Somalia and the Islamic Threat to Capital

8/18/2019 Somalia and the Islamic Threat to Capital

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Somalia and the Islamic threat to capital

(Aufheben gives the background to the civil war, famine and the US invasion of Somalia in

1992.)

Aufheben 2 (Summer 199!)

THE SOMALIA MYSTERY

"he landing of US troo#s on the beaches of Somalia in $ecember 1992 might be significant for anumber of reasons. "he ludicrous s#ectacle of television camera crews virtuall% &ostling the

troo#s for s#ace on the beach to get the best #ictures seems to #oint to the need on the #art of the

American state to draw attention to itself not onl% as a militar% #ower, but also as an efficienthumanitarian force' not &ust the worlds co# but also the worlds social worker.

"he a##arent suddenness of the decision b% then resident *ush to send in the marines mightsuggest that we need look no further for an e+#lanation for such ostentatious benevolence than

the #revalent &ournalistic glosses that the o#eration was #erha#s a last dramatic #ersonal gesture b% a lameduck #resident, more lauded for his foreign #olic% than his domestic achievements, an

attem#t to salvage his vision of a new world order and the international #olicing role of the US

for #osterit%. *ushs e+#ressed &ustification for sending troo#s to deliver relief su##lies was interms of the need to #revent armed Somalis -ri##ing off their own #eo#le-. And, in fact, when

the US troo#s ended the o#eration in earl% a% this %ear, the consensus among &ournalists was

that, though the US troo#s had done little to tackle the causes of the civil war in Somalia, the%had indeed hel#ed with food distribution, which was said b% man% to be the main reason for the

high levels of starvation in that countr%.

/et the e+tent of the Somalian famine and its #roblems of food distribution had long ceased to be

news b% the time *ushs decision came. 0or the #revious two %ears, the U had attem#ted tonegotiate with various clan leaders to bring in relief su##lies to famine hit areas. As class

conscious c%nics, we might see *ushs somewhat belated outbursts on -bandits- and his

un#recedented attack of charit% as, at some level, a #rete+t. ven within the aid agencies,3uestions have been asked about the reasons given for the invasion. "hus one U official

described the American claim that 456 of food aid was being looted as -bullshit-. 7e saw the

American invasion as an e+cuse for the testing of certain o#erational methods b% the US arm%. 8t

is not clear, however, wh% the American state should want sim#l% to test certain o#erationalmethods in Somalia at this #articular time. Similarl%, edicins sans 0rontiers claimed that the

figures of 96 malnutrition cited b% the Americans were out of date and, again, &ust a #rete+t forsending troo#s in. "roo#s, said the 0rench s#okes#erson, would shatter the balance between theaid agencies and the clans. 0inall%, we are told that some of the claims about starvation, and

#articularl% dis#lacement, are -absurd- given that Somalias #o#ulation is largel% nomadic

an%wa%.

"hus #roblems have been raised, but the bourgeois critics of American intervention bring us littlecloser to a full e+#lanation. :e need to take a #roletarian view#oint in our search for answers.

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:e might therefore understand *ushs sudden change of heart on the 3uestion on intervention in

Somalia in terms of the strategic interests of :estern ca#ital against the #articular forms of

#roletarian militanc% in the region. :e might ask, for e+am#le, whether the invasion hadan%thing to do with the a##arent s#read of 8slamic fundamentalist influence in the 7orn of

Africa, minor re#orts of which have been a##earing in the bourgeois #ress over the last %ear.

8slamic fundamentalism is the common declared enem% of the Americans, the U and the ma&or

clan leaders in Somalia. Somalia is 1556 oslem, and although under Siad *arre it might have been regarded as a #oliticall% 8slam ic countr%, fundamentalists have never been ha##% with its

laws. :hile the ma&or clan leaders in Somalia welcomed the US intervention (albeit

inconsistentl%), one of the countr%s 8slamic #arties, the 8ttihad al 8slami al Somalia, greeted theAmericans with threats. ow, the leaders of the main militar% factions have had to give

assurances to an increasingl% disillusioned #o#ulation that the% will introduce 8slamic shariah

law. ;rou#s of 8slamic militants who have taken #art in the civil war in Somalia are a##arentl% backed b% Sudan, which is backed in turn b% 8ran. Sudan itself has been engaged in a civil war<

the (Arabic) north is tr%ing to im#ose 8slamic law on the (-African-) south. "he southern forces

are backed b% :estern interests, including #eo#le like "in% =owlands. Sudan condemned theAmerican intervention for destabili>ing the region. ?ther #oliticians in the region see the US

o#eration as a warning to the @hartoum government which has su##orted 8slamic fundamentalist

grou#s in both Africa and the Arab world. 8t is interesting in this res#ect that the US envo% who

headed the US mobili>ation, =obert ?akle%, is better known in the oslem world as a man morefamiliar with warfare than relief efforts. 7e ran the Afghan mo&ahedin fighting the Sovietbacked

regime in @abul. "he #resence of the US forces ma% encourage Sudan to kee# a low #rofile in

case the troo#s are sent into the south of that countr%. "he arrival of US troo#s also coincidedwith a growing secessionist tone from the southern troo#s fighting @hartoum.

*ush was at #ains to em#hasi>e that the intervention in Somalia was to be a ver% limited one.

"he aim was sim#l% to get food into the region< that was all. As soon as this was achieved, theUS troo#s could be gone. All this would fit with a scenario whereb% the effects of the famine areameliorated, %et the various dominant armed factions within the countr% are still ultimatel% able

to struggle for #olitical control. 8f the% had been disarmed or defeated b% the Americans, this

would leave the wa% o#en for forces even less desirable, in the e%es of the American bourgeoisie,to make a bid for #ower. "he US force therefore ho#ed to create a degree of stabilit% in Somalia

in order to #revent a feared rise in 8slamic fundamentalism.

7owever, the s#read of 8slamic fundamentalism ma% not be the onl% reason for the o#eration<

and indeed other e+#lanations have been #ro#osed b% revolutionaries. "hus both :orld=evolution and ?rganise have #ointed to the conflict between the national ca#itals of uro#e

and the US over influence in the region. *ut if this is the e+#lanation, wh% did the US hand over

to the U in a% this %ear instead of retaining a #ermanent #resence in the countr%B

ven if com#etition between :estern states was a factor in the invasion, such an e+#lanation is,in an im#ortant sense, back to front. "he ver% need for influence in the region is itself a s%m#tom

of the re3uirement of ca#ital to res#ond to #articular #roletarian struggles. "he form of the

#roletarian struggle determines the form of ca#itals develo#ment, both nationall% andinternationall%. -?#eration =estore 7o#e- might therefore be best gras#ed in terms of its global

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conte+t of class struggle and ca#italist res#onse. "o do this we must briefl% outline some of the

histor% of Somalia and the 7orn of Africa more generall%.

ORIGIN OF THE PRESENT SITUATION THE OL! "ORL! OR!ER # THE $OL!

"AR

As with most of subSaharan Africa, and indeed the "hird :orld in general, ca#ital had little

economic interest in the 7orn of Africa be%ond whatever #rimar% #roducts and raw materials

that could be found there. 8n the case of the 7orn of Africa these were few. Among the #easantand #roles, the survival of communal ties and the lack of a tradition of wage de#endence fostered

a sense of entitlements with regard to the distribution of wealth in the communit%. Communal

ties are also res#onsible for the fact that most African #roleterians fail to e+#erience ca#italslaws as naturalo r inevitable. onetari>ation and commodification of social relations have

graduall% undermined these traditional relations, but ca#ital accumulation has been confined to

narrow sectors, restricting the develo#ment of modern ca#italist social relations.

"he general shift towards cash cro#s and #lantation economies made subSaharan Africaincreasingl% unable to guarantee its own needs and thus #rone to famine. 8n the 7orn of Africa,

the local business class makes most of its mone% in the im#orte+#ort trade, which creates little

em#lo%ment and channels much wealth abroad. Ca#italintensive e+#ort agriculture hel#ed

#lunge the region into debt and soaked u# the resources land and ca#ital needed for food #roduction.

7owever, while the 7orn of Africa shared the #roblems of underdevelo#ment that have affected

subSaharan Africa generall%, it was also in a distinctive #osition. :hile of relativel% littleintrinsic economic interest, its geo#olitical location gave the region a strategic im#ortance to the

world #owers. 0irstl%, it was of close #ro+imit% to the allim#ortant oil #roduction centres of the

iddle ast. Secondl%, because it controlled the im#ortant trade route through the Sue> Canaland the =ed Sea. "he histor% of Somalia is a stor% of im#erialism and cold war rivalr%.

Histor% o& imperialist ri'alries in Somalia

Somalia was coloni>ed b% the *ritish and 8talian states in the nineteenth centur%. "o *ritain, the

Somali #orts were useful as source of meat su##lies to nearb% Aden. "he 8talian state, the last

colonial #ower in the countr%, develo#ed lucrative banana #lantations, often having to forcerecalcitrant #easants to work on them as slaves. ventuall% bananas su#erseded hides as the

countr%s main e+#ort< both these and meat remain im#ortant in Somlias foreign trade.

"he 8talian colla#se throughout ast Africa was #rimaril% the result of desertion b% their Africanconscri#t forces. 8nde#endence and unification were finall% achieved in Somalia in 19D5. 8n19D9, the arm% under Siad *arre sei>ed #ower. Siad *arre courted the USS= in an attem#t to

create a greater Somalia. :ith militar% assistance, he ho#ed to take land occu#ied b% ethnic

Somalis in thio#ia and @en%a, countering local #roletarian militanc% with an a##eal tonationalism. "he #artnershi# was an attractive one to the USS= because of the #ro+imit% of the

7orn of Africa to the oil#roducing ;ulf states and the iddle ast in general. Soviet rewards

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for having bases on Somali territor% com#rised saturating Somalia with wea#onr%. 8n turn,

Somalia, #assed the wea#ons on to #roSomali guerrillas fighting inside thio#ia.

*ut the 19EF socialist revolution in thio#ia created com#lications for the SovietSomalirelationshi#. "he USS= violated an agreement with Somalia b% su##l%ing arms to thio#ia.

*arre was alread% tr%ing to get the :est on his side when the USS= dro##ed Somalia and o#enl% befriended thio#ia in the war. "he break with the Soviet Union led to a wave of #o#ularit% for

*arres government in Somalia. *arre offered the abandoned Soviet militar% bases to the USAwho rewarded him b% flooding the countr% with even more wea#ons.

8n the 1945s, *arre remained in #ower largel% through his abilit% to #la% his enemies off against

each other. *ut in 1991, the rival clanbased o##osition fronts, whose ideologies were basedlargel% on their desire for foreign backing, collaborated against him and his government

colla#sed. 7aving defeated him and driven him out of the countr%, however, the various anti

*arre fronts fell out. "here was also schism within some of the clans. "his has led to the current

situation where there is no national #olice force and no central government and the southern

#ortion of the countr% is s#lit between rival -warlords-. ?f the most #owerful warlords, Aideed isa general, a former government minister and ambassador to 8ndia, ahdi is one of his former

clan members and organ is another general and a soninlaw of *arre.

$onse()ences o& s)perpo*er ri'alr% &or the Horn+ partic)larl% &or Somalia

"he underdevelo#ment of the 7orn of Africa was onl% e+acerbated b% the flooding of arms into

the area and b% the high de#endence of large sections of the #o#ulation on militar% em#lo%ment.

8nstead of being s#ent on develo#ing the forces of #roduction, mone% was #oured into militar%e+#enditure. Clearl%, such a #riorit% makes even economic re#roduction on the same scale

difficult if not im#ossible. 8n the earl% 19E5s, Somalia was selfsufficient in its food #roduction<

but b% the mid1945s, it was one of the most foodde#endent in Africa, and man% of its #olicieswere dictated b% the 80.

"he economic decline of Somalia was #artl% a result of the cost of the ?gaden :ar with

thio#ia. Also, *arres economic #olicies for the banana and sugar e+#ort trade were disastrous

for these industries. 7owever, these factors in the decline of Somalias econom% might be

regarded as s%m#toms of the inabilit% of ca#ital in Africa to screw 3uite as much out of the #roletariat as ca#itals in other continents were able to do< ca#ital and o#erating costs in Africa are

more than 56 higher than in Southern Asia, where the return is also greater.

8n a conte+t of s#iralling food and fuel #rices and shortages, there were riots in August 194E in

ogadishu. "hese were enough to force the government to grant a number of concessions. "heruling class were no doubt mindful that similar disturbances in similar circumstances had

heralded the thio#ian revolution in 19EF, terminating the long reign of 7aile Selassie.

"AR+ MASS STAR,ATION AN! THE $OLLAPSE OF STALINISM

-. The crisis o& Third "orld de/t

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Africa for the most #art did not benefit from the flight of ca#ital out of the :est following the

#roletarian offensive of the 19D5s and E5s. 8nstead, the continent suffered the conse3uences of

this flight. 0aced with huge debts and s#iralling interest rates and a stagnant world market inmanufactured goods, newl% industriali>ing countries such as e+ico and *ra>il had little o#tion

but to increase the #roduction and e+#ort of traditional #rimar% #roducts such as bananas, coffee,

ores etc. "his dramatic increase in the e+#ort of traditional "hird :orld #roducts forced #ricesdown in the world market. "his was catastro#hic for much of Africa, #ushing much of it to the

brink of starvation. 8n the case of Somalia, b% the end of the 19D5s, the com#etitiveness of the

countr%s leading cro# and e+#ort bananas was alread% declining relative to Gatin American #roducers such as cuador

0. $ollapse o& the Eastern 1loc

"his #light of Africa in the 1945s was made worse b% the colla#se of the USS= which meant that

there was no longer su#er#ower com#etition for influence through aid. "his was #articularl% true

of Somalia, which had been so de#endent on su#er#ower rivalr%. :ith this lack of su#er#ower

com#etition over the region, *ushs decision to invade might seem rather anachronistic. 8ndeed,it was the US, in arch 1992, which vetoed a #ro#osed monitoring o#eration b% the U

(a##arentl% because of the cost), restricting the U instead to delivering humanitarian aid. Sowh% did *ush suddenl% change his mindB "o get closer to a #ossible answer we must turn to the

general #roblems that face American ca#ital now and in the recent #ast.

!2 THE RISE OF ISLAM

-. The importance o& oil in the post -345 *orld

Since the Second :orld :ar, the car industr% has been the linch#in of ca#ital accumulation. 8t

has been the ke% industr% in the 0ordist ode of Accumulation. "he 0ordist ode ofAccumulation re#resented a com#romise between the demands of ca#ital and the needs of the

:estern #roletariat. As an a##roach to industr%, it allowed increased sur#lus value to be #roduced alongside increasing real wages. :ith 0ordism, the rate of #rofit did not have to be

sustained b% raising the rate of e+#loitation through the -su#ere+#loitation- of colonial labour,

nor b% the a##ro#riation of mono#ol% #rofits through the restriction of the domestic market.

8nstead, the rate of #rofit was sustained through the #roduction of relative sur#lusvalue and thee+#ansion of the domestic market for consumer goods. "hus, #articularl% after 19F, ca#italism

became based on mass #roduction and mass consum#tion< ca#italist cor#orations no longer

sought to restrict #roduction so as to ma+imi>e #rices but rather sought to cut #rices andma+imi>e sales (-#ile em high and sell em chea#-).

"he ra#id e+#ansion of the car industr%, the 0ordist industr% #ar e+cellence, re3uired the

e+#ansion of the coal, #ower and steel industries. *ut coal #roduction, vulnerable to the

militanc% of miners, was becoming too risk% for ca#ital as a general source of energ%. "hede#endenc% on oil for the smooth running of the car econom% develo#ed into a mad dash for the

stuff in ca#itals des#erate search for a general alternative energ% source to coal.

0. Gro*th o& oil prod)ction in the Middle East


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:ith the growth of oil #roduction in the iddle ast came the ra#id moderni>ation of social

relations in #reviousl% traditional societies. "he emergence of a national bourgeoisie with means

to establish a national strateg% of ca#ital accumulation was accom#anied b% the a##earance of anoil#roducing #roletariate. 8n the late 19E5s, #roles from e+ico to igeria to 8ran used the

higher #rice of oil to demand a better standard of living, higher wages, schools, hos#itals etc. "he

#rice of oil went u# to kee# u# with these demands. "hus much of the wealth generated b% thehigher oil #rices im#osed b% ?C went to #roletarians instead of being invested in the

industries which re3uire high levels of technolog% and energ%.

8n the "hird :orld, various socialisms and nationalisms emerged as #owerful ideologies to

mobili>e the emergent oil#roducting classes behind the #ro&ects of national accumulation (overand against that of global accumulation of :estern ca#ital). asser in g%#t, the *aathist and

Communist arties in 8ra3, ;addaf% in Gib%a and the G? are all cases in #oint. :hile

movements such as these divided the #roles and inhibited the develo#ment of autonomouse+#ressions of #roletarian militanc%, thus hel#ing ca#italingeneral, the% also threatened to some

e+tent the #articular interests of :estern ca#ital. "here was alwa%s the threat of iddle astern

countries which had ado#ted these ideologies going over to the state ca#italist astern bloc orcutting themselves off from :estern ca#ital in some other wa%, thus o#erating against the

interests of ca#italingeneral.

6. Islam &ostered as 78moderate78 alternati'e to Stalinism

As a moderni>ing #ro&ect, the ideologies of ational Accumulation had to be secular. *ut to

#eo#le in nations onl% recentl% unified and who defined themselves largel% in terms of tribal orother allegiances, nationalism alone was clearl% insufficient. 7ence, in order to mobilise

traditional sectors (#easants etc.), there was the need to reconcile secular national moderni>ation

with 8slam. 8ndeed, there is no necessar% conflict between 8slam and the interests of ca#ital.

Although the @oran #rohibits interest, there are wa%s of evading this, and ca#italistdevelo#ments have been uninhibited in man% oslem countries. "he religion was therefore

#romoted b% #ro:estern conservative regimes as a safe alternative to stalinism, to #revent #o#ular su##ort for radical nationalist ideologies and to divert the class struggle. 0or e+am#le,

8srael #romoted 7i>bullah in the ;a>a stri#, ;eneral Hia #romoted 8slam in akistan, the US

su##orted moslem fighters against the Sovietbacked regime in Afganistan, and the religion is

still used effectivel% in Saudi Arabia.

4. The polic% /ac9&ires

8n man% cases, however, 8slamic fundamentalism is getting out of control as far as :estern

ca#ital is concerned. 8slamic #ractices threaten to cut off large areas from the world market, &ust

as stalinism threatened to do. ara#hrasing (and reversing) "ronti, while it is true that ca#italma% sometimes ob&ectivel% force the #roletariat into certain choices, it is also true that the

#roletariat makes these choices work against ca#ital.

"he first sign that the #olic% of using 8slam to guarantee national ca#ital accumulation and a

#lace in the world market had backfired was the 8ranian revolution. "he revolution was s#arked b% oil strikes and the #roletarian sei>ure of the oil wells< it was the #roletariat who destro%ed the

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Shahs regime. "he mullahs managed to recu#erate and su##ress this, however, and channel it

into a form of 8slamic fundamentalism that went far be%ond the intentions of :estern #u##ets

such as the Shah.

:ith the colla#se of stalinism as an embodied ideal and a #otential #atron, and with the

discrediting of Arab nationalism, 8slamic fundamentalism has emerged as the #otentialre#lacement ideolog%. 8slam has historicall% been a religion of resistance and inde#endence for

much of the worlds #o#ulation. 0undamentalism has been #osited b% followers as the trueo##osition to (:estern) Christianit% and, b% e+tension, as an alternative to democrac% and

ca#italism. 8slam is a more worldl%, materialistic religion than Christianit%, and easil% acce#ts a

role as a #olitical force. Communalistic and egalitarian #rece#ts to acce#t res#onsibilities torelatives and to fellow moslems (regarded as forming a single -nation-) can ham#er ca#ital

accumulation. All these factors make 8slamic fundamentalism both a likel% substitute for

stalinism for both the o##ressed "hird :orld #roletariat, who have little ho#e of overthrowingworld ca#italism b% themselves, and the US bourgeoisie, which might re3uire an e+ternal enem%

in order to unif% itself. Gike stalinism, the ideolog% of the -e+#ort of the revolution- so feared

b% :estern ca#ital sim#l% serves to consolidate counterrevolution at home.

E2 THE THREAT OF ISLAM

-. The ne* threat

*ut the #erceived threat to the interests of :estern ca#ital is both real and illusor%. "he threat is

real in that 8slam is indeed a #owerful means of mobili>ing the #oor against the interests of

:estern ca#ital. vidence for this real threat comes from the increasing damage caused to thefunctioning of the Algerian and g%n#tian economies b% fundamentalist movements and terrorist

grou#s. *ut the danger is e+aggerated to #rovide a necessar% e+ternal threat through which to

mobili>e the American bourgeoisie.

8n the #ast, the American bougeoisie was mobili>ed b% the stalinist threat. 0aced b% the threat ofstalinism, militar% e+#enditure became a surrogate industruial #olic%. "his surrogate industrial

#olic% became #articularl% im#ortant with the relative decline of the US as an economic #ower

and the need for restructring to meet com#etition from Ia#an and the acific =im. 8n contrast

with #revious administrations, =eagan abandoned all ho#e of defending the generalcom#etitiveness of American industr%. "he #olic% of com#etitive devaluation of the dollar was

dro##ed< interest rates were #ushed u# to finance the growing budget, and trade deficits and the

dollar were allowed to soar. Garge swathes of the rustbelt industries in the orth astern stateswere devastated. Under the guise of national securit%, state investment was able to circumvent

the vested interests of the old industries and find its wa% to the more d%namic leading edge of

#roductive Ameican ca#ital. S$8 (-Star wars-) is the most well known e+am#le of this.Although militaril% #re#osterous, it allowed ca#ital to be shifted from rocket technolog% and the

aeros#ace induistr% to the com#uter software and electronics industries. 8ndeed, S$8 re#resented

a massive state subsid% for these leading edge industries at a critical stage in their battle with 0arast com#etitors. ore than this, however, =eagan also managed to reorientate the world

accumulation of ca#ital around American militar% #roduction. :ith more and more American

mainstream industries falling behind to foreignbased com#etition, the American consumer could

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no longer be relied u#on to bu% American. 7owever, militar% demand came fromthe goverment

which could bias its s#ecifications in favour of Americanbased ca#ital. "hrough large militar%

e+#enditures, the centre of gravit% of the world accumulation of ca#ital would shift towardsmilitar% #roduction where Americanbased ca#ital would have a com#etitive advantage. 8n this

wa%, the US could reassert its economic hegemon%.

*ut this use of militar% e+#enditure as a surrogate industrial #olic%, overriding #articular interests

in favour of general US interests in the name of ational Securit%, has been in crisis since thecolla#se of the astern *loc and the mounting budget deficits. 8t is no longer sustainable. 7ence,

American ca#ital might be argued to be facing two choices. -Strateg% A- entails renewing the

#olic% of militar% accumulation as a surrogate economic #olic% b% raising the s#ectre of 8slamicfundamentalism. -Strateg% *- would be to intervene directl% in the econom% with mone%

financed through defence cuts.

0. 1)sh:s /elated in'asion

"his brings us directl% back to the m%ster% of *ushs belated invasion of Somalia. :e canconclude b% asking two 3uestions regarding the manoeuvre. rom#ted b% the growing threat of

8slamic fundamentalism in the 7orn of Africa and orth Africa generall%, was the invasion an

attem#t to bounce Clinton into -strateg% A- on behalf of the militar%Jindustrial faction of US

ca#italB And, even if this is not the case, how far did the invasion address the real #roblems for:estern ca#ital of 8slamic e+#ansion in the areaB "he answer to the latter 3uestion ma% become

clearer in the coming months.

Footnotes

:orld =evolution (1D1< 0ebruar% 199!) suggested as one of the two main ob&ectives of the

militar% de#lo%ment the USAs wish -to signal to its two main im#erialist rivals ;erman% and0rance in the first #lace that the US will not hold back an% longer from an%where in the world.-

(#. F).

?rganise (!5< A#rilIune 199!) commented' -"his forward cam# for the USA on the astAfrican coast can allow it to intervene against the interests of the 0rench (or uro#ean) ruling

class. 8t could intervene in Chad, in Haire, throughout orth Africa where 0rench interests are

under threat, in #articular in Algeria.- (#. D). 7owever, the article also #oints to the function ofthe o#eration of countering the menace of 8slamic fundamentalism.

See for e+am#le S%lvia ankhurst (191) +8talian Somaliland. Gondon' :atts K Co.

8t is im#ortant to note in regard to this that the debt crisis suited man% African dictators as much

as :estern ca#italists< maintaining the constraints im#osed b% debt can be a wa% of maintaining

internal order in African countries.

80 Surve%s of African conomies. Lolume 2 (19D9). :ashington.

See Aufheben 1, #age 19, footnote !4.

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See the idnight otes #am#hlet :hen Crusaders and Assassins Unite, Get the eo#le *eware

(1995)

Clearl%, ca#ital is not a unitar% force, and #articular -moderni>ing- ca#itals have on occasion been able to use "hird :orld nationalism against rival ca#itals. "hus, in 19D, the US effectivel%

sided with the nationalist government of g%#t b% refusing to su##ort 0rench and *ritishintervention to #rotect the latters -ownershi#- of the Sue> canal.

:e can infer from the call b% ;adaffi in a% this %ear that all fundamnetalists should be kiledwithout trial that this idelog%t is getting be%ond the control of the islamicsocialists and is

threatening them too.

htt#'JJlibcom.orgJlibrar%Jsomaliaislamicthreatca#italaufheben2

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Somalia and the Islamic Threat to Capital