SOVIET TACTICS FOR WARFARE AT SEA · SOVIET TACTICS FOR WARFARE AT SEA: TWO DECADES OF UPHEAVAL INTRODUCTION .. Major innovations have changed the shape of Soviet military doctrine

' V UBRARY RESEARCH REPORTS OIVISIOM

~; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 93943

PROFESSIONAL PAPER 367 / November 1982

SOVIET TACTICS FOR WARFARE AT SEA Two Decades of Upheaval

Charles C. Petersen

CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

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The ideas expressed in this paper are those of the author. The paper does not necessarily represent the views of either the Center for Naval Analyses or the Department of Defense.

PROFESSIONAL PAPER 367 / November 1982

SOVIET TACTICS FOR WARFARE AT SEA Two Decades of Upheaval

Charles C. Petersen

Naval Studies Group

CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

2000 North Beauregard Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22311

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Introduction 1 Sources and Methods 2

Levels of Discourse 3 Authorltativeness of Sources 6

The Great Tactical Debate, 1961-1964 8 Massed Action 10 Combined Action 11 Emergence of a Consensus 14

The Consensus IB Resurrection of the "Outdated Ideas" 21

Forms of Tactical Warfare 24 Causes of the Volte-Face 26

Reassessment of EnenQr Defenses 26 Reassessment of Soviet Capabilities 27 Increased Tactical Importance of Conventional Weapons 29

How It May All Fit Together 31 Notes 34 Soviet Sources Cited 47

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SOVIET TACTICS FOR WARFARE AT SEA: TWO DECADES OF UPHEAVAL

INTRODUCTION ..

Major innovations have changed the shape of Soviet military

doctrine over the past decade. Their effects on the Soviet Navy's stra-

tegic employment concepts and on its "operational art"* have been

discussed at length in the West for several years now. That the Soviet

Navy's views on the tactical aspects of warfare at sea have also under-

gone major changes, however, is much less well appreciated—despite the

development of new tactical scenarios and force employment principles by

Soviet naval theorists, despite the existence of a large body of Soviet

writings dealing with these changes, and, finally, despite the profound

impact they have had on contemporary Soviet warship design. As a

result, the emergence in recent years of several new classes of warships

from Soviet yards has produced a good deal of puzzlement among our naval

cognoscenti over why these new designs are so different from the old

ones. Why, for example, do the Oscar class SSGN and the Kirov CGN both

* The Soviet Military Encyclopedia defines "operational art" as "the component of the military art that encompasses the theory and practice of preparing and executing combined and independent operations...by large formations [ob"edineniya—e.g., an army, flotilla, eskadra, etc.] of branches of the armed forces. The operational art occupies an inter- mediate position between strategy.. .and tactics." Thus, in Soviet military usage, the term has a much more specific meaning than it has in ours. While Soviet officers would be comfortable with designators such as "Operation Overlord" and "Operation Sea Lion," they would almost certainly object to the U.S. Navy's using the term "operations area" to denote a place where tactical evolutions are taking place.

carry so many more missiles than their generational predecessors? lifhy

Is the latter the first cruiser since the early 1960s to carry surface-

to-surface missiles? It is difficult to place any of these weapons

platforms on an evolutionary continuum of Soviet warship design because

of the many sharp departures they reflect. We must look elsewhere if we

are to explain their significance ; many of the answers to these

questions can be foimd in Soviet writings on naval tactical theory.

This paper will focus primarily on the development of Soviet views

on anti-surface warfare (ASUW). The period with which this analysis

deals begins in the early 1960s, when Soviet theorists first began to

weigh the implications of their Navy's acquisition of nuclear-missile '

weapons on its tactics. Only a thorough understanding of the issues

raised in this debate will enable us to assess the meaning and import of

Soviet tactical writings today. ■ ■

SOURCES AND METHODS '

Before we begin our analysis, a few words about these writings

sliould be said.

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Levels of Discourse

1 Soviet literature on naval theory contains three levels of

discourse. At one level, Soviet theorists discuss the basic "forms"

that warfare at sea can assume in a future global conflict. In any

given historical era, say these theorists, the forms of warfare remain

relatively constant, although their "content" may change (and new ones

may appear on the scene). The "engagement" (boy), for example, has

persisted as a form of tactical warfare since ancient times, while the

methods by which it is fought—its "content"—have been completely

transformed. In practice, however, these forms themselves are far from

immutable—in the sense that Soviet definitions of them may change, as

y Soviet assessments of how likely they are to occur in the "next"

r. This is especially true for Soviet naval tactics, where the "naval

engagement" (morskoy boy) in particular has evolved at the hands of

theorists in significant, and revealing, ways over the past 20 years.

At another, slightly less rarefied, level these theorists discuss

"principles of the art of naval warfare." These principles derive,

mutatis mutandis, from those applying to the military art as a whole and

may have a strategic, operational, or tactical embodiment ("surprise,"

for example, may be strategic, operational, or tactical, depending on

the scale of its application and the scope of its effect on the

enemy ). Although they are said to reflect "the objectively existing

ma

wa

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laws of warfare," their purpose is normative, that is, they "are fol-

lowed when a war, operation, or engagement is prepared and conducted."

Like the forms and methods of warfare, they, too, may change: "some

lose their importance; others...gain new content; and new [ones]...come

into being." In naval tactics, two such principles—massirovanle or

"massed action" and vzaimodeystvle or "combined action"—are of special

interest here for that very reason, and this analysis will devote con-

siderable attention to their development for the insights they provide

into the present state of Soviet naval tactical thought.*

It is only at the "lowest" level of discourse that we find the

Soviets writing about tactics in a way that will seem familiar to the

Western reader, that is, in terms of specific means, methods, or

maneuvers for achieving specific tactical objectives. This type of

treatment, however, tends to be less straightforward than we might

expect: Some of them will parade as descriptions of "foreign" naval

* For reasons this author does not fully understand, these principles, along with a host of others, were at one time often called "categories of the art of naval warfare." The term "categories" originated with Aristotle, who used it to denote the ten types of logical predicates that a subject may carry. In modern times, it refers to the basic premises of some metaphysical systems, including Marx's "materialist dialectic," whence it was borrowed by Soviet military pedagogues to denote "the basic, fundamental concepts [of military sciencel, reflect- ing the general, essential properties of war...and warfare." Why normative military principles achieved the ranking of "categories" in the minds of Soviet military theorists cannot be determined, but we may assume from the Soviet Militarij Encyclopedia's separate definitions of "principles of the military art" and "categories of military science" that the two terras are no longer considered synonymous.

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tactics (which they may or may not really be) and others as efforts to

draw lessons (which are not always made explicit) from World War II or

the "Great Patriotic War." In each case, a judgment must be made as to

the "real" meaning or purpose of the discussion in question. Fortu-

nately, some rules of thumb do seem to apply here, at least where

professional military journals, which provide the bulk of the source

material for this paper, are concerned; for almost invariably they are

divided into sections whose headings offer an important clue to the 1 , .

raison d'etre of the articles arranged in them. If an essay entitled

"Some Trends in the Development of Naval Tactics" appears in Morskoy

sbornik's section on "The Art of Naval Warfare"—the journal's principal

theoretical section—we may safely assume that, for all its references

to "the opinions of foreign specialists," it accurately reflects Soviet

(or at least the author's own) views on the subject. On the other

hand, if an article on anti-ship missile defense (ASMD) appears in the

"Foreign Navies" section of the journal, there is a better-than-even

chance that its allusions to U.S. or NATO views are designed to be taken

12 at face value. This does not mean, however, that no insight into

Sovîet views can be gleaned from articles in that section, for Soviet

writers often allow their own or official prejudices to creep into their

assessments of the "probable enemy." Vice-Admiral Stalbo's now-famous

13 articles on aircraft carriers in World War II and in the postwar

period illustrate the point. U.S. military doctrine, avers Stalbo,

has assigned to carriers a "significant role in the protection of

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strategic missile submarines and in warfare against enemy missile

submarines." This, of course, is palpable nonsense and makes sense

only if we take it to represent Soviet views, or at the very least

Stalbo's own. ,

Authoritatlveness o£ Sources ...

When assessing the writings of Soviet military theorists—whatever

their level of discourse—we must also make judgments about their

authoritativeness. When do they reflect "the system of views adopted by

the state...on the goals and character of a possible war, on readying

the nation and armed forces to wage it, as well as on the methods of

waging it"?—that is, when do they reflect Soviet military doctrine?

When, conversely, do they represent the individual views of a given

author? . . . . ,,, ■.-■-.

Many monographs bear the stamp of official sanction on their title

pages. The Officer's Handbook and the third edition of Hilita.ry

18 Strategy, published as part of the "Officer's Library" series of the

Soviet Defense Ministry's Military Publishing House, belong in this

19 group. So do books whose title pages carry captions such as "textbook

20 for higher naval colleges."

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Some publications contain—or are associated with—what James

McConnell has called "doctrinal authenticators": telltale character-

izations indickting that the views set forth in them also conform to

21 Soviet military doctrine. Reviews of Admiral Gorshkov's series of

articles on "Navies in War and Peace" state that they had armed the

Navy's officers with a "scientifically substantiated system of views on

.•22 the development of navies and on their role and place in warfare. As

McConnell argues—and the Soviet /fiiitary Encyclopedia confirms—Soviet

military doctrine defines itself as a "scientifically substantiated

23 , - system of views.

Soviet military doctrine, of course, does not pretend to have

answers for every conceivable problem; nor by the same token do all

Soviet military writings claim to be authoritative. That there is room

for differences of opinion on some issues is plain from several

instances of give-and-take between authors and readers in Morskoy

24 sbornik alone during the past few years. And, as we will see below,

there is much to be learned about the development of Soviet tactical

thought from such debates. ' ■ ' c'^ .

The vast majority of Soviet military writings, however, cannot be

pigeonholed this easily. But we need not despair of being able to

assess their authoritativeness: if a given formulation or argument

appears time and again, unchanged and undisowned, we may with some

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confidence presume It to reflect the party line of the moment. If

several writers assert, for example, that command of the sea is

"unthinkable" or "impossible" (or words to that effect) without command

25 of the air, mere happenstance will scarcely serve as an explanation

for the observable uniformity. Nor is it likely, if no one deems it

necessary to take issue with them, that all these writers are speaking

out of turn. > , ,.- , . . ; „,

Soviet professional military journals—chiefly Morskoy sbocnik and

Voennaijd. mysl', organs, respectively, of the Navy and the General

Staff—were the principal sources for this analysis. A number of Soviet

monographs aimed at a military readership were also consulted, as was

the Soviet /•filitary Encyclopedia.* . , ., .,

THE GREAT TACTICAL DEBATE, 1961-1964

The Soviet Union exploded its first fission bomb in 1949, its first

thermonuclear device four years later, and by the middle 1950s had

developed missiles for their delivery. The "revolution in military

affairs" that these achievements heralded was slow in developing, for

"some military theorists still thought that nuclear weapons could not

change the basic principles of warfare and would not bring any serious

qualitative changes to existing methods of warfare." But by 1959 "all

* For a complete list of sources cited in this paper, see pp. 62 ff.

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the top brains of the General Staff" agreed that Soviet military doc-

trine needed revising and that nuclear-missile weapons must dictate the

27 shape of future Soviet military strategy. Shortly thereafter,

according to the testimony of Colonel-General N. Lomov, a debate began

on "the character of a possible world war, the methods of warfare should

nuclear-missile weapons be employed, the missions of the Armed Forces as

a whole and of their individual services and force arms..., the further

■ 28 improvement of [its] organization and equipment..., etc."

And in January 1961, Rear-Admiral K.A. Stalbo fired the opening

broadside of a debate on naval tactics sponsored by Morskoy sbornik.

"One of the important tasks of contemporary military theory," he began,

" .. .is to develop new methods of fighting engagements [jbol] .. .when nuclear-missile weapons are used.... As weapons and military equipment develop, the forms of

. warfare at sea also continually change. It is natural that...some force eraplojmient concepts and principles should change along with them.... Some concepts and principles die off and are replaced by new ones, and others change only in importance. But the old views and notions [about them] are proving very tenacious, which without doubt is hampering the development of [our] theory and the improvement of practice.

That is why an examination of various categories [principles] of the art of naval warfare as manifested today is advisable.

Boldly, Stalbo proceeded to question the relevance in the nuclear-

missile era of two of the most deeply-ingrained principles of Soviet

naval tactics: the principle of "massed action" (massirovanie), which

called for the concentration or "massing" of forces when engaging an

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enemy; and the principle of "combined action" (vzalmodeystvie

raznorodnykh sil), according to which that enemy could be defeated only

by the combined, closely-coordinated efforts of units from several naval

force arms, acting thus to compensate for their individual weaknesses

and at the same time to enhance their overall effectiveness. These

principles had matured during World War 11, when the Soviet Navy was

compelled to fight an ocean-going enemy navy with forces that could not

operate beyond offshore waters.

Massed Action

This principle, argued Stalbo, belonged to the age of shells and

torpedoes, whose lethal force was "relatively small" and probability of

hitting the target "negligible."^^ What was more, this was an

age—World War II~when defenses were more than a match for offensive

capabilities. Thus, only a "large mass" of forces could defeat an

enemy and then only by "repeatedly" firing on him.^^

But today, according to Stalbo, the situation had "sharply

changed." The "great destructive force" of modem weapons had elimi-

nated the need to fire again and again at the enemy in a naval engage-

ment. One nuclear-tipped torpedo or missile could "in some conditions

destroy not one major ship, but several such ships and their screening

forces." Moreover, the hit probability of the new weapons had

"increased considerably" ; under "certain circumstances, it now

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approaches unity." Finally, missiles could be fired from stand-off

ranges; missile-armed aircraft, for example, could fire at surface

targets "while remaining beyond reach of [their] most formidable oppo-

nents .. .surface-to-air missiles"~and the gap between the ranges of

antiship and antiaircraft missiles was likely to grow "even larger" than

that in the years to come."^ In view of this, it was no longer neces-

sary to reckon on large losses of weapon platforms when determining the

35 size of a force needed to perform a given combat mission. For all

these reasons, concluded Stalbo, "the concentration of a large number of

platforms in a modem naval engagement—their massing—is ceasing to be

a basic principle of naval force employment." Today, an assigned task

could be performed "with a single powerful shot (moshchnoe razovoe

vozdeijstvie) against the enemy...with a relatively limited number of

weapon platforms."

Combined Action

This, Stalbo argued, was also a principle better suited to bygone

days, when a mixture of platform types, mutual fire support, and concen-

tration of forces were needed to perform tactical missions ; combined

action was "not just important, but essential" and "inevitably" entailed

"37 "large expenditures of time. *

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Given the enormous lethality of nuclear-missile weapons, however,

"the problem of seizing the initiative and of decisively defeating the

enemy before he fires his own weapons" was "especially acute," for

"losing the opportunity to be the first to open fire will frequently

38 mean also losing the engagement."

Nor was the need to strike at once the only factor that

"frequently" ruled out the possibility of combined action. The range

and power of nuclear missiles demanded the use of formations so spread

out that launch platforms would have to operate "beyond visual and elec-

tronic reach of each other," posing "extraordinarily great technical

• 39 difficulties' for command and control of a coordinated effort.

Yet the same properties of nuclear-missile weapons that made

combined action impossible also made it unnecessary. The modern means

of warfare, claimed Stalbo, "free the attacker's striking groups from

being completely dependent on each other," enabling "a homogeneous force

to carry out an attack independently." The capabilities of submarines

and aircraft—the "core of the strike forces of the [superpower]...

navies"—were "altogether incommensurable" with those of surface ships

or of "the forces and means for combatting missiles." Thus, "the crea-

tion of mixed groups to fight an engagement at sea has ceased to be the

sole possible way of performing combat missions." From all this,

Stalbo concluded that combined action was "ceasing to be essential to

the execution of combat missions."

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Stalbo's assault on these once unquestioned principles provoked a

controversy whose like has rarely been aired on the pages of Morskoy

sboraik, then or since. An intervention by the journal's editors later

that year failed to quell the argument, and it resurfaced the next, its

scope expanded and its vigor undiminished. '^ Because of their impor-

tance in the subsequent development of Soviet tactical thought, the

arguments advanced by Stalbo's opponents ought to be summarized.

In challenging the notion that massed action could no longer serve

as a basic principle of naval tactics, these opponents argued in three

main directions. Some warned that the new weapons, formidable though

they now were, would eventually and inevitably be countered. "Any new

weapon seems to some degree 'absolute' as long as the means for fighting

against it are not developed," wrote one critic. Insisting that none

could remain "absolute" indefinitely. Others claimed that there were

ways of defending against nuclear-missile weapons already: "The depth ,

of antiaircraft and antisubmarine defenses.. .has greatly increased, in

view of which attacking aircraft and submarines will be subjected to

counterattacks at distances considerably greater than in the World-

War-II period. "'^^ Still others, though conceding that modern launch

platforms could stand off from their targets, argued that the missiles

themselves were vulnerable to enemy fire: "even a salvo of missiles if

too small may fail to reach the target, since all of them may be

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destroyed or shot down" by surface-to-air missiles. While this did not

45 require that forces be massed, it did require that weapons be massed ;

the principle therefore lived on, although admittedly its "content" had

changed. . ,, .

A similar cacophony of objections greeted Stalbo's demotion of

combined action. "It allows the strengths of some forces to compensate

for the weaknesses of others," which "enables them overall to perform a

combat mission more completely and reliably [and] with fewer...losses,"

said one critic. "The employment of mixed forces as well as of forces

with different weapons and combat equipment allows the strengths of some

48 forces to make up for the weaknesses of others, said another. It was

therefore "wrong to cast doubt on the advisability. . .of combined

49 action," concluded a third. And a fourth, while agreeing on the

whole" with Stalbo on this issue, argued that "one must not completely

reject the need for mutual fire support." .. .*

Emergence of a Consensus ■ • •■ '• ': '.■

(U) For all the uproar that Stalbo's article provoked, however,

the conservatives were fighting a losing battle, even though Admiral

Gorshkov himself proffered his backing. For one thing, the views it

52 expressed found a considerable measure of support. More important,

they accorded well with the Soviet military leadership's push to "rework

the theory of the military art" and "reeducate [Armed Forces] personnel.

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CO especially officers and generals." And finally, many of Stalbo's key

assumptions and arguments his opponents either acknowledged or left

unchallenged.

Only one of them dared question that the principal means of

tactical warfare would now be nuclear missiles ; none disputed the

enormous lethality of these weapons (some even conceded their present

superiority over defensive systems) ; and no one challenged the

assertion that they were so accurate their probability of hitting a

target "under certain circumstances...now approaches unity." All

these were central premises in Stalbo's contention that "the need to

concentrate [weapon] platforms...to perform an assigned mission has now

passed."

The critics found it even more difficult to refute Stalbo's

position on combined action. Even as they insisted that it remained

58 "the sine qua non of successful performance of a combat mission," they

did not deny that it posed extraordinarily difficult and time-consuming

59 command and control problems at a time when preemptive action was

essential. (As one of them put it: "The threat of large losses from

nuclear weapons makes preempting the enemy's strikes and minimizing the

time used to perform an assigned mission an especially critical

problem.")^°

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Thus, by early 1964, when Morskoy skornik's editors interceded for

the second and final time to wrap up the debate, Stalbo's views had made

considerable headway, and had been taken in directions that even Stalbo

had not foreseen.

On the question of combined action, the editors found his arguments

persuasive. "On the ocean expanses at long distances from home bases,"

they wrote, "it is quite difficult to organize combined action between

force arras such as...submarines and aircraft." Given that "to delay

in striking at an enemy grouping" was "fraught with grave consequences,"

it was "advisable to strike...immediately, as soon as weapon range

allows." If plans for a combined air-submarine strike stood in the

way of meeting this requirement, they must be abandoned; for if the

submarines put off firing their missiles while awaiting the arrival of

the aircraft (or vice versa), the enemy would be able "either to evade

their [attempted combined] strike, or defeat them as they concentrate

[together], or both...." Consequently, "combined action between

groups from different force arms in forward areas must not be considered

In all cases the sine qua. non of organizing combat."

Moreover, with his assertion that enemy forces could now be

destroyed preemptively from standoff ranges, Stalbo set the stage for

an assault on yet another theoretical sacred cow: that the naval

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engagement was "the only way to [tactical] victory." For as partici-

pants began to point out later in the debate, if by "engagement" one

meant "an organized bilateral struggle," an action where no exchange of

fire took place could scarcely be called by that name.

The editors of Morskoy sbornik also agreed with this notion.

"Before the arrival of long-range weapons," they reasoned, "an attacker

was forced to close with the target...while under enemy fire." In those

days the engagement was "the main, and in point of fact, the only" form

of naval warfare. But now that nuclear-missile weapons were "in wide-

spread use," tactical assignments could be carried out "with one or a

few salvos, often even without the attacker entering the enemy's zone of

defense." Today, the enemy could be "defeated and even crushed by aeans

of a auclear-missile strike"—an action "by no means unfailingly

associated with a prolonged exchange of fire...." The "new essence" of

the strike as "one of the basic forms of warfare" was "sweeping aside"

the old view that the enemy could be beaten only by engaging him.

Although the engagement remained an "important" form of naval warfare,

it was "most likely" only when conventional weapons were being used.

It was only on the principle of massed action that the editorial

board disagreed with Stalbo: Like him, they believed that the launch

platforms of the day were much less vulnerable to enemy defenses, but

they could not say the same for the missiles they carried. A single

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cruise missile, they argued, could be shot down "comparatively easily,"

and so could an entire salvo if its size did not exceed "a certain

minimum." This entailed a need to "mass forces and fire"—even if

nuclear weapons were used—in order to "increase the assurance that the

missiles will reach the target when there is strong opposition from

enemy defenses.".

THE CONSENSUS

But by the eve of the Twenty-third Soviet Communist Party Congress,

even this had changed, capping the debate with a total victory for the

views of Stalbo and his supporters. "The main concern...in warfare at

sea," wrote Admiral N.M. Kharlamov in January 1966, "is today coming to

be not the massing of forces with a view to attaining the largest pos-

sible number of direct bomb, shell, or torpedo hits on enemy ships, but

the organization of a small number of nuclear-missile strikes by com-

paratively small groups and even by single [launch] platforms." "The

notion of 'massed use of forces' has gained new content," wrote Admiral

Yu. A. Panteleev a month later. "Now, there is no need to concentrate a

large number of surface ships, submarines, and aircraft in a limited

area.... [The] power of a [strike]...is determined not by the number of

missiles fired, but by the power of the warheads."

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As table 1 shows, these two authors all but paraphrased each

other—and Stalbo—on everything else that had been at issue during the

debate, and coincided at critical junctures with judgments delivered in

72 the authoritative third edition of Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy.

73 This congruence, together with the stature of the authors, bespeaks

the authoritative character of their formulations.

By the time the Soviet Navy completed its review of postwar

tactical theory, therefore, it had found the principles and notions

lying at the theory's very core to be significantly less relevant in the

nuclear-missile era of warfare. The spectacular power, reach, and

accuracy of the new weapons had put in doubt not only the need to

concentrate a variety of platforms to fight the enemy, but also the

advisability and even feasibility of attempting a combined effort

against him in an age when immediate action had become imperative.

Victory would belong not to the side that massed its forces or strove

for the synergism of a carefully coordinate strike, but to the side that

struck first with whatever forces were at hand. Preemption, indeed, was

the key not only to victory, but to survival itself. In the past, as

Panteleev put it, the first salvo—though of "great importance"—^was

"almost never decisive"; but today it meant "'to be or not to be' ; for

from a failed first salvo, one must expect an answering enemy strike

74 with a decisive result. Thus, when Kharlamov wrote that "naval

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i -24-

engagements as previously understood...have become a thing of the

past," ^^ he really meant that they must not be allowed to take place at

all, for engaging the enemy presupposed exchanging strikes with him, and

an exchange of fire would inevitably prove fatal.

Thus was Soviet naval theory "freed," as Admiral Gorshkov wrote a

year later," from manifestly outdated ideas," and the "gap between the

combat capabilities of [nuclear-missileJ weapons and the tactics for

their employment" eliminated.

Although the new tactical doctrine did not take formal effect until

shortly before the Twenty-third Party Congress in the spring of 1966, at

least some of its elements appear to have been implemented informally

several years earlier. In April 1963, for example, one of the partici-

pants in the debate proposed that the Soviet Navy abolish its tradi-

tional distinction between "force arm tactics" on the one hand and

"general naval tactics," or the tactics of combined action, on the

other. The term "general tactics," he wrote, ought to be "abandoned

altogether," since "in real life the theory and practice of waging

combat both independently as well as jointly with other force arras are

developed and refined by the tactics of each force arm"; that is, "the

basic principles of the combined enqiloyiiient of naval forces are dictated

not ty one or another principle of general tactics, but by the tactics

-25-

of whatever force arm is the main one when performing a given concrete

78 task." This suggests that as early as 1963 the importance of combined

action had sharply diminished—while that of independent action had

risen—in the Soviet Navy's everyday tactical practice.

RESURRECTION OF THE "OUTDATED IDEAS" ''''"■

But the formal consensus lasted only a few short years, barely

surviving the close of the decade and giving way in the early 1970s to a

revival of the same "outdated ideas" the Soviet Navy had fought for so

long to repudiate.

The first hints that a theoretical volte-fa.ce was underway—or had

already occurred—appeared in mid-1971, when the author of an article on

Soviet naval theory on the eve of the "Great Patriotic War" observed

that the Navy's 1937 Combat Ma.nua.1 had "recommended that [tactical]

missions be performed by the principle of combined action and massed

action for...the fullest exploitation of the firepower and mobility of

79 the forces participating in an engagement." Seven months later, an

article on "trends in the development of naval forces" stated that "the

methods of operational-tactical employment of naval forces in warfare at

sea are changing," pointing to the "increasingly noticeable determi-

nation abroad to employ them jointly in a tactically coordinated way [v

on takticheskom vzaimodeystvli]," And in mid-1972 Admiral Gorshkov wrote

-26-

that "the First World War clearly showed that combined action of forces

81 and means had become the sine gua non of warfare at sea." By 1974,

however, the Soviets no longer found it necessary to defend this voJLte-

face with allusions to ostensible historical or "foreign" practice.

Combined Action

"In the military and naval art," began an article in early 1974

entitled "Combined Action—A Paramount Principle of Force Employment,"

"there are a number of fundamental, cardinal questions associated with

the theory and practice of warfare. One of these is the combined action

Q O of forces taking part in an operation or engagement." At the tactical

level, wrote the author, combined action "is designed to eliminate

mutual interference" between units deploying, maneuvering, and firing

their main weapons, "as well as to intensify pressure [vozdeystvie] on

the enemy" such that "the results of this pressure are greater than the

sum of strikes (attacks) made by individual ships, aircraft, and groups

participating in an engagement." Combined action, if "correctly" organ-

ized, "enables a mixed force to attack the enemy...from different direc-

tions with a variety of means and hampers his evasion of strikes."

Thus, the eneiny "sustains maximum damage and the attackers a minimum of

losses." In short, "combined action of all forces plays a decisive

role in the modern naval engagement," and "is one of the basic

principles of waging combat in modern conditions," without which "not

one of the missions of the armed struggle can be executed."^^

-27-

A host of theorists have echoed these thoughts since then,

including Admiral Gorshkov: "Combined action...is one of the most

important categories [sic] of the art of naval warfare," he wrote in

both editions of Sea Power of the State. "A rational combination of the

offensive and defensive capabilities of mixed groups enables the execu-

tion of tasks which considerably exceed in scale those executed with the

aggregated capabilities of homogeneous forces.... The importance of

tactical and operational combined action is growing in the navy's

execution of every mission."

Massed Action

Though less immediately obvious, the changes here are no less

significant.

In December 1974, Admiral Gorshkov wrote that because of the range

and power of today's weapons, massed action "will no longer necessarily

have to be realized in the form of participation of a large number of

ships and aircraft"—not, it would seem, a new formulation, were it not

for what Gorshkov added to it. Although massed action would involve

only a "relatively small" number of platforms, it "will take the form of

concentration of...the weapons necessary to perform a combat mission."

And not incidentally, he—and others who followed—spoke not of "massing

of forces," as had been the practice in the previous decade, but as

..... ^ ..87 massing of forces and means.

-28-

Since then, a number of authors have elaiborated on this theme. "In

order, for example, to overcome an antiship-missile defense and achieve

the necessary number of Viits," said one, "it is necessary to increase

the number of missiles in a strike against one target.... The modern '

interpretation of massed action basically implies not the concentration

of ships and aircraft, but of the power of a strike."^^ The "massed use

of weapons," he added, "is a characteristic feature" of tactical actions

89 today. In other words, the emphasis has shifted to saturation of

enemy defenses, overwhelming them with large numbers of missiles, if not

necessarily with large numbers of platforms.

Forms of Tactical Warfare ; . ,

Finally, the naval engagement has once again become the principal

"form"—we would call it "scenario"—of warfare at sea at the tactical

level. The engagement, wrote Gorshkov in 1974, "has always been and

remains fundamental for the execution of tactical missions"—a

judgment he repeats in both editions of his book.^^ In fact, the term

"naval tactics" itself is now defined as "the study and development of :

methods of preparing for and fighting the naval engagement."^^

Moreover, the "modern naval engagement," says the Soviet Military

Encyclopedia, entails the participation of "mixed forces" and is

characterized by "combined tactical action" and "massing of forces and

means." ,. ■• . . ' •

-29-

. Writing in 1977, a naval officer candidly acknowledged that the

postwar development of "this part of the art of naval warfare" had been

"tortuous." "With the advent of nuclear-missile weapons," he explained,

"the role of naval tactics"—as opposed to force-arm tactics—"was

somewhat reduced." The "qualitative leap" in the capabilities of "force

arms such as submarines and aviation" engendered "a tendency to enhance

the role of independent action by them, especially in forward areas."

The strike became the "basic form" of tactical action for the Navy's

missile forces, with the engagement remaining important "only" in

"offshore areas." The role of "naval tactics" was "considerably

degraded" as a result, and "attempts were even made to eliminate [naval

tacticsJ as such from the art of naval warfare." But the "further

development of the methods of waging warfare at sea" and the "experience

of operational and tactical training," concluded this officer, "have

94 changed this point of view. ' - . ■ ^ , •, '

Neither combined action nor massed action, to be sure, have

regained the status they once enjoyed of "categorical ii^peratives" of

the art of naval warfare: Departures from combined action, says

95 Gorshkov, are possible "in some instances"; and "massing of forces and

means" does not—despite its name—actually imply that forces should be

massed. And the strike, though no longer the "basic" form of tactical

96 action in forward areas, remains important enough for Gorshkov to

imply that its effect on the outcome of naval engagements can "in

..97 certain conditions be decisive.

-30-

All the same, the 1970s have witnessed a real counterrevolution in

Soviet naval tactical doctrine. Although the revolution in tactical

thought has not quite come full circle, it has come most of the way; the

conservative views of Stalbo's opponents, discarded only after long and

contentious argument by the mid-196Us, have returned to the fore in the

1970s, as firmly entrenched as ever. Why were these conservatives wrong

then, and why are they right today? What happened at the turn of the

decade—what were the factors that made for this change?

CAUSES OF THE VOLTE-FACE

The evidence suggests that at least two, and possibly three,

factors played a role.

Reassessment of Enemy Defenses

The first of these was a newfound respect for the strength of enemy

defenses. By definition, an engagement is a bilateral contest, consist-

• 98 ing of "reciprocal attacks, counterattacks, and their repulsion.

Surely, then, the Soviet Navy's revival of the naval engagement of

itself implies a loss of confidence in its ability to destroy enemy

99 forces with a preemptive strike before they can effectively respond.

But there is even more direct evidence than that.

-31-

"With the expansion of surveillance capabilities," wrote a Soviet

flag officer in 1973, "the possibility of preempting the enemy in combat

is becoming more and more difficult." Massed action, another flag

officer has stated, "has become even more in^jortant than before" because

of the "increased...capabilities of aircraft-carrier task-force anti-

missile, antiaircraft and antisubmarine defenses." A passage in

Gorshkov's Sea. Power of the State suggests that the principle of

combined action was revived for similar reasons: "The striking [power]

and defensive capabilities of naval forces are continually increasing,

which gives grounds for asserting that in the future combined tactical

action will be required in order to overpower the enemy's organized and

102 deeply-echeloned defense in an engagement."

Reassessment of Soviet Capabilities

The second factor involved a reassessment of Soviet capabilities

themselves. Only one unmistakable piece of evidence for this exists,

but its remarkable candor and the stature of its author—Rear Admiral

103 N.B. Pavlovich, a distinguished naval theorist and historian—make it

powerful evidence indeed. "The peculiarities of the new weaponry's

properties," wrote Pavlovich in an article published late 1974,

compelled a review of a number of principles developed from the experience of World War II and to some degree from that of local wars in the postwar period. One of these principles was massed action.... '

The effectiveness of the new types of weapons, evinced in their increased lethal radius and accuracy, changed the estimate of the quantity of weapons and [launch] platforms needed to achieve the results

-32-

desired of a strike. But because their theoretical accuracy was somewhat overrated, the measure of weapons needed to achieve decisive results was set too low. This in turn affected the formation of views on the methods of employing forces delivering and supporting strikes.

The "views" to which Pavlovich referred, of course, were those voiced by

Stalbo in 1961 and Panteleev and Kharlamov 5 years later to the effect

that massed action could no longer be considered a "basic" guide to

force employment. But actually, wrote Pavlovich, massed action "can

scarcely be disregarded," even in the best of worlds, because the number

of weapons employed "by each attacking group ought to guarantee a

quantity of hits such as would entail achieving the results that corre-

spond to the objectives of the strike."

The principle of combined action, according to Pavlovich, suffered

because of the same blithe approach to the new weapons:

With the advent of nuclear-missile weapons, the ''-' ' accelerating development of the forces and weapons for

a strike made the latter so powerful that successful delivery of it foreordained the further course of events. One would have thought, thanks to the high speed of [launch] platforms and weapons for a strike, " ■ that carrying it out had become simpler. In actual fact this is a far from simple task. Performing it requires thorough support. The efforts of mixed forces acting...in the interests of the forces delivering the '; strike are needed.

Although advances in weapons technology made lags in the

development of naval theory "especially dangerous," concluded Pavlovich,

-33-

it must not be forgotten that extreme judgments have at times appeared in the process of development of the military art and the art of naval warfare, [judgments] which arose because of one-sided or simply incorrect assessments of the results of a given event or of the true effectiveness of the means of attack....

The implementation of extreme views in the construction of naval forces or their reflection in naval theory—and particularly in documents that determine the forms and methods of employing these forces—can prove to be no less harmful than if the methods of warfare lag behind the capabilities afforded by the level attained by combat technology.^

Increased Tactical Importance of Conventional Weapons

The role played in the volte-face by the third factor—if, in fact,

it really was a factor—cannot be ascertained with anything like the

certainty of the other two. Because of its potential importance,

however, it must be discussed here.

Since the early 1970s, a number of Soviet theorists have pointed to

the growing role of conventional weapons in warfare at sea at both the

operational and tactical levels. Writing in 1973, for example, a Soviet

theorist stated that modern naval operations would be characterized by

the "mass [massovoe] use of a variety of the latest [a euphemism for

"nuclear"] and conventional weaponry," and that the navies of "the

largest countries" were equipping their forces with "not only the latest

weapons of great lethality, but also conventional weapons." In a

1977 article on the "basic features of the modern naval engagement,"

another theorist wrote that "the naval engagement has come to be

-34-

regarded primarily as a combination of conventional and nuclear strikes

by mixed naval forces, coordinated as to target, place and time.'

Clearly, then, conventional weapons have become more than just the

"auxiliary means" of warfare they were in the 1960s.

What is not so clear is whether this change was a cause (that it

was the cause may be safely dismissed given the evidence that there were

others involved) or an effect of the counterrevolution in tactical

doctrine.

As a cause, the return to favor of conventional weapons looks

plausible, for in the measure that they became more respectable, so too

would force employment principles originally formulated with their use

in mind. Did the Soviets conclude, for example, that nuclear weapons '

were not always appropriate in tactical situations—too "dirty,"

perhaps, for employment outside the strategic context? The references

to combined use of nuclear and conventional weapons militate against

this as an answer. Did they decide there were some things they could do

better with conventional munitions? It is difficult to think of any, if

one grants that the main purpose of warfare at sea is to destroy the

enemy or at least render him impotent. Or did they decide there were

some things they could do well enough with conventional weapons and

therefore more cheaply? Perhaps so: fissile materials are expensive to

process and nuclear warheads expensive to build and maintain.

-35-

But the renewed importance of conventional weapons is equally ;.

plausible as an effect, especially of the requirement for massed

action. If one must allow for the possibility of large losses of

missiles to enemy fire, saturation of enemy defenses with massed

all-nuclear strikes is hardly cost effective: the aim of diluting the

defensive effort is just as well served if some of the missiles have the

less expensive—and more expendable—conventional warheads.

HOW IT MAY ALL FIT TOGETHER

Despite this uncertainty, the main directions in the postwar

progression of Soviet naval tactical thought are plain. A prolonged

debate in the early 1960s ended in victory for those theorists who

believed that the arrival of nuclear-missile weapons called for

far-reaching changes in some basic tenets of Soviet naval tactics.

Those who defended the old views "lost" the debate primarily because

they were unable or even unwilling to challenge many of the reformers'

key arguments. Like the reformers, they too stood in awe of the new

weapons, which made their advocacy of massed action seem pointless; none

of them doubted that the time factor was critical, which made their

insistence on combined action, given the time it consumed, seem

reckless; and since victory—indeed, survival itself—depended on

preemption, how could one speak of engaging the enemy? Almost

-36-

inevitably, therefore, independent action, especially by submarines and

aircraft, became the basic principle, and the preemptive strike the

basic "form," of naval tactical warfare in forward areas.

By the early 1970s, the confident outlook reflected in that

doctrine—and in Sokolovskiy's claims that the aircraft carrier was "a

highly vulnerable target" —was badly shaken. The Soviets realized

they had underrated the enemy's ability to defend himself and overrated

their own ability to destroy him quickly, cleanly, and economically.

Mere preemption would not assure his elimination; the prospects of

avoiding engagements with him had faded; massed action no longer was

pointless, nor combined action reckless; and conventional weapons, once

the stepchild of the nuclear age, found new respectability.

In varying degrees, the new generation of surface combatants and

submarines embodies this counterrevolution in Soviet tactical thought,

particularly where the principle of massed action—or, more precisely,

saturation—is concerned. For among the many differences between the

new platforms and their generational predecessors, none is so striking

as the difference in number of missile launchers. The Oscar class SSGN,

for example, has twenty-four such launchers—three times the number

carried by the Charlie and Echo-11 classes, and six times as many as the

Juliett class SSG. Kirov, the new cruiser, has twenty SSM launchers, or

five times the number found on the last SSM cruiser design before it,

Kresta-I.^^^

-37-

The revival of combined action as a "paramount" principle of naval

warfare is not nearly as obvious in the new designs, nor should we

expect it to be, since it is more relevant to how forces should be

employed than to how they should be designed. Nevertheless, it may well

have something to do with the Soviet Navy's renewed interest in building

SSM-firing cruisers, perhaps for combined submarine-, surface-ship-, and

air-launched strikes against enemy high-value targets. ,

Finally, the return of the naval engagement—morskoy boy—as the

Soviet Navy's "basic" tactical scenario is consistent with, and is very

likely reflected in, its present reported attempts to develop a CTOL

aircraft carrier to improve, among other things, its fleet air defense ,

capabilities.

-38-

NOTES

Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya [hereafter referred to as SVE], vol. 6 [Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978], p. 53, s.v. "Operativnoe iskusstvo".

See S. Filonov, "Morskaya operatsiya," Morskoy sbornik (hereafter cited as MS), No. 10, October 1977, p. 22.

The discussion was initiated by James M. McConnell of the Center for Naval Analyses, who suggested in a 1974 analysis of Admiral Gorshkov's "Navies in War and Peace" that the Soviets had adopted a strategy of withholding a portion of their SLBMs in a general nuclear war in order to influence the shape of the postwar peace, should both the principal belligerents involved survive the war. See "Admiral Gorshkov on 'Navies in War and Peace, '" CNA Research Contribution 257, September 1974, pp. 71-116.

4 Compare the Oscar class, which carries 24 missile tubes, with the

Charlie-, Echo-II-, and Jullett-class cruise-missile submarines, which have 8, 8, and 4 tubes, respectively. The Kirov has 20 SSM launchers, while the 4 Kresta-X-class ships each have only 4. See Jane's Fighting Ships, 1981-1982.

The distinction between "form" and "content" in Soviet military doctrine issues directly from that made by Marxist-Leninist philosophy, where form and content are said to "reflect the interaction of the two sides of every phenomenon." Each phenomenon's content, on the one hand, is "the sum total of all [its] component elements, characteristics, connections, contradictions, and developmental tendencies," while its form on the other hand is "the relatively stable association between [itsj elements, [i.e.] its internal organization and structure...its outward expression" {sVE, vol. 7 [Moscow, 1979], p. 425, s.v. "Soderzhanie i forma"). For a discussion of the subject in its military embodiment, see ibid., pp. 501-502, s.v. "Sposoby boevykh deystviy"; and ibid., vol. 8 (Moscow, 1980), p. 305, s.v. "Forray boevykh deystviy."

Ibid., vol. 2 (Moscow, 1976), pp. 161-163, s.v. "Vnezapnost'."

Ibid., vol. 6 (Moscow, 1978), pp. 542-543, s.v. "Printsipy voennogo iskusstva."

-39-

About categories, Bertrand Russell once wrote: "What, exactly, is meant by the word 'category,' whether in Aristotle or in Kant and Hegel [he might just as well have added Marx to the list], I must confess that 1 have never been able to understand. I do not nyself believe that the term 'category' is in any way useful in philosophy, as representing any clear idea" (A History of vfestern Philosophy [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945J, pp. 199-200).

g SVE, vol. 4 (Moscow, 1977), p. 121, s.v. "Kategorii voennoy nauki."

See notes 7 and 9 above, respectively. Nevertheless, confusion persists, as witness Gorshkov's use of the terms in the second edition of Sea Power of the State, where he introduces his section on "Theoretical Questions of the Art of Naval Warfare" by saying "let us briefly discuss some principles of naval [force] employment," and then proceeds to call them all "categories of the art of naval warfare" iMorskaya moshch' gosadarstva, 1st ed. [Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976], pp. 361-380; 2nd ed. [Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979], pp. 330-346.

See N.P. V'yunenko, "0 nekotorykh tendentsiyakh v razvitii morskoy taktiki," MS, No. 10, October 1975, pp. 21-26. A March 1978 article in the same journal commemorating the 130th anniversary of its founding supports this point. Appraising the journal's section on "The Art of Naval Warfare," the author writes that articles such as V'yunenko's help Soviet officers to "develop unified tactical thinking" and prompt them to "analyze and interpret...events arising in the course of tactical and operational training" (I. Gordeev, "Nash zhurnal," MS, No. 3, March 1978, p. 25).

See B. Rodionov, I. Novichkov, "Problema PRO: Razreshima li ona?," MS, No. 5, May 1978, pp. 96-103.

K.A. Stalbo, "Avianostsy vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne," MS, No. 1, January 1978, pp. 91-100.

14 .. Idem, Avianostsy v poslevoennyy period," MS, No. 6, June 1978, pp. 91-100.

15

16

17

Ibid., p. 94. -. . ,

SVE, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1977), pp. 225, s.v. "Doktrina voennaya.

Spravochnik ofitsera [Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971], 398 pp.

1 X V.U. Sokolovskiy (ed.), Voennaya strategiya [Moscow: Voenizdat,

1968], 464 pp.

-40-

19 Books published as part of the "Officer's Library" are apparently

designed to serve as "textbooks for the self-education of a wide circle of Soviet officers" (Sokolovskiy, op.cit. , p. 4).

See S. Ye. Zakharov (ed.)» Istoriya voenno-morskogo iskasstva [Moscow: Voenizdat, 1969], 575 pp.

See James M. McConnell, "The Gorshkov Articles, the New Gorshkov Book and Their Relation to Policy," in Michael MccGwire and John McDonnell (eds.), Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), pp. 604-612.

A. Gontaev, "Plot v voyne: opyt i uroki," MS, No. 4, April 1975, p. 104.

23 McConnell, op.cit., p. 611. "Contemporary Soviet military doctrine,"

says the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, "is a system of guiding principles, of scientifically substantiated views of the CPSU and the Soviet Government on the essence, character, and methods of waging a war that may be thrust upon the Soviet Union by the imperialists, as well as on the military...preparation of the Armed Forces and the nation to crush the aggressor" (SVE, vol. 3, p.229, s.v. "Doktrina voennaya").

24 Vice-Admiral Stalbo has been involved in a number of these recently.

For example, (1) his article on aircraft carriers in World War II ("Avianostsy vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne") was attacked by the journal's chief editor for not giving "due attention to the vulnerability of these ships to submarine weapons" (A. Pushkin, "Boevye deystviya amerikanskikh i yaponskikh podvodnykh lodok protiv avianostsev v period vtoroy mirovoy voyny," MS, No. 9, September 1979, p. 12); (2) the main points of his article on the development of views on submarines ("Razvitie vzglyadov na podvodnye sily," MS, No. 9, September 1979, pp. 81-87) were characterized by Vice-Admiral Gontaev as "insufficiently convincing," "one-sided" and even "tendentious" ("Na avanstsene nauchno-tekhnicheskoy revolyutsii," MS, No. 2, February 1980, pp. 80-90); and (3) in a two-part article published in 1981 on the "theory of the development and employment of the Navy" ("Nekotorye voprosy teorii razvitiya i ispol'zovaniya VMF," MS, No. 4, April 1981, pp. 20-28 and No. 5, May 1981, pp. 17-27), he asks that his thoughts (which "remain the author's opinion only") be "amplified and critically appraised by the journal's readers" (No. 5, p. 27); to date, four responses have been published (G. Kostev, "Ob osnovakh teorii Voenno-Morskogo Flota," MS, No. 11, November 1981, pp. 24-29; V. Chernavin, "0 teorii Voenno-Morskogo Flota," MS, No. 1, January 1982, pp. 20-24); V. Sysoev, "Teoriya upravleniya Voenno-Morskim Flotom," MS, No. 3, March 1982, pp. 21-27; B. Makeev, "Nekotorye vzglyady na teoriyu vooruzheniya VMF," MS, No. 4, April 1982, pp. 27-31.

-41-

See Yu.Bystrov, "Zavoevanie gospodstva na more," MS, No. 3, March 1977, pp. 17, 20 ("The experience of [the second world] war showed that winning command of the sea is impossible without a preponderance of forces in the air"; "Command of the sea has become unthinkable without command of the air...."); A. Pushkin, op.cit., p. 11 ("A paramount factor of command of the sea in ocean areas [in World War II] was command of the air...."); G. Kostev, op.cit., p. 25 ("...winning comi:iand of the sea is virtually unthinkable without winning command of the air.")

I. Korotkov, "0 razvitii sovetskoy voennoy teorii v poslevoennye gody," Voenno-lstoricheskiy zhurnal. No. 4, April 1964, p. 44.

The Penkovskiy Papers, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965), p. 251. A 1976 history of the Soviet General Staff Academy corroborates this date in a description of a lecture delivered in August 1959 at the Acadeny by the then Chief of the General Staff Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy:

A lecture by the Chief of the General Staff delivered at the Academy in August 1959...acquainted the Academy's leaders, professors, instructors and students with the new views on the probable character of a future war...and pointed to the tasks of Soviet military strategy that followed therefrom.

The lecturer's basic propositions, which defined the general direction of the development and preparation of the Soviet Armed Forces for the immediate future, became the foundation not only of the [Academy's] strategy course, but of the entire training program for generals and officers at the General Staff Academy.

See V.G. Kulikov (ed.), Akademiya General'nogo shtaba (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), pp. 152-153.

N. Lomov, "0 sovetskoy voennoy doktrine," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 10, May 1962, p. 11 (Colonel-General Lomov was Chairman of the Department of Strategy at the General Staff Academy at the time. See V.G. Kulikov, op. cit., pp. 157, 185).

29 K.A. Stalbo, "0 nekotorykh kategoriyakh voenno-morskogo iskusstva v sovremennom ikh proyavlenii," MS No. 1, January 1961, p. 17.

^'Îbid., p. 17.

^Îbid., p. 18.

^^rbid., p. 19.

-42-

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

3y Ibid.

40 Xbid.

41 Jbid.

p. 19.

p. iy-2u.

p. 20.

p. 20.

p. 21.

p. 21-22.

p. 23.

p. 22-23.

p. 23.

See V.S. Lisyutin, "K voprosu o kategoriyakh voenno-morskogo iskusstva V sovreiuennykh usloviyakh," MS, No. 3, March 1961, pp. 14-22; V.S. bysoev, "Ob izmenenii soderzhaniya nekotorykh ponyatiy voenno-morskogo iskusstva," MS, No. 4, April 1961, pp. 22-30; "0 nekotorykh printsipakh voenno-morskogo iskusstva v sovremennykh usloviyakh," MS, No. 10, October 1961, pp. 16-25; B.F. Petrov, "Taktika flota i predmet ee issledovaniya," MS, No. 7, July 1962, pp. 24-31; N.V. Sukhodol'skiy, "0 formakh i zakonomernostyakh boevykh deystviy na more," MS, No. 10, October 1962, pp. 19-25; A.G. Svetlov, "0 vzaimodeystvii v morskom boyu," MS, No. 12, December 1962, pp. 18-25; B.P. Molotkov, "Ob izmenenii form boevykh deystviy na more v svyazi s razvitiem sredstv vooruzhennoy bor'by," MS, No. 3, March 1963, pp. 24-27; L.A. Emel'yanov, "K voprosu o taktike flota i predmete ee issledovaniya," MS, No. 4, April 1963, pp. 23-28; B.N. Ivanov, "0 predmete issledovaniya taktiki," MS, No. 6, June 1963, pp. 27-30; Yu. V. Kolesnikov, "0 nekotorykh kategoriyakh taktiki flota," MS, No. 11, November 1963, pp. 19-24; "Teoriya voenno-morskogo iskusstva i sovremennyy flot," MS, No. 2, February 1964, pp. 41-47.

Lisyutin, op.cit., p. 16; see also V.T. Protsenko, cited in "0 nekotorykh printsipakh voenno-morskogo iskusstva v sovremennykh usloviyakh," p. 16.

44 M.E. Krasnokutskiy, cited in ibid., p. 19; also B.V. Nikitin, cited in ibid., p. 19; and V.I. Mateev, cited in ibid., pp. 18-19.

45 Svetlov, op.cit 19; also Sysoev, op.cit- p. 23.

-43-

Ibid., p. 23.

Lisyutin, op.cit., pp. 17-18.

48 ' ■ Svetlov, op.clt., p. 20.

49 Nikitin, op.cit., p. 20.

Krasnokutskiy, op.cit., p. 21.

See S.G. Gorshkov, "Resheniya XXII s"ezda KPSS i zadachi voennykh moryakov," MS, No. 1, January 1962, p. 17: "when carrying out both theoretical and practical tasks, it is necessary to proceed from the fact that the eneiBy will offer strong opposition during the fight. In order to overcome this opposition, massed use of forces and combined action of all the forces assigned to perform a combat mission will be required."

On massed action: "Compared to conventional weapons, nuclear-missile weapons possess incomparably greater hit probabilities and colossal destructive capabilities. Some weapon models virtually defy shooting down with current defensive means. Of course...one should take into account the expected level of enemy resistance and the conditions that ensure hitting the designated target.... So does it follow from this that a [tactical] nuclear-missile strike...is characterized by the massed use of forces?" (Kolesnikov, op.cit., p. 23). On combined action: "Today all the conditions exist that permit abandoning the obligatory principle of combined action..." (Protsenko, op.cit, p. 24);"the improved tactical properties of modern weapons considerably diminish the interdependence of forces in an engagement..." (Sysoev, op.cit., p. 24); "The increased combat capabilities of the modern navy's force arras in many cases also permits employing them independently in an engagement (without coordinating their actions with the striking forces of other force arms)" (Sukhodol'skiy, op.cit., p. 35).

53 Speech by Defense Minister R. Ya. Malinovskiy at the Twenty-third CPSU Congress, 23 October 1961; text in Krasnaya zvezda, 24 October 1961, pp. 3-4. Even Gorshkov conceded that "the new conditions of warfare imperatively demand that many established tenets of military science be reexamined." See "Resheniya XXII s"ezda KPSS i zadachi voennykh moryakov," p.17. -..

-44-

Nikitin, op.cit., pp. 18-19: "It would be wrong to rule out the possibility that conventional weapons will be used...and to proceed from [the assumption] that in all cases the objectives of an engagement will be achieved only with nuclear-missile weapons"; to which Kolesnikov (op.cit., pp. 19-20) replied: "Our military science has been forced to regard nuclear-missile weapons as the main means of achieving victory over the enemy. We emphasize—the main [means], and not a reserve [means], nor an auxiliary [means], nor a means for exploiting a break- through obtained as a result of employing conventional weapons. Con- versely, conventional weapons have become not the main [means], but a supplementary and sometimes reserve means. These premises are also, in our opinion, the point of departure when examining the forms of warfare at sea both on an operational and on a tactical scale."

55 Lisyutin, op.cit., p. 16; Protsenko, op.cit., p. 16.

Stalbo, "0 nekotorykh kategoriyakh voenno-morskogo iskusstva v sovremennom ikh proyavlenii," p. 19. A belief in the fantastic accuracy of guided missiles pervaded Soviet writings of the time; references to hit probabilities of between 60 and 90 percent were common. See V.G. Rog, "Vliyanie raketno-yadernogo oruzhiya na primenenie aviatsii na more," MS, No. 6, June 1963, p. 34 ("The probability that one SAM...will hit an air target flying at an altitude of 18 kilometers is 65 percent"); P.N. Verin, K.V. Morozov, Raketnoe oruzhie protlvovozdushnoy oborony na more [Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964], p. 9 ("The average probability of hitting a maritime target with a guided missile and a conventional gravity bomb in the same conditions is 60-80 percent and 1- 2 percent, respectively") and p. 44 ("A modern [jet] aircraft.. .can be shot down with one or, at worst, two surface-to-air missiles"); B.F. Petrov, "Soderzhanie i kharakter sovremennykh boevykh deystviy na more," MS, No. 1, January 1965, p. 14 ("Missiles, especially those equipped with homing devices and designed to hit sea and air targets, have a hit probability of 60-90 percent").

Stalbo, "0 nekotorykh kategoriyakh voenno-morskogo iskusstva v sovremennom ikh proyavlenii," p. 19.

CO - ■ .,

Matveev, op.cit., p. 20.

59 Svetlov, op.cit, p. 25 See also Lisyutin, op.cit., p. 20; Nikitin,

op.cit., p. 20; editors of Morskoy sbornik, in ibid., pp. 24-25.

Svetlov, op.cit., p. 19. See also Lisyutin, op.cit., pp. 16-17; Nikitin, op.cit., p. 20; Editors of Morskoy sbornik, op.cit., p. 24.

-45-

"Teoriya voenno-morskogo iskusstva 1 sovremenny flot," MS, No. 2, February 1964, p. 45.

^Îbid., p. 45. . ■'

Ibid., pp. 45-46.

^Îbid., p. 46. . :.

Stalbo, "0 nekotorykh kategoriyakh voenno-morskogo iskusstva v souremennom ikh proyavlenii," pp. 19-20.

Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Enstiklopediya, 2nd ed., vol. 5 (Moscow, 1950), p. 37b, s.v. "Boy."

Petrov, "Taktika flota i predmet ee issledovaniya," pp. 27-28; Molotkov, op.cit., p. 25. The notion that modern weapons could be fired from standoff ranges was also echoed outside the confines of this debate in a number of articles and publications. See, inter alia, V.G. Rog, op.clc, p. 32 ("The employment of air-to-surface guided missiles can rule out opposition from shipboard antiaircraft weapons against missile- carrying aircraft, and under some conditons missile-carrying aircraft can deliver a strike without entering the area of action of fighters providing air cover for ships"); A.N. Sukhanov, "Vliyanie razvitiya tekhniki i oruzhiya na taktiku aviatsii pri deystviyakh po korabylam v more," MS, No. 4, April 1961, pp. 35-36 ("Some types of guided missiles...possess a range...that permits attacking a target from distances that exceed the combat radius of some types of shipboard fighters"). In the event that fighters were encountered, these and other writers doubted that they could provide effective opposition in anything less than optimal conditions (no ECM, good visibility, etc.). See Rog, op.cit., pp. 34-36; K.V. Morozov, Korabel'nye sredstva protivovozdushnoy oborony [Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960] pp. 101-102; P.N. Verin, K.V. Morozov, op.cit., p. 122; I.I. Kolosov, "Ueystviya aviatsii po korablyam v more v usloviyakh radioprotivodeystviya," MS, No. 3, March 1962, pp. 40-42; S.A. Gulyaev, "Rol' aviatsii v boevykh deystviyakh na more v sovremennykh usloviyakh," MS, No. 6, June 1965, pp. 41-42.

AX "Teoriya voenno-morskogo iskusstva i sovremennyy flot," pp. 42-43.

Boldface in original.

Ibid., pp. 44-45. ■ -

N.H. Kharlamov, "Tendentsii razvitiya voenno-morskikh flotov," MS, No. 1, January 1966, p. 34.

-46-

71YU. A. Panteleev. "Nekotorye voprosy deystviy flota v sovremennoy voyne," MS, No. 2, February 1966, pp. 28-29.- '.;

'''^See notes 18 and 19.

^\dndral Kharlamov was formerly commander-in-chief of the Baltic Sea Fleera950-!954). At the time his article was published, he was involved in "responsible duties in the Navy's central apparatus -probably xts Main Staff (Sol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 3rd ed., vol. ô (Moscow 1978J, p. 201). Admiral Panteleev, a former commander-in-chxef if trPacLii'ocean pieet (1951-1955), wrote as tê head of the Soviet Naval Academy (5VB, vol. 6 [Moscow, 1978], pp. 206-207).

^'^Panteleev, op.cit., p. 28.

''^Kharlamov, op.cit., p. 34.

7^S.G. Gorshkov, "Razvitie sovetskogo voenno-morskogo iskusstva," MS, No. 2, February 1967, p. 21.

77see BoVshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 2nd ed. vol. 41 (Moscow, 1956) P. 543, s.v. "Taktika Voenno-Morskogo Flota ; Morskoy slovar , 111. 2 [Mosco;: Voenizdat, 1959], p. 403, s.v. "Morskaya taktika.

7«L.A. Emel'yanov, op.cit., pp. 24-25 (boldface in original).

7% P. Vyunenko, "Sovetskoe voenno-morskoe iskusstvo nakanune Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny," MS, No. 6, June 1971, p. 32. Although Admiral Gorshkov, writing in 1967 on the history of Soviet naval theory had found much to commend in the Combat Manual's treatment of operational and tactical issues, he pointedly reproached postwar theorists for trying to apply its provisions in the nuclear-missile age. singling out for criticism their determination to make "any" tactical action against enemy surface ships a matter of "delivering the main strike in coastal waters of necessity with a combined naval force." This could not be justified," since it "inevitably promoted the entrenchment f hackneyed methods of naval force employment in combat" and "restricted the initiative" of tactical commanders ("Razvitie sovetskogo voenno-morskogo iskusstva," p. 17). V'yunenko's article contained no such afterthoughts.

^^N. Aleshkin, "Nekotorye tendenstii razvitiya voenno-morskikh sil," MS, No. 1, January 1972, p. 29.

-47-

Q 1

"Voenno-morskie floty v voynakh i v mirnoe vremya," MS, No. 5, I4ay 1972, p. 24. In a later article in "Navies in War and Peace," Gorshkov wrote that during the Second World War "homogeneous naval tactical formations [soedlneniya] were transformed into mixed [tactical formations], which permitted the execution of the most probable missions of the war at sea. The methods of combined action against the enemy by different force arms and types of weapons...were developed and improved' (ibid., MS, No. 11, November 1972, p. 32).

G. Kostev, "Vzaimodeystvie—vazhneyshiy printsip ispol'zovania sil," MS, No. 2, February 1974, p. 28.

Ibid., p. 29.

84 'ibid., p. 30 (emphasis in original).

Ibid., p. 53.

'Afi Morskaya mosch' gosudarstva, 1st ed., pp. 367-368; 2nd ed., p. 335.

See also Gorshkov, "Nekotorye voprosy razvitiya voenno-morskogo iskusstva," MS, No. 12, December 1974, p. 28; N.P. V'yunenko, "0 nekotorykh tendentsiyakh v razvitii morskoy taktiki," pp. 22-23; SVE, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1976), pp. 123-124, s.v. "Vzaimodeystvie"; V.S. Mamchits, "Osnovnye osobennosti sovremennogo morskogo boya," MS, No. 4, April 1977, p. 24; M. Iskanderov, "Razvitie boya,"iifS, No. 5, May 1980, p. 31.

87 '"^ "Nekotorye voprosy razvitiya voenno-morskogo iskusstva," p. 28

(emphasis mine). The expression "massing of forces and means" (massirovanie sil i sredstv) or, alternatively, "massing of forces and weapons" (massirovanie sil i oruzhiya) can be found in most of the treatments of the subject since 1974. See N. Pavlovich, "Osnovnye faktory razvitiya voenno-morskogo iskusstva," Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal. No. 12, December 1974, p. 50; V.S. Mamchits, "Osnovnye osobennosti sovremennogo morskogo boya," pp. 24-25; V. Chernavin, "0 teorii Voenno-Morskogo Flota," p. 23; SVE, vol. 5 (Moscow, 1978), pp. 179-180, s.v. "Massirovanie sil i sredstv." For references to "massing of forces" only, see V'yunenko, "0 nekotorykh tendentsiyakh v razvitii morskoy taktiki," p. 25; K.A. Stalbo, "Nekotorye voprosy teorii razvitiya i ispol'zovaniya VMF," MS, No. 5, May 1981, p. 21.

-48-

QQ ° Mamchits, "Osnovnye osobennosti sovremennogo morskogo boya," pp. 24-25.

^Îbid., p. 27. . ; ■'■■"

90 Nekotorye voprosy razvitiya voenno-morskogo iskusstva," p. 26.

Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva, 1st ed., p. 366; 2nd ed., p. 333.

SVE, vol. 7 (Moscow, 1979), p. 631, s.v. "Taktika voenno-morskogo flota." See also Stalbo, "Nekotorye voprosy teorii razvitiya i ispol'zovaniya VMF," MS, No. 4, April 1981, p. 27: "The theory of naval tactics develops, studies and investigates that realm of the art of naval warfare where the highest and basic form of [naval] action is the naval engagement—the basic means of attaining victory."

93 SVE, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1976) p. 547, s.v. "Boy morskoy."

" Mamchits, "Osnovnye osobennosti sovremennogo morskogo boya," p. 24. Mamchits appears to be referring to the proposed elimination by one of the participants in the 1960s debate of the term "general naval tactics" (see above, p. 19-20): "Then [only] force arm tactics and the operational art would remain" as components of the art of naval warfare (see Emel'yanov, op.cit., p. 25).

95 Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva, 1st ed., p. 367; 2nd ed., p. 335.

^°See SVE, vol. 8 (Moscow, 1980), p. 305, s.v. "Formy boevykh deystviy," where the strike is listed as a form of warfare, but not as a basic form of warfare, either at the tactical, operational or strategic level.

97 Morskaya moshcha' gosudarstva, 1st ed., p. 365; 2nd ed., p. 333; "Nekotorye voprosy razvitiya voenno-morskogo iskusstva," p. 25. Gorshkov's statement that the strike "is becoming increasingly equivalent to the engagement," however, should not mislead us into thinking that nothing has changed. Writing in 1980, Admiral Sysoev, the current chief of the Soviet Naval Academy, makes clear that the strike—though "becoming equivalent to the engagement"—remains only an "element" of it, albeit one of the "main" ones (V.S. Sysoev, "Razvitie form vooruzhennoy bor'by na more," MS, No. 11, November 1980, p. 24).

^^SVE, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1976), p. 547, s.v. "Boy morskoy."

-49-

9y Soviet statements are consistent with this inference. According to Mamchits, naval striking forces must "possess not only power enough to defeat the enemy, but also the appropriate combat stability, in order to hold out against enemy fire.... Questions of ensuring the combat stability of forces in all phases of an engagement have become especially important" ("Osnovnye osobennosti sovremennogo morskogo boya," pp. 25-2fa).

A. Gontaev, "Vnezapnost' kak kategoriya voenno-morskogo iskusstva," MS, No. 3, March 1973, p. 35. Other examples: "As armaments develop the role of surprise is becoming even more important.... At the same time the capabilities of reconnaissance and early warning of missile attack have increased.... In modern conditions the role of surprise has become more important by far than before. But at the same time achieving it has become much more difficult" (Stalbo, "Nekotorye voprosy teorii razvitiya i ispol'zovaniya VMF," MS, No. 5, l-Iay 1981, p. 221); "Since the advent of [fighter?] aircraft and thereafter of radar and other more sophisticated detection systems, the struggle to actualize the surprise factor in warfare at sea has intensified" (Mamchits, "Osnovnye osobennosti sovremennogo morskogo boya," p. 25).

V. Chernavin, "0 teorii Voenno-Morskogo Flota," p. 23. See also Mamchits, "Osnovnye osobennosti sovremennogo morskogo boya," p. 24 ("The increased defensive capabilities of navies and the enhancement of the combat stability of ships and tactical formations have necessitated an even greater massing of forces and weapons in an engagement").

Gorshkov, Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva, 1st ed., p. 367, 2nd ed., p. 335.

(U) Nikolay Bronislavovich Pavlovich chaired the Soviet Naval Academy's Department of General Naval Tactics during the second World War and coauthored the Soviet Navy's 1945 Combat Manual iVoprosy taktiki V sovetskikh voennykh trudakh (1917-1940 gg.) [Moscow: Voenizdat, 1970J, p. 445). A number of sources credit Pavlovich with exerting a substantial influence on the development of Soviet naval tactics during the war. (Gorshkov, "Razvitie sovetskogo voenno-morskogo iskusstva," p. 14; SVE, vol. 2 [Moscow, 1976], p. 231, s.v. "Voenno-morskaya akademiya imeni Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuza A.A. Grechko"; A. Orel, "V gody voyny," MS, No. 1, January 1977, p. 18). After the war, Pavlovich edited a two-volume work on navies in the First World War (Fiot v pervoy mirovoy voyne [Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964]), and coauthored (with Admiral V.l. Achkasov) a history of Soviet naval warfare in World War II (Sovetskoe voenno-morskoe iskusstvo v Vellkoy Otechestvennoy voyne [Moscow: Voenizdat, 1973]).

-50-

"Osnovnye factory razvitiya voenno-morskogo iskusstva," p. 50 (.emphasis mine). Pavlovich died in late June 1973 (see obituary in Krasnaya zvezda, 30 June 1973, p. 4); the article was published posthumously.

^'^Îbid., pp. 50-51.

^^Îbid., p. 51.

^^Îbid., pp. 51-52.

1 OH B. Bannikov, "Kharakternye cherty sovremennykh morskikh operatsiy," VM, No. 3, March 1973.

Mamchits, "Osnovnye osobennosti sovremennogo morskogo boya," p. 24.

Voennaya strategiya, 3rd ed. (1968), pp. 363, 364. Surely the evidence adduced in this paper suggests that such statements were not all bluff! However, for a contrary view, see Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1968), p. 118.

^^^Jane's Fighting Ships, 1981-1982

An apparent "fly in the ointment," of course, is the Kiev class, design work for which probably began in the first half of the 1960s, but which is equipped with eight SS-N-12 launchers. One explanation may be that the launchers were added to the ship much later in the design phase. Unfortunately, this explanation is extremely difficult to con- firm, given that a full history of Kiev's design phase is unlikely to come to light.

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Kulikov, V.G., ed. Akademiya General'nogo shtaba [The General Staff Academy]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976.

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Lisyutin, V.S. "K voprosu o kategoriyakh voenno-morskogo iskusstva v sovremennykh usloviyakh" [Categories of the art of naval warfare in modern conditions]. Morskoy sbornik, No. 3, March 1961, pp. 14-22.

Lomov, N. "0 sovetskoy voennoy doktrine" [Soviet military doctrine]. Kommunlst Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 10, May 1962, pp. 11-21.

Makeev, B. "Nekotorye vzglyady na teoriyu vooruzheniya VMF" [Some views on the theory of Navy weapons development]. Morskoy sbornikt No. 4, April 1982, pp. 27-31.

Mamchits, V.S. "Osnovnye osobennosti sovremennogo morskogo boya" [Basic features of the modern naval engagement]. Morskoy sbornik, No. 4, April 1977, pp. 23-27.

"Massirovanie sil i sredstv" [Massing of forces and means]. Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya. Vol. 5. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978, pp. 179-180.

liolotkov, B.P. "Ob izmenenii form boevykh deystviy na more v svyazi s razvitiem sredstv vooruzhennoy bor'by" [Change in the forms of warfare at sea owing to the development of the means of warfare]. Morskoy sbornik. No. 3, I-Iarch 1963, pp. 24-27.

Morozov, K.V. Korabel'nye sredstva protivovozdushnoy oborony [Shipborne means of air defense]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960.

Morskoy slovar' [Maritime dictionary]. 2 vols. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1959.

"0 nekotorykh printsipakh voenno-morskogo iskusstva v sovremennykh usloviyakh" [Some principles of the art of naval warfare in modern conditions]. Morskoy sbornik. No. 10, October 1961, pp. 16-25.

"Operativnoe iskusstvo" [Operational art]. Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya, Vol. 6. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978, pp. 53-57.

Orel, A. "V gody voyny" [In the war years]. Morskoy sbornik. No. 1, January 1977, pp. 16-19.

Panteleev, Yu.A. "Nekotorye voprosy deystviy flota v sovremennoy voyne" [Some issues of naval action in modern war]. Morskoy sbornik. No. 2, February 1966, pp. 27-34.

"Panteleev Yuriy Aleksandrovich." Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya. Vol. 6. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978, pp. 206-207.

Pavlovich, N.B. "Osnovnye faktory razvitiya voenno-morskogo iskusstva" [Basic factors of the development of the art of naval warfare]. Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, No. 12, December 1974, pp. 48-53. , ed. Flot V pervoy mirovoy voyne [Navies in the First

World War]. 2 vols., Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964. Pavlovich, N.B., and Achkasov, V.I. Sovetskoe voenno-morskoe iskusstvo

V Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne [The Soviet art of naval warfare in the Great Patriotic War], Moscow: Voenizdat, 1973.

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Petrov, B.F. "Taktika flota i predmet ee issledovaniya" [Naval tactics and its subject of study]. Morskoy sbornik. No. 7, July 1962, pp. 24-31.

"Soderzhanie i kharakter sovremennykh boevykh deystviy na more" [Content and character of modern warfare at sea]. Morskoy sbornik. No. 1, January 1965, pp. 7-15.

"Printsipy voennogo iskusstva" [Principles of the military art]. Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya. Vol. 6. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978, pp. 542-543.

Pushkin, A. "Boevye deystviya amerikanskikh i yaponskikh podvodnykh lodok protiv avianostsev v period vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [American and Japanese submarine warfare against aircraft carriers during the World War 11 period]. Morskoy sbornik. No. 9, September 1979, pp. 11-26.

Radzievskiy, A.I. "Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva" [Sea power of the state]. Voennaya mysl'. No. 7, July 1976, pp. 83-92, Confidential.

"Soderzhanie i forma" [Content and form]. Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya. Vol. 7. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979, pp. 425-426

Sokolovskiy, V.D., ed. Voennaya strategiya [Military strategy]. 3rd rev. ed. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968.

"Sposoby boevykh deystviy" [Methods of warfare]. Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya. Vol. 7. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979, pp. 501-502,

Spravochnik ofitsera [Officer's handbook]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971. Stalbo, K.A. "0 nekotorykh kategoriyakh voenno-morskogo iskusstva v

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in World War II]. Morskoy sbornik. No. 1, January 1978, pp. 91-100.- . "Avianostsy v poslevoennyy period" [Aircraft carriers in

the postwar period]. Morskoy sbornik. No. 6, June 1978, pp. 91-100

"Nekotorye voprosy teorii razvitiya i ispol'zovaniya VMF" [Some issues of the theory of the development and employment of the Navy]. Morskoy sbornik. No. 4, April 1981, pp. 20-28.

. "Nekotorye voprosy teorii razvitiya i ispol'zovaniya VMF." Morskoy sbornik. No. 5, May 1981, pp. 17-27.

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Sukhodol'skiy, N.V. "0 formakh i zakonomernostyakh boevykh deystviy na more" [Forms and patterns of warfare at sea]. Morskoy sbornlk. No. 10, October 1962, pp. 19-25.

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the forms of warfare at seaj. Morskoy sbornik. No. 11, November 1980, pp. 24-29. . "Teoriya upravleniya Voenno-Morskim Flotom" [The Navy's

theory of command and control]. Morskoy sbornik, No. 3, March 1982, pp. 21-27.

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"Vnezapnost'" [Surprise]. Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya. Vol. 2. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976, pp. 161-163.

"Voenno-morskaya akademiya imeni Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuza A.A. Grechko" [Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko Naval Academy]. Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya. Vol. 2. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976, pp. 230-231.

Voprosy taktlkl v sovetsklkh voennykh tradakh (1917-1940 gg.) [Tactical issues in Soviet military works, 1917-1940]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1970.

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Zakharov, S.E., ed. Istorlya voenno-morskogo Iskusstva [History of the art of naval warfare]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1969.

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CNA PROFESSIONAL PJVERS - 1978 TO PRESEMT*

PP 211 Mlzrohl, Maurice M., "On Approximating the Circular Coverage

Function," 14 pp., Feb 1978, AD A054 429

PP 212

Mangel, Marc, "On Singular Characteristic Problems with Unique Solution," 20 pp. AD A058 535

Initial , Jun

Value 1978,

PP 213

Mangel, Marc, "Fluctuations In Systems with Multiple Steady States. Application to Lanchester Equations," 12 pp., Feb 78 (Presented at the First Annual Workshop on the Information LInl<age Between Applied Mathematics and industry. Naval PG School, Feb 23-25, 1978), AD A071 472

PP 214 Welnland, Robert G., "A Sorewhat Different View of The

Optimal Naval Posture," 37 pp., Jun 1978 (Presented at the

1976 Convention of the American Political Science Associa-

tion (APSA/iUS Panel on "Changing Strategic Requirements and

Military Posture"), Chicago, 111., September 2, 1976),

AD A056 228

PP 215

Colle, Russell C, "Comments on: Principles of information

Retrieval by Manfred Kochen," 10 pp.. Mar 78 (Published as a

Letter to the Editor, Journal of Documentation, Vol. 31,

No. 4, pages 298-301), December 1975), AD A054 426

PP 216

Colle, Russell C, "Lotka's Frequency Distribution of Scientific Productivity," 18 pp., Feb 1978 (Published In the Journal of the American Society for information Science, Vol. 28, No. 6, pp. 366-370, November 1977), AD A054 425

PP 217 Colle, Russell C.

Productivity," 17

meeting of the American Society for information Science held

In San Francisco, Ca11forn1 a, October 1976), AD A054 442

, "BIbllometrIc Studies of Scientific

pp.. Mar 78 (Presented at the Annual

PP 222 ■ ■ '■■ '■ ■ Mlzrahl, Maurice M., "Correspondence Rules and Path

Integrals," 30 pp., Jun 1978 (invited paper presented at the

CNRS meeting on "Mathematical Problems In Feynman's Path

Integrals," Marseille, France, May 22-26, 1978) (Published

In Springer Verlag Lecture Notes In Physics, 106, (1979),

234-253) AD A055 536

PP 223

Mangel, Marc, "Stochastic Mechanics of Moleculelon Molecule

Reactions," 21 pp., Jun 1978, AD A056 227

PP 224

Manger, Marc, "Aggregation, BIturcatlon, and Extinction In

Exploited Animal Populations*," 48 pp.. Mar 1978,

AD A058 536

•Portions of this work were started at the Institute of

Applied Mathematics and Statistics, University of British

Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada

PP 225

Mangel, Marc, "Oscillations, Fluctuations, and the Hopf

Bifurcation*," 43 pp., Jun 1978, AD A058 537

•Portions of this work were completed at the Institute of

Applied Mathematics and Statistics, University of a-itish

Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.

PP 226

Ralston, J. M. and J. W. Mann,* "Temperature and (Jjrrent

Dependence of Degradation in Red-Emitting GaP LEDs," 34 pp.,

Jun 1978 (Published In Journal of Applied Physics, 50, 3630,

May 1979) AD A058 538

*Bet! Telephone Laboratories, Inc.

PP 227

Mangel, Marc, "Uniform Treatment of Fluctuations at Critical

Points," 50 pp.. May 1978, AD A058 539

PP 228

Mangel, Marc, "Relaxation at Critical Points: Deterministic

and Stochastic Theory," 54 pp., Jun 1978, AD A058 540

PP 218 - Classified . • '

PP 219

Huntzlnger, R. LaVar, "Market Analysis with Rational Expec-

tations: Theory and Estimation," 60 pp., Apr 78, AD A054 422

PP 220

Maurer, Donald E., "D1agona11zatI on by Group Matrices,"

26 pp., Apr 78, AD A054 443

PP 229

Mangel, Marc, "Diffusion Theory of Reaction Rates, I:

Formulation and Elnsteln-Smoluchowskl ^proxlmatlon,"

50 pp., Jan 1978, AD A058 541

PP 230 ■■-.■: ■■■■■...

Mangel, Marc, "Diffusion Theory of Reaction Rates, II Ornsteln-Uhlenbeck Approximation," 34 pp., Feb 1978, AD A058 542

PP 221 Welnland, Robert G., "Superpower Naval Diplomacy In the

October 1973 Arab-Israeli War," 76 pp., Jun 1978 (Published

In Seapower In the Mediterranean; Political Utility and

Military (^nstralnts. The Washington Papers No. 61, Beverly

Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1979) AD A055 564

PP 231

Wilson, Desmond P., Jr., "Naval Projection Forces: The C^se

for a Responsive MAF," Aug 1978, AD A054 543

PP 232

Jacobson, Louis, "Can Policy Changes Be Made Acceptable to

Labor?" Aug 1978 (Submitted for publication In Industrial

and Labor Relations Review), AD A06I 528

*Ct^ Professional Papers with an K) number may be obtained from the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of

Conmerce, Springfield, Virginia 22151. Other papers are available from the Management Information Office, Center for Naval

Analyses, 2000 North Beauregard Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22311. An Index of Selected Publications Is also available on

request. The index Includes a Listing of Professional Papers; with abstracts: Issued from 1969 to June 1981.

PP 233

Jacobson^ Louis, "An Alternative Explanation of the Cyclical

Pattern of Quits," 23 pp., Sep 1978

PP 249

Glasser, Kenneth S., "A Secretary Problem with a Random

Number of Choices," 23 pp.. Mar 1979

PP 234 - Revised

Jondrow, James and Levy, Robert A., "Does Federal Expendi-

ture Displace State and Local Expenditure: The Case of

Construction Grants," 25 pp., Oct 1979, AD A061 529

PP 235

Mlzrahl, Maurice M., "The Semlclasslcal Expansion of the

Anharmonlc-OscI I later Propagator," 41 pp., Oct 1978 (Pub-

lished In Journal of Mathematical Physics 20 (1979) pp. 844-

855), AD A061 538

PP 237

Maurer, Dotiald, "A Matrix Olterlon for Normal Integral

Bases," ID pp., Jan 1979 (Published In the Illinois Journal

of Mathematics, Vol. 22 (1978), pp. 672-681

PP 238

Utgoff, Kathleen Classen, "Unemployment Insurance and The

Employment Rate," 20 pp., Oct 1978 (Presented at the Con-

ference on Economic Indicators and Performance: The Ckirrent

Dilemma Facing Government and Business Leaders, presented by

Indiana University Graduate School of Business). AD A061 527

PP 250

Mangel, Marc,

tems," 26 pp..

"Modeling Fluctuations In Macroscopic S/s-

Jun 1979

PP 251

Trost, Robert P., "The Estimation and Interpretation of

Several Selectivity Models," 37 pp., Jun 1979, AD A075 941

PP 252

Nunn, Walter R., "Position Finding with Prior Knowledge of

Covariance Parameters," 5 pp., Jun 1979 (Published In IEEE

Transactions on Aerospace & Electronic Systems, Vol. AES-15,

No. 3, Mar 1979

PP 253

Slasser, Kenneth S., "The d-OioIce Secretary Problem," 32 pp., Jun 1979, AD A075 225

PP 254 Mangel, Marc and Quanbeck, David B., "Integration of a

Bivariate Normal Over an Offset Circle," 14 pp., Jun 1979,

AD A096 471

PP 239

Trost, R. P. and Warner, J. T., "The Effects of Military

Occupational Training on Civilian Earnings: An Income

Selectivity Approach," 38 pp., Nov 1979k, AD A077 831

PP 240

Powers, Bruce, "(Soals of the Confer for Naval Analyses,"

13 pp., Dec 1978, AD A063 759

PP 241

Mangel, Marc, "Fluctuations at Chemical Instabilities,"

24 pp., Dec 1978 (Published In Journal of Chemical Physics,

Vol. 69, No. 8, Oct 15, 1978). AD A063 787

PP 255 - Classified, AD B051 441L

PP 256

Maurer, Donald E., "Using Personnel

27 pp., Feb 1980, AD A082 218

Distribution Models,

PP 257

Thaler, R., "Discounting and Fiscal Constraints: Why Dis-

counting Is Always Right," 10 pp., Aug 1979, AD A075 224

PP 258

Mangel, htorc S. and Thomas, James A., Jr., "Analytical Msthods In Search T>ieory," 86 pp., Nov 1979, AD A077 832

PP 242 Simpson, William R., "The Analysis of Dynamically Inter- active Systerre (Air Combat by the Numbers)," 160 pp., Dec 1978, AD A063 760

PP 259 Glass, David V.; Hsu, Ih-Chlng; Nunn, Walter R., and Perin, David A., "A Class of Commjtatlve Markov Matrices," 17 pp., Nov 1979, AD A077 833

PP 243 Simpson, William R., "A Probabilistic Formulation of rtjrphy Dynamics as Applied to the Analysis of (êratlonal Research Problems," 18 pp., Dec 1978, AD A063 761

PP 244 Sherman, Allan and Horowitz, Stanley A., "Maintenance Ctosts

of Complex Equipment," 20 pp., Dec 1978 (Published By The

American Society of Naval Engineers, Naval Engineers

Journal, Vol. 91, No. 6, Dec 1979) AD A071 473

PP 260

Mangel, Hsrc S. and Cope, Davis K., "Detection Rate and

Sweep Width in Visual Search," 14 pp., Nov 1979, AD A077 834

PP 261

Vila, Curios L.; Zvljac, David J. and Ross, John, "Franck- Ctondon Theory of Chemical Dynamics. VI. Angular Distribu- tions of Reaction Products," 14 pp., Nov 1979 (Reprinted from Journal Chemical Phys. 70(12), 15 Jun 1979), AD A076 287

PP 245 Simpson, William R., "The AcceIerometer ^tethods of Obtaining Aircraft Performance from Fll^t Test Data (Dynamic Per- formance Testing)," 403 pp., Jun 1979, AD A075 226

PP 246 Brechling, Frank, "Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance," 35

pp., Feb 1979 (Presented at the Nber Conference on "Low

Income Labor Markets," Chicago, Jun 1978), AD A096 629

PP 262

Petersen, Charles C, "Third World Military Elites in Soviet

Perspective," 50 pp., Nov 1979, AD A077 835

PP 263

Robinson, Kathy I., "Using Commercial Tankers and Contalnei— ships for Navy Underway ReplenlshTOnt," 25 pp., Nov 1979, AD A077 836

PP 248

Thotnas, James A., Jr., "The Transport Properties of Dilute

Gases In Applied Fields," 183 pp.. Mar 1979, AD A096 464

PP 264

Welnland, Robert G., "The U.S. Navy In the Pacific: Past,

Present, and Glimpses of the Future," 31 pp., Nov 1979

(Delivered at the International Symposium on the Sea,

sponsored b/ the International Institute for Strategic

Studies, The Brooklngs Institution and the Yomluri Shimbun,

Tokyo, 16-20 Oct 1978) AD A066 837

PP 265

Welnland, Robert G,, "War and Peace In the North: Some

Political Implications of the Changing Military Situation In

Northern Europe," 18 pp., Nov 1979 (Prepared for

presentation to the Conference of the h4ordlc Balance In

Perspective: The Oanglng Military and Political Situation,"

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Cjeorgetown

University, Jun 15-16, 1978) AD A077 838

PP 266

Utgoff, Kathy Classen, and Brechling, Frank, "Taxes and

infiatlon," 25 pp., Nov 1979, AD A08I 194

PP 267

Trost, Robert P., and Vogel, Robert C, "The Response of

State Government Receipts to Economic Fluctuations and the

Allocation of Ctounter-Cyclleal Revenue Sharing Grants,"

12 pp., Dec 1979 (Reprinted from the Review of Economics and

Statistics, Vol. LXI, No. 3, August 1979)

PP 268

Thomason, James S., "Seaport Dependence and inter-State

Osoperatlon: The Clase of Sub-Saharan Africa," 141 pp.,

Jan 1980, AD A081 193

PP 269

Weiss, Kenneth G., "The Soviet Involvement In the Ogaden

War," 42 pp., Jan 1980 (Presented at the Southern Conference

on Slavic Studies In October, 1979), AO A082 219

PP 277

Mangel, Marc, "Small Fluctuations In Systems with Multiple

Limit Cycles," 19 pp.. Mar 1980 (Published in SIAM J. Appl.

Math., Vol. 58, No. 1, Feb 1980) AD A086 229

PP 278

Mizrahl, ^teurlce, "A Targeting Problem: Exact vs. Expected-

Value Approaches," 23 pp., Apr 1980, AD A085 096

PP 279

Walt, Stephen M., "Causal Inferences and the Use of Force: A

Critique of Force Without War," 50 pp.. May 1980,

AD A085 097

PP 280

C3oIdberg, Lawrence, "Estimation of the Effects of A Ship's

Steaming on the Failure Rate of Its Equipment: An Applica-

tion of Econometric Analysis," 25 pp., Apr 1980, AD A085 098

PP 281

Mizrahl, Maurice M., "Ojmment on 'Discretization Problems of

Functional Integrals In Phase Space'," 2 pp.. May 1980,

published In "Physical Review D", Vol. 22 (1980),

AD A094 994 ■

PP 283

DIsmukes, Bradford, "Expected Demand for the U.S. Navy to

Serve as An Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: Thinking

About Political and Military Environmental Factors," 30 pp.,

Apr 1980, AD A085 099

PP 284

J, Kellson,* W. Nunn, and U. Sumlta,''* "The Laguerre Trans-

form," 119 pp.. May 1980, AD A085 100

*The Graduate School of Management, University of Rochester

and the Center for Naval Analyses

**The Graduate School of Management, University of Rochester

PP 270

Remnek, Richard, "Soviet Policy In the Horn of Africa: The

Decision to Intervene," 52 pp., Jan 1980 (To be published In

"The Soviet Union In the Third World: Success or Failure,"

ed. b/ Robert H. Donaldson, Westvlew Press, Boulder, Co.,

Summer 1980), AO A081 195

PP 271 ■ '

McConnell, James, "Soviet and American Strategic Doctrines:

One More Time," 43 pp., Jan 1980, AD A081 192

PP 272

Weiss, Kenneth G,, "The Azores In Diplomacy and Strategy, 1940-1945, 46 pp.. Mar 1980, AD A085 094

PP 273 Nakada, Michael K., "Labor Supply of Wives with Husbands

Employed Either Full Time or Part Time," 39 pp.. Mar 1980,

AD A082 220

PP 274 ' ' '■ - ■

Nunn, Walter R,, "A Result In the Theory of Spiral Search,"

9 pp.. Mar 1980

PP 275

Goldberg, Lawrence, "Recruiters Advertising and Navy Enlist-

ments," 34 pp.. Mar 1980, AD A082 221

PP 276

(Goldberg, Lawrence, "Delaying an Overhaul and Ship's Equip- ment," 40 pp.. May 1980, AD A085 095

PP 285

Remnek, Richard B., "Superpower Security Interests In the

Indian Ocean Area," 26 pp., Jun 1980, AD A087 113

PP 285

Mizrahl, Maurice M., "On the WKB Approximation to the

Propagator for Arbitrary HamIItonlans," 25 pp., Aug 1980

(Published In Journal of Math. Phys., 22(1) Jan 1981),

AD A091 307

PP 287

Cope, Davis, "Limit Cycle Solutions of Reaction-Diffusion

Equations," 35 pp., Jun 1980, AD A087 114

PP 288

Golman, Waiter, "Don't Let Your Slides Flip You: A Painless

Guide to Visuals That Really Aid," 28 pp., (revised

Aug 1982), AD A092 732

PP 289

Robinson, Jack, "Adequate Classification Guidance - A

Solution and a Problem," 7 pp., Aug 1980, AO A09I 212

PP 290

Watson, Gregory H., "Evaluation of Computer Software In an

Operational Environment," 17 pp., Aug 1980, AO A091 213

PP 291

Maddala, G. S.» and Trost, R. P., "Some Extensions of the

Nerlova Press Model," 17 pp., Oct 1980, AD A09I 945

•University of Florida

PP 292 Thoims, James A., Jr., "The Transport Properties of Binary Gas Mixtures in /^plied Nbgnetic Fields," tO pp., Sept 1980 (Published in Journal of Chemical Pfiysics 72(10), 15 May 1980

PP 293 . ThofiBS, James A., Jr., "Eva luation of Kinetic Theory (Sotli- sion Integrals Lfelngthe Gfenera I i zed Phase ^lift ^proach," 12 pp.. Sept 1980 (Printed in Journal of Qiemical Physics 72(10), 15 May 1980

PP 305

Nunn, Laura H., "An Introdjction to the Literature of Search Theory," 32 pp., Jun 1981

PP 306 Anger, Thomas E., "What Good Are Warfare Models?" 7 pp.. May 1981

PP 307 Thonason, James, "Dependence, Risl^, and Vu i nerabi i 1 ty," 43 pp., Jun 1981

PP 294 Roberts, Stephen S., "French Naval Policy CUtside of Eirope," 30 pp.. Sept 1980 (Presented at the Cbnference of the Section on Military Studies, international Studies Association Kl awah Island, S.C), AD f09\ 306

PP 295 Roberts, Stephen S. , "An Indicator of Informal Enp i re: Patterns of U.S. Navy 0*uising on Overseas Sfations, 1869- 1897," 40 pp.. Sept 1980 (Presented at Fourth Naval History Syrposium, US Naval fcsdeny, 26 October 1979, AD AD91 316

PP 296 Oismukes, B"adford and Petersen, Charles C, 'Maritime Factors Affecting Iberian Security," (Factores l^r I timos Oue Afectan La Securldad Ibeica) 14 pp.. Get 1980, AD A092 733

PP 297 - Classified

PP 298 Mizrahi, Maurice M., "A Markov Approach to Large Missile Attacks," 31 pp., Jan 1981, AD A096,159

PP 308 Mizrahi, M.M., "(xsrrespondence Rules and Path Integrals," Jul 1981. Piijlished in "Nuovo Ciirento B", Vol. 61 (1981)

PP 309 We In land, Robert G. , "An (The?) Explanation of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," 44 pp.. May 1981

PP 310 Stanford, Janette M. and Tai Te Wu,* "A Predictive Method for Daterminlng Possible Tbree-d ItiEnsiona 1 Folding of imrrunogtobu I I n Badtbones Around Antibody Oamblning Sites," 19 pp., Jun 1981 (Pibllshed In J. theor. Bloi. (1981) 88, 421-439 *Northwestern University, Evanston, IL

PP 311 Bowes, ^terIanne, a-echling, Frartc P. R. , and iJtgoff, Kathleen P. Classen, "An Evaluation of Ul Funds," 13 pp.. May 1981 (Published In National Commission on Unenployment

Conpensatlon's Unemployment Conpensation: Studies and Research, Volume 2, July 1980)

PP 299 Jondrcw, James M. and Levy, Robert A., "Wage Leadership in

Obnstruction, 19 pp., Jan 1981, AD «94 797

PP 312 Jondro, James; Bowes, ^terIanne and Levy, Robert, 'The C>)timum êed Limit," 23 pp.. May 1981

PP 300 Jondrcw, James and Schmidt, Peter,** "On the Estimation of Technical Inefficiency I n the Stochastic Frontier Production Function Model, " 11 pp. , Jan 1981, AD A096 160 •Michigan State University

PP 301 JondrcK, Jamss M., Levy, Robert A. and lijghes, Claire, "Technical Change and Employment In Sfeel, Ajtos, Aluminum, and Iron Ore, 17 pp.. Mar 1981, AD A099 394

PP 302 Jondro*, James M. and Levy, Robert A., "The Effect of I tiports on EmpioynBht Under fetional Ejpectat ions," 19 pp., Apr 1981, AD A099 392

PP 313 Roberts, Stephen S., "The U.S. Navy in the 1980s," 36 pp., Jul 1981

PP 314 Jehn, Christopher; Horcwitz, Stanley A. and Lockman, FbbertF., "Examini ng the Draft Ctebate," 20 pp., Jul 1981

PP 315 Buck, Ralph v., Capt. , "Le Catastrophe b/ any other

name...," 4 pp., Jul 1981

PP316 Roberts, Stephen S., 'Vestern European and NATO Navies, 1980," 20 pp., Aug 1981

PP 303 Thomason, Jamas, 'TTie Rarest Cbmmodi ty In the Coming itesource tors," 3 pp., Aug 1981 (Pifalished I n the toshington Star, Apri I 13, 1981)

PP 304 Duffy, Michael K.; Greewood, Michael J. * and McDowell, John M.,*** "A Q-oss-Sectlonal ^bdel of Ainual Interregional Migration and Enplo/ment (Srowth: Interterrporai Evidence of Structural Change, 1958-1975," 31 pp., Apr 1981, AD «)99 393 *Univers ity of Ck)lorado **Arlaona State University

PP 317 Roberts, Stephen S., "Superpower Naval Crisis Management In the ^tedlterranean," 35 pp., Aug 1931

PP 318 Vego, Milan N., "Yugoslavia and the Soviet Policy of Force

in the *diterranean Since 1961," 187 pp., Aug 1981

PP 319 Smith, Michael W., "Antiair Warfare Defense of Ships at Sea," 46 pp., Sepl981 (Th 1 s ta Ik was del ivered at the Nava i Warfare System and Technology Conference of the American

Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics In Wishington on December 12, 1980; in Boston on January 20, 1981; and in Los Angeles on June 12, 1981.)

PP 3 20 Trost, R. P.; Lurie, Philip and Berger, Edwarit "A Note on Estimating Cbntinuous Time Cecislon htdels," 15 pp., Sep 1981

PP 321 Duffy, Michael K. and Ladman, Jerry R.,* "The Slitw 1 taneous [teterml nat 1 on of Income and Employnent In Lhlted Sfates— ^texl CO Elorder Regl on Econcml es," 34 pp., Sep 1981 *fesociate R-ofessor of Economics, firliona Sfate University, Tenpe, AZ.

PP 335

Lee, Lung-Fei, G.S. Maddala, and R. P. Trost, "Asymptotic QDvarlance hfetrices of Two-Stage i=roblt and Two-Stage Toblt Methods tor Slmu 1 tanecus Equations Mode Is wl th Se lect IvI ty," 13 pp., Jan 1982. (Piljllshed In Econometr i ca. Vol. 48, No. 2 (March, 1980)

PP 336 O'Neill, Thomas, Ttoblllty Fuels for the Navy," 13 pp., Jan 1982. (Accepted for pii>llcatlon In Naval Institute Proceedl ncfi)

PP 322 Warner, John T., "Issues In Navy Nbnpoer fesearch and ftallcy: An Economist's Fferspect ive," 66 pp., Dec 1981

PP 337 Warner, John T. and Goldberg Mattha* S., "The Influence of Non-Pecuniary Factors on Labor Sjpply," 23 pp., Dec 1981

PP 323 Bomse, Frederld^ M., "(jeneratlon of (ijrrelated Log-Normal

Sequences for the Simulation of Clutter Echoes," 33 pp., Dec 1981

PP 324 Horowitz, Stanley A., "Quantifying Seapower fteadiness," 6 pp., Dec 1981 (Pti>llshed In Defense h^nagement Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2)

PP 326

Roberts, Stephen S., "Western European and NATO Navies, 1981," 27 pp., Jul 1982

PP 339 Wilson, Desmond P., "The Persian Gulf and the National Interest," It pp., Feb 1982

PP 340 Luriek Philip, Trost, R. P., and Berger, Edwarct "A Method for Aialyzlng Multiple êll Duration Data," 34 pp., feb 1982

PP 341 Trost, Rpbert P. and Vogel, itobert C, "Prediction with Pooled Ctoss-Sectlon and Time-Series Data: Twp Case Studies," 6 pp., Feb 1982

PP 327 Hamrron, (b 1 I n, Capt., USN and O-ahan, David R., Dr., "fetlmation and Aialysls of Navy îlpbuiiding Ftogram Disruption Costs," 12 pp.. Mar 1980

PP 342 Lee, Lung-Fei, Maddala, G. S., and Trost, R. P., "Testing for Structural (hange by D-^bthods In Switching Simultaneous Equations Models," 5 pp., Feb 1982

PP 328 Welnlanit Fbbert G., "Northern Waters: Their Strategic Significance," 27 pp., Dec 1980

PP 343 Goldberg Matthew S., "Projecting the Navy Enlisted Force Uvel," 9 pp., Feb 1982

PP 329 Mangel, MarQ "Appl led Mathematicians And Naval Operators," 40 pp., I*r 1982 (Itevlsed)

PP 344 Fletcher, Jean, W., "Navy Quality of LI f e and ReenI Istment," 13 pp., Nov 1981

PP 330

Lockman, Robert F., "Alternative Approaches to Attrition Nbnagemsnt," 30 pp., Jan 1982

PP 331 Roberts, Stephen S., "The Turkish Straits and the Soviet Navy In the *diterranean," 15 pp., Nbr 1982 (Piilished in Navy international)

PP 332 Jehn, Christopher, "The RDF and Arph ibtcus Warf are^ " 36 pp., *r 1982

PP 333 Lee, Lung-Fei and Trost, Robert P., "Estimation of Some Limited Dependent Variable Nbdeis with /^plication to Housing Demancl" 26 pp., Jan 198i (Published in Journal of

Econonetrics 8 (1978) 357-382)

PP 345 Utgoff, Kathy and Thaler, Dtd(, "The Economics of Muiti Year (bntracting," 47 pp., Msr 1982. (Presented at the 1982 Annual Meeting of the Public Oiolce Society, San Antonick Texas, l*rch 5-7, 1982)

PP 346 Rostker, Bernard "Selective Service and the At l-Volunteer force," 23 pp., Ntar 1982

PP 347 McC^nnel I, James, M., "A Possible Counterforce Role for the Typhoon," 24 pp., hbr 1982

PP 348 Jondrcw, James, Trost, Robert, "An Enplrical Study of Production inefficiency in the Presence of Errors-ln-The- Variables," 14 pp., Feb 1982

PP 334

Kenny, LawrenceW., Lee, Lung-Fei, Maddala, G. S., and Trost R. P., "fteturns to Cbllege Education: An Investigation of Self-Selection Bias Based on the Project Talent Data," 15

pp., Jan 1982. (Piillshed in International Economic Ffeview, Vol. 20, No. 3, October 1979)

PP 349

W. H. a-edcenridge, 0. Kim tfelmin, •'Co I I Isionai Intra- multiplet Ftelaxatlon of Cd(5s5p PQ . j^ ^V Alkane Hydro- carbons," 7 pp., Jul 1981. (Published In Journal of Chemical Riyslcs, 76(4), 15 Feb 1962)

PP 350

Levln. Marc, "A Msthod for Increasing the Firepower of

Virginia Class Cruisers," 10 pp., Apr 1962. (To be published

In U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings)

PP 351

Coutre, S, E,; Stanford, J, M,; Hovis, J, G,; Stevens, P. W.; Wu, T, T., "Possible Tbree-Oimenslonal Backbone Folding Around Antl bod/ Combining Sit© of Imrnunogtobul I n MOPC 167," 18 pp., Apr 1982. (Published in Journal of Theoretical Blolog/)

PP 352 Barfoot, C, Bernard, "Aggregation of Condi tional Absorbing

Markov Chains," 7 pp., June 1982 (Presented to the Sixth

European Meet i ng on Cybernet Ics and Systems Research, he I d

at the University of Vienna, Apr 1982.)

PP 353

Barfoot, C, Bernard, "Some Mathematical Methods for Modeling

the Performance of a Distributed Data Base System," 18 pp.,

June 1982. (Presented to the International Warklng Con-

ference on Model Realism, held at Bad Honnek, West Germany,

Apr 1982.)

PP 354

Hat I, John v., "Why the Short-War Scenario Is Wrong for Naval Planning," 6 pp., Jun 1982.

PP 356 Cylke, Steven; Goldberg, Matthew S.; Hogan, Paul; ^teIrs, Lee; "Estlfpatlon of the Personal Discount Rate; Evidence from Military ReenIIs+ment Decisions," 19 pp., Apr 1982,

PP 357 Goldberg, Matthew S,, "Discrimination, Nepotism, and Long-Run Wage Differentials," 13 pp., Sep 1982, (Published In Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1982.)

PP 558 Akst, George, "Evaluating Tactical Command And (isntrol Systems—A Three-Tiered ^proach," 12 pp., Sep 1982.

pP 361 Quanbeck, David B., "Methods for Generating Aircraft

Trajectories," 51 pp., Sep 1982.

PP 362

Horowitz, Stan I e/ A., "Is the Mi I I tar/ Budget Out of Balance?," 10 pp., Sep 1982.

PP 363 Marcus, A. J. , "Personnel Subs11 tut ion and Navy Avi at ion

Readiness," 35 pp.. Get 1982,

PP 366

Sprulll, Nancy L,, Gastwirth, Joseph L,, "On the Estimation

of the Correlation CtoeffIcient From Grouped Data," 9 pp., Oct 1982. (Pub Ii shed in the JcurnaI of the AmerI can Statistical Association, Sep 1982, Vol. 77, No. 379, Theory

and Methods Section.)

PP 367 Petersen, Cârles C, "Soviet Tactics For Warfare At Sea: Two Decades of Upheaval," 58 pp., Nov 1982.

Documents

SOVIET TACTICS FOR WARFARE AT SEA · SOVIET TACTICS FOR WARFARE AT SEA: TWO DECADES OF UPHEAVAL INTRODUCTION .. Major innovations have changed the shape of Soviet military doctrine