The Moral Status of Non-Human Animals and Animal Rights

Kody Sparks

Philosophy Honors Thesis

Thesis Advisor- Professor Churchill

2 December 2013

I. An Introduction to the Animal Rights Debate

Human rights have been a prominent topic of interest for hundreds of years. The

discourse on human rights intensified during the enlightenment and even more so during

the American and French Revolutions of the 18th century. The discussion of human rights

reached a new peak with the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in

1948, as a direct result of the atrocities of World War Two. This has been viewed, thus

far, as a fairly thorough, complete, and universal doctrine regarding the rights of human

beings, but it has not ended the discussion of rights by any means.

The issue of the moral status of non-human animals, human duties and obligations

toward non-human animals, and animal rights emerged in the 1960s and 1970s as a part

of our world’s growing environmental concern. As we have become more aware of the

environmental, social, and moral impact of our treatment of animals, the issue of animal

moral status and rights has grown and developed exponentially. The common use of

animals in factory farming, scientific research, zoos, recreational hunting, and other non-

essential areas have made the moral status of non-human animals a popularly theorized

and researched issue, with many philosophers, anthropologists, neuroscientists,

biologists, and other academics conducting various types of research over the past fifty

years. Contrary to the traditional viewpoint, which held that non-human animals were

fundamentally different from and inferior to humans, recent scientific evidence has led

many to support the idea that animals should be seen as having moral status and possibly

even some fundamental rights.1 The human capacities used to deny animals moral status,

including reason, moral agency, language, self-awareness, cognition, and consciousness,

1 Taylor, Angus, John W. Burbidge, and Angus Taylor. Animals & Ethics: An Overview of the Philosophical Debate. Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview, 2009. Print. p 15.

Sparks 2

are still being thoroughly researched.2 Moreover, emerging evidence on the issue

indicates that the perceived differences between human reason and non-human reason,

including moral agency, language, self-awareness, cognition, and consciousness, are

perhaps not as significant as was previously thought.3 This means that non-human

animals are being arbitrarily denied the basic rights that they deserve, specifically their

rights to life, liberty, and physical integrity.

The following sections will provide an idea of how we can view animals as moral

agents deserving of certain rights — rights that are today seen as strictly human rights

according to the Universal Declaration. Firstly, the concept of moral agency needs to be

explained. Many traditional theorists hold that the discourse on moral agency is only

relevant when it regards human societies and ideals. I believe that, to the contrary,

arguments can be made to substantiate the idea that animals also possess some degree of

relevant moral worth, albeit different than humans. Secondly, the concept of what rights

are, what they imply, how animals can be understood to be rights holders, and what

particular rights they can be said to holding need to be explained. Next, I will discuss

some commonly held theories of why animals are not moral agents nor deserving of

rights, including that:

1. They are not conscious or rational like humans

2. They do not use reason nor have the cognitive abilities that humans have

3. They lack the kind empathy and emotions that humans possess

4. They lack developed interests in the way that humans have

2 Taylor, 15.3 See Suggested Readings section to find a few examples of research and evidence of cognition, consciousness, empathy, and emotion in non-human animals.

Sparks 3

My aim is to show that each of these theories suffers from one or more fatal problems. In

general, each one of these proposed morally significant criterion used to deny shared

moral status and rights between humans and non-human animals is either too demanding,

or not demanding enough.4 Lastly I will take the information and arguments made within

the various sections of this paper and summarize them into a basic outline of my theory

of the moral status of animals and animal rights.

II. Animals as Moral Agents

In order to determine whether it is possible for non-human animals to be moral

agents or to have moral status of some sort, it is necessary to acquire a basic

understanding of what moral status entails. Traditional theories, including many

contemporary theories, generally agree that all and only humans are capable of

possessing moral agency and having moral worth. This view is very basic, though, and it

fails to take into consideration many of the intricacies of moral status and its obligations

and duties. Some philosophers in the traditionalist camp tend to argue that all and only

humans have moral status due to the view that human beings are the only species that live

in moral social contexts and that they alone are able to make and respond to moral claims

because of this.5 With further inspection, though, this idea, like the many of the other

proposed morally significant criterion for human rights, is both too demanding, and not

demanding enough.

4 Jamieson, Dale. Ethics and the Environment: An Introduction. Cambridge, UK:Cambridge UP, 2008. Print. p. 105-106.5 Gruen, Lori. "The Moral Status of Animals." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University, 01 July 2003. Web. 18 Oct. 2013. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/>.

Sparks 4

A favored method of arguing for animals’ rights is the use of “marginal cases”.

These cases, which include infants, the insane, and the mentally disabled, are a good

point of comparison with non-human animals. While traditionalists argue that all and

only humans are capable of making and responding to moral claims, these marginal cases

show that, in fact, not all humans can make and respond to moral claims, but we treat

them as if they can anyway. This becomes a direct contradiction and a major point of

contention for animal rights advocates. This opens the traditionalist argument up to the

critique: If not all humans are capable of making moral claims, why are humans the only

subjects of moral status? If we treat infants, the insane, and the mentally disabled (all of

whom are not, by the requirement of the ability to make and respond to moral claims,

moral agents) as such, why should we not treat other sentient beings, including many

non-human animals, as if they were moral agents as well?6

The fact that some humans are unable to receive and act upon moral claims within

their moral community is not the only argument, though. Many authors and researchers

are citing evidence that humans are not the only beings with morality. Evidence is

beginning to show that non-human animals may also be able to act prudentially within

their own moral communities.7 Frans De Waal is one such researcher making these

claims. He has started compiling his own research on apes and monkeys as well as other

outside research in order to show that the basic pillars of morality are present within non-

6 Singer, Peter. "Speciesism And Moral Status." Metaphilosophy 40.3-4 (2009): 567-81. Print. 569-570.7 Singer, Peter. "Speciesism And Moral Status."; De Waal, Frans. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1996. Print.; DeGrazia, David. Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002. Print. Chapter 3.; De Waal, Frans. Moral Behavior in Animals. Perf. Frans De Waal. TED Talks, Nov. 2011. Web. 4 Nov. 2013. <http://www.ted.com/talks/frans_de_waal_do_animals_have_morals.html>.; I Am. Dir. Tom Shadyac. Perf. Tom Shadyac, Desmond Tutu, Noam Chomsky. Shady Acres, 2010. Online.

Sparks 5

human animal species and communities.8 This will be addressed in more detail in the

following section.

Due to the fatal rebuttal that marginal cases pose to the necessity of the ability to

make and receive moral claims for the status of moral agency, many modern theorists

have discarded the “all-or-nothing” view of moral status for the position that moral status

can admit degrees. In his essay “Moral Status as a Matter of Degree?” David DeGrazia

states, “Some people contend that fetuses have moral status but less than that of paradigm

persons. Many people hold views that sentient animals do have moral status, but less than

that of persons. These positions suggest that moral status admits of degrees.”9

Before addressing how moral status can admit of degrees, we must address what

exactly it means to have moral status. David DeGrazia states, presenting a very basic

notion of moral status, that a being has moral status if moral agents’ treatment of that

being is considered morally relevant and important.10 This moral importance must be

direct and independent of any usefulness that the being provides. So, a being will have

moral status if they can be viewed as having inherent moral importance of some sort. Put

formally, “To say that X has moral status is to say that (1) moral agents have obligations

regarding X, (2) X has interests, and (3) the obligations are based (at least partly) on X’s

interests.”11 The inherent moral importance necessary for moral status, DeGrazia argues,

is connected with and derived from the interests and welfare of the being.12

8 De Waal, Frans. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1996. Print; De Waal, Frans. Moral Behavior in Animals. Perf. Frans De Waal. TED Talks, Nov. 2011. Web. 4 Nov. 2013. <http://www.ted.com/talks/frans_de_waal_do_animals_have_morals.html>.9 DeGrazia, David. "Moral Status as a Matter of Degree?" The Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2008): 181-98. Print. p. 181.10 DeGrazia, "Moral Status as a Matter of Degree?", 183.11 Ibid.12 DeGrazia, "Moral Status as a Matter of Degree?", 183.

Sparks 6

Now, based on this very basic definition of moral status, one must prove that non-

human animals are capable of having interests and welfare in order to argue that they are

deserving of moral status. Traditional theories hold that animals are not capable of having

interests or welfare in anything similar to the way humans are, but recent scientific

evidence, which will be elucidated in section IV, seems to imply that this is incorrect.

Degrazia concludes, “Nearly all the leading work in animal ethics and, I suggest, the only

plausible account of the wrongness of cruelty to animals support the thesis that sentient

animals, who by definition have an experiential welfare and therefore interests, have (at

least some) moral status.”13 It is necessary to point out that a being with moral status does

not necessarily equate to a rights-holding individual, at least based on a very commonly

held idea of rights, but this will be addressed further in section III.

So, given that moral status implies some inherent moral importance derived from

the interests and welfare of the being, one can begin to see how moral status is not

necessarily an all or nothing concept, as was previously thought. Many modern theorists

now hold, given the developments in theory and evidence in research, that both humans

and sentient non-human animals have interests and welfare and therefore moral status.

But the research also shows that humans do not necessarily have the same interests nor

the same amount of consideration of those interests, implying that we do not necessarily

have the same moral status as non-human animals. Instead, it is held that while non-

human animals and humans do, in fact, share moral status, humans have a greater degree

of moral status than do non-human animals.14

There are two ways in which it is generally held that moral status comes in

13 Ibid.14 DeGrazia, "Moral Status as a Matter of Degree?", 186.

Sparks 7

degrees:

1. The Unequal Consideration Model of Degrees of Moral Status15

2. Unequal Interests Model of Degrees of Moral Status16

Under the Unequal Consideration model of Degrees of moral status, it is worse, or more

morally reprehensible, to kill human persons because they are due full moral

consideration17, whereas non-human animals, while still given some moral consideration,

are due less. To present an example, it is argued that, though two individuals, one human

and one non-human, have comparable interests in not suffering, the human person’s

interest has greater moral importance than the animal’s interest.18 But not all interests

across species, even those similarly named, are comparable. Under the Unequal Interests

Model of Degrees of Moral Status not all moral agents have the same or even similar

interests and equal moral consideration need only be given to equal interests between

humans and non-human animals.19 I personally find that the Unequal Interests Model of

Degrees of Moral Status is fairly obvious and commonsensical, and tend toward a version

of this model in my own theory of the moral status of animals.

III. Rights and Non-human Animals

It is not entirely clear and has not been explored thoroughly, at least in my

research, what the exact difference is between moral status and rights. Many of those

opposing an animal rights position may allow that non-human animals have, at least

15 Ibid.16 Ibid,188.17 Moral consideration is the moral weight or interest that we grant to a particular being’s prudential interests. DeGrazia, "Moral Status as a Matter of Degree?", 186-18718 DeGrazia, "Moral Status as a Matter of Degree?", 188.19 Ibid.

Sparks 8

some, moral status, but would deny that they have rights in anything similar to the way

humans do. This may be because they take the idea of moral status to come in degrees,

but see rights as an all-or-nothing concept. I disagree with those completely opposed to

animal rights and, as an extension of my position regarding the Unequal Interests Model

of Degrees of Moral Status, would argue that rights come in degrees as well. I would

confer some of the basic human rights upon sentient non-human animals. I believe that

the holding of static, uniform requirements for rights, in form and degree, is an archaic

remnant of the traditional idea that moral status and rights are an all or nothing idea. I

believe that different rights have different requirements due to their degree of importance

or how fundamental they are.

As explained in the previous section, to say that a being has moral status means

that the being has interests and that other moral agents have obligations toward that being

based, as least partially, on his or her interests.20 These obligations are not based on any

societal norms, laws, or contracts, but are conferred upon a being simply based on

common interests and moral consideration. Joel Feinberg argues that rights are very

closely related to this definition of moral status. Invoking the argument from marginal

cases, he argues that all that is required in order to be a rights-bearing individual is, “that

the being be capable of being represented as legitimately pursuing the furtherance of its

interests.”21 It has been argued that this definition is too inclusive, though.

Leif Wenar, the chair of Ethics at King’s College London, defines rights as,

“entitlements (not) to perform certain actions, or (not) to be in certain states; or

20 DeGrazia, "Moral Status as a Matter of Degree?", 184.21 Wilson, Scott D. "Animals and Ethics." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. IEP, 23 Oct. 2001. Web. 18 Sept. 2013. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/>.; Feinberg, Joel. "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations." Philosophy and Environmental Crisis. By William T. Blackstone. Athens, GA: University of Georgia, 1974. 43-68. Print.

Sparks 9

entitlements that others (not) perform certain actions or (not) be in certain states.”22

Rights are often classed together by common attributes due to the sheer number and

variety that are claimed in modern society. Rights-assertions can be categorized

according to who is alleged to have the right, what actions, states or objects the right

pertains to, or why the right holder allegedly has the right. While many argue for a

fundamental difference between rights and moral status, this definition of rights also

seems fairly similar to DeGrazia’s definition of moral status.

Though these definitions are very similar, many would argue that the difference

between rights and moral status is not in the definition or function, but in the

requirements in attaining them. Moral status, at least according to DeGrazia’s definition,

only requires that a moral agent have prudential interests. Many traditionalists would

argue that rights require more than this, though. Rights, it is often held, require prudential

interests as well as that the agent can not only receive the benefits of, but also perform the

correlative obligations and duties, of the rights. Steve Sapontzis terms this the

‘Reciprocity Requirement’ and defines it as, “Only those who respect the moral rights of

others are entitled to moral rights.”23 This clearly seems to be a major issue for animal

rights proponents.

Animals are clearly unable to perform the correlative duties of rights in the same

way that humans are, but why should they? I would argue that this requirement is blatant

anthropocentrism and speciesism.24 Although animals are not able to participate in the

22 Wenar, Lief, "Rights." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University, 19 Dec. 2005. Web. 28 Oct. 2013. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/>.23 Sapontzis, Steve F. "Moral Community and Animal Rights." American Philosophical Quarterly 22.3 (July 1985). Print. p 251.24 Speciesism is the assignment of different values, rights, or special consideration to individuals solely on the basis of their species membership. According to Speciesism, certain characteristics, typically seen as solely attributable to the human species, such as conciousness, cognition, emotion, autonomy, etc., are morally relevant and give humans higher moral status than non-human animals.

Sparks 10

moral community required of human rights, there is evidence that they do, in fact

participate in moral activity within their own communities.25 Frans de Waal argues, in his

work Good Natured, that human morality could not have developed without the empathy

and emotions that our species shares with other animals. De Waal cites his own research

with apes and monkeys as well as others’ ongoing research with other non-human

animals in order to show that the foundational characteristics of morality are natural and

that they can be seen in the behavior of other non-human species. According to De Waal,

the pillars of morality are reciprocity and empathy.26 As I have stated already, reciprocity

is a characteristic that many use to deny rights to non-human animals. Empathy, as I will

address in the next section, is another such characteristic that is used to deny rights to

non-human animals.

In a speech that Frans De Waal gave for TED Talk, he specifically cites

experimentation done with chimpanzees and elephants in which both species engaged in

reciprocal and cooperative behavior.27 He also demonstrates evidence of simple body

channel empathy, specifically in the forms of yawn contagion and consolation, in many

animals as well as the more complex, often considered solely human, cognitive channel

empathy in chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys, dogs, and birds, among other animals.28 De

Waal shows, in his book and speech, how many different types of animals respond to

social rules, help each other, share food, resolve conflict, and even develop their own

Current research shows, though, that these morally relevant criterion are, in fact, arbitrary and that the characteristics are found in many non-human animals and are not found in many humans. Singer, "Speciesism And Moral Status."25 De Waal, Frans. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals.26 De Waal, Frans. Moral Behavior in Animals. Perf. Frans De Waal. TED Talks, Nov. 2011. Web. 4 Nov. 2013. <http://www.ted.com/talks/frans_de_waal_do_animals_have_morals.html>.27 De Waal, Frans. Moral Behavior in Animals. 3:30-8:00.28 De Waal, Frans. Moral Behavior in Animals. Perf. Frans De Waal. TED Talks, Nov. 2011. Web. 4 Nov. 2013. <http://www.ted.com/talks/frans_de_waal_do_animals_have_morals.html>.

Sparks 11

rudimentary sense of justice and fairness, further undermining the argument that humans

are the only creatures with moral agency.29

The fact that animals are capable of moral actions in their own community is not

the only reason that animals should be given moral consideration in regards to rights,

though. Some authors have begun arguing that not all rights necessarily require

reciprocity. If this is the case, then animals can hold certain rights, specifically those to

life, liberty, and bodily integrity, which impart correlative obligations on humans.

Humans have systematically derogated these rights and ignored these correlative

obligations, especially since the modernization of the 19th century. Steven M. Wise is one

such author who argues that the basic rights of life, liberty, and bodily integrity do not

necessarily require entrance into a contract or reciprocation.30 Wise, a legal scholar

specializing in animal protection, primatology, animal intelligence, animal rights

jurisprudence, and animal rights law has argued in numerous books and articles that non-

humans animals are due the basic “human rights” of life, liberty, and bodily integrity.

Wise uses Hohfeld’s widely embraced theory of rights and states that a right is, by

definition, “an advantage conferred by legal rules upon one legal person against another

who bears the corresponding legal detriment.”31 He then goes on to list and explain the

four types of rights: liberties, claims, powers, and immunities.32 Wise claims that

immunities, rights that legally disable one person from interfering with another, are the

most basic human rights as well as rights to which at least some nonhuman animals are

29 De Waal, Frans. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals.; De Waal, Frans. Moral Behavior in Animals.30 Wise, Steven M. "The Basic Rights of Some Non-human Animals under the Common Law." The Nonhuman Rights Project RSS. N.p., n.d. Web. 07 Nov. 2013. <http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/publications/>.31 Wise, "The Basic Rights of Some Non-human Animals under the Common Law."32 Ibid.

Sparks 12

most strongly entitled.33 Wise argues that our fundamental immunities arise from the

principles of liberty and equality. Liberty entitles a being to be treated a certain way

because of what they are and equality demands that likes be treated alike.

One of the most important but most misunderstood aspects of liberty is autonomy

— a characteristic that only moral persons have.34 Many opponents of animal rights

follow a Kantian theory of full autonomy, but Wise tends to think that autonomy is not an

all-or-nothing concept, but that, “lesser autonomies exist and that a being can be

autonomous if she has preferences and the ability to act to satisfy them, if she can cope

with changed circumstances, make choices, even ones she can't evaluate well, or has

desires and beliefs and can make appropriate inferences from them.”35 He calls this type

of lesser autonomy ‘Practical Autonomy’ and claims that having this type of autonomy is

sufficient for basic rights.36 Having basic, fundamental rights is not a matter of entering

into a contract or reciprocation, according to Wise, but is simply derivative of an ability

to have interests, desires and beliefs, and to be able to make decisions in order to satisfy

those interests, desires, and beliefs.

Steve F. Sapontzis, prominent animal rights advocate and professor emeritus of

philosophy at California State University, East Bay, specializing in animal ethics and

environmental ethics, similarly argues that reciprocity is not a requirement of our basic

rights to life, liberty and bodily integrity.37 Sapontzis argues that the basic principle

behind the reciprocity requirement and the reason why is has intuitive appeal is because it

33 Ibid.34 Ibid.35 Ibid.36 Wise, "The Basic Rights of Some Non-human Animals under the Common Law."37 Sapontzis, Steve F. "Moral Community and Animal Rights." American Philosophical Quarterly 22.3 (July 1985): 251-57. Print.

Sparks 13

addresses the fairness that we all seem to want in moral relationships.38 Sapontzis,

avoiding an argument from marginal cases39, states that the Achilles heel of the

reciprocity requirement is that, “it cannot provide a basis for the obligations of the

powerful to the powerless…Thus if reciprocity were a necessary condition for having

moral rights, the weak would be excluded from having moral rights against the strong.”40

This is extremely counterintuitive to our common moral goals, though. One of the

fundamental reasons for rights is to protect the weak against the strong in order that they

are able to fulfill their interests.41 This is the case in regards to humans and should be the

case in regards to non-human animals as well. If one accepts the reciprocity requirement,

it seems that they undermine one of the fundamental purposes of moral rights in the first

place.

Regardless of whether or not non-human animals are capable of having moral

status or the ability to bear rights, it seems that the burden of proof in this debate is being

placed on the wrong side. The anthropocentric point of view is taken for granted and it is,

without question, assumed that humans have an entitlement that non-human animals do

not. It is also taken for granted that, because of this entitlement, humans are allowed to

utilize non-human animals to further their own interests, even though this is detrimental

to the animals’ interests. The burden of proof regarding the moral status of non-human

animals has always been placed on those in favor of regarding non-human animals as

moral agents or rights bearing individuals, but this seems wrong. Why should one have to

prove that they should treat another living organism with moral consideration and

38 Sapontzis, "Moral Community and Animal Rights." P. 252.39 Ibid.40 Ibid.41 Ibid.

Sparks 14

respect? It seems more logical that those who wish to treat non-human with moral

disregard should bear the burden of proving that these creatures are not, in fact, morally

relevant.

It is clear that the arguments for animal rights and moral status in animals are

currently, and may remain, indeterminate. It is also very clear, though, that that the

arguments against moral status in non-human animals are mostly, if not completely,

flawed. This may work in favor of the animal rights proponents, though. According to a

common understanding of morality, if an animal’s consciousness, cognitive abilities, and

emotions, and therefore their moral status, is indeterminate, the morally correct way to

treat them is as a moral agent until proven otherwise. In the case of indeterminacy, the

burden of proof should lie with those arguing in favor of acts and practices that would be

considered torture, murder, and slavery if performed on another moral agent. If we are to

treat non-human animals with moral disregard, those arguing in favor of this position

need to sufficiently prove:

1. Why non-human animals are not deserving of or do not meet the requirements of

moral status or rights?

2. Even if non-human animals are not moral agents, why humans should be allowed

to use non-human animals in ways that are destructive to the interests of the

animals, as we currently do in factory farms, zoos, and animal research?

Steve Sapontzis also argues that the burden of proof has been misplaced throughout the

animal rights debate. He argues, citing the moral goal of protecting the weak and giving

all a fair chance in pursuing and fulfilling their interests, that, “encouraging moral agents

to regard non-moral agents as resources exacerbates rather than corrects the disparities of

Sparks 15

power in our world.”42 He states that we should view our “moral entitlement”, if we really

do have a higher moral status than other creatures, less as a power like a feudal lord over

his serfs and more like the power of Plato’s Philosopher-kings.43 Rather than simply

using our ‘superior’ moral status selfishly for ourselves, we should use it to help others of

lesser moral standing.

IV. Models Against Animals’ Moral Status and Rights (sapontzis)

Many, if not all, of the arguments against moral status in non-human animals and

animal rights focus on characteristics that humans seem to have by nature, making

respect for certain rights morally appropriate. Many suggestions as to which

characteristics are relevant to moral status and rights have been put forth throughout the

animal rights debate, but none seem to be effective in denying basic rights to animals.

Rationality, cognition, autonomy, agency, a conception of the ‘good life’, reciprocal

moral communities, and consciousness are only a few of the characteristics used to justify

the human use of non-human animals as ‘things’ and the reasons proposed as to why it

cannot be meaningfully said that non-human animals have moral status, let alone rights.

Recent studies have been finding more and more evidence of these characteristics being

present in non-human animals, though.44 Two of the broadest and most cited

characteristics used to deny animal rights are emotions and consciousness, with the last of

these being one of the most controversial.

It has been argued that non-human animals lack empathy with other creatures as

42 Sapontzis, "Moral Community and Animal Rights." P. 254.43 Ibid.44 See Suggested Readings section to find a few examples of research and evidence of cognition, consciousness, empathy, and emotion in non-human animals.

Sparks 16

well as emotions generally and therefore cannot experience pleasure or pain, the feeling

of success or failure, happiness or sadness. This lack of emotion and empathy leads many

to argue that they cannot be moral agents possessing moral rights.

Empathy is the fellow feeling with other beings; it is understanding and sharing

the emotions, feelings, and desires of another being. The fact that non-human animals are

seen as not possessing empathy has been used as further proof that they are completely

unable to reciprocate moral actions and feelings. As we saw previously, though, some

rights, moral immunities in particular, do not necessarily require reciprocation or

involvement in a moral community at all. They simply require having interests and the

ability to act to satisfy them in changing circumstances, which most people would grant

to non-human animals.45 Even so, the arguments that non-human animals do not feel

empathy are basely incorrect, given recent research. Evidence stemming from late 20th

and early 21st century research points to a degree of empathy in many other primates,

including chimpanzees, orangutans, and gorillas, as well as in dogs, mice, chickens, and

elephants.46

Emotions have been used in a different way to deny animals moral status and

rights. Those who claim that animals do not have anything remotely resembling human

emotions are able to argue that, while animals may, in fact, have interests and an ability

to satisfy them, the fact that they do not have emotions means that their interests being

impeded and rights being derogated does nothing harmful to them. The term ‘sentience’,

at least as used in the animal rights debate, is used to denote, “the capacity to experience

some events as good or bad for oneself…[and to experience] mental states of suffering

45 Wise, "The Basic Rights of Some Non-human Animals under the Common Law."46 "Empathy." OneKind. N.p., 2010. Web. 09 Nov. 2013. <http://www.onekind.org/be_inspired/animal_sentience/empathy/>.

Sparks 17

(either painful sensations or emotional distress) and pleasure (or happiness), whether or

not these are the direct product of sensory input.”47 Therefore, if non-human animals are

incapable of feeling emotions or emotional distress or pleasure, they are not sentient and

do not deserve moral consideration. This argument is based on a flawed initial claim: that

animals do not feel emotions (pain and pleasure) in a similar way to humans.

Emotions in non-human animals have been documented since Darwin’s 1872

work The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. Twentieth century research

has been extremely important to the recognition of emotion in non-human animal

behavior. In particular, Jaak Panksepp, Baily Endowed Chair of Animal Well-Being

Science and Professor, Integrative Physiology and Neuroscience (IPN), Washington State

University, has conducted thorough research and concluded that emotions are not, in fact,

strictly human, but Panskepp argues that emotions have their origins in the evolutionarily

ancient parts of the brain shared by all mammals.48 The problem, historically, seems to be

that emotions are a very subjective quality and because humans are the only creatures

capable of expression, it was believed that only they were capable of emotions. In reality,

though, this merely proves that humans are the only creatures capable of verbalizing and

describing their emotions. If non-human animals share the same brain features that

produce emotions in humans, i.e. the amygdala and hypothalamus according to Panksepp,

then there is no reason to suspect that emotions do not also exist in non-human animals as

well.49

47 Taylor, 19.48 Panksepp, Jaak, and Pamela Weintraub. "Jaak Panksepp Pinned Down Humanity's 7 Primal Emotions." Discover Magazine. N.p., May 2012. Web. 09 Nov. 2013. <http://discovermagazine.com/2012/may/11-jaak-panksepp-rat-tickler-found-humans-7-primal-emotions>.49 Panksepp, "Jaak Panksepp Pinned Down Humanity's 7 Primal Emotions."

Sparks 18

David DeGrazia also cites a lot of evidence leading to the conclusion that animals

do, in fact, feel emotions.50 He argues that we are not interested in whether animals feel

pain per say, given that pain can be defined as merely, “an unpleasant or aversive sensory

experience typically associated with actual or potential tissue damage.”51 This is because

all of the behavioral, physiological, and functional-evolutionary evidence supports the

fact that many non-human animals, including almost all vertebrates, are capable of

experiencing sensations of pain.52 What we should be interested in, in regards to the

moral status of non-human animals, is suffering, which he defines as, “a highly

unpleasant emotional state associated with more-than-minimal pain or distress.”53

Suffering is an emotional reaction to physical or psychological pain that includes distress,

“an unpleasant emotional response to the perception of environmental challenges or to

equilibrium disrupting internal stimuli,” fear, “a typically unpleasant emotional response

to a perceived danger,” and anxiety, “a typically unpleasant emotional response to a

perceived threat to one’s personal or psychological well-being.”54 While many argue that

non-human animals do not have the emotional capacity for suffering, and thus are not due

moral consideration, DeGrazia disagrees. He claims that the typical behavioral and

physiological responses to fear and anxiety found in humans, including autonomic

hyperactivity, motor tension, and hyper-attentiveness, are also found in non-human

animals.55 He also shows that fear and anxiety would play the same functional-

evolutionary role in animals as it does in humans, stating that, “it permits a creature to

50 DeGrazia, David. Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002. Print.51 Ibid, 42.52 Ibid, 42-44.53 DeGrazia, Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction. P. 45.54 Ibid, 45-46.55 Ibid, 46.

Sparks 19

inhibit action and attend carefully to the environment in preparation for protective

action.”56 Given that this fairly conclusive evidence in support of emotions, pain, and

suffering in animals is only the beginning of the research, it seems that there is no reason

to suspect that animals do not experience emotions or even that they experience emotions

in a way that make them impervious to pain or suffering. Regarding animal suffering,

Peter Singer states, “we must not think that the suffering or the pleasure experienced by

animals counts any less from a moral point of view than a like amount of suffering of

pleasure experienced by humans.”57

The second, and more complex, argument against moral status and rights in non-

human animals hold that non-human animals do not possess consciousness, at least not in

any morally relevant way. Consciousness is one of the most mysterious natural

phenomena and identifying the causes, attributes, and effects of human consciousness

remains one of the most difficult and controversial problems for philosophers and

theologians. We tend to assume that all other humans (‘normal’ humans, at least) are

endowed with a consciousness similar to each other, but the question of whether minds

and consciousness exist in non-human animals is not so easily answered or assumed

away. Still, recent scientific evidence is beginning to show similarities between human

and some non-humans in such characteristics as cognition, rationality, self-awareness,

and even language assessment, all of which have been deemed necessary components to

consciousness.58

56 Ibid, 46-47.57 Taylor, 16.58 See Suggested Readings section to find a few examples of research and evidence of cognition, consciousness, empathy, and emotion in non-human animals.

Sparks 20

Consciousness itself is an extremely mysterious and misunderstood idea. It has

been argued that human consciousness can be split up into a number of different sub-

types of consciousness, including sleep/wake consciousness, perceptive or awareness

consciousness, access consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, and self-

consciousness.59 The first two sub-types of consciousness, sleep/wake and perceptive

consciousness, are almost unanimously believed to be a feature of both humans as well as

non-human animals.60 It has also been argued that access consciousness, having mental

representations for use in rational control of action or speech, is a feature of many non-

human species, including most mammals.61 The last two sub-types of consciousness are

highly debated in non-human animals, though, and have traditionally been held to be

strictly human characteristics.

Phenomenal consciousness is, “the qualitative, subjective, experiential or

phenomenological aspects of conscious experience.”62 As Thomas Nagel presents it,

phenomenal consciousness is what it is like to be something.63 Many have held that only

humans have phenomenal consciousness, but this seems to be a product of a traditional

anthropocentric point of view. We find it easy to accept the claim that there is the

subjective sense of being in each and every human, because we assume similarity

between ourselves and other human beings. There is no more proof of this subjective,

phenomenal consciousness in other humans than there is in animals, though. There is no

59 Allen, Colin. "Animal Consciousness." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University, 23 Dec. 1995. Web. 18 Oct. 2013. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/>.60 Allen, "Animal Consciousness."61 Block, Ned. "On A Confusion About A Function Of Consciousness." Journal of Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18.2 (1995): 227-87. Harvard.edu. Web. 9 Nov. 2013. <http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic720164.files/Block.BBS-1995.Onaconfusionaboutafunctionofconsciousness.pdf>.; Allen, "Animal Consciousness."62 Allen, "Animal Consciousness."63 Nagel, Thomas. "What It Is like to Be a Bat?" The Philosophical Review 83.4 (October 1974): 435-50. UTEP.edu. Web. 9 Nov. 2013. <http://organizations.utep.edu/portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf>.

Sparks 21

way of actually, objectively knowing whether another creature has phenomenal

consciousness due to the basic, subjective definition of the term. If animal consciousness

is indeterminate, the burden of proof should not be on those who want to treat them

morally, though.

Consciousness is being used as evidence that we may treat animals as morally

irrelevant. As I argued previously, the burden of proof is being placed in the wrong place.

Since phenomenal consciousness is inherently subjective, we cannot objectively prove

that other humans have phenomenal consciousness, let alone non-human animals. But

this would lead to the conclusion that, since we cannot prove that other humans are

conscious and consciousness is the morally relevant criterion for rights, that we do not

need to treat other humans morally either. Isaiah Berlin stated, “Unless men are held to

possess some attribute over and above those which they have in common with other

natural objects—animals, plants, things, etc.—the moral command not to treat men as

animals or things has no rational foundation.”64

Self-consciousness refers to, “an organism's capacity for second-order

representation of it’s own mental states.”65 The question of self-consciousness includes

questions of theory of mind in non-human animals and whether animals are able to

attribute mental states to others.66 Questions about self-consciousness and theory of mind

in animals are a matter of active scientific controversy, with the most attention focused

on chimpanzees and the great apes. Self-consciousness is one sub-type of consciousness

that can, and has, been proven to exist in humans and some non-human animals by

empirical means. Citing evidence from popular mirror studies as well as other research,

64 Berlin, Isaiah. Four Essays on Liberty. London: Oxford University P., 1969. Print.65 Allen, "Animal Consciousness."66 Ibid

Sparks 22

Richard Watson states in his work Self-Consciousness and the Rights of Nonhuman

Animals and Nature, “there are some animals besides humans - e.g., especially

chimpanzees, gorillas, dolphins, and dogs - which, in accordance with good behavioral

evidence, are moral entities, and sometimes moral agents. On the grounds of reciprocity,

they merit, at minimum, intrinsic or primary rights to life and to relief from unnecessary

suffering.”67

Many different characteristics have been cited as the morally relevant criterion

that make humans moral agents and rights bearing individuals, but not non-human

animals. Scientific evidence has always come to show that these characteristics are

neither universally, nor strictly, human characteristics. This does not mean that non-

human animals necessarily have these characteristics to the same degree as humans do,

though. Nonetheless, the mere possession of these characteristics alongside humans

should put humans and non-humans animals on the same moral standing at least in

regards to fundamental rights to life, liberty, and bodily integrity.

V. Summary: My Idea of Animals’ Moral Status and Rights

The first few sections of this paper, while vital to a general understanding of the

debate on the moral status of non-human animals and animal rights, have have merely

worked to establish the background information and basic descriptions surround the

debate thus far. Thus, in this section, I will synthesize the background information,

theories, and the terminology discussed this far in order to outline and present my idea of

the moral status of non-human animals and animal rights. This will include a description

67 Watson, Richard A. "Self-Consciousness and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals and Nature." Environmental Ethics 1.2 (1979): 99-129. Print.

Sparks 23

of which rights I am discussing, how and why animals can be seen as possessing moral

rights, and an answer to which animals I am referring.

To start, we must ask, which rights can be applied in a relevant way to non-human

animals? The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations

General Assembly on 10 December 1948, was the first global expression of rights to

which all human beings are inherently entitled. It includes thirty articles which espouse

the, “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all

members of the human family.”68 These rights include, most prominently, the rights to

life, liberty, and bodily integrity:

Article 3— Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4— No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slavetrade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5— No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degradingtreatment or punishment.69

There is a problem with the way these rights are laid out in the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights, though. These rights — one’s rights to life, liberty, and bodily integrity

cannot be shown to be universally nor strictly human rights. These rights, because of their

inclusion in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are held at the same level and of

the same importance as the right to education, the right to form and join trade unions, and

even the right to rest, leisure, reasonable limitation of working hours, and periodic

holidays with pay.70 This seems intuitively wrong. Without a right to life, liberty, and

68 United Nations General Assembly. "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights."University of Minnesota Human Rights Resource Center. Ed. Nancy Flowers. University of Minnesota Web. 18 Sept. 2013. <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-5/8_udhr-abbr.htm>. P. 1.69 Ibid, 2.70 Ibid, 5-7.

Sparks 24

bodily integrity, all of these other rights are meaningless. While it is important that these

rights are drawn out in legal doctrine, they are not fundamentally derived from this legal

doctrine. The rights to life, liberty, and bodily integrity cannot be said to be strictly

‘human rights’, but instead fall under a broader category of ‘living rights’ or ‘natural

rights’ that are not exclusive to human beings. There have been many different ‘human’

qualities, characteristics, and criterion presented as that which is necessary in order to be

a rights-bearing individual, but scientific research and evidence continues to show that

none of these are universally nor strictly human qualities. The rights to life, liberty, and

bodily integrity are the rights that humans derogate from animals most vigorously and

consistently. While there may be other rights in international human rights doctrine

which could be meaningfully applied to non-human animals, these very basic rights to

life, liberty, and physical integrity seem to present a reason why most, if not all, of our

current practices regarding animals are immoral and should be altered if not completely

ceased.

Many dislike the idea of granting animals rights because it seems to put non-

human creatures on the same level as humans, but this is not necessarily so. Granting

non-human animals the rights to life, liberty, and bodily integrity easily agrees with a

degree theory of moral status and rights. I would argue that all of the supposed morally

relevant criterion, including cognition, reason, emotion, empathy, self-awareness, and

consciousness, as well as moral status and the ability to bear rights are all characteristics

which come in degrees, among humans and non-human animals. While animals are not

qualitatively different from humans in regards to morally relevant criterion, they still may

be quantitatively different. So, it can be argued that humans do, in fact, have a place

Sparks 25

above animals, while still granting animals the basic rights to life liberty and bodily

integrity based on their more basic versions of cognition, reason, emotion, empathy, self-

awareness, consciousness, and moral status. It needs to be clarified, though, that this

means that humans cannot treat animals as morally irrelevant ‘things’ in the way that we

currently do. If one does feel it necessary, or if they feel that they are entitled to treat

animals as mere ‘things’, the burden of proof as to why animals’ moral status and rights

do not matter in the situation and why we should be able to use animals as ‘things’ lies

with them, not with those wishing to treat them as morally relevant.

Now that it has been shown which rights can be meaningfully applied to non-

human animals, the logical next question is which animals can be seen as rights bearing

individuals? This question cannot be easily nor completely answered as of yet, though.

Scientific research has only been conducted on a small number of species thus far, but as

it continues, more and more species are shown to possess the reason, linguistic abilities,

cognition, self-awareness, or consciousness necessary for basic rights. According to

Frans De Waal, the pillars of morality, reciprocity and empathy, are found in a number of

non-human animals, including chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys, dogs, and birds, among

other animals.71 Rudimentary moral communities have been seen in baboons, wolves,

elephants, and meerkats, as well.72 Even more complex characteristics, such as self-

awareness, cognition, emotions, and phenomenal consciousness, are suspected in almost

all mammals and many vertebrates generally.73 Drawing lines as to which non-human

animals are and are not included as moral agents and rights bearing individuals is not the

71 De Waal, Frans. Moral Behavior in Animals. Perf. Frans De Waal. TED Talks, Nov. 2011. Web. 4 Nov. 2013. <http://www.ted.com/talks/frans_de_waal_do_animals_have_morals.html>.72 Gruen, "The Moral Status of Animals."73 Allen, "Animal Consciousness."

Sparks 26

purpose of this particular paper, though. There is no doubt that as research is conducted

more thoroughly on different species, more evidence will emerge of these morally

relevant criterion in species previously thought to be non-sentient. Until all research has

been done on the subject, which may take a long while, no real answer can be given as to

where to draw the line on morality.

I. Conclusion

While the arguments in favor of animal rights and moral status are still fairly

indeterminate, the arguments against moral status and rights in non-human animals are

even more so. When the debate is analyzed, it seems that there is sufficient evidence that

non-human animals demonstrate moderate amounts of the characteristics necessary for

basic moral status and the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and bodily integrity. Again,

while not fully proven, the evidence is sufficient to deem necessary a reworking of our

treatment of non-human animals as morally irrelevant ‘things’. This would mean

changing or ceasing the factory farming industry, closing many zoos or increasing the

care and amenities in those deemed humane, compensating animals who hold jobs in our

society, and ceasing or reworking of the animal testing industry, among other things. All

of these actions would be considered seriously fundamentally immoral if they were

performed on another human moral agent, and until non-human animals can be fully

proven as non-moral creatures, they should not be allowed. The burden of proof should

lie with those using and performing typically immoral and often illegal acts on non-

human agents.

Sparks 27

References

Allen, Colin. "Animal Consciousness." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford

University, 23 Dec. 1995. Web. 18 Oct. 2013.

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/>.

Beitz, Charles R. The Idea of Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. Print.

Block, Ned. "On A Confusion About A Function Of Consciousness." Journal of

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18.2 (1995): 227-87. Harvard.edu. Web. 9 Nov.

2013. <http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic720164.files/Block.BBS-

1995.Onaconfusionaboutafunctionofconsciousness.pdf>.

Brennan, Andrew. "Environmental Ethics." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Stanford University, 03 June 2002. Web. 18 Oct. 2013.

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental/>.

Chartier, Gary. "Natural Law and Animal Rights." Canadian Journal of Law and

Jurisprudence 23 (2010): 33-46. Web. 18 Oct. 2013.

DeGrazia, David. Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002.

Print.

DeGrazia, David. "Moral Status as a Matter of Degree?" The Southern Journal of

Philosophy 46 (2008): 181-98. Print.

De Waal, Frans. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other

Animals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1996. Print.

Sparks 28

De Waal, Frans. Moral Behavior in Animals. Perf. Frans De Waal. TED Talks, Nov.

2011. Web. 4 Nov. 2013.

<http://www.ted.com/talks/frans_de_waal_do_animals_have_morals.html>.

Donald, James. "Natural Law and Natural Rights." James Donald. Web. 18

Oct. 2013. <http://jim.com/rights.html>.

"Empathy." OneKind. N.p., 2010. Web. 09 Nov. 2013.

<http://www.onekind.org/be_inspired/animal_sentience/empathy/>.

Feinberg, Joel. "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations." Philosophy and

Environmental Crisis. By William T. Blackstone. Athens, GA: University of

Georgia, 1974. 43-68. Print.

Gruen, Lori. "The Moral Status of Animals." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Stanford University, 01 July 2003. Web. 18 Oct. 2013.

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/>.

I Am. Dir. Tom Shadyac. Perf. Tom Shadyac, Desmond Tutu, Noam Chomsky. Shady

Acres, 2010. Online.

Jamieson, Dale. Ethics and the Environment: An Introduction. Cambridge, UK:

Cambridge UP, 2008. Print.

Jamieson, Dale. Morality's Progress: Essays on Humans, Other Animals, and the Rest of

Nature. Oxford: Clarendon, 2002. Print.

Low, Phillip. "The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness." Proc. of Francis Crick

Memorial Conference on Consciousness in Human and Non-Human Animals,,

Churchill College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge. Ed. Jaak Penskepp,

Diana Reiss, David Edelman, Bruno Van Swinderen, and Christof Koch.Web. 18

Sparks 29

Oct. 2013.

<http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf>.

Nagel, Thomas. "What It Is like to Be a Bat?" The Philosophical Review 83.4 (October

1974): 435-50. UTEP.edu. Web. 9 Nov. 2013.

<http://organizations.utep.edu/portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf>.

Panksepp, Jaak, and Pamela Weintraub. "Jaak Panksepp Pinned Down Humanity's 7

Primal Emotions." Discover Magazine, May 2012. Web. 09 Nov. 2013.

<http://discovermagazine.com/2012/may/11-jaak-panksepp-rat-tickler-found-

humans-7-primal-emotions>.

Regan, Tom. "Animal Rights - An Introduction." Speech. University of Heidelberg,

Heidelberg. 24 May 2006. YouTube. 16 Mar. 2008. Web. 16 Sept. 2013.

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fTNNJspZXA4>.

Regan, Tom. "The Philosophy of Animal Rights." Culture & Animals Foundation.

Culture & Animals Foundation, Web. 17 Sept. 2013.

<http://www.cultureandanimals.org/pop1.html>.

Sapontzis, Steve F. "Moral Community and Animal Rights." American Philosophical

Quarterly 22.3 (July 1985): 251-57. Print.

Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation: The Definitive Classic of the Animal Movement. New

York: Harper Perennial, 2009. Print.

Singer, Peter. "Speciesism And Moral Status." Metaphilosophy 40.3-4 (2009): 567-81.

Print.

Taylor, Angus, John W. Burbidge, and Angus Taylor. Animals & Ethics: An Overview of

the Philosophical Debate. Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview, 2009. Print.

Sparks 30

United Nations General Assembly. "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights."

University of Minnesota Human Rights Resource Center. Ed. Nancy Flowers.

University of Minnesota Web. 18 Sept. 2013.

<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-5/8_udhr-

abbr.htm>.

Watson, Richard A. "Self-Consciousness and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals and

Nature." Environmental Ethics 1.2 (1979): 99-129. Print.

Wenar, Leif. "Rights." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University, 19

Dec. 2005. Web. 28 Oct. 2013. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/>.

Wilson, Scott D. "Animals and Ethics." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. IEP, 23

Oct. 2001. Web. 18 Sept. 2013. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/>.

Wise, Steven M. "The Basic Rights of Some Non-human Animals under the Common

Law." The Nonhuman Rights Project RSS. Web. 07 Nov. 2013.

<http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/publications/>.

Wise, Steven. "Legal Personhood and the Non-Human Rights Project." Animal Law

Journal 17.1 (2010). Print.

Wise, Steven. "Nonhuman Rights to Personhood." Pace Environmental Law Review

3.30 (2013): 1278-290. Print.

Suggested Readings

Bekoff, Marc. "Animal Emotions: Exploring Passionate Natures." BioScience 50.10

(2000): 861. Print

Boissy, A., G. Manteuffel, M. Jensen, R. Moe, B. Spruijt, L. Keeling, C. Winckler, B.

Sparks 31

Forkman, I. Dimitrov, and J. Langbein. "Assessment of Positive Emotions in

Animals to Improve Their Welfare." Physiology & Behavior 92.3 (2007): 375-97.

Print.

Dawkins, M. S. "Animal Minds and Animal Emotions." Integrative and Comparative

Biology 40.6 (2000): 883-88. Print.

Gallup, Gordon G., Jr. "Chimpanzees: Self-recognition," Science (January 2, 1970), 86-7. Gallup, Gordon G., Jr. "Can Animals Empathize? Yes," Scientific American Presents

(Winter 1998), 66-71.

Griffin, Donald R., and Gayle B. Speck. "New Evidence of Animal Consciousness."

Animal Cognition 7.1 (2004): 5-18. Print.

Panksepp, J. "Affective Consciousness: Core Emotional Feelings in Animals and

Humans." Consciousness and Cognition 14.1 (2005): 30-80. Print.

Parker, Sue Taylor., Robert W. Mitchell, and Maria Boccia. Self-awareness in Animals

and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge [England: Cambridge UP,

1994. Print.

Povinelli, Daniel J., Kurt E. Nelson, and Sarah T. Boysen. "Comprehension of Role

Reversal in Chimpanzees: Evidence of Empathy?" Animal Behaviour 43.4 (1992):

633-40. Print.

Reiss, Diana, and Lori Marino. "Mirror Self-recognition in the Bottlenose Dolphin: A

Case of Cognitive Convergence." Proceedings of the National Academy of

Science 98.10 (2001): PNAS. Web. 1 Dec. 2013.

<www.pnas.orgycgiydoiy10.1073ypnas.101086398>.

Sparks 32