Smart Captive Consumer

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    Smart grids and the techno-material construction of an electricity consumer

    GRANDCLÉMENT Catherine GRETS !ED" R#D$ catherine%grandclement&gmail%com

    NADA' Alain C(RED ) CNRS nadai&centre-cired%fr

    Draft paper. Only to be quoted and/or cited with permission of the authors.

    A*STRACT+

    The paper focuses on construction of the « smart » electricity consumer in France. The analysis isbased on a seemingly minor episode of a large and still ongoing protest against the deployment of asmart metering infrastructure in France. That minor episode has howe!er largescale consequences

    for consumers and businesses.

    Following suit with social history and cultural theory approaches of consumption but with an "#Ttwist$ we consider consumers as constructed figures. %e e&amine 'the ma(ing of the consumer) in a!ery literal sense$ that of the material and technical de!ices through which an alleged 'consumerbeha!iour) is inscribed in a crucial piece of the electricity mar(et. "t least three !ersions of theconsumer struggle to be inscribed in the French smart meter. Two of them are !ersion of a consumerdefined by indi!idual preferences$ indi!idual action and rational optimisation. The first !ersion is an'energy sa!ing consumer) which resembles !ery much the 'attitude$ beha!iour$ choice) paradigm ofenergy efficiency *+ho!e$ ,-1-. The second !ersion is a 'rational chooser) on a mar(et$ originated ineconomic theory. The third !ersion is the attached consumer. argely capti!e of elaborate mar(et

    offers and mar(eting de!ices$ that consumer unwillingly relinquishes his power to suppliers *0ochoy$,--2 Trompette$ ,--3.

    The struggle to inscribe the consumer in the meter also is a struggle to define how the mar(et shouldwor(. %e follow the way in which different theories and practices of mar(et construction becomeinterwo!en in and around the technical design of the French smart meter. This paper brings aconcrete case study to the discussion of mar(ets as means of steering energy demand. 4t is also a

    critical appraisal of how mar(ets and consumers are constructed.

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    IntroductionIntroductionIntroductionIntroduction

    The paper focuses on the construction of the « smart » electricity consumer in France. Our analysis isbased on a seemingly minor episode of the large public and still ongoing protest against thedeployment of a smart metering infrastructure in France1. That minor episode which concerns a small

    technical component of the French smart meter has howe!er largescale consequences for consumersand businesses. %hat is at sta(e in this contro!ersy is how endusers are defined as electricityconsumers and with what type of agency.

    This story is reconstructed from a small set of inter!iews with highprofile managers in a series of (eyinstitutions of the smart meter programme,. %hile our inter!iews were intended to be e&ploratory$we found oursel!es propelled into a minutiae of technical details about the smart meter design andespecially about the 'radio module) of the French smart meter. 5ach of these technical details was infact a mo!e in a political and economic battle *atour$ 16672 8ac9en:ie$ 166-. %hat was at sta(e wasthe role of the consumer and its capacities to act in the renewed electrical world of the smart grid."ssociated with this position of the consumer was also e!idently the ability to act of businesses andother actors.

    Our approach of the case study is !ery much informed by an "#Tbrand of social studies of mar(ets.Following on social history and cultural theory of consumption but with an "#T twist$ we considerconsumers not as natural beings but as constructed figures. The tas( we set oursel!es on is ofe&amining 'the ma(ing of the consumer) in a !ery literal sense$ that of the material and technicalde!ices through which something such as a 'consumer beha!iour) could be e&pressed. 4n so doing$ werely on the notion of 'script) as put forward by 8adeleine "(rich *"(rich$ 166, in order to analyse theway in which agency is configured and distributed among 'humans 'and 'nonhumans) **"(rich andatour$ 166,2 *Oudshoorn and ;inch$ ,--ects of smart grids *?:den+chilling$ ,-132 +trengers$ ,-1

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    data. They de!elop business models around ser!ices of energy consumption optimisation forresidential customers. %hile contested by consumer associations$ this decision is also parado&ically supported on grounds of fair competition by tenants of free mar(et. This story thus has the potentialto add to the 'performati!ity) debate *8ac9en:ie et al.$ ,--$*8ac9en:ie$ ,--= focusing on'economists in the wild) rather than on academic economists. Or more precisely$ about the role of

    mar(eting (nowhow against that of the economic (nowledge *#ilsson and Eelgesson$ ,-13.

    This paper is di!ided in two sections. 4n the first section$ we point to the emergence of the consumercharacter in 5uropean energy policy. %e show that smart meters and smart grids are importanttechnologies that sustain the possibility for users to be understood as consumers. This sets the stagefor the second section of the paper in which we re!iew the !arious possible technical configurationsof the smart meter. Three such configurations are e&amined$ each of them corresponding to a differentunderstanding of what is a consumer and what he can do.

    1.1.1.1.  TheTheTheThe consumer as part of theconsumer as part of theconsumer as part of theconsumer as part of the smartsmartsmartsmart grid deploymentgrid deploymentgrid deploymentgrid deployment across Europeacross Europeacross Europeacross Europe

    1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.  The electricity cThe electricity cThe electricity cThe electricity consumer andonsumer andonsumer andonsumer and the smartthe smartthe smartthe smart meter in EU directivesmeter in EU directivesmeter in EU directivesmeter in EU directives

    The 'consumer) is a relati!ely new character in the electricity sector and one which is closelyassociated with the process of mar(et liberalisation. The consumer has become the rele!ant sub>ectof 5@ energy policy. 4n recent years$ two directi!es ha!e promoted both the consumer as the (ey actorof energy policy and smart meters as the way to allow consumers to hold this (ey role.

    This first of these directi!es is the ,--7 5@ Directi!e on energy efficiency

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    1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.  The consumer, the smart meter and the smart home in FranceThe consumer, the smart meter and the smart home in FranceThe consumer, the smart meter and the smart home in FranceThe consumer, the smart meter and the smart home in France

    1.2.1.1.2.1.1.2.1.1.2.1.  Principles of the smart homePrinciples of the smart homePrinciples of the smart homePrinciples of the smart home

    The smart electricity grid is a technological pro>ect that mobili:es important funding for research$technology and business de!elopment in the @+$ in 5urope and in "sia *+trengers$ ,-1ect that is focused on the home and is sometimes called 'smart home). The smart home is also afield where mar(et de!elopment is e&pected and where business models are speculati!ely imagined.

    The s(etch below is a technical diagram of how a 'smart home) could wor(. " bo& recei!es direct loadcontrol orders or price signals and communicate through wa!es or wires with the electrical appliancesof the home. This smart home does not need a smart meter to wor(.

    3 +uch as better monitoring of power failures and a better integration of renewable energies such as wind power

    and photo!oltaics.

    7 " physical property of the electricity system shall be noted here. For electricity to circulate in the electrical

    networ( and be deli!ered at consumption point$ supply and demand ha!e to be equal at all times. This is

    sometimes called the 'loadbalancing requirement) of the system. The loads *consumption must be balanced

    *met with generation *production. The smart grid opens up prospects for controlling consumption in order tomeet the requirement of production equals consumption at all times.

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    "(G,RE % Smart home se.arated from smart meter

    1.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.2.  The fusion of the smart meter and the smart home projects in FranceThe fusion of the smart meter and the smart home projects in FranceThe fusion of the smart meter and the smart home projects in FranceThe fusion of the smart meter and the smart home projects in France

    4n France$ a largescale smart meter rollout started in ,-1- with a 7month pilot phase during whicharound ects of technical inno!ation.4n Kune ,-11$ at a moment of heightened criticisms of the meter and while promoters of the pro>ect

    raced to speed up decisions on the smart meter deployment$ a new call for tender for smart griddemonstration pro>ects was issued. This call included the smart meter as an obligatory passage pointof such pro>ects.

    The initial smart meter pro>ect in France was howe!er not specifically designed to support demandside management functions. 4ts aims were rather to automate meter readings in order to sa!e onreading costs and to impro!e the bills accuracy2 to pre!ent electricity stealing2 and to monitorconsumption at the le!el of a neighbourhood. The funding scheme for smart home pro>ects of ,-11made two independent pro>ects *smart meter and smart home intersect. 4t led to embedding smarthome functions inside the smart meter. 4t also led to the disco!ery of an empty slot inside the meterwhere such smart home functions could be located *see figure ,. This empty slot could be filled with

    a 'radio module) whose wa!es could be transmitted to home appliances.

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    "(G,RE /% Em.ty slot inside the meter

    Following the presidential and general elections campaign in ,-1,$ the smart meter pro>ect was haltedfor se!eral months. 4n #o!ember ,-1,$ a wor(ing group on the meter was initiated by the newlyelected 5n!ironment 8inister. The wor(ing group comprised industry sta(eholders$ administrati!ebodies and consumer organisations. 4t dealt with financing aspects$ functionalities$ schedule$ healthissues$ technical standards$ etc. " subset of this wor(ing group was de!oted to the 'radio module) ofthe meter. The technical design of the radio module and the associated positions of the consumer andtypes of mar(et design is the topic of a struggle that we e&amine in the second part of this paper.

    2.2.2.2.  cripting consumers and !usiness models in the metercripting consumers and !usiness models in the metercripting consumers and !usiness models in the metercripting consumers and !usiness models in the meter

    +ince smart home pro>ects now had to pass through the meter$ it in!ol!ed a redesign of both the meterand the smart home. "s can be seen on figure

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    "(G,RE 0% Smart home through the meter

    2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.  Inscri!ingInscri!ingInscri!ingInscri!ing the "energy saver# consumer in the meterthe "energy saver# consumer in the meterthe "energy saver# consumer in the meterthe "energy saver# consumer in the meter

    4n order to be fully deployed$ the smart meter programme had to pro!e that it was beneficial *the costbenefit analysis should be positi!e$ see abo!e. 5nergy sa!ings for the endconsumers were includedin the e&pected benefits of the smart meter deployment. " quite widespread assumption was thatenergy sa!ings would become possible on the consumerLs side because of *almost realtime and easilya!ailable information about energy consumptions. 0entral to this reasoning was a !ersion of theconsumer endowed with beha!iours that would change according to information. This beha!iourist!ersion of the consumer is typical of the "ttitude$ Meha!iour$ 0hange or "M0 model of society that is!ery widespread in energy policy circles *+ho!e$ ,-1-.

    The smart meter$ howe!er$ only had a small and not easy to read screen. 4n addition$ meters are oftenlocated outside the home or deliberately hidden of sight *concealed in a cabinet with the fuse bo&$ forinstance. "s a consequence$ it seemed unli(ely that consumers would regularly chec( their meter$collect information and modify their electricity usage accordingly. 0riticisms arose. The energy anden!ironment agency issued a negati!e rating for the meter. " consumer organi:ation noticed thatconsumers would not only ha!e to bear the cost of the meter but also to pay for an additional  displayde!ice in order to get the frequently updated information that was part of the smart meter promise.

    "s a response to these criticisms$ in Kanuary ,-1,$ a ministerial order indicated that smart meterswould ha!e to ha!e N i an interface accessible to the consumer for information display 2 and ii thepotential to transmit data so as to enable the remote control of appliances. 0learly$ the smart meteralone was not fulfilling these requirements.

    0onsumer associations$ the energy and en!ironment agency and the energy ombudsman sei:ed the#o!ember ,-1, wor(ing group as an opportunity to demand that the smart meter be beneficial to theconsumer and pro!ide information in a way that would promote energy sa!ings beha!iours. 8oreprecisely they demanded that the radio module ser!ed this purpose. They as(ed that all

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    to a screen *an inhome display that would be pro!ided to e!eryone along with the meter *see figureB.

    4t was thus proposed that a communicating radio module and an 'inhome display) be installed witheach smart meter as part of the public ser!ice of electricity. "fter all$ the meter itself had beenintroduced with an argument of public ser!ice and equality in a typical manifestation of the

    'infrastructural ideal) *Sraham and 8ar!in$ ,--1. " single type of smart meter was to be installed inall ected to mar(et dynamics.

    "(G,RE 1% Smart meter 2 (n-3ome Dis.lay

    The regulator howe!er ruled against the uni!ersal pro!ision of radio modules and inhome displays. 4t >ustified his position with reference to the 'unbundling) doctrine and what is an essentially spatialaccount of where public ser!ice ends and where mar(et begins. @pstream from the meter is thenatural monopoly of the grid operated by a regulated public company *grid operator. Downstreamfrom it is the realm of the mar(et$ with se!eral companies competing for energy pro!ision *energypro!iders. The meter itself is situated in the domain of the public good. 4t is understood as a flatinterface between the two domains. From this point of !iew$ anything which is plugged in afterL *ordownstream from the meter is part of the domain of mar(et competition. This spatialpolitical orderwould be disturbed if the grid operator or indeed any public ser!ice operator was to pro!ide a datadisplay beyond the meterL and if it was to do so as a uni!ersal or basic ser!ice to all homes. +houldthis happen$ the spatial boundary between mar(et and regulated infrastructure would be fractured. "

    public good would enter the downstream domain$ it would enter peoplesL homes rightlyL posited asthe realm of the mar(et and in so doing it would distort competition *see figure 3. " publicly pro!idedinhome display would intrude$ e!en protrude in the neat di!ision between infrastructure and mar(etthat is a founding tenet of mar(et liberalisation in the electricity sector *8osca$ ,--=2 Ce!erdy$ ,-1B.

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    "(G,RE 4% The un5undling doctrine .re6ents the smart meter to 5e e7tendedinside the home)mar8et 9ith a dis.lay

    4n addition$ the energy regulator and the energy pro!iders saw the pro!ision of data about energyusage as a commodifiable ser!ice$ and thus as something that should be deli!ered through the mar(et$rather than being !iewed as a public good. ;ro!iders had already formulated business models basedon the telco industry in which they e&pected to offer consumers energy and energy ser!ices in new$commercially !iable bundles$ for e&ample by offering specific tariffs and  energy displays. The idea thatinhome displays would be pro!ided to e!eryone as part of the basic public ser!ice and pro!ision ofelectricity would instantly in!alidate these business models. 4f pro!iders were no longer able to

    compete on elaborate bundled offers of rates and smart displays but only on bare prices$ they wouldsoon enter a ratrace competition to the bottom. From their point of !iew future benefits were faste!aporating.

    The energy regulator insisted on drawing a clear line between the meter and the home because themeter is part of the natural monopoly of the electricity networ( which is regulated. The interface wasto be supplied by the mar(et *apps$ website$ displays.... and fully positioned on the consumer side.Eowe!er$ in order to satisfy to the Kanuary ,-1, ministerial order$ it was decided that a simplydesigned website would be set up$ where the customer could log in and retrie!e some informationabout his/her electricity usage *figure 7.

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    "(G,RE :% The smart meter and its .u5lic ser6ice 9e5 interface

    2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.  Using the meter to carry price signals and activate the consumerUsing the meter to carry price signals and activate the consumerUsing the meter to carry price signals and activate the consumerUsing the meter to carry price signals and activate the consumer

    The discussions about using the radio module as a gate to the inhome display opened up e&changesabout which data would be made a!ailable to the consumer. The ombudsman and consumerorgani:ations too( for granted that price data would be a!ailable in and through the meter. 4t wase&pected that the consumer could go buy a display de!ice and plug it into the meter in order to displayenergy prices and consumption at home. ;rice information was anyway needed in order to manageappliances which is an assumed ob>ecti!e of the smart home programme.

    The surprise was thus great in the wor(ing group when this assumption was not bac(ed up by thediscussions. #ot only would technicalities limit the meter in managing multiple and dynamic price fieldsbut the energy regulator again opposed this e!entuality. "ccording to the regulator$ 'unbundling)required the regulated grid operator not to interfere with mar(et coordination. This meant that gridoperator shall not access mar(et data such as electricity retail prices. "lthough the consumer needselectricity rates to manage its appliances$ those rates shall not pass through the meter.

    5!entually$ a compromise was foundN pricemenus could be inscribed as hierarchical inde&es in themeter. "s pro&ies for prices$ inde&es could inform the consumer about the hierarchy of pricing whilenot re!ealing the e&act real prices to the grid manager. Uet$ as emphasised by the ombudsman$ theywould not allow genuine optimisation. 0onsumerled demandresponse outside the prepac(agedoffers of energy suppliers *who (now their prices could only remain limited.

    The decision was thus again >ustified by a boundary argumentN the mar(et as a space of pri!ateinterests had to be clearly separated from the space of collecti!e infrastructure and public interests.

    2.$.2.$.2.$.2.$.  Using the radio module as a smart home !oUsing the radio module as a smart home !oUsing the radio module as a smart home !oUsing the radio module as a smart home !o%%%%

    The discussions about the radio module in the wor(ing group progressi!ely rendered e&plicit anotherpro>ect about this module. +ome actors intended to use the radio module to carry on the usualfunctions of energy management bo&es *see the initial smart home pro>ect$ in figure 1. The bo& infigure 1 could transmit direct loadcontrol order to appliances or recei!e price signals as inputs foroptimisation. ;rice signals could be processed by an algorithm comprising consumer preferences and

    appliances management resources in order to decide whether or not to shut down / postpone certainhome equipment *washing machine$ fridge$ heating G.

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    One ad!antage of using the radio module for demand response functionalities was that only themeters of customers with a demandresponse type of electricity rate would ha!e to be equipped withthat e&tra component. Eowe!er$ since there is only one slot in the French smart meter$ folding thesmart home bo& in its 'radio module) and using it for 'demandresponse) functionalities createdri!alries as it endowed the actor who lodges his bo& in the meter with de facto mar(et ad!antage.

    This pro>ect howe!er was closed down with the argument that a recent 5nergy 5fficiency directi!e = required the downstream meter mar(et to remain fully open to competitors. "s a mar(et offerchooser$ the smartelectricity consumer should be faced with multiple offers in order to get the chanceto e&press its optimi:ing potential and dri!e mar(et competition to a socially efficient configuration.

    The presence of an incompetition smart home bo&$ supported by pri!ate business models$ installeddownstream from the meter and communicating with it$ was thus required as a guarantee of acompetiti!e en!ironment.

    2.&.2.&.2.&.2.&.  'etting a mar(et for "smart home !o%es# d'etting a mar(et for "smart home !o%es# d'etting a mar(et for "smart home !o%es# d'etting a mar(et for "smart home !o%es# developevelopevelopevelop

    Finally$ the wor(ing group ended up with the following configurationN a radio module that transmits aprice hierarchy *but not a price list through 'openaccess) wa!es so that competitors could de!elopbusiness models downstream from it and offer competiti!e energy management bo&es.

    "(G,RE ;% The smart home through the smart meter9ith a mar8et for energy management 5o7es

    4n this final configuration$ the consumer could in principle choose separately a bo& and a rate and thenprogramme his bo& so that the bo& could decode the price hierarchy from the meter. Mut in practice$the energy pro!ider *who (nows prices is much more able to do that assemblage of rate and bo& thanthe enduser. This assemblage would be bundled offers with elaborate electricity rates$ an energymanagement bo& and perhaps a 'smart) thermostat$ an app or a display. 4n so doing$ mar(et actorswould render the cost of the smart grid equipment in!isible for the final user. +uch a 'bundled) offer

    = Directi!e ,-1,/,/5@ on 5nergy 5fficiency "rticle 1=

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    could comprise for instance a rate of this typeN price " at daytime wee(days e&cept from 7pm to =pm2price M from 7pm to =pm wee(days2 price 0 at nighttime wee(days2 price D at daytime wee(ends2price 5 at nighttime wee(ends2 price F from 1,pm to or emergencieslimited to 1B days a yearH and a compatible preprogrammed bo& that would allow the consumer toget most 'benefits) from that rate.

    4n this (ind of elaborate bundles of ser!ices$ the pro!ider (eeps the consumer 'under) his hand. Theconsumer is 'capti!e) captatedH in the sense of Trompette *,--3 and 0ochoy *,--. %hile$ accordingto 0ochoy$ it is always possible in principle for a customer to change supplier$ this is !ery difficult inpractice. The realm of this consumer choice is o!erloo(ed by the abstractness of the economicapproach to mar(et competition and the 'mar(et chooser) consumer. The figure of the consumer thatis inscribed in the technomaterial ecosystem of the meter is that of a semicapti!e consumer.

    $.$.$.$.  )onclusion)onclusion)onclusion)onclusionssss

    The first conclusion of this story has to do with the emergence of a consumer figure for smart grids.

    The case points at a struggle to inscribe the consumer in the meter. Three different figures are at playin this struggleN a beha!ioural energy sa!er2 a mar(et offer chooser and a capti!e customer. " ratherabstract economic doctrine *unbundling is countered in this struggle by concrete technomaterialmar(eting efforts which result in twists and ob!ious contradictions in that doctrine. The final consumeris depri!ed of price information$ an information that the economic doctrine sees as a basic conditionof the functioning of a mar(et. %e end up with the parado&ical result that in the name of the mar(et$prices shall not be disclosed to the final consumer

    The second conclusion is to consider mar(et boundaries as a :one rather than as a fine line. Theunbundling doctrine holds a representation of the mar(et as a delimited domain of acti!ity with clearcut boundaries. The in(y contro!ersy pro!es that this boundary is not a line. 4t is a :one to use a notion

    put forward by Timothy 8itchell *8itchell$ ,--. 4n this :one struggles and negotiations happen aboutwhere to draw the boundary. 8ar(et actors want to e&pand the mar(et in order to increase the scopeof their business models.

    The third conclusion deals with the notion of public interest. The radio module struggle could beconsidered as a focused discussion that allows actors not to rediscuss the smart metering programmeas such. 4n the discussion$ a con!ergence of interest emerges for financing the meter through themar(et at the e&penses of a capti!e consumer. The cost of the smart home infrastructure is borne byendconsumers through business models and the mar(et while public authorities stay out of the way.The 8inistries of energy and en!ironment and the energy regulator can a!oid being posited as the*political source of this cost. Moth the grid operator and the main energy pro!ider a!oid the ris( ofbeing posited as the managers of financial flows. Downstreammeter industrialists are endowed with

    an e&tended enough sphere of acti!ity to de!elop business models *mi& of ser!ice$ smarthomes G.Eence$ the capti!e consumer that is inscribed into the technical design of the meter and its ecosystemshould be regarded as the collateral effect of this con!ergence of interest. 4t must be noted howe!erthat this con!ergence of interest is not always the product of an intentional action on the part of theactors. "s said abo!e$ as a doctrine$ 'unbundling) deri!es its rhetorical power from proceeding throughclearcut dichotomies. 4t is howe!er so abstract when it comes to actual practices of mar(et actors thatit bypasses the subtleties of mar(eting de!ices. 4t cannot sort out the de!ices that see( to attach theconsumer from those which see( to offer the consumer a genuine choice.

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