaders may well have been fellow undergraduates at the University College of the West Indies. It is possibly a further advantage that the colonies are entering the union before the achievement of complete self-government. They may be less restive under federal controls than if they had previously enjoyed a period of absolute internal and external sovereignty. Of course it is of the highest necessity that the people be educated to accept the Federal Government as their own and not come to regard it as an outside power. This brings us back again to the need for loyalty to the union. In time the people of the West Indies federation must look upon themselves as West Indians first and only secondarily as

Jamaicans, Barbadians and so forth. Possibly the success of the Federal Gov ernment in securing economic and constitutional advances for the entire union

may determine the rate of growth of West Indian loyalty. In certain localities the people may be more ready than elsewhere to accept

the federation as the government of their most significant community. Gen

erally speaking, the larger islands have stronger local attachments and less

pride in being West Indian than in being Jamaican, Barbadian or Trinidadian.

However, the most difficult case may prove to be British Honduras. For reasons which need not concern us here the people of this colony in recent

years have appeared to be dissatisfied with the British connection. Leaders

of the only successful political party to be developed under universal suffrage have made outspoken attacks upon British policies. Furthermore, their re

gional self-identification has been Central American and not West Indian.

Communication with neighbouring Central American republics is easy and

Spanish is widely spoken, not only by the Mayan Indians who make up a

large proportion of the scanty rural population. Despite the predominantly

Jamaican ancestry of the Negro and coloured population of Belize they assert




emphatically their separateness from the West Indies. At the same time, even

during the period of the most extreme anti-British feeling, no local politician advocated publicly that the colony be annexed by Guatemala. It is safe to

say that few British Hondurans would favour such annexation. Indeed, the future of British Honduras would seem rather obviously to lie within the

West Indies federation. The road to self-government otherwise would leave

the ex-colony very much at the mercy of its Central American neighbours.a Recent utterances by local politicians would indicate that both the British connection and the federation are coming to be regarded much more favour

ably than formerly. Here, as in other cases, an improvement in transportation and increased trade with the islands might help to foster a feeling of com

munity with the West Indies.

The other mainland colony, British Guiana, which, like British Honduras, is still uncommitted to federation, would seem to be more likely to decide in favour of federal union at an early date. In the case of British Guiana there is no South American regional identification. There is little contact with Vene

zuela and Brazil. Here, the objection to federal union is based upon the fear

of some businessmen that their commercial interests would suffer. There is

also a desire to retain the vast undeveloped areas of the colony for the use

of its own expanding population, uncomplicated by large-scale immigration from islands suffering from population pressure. East Indian communal senti ment is another factor. If satisfactory agreements can be arranged to allay the fears of economic disadvantage and unrestricted immigration, it seems prob able that British Guiana would agree to join its sister colonies in a federal union. Some of the future political problems of the federation may be fore

shadowed by the arguments which have been advanced against its establish ment. In general, these arguments point out the possible economic disadvantage to a particular colony and especially the danger of an influx of unskilled immi

grants from less prosperous colonies. There is also the natural reluctance of

the more prosperous colonies to underwrite, at least by implication, the

liabilities of the poorer islands. There is some fear also of Jamaica, which, it is thought, might try to use the federal union for its own benefit to the

disadvantage of other members, A question that may well concern the student of politics is whether or not

the West Indian political party system is well enough advanced to cope with the demands of federal politics and provide the necessary support for a federal

government capable of formulating consistent, well considered policies. This

question is especially significant in relation to the parliamentary system which

operates poorly without parties unless the government is composed largely of official and nominated members, independent of the elected members. It was the need for solid support of the government which compelled the his toric rise of the party system in Great Britain, first, at the parliamentary level

aGuatemala, as the successor to Spanish claims in this area, has long claimed the territory of British Honduras. Mexico has a counterclaim to the district adjoining Yucatan,




and subsequently, with the broadening of the suffrage, among the mass of the electorate. History justifies the generalization that a cabinet consisting of

members of a single party, headed by the recognized leader of that party is better capable of providing a stable and consistent administration for a more

predictable period than one composed of a coalition of various parties and

independents. Coalitions are typically "marriages of convenience" with the threat of divorce ever present. Sometimes, as has been the case very often in

France, they represent an alliance of parties that agree to form a government in order to keep their enemies out of office but thereafter cannot agree at all as to positive policies. Such governments have short lives and even while he is in office the Prime Minister is seldom free to direct policy firmly for he must try to avoid the many issues that divide his coalition. Only too often the final political result of this situation is a cynical attitude toward politics and disgust with government on the part of the ordinary citizen. At such a

moment self-appointed national saviours are ready to decry parliament as a "mere talking-shop" and to attack democratic institutions, offering their own

despotic leadership as a preferable substitute. Fascism in one form or an other is incipient whenever representative, responsible government, for what ever reasons, is unable to produce the policies for which there is an effective

political demand. As remarked already, the parliamentary cabinet system is highly vulnerable

to the situation out?ined in the preceding paragraph. An inchoate party system is far more tolerable in the United States because the government (the Presi dent and his "cabinet") cannot be removed from office by legislative action, The worst that can happen is a legislative deadlock, with Congress and the President turning down each other's policies. Most of the time the President can retain fairly effective control of policies by receiving the support of some

members of both major parties. Indeed, the American national "parties" are

hardly to be considered as true parties in the British sense. They represent rather a coalition of state parties bearing the same name. The Republican and Democratic national coalitions exist mainly for the purpose of trying to elect a President and cannot impose party discipline upon members of Congress who give their prime loyalty to their state party leadership. The American

example, therefore, has little pertinence in a study of parliamentary feder ations.

A deadlock between government and assembly is intolerable in the British cabinet system. Conflict between the two must result either in an immediate resignation of the government and its replacement by one capable of securing

majority support in the assembly or else a dissolution of the elected legislature and a general election, "the appeal to the country" by the defeated govern ment. The latter device cannot often be used. It has become obsolescent in Great Britain and some political scientists believe that the "dissolution whip" (the threat of dissolution to keep wavering supporters under party discipline)

has become entirely obsolete. No country could stand the great expense, the




constant political turmoil and the frequent lack of effective government which

would accompany a series of closely spaced general elections. Nor are such

elections likely to bring about important changes in the composition of the

assembly. It would seem that the only alternative to the unsatisfactory situ ation as exemplified by the French National Assembly is a parliament with a

government which can count upon the consistent support of a majority of the members over a period of time long enough to allow effective policy formulation and execution.

This brings us to the problem of West Indian parties.a Were the federal par liament to consist only of separate and mutually suspicious unit delegations it would quickly exemplify the old saying that "federal unions are always

weak in the joints/' Governments would consist necessarily of more or less

temporary alliances between unit delegations. These alliances probably would be based more upon expediency and desire for office than upon loyalty to any leader or even to general policies and principles.

A recognition of the need for West Indian parties, has led already to signi ficant developments. The first of these was the formation of a Caribbean fed eration of socialist parties whose chief mover was the Honourable N. W.

Manley as leader of Jamaica's Peoples' National Party. At St. Lucia in Sep tember, 1956, a meeting was held with delegates from Jamaica, Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Kitts, Montserrat and Antigua and with observers from Domi nica and St. Vincent. The meeting chose the name: Caribbean Federal Labour

Party (later changed to West Indian Federal Labour Party). It received the

blessing of the British Labour Party via James Griffiths, the Deputy Leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party.

The reaction to this move was prompt. Even before Mr. Manley had an nounced the socialist alliance, Mr. Gomes denounced the proposed move as

"conspiracy amongst us" and shortly thereafter the moderate Trinidad Party of Political Progress Groups, with which Mr. Gomes has been allied in the

imprecise way formerly characteristic of Trinidad party politics, let it be known that an attempt would be made to counter the socialist d? marche by forming a West Indian "liberal" alliance. It was hoped that this might include Sir Alexander Bustamante's Jamaica Labour Party.0

Subsequently Mr. Gomes lost his seat in the Trinidad general elections which saw the triumph of Dr. Eric Williams and his new Peoples' National Movement.13 The Peoples' National Movement is primarily nationalist and is non-socialist which, so far at least, has prevented alliance with the Caribbean Federal Labour Party. Its part in federal politics in the future is still prob lematical but unquestionably its representatives will support all moves toward the rapid achievement of Dominion status.

It would seem probable that the Caribbean Federal Labour Party should have little difficulty in winning control of the first federal legislature. This

aFor a discussion of West Indian political parties see (2). ?>The Peoples' National Movement is remarkable both for the speed with which it was or

ganized and its electoral success against both strong independents and parties with a tradi tional trades union base.

cMr. Gomes resigned subsequently from the P.O.P.P.G.




alliance now includes the principal parties in Jamaica, Barbados and both the

Leewards and the Windwards. Nor should it be plagued by ideological divi

sions and the consequent "splintering" tendency so characteristic of left-wing

parties. In composition it has some parallels with its god-mother, the British

Labour Party. Most of the local parties combined in the Caribbean Federal

Labour Party are based upon the voting strength of trades unions which are

closely allied with the party. Some, like Manley's People's National Party, attract the votes of middle-class professionals and employees. All are nation

alist which means, in the West Indian context that they want rapid advance

to complete self-government. All are "socialist" in somewhat the same sense

as the British Labour Party in that they are devoted to the welfare-state idea

and to a managed economy although not to the classic socialism of public

ownership of all productive capital. They differ, or have differed in the past, in matters of detail such as the speed of desirable constitutional advance.

Similar differences as to tactics may well occur in the future but are unlikely to represent a split in basic ideology. In this respect the Caribbean Federal

Party may be more unified than some European socialist parties such as the

French Socialist Party (SFIO). But the construction of a federal party, ideology apart, involves serious

problems. Up to the present time, West Indian voters have been accustomed to think in terms of the colony only. Their party organizations have naturally been island-based. Even in the Leewards, federal institutions did not lead to any wider organization and, if anything, seemed to stimulate inter-island

jealousies. For a time, the federal parties may remain something of a

fa?ade, giving an appearance of unification to parties that remain essentially island-based in organization and control. In contests for power at the federal

level, the strength of the individual politicians will be dependent upon their

ability to remain masters of their own delegations and to continue to win elections within their own units. They are unlikely willingly to hand over

the reins of control to any federal organization. The prima donna type of

political leader certainly is not confined to the West Indian scene but quite certainly is characteristic of West Indian parties. Some of the leaders on both sides of die current federal party movements are of the demagogue type and

may be counted upon to place personal advancement above any other con

sideration. They will work with the team only so long as it suits their personal interests to do so.

The Prime Minister may have some trouble in choosing a ministerial team

composed of these island leaders, accustomed as they are to a high degree of autocracy within t?ieir parties and unused to political compromise. How well will Adams, Gairy, Bradshaw and others combine and co-operate with

Manley once the election is won and they find themselves together in a

ministry? Of course, some of these leaders may well prefer at the start to remain at home base and send their lieutenants to the federal legislature.

Whether they will accord any genuine primacy to the Prime Minister remains to be seen.




Under these circumstances the Prime Minister, in the early stages of the

federation, will not be the head of a real federal party with central control over the nominating machinery in the various islands, or even much, if any, influence upon nominations. His chief disciplinary power, so long as he re

mains Prime Minister, will rest upon his ability to secure the expulsion of a

particular politician from his cabinet. His use of this power no doubt will often be checked by the necessity of maintaining his majority in the legis lature. Local communalism may well prove to be a problem. The sub-leaders of his party are likely to consider themselves bound by a primary loyalty to their island and its interests as understood by the local voters. The West Indian Prime Minister may be something like a feudal monarch surrounded by barons who enjoy a high degree of independence and personal power not

flowing from him. He can never be certain of their loyalty whenever his

policies prove to be unpopular in their home islands. The counter-alliance in opposition to the Caribbean Federal Labour Party

will have these same problems but to an even greater degree. Middle class, free enterprise parties in the West Indies have been notoriously weak and

short-lived in most places. Sometimes they have been no more than the per sonal machines of independent politicians. Their membership is often tem

porary and almost without real "grass-roots" organization. The bond between, for example, the Jamaica Labour Party and the Party of Political Progress Groups will be but faintly ideological. It will be primarily a desire to oppose the Caribbean Federal Labour Party. The P.O.P.P.G. has, so far, represented a party in search of candidates and making do, sometimes, with candidates

having little in common with one another except a desire for election. Its members favour good government of a business-like sort and are much less interested in nationalism and constitutional advance than are the labour socialist parties. In this it is characteristic of middle class parties in other

units. Such parties attract some of the middle class vote, business men, con

servatives and land-owners who form a minority of the population and so

far have never been able to win a significant victory anywhere under uni

versal suffrage. The Jamaica Labour Party on the other hand, is a one-man

party constructed by and for its leader, Sir Alexander Bustamante, and held

together mainly by the force of his personality and his political skill. Ideo

logically, Bustamante has little quarrel with the Party of Political Progress

Groups supporters. But it is hard to believe that a federal alliance of these

parties plus the small conservative parties of other islands could form any

thing more than a temporary union in adversity. Such an opposition may

hang together while out of power but might have serious difficulties in form

ing a government based on a coherent policy programme. It would seem to

an outside observer that one of the prime needs, likely to remain unfilled

for a time at least, in the existence at the federal level of a well organized

opposition always ready to compose an alternative government. Certainly the West Indian electorate have become accustomed to partisan voting, even




in Trinidad, the last stronghold of the independent candidate. It may well

he that the day of the independent candidate is past in West Indian politics. A coherent Caribbean Federal Labour Party which is able to become a real

party and not a mere election alliance doubtless would stimulate the growth of a genuine opposition party.

Another complication in federal party politics will be the fact that all

party leaders must be gravely concerned about the disposition of their forces.

They cannot abandon entirely the local for the federal arena or they run

the risk of being cut off at the base. The inclination of important party

figures to seek federal honours might leave the local ramparts undermanned.

It will take the best persuasive powers and greatest diplomacy of which the

leaders are capable to keep enough key men in local politics to ensure the

continued victory of the party at the unit level while others are allowed to

enjoy the prestige of federal office. Unless managed skilfully, there is the

possibility that this problem might split some parties beyond repair. In spite of what has been written in the preceding paragraphs, the island

leaders will be under great pressure not to remain aloof and unco-operative but to make some compromises in order to remain within the federal party alliance so as not to lose all influence in the government of the federation. If the voters ever begin to think of federal policies and leaders as more im

portant than local ones, the effect upon party politics in the islands will be

very considerable. In this case, the influence of the federal party and its

leadership would replace local controls and the West Indian parties would

become the only significant ones. If Canadian and Australian party history affords useful precedent, the long-run tendency will be in this direction. The

local parties eventually will be absorbed in the national ones, in most cases, and voters, even when voting for local offices, will think in terms of supporting or opposing the federal parties and their leaders. A federation-wide party

system would go far to strengthen the weak federal "joints". Another result of federation which may be hoped for is the reduction in

the importance of charisma as an element in political leadership. This term, a sociologist's invention, refers to the adulation, sometimes approaching wor

ship, accorded a political personality who is believed to embody and express the spirit and aspirations of his community.a This type of leader tends to domi nate his adherents in dictatorial fashion. Party loyalty in this case is not loyalty to a set of principles but rather leader-worship. The charismatic personality is felt to be inspired and to deserve the unquestioning obedience of all. Charismatic leadership tends to be significant politically under two sets of circumstances. If a representative, democratic government is unable to meet the challenge of a prolonged social crisis and to produce adequate solutions in line with public demand, a charismatic leader, a Napoleon, Mussolini or

aWeber defines charismatic authority as . . . "resting on devotion to the specific and excep tional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person and of the normative

patterns of order revealed or ordained by him , , "




Hitler is likely to appear, overturn existing governmental institutions and establish a dictatorship. Similar leaders may emerge among people unused to

self-government at the moment they cast off a traditional and decadent des

potism (as in the Russia of 1917) or in a former colony which has achieved

self-government suddenly.0 Particularly in the case of universal suffrage exer cised without previous experience by a public with little education and much

illiteracy, the uninformed voter is prone to accept uncritically the emotional

appeal of the charismatic politician. No longer respectful of the traditional

leadership of colonial officials, exulting in a new sense of nationality, it is

easy for the ordinary voter to fall captive to oratory designed to flatter him,

give him the feeling of belonging to an important movement and keep him in a state of reverent obedience to the leader.

The British West Indies have witnessed the rise of a number of charismatic

political leaders.b Some of them, under other circumstances might have become a serious threat to the peaceful evolution of popular government. Fortunately, the powers still retained by colonial officials made such an outcome impossible. It is important, therefore, that as such restraints are removed, the West Indian voter acquire some skill in political analysis and a critical, secular approach to political issues. It may be somewhat easier for the average voter to do this in connection with federal politics. Time and distance make it difficult for a

federal leader to employ the barnstorming techniques of the charismatic poli tician on a Caribbean scale. The local leaders who depend upon these tactics and the fanatical devotion of their followers will cut a smaller figure in the federal picture. Even if a would-be dictator secures the headship of a federal alliance and becomes Prime Minister, his domination of the cabinet is likely to be far from absolute and to rest upon other considerations than blind

loyalty to himself. One might even hazard the generalization that charismatic

dictatorships cannot occur in a federal government.0 In the long run, of course, the form of government is less important than

fire motivations and behaviour of the electorate. As Professor Maurice Duver

ger has said, it is hardly necessary in a working democracy that everybody be politically active all the time but it is necessary that there be a considerable number of citizens drawn from all sections of society who constitute the

"politically active minority". It is not required that these politically active per sons be unselfish or all-wise but it is necessary that their ideas and proposals

aThere was fear in some quarters in the newly liberated United States that General Washing ton might use his enormous prestige to make himself the local "King George". Fortunately for the development of constitutional government Washington lacked the ambition and personality of a dictator. Latin America, on the other hand, provides many examples of the rapid de generation of a newly liberated colony into a dictatorship.

bit may be observed that most successful politicians have some charismatic, appeal?President F. D. Roosevelt and Sir Winston Churchill are obvious examples. It is the abuse of this appeal rather than its existence which indicates a pathological condition in a democracy.

cA genuine federation is meant. The U.S.S.R. created by Stalin's constitution is a federation in name only. This is also the case with some Latin American republics. Federal in form, these states are unitary in fact because they are controlled throughout by a single, hierarchic party cinder a dictator or oligarchy.




be subject to constant criticism and competition in the political market-place and that a fair number of the electorate try to use reason and objective stan

dards of comparison and judgment in deciding how to vote (5). As to the future, it is to be expected that the West Indies federation will

need to expand both the volume and the nature of its activities along with the economic growth of the area. Every federal government has found it

necessary to do this because of the tendency for federal problems to grow in importance and number together with economic expansion. Business today is less dependent than once it was upon the competition of the market and

more upon what Professor Galbraith calls "countervailing power", that is, ad ministrative decisions made either by large, private commercial or indus trial aggregations or governmental agencies. A. A. Berle goes so far as to refer to the American system as "administered capitalism" (3). Although his reference is to the United States, similar tendencies are exhibited in all

great industrial societies and these societies include and dominate, in an econo mic sense, the agricultural areas that supply them. There is every reason, therefore to expect increasing demand, as time goes on, upon the government of the West Indies federation for the regulation of the federations economy. No doubt also this will cause strain and stress within the federal structure. But if by the time these economic problems have become acute, there has evolved a real West Indian nation, its sense of community should enable West Indian statesmen to find satisfactory solutions without rending the new nation

apart.

References

1. AFTER, David E. (1955) The Gold Coast in Transition. Princeton. 2. AYEARST, Morley (1954) "A Note on Some Characteristics of West Indian Political

Parties", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 186. U.C.W.I., Jamaica. 3. BERLE, Adolf A. (1955) "Evolving Capitalism and Political Federalism,, in Arthur W.

Macmahon (ed.) Federalism, Mature and Emergent, p. 72. New York. 4. DICEY, A. V. (1915) Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed.,

p. 137. London. 5. DUVERGER, Maurice (1955) Political Parties, p. 123. London and **ew York. 6. ELLIOTT, Jonathan (ed.) (1949) Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution. J.

P. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia. 7. WEBER, Max (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. London.



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SPECIAL FEDERATION NUMBER || Political Aspects of Federation