Small Unit Tactics Partisan Warfare

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- II LASSiIE~SMALL UNIT 14011PARTI 1AI JRARY mFREAVENWORTH KAS ~ir F S ON N

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S1,1ALL UNIT TACTICSPARTISAN WARFARE

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HISTORICAL DIVISIONEUROPEA~N CO~ML ,ND

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Comments on Exanpies of PartisanW arfare Compiled For the Series

on "Small Unit Tactics"

Partisan warfare knows neither tactical rules nor generallyapplicable forms. The fo e is unpredictable and unscrupulous.His weapons are usually of s imple design and limited in numbers,In the East these weapons become dangerous because of the wili-ness an d trickery with which they are used, because of th e in-human self-sufficiency an d the cruelty of those who use them andbecause of their mobility, since they are independent of a supplysystem. Additional factors. are the proficiency in camouflage ofthe partisan units end th e z;uthless terrorism which they exer tagainst the population of their own country,

Success in partisan warfare depends n ot so much on the obser-vance of certain principles or on th e doctrinary application ofmethods which, in individual instances., have proved their worth ,but on a systematic determination of all factors which in anyspecific case might influence th e enemy-Is command, his co l muni-cations, his mobility en d his relations with the population. Thelarger the number of practical examples available for the s tudyof these factors, the, better. trained will be the imagination andunderstanding of those who may be called on to lead the fightingagainst partisans which , under contemporary conditions of warfare,may become the miss ion of all military commanders.

It is in this spirit that the following examples drawn fromsmall unit tactics during World War II should be read. Far moreimportant than smal l unit tactics., however, are the real policiesfor successfully fighting partisans.. These are the policies bymeens of which propagandistic, economic. an d political means turnthe native population against the partisans and gain its collabora-tion in the fight against them. This task, which is in th e handsof the supreme command agenc ies , begins with the first movementsof the combat troops onto enemy soil and with the first flight ofbomber aircraft over the enemy country .

In the long run, partisans can neither live nor wage war with-out at least the passive support of th e population. In order tofight the partisans it is therefore essential to gain th e confi-dence of the people .

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FOREIGN MILTARY STUDIES

Historical DivisionHeadquar te rs European Command

January 1952 NUBER 6

C ON TE NT S

PageComments on Examples of Partisan W arfare . . . . .Introduction., ................... .. * .b 0

Example 1 - The First Clash with Partisans ,...2 -- Partisan Fighting in Subterranean Stone

Quarries . .

3 - Partisan Warfare W ithout Partisans ...

4 -- A Company Commander . s Story,. .. .. .5 -- The Forest Camp. ,.......

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Foreign Military Studies. Prepared nonperiodically by th e HistoricalDivision, Headquar ters , European Comand , for th e purpose of increas-in g th e availability of selected special studies an d monographs pre-pared by or under th e supervision of this Division an d in coordina-tion with other staff ctivisions of this headquarters as appropriate.Th e material presented herein does no t necessarily reflect officialDepartment of the Army doctrine or accepted practices, bu t is forinformation only.. Loca l reproduction may be authorized upon speci-fic request to this headquarters . . A limited number of additionalcopies may be obta ined from the Historical Division, EUCOM, APO 403,Phone Contro l Officer, Karlsruhe Military 2614,

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UNCLASSIFIEPIntroduction

The following five practical examples are conceived as a con-tribution to the collection entitled "Smail -Ui t T:.ct .cs.tIt Theexamples deal with -partisan warfare and describe historical eventsthat took place from 1941 to 1943 in the Eastern the ater of war,

In the Russian campaign the principal author of this Iworkwas a division commander and a corps commander in the fightingagainst the 'partisans Other officers who fought in the Eastmade minor contributions, The problems of partisan warfare andthe mieasures which, on the basis of German experience in the East,were considered appropriate to deal with guerilla-infested areas,are treated at length in the German manual "Combat againstGuerillas" (Der Bandenkampf) and in the German translation of theRussian "Manual fo r Partisans" (Handbuch der Partisanen). Severalof the principles contained in these two manuals will be demonstra-ted below in the form of examples reflecting actual events.

No detailed explanatiorn is required to show how the aricientweapon of partisan warfare 'has gained in importance in recent times,and to what degree it determines the 'plans of statesmen and soldiers.A study of the nature of partisan warfare' is absolutely ess'en-tial in any up-to-date military training, in the furtherance ofwhich the following examples may provide interesting material be-cause they are 'based on actual front-line epxiiier 'e.Example .: e-1r)_depicts the first clash between 'German

troops and partisans near the East Prussian frontier in what wasformerlyj Lithuanian territory. Here the partisan units were com-po-sed mainly of isolated Soviet troop units, but also of local :in-habitants ,During the first two days of combat a hitherto unexpectedcharacteristic of the Soviet Armr was noticed. Isolated Russiansoldier s considered it their self-evidenI military duty: to con-.tinuc the fight as paitisans and: to enlist the civilian population;It was no lornger possible- as in Woild Wav ".I to ' leave Russianstragglers or isolated units unobserved behind the :German front,where they were practicallyon their own. In cases where a groupwhich had been cut off had an energetic leader, ''the fighting spiritwould be rekindled immediately after the first shock, and trouble

spots behind the front became inescapable.

*Commanded 5th Jaeger Division, 1940 - 43, and V Corps in late1943; later commanded Seventeenth Army (May to.September 1944).

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UNCLA SIFtED E7Cr&The command and the troops were initially inclined to regard the

partisans as unimportant and not fully on a par in combat value be-cause they usually were equipped only with, small arms. This was adangerous fallacy, Most partisans were energetic and ambitious men,and many among them were actually driven by fanaticism. Weaklingsstayed away from them from th e start. Since t1 Russian civil wars,a sort of legend had grown around the 'guerillas. The will to resistand th e resolve to inflict damage on the enemy without regard forinternational agreements on warf are made up fo r the lack of militaryequipment.

Combat against partisans .is cruel and merciless. It would there-fore be a mistake to oppose them with s'econd-class or weakforces;On the contrary, in order to save lives and time, the forces employedagainst them should be as strong as possible. In particular, the par-tisans rust b; attacked with, such arms as they lack themselves, namely,heavy weapons and artillery.

It is equally important in any attempts at encirclement to set upan air-tight ring around the actual combat area. It Was a partisanpractice not to continue a hopeless engagement, but to disperse, toexfiltrate from a pocket, and, if necessary, to break through in orderto reassemble in previously fixed areas. Even an otherwise successfuloperation uill prove a. failure if elements of the' partisans manage toslip through a cordon that is too weakly manned. In such a case itwould be safe to assume that they would soon appear elsewhere in orderto continue their raids,

Example 2 e - is an example of combat against partisanswho, under extraordinary circumstances (in deserted, subterraneanstone quarries and caves in the Crimea), ,held: ,Qut for months behindthe German lines... It is thus not a typical training example of "normal"partisan fighting methods in forest , jungle, swamps or mountains, butrather the narration of a unique action that may merit interest inasmuchas partisans may conceal themselves anywhere, a fact that was- confirmedby German experience in the Balkans, and is now confirmed by the fight-ing in southeastern Asia.

The operations against th. artisans in the- Crimean stone quarriesfailed, principally because accurate geographic information proved evenmore important than, he numerically superior forces of the attacker.Underground caves,. corridors and shafts were difficult to locate andtheir extent could be estimated only roughly. Moreover, any fightingagainst an enemy who has barricaded himself in a bewildering labyrinthis technically difficult if, one does not wish, or is' unable, to usepoison gas.

Since operations had to be carried on in this subterranean labyrinthit seems more than doubtful whether a third attack, as suggested in theexample, would have led to success. The chances . of, a. defenider familiar

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with the terrain and accustomed to. darkness , as compared with anassailant who lacked these qualifications, appear too' uneven, themore so since. the. partisans ha d an exceptionally resolute and ag-gressive leader..

Furthermore, even if a wire obstacle had been completed, itprobably would have been useless, since the surrounded partisanshad begun to dig a tunnel under the wire obstacle and through thesoft stone into the open. They were unable to achieve their aimbecause of the physical exhaus t ion induced by hunger.

During a subsequent investigation of Crimean stone quarries itwas learned that there existed at Bagerovo a subterranean cave sys-tem still larger than the on e in th e stone quarry southwest of KerchThe Bagerovo system was carefully prepared for sect ional defense,mainly by means of built-in fuzed explosives and machine gun emplace-ments covering th e passageways. In addit ion, everything needed fo rdefense w as available, such as a command post, a dressing station,a special sick bay, emergency assemfbly areas, food an d ammunitionstocks, a reservoir for collecting drip water and colored direct ion-al signals, Originally the partisans there even kept several headof cattle which were slaughtered on e by on e (the natives had madetimely use of the stone quarries to hide their cattle).

According to statements by local inhabitants, the undergroundstone quarries near Kerch had previously been used during th e Russiancivil war. After th e Bolsheviks occupied th e Crimea, th e Whites weresaid to have lived in them for years.

Here remains unsolved the problem of how a tenacious enemy, whois determined to f ight to th e end in large subterranean stone quar-ries .o r catacombs, can be overpowered other than by starvation,poison gas or without the prospect of heavy friendly casualties.

In operations on a smaller scale, as for instance' in the pre-parations for th e seizure of the rock fortifications of Gibraltarin th e summer of 1940, it was believed that a me ans which offeredsome prospects of success was to be found in the fact that evenhard rock can be drilled. through rapidly and that the narrow open-ings thus formed could be emplpyed tQ produce underground explosions.-*The measures under consideration could not have been considered sub-ject 'to t1F "Gas Warfare" rules, as th e means used would not havebeen poison gases but rather a highly explosive mixture of carbonand oxygen.

*The German term used is "Schiagendes Wetter" which refers todust or gas explosions in, mines.

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Example 3 deals with the rear areas of the GermanSixteenth and Eighteenth Armies. which "were Operating in the northernsectors of the Eastern .front. Owing to the- seesaw.movements of 'thewinter battles of 1942, the location of ;the' 'fronts held by thesearmies. was. not clearly defined and the rear areas, due to the exist-ing tactical confusion and the terrain conditions, offered idealpos-sibilities for partisan activities on. a la:ge' scale.

The successful tactics ;of constantly avoiding action, brilliantlypracticed by the partisans in this :instance,- is impressively reflect-ed in the description of a mopping-up operations with whidh a Germanregiment hadbeen entrusted.

For the. ame reasons as those mentioned in Example 1, the Germanefforts wIrere doomed to failure because the availabe mopping-upforces were far too weak to protect an operational, area of the sizeconc=erned.

Example' M 'illustrates.,as does. Example 5, an episodewhich occurred in the central sectbr of the Eastern .front, where thetypical White Russian scenery is characterized: by forests, swamps andwaterways, and where through-traffic 'is ecessarily confined to a fewpaved. roads and to the railways..

Any attack 'gainst a major. partisan headquarters, such as discussedat length in Example 4, is always a ..doubtfu.lundertaking because such aheadquarters possesses far more nurous contacts with, the populationand a far more extensive intel3igence service than an ordinary partisan'group.

When large forces are committed against such a, major headquarters,it is to be expected that th e enemy will learn about , th e irmpending attackand that he will avoid action by' a timely:4w~thdr wal.

If the size of the unit which is to carry out the attack is small,its approach may remain unnoticed by the -enemy.. On the other hand, itwill, then lack th e strength, to safely overcomrie the resistance of guards,cover detachments and finally of the--headquarters itself, and also atthe same time to tightly seal off the entire area so as to prevent th eescape of the senior staff members Ith Ue leaders of a partisan head-quarters succeed in. escaping,, 't~he attack 'may: be consider ed a faCilureeven though all the troops. have been captured or killed.

The only alternative left is the emiployment of h4ghly mobile unitsequipped with cross-country motor vehicles for rapid movement over largedistances and difficult terrain. Such a unit will have to be organizedin accordance with th e tasks which an effective attack demands. Theunit aust be able -to "rapidly :overcome the advanced and direct securitylines. Guns on self -propelied mounts anid 'numerous machinrea guns are need-ed for this purpose. The unit must have an.. assault, detachment to break


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T F-l-. *- d~~ 5~7-.~ I Frr.~ U CLAfSSIFtE1through the security lines and immediately advance to th e head-quarters proper and overpower its personnel , In addition th eunit must have armored vehicles equipped with superior weapons,f lame throwers , trench mortars , and have the support of low-flyingair craft, Finally, troops to cordon off th e part isans are abso-lutely essential as well as adequate infantry and engineer troopsequipped with cross-country vehicles of good quality.

In many instances th e nature of the Russian t errain will pre-vent th e use of the most modern combat and transportation equip-ment, inasmuch as part isans usually protect themselves not only bymilitary cover ing forces but also, whenever possible, take advan-tage of difficult terrain features, which present day vehicles areunable to master in all seasons,

Finally, in Example 5 - there is th e description ofth e capture of a "forest camp" that, situated in the mids t of th ehuge Bryansk forest , threatened German main supply channels consti-tuted by th e railway line and highway between Gomel and Bryansk,In contrast to Example 4, the action took place in the middle ofwinter.

This example illustrates how an aggressive unit, trained andequipped for winter warfare , was able, in spite of th e hardships ofthe cl imate , to overcome the Russian terrain difficulties in snow .arn. ic e mane easily than it could have in the warm season when roads,forests and fields turn into quagmires .

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SMALL UNIT TACTICS

Example. 1The First Clash with'Partisans

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The First. C ash with: Partisans

At 0305, on 22 June "1941, the' day when the campaign against theSoviet Union began, th e German V Corps.attackcd from an area eastond northeast of Suwalki (110 kilometers southwest of the formerLithuanian capital of Kaunas),

The spearhead division of V Corps had the miss ion of breakingthrough th e Russian front astride the, road leading f rom Suwalki toSeirijai by way .o f Lasdiji and, in addition, of, establi phing thesame evening a br idgehead across the Njemen in the Krikstoniai area(forty kilometers air distance ee.st .of the Germ'an jump-off positions).

On the way from the jump-off position to the projected bridge-head the following four obstacles hadto be overcome:

1. tThe so-called Soviet border pcosition close to the fron-tier'in th e Suwalki area, which had been occupied by th e Germans afterth e P6lish 'campaign These emplacements consisted of field positionsand oie. antitatnk trench,

. A.newly built concrete bunker line near Lasdijai.

3. A field position in th e narrow passage south of Lake Dus,west bof Seirijai.

4. The Njemrren River,The spearhead division overran. the :Russian 'border position on

th e first attempt. The attack against the newly-bui l t bunker linenear the smal l town' of Lasdi jai was executed by tw o regiments . The'regim-nt, on th e right. (southern) flank succeeded in peretrating th etown "at .1000hours , It then traor sdc '.the . narrowi passage south ofLake Dus and, inthe 'late afternoon, near Krikstoniai, it forced acrossing of the Njemon and established -.a br idgehead on the far side.Meanwhile, the regiment on the left. (nqrthern)'flank was engaged inheavy fighting near the bunkers north of Lasdijai 'where the laststrong .oncrete emplacements were not, destroyed until th e evening ofth e nex t day

On the evening of the first day of the attack the division wasgreatlly spread out, : The searhead regiment, the division's- recon-naissance battalion and the bulk of, th e ,,artillery were on th eNjemein or within the bridgehead on the! other, s-ide' of th e river,The regiment in th e rear, in an area thirty kilometers from the,.-river, was. fighting' the' enemy in. he bunkers near Lasdijai. The

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division s.:.original reserve regiment, having been pulled through th eLasdijai penetration point, had reached th e Seirijai area with itsleading elements, ' 'There was no. direct .cortact_with th e divisionswhich had thrust forward on the tdght -and left' of th e spearhead divii-sion. The division on th e -right had reached the area southwest ofSeirijai; the division on the left, which w as to advance north ofLake Dus, had encountered heavy resistance .northwest of th e lake.

At dusk, calm prevailed in the .sector' qf.the 'spearhead divis ion,At about 2200 hours th e noise of battle. was suddenly heard It didnot come from the Njemen br idgehead or the ' Ladijai' bunkers furtherwest,A but unexpectedly from the, Seiijai. area.

'Before proceeding further, it : should be, ientioned that on th eGerman side there were many officers 'who had fought in Russia during

orld War I.. The regimental commanders, 'soame of:";he battalion com-manders, as well as th e older reservre officers who headed the rearechelons an d services, had learned, o know the Russ ians in 1914 - 18 .Previous experience supported their. belief that th e Russians werehighly sensit ive to flank attacks, Once thes;e f anks had been over-powered, Russian troops accepted their fate as prisoners of war withresignation. In 7'orld War I it .was not considered unusual for tw o orthree German bicyclists or cavalrymen to lead' a column of some 50 0Russians several kilometers from the' battlefield to the prisoner ofwar collection point without either' difficulties or res is tance.Smaller columns were put in charge.. of the: ranking prisoner and sentback to th e collection point even 'ithout German *guards. Generallyspeaking, partisans were practically unknown in the E esbern ih tir,wring World War I

Such experiences and memories dating back to World War I wereconsadered to be still valid wit'h_'regard '.to th'e new Soviet forces,the Red Army. Overlooked was th e fact that this. Red Arnm could not:)e simply regarded as a continuation .ofthe former Czarist Army, fo rLt had been born in a long, nd cruel civil war .:where the objectivesaad justified th e means used. Several oys of fighting an d consider-ble reserves were needed to 'make us realize that th e 'spirit of theIed. Army was different from that prevailing in former Czarist forces.

The ,first .reports ;about rocturnal combat 'noises, supposedly eman-i.ting from street f ighting in Seirijai, were rot considered very n-)ortant. On th e contrary, the idea pr'evailed that,' due to th e excite-lent on the first day of the'campaig; Germnan 'l.nitsmight be firing on.ach other in the darkness ,

This opinion was proved wrong by reports arr iving'soon afterwardLt th e division command post located five'kilometers: south of Seirijai..:he fluctuating volume, of battle noises weri'e not derived from gunplayamong our own troops, ii wound'ed motorcycliSt'.eportd.that elementsf a bridge column, which had been. rgentlyy. needed.,to build' a bridgeLear Krikstoniai, 'had been'ambushed from'.he .-forest west,; .o f Seirijai


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whi le en route of advance ard that wes t of. he forest th e route washeavily., ammed..- The - commander of th e reserve' regiment that had beenmoved up to the Seiri jai area, reported street fighting in the townagainst armed civilians who had appeard suddenly..

The report abou t the participation of armed civilians in thefighting initially was doubted; Only a short t ime previously thisarea had been;"in Lithuaria "" Under a .German-Soviet agreement) afterthe Polish campaign. Lithuaina had beent ceded to the USSR -U entirelyagainst th e wi2L of its citizens,:, -it herefore appeared incrediblethat the Lithuanians ,should' so suddenly have taken up th e Russiancause, On the. whole it seemed more likely that the civilians doingthe fithting were Russian soldiers who had been separated from theirunit s ,i

Toward midnight the.' .comnrinhder of th e reserve regiment chargedwith security in th e Seirijai area reported as follcws:

t tSeirijai is firmly .held by us .There is occasionalshooting ' in the Seir~ijai forest, th e southern fr ingeof which is bounded by th e divis io n s advance andsupply route, Participation of armied ..civilians inthe fighting ias been confir rd. 1

Thereupon th e regimental commander was ordered to mop up th eSeirijai- forest at dawn.::.

The widening of.the Niemen bridgehead also began at dawn, whilefighting for th e bunker line flared up again at Las dijai.

On th e assuaitiaox that the enemy in the. forest was made up ofcivilians-'and stiagglers of 'negigible fighting power,when opposedby regular troops,:the -regime tal commanderr ordered one, battalionto mop up t;he' forest,.

The battalion :commander, 'for the Same reasbn, considered as ade-quate th e employment: of' or t comparhny -reinforced by heavy machine guxns,After- penetrating into th.e forest fo r a short distance, th e companysnet heavy resistance and was compelled to switch'. to - th e defense. The.,same happened to th e 'scond coar y,', Nor wasthe third company,.which was -sent into th e -for'est able to carry forward th e bogged-dawnbattle The action in the- Seirjai forest proved a failure,

However, this failure had cleared up th e si tuat ion. It had shownthat the enemy in the forest was stronger and 'more effective thanassumed, and that he" had been underestimated by a wide margin, Un-fortunately, the :..eneTmy-.hold forest dominated thy. errain over a widedis tance No by-pass protectbed' fromenemy, observation. and usable byvehicles was avail ble. :Consequently, :not only were communicationswithin the divisioh sector;, nt'errupted.,but also the flow of supplies

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moving~ to th e leading regiment whic was .:'then.:widening the br idgeheadacross the Njemen. This situation being: unbearable , the commander ofthe reserve regiment received :orders: to .odcupy immediately the Seirijaiforest with th e aid' f the entire regiment an d one attached artillerybattalions

The unknown foe in th e Seirijai forest.had thus been more success-ful than he- probably had expected, :.He tied ddwjr an entire reinfcrcedregi nt, on e third of the divisjones fighting :power, ' an d prevented itsdecisive employment in an attack ibeyond the: Njem en

The regimental commander committed two ,:battalions echeloned in depthin an attack on th e enemy in the. .frdest, .. :Becaus e of th e failure duringth e morning hours they were to attack systematically sector .by sector,and break resistance with the help of the concentrated fire of heavy in-,fantry weapons and thea tillery.,:,-

Elements of the third battalion sealed off the terrain outside ofth e forest to prevent th e enemy Is escape; other battalion troops remainedin Seirijai, which was. urprotejctedC: toward th e south and north,

In. the. woods the attacking battalions,met stubborn resistance. TheGqncentration of fire by infantry uns, mortars and artillery pieces inthe dense wooded terrain was difficult and. not always accompanied by thedesired effect. Th e situation did'not c.h .nge ..until the artillery andth e regimental 37-m antitank guns had been moved up._ close behind th e in-fantry an d had begun to fire at point-blank range. This direct fire brokethe resistance of th e savagely--Fight ing enemy7.

These tactics on th e part of a tenaciously f ighting foe took up a greatdeal of. . t ime., it w as evening before :resistance.. had -finally collapsed and'the, egiment had occupied 'the, entire forest,. After th e end of th e fightingthe following information 'became.available Some. 400 .- 5Q0 Russian soldiers ,who had been isolated by the German breakthrough, farrre.d the nucleus of theforces fighting in th e Seirijai forest, Only a fe w still wore their uni-: forms while. most of them had. procured civilian lcth in g in vil lages and.farss, so that. they could not be:.identified as:,soldiers.. The majority, hcw-ever, actually wer:e. civilians, from thel upper. strata of the Russian popula-t ion, who had settled in th e area after. th e Soviet Union t s occup tion ofLithuania. They had joined. th e soldiers either voluntarily or -under duress,The. leader of th e unit . operating in :the forest was the Soviet field gradeofficer who had commanded the attack on.Seirijai,. It was imposs ible tocapture him.

...He was not the only: one to, escape pproximately one-fourth of theunit was able to hide in the wheat fields outside the forest, andi, underthe cover of -darkness, to slip:through the:..thin.lines Qf .*Gerrmn troops sur-rounding therm: It.: was.. assumed at. thc tie that at.-least some ..elements, suc-ceeded in reaching th e far side of .th N emen. As the"--division continuedits eastward., dvance.., from, he. bridgehead several, oficers and' men disappeared

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without trace in an inexlicable manner in the densely wooded ter-rain behind the front, In ors instance a fiel.d grade air officervanished shortly after he had eft the division command post, Inspite of systematic investigation, nothing was ever heard abouthim, his driver or his vehicle. Whether rightly or wrongly, theGerman troops attributed these incidents to the partisans who hadescaped from the Seirijai forest.

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SMALL UNIT TACTICS

Example 2Partisan Fighting in Subter-ranean Stone Quarries


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P artisan Fighting in Subterranean Stone __-uarries

On th e eastern tip of th e Crimean Peninsula lies Kerch, a city,of 50,000 inhabitants, The city owes its founding by the Greeks asa trading outpost , and an eventful history covering more than 2,000years to its favorable location on th e Kerch Strait connec t ing theBlack and Azov Seas and the. Crimea with th e Kuban area.

After German t roops occupied Kerch in World War II th e cityplayed an important role as a transloading point for shipments tothe Kuban area, In early October 1943, when the Seventeenth Armyevacuated th e Kuban bridgehead because of Russian successes in theDon area and wi thdrew across th e strait to th e Crimea, Kerch againbecame part of' th e combat, zone.

The Seventeenth ArmyJ was conosod of German and Rumanian divi-sions, :After retiring from th e Kuban bridgehead all German divisionsexcept tw o (one, near Kerch, the other at the Is thmus of Perekop,which connec ts .the Crimea with th e continent to th e north) were movedup to th e Sixth Army, then fighting north of th e Sea of Azov, Thrownpieceneal into battle, these divisions. were unable to alter the ulti-iaS fate of -'the Sixth Army. The Russians thrust forward past Perekoptoward. Khers on, The Crimea was cu t off.

Late in October 1943, under. cover of darkness, the Russians launcheda large scale landing operation and crossed th e strait to occupy themountainous terrain northeast of ..Kerch. Counterattacks. by the German.98th Division, which had to defend sixty kilometers of coas t on bothsides of Kerch, failed as a result of. ;Russian superiority. The enemygradually moved ten divisions- and. two, armored, units into th e br idge-head, In the six months of fluctuating fighting against four majorRussian offensives it was ,7ossible tp prevent a widening of th e bridge-head beyond the. city of Kerpch and th e hills ,to the north extending toth e Sea of Azov. , The, m in burden: of th e f ighting against th e bridge-head troops was borne by, the 98th. Division an d another .German' divisionwvhich arrived later by air. u an an: troops protcted the, coast on'both sides of the bridgehead againist further landing attempts.

Partisans- had always, pperated -.in th e Crimea, although usually onlyin th e woods, of the Yaila ' an d .Yalta Mountains ;.At first, the popula-tion in the, vicinity of Kerch; caused no difficultis. Early- in: 19.4.4this situation changed... .

A road loads in a southwestorly direct ion from Kerch to th e portcity- of Feodosiyae It was the, only, aved, road. in th e area and. there-fore the main supply route feeding the defensive battle which hadthen flared up anew near Kerch. About five kilometers southwes t of


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the city,. a number of attacks occurred suddenly on this road, initi-ally only at night, Trucks and personnel carriers were ambushed andset afire, their.drivers and passengers were killed, It was not longbefore officers and soldiers proceeding alone were shot down in broaddaylight. After a short t ime the attacks occurred over a larger area.Ni= r th e advance Bagerovo airfield (west of Kerch) a Ger~i~an antiair-craf t soldier w as found shot dead. North of the airfield a battalionmarching to the front was engaged in a regular fire fight by an enemywho appeared at its front an d flanks as suddenly as' he later disappeared,

By this t ime partisans were a commnon feature of th e fighting inRussia. In th e above instance, however, th e Germans were unable to dis-cern th e area from which th e partisans were launching their attacks.

The extensive area between Kerch and Feodosiya, th e so-called KerchPeninsula, is completely barren, with no woods and still less a realforest. Even in villages a group of trees is a rarity, Denuded hillsand mountains , at the summits an d crests of which the bleak reck piercesthrough, alternate with flat steppes, Visibility was therefore excell-ent. The localities were easi ly kept under control. 1oreovcr, the1Kerch area was occupied by numerous artillery and supply units.

The riddle of the partisans' hideout was soon solved. On a certainafternoon, again in the area southwes t of Kerch, a large truck was am,-bushed., Under its tarpaul in were not supplies, as the partisans had pro-bably assumed, but Rumanian soldiers, armed with submachine guns. The am-bush miscarried, During th e pursui t across th e open field, th e Rumanianssuddenly found themselves a lone , The fleeing partisans disappeared beforetheir very eyes as if swallowed up by the ground.

A systematic search of the terrain revealed numerous holes lookingl ike large bomb or shell craters. However, th e stony--sided holes werenot du e to shell explosions; they were the old, dilapidated entrances andexits of a large subterranean stone quarry,

A visitor to Kerch and th e nearby villages will , on a sunny day, bestruck by the glaring whiteness of the houses . The houses are hot oaintedwhite. Th e dazzling whiteness is du e to the -stones from which th e housesare built. The stones are procured from underground quarries. Whenfreshly cut they are said to be so soft that they can be sawed (similarin this to the stones in the Cher Valley, south of Orleans); when exposedto the air they harden and become durable, The subterranean stone quarrieshave existed for ages. In th e course of 2,000 years th e inhabitants inthe vicinity of Kerch worked almost a dozen of these underground stonequarries. The largest of them have multi-storied galleries extendingseveral hundred meters in length plus numerous side-galleries,

It was no w absolutely clear that the headquarters of th e partisanswas in the subterranean stone quarry southwest of, Kerch.


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plant located between Kerch and Jenikal&.e A group of the partisanswished to accept the Rtmanian' demand for. surrend.er'., The engineer hadtheir spokesmen shot, , He set the death penazltyfor anyone who shouldexpress such thoughtsin th e futures .The filli ng-in of the entranceshad not cut off th e air supply, indeed this me:as.ureprqved absolutelyineffectual, Moreover, the partisans had dug shafts straight upward.DLuring the day the shafts were carefully camoufl+aged and at night usedas exits for, raids, Food was rationed but adequate, . No acute watershortage existed, A shaft' filled with . grater.w as available; in addition,dripping -water was collected.

On the basis .o f these statements th e Rumanian. commander questionedthe. German command as to what he now should do . It :was a difficultdecision, It would of course have been desirable.; to quickly and vo-pletely eliminate th e part isan nest located' so . close behind3 th e front.After two unsuccessful operations it..appeared mree than doubtful, how-ever , whether a third operation, for which th e Rumanians requested Ger-man aid, would have scored any worthwhile gains even with very strongforces, Furthermore, our t roops were- at that time .(the end of January1944) , uider such- heavy pressure from ,the Russian bridgehead that itwas impossible' to detach German units, On the, contrary, given a con--tinuation of the Russian attacks it was to be expected that even th eRumanian units securing the coest on both sides of th e br idgeheadagainst renewed landing attempts would have to be . throw n into the de-fensive battle near -Kerch, Consequently, .it was, irmpossible to assumeresponsibility for a large-scale operation with its: prospective. losses,The German command therefore gave the Ruranian division commander thefollowitng order:

"To operation in force will- take place, The subterran-'ean partisan nest southwest of Kerch' will bey completely seal-ed off from the outside by substaritial iwire :obstacles,..After , setting up th e wire obstacles th e Rumanian combattroops will be withdr awn, li- their place; 'units dr aw nfrom 'the rear services '.(so-called alert units) willassume guard duty;TI ' '

The order to set up th e wire obstacle was, ne-ver carried: out. If he nthe Rumanians began building it the partisans recognized the impendingdanger , broke through the inadequately-manned cordon dur ing darkness,and moved with all their belongings into th e .huge.. nderground stoneq'uarries near Bagerovo,

Located te n kilometers west of KerchBagerovo not onlyh. d an airfieldbut also -a r ailhead and was thus the most. important transloading point be-hind the front. The new quarters o f the partisans therefore representeda still more 'serious menace than the' ones they' had -abandoned, 'souttwest ofKerch, especially since the engineer of the steel plant was ,undoubtedly acapable' and very energetic leader,


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44 T i:The German command therefore requested th e following measures

to be taken. Rumanian reserves were to imediat ely and definitelyisolate. the underground .stone quarry system. near Bagerovo, an areaextending for almost a square kilometer; an d they were to build astrong, continuous. wire obstacle in uninterrupted day and nightshifts, A commander was to be appointed who'. as to be in fullcharge of all labor an d guard personnel., The German command assign-ed to th e Rumanian commander so-called, alert units drawn from thepersonnel. of ammunition columns,,signal an d supply units, orderlyrooms, ,kitchens, as well as on e searchlight battalion,

Forces such as are hardly ever required fo r fighting in the openfield, namely, tw o Rumanian infantry battalions, German and Rumanian,.alert units, on e searchlight battalion, two construction battalinsgiven th e taste of setting up the wire obstacle -- all told soi - twothousand en, were thus pinned down by -a ; subterranean.,par tisan unitnumbering only a little over one hundred men.,

Be that as it may, after f ive days an effective., continuous wireobstacle had been completed, Nightly breakout attempts were usuallynipped in th e bud. The tw o Rumanian infantry and construction bat-talions departed, leaving the Rumanian and German alert units incharge of guard duty

In daylight only a fe w observers were on guard duty. At night,sentries were moved up t the wire obstacle while patrols kept thearea under surveillance, The alert units themselves , in contactwith each other by te lephone, were grouped compact ly behind the ele-vations of th e terrain, on which th e searchlights were located.

During th e first weeks of th e cordoning operation th e partisansmade several nocturnal breakout at tempts which failed from thestart due to th e machine gun fire that was synchronized with th esearchlights, At the end of February, three weeks after th e operationbegan, th e first clandestine deserters appeared at the wire obstacle.They stated that food stocks were nearly exhausted and that contactno longer existed with the outside world, The partisans' leader(still th e engineer from the steel plant near Kerch) was preparing

for a breakout in order to move to another subterranean stone quarry ,Because of this information, th e alarm units-were reinforced by twoRumanian companies; If the partisans succeeded in breaking out an destablishing themselves in one of the nearby underground stone quarrieswhich, because of th e lack of manpower,could be guarded only ' by sen-tries, there would be "a bottomless barrel," so to speak.

The expected breakout did not take place until late in Mlarch.It was executed with great daring by the starving partisans, MIostof them were killed, the rest taken prisoner 0 The engineer w as tobe found neither among the prisoners nor th e dead , however. Forthree months he had been the driving power of activities which

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literally were underground, . of activities which ha d cost both Germansand Rumanians considerable casualties. He had t ied dow;n forces ofsignificant size and had caused th e loss of much time, .In accord-ance with intercepted Russ ian radio messages, the engineer had suc-ceeded in slipping through the German lines that same night and hadarrived safely inside the Russian bridgehead.

Only hunger had induced him to make th e breakout attempt. If hecould have held out for on e more week, he *:ould have been liberatedeven w-ithout a breakout attempt. For on 8 April th e Russians piercedthe'defenses of the Perekop Isthmus and advanced in great superioritytowaard Simferopol , the Crimean capital. In the night o f 9 Apri l ou rtroops -ho, for six months, had contained attacks from the Russ ianbridgehead, were compelled to evacuate thejir positipns. They w re.no longer able tot join fordes wiith the one-time t Perekop Group,"asordered, because Siiforopol had meanwhile fallen. In an adventur-ous march along th e southern Crimean coast by way of Sudak and Yalta,they fought their wray to the Sevas topol area.

1.

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SMALL UNIT TACTICS

Example 3Partisan Warfare Without Partisans

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Pa tisan Warfare Tfithout Partisans

The shape of the front lines and the coniat'conditions inthezone .,of the -German Sixteenth Ar'my, operating in Russia under ArmyGroupNorth, had, since the spring of 1942, taken on forms whicheven a .tactical instructor gif ed with a very lively imiaginatiQncould hardly have. imagined. The left flank of the Sixteenth Army.was anchored on Lake Ilhn', Here close contact dxis ted with theright flank of the Eighteenth Army, and this was actually the onlyfeature that could be called normal within the entire zone of theSixteenth Army.. South of Lake Ilnen the so-called,' tfunnel; route"had developed, a funnel-shaped approach to th e Demyansk pocketwhich formed a salient far in front of th e lines and in which therewere seven to eight divisions, faced on all sides by four times asmany enemy troops,

The narrowest point in this pocket, at the Lovat River .bridge.near Ramushevo, was. only 3 500 meters across and was under Russianartillery fire from th e north and south. The only approach route:leading through the funnel into the pocket', a route which was called'"Reichsknueppeldaimm'" (Reich corduroy highway), was inadequate tocarry supply traffic. alone, For this reason numerous transportplanes flew into the pocket daily, just skimming the tree t.ops of theswampy forest. If, then, the Russians informed their air force atthe moment when the transport planes,' under mrtachine gun fire, crossedthe narrow passage at Ramushevo, almost brushing th e roofs of thehouses, .Russian -planes were able to arrive just in ti=n& to attack,while they: were being unloaded; the 'planes which had landed on theonly strip- in the pocket;' The e'nemy carried ovit unceasing .ma ox. at-tacks against.: the funnel and pocket in order to annihilate .these :wounusual positions. Heavy casualties .were incurred duiring stubbornfighting.: in swamps and forests' In early. June1942: the average fight-ing strength.of O erman compa anie s committed at focal' points. had.dwindled to about twenty -men.,

Behind the besieged Demyansk pocket, beginning in the Rramushevoarea, a second. front had developed running southward to the city ofKholnmi In one :sectar- of this front, in the midst of'. swarms,, the 5thLuftwaffe Field Division '-vas ' committed, As it had to hold . a. verylarge area with inadequate forces, this newly activated division wasunable to establish: acontinuous l ine. Its position, comprised a.series.of various-sized 'strdng-po nts, 200-800 meters apart. Only.at the most important "places did there exist anything resembling a,defense '.in depth. ' Khol itslf,d nstitutin7 the right lank of theSixteenth Army, had been surrounded since winter by the Russians and

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was defended by General Scheerer, There was no contact with the ad-jacent army on the right . The. large swampy area south of Kholm wasa. sort of no-man s land;

A sim ilar no-man's land, although mere densely populated, wassituated directly behind th e posit ions of the 5th' Luftvraffe FieldDivision. This was an area approximately fifty kilometers square,without a single paved road, very swampy, axn with narrow strips ofland between the,.swampy parts. The villages were located on thesenarrows ips of land.. To th e south the area joined th e no-man's.land near Kholm, while to the north its extent ffluctuated, In thewest ;it reached almqst to th e railway junction at Dno, th e maintransloading point of the Sixteenth Army,

In this large area of about 3,000 square kilometers there wasnot a single German soldier, still. less a German. administration- Thearea was left to, itself because manpower for its garrisoning was lack-ing. Its actual masters were the partisans.,

Several times during th e winter of 1941- 42 the Sixteenth Armytried to . penetrate into this area., in order at least to protect thevital. Dno area, by an outpost line of some. depth.. Since the Sixteenth,.Arry was always under strength, only, hastily improvised units of' atmost battalion strength could. e put into the -field. After initialsuccesses -these units regularly had to contend with superior partisanforces who inflicted bloody losses, Drio itself was severa . t imes. in.danger of falling into partisan hands.- That- this did not happen theSix.teenth Army owed only to th e fact that the partisans were, led by acommander of less than average qualifications.

When, in the spring of 1942, the snow, melted,, turning the area intoa quagmire,, th e situation automatically calmed down for a. while becauseof the. difficulty of moverre nt k W ith the progressing improvement 'o f th eroads, the partisans tactivities resumed. They were now directed lessagainst th e Dno railway junction than against th e rear of the 5th ' Luft-waffe Field. Division. Impossible conditions gradually developed. in thisdivision's sectcr. The extended line of strong points, which lackeddepth , t ime and again was attacked from th e rear. The road from StarayaRussa to Khoi '(the division s only.supply road) led close behind the

'line of strong points an d was, sometimes cut for days. , If the road wascut at the diiision's northern flank,. he center and southern flank wouldremain' without sup'lies, until th e road was again: cleared of enemy- forces.In the'vast area under .theii. cont 'ol the part isans for rally drafted re-cruits who :received four weeks of training, After complet ion, of theirtraining th e conscripts slipped through th e Gorr an strong points atnight and over 'to .the Russian lines in order - as expressed by recruitscaptured'while 'passing through..the German lines -- "to carry out theirmilitary duties t . Soviet agents bound. for northern Russ ia slipped th roughin the oppos i te direction.

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A division would have been required to -clear :the': entire area ofpartisans and to pacify it definitely. But the S3i teenth Army hadno such reserves, not even as reinforceents for the> continuous"fighting within the "funnel" and th e Demyansk pocket . The availablemanpcwer sufficed- only fo r th e commitment of smaller units, whicheliminated the.worst damage until new acts of violence were co-mitted elsewhere 4

N ot until the late summer of 1942 was it possible; to detach .con-tingents from th e divisions committed in th e "funnel"f These wereformed:into a regiment composed of tw o battalions, on e mountain art-illery battalion and on e engineer company, Equipped ith highly mo-bile vehicles,, th e regiment was ordered to clear th e area.of partisasin the rear of th e Luftwaffe Field Division and to restore the. entirearea to German control .

The order contained two main difficulties. On the on e hand, theregiment would probably have only a l imited time, at its disposal, in-asmuach as it would be needed in th e "funnel" if the Russians thererenewed th e offenive which had just collapsed, Consequently, theorder had to be executed speedily. On the other hand, and this wasthe main. difficulty, th e part isans had to be forced to fight sinceunless they were defeated th e area could not be pacified 4 Hithertoth e partisans had always evaded action and. withdrawn into th e depthof th e area as soon as they faced an opponent of anything noar equalstrength. Only when, by drawing on reinforcements, they had obtainedabsolute superiority would they go over to the defense and finallyto counterattack,

According to - avai lable informtion thIe headquarters and th e mainpartisa n supply depot were in thle center of the area in three villagesclose to each other ,'rich were located ;on on e of the :narrov tonguesof land. urrounded by swamps; the :c rnmand eTr o, , the regiment believedthat the, partsans. could best be :engaged ,in battle if the, regimentwere to suddenly penetrate the area- and ;, advance against their ,mainsupply depot, by th e shortest , route,

In order to prevent, the partisans from learning about the impend-,ing operation, th e reginnt was assembled. a days': mrch- to ;the northof the 5th, Luftwaffe Field Dvision. F.or the. purpose of -.maintainingsurprise, the regiment omitted' at.the point of departure, namely, the5th, Luftwaffe Field Division's. commandpost area, any sort of scout-ing or. reconnoiteringg This actually ,was necessary inasmuch as a fewdays before a woded area . close behind the division command post hadbeen penetrated by a part isan battalion numbering several hundred men.The 'division cormmnder had been able to enploy against th e partissonly a weak alert unit consisting 'of clerks, kitchen personnel, andhorse grooms:

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The annihilation of these enemy forces.:was the first objectiveof the regiment,, With this' "accomplished, the troops, w re to ad -vance on th e main supp-ly depot,For this purpose the regiment marched southward during the

night. to the division command post area and' at daybreak launched anattack from th e march column through the ranks of the alert unitagainst the enemy forces, which had undertaken several local attacksduring the night.

when the regiment' egan its attack) hardly a hostile shot wasfired Without 'opposition it penetrated into the forest where not asingle partisan was seen, 'A laborious combing of the adjoining swa-psproved fruitless,,

Since the partisans were again applying their usual tactics ofevasion, the regimental commander decided on an immediate advance onthe main supply depot, in the belief that the partisans would -defendtheir supplies. The, regiment commenced the 'arch in two columnsalong miserable, half-mired roads,

In the first villages, situated on strips of land between swamps,the two columns met only a few, old men and women. Questioned aboutpartisans, they replied that they had seen none. In answer to queriesabout the whereabouts of th e younger men and women of the village- andthe children, the old people pointed to the west, saying "they fled,from. fear."

It _was remarkable that no fleeing inhabitants were encountered.The country was completely deserted, The reconnaissance planes at-tached to the regiment did not notice any movements except those ofcattle herds on roads and in the swampy lowlands- The majority of thepeople had also left the next villages, which were reached withoutfiring a shot. But the footprints leading'from -the villages acrossthe wet meadows to the swamps, which were largely covered by brush-wood, clearly indicated the route the natives had taken when they es-caped to the nearby swamps. Scouts who followed the footprints into''the dense brushwood occasionally met some women and children and afew heads of. cattle but hardly' ever an able-bodied man, It was. soonrealized that th e partisans and the 'population were cooperating close-ly, and that women 'and children were to hide in the nearest- swamps aslong as the Germans:ere in th e vicinity. All cattle had been de-clared the property of the-partisans, had been confiscated and had hadto be driveni to specified collecting points... All men in any way fitfor service were ordered to hide in the, swamps during daytime and tomarch by night, grouped according to villages,to the, nearest partisanunit.

Toward evening the two columns approached th e main supply depotwithout having been attacked and without having sighted a single

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armed partisan. The regimental comrmander's aim to frce the parti-sans finallyto: f ight was not . fulfi l led. The three vil lages werenot defended. On th e other hand, nt5 . single -round of ammunitionno r a bag. of f.%our was to be found. 'Nor. was there' :any clue to in-dicate that large amounts of supplies had ever been; ,stored. in thesethree poverty-str icken villages.

The existence- of a main supply depot had merely been simulatedto mislead the German intel l igence,

Somewhere in the, large area,, however;,thJ:partisans were boud'to have stored their stocks of.weapons, armmunition.and food. Todiscover the whereabouts of the' depots prisoners were necessary,During the, entire day not a: . inigle prisoner had been, taken who, ad--mitted being a member of the partisanics ' SinCce larrconnaissancewas also unable to detect any. movements by part isans in th e openterrain, it was assumed that they were- hidinin in th e scamps. Theregimental commander therefore decided to comb th e nearest, swanpsthe next day. Even if th e enemy should again ,aavoid. battle, the-rewas at ieast the likelihood of cspturing prisoners.

During th e night th e regiment witnessed a surprising spectacle.Airplanes approached which undoubtedly-were of Soviet. rigin. Assoon as the planes had become clearlyaudible, varicolored. lightsignals went up on all sides of the all-aaound defense positionstaken up by th e regiment on the. tone of landdurng. th e day) in-cluding th e sector which th e regimnnt. had just cossed. Someclever German observers noticed th e unifoim color combination ofthe l ight signals and~. thereupon fi:redi identical l ight signals whennew airplanes were heard approaching. To .their; surprise they saw,"parachutes f loat dovn 1n th e ::ilumn t&'aiea:,. The parachute packscontained ammunition and, unfo turu 'lyonly :n a few cases,,. a sortof choclate and tcbacco. '

The enemy was evidently in th e area and had actual ly surroundedthe regiment.

However, th e end result: of :thco d day of th e operation. was'again fruitless. In the dense brushwo'd ,ad' eed wilderness of 'thesurrounding swamps th e German forces captured;'women and childrenfrom nearby villages; a few heads of cattle which had been .withheldfrom th e partisans; a few unarmed'- en who claimed to: be harmless'family heads4 . Nowhere ..as .there any re'sistance. Just as. on"the,previous day, air reconnaissance :reporte'd: 'N pparti.sans. deteced;cattle herds are being driven -outhward,"

After dusk th e same. situation prevailed aa on the, previousnight. There was th e 'sound of approahing i'S6viet ;supply planes andlight signals were sentp onall sides of' the regimen Is perimeterdefense posi t ion, After midght there was heavy, rain,

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It was 'evident nom that the partisan comn ndhad issued ordersto avoid a clash with th e regiment., How, under these circumstances,was th e regiment 'ever going to carry out .its mission to clear th earea from partisans?; The regimental . commander reasoned that wherethe cattle herds converged there must 'also be partisans.. The samenight the regimert moved southward in twfo -columns, The rains c on-t inued.

An advance detachient moving forward on. cross-country motor ve-hides got stuck in the low-lying sections of the terrain. In th eafternoon, the regiment overtook several. cattle .herds in spite ofthe muddy roads& Shots were exchanged from, a great distance with

- th e cattle guards when, they tried to drive th e animals into th eswmps. No prisoners were taken. No reports were received fromair reconnaissance because of rain and fog. :No. supplies were foundin the villages Which th e Germans passed, through during the. advance..

Finally, on th e fourth day, when the regiment had advanced farsouthti~ard, a large stock of flour from the -new harvest was discover-ed in a vil lage. A group of armed menwho, led from th e villagefell into a German ambush.. Documents found on one of th e dead showed

*that definite orders had been-issued not .to fight against regularGermane units,- but to .evade and-to observe them, During' the presenceof German troops the principal mission of the partisans was to storeportions of th e supplies in small, inconspicuous depots, to be caredfor by the population; to safeguard th e c attle by driving them intothe southern part of the area, .and if necessary. nto the swamps, in.order to maintain a food supply for -the coming winter. -

Hoping that, through th e destruction of their. ood supplies, he;could finally make th e part isans give battle, .te regimntal comnand.-er ordered a systematic search for supplies in the, villages. TheLuftwaffe received orders to shoot all l ivestock, especially th e cat-tle hePds in the swaps

For two weeks th e regiment crisscrossed th e large area, findingnumerous small depots with food and ammunition, but no partisans. Inthe latter part of th e two weeks there were: no more cattle herds as

-the. Luftwaffe had destroyed- them all.The final esult of the regiment's expedition was at once, sur-

prising and disheartening. One evening,: in the area of the Dio rail-way junction, th e rear 'services had to be alerted because a7 strong

.partisan column, numbering more than :1,00 men, had left the pa-trolled area and, on its northward marh, ;shad crossed the railwayline and w as proceeding in the direction of the Luga forest --where it would be more-than-a 'day' .march from the regiment, whichat th e time was also advancing north. The .alerted supply'unitswere unable to engage the far superior partisan column, which dis-appeared In th e huge' forest south :of :Luga,. In doing so 'it had,


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certainly unconsciously, crossed an invisible wall, namely, th eboundary between the Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies, The Six-teenth Army was rid of its partisans. They now belonged" tothe Eighteenth Arrmy, whose operations they later seriously ira-pedled,

Three days later a new Russ ian attack was launched againstth e "funel," A lack of reserves there made it necessary to shipth e regix; :nt back to th e "funnel,," No other units were availablethat could have replaced th e departing regii nt. The entire areawas, as in the past , left to itself,

In th e autumn th e partisans were back in th e area,

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*SMIi L UNIT TACTICS

Example 14A Company Cornmarder's Story


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A Co as CommanrderIsStorV

Since th e winter of 1942 - 43: the main effort of the partisansin Central Russia had been~ directed -gainst the major railways whichc arried supplies from Germany. The fate of th e f ront depended onthe operation of 'the railways. By means of attacks on moving trainsand large-scale demolit ion of rails, bridges and tunnels, the parti-sans succeeded at times in halting almost all traffic on th e two im-portant feeding routes; the on e running from Warsaw to Gomel andEryanek; and fur ther to the north, the' one passing through Minsk,Borisov ard Smolensk.

In.the early summer of 1943 it was possible through agents todiscover th e location of the headquarters of th e part isan staffdirecting the attacks against the railways in the Borisov sector,The headquarters was located in th e vil lage of -Daljok., fifteenkilometers south of Lepel. Inconspicuous surve lance exercisedin th e Daljoki area confirmed the agents' reports.

For the German sector command it w as of paramount importance tocapture this dangerous and long-sought staff, which was the brainsof the partisan organization in the Borisov area,

For immediate commitment th e German sector commander had th e fol-lowing units available: In the Borisov area, one bicycle battalion-*that had been withdrawn three weeks ago from the f ront and had temp-orarily been made available to combat part isans; one "Landesschuetzen"L'(regional defense) battalion in Lepel (fifty kilometers north ofBorisov) which, ho ever, was presently fighting partisans in th e Beresina Valley (thirty kilometers west of Lepel) and of which only onecompany was still in Lepel; one .troop was in the Senno area (sixtykilometers east of Lepel).,

Generally speaking, in the course of time a. ertain pattern hadevolved in partisan fighting. After the whereabouts of a partisangroup had been discovered. ina village or somewhere deep in th e woods,

*,A bicycle battalion was organized as follows: a'headquartersand communicat ion platoon; first, .second and third companies, eachmounted on bicycles and equipped with. l2 light machine guns, and 6light mortars; fourth (Heavy Weapons) company (motorized), equippedwith 12 machine guns and six 37-nm antitank guns; a motorized train.

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an attack-.was launched simultaneously from several sides with super-ior forces an d weapons. The attack was usually scheduled to cormnenceat dawn. Although this system .o f concentric attacks was undoubtedlysuccessful it also undeniably involved a great disadvantage, for theattack succeeded only if th e partisans- did not learn befarehand of th econcentric approach, In the course of t ime, however, the partisanshad not only grown numerically, stronger, ,especially since Stalingrad,but they also had improved their organization and intelligence ser-vices. Ever more frequently '.the German units approaching from sever-al sides would find no partisans to kttack., because they had withdrawnin t ime.

Under the circumstances the most logical course would have beenfor th e German sector commander to order an'attack against Daljoki tobe carried out by th e bicycle battalion fron the, south and west, bythe Landesschuetzen from the north, and by the troop from the east 9However, it was not an ordinary partisan group that was stationed inDaljoki, but the highest partisan' staff of a large region, where allcommunications converged. Moreover, the sector commander desired notmerely to liquidate the staff but to "capture the staff members alive,in order to gain information about th e partisan organization throughinterrogations. It was unlikely that th e partisan' staff. would no tlearn about an approach march from three sides. 'Peihaps it alreadyknew about the pr eparations which 'had had to be made at three diff er-ent places.

The sector commander therefore decided against a joint operationand planned to have th e bicycle battalion, ithen stationed in area ofBorisov; carry ou t the attack on th e partisan staff. In this decisionhe was supported by a message frqm the 'co and r at Lepel stating thatth e fight against the partisans' in th e Beresina Valley was progressingonly slowly, and that this fact would probably necessitate th e commit-ment of the Landesschuetzen company which was still in Lepel.

On 23 June th e sector commander visited the bicycle battalion com-mander who, on th e previous day, had returned from an operation in theforests east of Borisov, and gave him a newi order, namely, to attack thepartisan staff in Daljoki.

The next :morning, on 24 June, the battalion. commander issued th e fol-lowing writ ten, battalion order:

11. The battalion, without the 3d Company, which for -thetime being remains, in its billets, will leave, camp at 0700'hours toniorrow, 25 .Juno, and will reach Beresina (thirtykilometers wes t of Lepel) in tw 6 ,days of marching,

"Ivssin: To destroy the' partisans in joint action withthe battalion from Lep'el which 'already is 'fighting in theBeresina Valley.

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?2 , Irarch route: Boris ov-Lepel-Beresina"3. Billets from 25 to 26 June: -,Staff ana signal coimuni_-cation p'latoon, in Wily; 1st Company, in Sloboda, 2nd Cormpany,

in Gadsivlia; 4th (Heavy Weapons) Company, in Anoshki."Quarter ing details- in charge of Lieutenant X will moveforward at 0400, 25 June, After th e arrival of the battalion

at the prescribed billets at about 1600 hours, th e quarteringDetails will assemble at about 1900 at the battalion commandpost in Wily whence they all will proceed by way of Lepel toBeresina Here they will report at post headquarters, whichwill assign. billets.

" 4, At 0700, 26 June, the battalion will leave from thenorthern exit of Wily and continue its march by way of Lepelto Beresina0

The operation against the part isan headquarters in Daljoki isdescribed by th e commander of th e 1st Coriany as follows:"It was very hot on 25 June,, After using the dilapidated

Borisov-Lepel..Beresina road, th e only so-called paved road in th e.entire: area, we reached our assigned billets in the afternoon,I coipany was .quartered n Sloboda, The -quartering parties,which drove on to Beresina after our' arrival, had taken great 'pains to :select for us th e houses which were least' infested withlice . But if one used thepoint of a bayonet to poke in th ecrevices. between the. tile stove and the wooden: walls it becameevident that ther~ewas .not, :.single house free of;lice in the en;-tire village, As a,precaution; the company bathed in th e Essa,which runs immediately west: .of! loboda, .As:elsewhere; the. popula-tion here* also was: poor, .inif'ferent, although polite, and, natur-ally, quite hosti le , to the, parttisans.,: .Thank Heaven, not ea singlepartisan is in. th e area, '..they said . But . they had heard that aday Is march from.there, -in th e : Beresina Valley, there had unfort-unately been some partisans: in..Zecent times'

tEarly next day, 26. une,.- the company bathed once more' in th eEssa in order to shed thel lice -of Sloboda,. realizing however thatin exchange. that same evening.,they wouldbe visited by th e verminof, Beresina, As ordered, my company: stood ready gat 0700 at th enorthern. exit . of Wily. In a. dense cloud., of dust. th e con'pany .rodeoff to Lepel.

"The battalion executive officer awaited us at th e first small.;wooden house in the little rural conmunity of Lepel,. Here we hada - two-hour break, were. ssued rations, . and:the company commandersreported to the battalion "c mmander,

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"Guides directed- th e comrpanies. to their resting places in thewestern part of tepel, along the Beresina road. In a house behindthe bridge, at the, exit toward Beresina I found the battalion com-mander, a major whom I had known fo r a long time. At the.beginningof the war against Russia he had commanded a company in our batta-lion and I was then his platoon leader. ' I noticed- immediately thathe was not entirely at ease. When all company: commanders were pre-sent he said immediately. and somewhat bluntly: 'Just so you knowright away, I fooled you. Our battalion never was ordered to fightthe partisans in the Beresina Valley in joint action wi-th. he Landes-sc huetze n. That is. a fabrication on my part so as to camouflage ourreal mission., .Actually, it is the supreme: partisan staff of th eBorisov guerilla area, who has been seen in Daljoki, that we have toattack and capture alive

"ne were by no means as surprised as the major expected. It wasobvious that he could not have publicly announced the day before inhis battalion order that we were on the way to.attack the partisanstaff in Daljoki. Considering the excellent partisan intelligenceservice, the news of our intention would have travelled to . Daljokifa r quicker than we could have reached the village.

"'Let us look at th e map., ' the major continued.. . !When I re-ceived orders to proceed'with my battalion to Daljoki. and to capturethe partisan staff which had comnitted numerous attacks on railwaysand which had carried ou t demolition' operation on both sides ofBorisov, I tried to think up some method likely to-catch the parti-sans by surprise. . In thD present, case I consider it. impractical tofollow the standard procedure, which would be to bring up rmy unitsduring the night from a2ll four sides toward Daljoki: and to wait fo rmorning to break simultaneously into th e village.. X am convincedthat the staff in Daljoki would have. learned., about our approach fromBorisov to Daljoki, a distanc'e of roughly forty kilome ters, and evenmore definitely, of our assembly at night. I believe that we wouldhave found the nest deserted. I would have-! iked best to use a smallunit on motor vehicles, one or at most two companies, from Borisov,W~ithout a stop, and driving at full speed, we would, after reachingSloboda, have turned from the Lepel highway into the dirt road toDaljoki; the leading company, on its motor vehicles:, would havedriven right into the center of the village, while th e rear coianywould have scaled -off he village in the south and east toward the'swamp area. That would have been a real- surprises But fo r such anundertaking one needs suitable. cross-country vehicles -- .and I donot have them. The solution, therefore, is to simulate. normalmarch movement such as frequently takes place on the road from Borisovto Lepel The objective given out. ill be'tthe -partisan hotbed in theBeresina Valley, which is known, t all, In order to strengthen er ipression of a routine march movement which in no way has anything todo with the staff in Daljoki, yesterday I .ordered ,the battalion to: bebilleted at a level with Daljoki along the march route, For the same

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reason, the quartering details which. were sent in advance have re-quisitioned billets in the usual manner,'whereupon they went on ina body to Beresina, There they are a t "work providing for billets,as ordered, and they will not find -otitunt tonight that they have'worked in vain. A ll these measures :are- fo r the. sole purpose of'preventing th e part isan staff from becoming suspicious and to induceit to remain in Daljoki. Besides , .I'-anconvinced that the partisanstaff has already known sinc: last. night that th e battalion is. goingto march into th e Beresina' Valley' 1

"The major thereupon said, 'Accordirg to my watch it is now afew minutes past 0900 hours., Unt i l "1100: hours please continue t.o,behave as if we were resting on ou r way to Beresina. Nothing mustpoint to the fact that we have something entirely different inmind. No vehicle may leave its place or turn southward before'1100.. Unti l 1100 we have only one' .objective: Beresinal

"'At he stroke 'ibf 1100 the battalion will turn around, leavingbehind th e train and. an y other elements. not absolutely essentialfor th e attack, and drive back over th e same road it used a fewhours before on the. way to Lepel. The' following sequence will bemaintained:' 1st, 2d. and 4th Companies.:" The three dirt roads lead-in g to Daljoki will be usedas follows:, th e 1st Company: taking the:one from.Wily .(byway of Soyaditai) the, 2d Company, the one fr.omSloboda; the. 4th (motorized) Company,.:. he road from Gadsivlia. Thebattalion staff will procced with, the-,.4th Company.

trtiOn the way there will be no :halts' or reconnaissance. For eachcompany the objective is. Daljoki;.- :'-The first resistance, I believe,will be encountered not later than at the f-arm houses at Liski,Podrussy, Pospach and Ivan, Bar which: front Daljoki in a semi-circle.For I assume that an important. staff.. 'such as the ons in Daljoki willnot be satisfied.with protecting pits imniediate vicinity. Any re-sistanco offered, at ,these farms must'.be broken quickly. For thispurpose the, 4th Company will detach one platoon of 'two antitank gunsto both the 1st and 2d Companies. At 1200 hours, gentlemen, I wantto see yoti and your' companies break iunto Daljoki. Is that' clear?'

"The major 's plan was by. no means. clear to us. I, as his seniorcompany comriander, answered' in :th e name:oof the others, arguing asfollows: 'To penetrate Daljoki::at noon is' something we can probablymanage, provided there are no strong enemy forces in the farm, housesfront ing'the village .. On the other hand, what will th e partisan"'staff do when it hears _shots fired at. th e farms or at th e edge of-the village?' .

"'I definitely believe, I said, 'that th e real partisan staff,namel, its leaders, will quickly run ,either toward -the s'outh oreast and iriash .in th e swanmps. t :am 'fraid that in this manner wemay perhas catch a few unimportant pa'ti ns in~the.rear guard.'


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But the very men we are most anxious to get will not fight but -dis'appear as fast as possible.'"'I think so, too,' the major replied, '.That is why the 3d .Com-

pany will take up positions at the edge of the swamp at 1100 hours."iHe placed an aerial photograph, of the Daijoki area on the table.'The 3d Company,' he added, 'remained in camp when we marched off to

Borisov, Yesterday afternoon it was loaded on tarpaulin-coveredtrucks and in the evening it was billeted' in Gorodok, that is, behindthe 4th Company. The 3d Company took along no..bicycles and carriedonly l ight weapons such a's pistols; cabire s, submachine guns andrifles :with silencers,:-

" This mrning before 'dawn the company rode from erodok towardLepel. Inro kilometers north of Anoshki, at a point.where. the foresttouches the road, the six trucks stopped briefly. ' My orders were tostop for only hal a minute. 'The company detruck'ed, whereupon the em-pty trucks, which had not' their motors shut, off, were driven throughLepel to Beresina. Thee'3d Company- had orders, using the aerial photo-graph you see here, and"with the aid of .a c ompass, to march straighteastward through the woods and moors, and, after crossing the Essa,to march into the swamp 'south of Daljoki, or rather to wade. In theswamp, which is covered by dense brushwood, the company will hide. ina very small area, I repeat, in the 'middle of the swamp. It willsend out-no reconnaissance patrols.. Its only task will consist inremaining unnoticed. At 1100 hours, at the very moment when the bat-talion here in Lhpel will turn around for the attack on the partisanstaff, the '3d Company will cautiously and secretly occupy the fringeof the swamp south of Daljoki ard' alsd the forest directly east ofIvan Door. There the company will remain. It will not even attackwhen the battalion penetrates Dalljoki. Its mission is to capture 'thereal partisan staff when it tries to escape into, the swamps. Every-thing else is of secondary interest to it.. - told the commander of3d Company that for half a day his company was. to act like Indians.

"'Of course I would have gladly 'spred the 3d Company the unusualmarch through the wet forest and the moors, the wading in the Essaand the painful stay. in the ho t swamps south of Daljoki, where theywill be half devoured by myriads of gnats' and other stinging insects,I could. have ordered the company to ' advanc e on the dirt road whichruns some six to eight kilometers east of the paved road in the di-rection of Liski and then on to Gadsivlia, However, this dirt roadis, in my opinion, one of 'the roads connecting the partisan staffin Dalijoki with the partisan units 'operating in the Borisov woods.I have no doubt that an advance by the 3d Company on this road would

*,Russian rifles captured from the partisans "and' quipp'ed withsilencers and:us ng special'ammrunition,. The report is hardly audi-ble at a distance of a, undred paces..'

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be 'rapidly' reported. toB th . partisan staff, a f act which' would makeour entire undertak; ng a failure, That is th e reason I 'have orderedth e 3d Company' to ' move, through woods arId swamps. In doing so , I' amfully aware that if :there is. a single minor and ridiculous slip allour trouble and laborious preparations will hve been in vain. Somefellawrfrom Daljoki or'Liski need, only see our approaching company andreach' th e staff ''in Daljoki unseen by us., .'That would be th e end; Butthere is nothing todprevenit hiat; either we'will be lucky :or we won tt.I feel th e 3d Company will have luck and bring to-a successful con-clusion our last operation against the partisans. 'For n four daysbn 1 July,'we are returning to our dj.vision at the Smolensk front, '

"TVWhen I returned to my company the field kitchen was ready toissue food. I used this opportunity to sit down with my platoonand group leaders in a corner of. th e farm, courtyard and, while weate, to inform them of the battalion's new mission. I''f orbade thento mention Daljoki before we had left Lepel behind us At 1050 th ecorany assembled on th e street outsidd th e couintyarrd, facing in th edirection of Beresina, I managed to get the inhabitants, who wit-nessed th e assembly, quickly off th e road when I let them know thatthey could have the r'est of the food from the 'field itchen in thecourtyard. I was well aware that Iw as thus giving more than oneof the ,partisah spies and collaborators an undeserved lunch.

"'At1100 sharp I gave th e signal to depart. The company fturredtheir' bicycles around. We drove back on the same road on which wehad come three hours earlier. Since we could use th e tracks we ha dleft in th e morning on th e very por road, we were able to proceedat a good 'rate of speed with our bicycles, In Wily we turned intothe dirt road to Seyaditai and Daljoki, Since th e dirt 'road' wassandy our speed was' somewhat reduced. lWre passed through Seyaditai.It was just 1130 when th e forward platoon with the two attached anti-tank guns left th e vilJage in.: the direct ibn of Pospach. Throughbinoculars I cleairly saw, on a,low rise in th e ground, and between'some bunches of trees the roofs of Pospach looking like a countryestate; th e distance was about 2,500. meters , I could not see Daijoki,which la y behind th e rise in the: ground. ,

"The company fo l lowed the forward platoon at a distance of 500meters.. In my sidecar motorcycle I rode up to th e forwaird 'platoonleader. The head of th e platoon's bicycle file had already come soclose to Pospach -that with the nak.d eye one could see th e detailson the buildings of 'the estate. I began to'feel uncomifortable,thinking that perhaps, in spite of alL our carefully prepared de-ceptive maneuvers, the.petisan staff mid-it have gotten wind of th e.operation and 'fled

"Just a s I stopped.. near~ the platoon leader it all of a suddenbecame" lively in Pospach. Rifle shots sounded and simultanecuslya burs t of machine gun fire swept the dirt road' The 1st.: Platoon

7 25

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jumped f rom. their bicycles and took cover . The tw o antitank gunsbehind th e platoon were unlimbered. Their crews tried to hit theenemy machine gun with high-explosive shells *A second nachine gunbegan. to fire in Pospach , To run up against.such fire. appeared toMe neither expedient o necessary. I ordered th e platoon-leader,next to whom I was lying, to use his four -,machine guns and the anti-tank platoon to overpdwer the enemy. 'Under the cover provided bythe trees I led the other tw o platoons in an eastward lunge againstth e enemy's rear.

"Unfortunately, we d id not succeed in encircling enemy forces 0At the last moment they withdrew toward Ivan Bor. But we were ablestill to cover them with machine gun fire in the open field 0 I hadth e impress ion that only vexy few of the partisans had escaped. Isent a reconnaissance patrol after them.

"The action, which l as-ted a lmost an hour, had cost us one headan d five wounded,

"About tw o kilometers ahead of us, in a flat, open field, wasthe village of Daljoki, Behind it one saw ,the wooded arc const i -tuting the fr inge of the swamp. If all haad gone well , th e 3d Com-pany was bound to be in -this rswap. The 2d: omany appeared -it was close to 1300 hours -- to be just penetrating into Podrussy.QLoud battle noises were audible coming from the area behind a linefrom Podrussy to Liski, an d perhaps also fromn Daljoki, where a fewhouses burned.

tSince ' I' had first to send back for th e bicycles, an d in orderto Save time, I committed the forward platoon -- it was noiCT he 2dplatoon. -- in an attack on. Daljoki on foot. The riflemen advancedin very loose order east; of th e dirt road. Halfway between Pospachand Daijoki, in the barren and flat terrain, th e platoon receivedsavage machine gun fire directly on its flank from the direction ofIvan Bor., The platoon was therefore forced to employ some of itselements facing east. As the intensity of flanking fire from IvanBor increased, endangering th e advance of the company to Daljoki,I ordered"the 3d Platoon, which at th e .momrnt was waiting for thebicycles at ?ospach, together with th e 1st Platoon, to attack andtake Ivan Bor.

"Shortly after the 3d Platoon had assembled, we saw whi te groundsignals rise in'Daljoki. This meant: 'We are here! V Daljoki wastherefre in our hands. Immediately thereafter a motorcyclist camefrom Daljoki, speeding toward Pospach. It was the battalion execu-tive officer. He transmitted a battalion order which stated:'Daljoki has been taken by 4th Company," Podrussy,. by 2nd Company.Elomnnts of the 3-d Company are still.:'.ghting against the partisansfrom Ivan Bor in the 'woods directly east of this village. The 1stCompany will discontinue -its advance toward Daljoki and occupy IvanBor.'

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1 II)

t In order to quickly en d partisan resistance and to avoid casual-ties, I committed the entire company against Ivan Bor. In spite offire from twelve machine guns , six light mortars ancd tw o antitankgu.7ns, th e partisans did not surrender. They fought on to the lastround. h,en we penetrated Ivan Bor we m et a platoon of the 3d Co -pawny coming toward us from the forest east of tho estate. Th e mensimply looked awful. Their f,.ces were' bloody and swollen from in-sect bites, their uniforms caked with mud. The platoon leader re-ported as follows: 'Soon after the beginning of th e action nearBospach we noticed r horse-drawn carriage coming from Daljoki. In-side th e carriage s t, in. ddition to th e driver, four woren whowore the large shawls customary in th e area. The carriatge passedthrough Ivan'Bor in which thre was a partisan unit. Directly eastof Ivan Bor the carriago ran up against th e platoon of the 3d Com-pany, which, since 100, had been hiding on both sides of th e roadin the swamp. The four wom.en immediate lv aimed their weapons an dfired. They ,,ere shot dead. Actually they wore men, perhaps thecore of th e staff. Unfortunately we could no t find a single scrapof paper on them. '

".Ater th e reduction of Ivan B or all resistance within the bat-talion area seemed to have ended. giftor 1500 not a shot was fired,I had th e bicycles brought up and sent my conrcany commander to near-by Daljoki to inform the battalion commander that we. had occupiedIvan Bor. I rescinded my order to th e company comrmander, however,when I saw the battalion c omander t'sommand car approaching fromDaljoki. The myajor was accompanied by the commnander of th e 3d Co-pany. The gnats in th e swamp had made such a mess of th e latterthat I could barely recognize him.

"The major stated t hat the attack had been successful insofaras, except fo r a few men who had managed to escape, th e partisanstaff had been eliminated. Unfortunately it had not been possibleto capture the top leaders alive. The core of th e staff, sometwenty men, had early wi thdrawn southward from Daljoki, and indoing so had run right into th e rifles of the 3d Corrpany, hidden atth e edge of the swamp, Upon our command to strrender they firedtheir submachine guns. They were all killed in hand-to-handfighting..

"After th e attack th e battalion returned to th e caup in Borisov."

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SMA LL UNIT ThOCTICS

Examiple5The Forest Camnp

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The tretCm

In the huge forests wes t of Bryanek (Central Russ ia) , wich areinterspersed with swamps, it was never possible for German forces toreally get the upper hand over the partisans for any length of time.There were to o many of theme Casualties inflicted by th e few Ger- "nsecurity units available were readi ly offset by reinforcements re-ceived from th e extensive rear areas. They (the partisans) wereequipped with automatic weapons which came froze large stocks whichth e Soviet Ary had ha d to leave behind in the woods during its re-treat in th e summer of 1941. Under tight and uniform direction fromMoscow, the partisans in the Bryansk area had carefully coordinatedtheir own activities with operations on the battlefield, and thus,in time of crisis, they became a heavy burden an d a cause for dailyworry to our supply services.

A very active group numbering 300 to 400 mn, th e so-called GroupRuda, mainly attacked th e railway line and the highway west of Bryansk;More than other partisan units in the Bryansk area, Group Ruda wasdistinguished by having an especially energetic and audacious commanderaround whose name a legend. had grown in th e course of time. . His groupwas characterized by aggressiveness and harsh discipline. H is orderswere also w ill ingly obeyed by the civilian _population in remote vil lages,to which German reconnaissance or police patrols came only occasionally.Over a long period only one case of noncompliance became known, whenth e mayor of a small forest village refused to deliver th e last milkcow of the village and instead offered some sheep9 . A few days laterth e mayor appeared with his Wife an d children 'at th e nearest Germanheadquarters where he counted out twenty Czarist gold rubles on thetable and demanded that he and his faiily be iimmediately evacuated byair, and not by th e railway, which was endangered by partisan attacks,because they feared for -their lives.

In th e summer of 1942, several attempts to destroy th e dangerousGroup Ruda failed because each t ime the group managed to escape intoremote woods and swamps. In th e autumn it was finally possible todiscover the actual. hide