Consultation Report No. 1

Socio-Economic Implications of the Alternative Constitutional Frameworks

of Settlement in the Sudan

The Sudan Peace-Building Programme

African Renaissance Institute (ARI)

&

Relationships Foundational International (RFI)

Vaalwater, South Africa

January 2001

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Table of Contents

The Summary Discussion Notes included in this document were compiled under the Chatham House Rule. They do not reflect the opinions of anyone participant but are drawn from the range of views expressed, nor do they necessarily reflect the views of the secretariat.

Part Page Table of Contents 1 Summary of the First Consultation 3 Letter from Professor Yusuf Fadl Hasan on Behalf of Sudanese Participants 5 List of Sudanese Participants Attending the First Consultation in their Private Capacity 7 Background Papers to the First Consultation and Summary Ensuing Discussion 9

1. The dividends of peace: the potential for economic development of the Sudan when peace is achieved 9

a. Paper presented by Professor John Mellor 9

b. Summary of discussion 15

2. Alternative constitutional frameworks of settlement in the Sudan 17

a. Paper introduced by Dr. Edward A. Christow 17 b. Summary of discussion 36

3. Technical issues which need to be addressed to achieve a

constitutional settlement: outline discussion of water rights and allocations 40

a. Paper introduced by Dr. Michael Schluter on behalf of Professors Deryke and Roger Belshaw 40

b. Summary of discussion 46

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4. Technical issues which need to be addressed to achieve a constitutional settlement: outline discussion of the oil sector 48

a. Paper introduced by Dr. Edward A. Christow 48

b. Summary of discussion 50

Notes on the Way Forward for the Sudan Peace-Building Programme 52 Appendices 1. Background to the African Renaissance Institute (ARI) 53 2. Background to the Relationships Foundation International (RFI) 55

3. Notes on the Values Promoted by the Relationships Foundation from the talk given by Dr. Michael Schluter at the Consultation 58

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Summary of the First Consultation

“Our two and half days of preliminary discussion has established a firm foundation on which we can build mutual confidence. Indeed the background papers and the wise statesmanship and the neutral and objective stand that you have taken gave us the courage to speak our minds freely, enumerate grievances and venture to suggest possible solutions.”

Letter from Professor Yusuf Fadl Hasan on Behalf of Sudanese Participants Participants and Venue of the first Consultation The completion of the first consultation, which took place in South Africa from 22 through 25 January 2001, brought to fruition the background research, fundraising and preparations of the past 18 months. The first consultation brought together 14 Sudanese participants with links to the leaders and their respective constituencies, and 8 international facilitators, who attended the first consultation in their personal capacities. The Sudanese participants came from the following constituencies in the Sudan: Beja Congress, Civil Society, Democratic Unionist Party, Federal Alliance, National Congress, National Democratic Alliance, Women Groups, Sudan African National Union, Sudan Communist Party, Southern Front, Sudan Human Rights Group, Sudan Law Society, Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement, Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement-United, Sudan Trade Unions, Umma Party and Union of Sudan African Parties. Areas Covered by the First Consultation a. Introduction of participants to the Sudan Peace-Building Programme Introduction to the background, purpose and modus operandi of the Sudan Peace-Building Programme, the background of the African Renaissance Institute and the relational thinking which informs the work of the Relationships Foundation, the parent body of the Relationships Foundation International.

b. Participant introductions Each participant gave a brief personal history of themselves and their current work.

c. Recent developments in the Sudan and the Horn of Africa There was a discussion of the position of the country highlighting the need for settlement in the Sudan. d. Exploration of the peace dividends for the Sudan. An overview of the Sudan economic growth potential available from cessation of hostilities. The paper, presented by Professor John Mellor, considered the major sectors of the Sudanese economy and constructed a strategy for economic growth, which was driven by growth in the agricultural and oil sectors.

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e. Alternative constitutional frameworks for the Sudan Dr. Edward A. Christow provided a survey of alternative constitutional models for settlement in the Sudan. Each model was assessed in the light of shared principles of relationship, impact on the respective stakeholders, practical feasibility and their respective, socio-economic and political implications. It was decided to look further into Federalism and Self-determination, as well as the issue of State and Religion.

f. Technical issues which need to be addressed to achieve a constitutional

settlement: Water and Oil Dr. Michael Schluter and Dr. Edward A. Christow initiated discussions on the Water Rights and Allocations and the Oil Sector respectively. Dr. Michael Schluter provided an overview of Sudan’s main water options, including irrigation potential in light of food security concerns and commercial agriculture potential. This paper was provided by Professors Deryke and Roger Belshaw. Dr. Edward A. Christow, provided an overview of the oil sector, and examined the issues which need to be addressed if there is to be a constitutional settlement, including ownership and control of industry sector assets, revenue sharing options and environmental impact assessment procedures and funding. The Sudan Participants agreed that these two topics should be dealt with in greater detail during the next two consultations. This was followed by a discussion of other issues, which the participants believed needed to be addressed as priorities to achieve a constitutional settlement.

g. The way forward for the programme The Sudanese participants were presented with eleven possible topics for future consultations. The participants were invited to consider other topics they would like to discuss together and they were asked to comment on:

1. What other topics they would like to discuss 2. Which topics they would like to discuss for the first two sessions 3. What should be the length of each consultation 4. How many topics should each consultation cover 5. How many consultations they would like to have per year 6. Where they would like to meet during the next two consultations

After thorough discussion on the way forward for the Sudan Peace-Building Programme, the participants agreed to hold three consultations per year, each four days long, each covering one socio-economic issue and one political issue. The second consultation will take place in the UK from 21 to 25 May 2001 and look into (1) Water Issues and Agriculture, and (2) Federalism and Self-determination. The third consultation will take place in South Africa from 10 to 14 September 2001 and look into (1) Oil and (2) Religion and the State.

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Letter from Professor Yusuf Fadl Hasan on Behalf of Sudanese Participants Professor Washington Okumu Viscount Crispin Brentford Dr Michael Schluter Members of the Secretariat of the Sudan Consultation Forum Colleagues and Members of the Forum Sirs My colleagues, members of the Forum, have given me the great honour of saying a few words at the end of this fruitful meeting. May I, on their behalf, thank most sincerely the organisers, the African Renaissance Institute and the Relationships Foundation International, for having taken the initiative to invite us to discuss the North-South Conflict and help in resolving it. We all as Sudanese appreciate your serious endeavour to resolve this issue and help in suggesting ways and means of bringing peace and prosperity to the Sudan. We commend your concern and humbly acknowledge the low-key approach with which you have initiated the Sudan Consultation Programme, without publicity or pressure from the media. No doubt the vast experience of the Institute and that of the Foundation, with which it had handled similar intricate issues, will bring our deliberations, in shâ’ Allah, to a happy ending where wisdom and hopeful vision will prevail. Sirs, our two and half days preliminary discussion has established a firm foundation on which we can build mutual confidence. Indeed the background papers and the wise statesmanship and the neutral and objective stand that you have taken gave us the courage to speak our minds freely, enumerate grievances and venture to suggest possible solutions. We thank you for the great trouble that you have taken to make our first meeting a possibility; we thank you for the great honour you have bestowed on us as participants to shoulder with you this grave responsibility that affects the future of our country. Most of us assembled here today have a clear appreciation of the gravity of the issue. We have benefited not only from the technical information, the papers that were presented and the frank interventions, but also from the many friendly and sincere discussions that took place outside the beautiful meeting hall. The informal mutual talks were a strong stimulant to creating bridges of reciprocal trust and confidence. We promise to follow the good example you have set during the meetings, by undertaking our homework seriously to prepare ourselves for the future meetings; we will be frank and will try our utmost to be flexible, and appreciative of the other points of view.

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Thank you for affording us this golden opportunity to discuss this complex issue. We are indeed grateful and appreciate very much your generous attitude in allowing us to share your vast experience and for putting the whole programme in gear. We hope our consultations will help in delivering a comprehensive peace. Thank you Professor Yusuf Fadl Hasan January 2001

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List of Sudanese Participants Attending the First Consultation in their Private Capacity

The following Sudanese and international participants attended the first conference of the Sudan Peace-Building Programme1, which took place from 22 through 27 January 2001 in Vaalwater, South Africa. Sudanese Participants 1. Professor Yusuf Fadl Hasan 2. Ms. Ester Koko Rahal 3. Dr. Hassan Makki Mohammed Ahmed 4. Ms. Amira Yusif Adam Haroun 5. Professor Farouk Mohammed Kadouda 6. Mr. John Luk Jok 7. Ms. Rebecca J. Okwaci 8. Mr. Monyluak Alor Kuol 9. Mr. Abdon Agau 10. Mr. Osman A. Karain Solma 11. Mr. Salih Hussein Jackin 12. Professor Hamad Bagadi 13. Col. Dominic Dim Deng 14. Dr. Sayed el-Khateeb Apologies 1. Dr. Fadil Shibeika 2. Chief Mario Malok Lual 3. Umda Abdel Ghalil Baker 4. Ms. Mary Ayat Unguec The above mentioned Sudanese participants who have attended the first consultation in their personal capacities come from the following constituencies and regions in the Sudan: Regions 1. Bahr el- Ghazal 2. Central 3. Darfur 4. Eastern 5. Equatoria 6. Khartoum 7. Kordofan

1 The Sudan Peace-Building Programme process is a partnership between the African Renaissance Institute (ARI) and the Relationships Foundation International (RFI).

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8. Northern 9. Nuba Mountains 10. Upper Nile Constituencies 1. Beja Congress 2. Christian 3. Civil Society 4. Democratic Unionist Party 5. Federal Alliance 6. Moslem 7. National Congress 8. National Democratic Alliance 9. Women Groups 10. Sudan African National Union 11. Sudan Communist Party 12. Southern Front 13. Sudan Human Rights Group 14. Sudan Law Society 15. Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement 16. Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement-United 17. Sudan Trade Unions 18. Umma Party 19. Union of Sudan African Parties, International Participants 1. Professor Washington Okumu Chairman 2. Viscount Brentford Co-Chairman 3. Professor John Mellor International Consultant 4. Dr. Michael Schluter Research Director 5. Dr. Jeremy Ive Executive Director 6. Dr. Edward A. Christow Executive Secretary 7. Miss Catherine J. Bromwich Assistant-Executive Secretary 8. Mr. Alphonso Soliman Arabic Interpreter and Translator

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Background Papers to the First Consultation and Summary Ensuing Discussion

1. The dividends of peace: the potential for economic development of the Sudan when peace is achieved

a. Paper presented by Professor John Mellor, Abt Associates, Inc.

John W. Mellor, currently vice-president of Abt Associates, Inc, was formerly the founding Director of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Chief Economist of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and for many years Professor of Economics, Agricultural Economics, and Asian Studies at Cornell University. He is the recipient of the Wihuri Prize (Finland) and the Presidential Award (The White House, USA) for his work in alleviating hunger and of many prizes for the originality and quality of his research in economic development. Sudan is blessed with a wealth of resources for achieving rapid economic growth. These include oil revenues and foreign investment potentials for capital, human resources, and rich soils and water. However to realise the potentials in those resources the capital must be invested in integrating infrastructure and in developing the human resources, and the land and water need to be developed to provide ample income and employment and assist in transforming the economy into a balanced structure of agriculture, industry and services. Realising these potentials is not possible without good, stable governance for which peace is a necessary condition. The nature of the peace dividend also determines the optimal form of governance and relations among regions. The most rapid economic growth and hence the largest peace dividend will be achieved with close economic integration of the diverse parts of the country. Oil for Development The revenue from oil gives Sudan great flexibility in development investment. Well spent oil revenues will attract additional foreign private investment and foreign aid. Given the potentials oil offers, it is surprising that a country can be worse off with oil than without it. The oil exports result in a currency valuation that prices other exports out of the market, setting back development in other areas of potential efficiency. Oil provides very few jobs in itself, so the net effect may be a low level of job creation and a narrow base of participation in growth. It is only through sound investment of oil revenues in the development of other sectors that the benefits materialise. Indonesia used its oil revenues to invest in rural infrastructure, bringing income to the mass of people, to invest in human capital, raising incomes, and prevented its currency from becoming overvalued. Nigeria exemplifies being worse off from oil - overvalued exchange rate, no rural investment, little investment in human capital. Until recently, only a very few benefited from Nigeria's oil wealth.

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Sudan, because of its highly productive agricultural resources offers unusual opportunity for investment of oil revenues as well as foreign resource flows to provide rapid growth in employment throughout the country, and hence broad participation in growth. Investment in People If there is to be broad participation in development and an end to poverty, resources must be invested in people. Investment to create jobs must go hand in hand with investment in education and improved health. Investment to create jobs must begin where the bulk of the people are located, building strong, high employment market towns. The engine of such growth is agriculture, which provides not only agricultural output and direct employment, but far more important, it provides the income to support expansion of rural and small town non-farm production of goods and services. These non-farm jobs are far more labour intensive than any type of manufacturing or export product growth. Indeed, for each additional job created in agriculture an additional two jobs are created in non-farm rural and small town occupations. With increased commercialisation the ratio of off-farm to farm jobs increases to three to one. We now have statistical evidence from many countries over substantial periods of time that it is rural and agricultural growth that drives employment increase and poverty reduction. It is the stimulus of agricultural incomes to rural and small town production and employment that explains this relation. Urban and manufacturing growth do little to reduce even urban poverty. That is because urban poverty is a function of the difference between urban and rural incomes. Poverty is most rapidly closed by reducing that income gap. The importance of agricultural incomes to growth can be readily understood by observing the large impact of cyclical behaviour of weather. In good crop years the town prosper. In poor crop years they do very poorly. In each case employed moves with income. What accelerated agricultural growth rates do is to provide the same effect as steadily improving weather, year after year. This effect comes not from weather, but improved technology steadily raising crop yields and improved markets for higher value commodities. Sudan has rich agricultural resources that are now grossly underutilised. Proper utilisation will provide accelerated agricultural growth with its powerful multipliers on poverty reduction. In the north, lack of investment in agriculture has seen highly productive irrigation resources either stagnate or even decline in productivity. Peace will bring the resources to once again invest in these highly productive resources. In the south the potential for moving beyond minimum subsistence agriculture has never been realised, despite the abundance of water resources and the rich soils. The peace dividend will be immense in these regions, with strong multipliers other parts of the country. As employment growth expands in agriculture and in the market towns, the demand for educated people will rise disproportionately rapidly. That will provide a high rate of return to improved education and health. That not only justifies the public investment in those public services, but families will want their children educated to take advantage of

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he jobs for persons with primary and increasingly for secondary education. School drop out rates will decline. Developing High Value Agriculture If agriculture is to be the engine driving market town employment, it must increase output more rapidly than population growth so that incomes per capita rise. Modestly improved subsistence agriculture is not enough. Agriculture must be commercialised. In general, that requires emphasising high value commodities - for example, horticulture, livestock, coffee, and tea. Of course, the most efficient agriculture is one in which the basic labour unit is the family, and where capital is expensive that will be a small farm thus; throughout this exposition the emphasis is on increasing the productivity of small farmer agriculture. Thus, in the already intensively irrigated areas, for example, the Gezira, what is needed is substantial investment in improvement and rehabilitation of irrigation schemes, investment in physical infrastructure to provide access to foreign markets for high value horticulture and along with that import policies that will reduce transaction costs at ports and imports, and for rapid low cost transport to high income markets. The objective is large increases in incomes of farmers. The expenditure of that additional income will result in rapid expansion of provision of market town and village services for house improvements, furniture, tailoring and a wide variety of services. The market towns will become vibrant commercial centres. That will reduce the concentration of urban population in Khartoum and provide a healthier development pattern with wide participation. In the south, the first emphasis will no doubt provide increased subsistence farming incomes. However, for rapid increase in incomes, intensification must carry incomes rapidly beyond improved subsistence. In much of the south the abundance of land would allow large increases in income from cereals production. That will require massive investment in physical infrastructure to provide low cost transport to the Red Sea and hence export to the Middle East. River transport will need improvement as well as the full grid of all weather feeder roads. A full grid of telephone communications is also essential to a commercial agriculture. Starting with the low level of infrastructure in Sudan at present that calls for massive investment. However, that investment will reach large populations. Again, the result of such development will be rapid growth in farm incomes, expenditure of those incomes largely in the villages and market towns and rapid growth in employment in those localities. Wide participation in growth will occur with increased employment and soon rising real wages. Sudan is more than the northern irrigated areas and the south. Each area has its own comparative advantage. For example highland areas have potential in coffee, specialty horticulture, and other niche crops. Again, the objective must be to provide large increases in income. That requires large infrastructure investment, and technical

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assistance in the growing and marketing of high value commodities. The benefit is broad participation in development through widespread increase in employment and a dispersed pattern of urbanisation in many rapidly growing market towns, rather than a concentration in Khartoum alone. Development of a high income, geographically dispersed commercial agriculture requires focussed attention by government. Government policy must be favourable to development of the private sector which is the most efficient provider of the key services required by a commercial smallholder agriculture. The facilitative role of government will include monitoring critical functions to see that the private sector is performing them and taking necessary actions to assist the private sector where that is essential. There must be access to rapidly changing technology, requiring a national system of agricultural research, tuned to each major region and its few key commodities and serving as a link to global research systems in both the private and public sectors. And, of course massive investment in physical infrastructure is required. Because the role of government is vital to small farmer agriculture, care must be used to see that only the essential activities are performed by government so that the limited potential will not be lost in a range of less essential activities better performed by the private sector. Nation Building Benefits of an Agriculture Driven Strategy Using Sudan's immense, widely dispersed agricultural potentials as the basic engine of growth brings faster over-all growth and more rapid transformation of the economy to a modern mix of agriculture, industry and services. The market town enterprises initially stimulated by agricultural incomes will gradually take on a life of their own, exporting elsewhere in Sudan and eventually to overseas markets. Those enterprises will grow rapidly and the relative weight in the economy will increase. Each region will develop centres of commercial activity and Khartoum, which is already a financial and commercial centre will grow rapidly to service the regional centres and its scale economies would facilitate growth in specialised export industries. Thus, each region of Sudan would be strengthened by the others and Khartoum would grow far more as a servicing centre for these regions than in an alternate model. The alternative model, of growth in non-agricultural exports, would centre in Khartoum because of the scale economies for export industries in a larger town. Competition in such exports with other countries that started earlier would be intense. And, the rest of Sudan would languish with the concentration of population in Khartoum pressing hard against its resource base. Because mobilising resources throughout the nation gives much more total growth than the export model centred in Khartoum, Khartoum would likely grow faster, but in the context of rapid growth in the outlying urban centres as well.

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The high value agriculture strategy of course has an important export component. Thus, favourable macro policies would be just as necessary as for the non-agricultural export model. It would be important that goods, services, and finances move freely from one part of the country to another. In a globalising economy small entities facing multiple barriers to movements of goods, and services and finances are at a great disadvantage. Conversely, the more integrated each region is with each other region the better its prospects for high value agricultural production and exports. The geographically dispersed use of the agricultural engine for pushing rapid growth would require far larger investment in physical infrastructure than a strategy simply concentrated in the capital city. That investment would serve to integrate the many parts of the country. That is where oil revenues and foreign resource flows become important. The returns to economic growth would be high, but the initial investment is substantial. Again, one needs full economic integration to justify such enormous investments in physical infrastructure. Food Security Food Security is a particular concern, particularly in the south where food insecurity has been a recurring phenomena. The strategy of commercialising small farms, raising their incomes and integrating them with the market towns and the global economy is favourable to food security. Most farmers will continue for some time to question the efficiency of markets for providing their basic food supplies. Hence as they increase the importance of crops and livestock for sale they will increase the productivity of food crop production. That will be a direct contribution to food security. But, far more important, as their incomes rise well beyond minimum subsistence they will be able to sustain a poor crop year or other misfortune which reduces income substantially without dropping below minimum subsistence. Food security also requires the ability to move food supplies in and out a region according to the impact of weather on production and that requires the same physical infrastructure as a commercialising agriculture. Indeed, without commercial sales it will be difficult to pay for and maintain the physical infrastructure required for food security. Thus, food security does require some improvement in water control and production of the basic food staples. But, food security requires going beyond that to producing a surplus that provides a margin of safety when income declines. Keys to Success Success in broad based development that includes the bulk of the population must occur initially where those people are located. Such a strategy uses agriculture as the basic engine of growth. Expenditure of increased agricultural incomes provide the stimulus to rapid growth in village and market town employment.

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For Sudan, this strategy requires productive investment of oil revenues in rapid, geographically widespread physical infrastructure. That will give each region the basis for a strong agriculture led growth strategy. It will be economically sound and will integrate the nation. Commitment to such a strategy will be attractive to foreign investment and foreign aid, allowing even more rapid development of physical infrastructure. Stipulation of such regionally dispersed infrastructure investment from oil revenues would be an overt means of ensuring rapid development rather than simply dividing oil revenues amongst regions. Given the particularly low level of development of infrastructure in the south, that region would in an economically rational allocation receive a high initial share of such investment. However, Khartoum would in particular be a beneficiary of such investment because of its accelerated development as a financial and service centre for the regional centres. There must also be explicit attention to the needs of a smallholder agriculture. That includes fostering a vigorous private sector, but also public investment in agricultural technology generation and dissemination. It also includes monitoring the requirements of agricultural growth to be sure all the needs are met. The result of such attention will be fast, equitable growth, geographically dispersed, but integrated nationally and internationally. Each region will benefit from its own growth while obtaining complementary benefits from the growth of other regions. Such a pattern of growth benefits immensely from full integration both internally and with the global economy.

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b. Summary of Discussion

Professor John Mellor’s presentation outlined the peace dividends to the Sudanese people and stressed that agriculture could become engine for employment growth. In response, the participants made a number of interesting points and comments:

1. Despite the Ministry of Finance claim that the Sudanese economy grew up by 7.2 percent in the last year, twice the average of Least Industrialised Countries, the rate of growth in the country was below zero. For example, using Ministry of Finance figures, the agricultural sector in the country declined by 4.8 percent and according to the Sudanese Association of Businesses, sixty percent of the private businesses had to close down whilst the remaining forty percent had been operating below capacity. Sudan has a great potential. The current challenge is how to employ it? To employ it we need good governance in the Sudan whilst checking the spread of corruption. Many experts are not happy about the discovery of oil and stressed that its discovery has generated more political than economic weight. IMF is trying to dictate how we should spend our oil revenue. This is not only politically destabilising but also constitutes a challenge to Sudan’s sovereignty. In the Sudan there is a huge potential to develop the cotton industry whose return could be twice as much as oil. However, this can only be achieved if the government does not neglect the agricultural sector.

2. The Sudanese economy should be accessible to all people within the country and

should not create “invisible citizens” who are excluded from participating in the economic life of the country. Concurrently, the World Bank should not give Africans the rope with which to hang themselves and should not support corrupt dictators because it owes the continent a duty of care.

3. Our country has a vast agricultural potential, which needs to be studied. We

should realise the positive benefits from agriculture whilst accommodating and reversing the changing social patterns which have to be addressed. For example, consumption patterns in urban areas have changed and people have begun to eat less sorghum, and as a result agricultural renaissance needs to take into account these factors. In addition to crop agriculture, it should be pointed out that development of the animal husbandry industry could contribute more to the development of the country than many other sectors. This could be augmented through such programs as the Jonglei canal which will release some of the resources which are required for the development of the cattle industry.

4. This paper has generated two inter-linked questions. Firstly, is the Government of

Sudan (GOS) in a position to accept advice from those who know, and implement it? And secondly, can this advice be implemented under the current conditions, and is the GOS willing to create these conditions?

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5. How do we improve the quality of life in rural areas? Does Sudan really have such a great potential? Although there has been some improvement in the infrastructure in some parts of the country, so far agricultural potential in the country has not been realised. One such example is the Gezira scheme which deteriorated owning to lack of investment and bad management.

6. Today, there are 26 universities in the Sudan. In the last twenty years the

university population has grown from 5,000 to 45,000. We see a similar pattern both in primary and secondary education. Although the number of university students has increased the quality of education has declined over the years. The education of many professionals had been wasted, as they could not apply their knowledge to the areas of their specialisation.

7. How did Sudan miss the opportunity for economic development? How did

Sudan’s economy survive through two civil wars?

8. Given the fact that the country has been devastated by two civil wars we should ask ourselves two things. What can be done while the war is going on? What can be done for peace to be achieved? In this sense, we should take time for peace to be achieved.

9. Oil has become a disincentive for peace because it is a source of income and will

be spent on the continuation of the war.

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2. Alternative constitutional frameworks of settlement in the Sudan

a. Paper introduced by Dr. Edward A. Christow A. A Relational Introduction. This paper seeks not only to facilitate an exploratory consultation process between the whole range of Sudanese participants, in their personal capacities, but also to articulate a shared framework of thinking on a number of socio-economic issues. It aims to articulate mutual understanding among the Sudanese people. It is underpinned by a relational worldview that seeks to promote and nurture a shared vision for the future of the Sudan through which good and healthy relationships will grow and develop to the benefit of the communities and individuals.2 This relational vision could be seen as one of sphere sovereignty, where no one institution or section of the country can appropriate to itself the sole control of the levers of power or the exercise of authority. Both the Moslems and Christians recognise that all power and authority needs to be seen as deriving properly from God alone, and as such, needs to be exercised in a way which is appropriate to each institution concerned. The proposed relational vision could also rest on the notion of vocation, which is not to be understood in individualist terms, but rather needs to be exercised through relationships. This is very different, on the one hand, from the liberal, individualist approach, which starts from the notion of political players as self-sufficient individuals. It is also very different, on the other hand, from the collectivist approach, in which society as a whole is seen as the validator of the diversity of social institutions, and actors seen simply as parts of the whole. The whole and varied range of relationships take their direction, meaning and potential from the covenant with God; in this area also there is a high degree of overlapping and understanding between Muslims and Christians. Consequently, it could be that as the Sudanese see their country in the light of this covenant, true social harmony can be established without perpetuating war. Negatively, the covenant restrains the overarching power of any one group or institution. Positively, it points the way forward, offering the possibility of true harmony and unity in diversity - harmony not imposed externally or internally, but proceeding from a proper and positive exercise of responsibility. This is because, from a relational perspective, responsibility is always exercised not as domination but as service, which properly results in benefits to all the people and the development of the country as a whole.

2 Schluter, Michael and Lee, David. 1993. The R Factor, Hodder & Stoughton, London.

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B. Self-determination This section will attempt to define the term self-determination and explore the definitions of the ‘self’ and ‘colonial’, as well as its goals, mechanisms and timing. In addition this section will attempt to deal with the questions of viability and ‘balkanisation’, and the contradictions between self-determination and other international norms and principles. 1. Definition

Like many other terms, self-determination is open to many and conflicting interpretations. In its most basic form, self-determination may be understood as the rearrangement of the territorial order so as to make allowances for the aspirations of the people. In this regard, we can speak of two forms of self-determination: external self-determination - the right of every people to choose the sovereignty under which they live; and internal self-determination - the right of every people to select their own form of government.3

2. What is the ‘self’?

Self-determination assumes the presence of a ‘self’ which has legal personality (i.e. the rights and duties enforceable at law) that would entitle it to claim this right on behalf of the people it claims to represent. The UN Charter declares that “all peoples have the right to national self-determination”, but who is to decide what a ‘people’ is and who are ‘all’? One may say that the nation, or people, has to be a ‘distinct self’ but who and how is going to determine what is distinct? Legal experts agree that “the determination of which ‘self’ is entitled to determine ‘what’ and ‘how’ remains the central question.”4

In many cases, different selves will clash because they will emerge through a process of differentiation which leads to the formation of a political unit with distinct characteristics that set it aside from the others. In Africa the most common selves are the colonial, the ethno-cultural, or the historic state, the natural geographic unit, the communal unit or a combination of the two. For example the ‘self’ can encompass the territory of the former colony in its colonial boundaries, it can incorporate a number of ethno-cultural elements or traits that bind a group of

3 Brownlie, Ian. 1998, Principles of Public International Law, fifth edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Shaw, Malcolm M. 1997, International Law, fourth edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 4 Nueberger, Benyamin. 1986, National Self-determination in Postcolonial Africa, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, Boulder, Colorado, p. 19. Benedict Anderson has associated the self with the concept of the nation and has defined the latter as “an imagined political community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion...The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them...has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations...It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-oriented, hierarchical dynastic realm...it is imagined as community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always, conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.” Anderson, Benedict. 1991, Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, Verso, London, pp. 6-7.

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people together, or it can be determined by the geography or the historical personalities linking the present to the past. It should be pointed out that “the definition of the ‘self’ is not only space and group bound; it is also time bound.”5

3. Means of Self-determination

There are different ways of ascertaining the wishes of the population, but the most common means include: plebiscites, decisions by governments, general elections, parliamentary votes and reports by investigation commissions.

4. Does Self-determination Conflict with other International Principles?

In Africa, as in other continents, the principle of self-determination has frequently clashed with other international norms and values thereby giving rise to a conflict of laws. The most important laws which collide with the principle of self-determination are the territorial integrity of states, the states’ right to self-defence, the peaceful resolution of conflict, non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, and international peace and security. In international law these conflicts of laws are dealt with through a number of legal and political processes taking into account the prevailing circumstances in each case.6

5. Alternative Constitutional Frameworks of Settlements

Although self-determination is most commonly associated with independence and partition, it may be embedded in other constitutional alternatives depending on how the words ‘self-determination’ are interpreted and applied. Specifically, the goal of self-determination may be associated with any of the following five forms of political association and organisation: Centralism/ Unitary, Controlled Decentralisation, Federation, Confederation and Partition/Secession.7

5 Ibid., p.58. 6 Morris, J.H.C., ed. 1980. The Conflict of Laws, Volumes 1 and 2, Stevens & Sons Limited, London. 7 Ray, James Lee. 1992. Global Politics, fifth edition, Houghton Mifflin Company, Princeton.

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C. Possible Alternative Constitutional Frameworks for Settlement in the Sudan This section aims to evaluate the viability and prospects of five possible alternative settlements in Sudan, each of which could hypothetically accommodate the demands and desires of the Sudanese people (or at least some sections of the country). This will be accomplished in two parts. This first part will offer a brief description of the envisaged frontiers of the polity along with its corresponding and ‘imagined’ political, economic and social systems. The second part will evaluate the feasibility of each option and examine the perceived hopes and fears of each side. These options need not be sharply distinct, absolute, monolithic or unchanging, but are offered to clarify and focus thinking about the alternatives. 1. Centralism/Unitary Alternative

In a unitary system, the state has a highly centralised authority over the whole country and supervises directly the work of each state and organ in every region. This model provides only a token decentralisation and as a result the officials in each department and geographical unit are appointees of the central government whilst the autonomy of each region is minimal or non-existent. In such a system the constitution is written by the central government and there is no division of power between the centre and periphery.

In order for the Centralism/Unitary framework to become a workable basis of settlement in Sudan it would have to involve a power-sharing arrangement between political or regional groupings which should be backed by international guarantors – from the Horn of Africa and the West. By providing access to power and resources to its former opponents, the Government of Sudan (GOS) will diffuse the tension between the different parties, allowing the new coalition government to tackle the contentious issues in the country. Mozambique provides a good example where two former protagonists were able to end the country’s civil war through a power-sharing arrangement which resolved the socio-economic and political issues between them.

a. Frontiers: Sudan’s territory will remain as before while the state, regional

and district borders may be altered in accordance with government policies.

b. Political System: Depending on the structures and modalities of the power-sharing arrangement and the grand coalition, the new political order will be more stable and have an in-built flexibility. ‘Power-sharing’ means that there would be allocation of senior political appointments, and civil service and other public appointments, in proportion to the numbers of votes the party receives in national elections. In other respects, the political system in the country would probably remain as before. The central government will continue to supervise the working of each region and the centre will remain the supreme authority in judicial, legislative and executive areas. It will use a ‘top-down’ approach in delegating powers to

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the regional and local authorities, albeit there will be a consultation process between all coalition partners. The central government will remain in complete control over the political developments in the country. The constitution will be written by the central government and the centre will maintain its monopoly over the civil service as well as the military and security structures.

c. Economic System: At the present time, a mixed economic system

operates in the Sudan. If the war persists, the government will find difficult it to rectify the uneven economic development between regions and localities. This trend will favour the north at the expense of southern, eastern and western Sudan. In a power-sharing agreement, this may be mitigated by resource-sharing arrangements, giving access to the government revenue to each party based on the proportion it receives of the national vote.

d. Religious and Cultural Systems: If the status quo persists then the government might be inclined to continue moulding the identity of the country, guided by its vision of Sudan. In such a case Islam and Arabic will remain the essential basis for Sudan’s legal, economic and political systems. Power-sharing could resolve the outstanding religious and cultural issues between the parties through the inclusion of provisions in Sudan’s constitution which would protect the rights of each constituency in the country.

e. Feasibility: A power sharing agreement could address many of the country’s problems and halt the decay of the Sudanese state, allowing the government to implement those policies which could broaden popular participation in political decision-making. If state decay is halted, this will permit the new administration to address Sudan’s political and socio-economic problems; today 50% of total government spending goes to the war effort. Power-sharing could shift power to the marginalised sections of the society. Power-sharing could also establish new structures, checks and balances on government actions, allowing the state to sustain itself. Since the status quo cannot sustain peace and unity, the different parties should try to narrow their differences and to compromise. Power-sharing could provide the basis of such a framework. The alternative to peace is that the conflict in the country will continue to widen the positions between the parties making compromises more difficult. The Western countries could support centralism as a framework of settlement if this alternative does not come as an imposition of one party

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on the rest of the country and if the Sudanese parties have the consent of their respective constituencies.

f. The Perceived Hopes and Fears of the Parties with Regard to the Centralism/Unitary Alternative: One of the most likely fundamental fears - which could be found in every alternative - is the lack of trust between all parties. This could be the product of a number of factors including the pervasiveness, longevity and the deeply rooted nature of the civil war. The lack of trust could preclude the signing of a peace agreement and therefore stall its implementation. The principal hope of each party in regard to each constitutional option is likely to be that a peace settlement would bring respect for human rights, participatory politics, sustainable development, strengthened public institutions and improvement in the security situation of their polity. The main fear of most parties in the first constitutional option considered here, centralism, is that this system will fail to resolve the main contentious issues between the parties. These are: sharing of power and national resources, the system of government, separation of religion and state, the definition of national identity and the principles of foreign and internal policies. Many southern Sudanese would argue that the nature of the country dictates a devolution of power and a multi-national state rather than a unitary nation-state. They could reinforce their position by pointing out that the forty-year-old nation-building experiment has failed to resolve Sudan’s problems. Most of the northern political parties may find it hard to accept that centralism, even with power-sharing, will meet the specific interests of their constituencies and that the national budget will not favour the centre at the expense of the periphery. Most parties may fear that the central system could interfere too much in the local affairs of their constituencies without paying due attention to local conditions. The lack of checks and balances on central authority could be another anxiety in every region.

2. Controlled Regionalism Alternative

In this case, the central authority retains the overall control of the country while delegating to the regions areas of government responsibility such as education, health and tax collection. The amount of power devolved to the region will vary from one case to another but in most cases will result in a greater freedom for every region, allowing them to elect their own officials. This will give the regions some measure of authority, by virtue of their ability to put checks and balances on the central government with regard to policies, decrees and regulations.

The Regional Decentralisation Alternative could become a basis of settlement in the Sudan through a power-sharing arrangement between the parties, and the

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devolution of power to all regions in such areas as education, health and religion, backed by international guarantors and donors. This framework would bring all parties into a coalition government and give a degree of authority to each constituency over its own territory, while the international community would closely monitor and support the transition process. In Bulgaria, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF)-led government was able to accommodate the demands of two sizeable religious and ethnic minorities – Turks and Macedonians – for the protection of their rights through a power-sharing arrangement backed by a degree of regional autonomy.

a. Frontiers: Sudan’s frontiers will remain as before. However, the state’s

administrative divisions may change as a result of devolution of power. The new administrative divisions may change the size and the ethno-linguistic composition of provinces. The most likely criteria to be employed in the revision of Sudan’s administrative structure are ethno-linguistic, economic, political, historical, geographical and religious.

b. Political System: If the GOS draws in the major political parties it will have to go ahead with political liberalisation, implementing different reforms and changes to the political system of the country. In order for this to happen the GOS will have to approve a new law of political association, in consultation with its former opponents. In this case, the different political parties will have a say to in the drawing-up of a new constitutional framework for Sudan.

c. Economic System: The mixed economy will have to be further liberalised and decentralised, and the political parties and regions will have to have greater access to central government resources. It is possible that the central authority would retain overall control of macro-economic management while devolving powers to the regions, in such areas as tax collection, regional planning and project delivery.

d. Religious and Cultural Systems: Sudan’s constitution could include provisions which will protect the rights of different religious and cultural groups, containing such mechanisms as: minority vetoes, cultural councils and cultural representatives in an upper house of the legislature. Amongst these safeguards, the principle of religious association will have to be addressed in a greater length between and with the various faiths.

e. Feasibility: The restructuring of any state is a painful process which has its benefits and drawbacks. The introduction of any reforms and the devolution of power will require consensus amongst diverse and often mutually antagonistic groups, as well as properly thought out policies. This process will put a strain on GOS’s finances and on material and human resources.

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During the planning, organising and implementation of the devolution process the government will have continuously to evaluate the disparities between the projected and actual institutional reforms so that amendments can be made in a timely and effective way. One benefit of regional decentralisation is that if it is properly implemented it may bring the decision-making process closer to the people, thereby allowing them to arrange their affairs according to their own wishes. One of the greatest handicaps of this alternative framework is that it may not satisfy the demands and aspirations of the people from eastern, southern and western Sudan because it does not go far enough. The overall expectations in eastern, southern and western areas have gravitated towards greater devolution of power and freedom in regional questions The perceived feeling within the international community, including Sudan’s neighbours, questions the viability of this constitutional alternative in meeting the hopes and aspirations of its people. Although these countries might not have major objections to this arrangement, some of Sudan’s neighbours (and international partners) will be concerned about the way certain issues are dealt with and the impact of these policies abroad.

f. The Perceived Hopes and Fears of the Parties with Regards to the Regional Decentralisation Alternative: The most likely fear of most parties is that regional decentralisation may not go far enough in addressing the balance of power between the centre and the regions. The different parties may even question whether power and resources are shared equally between and within each state.

3. Federal Alternative

Under a federal model, the political authority is divided between the centre and the regions. Most commonly, the division of power will give the central government the right to exercise authority over the whole territory in areas such as defence, foreign policy and security, whereas each region is allowed to exercise some degree of independent authority over its own territory. This division of powers allows the two levels of authority to maintain their own integrity. This form of association is usually embodied in the written constitution, setting out the terms in which power is divided and maintained. In this case separate legislative and administrative institutions will be required to maintain the federal principles and to ensure that the union between the regions is preserved.

This arrangement will have to ensure that there is parity between and within each political party and region so that each state will be able to maintain its own integrity. A good example is the United States of America (USA) where there is parity among the federal states, between the states and the central government.

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a. Frontiers: Sudan’s territory will remain intact, but there will be numerous changes to the country’s administrative borders. A workable solution calls for the frontiers to be demarcated on the basis of ethno-linguistic, socio-economic and historic criteria. These would have to be employed in such a way that they would capture those constituents that are willing to be part of that particular sub-unit. In order for the regional and district borders to be viable they would have to be worked out through a consultative process between and within states and between each individual state and the central government.

b. Political System: In the federal system there is a division of power between the federal government and its constituent units in such a way that the whole commonwealth is aware of the degree of power that is held at each level. In this case, the central authority will retain control of defence, foreign affairs, transport and communications while devolving others to the individual states. The federal system should possess a system of checks and balances between the executive, legislative and judiciary at both state and federal levels. In the long-run, the parity of the different regions could lead to affirmative action which should correct the great imbalance and under-representation of certain ethnic groups in every federal structure and institution.

c. Economic System: Although the federal government will retain overall authority over monetary and fiscal policy, each state could have considerable autonomy in many areas relating to regional development, commerce, planning and agriculture. The central government and federal states will have to devise a system of allocating the revenue between them. The central government might be forced to extend special assistance to underdeveloped regions (like those in the south) and it might have to intervene at certain times in order to enforce economic austerity or structural adjustment. One contentious issue could be: how would the central government share those natural resources (such as oil) that are common to all Sudanese with the different states? In Sudan, the federal alternative could lead to the erosion of power of certain sections of society that have had a privileged status. On the other hand, this model may encourage greater foreign aid and investment, not only to the individual federal states but also to the country as a whole.

d. Religious and Cultural Systems: Each individual state will have control over its religious and cultural policies as guaranteed by the country’s constitution and central government. The federal government would have to ensure that no law or institution discriminates against any person or group on the basis of religion, race or culture. Different states may enact policies aimed at the preservation of the cultural identity of specific groups and these would have to be respected by the government. Furthermore, the central government and the states would have to

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establish various mechanisms which will protect the rights of minorities on an individual and communal basis.

e. Feasibility: The stability of this model will depend on how power is

shared and maintained between the centre and the periphery. If these concerns are tailored in the right way they will lead to parity between each state or region, thereby ensuring that the system is sustainable in the long-run. Safeguards have to be present at each level in the judicial, legislative and executive spheres to ensure that the rights of every state or region are not overridden by the central authority. These safeguards would also have to take into consideration the specific concerns of different ethno-linguistic groups. Many believe that the multi-national nature of the Sudanese society suggests that the multi-national interests should be given priority over the interests of the central government. However, the process of setting up a decentralised federal model may make it more difficult to develop a shared national vision and outlook. As a result, certain national goals will be delayed or shelved because they conflict with the aims of different states, and vice-versa. The federal model offers greater protection to the business community than the centralised model - because of the division of powers between the federal government and states. It gives greater authority and freedom to each state to pursue economic development by taking into consideration local needs and conditions, thereby generating greater popular participation in the planning and execution of decisions and programmes. However, the central authority should devise programmes which will rectify regional economic imbalances. It should also ensure that the revenue from those natural resources (such as oil) which are common to all Sudanese are equally divided between all states. In Sudan, this question is complicated further because oil is pumped in one state, processed in another and exported from a third. While the federal model might enact various mechanisms which will protect the rights of minorities on an individual and communal basis, it may not take into consideration the concerns of specific groups which favour the present status quo. For example, some parts of the Arab and Moslem majority in northern Sudan might find it hard to accept that religion and the state are separate, because in Islam there is no separation between the two. This might be especially true for members of northern or southern communities living outside their own states.

f. The Perceived Hopes and Fears of the Parties with regard to the Federal Alternative: While this alternative may be acceptable to most parties, each region will be wary of the central government’s commitment

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in carrying out the required institutional and structural changes to the federal and regional states. Each party may feel that it may have to cede parts of its territory in order for the federation to work. The central government may fear that it would have to give-up its nation-building agenda and that it would lose a large proportion of its powers to the regional states

4. Confederal Alternative

Confederation is a voluntary association of independent states that have their separate administrative, executive and legislative organs. In this case, each polity will delegate powers to the central body through a binding treaty, which forms the constitution of the confederation. Each state retains sovereign authority within its own territory with the right to secede from the confederation backed by the constitution. The confederal authority typically conducts foreign, trade, defence and security on behalf of every state, but each political unit would retain sovereign control over all other matters not specifically delegated to the centre.

Confederation could become a basis of settlement if northern and southern Sudan join in a voluntary association with each state having its own administrative, executive and legislative organs and with both polities retaining sovereign authority over their own territory. This framework would have to be backed by international guarantors. The confederal constitution also would have to endorse the right of each state to secede from the confederation. Switzerland is one example of how a confederation conducts the foreign, trade, defence and other affairs on behalf of every state while each political unit retains control over all other matters not specifically delegated to the centre.

a. Frontiers: The division of Sudan into loosely confederal states will create

two - or possibly more – independent political units, each incorporating those areas that have expressed their wishes, through a referendum, to establish their respective frontiers. Such a confederation will most likely consist of two confederal states: Southern Sudan and any other areas wishing to join it: and Northern Sudan, consisting of Darfur, parts Kordofan and any other areas which may like to join it.

b. Political System: If there is a confederation it will most likely be a voluntary association of two independent states - northern and southern – that have their separate administrative, judicial and legislative organs. The constitution of the confederation will be formed by a treaty between the two states, with each state retaining the sovereign authority in its own territory, including the right to secede from the confederation. The central confederal authorities – executive, judicial and legislative – will be composed of an equal percentage of people from both confederal states. Foreign policy and trade could be conducted on a confederal basis by central institutions, with the two states having the necessary balances and checks on the central organs. The component confederal states could

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retain sovereign control over their respective defence forces while instituting a defensive alliance.

c. Economic System: One of the most contentious areas is likely to be the control over resources that are shared by the component confederal states, especially oil and water. The greatest challenges to the confederal and state authorities in the short run would most probably be how to divide the assets and debts of the former polity. The component confederal states will have to end the economic stagnation, develop their agriculture, liberalise trade, abolish most government monopolies and develop and exploit energy resources. The component confederal states could each choose their own economic system; these will most probably be government-dominated mixed systems.

d. Religious and Cultural Systems: In a confederation the component confederal states will each have control of cultural and religious affairs. They will also have to offer guarantees to their neighbours that the minorities in their territory will be decently treated and protected. This can be ensured by a protocol between the respective confederal states backed by institutional mechanisms to protect the rights of minorities. In addition, the confederal and state constitutional frameworks will have to recognise ethno-linguistic and cultural diversity and ensure peaceful co-existence between the various nationalities in the country.

e. Feasibility: In the case of Sudan, the confederal system could remedy a lot of problems but would also create a number of predicaments for both the north and the south. It is probable that not all parties will agree to be part of a confederation. The perceived objections of the northern parties may not only centre on the structures of the new polity but may also arise on account of the need to partition the country before a federation is formed. Another important issue which may arise if Sudan becomes a confederation is that there might be a duplication of institutions and structures at different levels, leading to unnecessary expenditure. This might be especially true for legislative and executive organs. There are also issues of when and how the laws, rules and regulations of each state and the country would be enforced. Would the southern assembly permit another institution to overrule the laws which it has passed? Would a northern institution be allowed to look after the interests of Arabs and Muslims in the south? It would be important that such issues were tackled in advance. Their settlement could be quite a protracted process.

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Another potential source of problems in a confederation is the ethno-linguistic and cultural diversity within the component confederal states. If Sudan became a confederation the internal and external frontiers could continue to be the object of continuing disputes. Currently there are two international border disputes involving Sudan and its neighbours. These are the Halaib triangle - which both Sudan and Egypt claim – and the Illembi Triangle – which is in the south east corner of Sudan, bordering Kenya and Ethiopia. The disputed areas between the north and the south are the following: Abyei district, Southern Kordofan, Unity and Bentiu areas, Chali area, Kafia Kingi and Hofrat al-Nahas and a big part of northern Upper Nile.

f. The Perceived Hopes and Fears of the Parties with Regards to the Confederation Alternative: A confederation would encompass many of the hopes and fears of the previous alternatives. For example, the different parties may be wary of each other’s unspoken agendas and may fear that this could lead to a U-turn in policies. If the confederation alternative is imposed on the north and the south without the consent of the different parties, lack of support will lead to its failure. Most of the northern establishment will oppose this arrangement because it will lead to the dismemberment - and possible weakening - of the Sudan as a whole. On the other hand, the southern parties may be afraid that GOS could use this alternative as a means to contain their aspirations to independence.

5. Partition Alternative

When a political entity is dismembered it is succeeded by new political unit(s) which exercise their own sovereign authority within their own territory. Each new sovereign state will then rearrange its political, economic social order so as to make allowances for the aspirations of its own people. Consequently, each state could opt for unitary/centralism, regional autonomy, federation or confederation. Upon dissolution, the newly created polities will not only inherit the treaties and conventions signed by the previous sovereign authority but also a proportion of its assets and debts.8

The Partition Alternative could become a basis of settlement if the division of Sudan is accomplished through an agreement, coming out of a peaceful consultative process which is backed by a popular referendum and supervised and recognised by the international community – and most importantly by the OAU. In this case, each independent state will have its own sovereign authority over its territory, whilst inheriting a proportion of the debt and assets of their former state. Czechoslovakia is an important example of how a peaceful ‘divorce’ could be accomplished – as opposed to the Eritrea-Ethiopian case.

8 Harris, David John. 1998, Cases and Material on International Law, 5th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London.

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a. Frontiers: The position of the GOS and most northern parties is that in the event of partition, southern Sudan should inherit those administrative boundaries as they stood at the moment of independence in 1956, leaving a number of contested areas outside this new polity. These areas include Abyei district, Chali area, Kafia Kingi, Nuba mountains, Hofrat al-Nahas and the northern part of the Upper Nile province. SPLM’s definition of southern Sudan is that ‘New Sudan’ should consist of Southern Kordofan, Southern Blue Nile, Abeyi and other marginalised areas. The perceived SPLM view is that Northern Sudan should consist of Northern Kordofan, Central, Northern and any other region which may like to join them.9 Darfur state and the Beja region could either join the north or the south, or these two regions may secede from the rest of the country.

b. Political System: Each entity determines its own political system and exercises its own sovereign authority within its territory. In this case, the population of each independent state might go through a process of internal self-determination whereby the people will determine the form of government that best meets their hopes and aspirations.

c. Economic System: Both entities will have to determine the salient features and structures of their own economy, although it is likely that both will opt for a government-dominated mixed economy. Both states are likely to retain their supervisory roles in the areas of forestry, agriculture, livestock, fisheries, manufacturing, mining, transport and communication, whilst the question of access and ownership of the oil industry is likely to create tensions between the two polities. For example, the two countries may find it hard to come to a resource sharing agreement because the most oil rich areas are disputed by them. This is further complicated by the fact that all but one of the refineries are in the north and that the pipelines pass through another disputed region in the east.

d. Religious and Cultural Systems: In this case each state will have to ensure that no law or institution discriminates against any person or group on the basis of religion, race or culture. Consequently, constitutional guarantees will have to be enacted which will safeguard the rights of religious and ethno-linguistic minorities in each of the two new states. Furthermore, both countries would also have to safeguard the freedom of people to move to the successor state in which their culture is predominant or to the country to which they feel that they belong. The above measures are vital because there are today millions of migrants and displaced people all over Sudan.

e. Feasibility: If Sudan is partitioned, the central question for both countries will be to sustain their independence in the short run and become two viable states in the long run. It may be argued that since southern Sudan

9 SPLM Presentations to Peace Talks on Sudan, Abuja (1993) and Nairobi (1997).

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has never existed as an independent state - although it was once a semi-autonomous region - it will face considerable challenges as it attempts to develop its own political and socio-economic structures. Furthermore, southern Sudan will become a land-locked state dependent on its neighbours, including northern Sudan, for its access to the sea. The two new countries would also find it hard to separate their complementary economies. For example, southern Sudan may find it hard to cope without northern manufactured products and services, while the north may be short of cattle products and some agricultural products. Furthermore, the two new countries may find it hard to divide Sudan’s assets and debts. For example, it will be difficult for the two new countries to divide Sudan’s $22 billion external debt and unpalatable for northern Sudan to transfer some of its financial assets to the south. It would greatly facilitate the process if northern and southern Sudan addressed frontier, resource and ethnic disputes before the country was partitioned. In this way the two former member states which were formerly the Sudan would be able to avoid the internationalisation of internal conflicts and problems which will threaten the stability of their territory as well as the Horn of Africa region. For example, the failure of Ethiopia and Eritrea to resolve their political, economic, ideological and frontier disputes has led to the resurfacing of the tensions between the two independent states leading to a frontier war which has claimed ten of thousands of lives and has led to the internal and external displacement of hundreds of thousand of people in both countries. The rights of minority groups should not only be protected by the two countries’ constitutions but both states should assist those communities and people who wish to be relocated to the country to which they feel they belong. This will pose a great challenge to the newly independent states and may place a greater strain on northern Sudan where roughly two million southerners reside. The repatriation, relocation, rehabilitation and re-integration of these southerners would depend heavily on direct assistance from the West. The international community, especially the OAU member states, may not easily recognise the partition of Sudan because of their attachment to sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the state, as seen in OAU’s founding charter, although the case of Eritrea does set a precedent. The two countries’ internal and external policies will be closely watched by the international community and by Sudan’s neighbours. Egypt might be one of the countries which could oppose the partition of Sudan because of its dependence on the waters of the Nile. However, its concerns - and those of northern Sudan - could be addressed within the framework of a Nile Waters agreement.

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f. The Perceived Hopes and Fears of the Parties with Regard to Partition Alternative: It is very likely that this alternative will be the most contentious of all options and that all sides will have strong views about supporting or opposing secession. GOS’s most obvious fear may be that the SPLM may continue to sponsor the war in the north after its independence. For example, even though the conflict in the south might end, the war in Darfur and eastern Sudan could go on with SPLM supporting GOS’s opponents. Furthermore, the northern political parties may fear that the SPLM may not abide by its international commitments with regard to the Nile waters. SPLM for its part, would probably be wary of its neighbour’s domestic and foreign agenda in so far as it could have a direct impact on its newly won independence.

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D. Conclusion By looking at the full range of aspects contributing to and constituting conflict, and by contextualising each alternative within the hopes and fears of every party in the country, it becomes more practicable to analyse in-depth the totality of Sudan’s situation; and to suggest preliminary ways forward which may be able to remedy the present status quo. It is the hope and aim of this paper that the clarification of the alternative constitutional frameworks for settlement in the Sudan will provide a basis for an informal exploratory debate, involving participants in their personal capacities. Our hope is that the participants can seize the opportunity to examine the socio-economic issues and to promote and nurture a shared vision of Sudan through which good and healthy relationships will grow and develop for the benefit of all the people of the Sudan.

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Bibliography

Books Albino, Oliver, 1970. The Sudan: southern viewpoint, Institute for Peace Relations, London. Anderson, Benedict, 1991. Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, Verso, London. Beshir, Mohammed Omer, ed., 1984. Southern Sudan: regionalism and religion, Motala Grafiska AB, Motala. Brownlie, Ian, 1998. Principles of Public International Law, fifth edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Cassese Antonio, 1986. International Law in a Divided World, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Cervenka, Zfenek, 1969. The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter, second edition, C. Hurst, London. Harir, Shafir and Tvedt, Terje, 1994. Short-cut to Decay: the case of the Sudan, Motala Grafiska AB, Motala. Harris, David John, 1998. Cases and Material on International Law, fifth edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London. Henderson, K. D. D., 1965. Sudan Republic, Earnest Benn, London. Holt, P. M. and Daly, M. W., 1986. A History of Sudan: from the coming of Islam to the present day, Longman, London. Metz, Heln Chapin, ed., 1992. Sudan: a country study, US Government Printing Office, Washington. Morris, J. H. C., ed., 1980. The Conflict of Laws, volumes 1 and 2, Stevens & Sons Limited, London. Neilands, Robbin, 1996. The Dervish Wars: Gordon and Kitschener in the Sudan, 1883-1898, Murray, London. Neuberger, Benyamin, 1986. National Self-determination in Post-colonial Africa, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado. Ray, James Lee, 1992. Global Politics, fifth edition, Houghton Muffin Company, Princeton.

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Schluter, Michael and Lee, David, 1993. The R Factor, Hodder & Stoughton, London. Shaw, Malcom M., 1997. International Law, fourth edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Woodward, Peter, 1990. Sudan, 1898-1989: the unstable state, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado. Journals Africa Confidential, 1995-2000. Africa Analysis, 1995-2000.

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b. Summary of discussion Dr. Edward A. Christow’s paper on the alternative constitutional means of self-determination in the Sudan stimulated a lively and animated discussion through which the participants raised a number of interesting issues and questions:

1. The length and ferocity of the Sudanese civil war has had an impact on the future of the country and the popular feelings of the people. The manner in which the fighting has been conducted should be considered seriously as it has generated feelings which people never forget. Another problem has been the fact that most of the time the opinions of the people have been seen as irrelevant or irrespective as political actors have suppressed them. Given the above context we should ask ourselves whether it is possible to bring together people into peaceful coexistence? The priority is how to stop the war.

2. The paper does not evaluate the historical experience of regionalism and

decentralisation. In the Sudan many structures were tried by successive administrations but they have failed. We ask ourselves how do we accommodate religious and cultural diversity of the country? Given the religious and cultural diversity in the country, some think that we need a strong central government whilst other feel that we need extreme levels of decentralisation. Some feel that the former colonial power created a fake polity. What should be the role of religion in the state? How do we ensure that the rights of individuals and minorities are safeguarded in the country’s constitution and how do we apply criminal law from one region to the next? One way of resolving the above dilemma is through consociational system where the concept of majority and minority does not work. The consociational system works through the accommodation of crosscutting elites. Rather there is a partnership between different ethnic groups ensuring that the system will take into account the diversities within the country. We could have a power-sharing agreement on which the minorities ate represented. Another intractable issue is question of border areas as mentioned by the paper.

3. Over the years there was a progressive loss of confidence and trust among the

Sudanese actors which lead us to ask ourselves: how then can we agree and how do we recognise each other?

4. The problem of pacification did not start in 1990. The Nuba Mountains were

first bombarded in 1916 when Britain tried to put down a rebellion. Similarly, southern Sudan has a long history of pacification. The first conflict exploded in 1955 and the second phases started in 1983 when Sudan was secular. If we are serious about peace we should ask ourselves how do we stop the war and how do we coexist? Furthermore, why is the Southern Council not willing to move to Juba and why aren’t we willing to sit down and talk objectively about peace?

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5. Before the British and Egyptians invaded our country there was no Sudan.

Today Sudan is not a nation but a multi-national state, which had been ruled by elected an elite in Khartoum. This elite was created by the colonialists who found that the people served their plans. It should be pointed out that Islam never encourages anyone to kill for wealth and power.

6. Much has been said about the way colonialism contributed to Sudan’s present

situation. On the other hand we must be honest in recognising that we have not been asked by outsiders to stick to Western alternative to governance, but nevertheless we have applied it to our country. I see a number of problems in our country. Firstly, there is the problem of the motives of some external mediators who come to our help. Are they genuine, do they interfere in Sudan’s internal affairs and do they support our peace efforts? Secondly, there is the problem of religious and cultural discrimination. Many people who are born into today’s war feel that they are at a disadvantage. Furthermore, many displaced people in Khartoum are affected by Sharia, which was introduced in 1983, because their culture goes against it, as it is in the case of Southerners brewing alcohol. Thirdly, there is a problem of confidence and trust. Many agreements had been dishonoured. However, we must be frank in acknowledging that we need peace today rather than tomorrow.

7. Sudan is a modern creation. During the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries the

frontier of the country developed owing to the rise of Islam which promoted trade and increased the interaction between the different regions. After 1821 the Turko-Egyptian administration pushed to the South. Before that time it was impossible for the Arab to go to the south because they lacked the means to do so. As the Arabs went to the South with the aid of steamers they opened trade to slavery. The Anglo-Egyptian administration did not have a clear policy for Southern Sudan but protected it by closing it from the North until 1947 and prevented the two regions from interacting. Then Britain took the decision to join it to the North even though very little economic and social development took place in the region. As a result, at independence the Northerners were better off than their Southerners, who got a poor deal, and the first civil war started in 1955 before the British left. Unfortunately, successive governments did very little to improve the socio-economic situation in the South and instead they attempted to bring the two parts of the country together through Arabisation and Islamisation. For example, General Aboud attacked the church in the Sudan and tried to unify the country through Arabisation and Islamisation. In the Sudan, the Arab term is very diluted. Arabness is a cultural expression rather than a blood relation. It is not based on ethnic traits but linguistic basis. Consequently, today Khartoum is an African city. So far neither side has been serious about peace. Civil society has an important role to play in reaching peace in the country because grievances can only be resolved through democratic and transparent system.

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We should also bear in mind that what brought the north and the south together was economic interest. In Sudan religion is a symbol of identity, in a way it is a mark of how we relate to the world. For example, the Umma Party’s support is Moslem. At the same time we must not underestimate the importance of Christianity in the South. Historically, Sudan has been federal since 1820 and at the same time the central government was not a Sudanese creation. If this system does not work in a future democratic system then we should allow the Southerner to have the secession they want.

8. Until recently the consensus of the Sudanese people was gravitating towards

federalism but this system was not applied well in the country. The consociational framework could resolve Sudan’s most sensitive issue – religion. If a consensus is reached on religious plurality then peace will not be far away. That is why we would have to think of a way to accommodate all religions in the Sudan. One example where this has been accomplished successfully is Lebanon.

9. Sudan has been independent for 46 years and it has for long tried to resolve its

problems. Today, religion has become the number one factor in the Sudanese conflict, although at first it was the injustice of the distribution of the resources that drove Sudan into civil war. Since General Aboud introduced Islam into the political scene, it has never left it and over time became the ideology of three northern parties. The Moslem Brotherhood made Nimeiri a “Born Again Moslem” and forced him to abrogate the Addis Ababa agreement because Southern Sudan had a degree of freedom, which was lacking in the north. There is a feeling, at an individual level, that that the northern people are very good and sympathetic to the southern populace, but their attitude is very different from that of the government. That is why religion must be removed from politics.

10. Religion and race are not the main causes of the conflict in the Sudan - they

only became a problem when they were usurped by successive governments and as result the nation-building effort was never achieved but interrupted by historical factors. In the Sudan the Christian community was not favoured by the colonial powers. In universities the relationships between Northern and Southern students deteriorated when Arabic became the medium of instruction and when Christian students had to take a course in religion which counted in their final grade. Federalism system in the Sudan has not been practised very well. The current federal system is very expensive and useless. Today most governors are military and their deputies are from the National Congress. So why are the people in the South fighting today? The answer is that they are against the central government system. There are also classes that profit from the war, like military personnel, Jellaba merchants and Khartoum politicians. If Southern Sudan becomes a separate state it will have no access to sea and it will be an unstable and poor state because there is a lack of the concept of authority in region.

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11. The best framework for the country is one which:

a. Enshrines democracy and human rights. b. Federal in character. c. Respects the cultural and religious identities of peoples. d. Committed to the development of the country as a whole and the

building of infrastructure and social institutions.

It should be pointed out that since 1996 all parties in the Sudan, including the current government have endorsed and accepted the idea of self-determination for the south. 12. When the people in the Nuba Mountains began to suffer from the second civil

war they asked SPLA for help in defending them against the northerners who too their women and children. If this war carries on, how can we have respect for the current government in Khartoum?

13. The present Sudanese constitution prevents both non-Moslems and non-Arabs

from becoming President in the country. Why is the current administration trying to protect their interest through such means?

14. Forcible Islamisation is against Islam. The Quoran states that there should be

no compulsion in religion. The Sudanese constitution does not bar non-Moslems or non-Arabs from attaining the office of the President and it does not specify a religion of the state. We should distinguish between prejudice and discrimination. We have prejudices in both the north and the south because of a host of factors. Prejudices become discrimination when we act with belief. It should be noted that no political force in the Sudan supports the centralism alternative. If the actors support unity then the choice is between federalism and confederation with the constitution not only satisfying Moslems, Christians and other religions but also being acceptable to all. Partition should be our last resort in settling our differences. In any case, the international community could play a role by enforcing non-discrimination in public life and by enforcing any agreements made by the GOS and other parties.

15. The end of the Cold War has forced us to examine two tenets of the charter of

the Organisation of African Unity, namely: the inviolability of the current borders within Africa and the non-interference in the affairs of other states. This should be given particular attention because different regimes have used these two principles to hide behind the human rights abuses perpetrated by them.

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3. Technical issues which need to be addressed to achieve a constitutional settlement: outline discussion of water rights and allocations

a. Paper introduced by Dr. Michael Schluter

WATER RIGHTS AND ALLOCATIONS FOR THE SUDAN (1) Essential Negotiating Principles

(a) Initiate modalities and agreements for negotiating new Nile Waters Agreement under UN/US auspices. All riparian states to be represented;

(b) Establish donor states willingness in open or closed negotiations to buy off Egypt’s objections to replacement of the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement;

(c) Establish the principles of interstate use or interstate sale of new water rights;

(d) Sudan’s new water rights: 1959w + post 2000 w = present use +/- post 2000 change in use + water sales >= 0

(2) Current Average Nile Flows

(a) The annual volume of flow through the system has traditionally been measured in terms of its usefulness to Egypt, so is quoted as the quantity of water that would arrive at the dam at Aswan after losses due to evapotranspiration. In Figure 1 these discounted discharges are shown in brackets. Of the 74 km3yr-1 available for use Egypt in 1959 was allocated 55.5 km3yr-1 and the Sudan 18.5 km3yr-1 ;.

(b) From the point of view of water usage by the Sudan and Egypt the Nile Basin can be considered to consist of two very disparate drainage systems – the White Nile system which has an equable regime with very little sediment load but a very considerable quantity of water lost due to evapotranspiration, and the system of the Blue Nile and the other right bank tributaries which drain the Ethiopian Highlands which have very peaky regimes, carry vast amounts of sediment but lose much less water from evapotranspiration.

(3) Recent Developments in Egypt

(a) Since the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1963 flooding downstream from normal flows has been eliminated, conferring considerable benefit to the country;

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(b) The benefit of the control of normal flood has not been gained, however, without problems. The sediment, mainly from the Blue Nile system, accumulates at the south end of the reservoir, leaving sediment-free water to flow northwards from the dam. Such flows are highly erosive, so steps had to be taken to eliminate the uncontrolled overflows from extreme floods. A spillway was built to the west of Lake Nasser in 1979 to drain surplus flows into a depression in the desert. This expedient also removed the need to draw down water levels each year but exposed the greater surface area produced by higher levels of storage to very great rates of evaporation and seepage. The surplus was increased by the Sudan’s failure to use all its allocation;

(c) The prospect of large amounts of water running to waste in the desert was not acceptable, so a diversion canal has been constructed to take water to a series of irrigable depressions and oases to the north-west of Lake Nasser;

(d) In spite of measures to increase the efficiency of water usage and to recycle urban waste water Egypt has become very dependent on sustained high flows, making it interested once again in schemes outside its boundaries to reduce the losses to the Upper Nile waters before they arrive at Aswan.

(4) White Nile Options (a) Completion of the Jonglei I canal. Designed to maximise the flow of

water past the swamps of the Sudd to Northern Sudan and Egypt, the canal project was brought to an end by local protestors in the civil war when close to completion. Options range from completing the scheme to its original design to modifying it to include local objectives such as flood protection, small-scale irrigation of agriculture and environmental conservation (but most livestock in the vicinity of the canal are reported stolen or killed as a consequence of the civil war). The options need to be costed and evaluated in terms of preferences of local people and potential funding agencies;

(b) Consideration of Jonglei II. The benefits of Jonglei I are limited by the lack of any extensive flow regulation systems. Jonglei II involves creating extensive works at the outflow from Lake Albert to alter the regime of the river to maximise water availability for the Sudan and Egypt. Again, options range from completing the scheme to its original design to modifying it to include a variety of local objectives. The options, which involve much larger engineering structures, would need to be costed and evaluated in terms of response from riparian governments, local peoples and potential funding agencies;

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(c) Further plans are in existence for minimising losses in the marshes in the western part of the Sudd and in the plains along the lower Sobat. These need extensive re-evaluation, but lie entirely within the Sudan’s frontiers;

(d) Small-scale pump irrigation schemes in Northern Sudan are in need of refurbishment, and could be extended using water already allocated to the Sudan under the 1959 Agreement.

(5) Blue Nile Options (a) Lack of maintenance in the major irrigation schemes in the Gezira area

between the Blue and White Niles has reduced the ability of the Sudan to use its allocation fully (as well as reducing production). Restoration of the system should be a priority;

(b) The various regulatory schemes on the Blue Nile that supply the Gezira are reaching the end of their useful life due to infilling by silt. Options range from restoration of the capability of the present works to the development of multi-purpose schemes higher up the Nile in Ethiopia. There, more effective regulation and storage of water could be combined with the generation of hydro-electric power. Reduced evaporation losses from high altitude dams could be used to solve some of Egypt’s problems;

(c) Similar possibilities exist on the other rivers of the Blue Nile system, especially on the Atbara inside Ethiopia.

(6) North Sudan Interests

(a) To conclude the war with the South so that financial and management resources can be used to:

(i) rehabilitate the Gezira scheme and raise productivity/output (ii) develop new irrigation potential north of Khartoum where large scale irrigation potential exists.

(b) To conclude the war so that it becomes feasible more by negotiation to charging Egypt for the use of Sudan’s unused allocation under a new multinational Nile Waters Agreement.

(c) To increase the flow of White Nile Waters through the North by

completion of Jonglei I and II (III), revised in detail to reflect agreed regional Sudanese objectives, problems and opportunities.

(d) To increase the flow of water, reduce silt and gain greater control over the

flow of Blue Nile water coming from Ethiopia either by high altitude dams

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in Ethiopia or by dams within Sudan south-east of Khartoum. Ideally this requires an integrated scheme between Sudan (North), Ethiopia and Eritrea.

(e) To minimise inter-area and inter-group conflicts of interest within the

North by utilising objective criteria and formulae for inter-area allocation of benefits and responsibilities.

(7) Interest of South Sudan and Other Regions

These concern only the White Nile. In the past schemes like Jonglei I (& II) have been designed to maximise water flows to Egypt and North Sudan with little thought for the potential consequences for residents in the South. If the war ends, from the South’s perspective, the options include: (a) Redesign of Jonglei I (II and III) so that on a long-term basis the

completion of these large-scale schemes increase agricultural production potential in the South.

(NB. The loss of most livestock in the Sudd, and displacement of so many people, provides an opportunity to redesign the area for enhanced production systems)

(b) Estimate appropriate level of financial compensation for the South payable

by Egypt for losses of water availability through completion of Jonglei I if it is not associated with irrigation schemes in the South to increase agricultural production.

(c) Estimate what share of any payments by Egypt to Sudan’s unused part of

its water allocation should be transferred to fund projects in other regions. (d) as (e) above: ‘the South’

(8) Egypt’s Interests

(a) To maximise flow of water from both White Nile and Blue Nile, especially for the period of maximum use in April/May onwards.

Thus: (b) To see completion of Jonglei I. (c) To promote construction of Jonglei II (and III).

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(d) To ensure increased use of Nile Waters for irrigation in Sudan are at least matched by schemes which increase the timely flow (e.g. Jonglei I, II (and III)).

(9) Interests of Ethiopia

(a) Ethiopia would like a series of dams to control discharge of Blue Nile waters into Sudan as they are seasonal and volatile. This would provide a source of hydro-electric power, reduce silt losses, allow increased irrigation in W Ethiopia and benefit Sudan (North) and Egypt.

(b) Ethiopia is concerned that schemes like Jonglei I which significantly

reduce evapotranspiration in the Sudd in South Sudan might adversely affect rainfall levels and reliability in what could be an increasingly variable regional ecosystem.

(10) The Role of the Headwater States – Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, DR

Congo, Burundi, CAR

(a) The willing Cupertino of Uganda and DR Congo is necessary for the construction and operation of Jonglei II;

(b) The willing Cupertino of all headwater states in pursuing moderate water

extraction regimes is necessary to peacefully and equitably share the Nile resources and thus preventing conflicts amongst riparian states.

(11) Concluding Comments

The end of the war will benefit both North and South Sudan substantially in terms of:

(a) Potential to use the Nile waters more effectively in existing irrigation

systems in the North. (b) Potential to establish new irrigation schemes in both North and South due

to the increase in domestic and international resources available for development purposes.

(c) Potential to increase the flow of water, and potentially charge Egypt for

Sudan’s unused allocation (with revenues shared between North and South) under a new multinational Nile Waters agreement.

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(d) Potential development projects in the South based on either using the Nile Waters, or using additional revenue gained from non-use of the water for public expenditure on other income-generating projects, such as rain-fed agriculture, or in other sectors such as education. This needs urgent research and appraisal.

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b. Summary of discussion Dr. Michael Schluter’s presentation generated a lively discussion through which the participants raised a number of important issues and questions with regards to the issue of water in the Sudan:

1. Discussion of such an important issue requires the input of local and international lawyers and water resources experts and a whole consultation devoted to this issue. This problem is crucial because it touches on a number of very important socio-political issues and the waters have deepened the conflict in the country. It should be pointed out that currently there are two new dams under construction, one in Ethiopia and the other one in the Sudan. For Egypt the Nile waters are a matter of life and death and the same can be said for the people living North of Atbara because they are as reliant on this resource as their counterparts across the northern frontier. This discussion should include experts from Southern and Northern Sudan.

2. In Southern Sudan the issue of water is not crucial because the region has got

plenty of rain. The most populated region is Bahr el-Ghazal, which is far from the Nile. When the Jonglei I was being built it took the life of many animals that had tried to cross it. The Sudanese government made matters worse because it did not build the crossing bridges it had pledged to construct.

3. We need a need common approach to enhance the environment of the Nile.

This could be achieved through integration of the Nile waters and promoting the Nile as a factor of peace. First, enhance the Nile Valley itself through a joint cleaning project. Second, co-ordinate crop cultivation so that those crops which require lots of water are cultivated along lakes and those that require less water are grown along the rivers. Third, Ethiopia and Sudan have to establish ways of exploiting their own reservoirs of water.

4. This consultation should not only draw on the expertise of local professionals

but also on other countries interested in the Nile waters. Apart from the riparian countries there are a number of other countries that are interested in the Nile. Currently, Israel is constructing a hydroelectric power station in Ethiopia. Similarly, Libya has got its own interests. When we discuss the issue of the Nile waters we should look at both the positive and also at the negative aspects of this matter.

5. The Beja people in the Sudan do not get any waters from the Nile even though

they have fertile land, which could be cultivated, and despite the fact that an oil pipeline passes through their region. Unfortunately, the Beja people have not been able to benefit from either resource. It should be pointed out that Eastern and Western Sudan do not have any Nile waters passing through them and yet their people have survived over the years.

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6. There is need for an international agreement on the Nile waters because the present instrument excludes eight out of the ten riparian countries. In addition to Egypt and Ethiopia there are other countries concerned about the Nile, like Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. In Southern Sudan, there are three rivers running parallel to the Nile from Central Africa: Kiir, Loual and Jur. Recently, the Nile waters have become a political issue in the Egypt and as a result Cairo has prepared a reserve army to safeguard its interests. Aboud who looked to Egypt for protection signed the Nile water agreement, which the other countries felt they were not bound by, as they had not been consulted. Today, Britain has a moral obligation to bring a more just agreement to the region. We need to discuss and ally the fear, which Egypt may have.

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4. Technical issues which need to be addressed to achieve a constitutional settlement: outline discussion of the oil sector

a. Paper introduced by Dr. Edward A. Christow

OUTLINE OF ISSUES FOR FUTURE CONSULTATION

OIL SECTOR 1. Necessary Preliminaries a. Examine the issue of ownership and access to oil in Sudan.

b. Examine how control is exercised and revenue shared when oil is pumped out from

one state or province, processed in another and exported from a third.

c. Examine the principles for the conduct of foreign and, local oil and gas companies, which could be incorporated into the country’s legislation.

d. Examine the impact of oil producing industries on local people and the environment in the region, including environment impact assessment and emergency response plan in the events of oil spills and pipeline breakdowns.

2. Current State of the Oil Industry a. Currently Sudan is pumping 150,000 barrels per day, earning the government $350

million a year. If the pipeline capacity is successfully expanded to 250,000 barrels per day, by the end of the year 2000, the government revenue will rise to $300-$500 million a year.

b. Sudan has five oil refineries: El Obeid: 2,000 barrels per day, Abu Jabra 10,000 barrels per day, Jayli 50,000 barrels per day, Concorp 10,000 barrels per day and Port Sudan 24,000 barrels per day. Currently, Sudan imports daily 40,000 barrels of refined petroleum products.

c. Currently, there are twelve international companies involved in the exploration,

extraction and processing of oil in the Sudan. These are: Agip (Italy), China National Petroleum Corporation (China), Elf-Aquitaine (France), Gulf Petroleum Corporation, Lundin Oil (Sweden), Mobil, National Iranian Gas Company (Iran), OMV-AG (Austria), Petronas (Malaysia), Royal Dutch Shell (The Netherlands), Talisman Energy (Canada) and Total-Fina (France and Belgium).

d. The oil fields lie in areas disputed by both sides in the conflict. The conflict over oil is

not only resource-based but has also become identity driven. Oil has served to intensify the conflict in the south and has become a disincentive for peace. There is a

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difficulty that oil has generated negative consequences for the people in the oil-producing regions and these need to be addressed as part of the confidence-building process.

e. The current extraction and processing of oil in Sudan is environmentally unfriendly. With poor safety procedures, the 1,610 kilometre-long Sudanese pipeline passes through several conflict regions, making it an ideal military target. The Sudanese waxy crude oil is laced with heavy metals, which take far longer to disperse than oil whose main components evaporate faster.

3. Oil Industry Options a. Establish an equitable distribution of oil revenue on a national and regional basis.

This will reduce the economic disparity between and within regions and will improve the ethno-linguistic and political ties throughout Sudan.

b. Establish improved safeguards to meet internationally accepted standards of oil extraction, processing and utilisation. The incorporation of such standards, within Sudan’s legislation, will improve the protection of the flora and fauna of the country.

c. Establish principles for the conduct of oil and gas companies in Sudan. Some of these principles are: the people’s participation in the planning and production of oil; land-rights and traditional rights; environmental standards; the socio-economic and political rights; labour standards and workers’ rights; and the monitoring, auditing and verification of oil and gas companies. The establishment of such principles will clarify the roles and responsibilities of the government, business community, civil society and the Sudanese people, leading to greater accountability on the part of each party.

d. Establish how the petroleum peace dividend could be channelled into the industrial,

agricultural and social sectors of Sudan. If some of the peace dividend is transferred to the manufacturing sector, it could have a quick impact on the medium and small-scale enterprises, which are labour-intensive and require small capital. If some of the peace dividend is transferred to the agricultural sector – like the Gezira Scheme - this could improve the food security situation in the country by providing small extension services to the farmers and their families. Alternatively, if this peace dividend is channelled to poverty or employment generation schemes it could greatly improve the living conditions of the poorest sections in the urban centres. The peace dividend could also be used to develop further the petrochemical industry throughout the whole country. For example, the oil industry personnel and the country as a whole could benefit from improved environmental and labour standards.

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b. Summary of discussion

Dr. Edward A. Christow’s presentation provided an overview of the oil sector, and examined the issues which need to be settled if there is to be a constitutional settlement. In response, `the participants made a number of interesting points and comments:

1. Oil is a very contentious issue not only in the Sudan but also in other countries such as Nigeria where the Ngoni people have seen their human rights violated by the government and by the inadequate labour standards imposed by the multinational corporations. There are two issues, which we should consider. First, the approach adopted by the GOS and second oil as a factor of peace and/or conflict in the country. Furthermore, we should examine the question of private and public ownership of oil. Can individuals and communities own oil discovered on their land? It will be conducive if we look at the experience of other countries in dealing with this question.

2. There are many resource-based conflicts in Africa revolving around the issue

of oil and water. Unfortunately, these two issues have had a negative impact on the North-South relations. It is also unfortunate that these two resources have neither been shared equally nor utilised properly. Thus oil can either be a blessing, if it is used properly, or a curse if it is being misused. Owning to the intensification of the conflict in the south, the cost of war has increased from one million United States (US) dollars a day to two million US dollars per day. Although there is no reliable information, currently 21 percent of government revenue come from the oil industry.

3. Over the years oil has become a weapon of destruction as local communities

and civilians residing around the oil fields have been removed through aerial bombardment and forceful displacement violating customary rights. In the future the adopted constitutional alternative will determine the ownership and sharing of the oil wealth. The current production sharing agreement not only excludes the south but also has further internationalised the Sudanese civil war. For example, Chinese troops are protecting the oil installations. Some oil fields are next to rivers and as a result oil exploration has led to the pollution of water supply. As the oil industry develops, this industry will deepen the conflict in the country and will be used as a weapon of the present administration.

4. We should have a separate session, which should look more closely at the

various socio-economic and political issues surrounding the oil industry. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that now is not the proper time for foreign companies to invest in this industry because they will aid one side and supplant their opponents.

5. When oil was discovered in 1980, the GOS said that it was situated 140

kilometres south of Khartoum. The Central Mining Ministry never consulted

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the Southern Regional Government. In order to guarantee that the lion’s share of the revenue belongs to the North, the central government created the Unity state where the oil was located. Since oil became a national asset, over the years the Southerners have asked for the revenues to be shared. Instead, Chevron practised racial discrimination between northern and southern employees and the southerners were paid less than their counterparts from the north. Over the years the Dinka and the Nuer have been displaced by the central government from the oil producing areas.

6. GOS position has been to use it with most of the oil coming from Bentui and

some from Southern Kordifan. Currently the government gets 35 percent of the value of the oil. The Greater Nile Corpration owns the rest with the Sudan National Petroleum Corporation owning five percent in it. After five to six years the GOS will own all oil.

7. Today, most of the revenue from oil goes to buy military equipment enabling

the GOS to produce armaments in Khartoum for the first time. In future consultations we should discuss how we should utilise the oil revenues and why are Arabs are being brought into oil areas to live.

8. Oil revenues belong not only to the north and the south but also to the rest of

the country. If Sudan is one country then the oil revenue should benefit the whole population. Future consultations should consider how oil exploration and production affects communities in war related areas.

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Notes on the Way Forward for the Sudan Peace-Building Programme During a final session the Sudanese participants were presented with eleven possible topics for future consultations. The following topics were put forward by the Secretariat for consideration under the alternative constitutional frameworks:

1. Water 2. Agriculture 3. Oil 4. Transport and Infrastructure 5. Education 6. Criminal Justice 7. Religion and State 8. Defence and Military 9. Business and Finance 10. Federalism and Self-determination 11. Role of Foreign Capital

The participants were invited to consider other topics they would like to discuss together and they were asked to comment on:

1. What other topics they would like to discuss 2. Which topics they would like to discuss for the first two sessions 3. What should be the length of each consultation 4. How many topics should each consultation cover 5. How many consultations they would like to have per year 6. Where they would like to meet during the next two consultations

After thorough discussion on the way forward for the Sudan Peace-Building Programme, the participants agreed to hold three consultations per year, each four days long, each covering one socio-economic issue and one political issue. The second consultation will take place in the UK from 21 through 25 May 2001 and look into the following areas: a. Water and Agriculture b. Federalism and Self-determination The third consultation will take place in South Africa from 10 through 14 September 2001 and look into the following areas: a. Oil b. Religion and the State

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Background to the African Renaissance Institute (ARI) and the Relationships Foundation International (RFI)

1. Background to the African Renaissance Institute (ARI)

The African Renaissance Institute (ARI) was born out of two years of consultations, formulation and organisational work out of which evolved several pragmatic operational strategies aimed at establishing the most effective way of mobilising and networking Africa’s human resource, intellectual wealth and enterprise for an African Renaissance in the third millennium. It is designed to serve as a vehicle for Africa’s thinkers, researchers, and development workers in all walks of life, across barriers of language, religion, and geographical borders, who are motivated by the quest for Africa’s survival, recovery, and sustainable development. The ARI has been established to fully capture the visions, aspirations, creative endeavours and spirit of the African Youth, Woman and Man. The main objective of the ARI is to marshal and deploy, systematically, a critical mass of able and pragmatic people dedicated to the survival, recovery and renaissance of Africa. The ARI is determined to contribute to the determination and execution of Africa’s own home grown Development Agenda. In doing this, ARI will be a network of development activists, mobilised and organised, using the latest techniques and technologies, to optimise Africa’s own capacity to resolve the age old problems of:

• Poverty and deprivation • Technological backwardness • Financial and economic dependency • Macro-economic management for global economic competitiveness • Enterprise development vis-à-vis the constraints faced by local private sector

enterprises • The plight of youth, women and growing unemployment

ARI is not a political movement. It does not claim to be a custodian of solutions to all of Africa’s social and economic problems. The ARI is non-partisan to any political thought, systems or movements, beyond supporting the processes that are necessary to un-lock our creative and resource potential. The ARI is committed to contributing constructively to the continent’s development process through working with African Governments, other African Development Institutions, and the Private Sector in order to achieve the following objectives: 1. To undertake problem solving research in the priority areas of:

• Human Resource Development • Science and Technology Development • Economic Recovery

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• Governance and Peace • Infrastructure and Communications Development • Human Settlements, Energy and the Environment • Health and Cultural Affairs

2. To build user-friendly and supportive databases containing significant findings of research on Africa’s development endeavours. The data shall be generated from the archives of Universities, Research Institutes, Public and Private Companies, Governments, Non-Governmental Organisations, Multilateral Development Funding Institutions, Regional Organisations and other international organisations.

3. To assist African Governments undertaking economic and recovery reforms. The

ARI shall provide independent counsel on reforms and problem-solving development strategies.

4. To facilitate regional and national dynamics for creating ‘real jobs’ and to

produce the critical material needs for the largest numbers of our people in the most cost-effective manner.

5. To closely monitor individual national economies and to provide advance

warnings to Governments of impeding serious developments in their economies. The human resources of the ARI shall therefore remain at the disposal of Governments, Public and Private Companies, constituting a pool of advisors who may be called upon to provide objective diagnosis of problems that currently exist or those that may develop.

6. To cause the circulation of the ARI’s major assessments of the state of play of the

continent’s economic recovery programme to be followed up through dialogue with bilateral, multilateral and other development agencies and organisations.

7. To put in place an inclusive participatory discussion process on the modalities for

effecting Africa’s Economic Recovery, involving community groups, public institutions and the private sector.

8. To fight for the eradication of the false impression that “Africa has no problems”

or that all problems that exist are solely due to an externally-induced or historical phenomena”. The ARI intends to help develop an attitude of mind that is commensurate with the challenge for engendering the continent’s self-reliant development and the creation of structures and policies requisite for Africa’s competitive survival in the global economy.

9. To work towards “not feeling sorry for ourselves” and to deal with the real issues

of backwardness that shall not vanish away through wishful thinking.

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2. Background to the Relationships Foundation International (RFI) The Relationships Foundation International is the international arm of the Relationships Foundation.

The Relationships Foundation The Relationships Foundation is a research and initiatives charity working primarily in the sphere of British economic and social policy. It believes that social and individual well-being is found in and through relationships. It seeks to strengthen society by ensuring that the potential for good relationships is fostered rather than undermined. This is achieved through ensuring that relational thinking is applied to public policy and in the goals, structures and ethos and working practices of public and private sector organisations. Its understanding of good relationships is defined by the ethical value of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, many of which are shared by people of different backgrounds and faiths. Its methods are research, publications, networking, practical initiatives and lobbying.

The origins of the Newick Park Initiative NPI’s methodology for action was tested and refined during its work on South Africa, where the Initiative was actively involved between 1986 and 1991. It worked in co-operation with representatives of the major political groupings in South Africa to prepare the ground for a peaceful transition from apartheid to majority rule. With the goal of building up political confidence and trust through informal channels to high level South Africans, NPI organised ten conferences to discuss key political, constitutional and economic obstacles to South Africa’s future; these included, for example, land ownership, the industrial structure, and the public sector. Most of the work was done behind the scenes and its achievements are therefore not on public record. However, a measure of the lasting influence and success of the Initiative can be seen in the facts that: • Professor Washington Okumu, Director of NPI throughout the time it was involved

in South Africa, used the relationships and the knowledge that he had built through the Initiative to mediate successfully between President de Klerk, Nelson Mandela and Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi to secure the participation of the Inkatha Freedom Party in the first democratic elections of April 1994, thus securing fully peaceful participation in the political process of transition;

• Senior and highly respected sources have told NPI that research papers and policy

documents written in the context of NPI’s South African programme significantly influenced the constitutional discussions which took place in the period 1990 to 1994.

The Newick Park Initiative in Rwanda

NPI began work in Rwanda in August 1994, immediately following the genocide. Five years later our methodology has helped to build the capacity of Rwanda’s social, economic and political institutions:

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• Strong evidence suggests that reduced agricultural production created poverty that contributed to the general context of insecurity in which the genocide was able to occur. Therefore NPI has worked alongside the Ministry of Agriculture to strengthen their policy analysis through the input of international experts’ world-wide experience and research in country.

• Following the genocide 130,000 people were arrested for crimes committed during

that period. Five years later, only 900 prisoners are being tried each year; at this rate trials would still be continuing in 100 years. NPI worked with local partners to seek ways round this impasse. Unless justice is seen to be done by survivors, prisoners and their families, bitterness and revenge will take deeper root in Rwandan society. To this end NPI researched the possible roles of local truth enquiries – a route that would also allow for victim – offender mediation and the opportunity for conciliation.

Track Record of the Newick Park Initiative The Newick Park Initiative has a proven track record of holding major international conferences without attracting unwanted publicity. Joint declarations produced by participants at the end of each conference indicate the ability of NPI to facilitate the reaching of consensus among participants. Through the relationships which NPI developed in South Africa and Rwanda, the Initiative has established a reputation as a credible, impartial and productive forum. NPI has built-up an international network of research contacts and international experts on constitutional, political and economic obstacles to peace. This means NPI can rapidly mobilise high quality research in support of the dialogue process.

Profile of the Relationships Foundation International’s Advisory Board The Advisory Board meets together with the Directorate, and supported by the Secretariat, three times a year, but is also available for consultation between meetings. Further approaches are currently being made. THE RT. HON. VISCOUNT BRENTFORD, CHAIRMAN British Peer. Member of the House of Lords, 1983-99. Practised for many years as a solicitor in London. DONALD ANDERSON, Member of Parliament British Labour Member of Parliament for Swansea East since 1974. Opposition front-bench spokesman on Foreign Affairs, 1983-92. Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK Parliament since 1997. PROFESSOR M A ZAKI BADAWI Principal of the Muslim College, London and Chairman of the Imam’s Mosque Council (UK) EMERITUS PROFESSOR DERYKE BELSHAW Professor at the School of Development Studies, the University of East Anglia, Norwich. International expert on food production and rural development in Africa.

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SIR FRED CATHERWOOD Vice-President of the European Parliament 1989-92 and Vice-President of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee 1992-94. SIR ANDREW GREEN Former British Ambassador to the Saudi Arabia. CANON ANDREW WHEELER The Archbishop of Canterbury’s Secretary for Anglican Communion Affairs.

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3. Notes on the Values Promoted by the Relationships Foundation from the talk given by Dr. Michael Schluter at the Consultation

The Relationships values have emerged from the following starting points:

1. Relationships are the key to personal wellbeing. If we look at what is the most important thing in our lives, we would see that it is not our house, car or other material possessions but rather our relationships. Relationships are the key to our identity. They define who we are and whom we will become, shaped by our interactions. Furthermore, relationships are a significant factor in our physical, psychological and financial wellbeing. In addition, relationships are the reason why each of us is unique. 2. Relationships are the key to private, family and public life. Relationships affect not only our private and family life but also our public lives. Constitutions, laws, policies and structures of institutions govern how we relate to one another. Even working practices and office layouts affect relationships. Any future constitution in the Sudan will affect how all of you relate, and how your children will relate to each other. 3. Relationships are the key to economic performance and business strategy. If we think of a business we will see that it is a complex bundle of relationships with customers, investors, suppliers, employers, etc. The economy is a matrix of relationships on a larger scale between government agencies and private sector organisations. The key issue is how those relationships are organised. Capital plays a key role in the development of those relationships 4. Factors which determine how well people know each other. In my book, which is called the ‘R-Factor’, I have underlined five factors which determine how “close” people are: Directness (proximity in contact), continuity (proximity through time), multiplexity (proximity in multiple spheres), parity (proximity in levels of power) and commonality (proximity of purpose). The fifth factor, commonality, will determine whether people have shared values, vision and purpose. One of the goals of our consultation is to develop greater shared vision and purpose. 5. A Relational approach raises some larger questions. The Relational approach raises some significant questions. For example, justice, being a key factor in healthy relationships, raises the question of forgiveness. What is the meaning of political forgiveness? How can it be achieved? These are questions that many countries have been dealing with. Out of these arise a number of other important questions: What sort of relationships are we looking for? With whom? What kind of political structures will produce these relationships? These are some of the key concerns of the RFI in seeking to facilitate this consultation.