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october 98

The UNTAESExperience:Weapons Buy-back in EasternSlavonia, Baranja and WesternSirmium (Croatia)

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About the author

Cover Photo:UNTAES buy-back program:weapons turned in at the RussianBattalion's Weapons Buy-backlocation at Klisa, Eastern Slavonia.

Contents

ZusammenfassungGerman summary 4

Executive summary 5

Preface 6

Prologue to a Collection Effort 9

Politico-military background 9

The Basic Agreement and the establishmentof UNTAES 11

Demilitarization and the economy 13

Impetus for the weapon collection effort 14

Program Design and Implementation 16

Discussions with Croatian autorities 16

Program elements and inception 17

Weapon storage and disposition 20

Program Outcome and Impact 22

An element of a broader strategy 22

Numerical results and costs 22

Shifting perceptions 23

Addressing the availability and visibility of weapons 24

Overall assessment of the program 25

References 26

Appendices

I. Basic Agreement 27

II. Promotional Poster�Serbian(Cyrillic) script 30

III. Promotional Poster�Croatian(Latin) script 31

IV. UNTAES Bulletin, Issue No. 16(October 1996) 32

V. UNTAES Bulletin, Issue No. 17(October 1996) 33

VI. Weapon Buy-back ProgramResults to 7 March 1997 34

Derek Boothby served as DeputyTransitional Administrator ofUNTAES from February 1996 toMarch 1997. He was previously theDirector of the Europe Division inthe United Nations Department ofPolitical Affairs. His earlier service inthe UN included work on the formerYugoslavia on the staff of Mr. CyrusVance, Deputy Director ofOperations for weapons inspectionsin Iraq, and a number of positions inthe Department for DisarmamentAffairs. Mr. Boothby currently residesin the United States and can bereached via e-mail atDGBoothby@aol.com.

The views expressed in this paper arethose of the author and do notnecessarily represent those of eitherthe United Nations or the BonnInternational Center for Conversion.

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brief 12The UNTAESExperience:Weapons Buy-back in Eastern Slavonia,Baranja and Western Sirmium (Croatia)

byDerek Boothby

october 98

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Ende 1995 wurde parallel zum Abkom-men von Dayton, mit dem die Waffenin Bosnien und Herzegowina endlichzum Schweigen gebracht wurden,zwischen Serben und Kroaten über dieZukunft des letzten von Serbienbesetzten Teils Kroatiens verhandelt.Dieses Gebiet, westlich der Donau, dernatürlichen Grenze zwischen denbeiden Ländern, war seit dem Fall desZentralortes Vukovar im November1991 unter der Kontrolle der Serben.Das Ergebnis dieser Verhandlungenwurde in Erdut, einem Dorf am Uferder Donau, am 12. November 1995unterzeichnet. Es sah vor, daß der UNSicherheitsrat eine Übergangs-verwaltung einsetzte, die das Gebiet füreinen bestimmten Zeitraum �regieren�sollte, und daß er eine internationalebewaffnete Truppe zur Sicherung desFriedens und der allgemeinen Sicher-heit autorisierte.

Am 15. Januar 1996 gab der UNSicherheitsrat grünes Licht für einezweijährige UN Friedensmission indiesem Gebiet. Die Aufgabe derUNTAES (United Nations TransitionalAdministration in Eastern Slavonia,Baranja and Western Sirmium) war diefriedliche Reintegration des Gebietes indie Republik Kroatien.

UNTAES war mehr als eine reineFriedensmission. Als �Regierung� hattedie Übergangsverwaltung weitreichendeVerantwortung auch in zivilen Berei-chen, wie z. B. die Einhaltung vonRecht und Ordnung. Obwohl dieansässige serbische Armee im Juni 1996entwaffnet worden war, gab es immernoch eine große Zahl von Waffen inden Händen der serbischen Bevölke-rung. Dazu gehörten Gewehre ebensowie Panzerabwehrraketen, Mörser,Minen und viele Typen von Munition.

Obwohl das Mandat der UNTAESnicht ausdrücklich vorsah, die Zivilbe-völkerung zu entwaffnen, war es klar,daß solch eine Aktion nötig war, umüberhaupt Recht und Ordnungeinziehen zu lassen, um Frieden undSicherheit zu gewährleisten und um dieRahmenbedingungen für die zukünfti-ge Übergabe eines entmilitarisiertenund sicheren Gebietes an die alleinigeKontrolle der kroatischen Regierungzu schaffen.

Die Option, in Razzien Waffen zusuchen und zu beschlagnahmen, wurdevon den UNTAES verworfen, da manbefürchten mußte, daß die Bevölke-rung die UNTAES schnell als Besat-zungsmacht ansehen würde. Manmußte andere Wege finden, ausrei-chende Anreize für die freiwilligeRückgabe von Waffen zu schaffen.Aus diesen Überlegungen entstand dasKonzept eines Waffen-Rückkauf-Programms, das von der kroatischenRegierung finanziert wurde. Verhand-lungen mit der kroatischen Regierungbegannen im Juni 1996; im Oktoberwurde man sich einig und das Pro-gramm begann.

Zwischen dem 2. Oktober 1996 unddem 19. August 1997, dem Ende desWaffen-Rückkauf-Programms, wurdenca. 10.000 Gewehre, 7.000Panzerabwehrrakenten-Werfer, 15.000Granaten und fast zwei MillionenSchuß Munition abgeliefert. Währenddes Programms konnte die Bevölke-rung die Waffen an vier Sammelplät-zen der UNTAES in der Region gegenBarzahlung und ohne Feststellung vonPersonalien abgeben. KroatischeExperten ermittelten die zu zahlendenBeträge und zahlten sie direkt bar andie Ablieferer aus. Dies geschah aufWunsch der UNTAES, die kein Geldverwalten wollten, um auszuschließen,daß später irgendwelche Anschuldi-gungen über eine falsche Verwaltungdes Geldes erhoben würden.

Funktionstüchtige Waffen wurdennach Zagreb gebracht und dort aufUN-Gelände bis zum Ende desUNTAES-Mandats im Januar 1998verwahrt. Sie wurden dann denkroatischen Behörden übergeben. Alte,unbrauchbare oder gefährliche Waffensowie sämtliche Munition wurden vonden UNTAES zerstört.

Alles in allem war das Waffen-Rück-kauf-Programm höchst erfolgreich.Natürlich wurden nicht alle Waffenvon der Zivilbevölkerung abgegeben,aber jede einzelne Waffe und jederSchuß Munition, die eingesammeltwurden, verminderte deren Gesamtan-zahl und trug zusammen mit vielenanderen Aspekten der Tätigkeit derUNTAES langsam aber sicher mit dazubei, daß die Region von einem unsiche-ren Kriegsgebiet zu einem Gebietwurde, in dem man sich wieder sicheraufhalten kann.

Beruhend auf den UNTAES Erfah-rungen gibt es wenig Zweifel daran,daß ein Waffen-Rückkauf-Programmunter den richtigen Voraussetzungen -mit Bedacht geplant und sorgfältigdurchgeführt - ein besonders sinnvollerBeitrag zu umfassenden Bemühungenum die Wiederherstellung von Friedenund Stabilität nach Bürgerkriegen ist.

Zusammen-fassung

German Summary

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In late 1995, at the same time as theDayton Accord was at last bringingsilence to the guns in Bosnia andHerzegovina, a separate agreement wasbeing negotiated between Serbs andCroats over the future of theremaining Serb-occupied part ofCroatia. This region, lying on thewestern bank of the River Danube thatwas the border between the twocountries, had been under Serb controlsince the fall of its main town,Vukovar, in November 1991. Singed atErdut, a village on the bank of theRiver Danube, on 12 November 1995,the agreement called upon the UNSecurity Council to establish atransitional administration to �govern�the region for a transitional period andto authorize an international force tomaintain peace and security.

Authorized by the United NationsSecurity Council on 15 January 1996,for the next two years a UN peace-keeping operation took place in theregion. With the title of UnitedNations Transitional Administration inEastern Slavonia, Baranja and WesternSirmium (UNTAES), its mission wasto achieve the peaceful reintegration ofthe region into the Republic ofCroatia.

UNTAES was more than astraightforward peace-keepingoperation. With authority to �govern�the region, the Transitional Administra-tion had extensive civil responsibilitiesincluding the maintenance of law andorder. Following the demilitarization ofthe local Serb army in June 1996, therewere significant numbers of weaponsin the hands of the Serb population.The weapons ranged from handguns toanti-tank rockets and mortars, mines,cassette bombs and a wide range ofammunition.

Although the mandate of UNTAEScontained no specific reference toremoving weapons from civilian hands,it was clear that a determined effort ofthis nature was consistent with theneed to ensure civil law and order, themaintenance of peace and security andthe preparation of conditions for theeventual handing over of the region,demilitarized and secure, to thesovereign control of the governmentof Croatia.

A �search-and-seize� operation byUNTAES was discounted, as it wouldhave resulted in UNTAES beingquickly regarded as an occupationforce. Other methods had to be found,with appropriate inducements thatwould attract the voluntary surrenderof weapons. Trom these considerationsthe concept arose of a weapons buy-back scheme financed by the Croatiangovernment. Discussions with Croatianauthorities began in June 1996 and byearly October, arrangements had beenagreed and the program began.

Between 2 October 1996 and 19August 1997, when the program ended,the program recovered approximately10,000 rifles, 7,000 anti-tank rocketlaunchers, 15,000 grenades and almosttwo million rounds of ammunition.The program provided for payments incash and anonymously, at fourcollection points in the UNTAESmilitary compounds in the region. Theamounts to be paid were determinedby Croatian weapons experts who thenpaid cash direct to the personconcerned. This was at UNTAESrequest so that no UNTAES personnelhandled any money, thereby eliminatingthe risk of subsequent allegations overthe mishandling of cash.

Weapons in good condition weretransferred to Zagreb and placed instorage in UN custody until the end ofthe UNTAES mandate in January 1998when they were handed over to theCroatian authorities. Weapons thatwere old, unserviceable or dangerous,and all ammunition recovered, weredestroyed by UNTAES.

Overall, the weapons buy-backprogram was a highly successfuloperation. It certainly did not removeall the weapons from civilian hands,but every weapon and every round ofammunition recovered reduced thenumbers at large and steadilycontributed, together with the otheraspects of UNTAES work, to movingthe region from the tension of wartowards s return of stability.

In the light of the UNTAESexperience, there would appear to belittle doubt that in appropriatecircumstances a weapons buy-backprogram�sensitively designed andcarefully implemented�can be ahighly useful contribution to widerefforts to restore peace and stability incivil societies in the wake of war.

ExecutiveSummary

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The termination of several long-standing armed conflicts in recentyears has raised the prospects for theredirection of resources towards morepeaceful pursuits. However, in manyrespects, the immediate post-conflictperiod is characterized as a time ofuneasy transition. Ex-combatants mustbe demobilized and reintegrated intocivil society, the long process ofphysical and psychological healing mustbegin, dysfunctional public institutionsrebuilt, and disrupted developmentrestarted in a sustainable way�allsignificant challenges in and ofthemselves. The presence of a largevolume of weapons�especially smallarms and light weapons�in thisenvironment directly endangers thefulfillment of these objectives.

Despite the extreme difficulties inimplementing disarmament in theimmediate post-conflict period,1

countries emerging from a period ofconflict, as well as the internationalcommunity, have begun to recognizethe importance of removing theweapons threat from the post-conflictequation. With increasing frequency,weapons collection is becoming anexplicit and essential element of peacesettlements. The agreements markingthe termination of conflicts in Nicara-gua, El Salvador, Haiti, Guatemala,Liberia, Mozambique, Angola, Mali,and the Central African Republic,among others, have all borne this outto varying degrees of success. Theinternational community also hasrecently introduced important initiati-ves calling for the proper integrationof weapons collection into conflict-termination agreements:

In August 1997, the United NationsPanel of Governmental Experts onSmall Arms delivered its final reportto the Secretary-General.2 Asidefrom highlighting the extent towhich the proliferation of smallarms is threatening internationaldevelopment efforts and the peace-keeping operations of the UN itself,the report urges the UN and itsMember States to step up theirefforts in combating the illicit useand transfer of these weapons.Among other things, the reportspecifically recommends: UN supportfor post-conflict disarmament measuressuch as weapons turn-in programs anddisposal of weapons; the integration ofweapons collection and disposal plans intopeace settlements; and the prompt collectionand destruction of all weapons not underlegal civilian possession and not requiredfor national defense or internal security.

On 26 June 1997, the EuropeanUnion Council of Ministers adoptedthe �EU Programme for Preventingand Combating Illicit Trafficking inConventional Arms,� in which bothMember States and the EuropeanCommission express their politicalcommitment to take action toprevent and combat illicit traffickingin arms�particularly small arms.The Programme itself lays out aframework of activities which fallinto three categories: 1) measures toprevent illicit arms flows from orthough Member States; 2) measuresto help other countries prevent illicitarms flows from or though theirterritories; 3) measures to assistcountries, especially in post-conflictsituations or situations where aminimal degree of security andstability exists, in suppressing theillicit flow of arms. The latterincludes incorporating appropriate

measures into peacekeeping operations andcease-fire and peace agreements;establishing weapons collection, buy-backand destruction programs; setting upeducational programs to promote awarenessof the negative consequences of illicittrafficking, and; promoting re-integrationof former combatants into civilian life.

Though these initiatives areencouraging, significant gaps remain inboth knowledge of past experienceand plans on how to proceed withimplementation of practical measuresin the areas circumscribed. However,with further elaboration of what hasbeen done and what is possible, statescan be compelled to take concreteaction.

Weapons collection atBICC

The case study presented in BICC Brief12�covering the weapons buy-backprogram conducted by UNTAES inEastern Slavonia�has beencommissioned in conjunction withBICC�s project on Weapons Collection andDisposal as an Element of Post-SettlementPeace-Building. The project, spanning atwo-year period, is partially funded bythe Ford Foundation and the UnitedStates Institute of Peace, in addition toBICC�s own institutional core funding.In essence, the project has beendesigned to enable a betterunderstanding of the interaction andrelative importance of weaponscollection and disposal among otherpost-conflict processes�such as thedemobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants.

Preface

1 In such a situation, combatants are oftenuncertain a peace will hold and unwilling to giveup their arms, and the unstable securityenvironment warrants even �civilian� possessionof weapons for self-defense.2 Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts onSmall Arms. United Nations General Assemblydocument A/52/298, 27 August 1997.

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As part of this project, we have chosento undertake a focused comparison ofseveral countries where weaponscollection was considered an essentialelement of the process. The casesselected to date include: Guatemala, ElSalvador, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia),Mali, the Central African Republic, andLiberia. These cases share bothsignificant similarities and offersignificant differences from which toevaluate aspects of weapons collectionand derive lessons learned.

There are, potentially, two phases toweapons collection in a post-conflictsociety. In what I will term Phase Icollection, the immediate threat ofreversion to open conflict is removedor lessened by the disarmament anddemobilization of ex-combatants.However, this does not remove thethreat of weapons or the potential forreversion to violence. Frequently, insocieties which have undergone drawn-out and divisive conflict, a culture ofviolence is instilled and weapons havebeen dispersed throughoutcommunities�among combatants andnon-combatants alike. Therefore, PhaseII collection and related activities are agroup of longer-term efforts aimed atdisarming an armed civilianpopulation, reducing the availabilityand visibility of weapons, anddiminishing the perception thatweapons are a means to settle disputes.Essentially, the experience in EasternSlavonia reflects both these aspects ofweapons collection and thus offersfertile ground for analysis.

The project is specifically geared togenerate a strategy for the integrationof effective weapons collectionprograms into post-conflict peace-building activities, and to develop apractical handbook to guidepractitioners in the effective collectionand destruction of small arms and lightweapons. Weapons collection and

destruction, especially in the immediatepost-conflict and/or forcedemobilization phase, is a key choke-point and provides a window ofopportunity to begin to make inroadsinto stemming the flood of weapons incirculation in conflict-prone regions.Equally as important, the timely andeffective collection of weapons can bea measure of conflict prevention;preventing the subsequent spread ofthese weapons to other conflicts withinor outside the immediate area.

Approach andmethodology

As noted above, the core of the projectis a focused comparison of case studiesto determine the elements ofsuccessful weapons collection programdesign and implementation, as well asthe relevancy of weapons collection inthe broader context of peace-buildingand development. In order to achievemaximum comparability among thestudies commissioned, each author hasbeen provided with a set of factorsfrom which to base their datacollection and analysis. These factorswere designed to be relevant to theenvironment, conduct and outcome ofweapons collection in the selectedcountries. This set of baseline factorsis as follows:

Contextual factors�The generalenvironment triggering and influencing theperformance of the collection effort. Thisincludes a broad review of the politicaleconomy of each country as well as amore detailed analysis of theconflictual context that prompted theweapons collection effort and thenature of the weapons-related threat.Analysis of these factors will requireconsideration of the:

general economic situation in thecountry

impetus for the collection effort

legal context

cultural acceptability of weapons

availability and visibility of weapons

types and volume of weapons incirculation

sources of weapons flows (internalcirculation, leaks, imports)

Program factors�The goals, design, andconduct of the collection program itself. Thisincludes a detailed review of programdocumentation (including elements ofpeace agreements referencingdisarmament provisions and peace-keeping force mandates) as well asinterviews with key informants of theprocess. Analysis would include:

definition and feasibility of programgoals

incentive structure, adequacy andside-effects

whether the program was part of abroader strategy (education,awareness, enhanced security)

timing and duration

storage and destruction

form(s) of the collection effort(voluntary hand-in, buy-back,amnesty, enforcement action)

scope of collection (ex-combatants,civilian population, etc.)

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role of external assistance (incl.peacekeeping forces, advisors,financial and technical assistance)

Outcome factors�Actual programresults as well as the perceived impact by therelevant actors and civilian population. Thisgroup of factors aims to evaluate theimpact of the weapons collectioneffort and whether original goals andobjectives were achieved. Thesefactors, especially, will require bothquantitative and qualitative analysis ofthe program�s impact:

number and condition of weaponscollected

overall program cost

perception of the generalpopulation as to the collectionprogram and its outcome

whether the program addressed thesupply and demand of weapons

whether the original goals of theprogram were reached

whether the potential for violencehas been decreased

final disposition of the weapons

whether collected weapons havebeen replaced through furthersupply

whether the visibility of weaponsdecreased or increased

intangibles�secondary and tertiaryeffects of the collection experience

We, at BICC, trust you will find thefollowing study not only engaging, butalso ripe with practical observationsfrom which to inform further planning,implementation and evaluation ofweapons collection efforts.

Joseph Di Chiaro IIIProject Leader

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From October 1996 to August 1997 aweapons buy-back program was carriedout by the United Nations TransitionalAdministration in Eastern Slavonia,Baranja and Western Sirmium(UNTAES). During those ten months,approximately 10,000 rifles, 7,000 anti-tank rocket launchers, 15,000 grenadesand almost two million rounds ofammunition were removed fromcivilian hands (United Nations SecurityCouncil, 1997). Before describing howthis program was organized and carriedout, it is of interest to consider howsuch a large quantity of arms andammunition came to be in the handsof a civilian population of some135,000.

Politico-militarybackground

By its constitution of 1974, theSocialist Federal Republic ofYugoslavia under Tito was organizedfor administrative purposes into sixrepublics, with two autonomousprovinces within the republic ofSerbia. The boundary line between therepublic of Croatia and theautonomous Serb province ofVojvodina was drawn for the most partdown the river Danube, from theHungarian border in the north to Ilokin the south. Principally intended as anadministrative demarcation, whenCroatia�s independence was recognizedinternationally in 1992 this boundarybecame Croatia�s eastern border withSerbia.

By the time of Tito�s death in May1980, the strains of keeping theSocialist Federal Republic ofYugoslavia together were alreadymounting. In the years that followed,the federal institutions deteriorated andthe country disintegrated into factionalstruggles. Fanned by the flames ofnationalism and wideningdisagreements with the federalauthorities in Belgrade, first Slovenia inSeptember 1989, then Croatia in April1990, declared sovereignty whileremaining members of the federalrepublic. Within Croatia, some 12percent of the population of 4.7million were Serbs, mostly in the threeregions of the Krajina, WesternSlavonia and Eastern Slavonia.Increasingly, during 1989 and 1990hostile acts between militant membersof the respective communitiespolarized opinion and spread deepapprehension and fear on both sides.More incidents and provocationsoccurred and, in May 1990,confrontation between Croats andSerbs escalated sharply when a numberof Croatian policemen were killed in aSerb ambush in Borovo Selo, on thenorthern outskirts of Vukovar. In theweeks that followed, further violentincidents took place that led to theatmosphere becoming yet more highlycharged.

On 25 June 1991 Slovenia and Croatiadeclared themselves independent.Open warfare broke out in the summerof 1991 between the Yugoslav People�sArmy (JNA) and the poorly equippeddefense units of the two new states.The war in Slovenia lasted only ten

Prologue to aCollection Effort days, as the JNA saw no reason to fight

when virtually no Serbs lived in thecountry. However, in Croatia�whichcontained almost half a millionSerbs�the fighting was vicious andbitter. For the Serbs, it was a matter ofprotecting Serb lives and property byasserting territorial control. To theCroats it was blatant Serb aggression.

By September, the JNA controlled overa quarter of Croatian territory. It wasin three separate blocks: in the Krajinaaround the Serb stronghold of Knin,in the part of Croatia known asWestern Slavonia, and in EasternSlavonia and the Baranja although thetown of Vukovar itself remained inCroatian hands.

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Box 1: The geographical setting

As the River Danube emerges southwards from Hungary, on its long way to the Black Sea, it winds itsway majestically across a highly fertile alluvial plain before turning south-east, then east towardsBelgrade and beyond. Over the years, the wide river has altered its course from time to time,meandering through marshlands and thickly wooded areas. Inland from the river the land is very rich,with vineyards, orchards and extensive open fields producing abundant harvests of wheat, barley, corn,sunflowers, rapeseed and other crops.

Along both its banks, the Danube passes villages and towns that have been inhabited for centuries:Batina, Apatin, Aljmas, Erdut, Dalj, Borovo Selo, Vukovar, Ilok and Backa Palanka. To the west of theDanube, the northern part lying between the tributary river of the Drava and the Danube is known asthe Baranja, while the central section is part of the larger area of Eastern Slavonia and the southernpart, extending from below Vukovar past Ilok and into Serbia is Western Sirmium. In the Baranja, theonly town of size is Beli Manastir, but further south the largest urban concentration is the town andriver port of Vukovar which, until war destroyed it in 1991, was a handsome and ethnically mixed townof some 58,000 residents with architecture and houses that reflected the history and wealth of theregion.

The Vukovar area itself has been settled for some 5,000 years, as evidenced by archeological finds atthe Vucedol site by the river five kilometers south of the town. The Romans established their presencein the vicinity of Vukovar, reclaimed marshland and planted the first vineyards. Demographically, theregion as a whole has witnessed the ebb and flow of many peoples and, until 1991, the population onboth sides of the river was a mix of Serbs, Croats, Hungarians, Slovaks, Vlachs, Ruthenes and others.

The width and speed of the Danube have permitted few bridges, but the richness of the land and thevalue of the river as a route of transport and communication have attracted the interests of powerfulstates and migrating peoples. On both banks of the river and the surrounding lands, Roman, Frankish,Turkish, Austro-Hungarian and German armies have marched, deployed and constructed defensivepositions. State authority has changed hands on many occasions as military power and politicalauthority have risen and fallen. In the 20th century, with the rearrangement of state borders thatfollowed the end of World War I, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was created, which wassubsequently, in 1928, given the name of Yugoslavia.

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After sporadic mortar attacks inAugust, between September andNovember 1991 the Serbs launchedsustained land and air bombardmentagainst Vukovar. Situated on the rightbank of the Danube, it was an easytarget for Serb artillery across the riverand Serb aircraft from nearby bases.JNA troops and Serb paramilitariesattacked the town by land, puttingmost of its residents to flight, and thefew who remained took shelter in theircellars. In the street fighting that tookplace over three months, the town wasvirtually destroyed. Vukovar fell on 18November and those residents whoemerged from almost three months intheir cellars found a town that wasalmost unrecognizable. Over 200patients and wounded at the hospitalwere taken out by the JNA and Serbparamilitaries to a farm south ofVukovar, interrogated, beaten, shot anddumped in a mass grave. This atrocityfurther enraged Croatian publicopinion, setting the scene for eventualrevenge.

By the end of 1991, except for a fewmostly elderly Croats living in isolatedCroatian villages, the only other Croatsliving in the region were thoseintermarried with Serbs. Through thecountryside to the west ran a sinuous,heavily mined no-man�s land. The twonearest Croatian towns, Osijek andVinkovci, were under Serb siege andwell within Serb artillery range. As inmost of Croatia, the populationpolarized and Serbs who had lived inthose towns, in fear of their lives, fledto the security of the Serb-held areas.From a pre-war population of EasternSlavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmiumestimated to be about 180,000, thenumber of Serbs and others remaininghad declined to less than half thatfigure. Vukovar, its port, railways,public services, schools, churches,shops, houses and industry weredestroyed. The villages that had hadCroatian residents were a tragic pictureof houses smashed, looted and burned,churches defaced�a rural life savagelytorn by the brutality of war. But for

The Basic Agreementand the establishmentof UNTAES

Through August and September 1995,Peter Galbraith, US Ambassador to theRepublic of Croatia, and ThorvaldStoltenberg, UN Representative to theInternational Conference on theFormer Yugoslavia, worked with thetwo sides to negotiate a text onarrangements for bringing the territorypeacefully under Croatian authority.

In addition to seeking to avoid arepetition of the dramatic events andthe exodus of Serbs that had takenplace in Western Slavonia and theKrajina, the international communitydid not wish to see a resumption ofconflict in Eastern Slavonia just at thetime when the Dayton Accord was ableto bring war to an end in Bosnia.Croatian military action to recovercontrol of their territory pre-Daytonwas one thing, but further open war,killings and ethnic cleansing post-Dayton was quite another. It thereforebecame essential to find a way ofavoiding such an outcome.

Eleven basic principles of a settlementwere tentatively agreed by earlyOctober, but it was only in the marginsof Dayton that Presidents Milosevicand Tudjman hammered out the dealthat led to what became known as theBasic Agreement. It was eventuallysigned at Erdut, on the banks of theRiver Danube, on 12 November 1995.Unlike the hundreds of pages andmaps that constituted the DaytonAccord, the Basic Agreement on theRegion of Eastern Slavonia, Baranjaand Western Sirmium consisted ofonly fourteen paragraphs (see text,Appendix I).

As its first provision, the Basic Agree-ment stipulated that there would be �atransitional period of 12 months�which could be �extended at most toanother period of the same duration ifso requested by one of the parties.�

those people who remained, the regionwas ethnically Serb, most of the landcould still be farmed and the producesold or bartered in Serbia.

Punctuated by sporadic bombardmentsand probing attacks against eachother�s lines, this uneasy situationcontinued until the summer of 1995.By then, Croatia had armed and trainedits military forces with assistance fromabroad despite the general armsembargo declared by the UN SecurityCouncil. In two swift and brutalmilitary operations, first WesternSlavonia and then the Krajina wererecovered. The tide of ethnic cleansingwas turned with a vengeance as now itwas Serbs who were ejected; almost200,000 Serbs fled from their homesand streamed eastwards. While manycontinued on into Serbia, some arrivedin Eastern Slavonia, Baranja andWestern Sirmium to make homes informer Croatian houses that had beenlooted and burned some four yearsearlier. This brought the number ofSerbs in the region to some 125,000,of whom about 60,000 were displacedfrom elsewhere in Croatia.

In August 1995, the Serbs in EasternSlavonia became greatly alarmed at theprospect of a Croatian attack torecover the last Serb-held enclave onCroatian territory. These fears wereheightened in early September whenNATO took strong military actionagainst the Serbs in Bosnia andHerzegovina and forced the parties tothe conflict to the negotiating table atDayton. This concern was well justifiedas, emboldened by their two earliersuccesses, there were loud public callsin Zagreb for a third operation inEastern Slavonia that would eradicatethe Serb problem once and for all.

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The signatories called on the UNSecurity Council to establish aTransitional Administration to �governthe Region during the transitionalperiod in the interest of all personsresident in or returning to the Region.�They also requested the Council toauthorize an international force tomaintain peace and security.

The Basic Agreement declared that theRegion would be demilitarizedaccording to the schedules andprocedures determined by the interna-tional force and not later than 30 daysafter deployment of that force. Thedemilitarization must include allmilitary forces, weapons and police,except for the international force andfor police operating under thesupervision, or with the consent, ofthe Transitional Administration. Therewas no mention of the control ordisposal of weapons that might remainin civilian hands.

The UN Security Council, in adoptingits resolution 1025(1995) on 30November, requested the Secretary-General to draw up a report and makerecommendations on how the BasicAgreement might be implemented. Hepresented that report on 13 December(United Nations Security Council,1995) and his concerns regarding thefragility of the situation in the regionwere quite apparent:

�4. After four years of hostilities andprolonged tension, deep-rooted mistrustprevails and each party perceives the other tohave broken agreements and committed actsof aggression. There is, in this Serb-controlled area, both an element oflawlessness and a fear of Croatian militaryand police action. The Croatian governmenthas, in the recent past, repeatedly stated itspreparedness to embark on military actionto achieve the reintegration of the territory.Against this background, and given thefailure of earlier attempts to demilitarizethe sector under a United Nations peace-keeping operation, deployment of aninsufficient force would be likely toundermine implementation of the basicagreement and to precipitate the very chainof events the operation is intended toprevent. Only a substantial military force

deployed at the outset could generate themutual confidence necessary for the partiesto take the difficult steps required of themunder the basic agreement.�

The Secretary-General�s preference fora multinational force, rather than a UNforce, authorized by the SecurityCouncil and with a Chapter VIImandate was clear. He proposed aforce of 9,300 troops, plus logisticsupport, attached for command andlogistical purposes to theimplementation force being deployedin Bosnia and Herzegovina. Originallyit was also envisaged in some capitalsthat the international force would notbe a UN force,1 but for a number ofreasons it became apparent that hisreport should include a UN option.Somewhat reluctantly, therefore, theSecretary-General offered as a secondoption that the operation should beentrusted to a UN force of the samesize.

Finding 9,300 troops, and theirnecessary logistic support, at the sametime as a major military operation wasbeing mounted in Bosnia andHerzegovina was no easy task for theinternational community. Moreover, asa UN operation it would increase thecosts on the five permanent membersof the UN Security Council, eventhough only one of them (Russia)would actually have troops on theground. In the absence of any UStroops, there was an even strongerneed for American commitment to bein evidence. In December Mr. JacquesPaul Klein, a career United StatesForeign Service diplomat (and also aMajor-General in the US Air ForceReserve), was identified as theprospective candidate for theleadership of the UN operation andvisited Belgrade, Zagreb and theregion. With personal assurances ofcooperation from Presidents Milosevicand Tudjman, he returned to theUnited States with the view that theoperation was practicable and could bedone with 5,000 troops provided thatthe member States fully supported it.

On 15 January 1996, the UN SecurityCouncil adopted resolution 1037(1996)establishing a UN peace-keepingmission under the name of UnitedNations Transitional Administrationfor Eastern Slavonia, Baranja andWestern Sirmium (UNTAES). Itsmilitary component was described as�an initial deployment of up to 5,000troops� with the following mandate:

�(a) To supervise and facilitate thedemilitarization as undertaken by theparties to the Basic Agreement, accordingto the schedule and procedures to beestablished by UNTAES;

(b) To monitor the voluntary and safe returnof refugees and displaced persons to theirhome of origin in cooperation with theUnited Nations High Commissioner forRefugees, as provided for in the BasicAgreement;

(c) To contribute, by its presence, to themaintenance of peace and security in theregion; and

(d) Otherwise to assist in the implementationof the Basic Agreement.�

(United Nations Security Council,1996)

On 17 January the Secretary-Generalinformed the Security Council of hisdecision to appoint Mr. Jacques PaulKlein as the Transitional Administra-tor.

1 Croatia had come to regard the presence ofUN troops as an obstacle to the recovery of itsterritory. At the same time, Washington did notbelieve that the UN had the capacity and muscleto perform the function successfully�ajudgment with which the Secretary-General didnot disagree as he had no confidence that thenecessary troops and resources would beforthcoming from member States. The originalUS idea was to have a combination of US andRussian troops, but when it became clear that thedeployment of yet more US troops, in additionto those in Bosnia, would be rejected by the USCongress, and that no other variation of aNATO option was available, Washington had noalternative but to fall back to a force of UN�blue-helmets.�

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It should be noted at this point that thelegal authority of UNTAES was, for aUN operation, unusuallystraightforward. In most UN peace-keeping operations, the UN leadershipdoes not have independence ofcontrol, but has to deal with one ormore existing governments and workwith those authorities in implementingthe mandate given to the operation bythe UN Security Council. ForUNTAES, there was no doubt that theregion was part of the sovereignterritory of Croatia, but in accordancewith the Basic Agreement andresolution 1037(1996), it was theTransitional Administrator who hadthe legal responsibility to govern theUNTAES region. In practice, the localSerbs continued to run much of theday-to-day business of local authority.Only the Transitional Administratorwas in a position to make bindingarrangements with the Croatiangovernment in Zagreb, the Serbiangovernment in Belgrade and the localSerb authorities.

Over the following four months, the1,600 Belgian and Russian troopsalready in the region as part of theexisting UN peace-keeping operationwere supplemented by a further 3,300troops. These consisted of battalionsfrom Jordan and Pakistan, with theirM60 and T95 tanks, M113 armoredpersonnel carriers and howitzers; ahelicopter squadron from Ukraine withMi-24 assault helicopters and Mi-8transport helicopters; an Argentineanreconnaissance company; a Slovakengineering battalion; a Czech fieldhospital and surgical team; and anIndonesian medical company. A smallPolish special police group was addedlater. There were also 100 militaryobservers from 22 countries. TheForce Commander was Major-GeneralJozef Schoups from Belgium,succeeded in February 1997 by Major-General Willy Hanset also of Belgium.

By mid-April, UNTAES hadestablished its civil, police and militaryheadquarters in Vukovar, and at theend of April the Jordanian andPakistani battalions arrived by ship atthe Croatian port of Rjeka and movedoverland to the region. As Springprogressed, the local populationwitnessed more and more evidence ofa vigorous UN presence. As the troopsand their military assets arrived andwere deployed, with heavy equipmenttaking up its positions and helicoptergunships exercising over the region, anunspoken but clear message was beingdeliberately sent to the Serb andCroatian authorities, and to the peopleof the region, that UNTAES was morerobustly equipped than other UNmissions and would be prepared toimpose security if challenged. Thisattitude, together with other aspects ofthe style with which UNTAESimplemented its mandate, undoubtedlyhelped to create an atmosphere thatwas conducive to the civilianpopulation subsequently taking part inthe weapons buy-back program.

Demilitarization andthe economy

At the beginning of the year, beforethe arrival of UNTAES troops, theregion was the home of between 8,000and 12,000 armed Serb soldiers of the�Army of the Republika SrpskaKrajina,� 11 Slavonia Baranja Corpsand a number of Serb para-militaries.Almost every able-bodied male wasserving, or liable to serve, in someform of military capacity, reserve orparamilitary group. Some of theofficers were from the JNA and themilitary equipment included 120 tanks,120 artillery pieces, 140 mortars andother heavy weapons. The Serb police(milicja) were also supplemented bypersonnel from Yugoslavia.

This military atmosphere pervaded asetting in which the economy wasvirtually at a standstill. Vukovar hadbeen extensively destroyed and in the

four years since the end of the fightingalmost nothing had been done torestore the economy. It must berecognized that the conditions in andaround Vukovar in the first monthsafter the fighting must have beenalmost indescribable, with bodies in theruins, rubble in the streets, noelectricity or water supplies, and winterweather. As time passed, basic clearingup was done and the hospital was putback into working order, but with thedestruction of the port, industry, therailways, shops and businesses, therewere almost no jobs. Apart fromindividual efforts, there was noreconstruction as there was no moneyavailable. Unemployment wasapproximately 70 percent. Theeconomy, except the agriculture sector,was devastated and there was littlefinancial or other support from anysource to help it to recover.

When, in late May 1996, UNTAESdeclared itself ready to supervisedemilitarization of the Serb army, itwas recognized that one of theproducts of this process would befurther unemployment. To a smallextent, this was alleviated by takingsome of the demilitarized soldiers intothe local police force. This did notimprove the expertise andprofessionalism of the police, but atleast it reduced the numbers of thosereleased on to the streets with no joband no prospects.The only part of the legal economythat functioned, albeit with difficulties,was agriculture. Between ploughingand planting in the spring and harvestin the autumn, there was seasonal workfor those living in the region who hadfarming equipment and land tocultivate. There was, of course, nomeans of exporting the producewestwards to markets in Croatia, buttraditional ties with Serbian markets tothe south and east continued. But thiswas work generally open only toindigenous residents of the region. The60,000 Serbs displaced from theKrajina and Western Slavonia were, forthe most part, jobless.

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Totally cut off from any financialsupport from the Croatian side, thelocal Serb authorities depended heavilyon subventions from the Yugoslavgovernment in Belgrade. These weregranted in return for oil beingproduced from the Djeletovci oilfieldsin the southern part of the region andtaken to help the Yugoslav economy.In mid-April 1996, however, a behind-the-scenes deal between Belgrade andZagreb resulted in the pumping of oilbeing stopped. From then on thefinancial subventions from Belgradealso began to dry up. Progressively,salaries of police, teachers and otherswere paid later and later as the yearwent on.

As is often the case in war zones, therewas a thriving black market. Coffee,cigarettes and other goods entered theregion from across the Danube and bycountry roads and trails from Serbia inthe south, often dodging efforts tocollect customs duties. This, too, meantthat the sources of income open to thelocal Serb authorities diminished, withthe result that there was no money toemploy people in demolishing rubbleor any works of reconstruction. Thepresence of UNTAES itself, withinternational personnel paying rent fortheir accommodation and withopportunities for offering some jobs tolocal employment, eased some of theeconomic strain. For the majority ofthe population, however, findingsources of income was a constantchallenge.

Impetus for theweapon collectioneffort

Identifying the problem

By late June 1996, the UNTAES ForceCommander was able to carry out aseries of inspections and then certifythat demilitarization had beensuccessfully completed. But as soldierstook off their uniforms and mergedinto civilian life, they often took theirhand-carried weapons with them. The

combination of a jobless, demoralized,apprehensive population with readyaccess to large quantities of weaponswas seen by UNTAES as a majorthreat to the maintenance of civil lawand order. Furthermore, the prevalenceof weapons and their use by armedgroups might tempt some of the moremilitant Serbs to carry out attacksacross the no-man�s land againstCroatian targets (although, in the end,this never occurred). In turn, suchdevelopments would invite Croatianpunitive action and bring UNTAESinto a political, or worse military,confrontation with Croatianauthorities. Finally the continuedpossession of weapons by local Serbswould be highly unacceptable to theCroatian government, could be anobstacle to the eventual transfer ofauthority to Zagreb, and wouldcertainly result in retribution by theCroatian authorities after the departureof UNTAES at the end of its mandate.In these circumstances, as soon asdemilitarization of the Serb army wascompleted, the next logical step was anorganized effort to control theweapons that remained and, as far aspossible, get them out of civilianhands.

The first part of this effort was thedesignation of weapons that could beheld legally and a system for theirregistration. The procedure designedby UNTAES was modeled closely onthe Weapons Act of Croatia of 1992,as amended in 1995, as this wouldeventually be the law in force in theregion at the end of the UNTAESmandate. The weapons permitted weredefined by exclusion: automatic, semi-automatic weapons with more than tenrounds of storage capacity, silencedweapons, exploding projectiles andother devices, and any other types ofweapons or devices UNTAESdesignated as prohibited, were notallowed. Weapons not prohibited couldbe registered for self-defense purposesand could be kept in the owner�s homeor regular place of abode. Followingusual practice in Croatia, no numeric

limit was set on the number ofweapons that could be registered.Permits to carry weapons, in additionto registration, were issued for huntingand sporting purposes subject to adistance limit of 10 kilometers fromplace of residence.

The issuance of registration licensesand carrying permits was implementedthrough local police stations and thearrangements were introduced in lateJune 1996, shortly after the end ofdemilitarization. With these two majoraspects in place, it became time toinstitute arrangements to take as manyof the remaining weapons out ofcivilian hands as possible.

The nature and scope of theweapons threat

In considering what might be the bestapproach to the matter of weaponscollection, UNTAES had to take fullyinto account local attitudes towardsfirearms. Throughout the Balkans thereis a traditional acceptance of civilianpossession of weapons. Not only arethey needed for hunting and sporting,but on occasions of weddings,celebrations or other significant days, itis not uncommon for weapons to befired into the air. The unwary foreigner,newly arrived into a Serb area, mighteasily mistake the customary feu de joieon Serb Orthodox New Year�s Eve asthe noise of a spirited gun battle.

This possession of guns was furtherstrengthened by the effects of war andthe perceptions by most families thatweapons, including automatic rifles,were needed for self-protection againstindiscriminate ethnic violence, murder,rape and robbery.

In addition to hunting rifles andhandguns, there was a wide variety ofhand-held weapons, grenades, minesand mortars in the region. Moreover,except in the Baranja which wasprotected by the river Drava, the Serbshad long expected that a Croatian

15B·I·C·C

attack would be spearheaded by tankscoming eastwards across the openfields. To rebuff such attacks, the JNAhad brought into the region anddistributed large numbers of mines andsingle-shot anti-tank rocket launchers.Many of these were left behind whenthe JNA departed, together with largequantities of ammunition of all kinds.

Thus, weapons left behind by the Serbmilitary during the conflict and upondemilitarization were the primarysource of available weapons. But it wasclear that, since the end of the hand-to-hand fighting in late 1991, weaponshad been circulating freely and in largequantities among the local population.

Secondary sources were across thetraditionally open border with Serbia,to the east and south. AlthoughUNTAES border monitors werestationed at the border bridges andcrossings, and greater efforts weremade after demilitarization to stop theimport of weapons, the fact remainedthat it was not practicable to searchextensively every vehicle and all itscontents as they entered the region. Inparticular to the south the border withSerbia lay across open countryside andwooded areas through which localpeople knowing the trails andsecondary roads were always able tobring in further weapons if they sowished. However, as there were alreadylarge numbers of weapons in theregion, it seems doubtful that there wasany organized illicit trafficking.

In early 1996, when UNTAES was firstestablished, it was not unusual to seehandguns and similar small weaponsbeing carried in the streets. This wasprimarily due to the fact that manylocal Serbs were also serving in theSerb army, or liable to do so, and thelocal Serb milicja did not regard thepractice as one that they should doanything about. As UNTAES troopsand police grew in numbers, thesituation improved but handguns wereoften still carried discreetly, particularlyby local thugs and �mafiosi.�

Box 2: An illustrative list of weapons incivilian hands

Handguns: pistol CZ M 70 cal 7.65 BR pistol CZ M 99 cal 9 mm Luger and 40 S&W trophy pistol cal 9 mm Luger (�Parabellum� Luger 08, Walther P 38, etc.)

Long military weapons:repeater rifle CZ �company 44� MSsemiautomatic rifle PAP M 59/66 cal 7.62x39semiautomatic sniper rifle with optical device CZ M 76 cal 7.9

Long hunting weapons:shot gun �boker� SSSR IZhunting carbines Zastava-70 (various calibers)

Automatic weapons:automatic pistol �Skorpion� cal 7.65automatic rifle M 70 CZ cal 7.62x39sub-machine gun M 53 CZ cal 7.9machine gun Heckler & Koch PM cal 5.9 Para

Other weapons:portable launcher M 57RPG 7grenade launcher MGL 40guided anti-tank rocketshand grenades

The types of weapons in circulationvaried widely, as did their age andcondition. Some were modern, still inthe manufacturer�s wrapping, whileothers were relics of World War II andeven, on occasions, of earlier vintage.Box 2 provides an illustrative list.

In addition, there were anti-personneland mortar mines, cassette bombs,grenade fuses, artillery projectiles and awide range of ammunition. At thebeginning of the buy-back program,UNTAES categorically refused toaccept mines. In public

announcements, UNTAES declaredthat mines were highly dangerous andshould not be moved or carried.Subsequently, however, despite theseinstructions there were occasions whenmines were brought to the collectionpoints and were accepted by UNTAESfor destruction.2

2 Although mines were dangerous to transportto the collection points, it would have beenirresponsible for UNTAES to have sent themaway. In the final weeks of the program over 500mines, including TMA4 anti-tank mines, werebrought to the collection points in the Baranja.Their source was never identified but UNTAESmilitary believed that they might have come fromminefields around Kopacevo.

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Neither the Basic Agreement norresolution 1037(1996) approved by theSecurity Council in January 1996contained any specific reference to aweapons buy-back program, nor wouldsuch a reference be expected. But thephilosophy of the UNTAES leadershipwas to regard the mandate as a flooron which the fabric of implementationwas to be constructed, rather than aceiling that placed restraints and limitson the operation. Accordingly, adetermined effort to significantlyreduce the quantities of weapons incivilian hands was consistent with theneed to ensure civil law and order, themaintenance of peace and security andthe preparation of conditions for theeventual handing over of the region,demilitarized and secure, to thesovereign control of the governmentof Croatia.

One possible method that waspromptly discarded was a house-to-house search. Such a �search and seize�policy would have been unacceptablyintrusive and would have resulted inUNTAES being quickly regarded as anoccupation force. On the contrary, itwas necessary that UNTAES shouldwin the confidence and respect of thelocal population if the aims of the civilaspects of the UNTAES mandate wereto be achieved. Moreover, it wouldhave been an incorrect use ofUNTAES troops and an inappropriatefunction for UN civil police. It wasdecided that such invasions of privateproperty would only take place if therewere incidents that necessitated suchactions, and that on such occasions thelocal police force would be used.

In this context, it should be recalledthat one of the tasks of UNTAES wasto establish and train a TransitionalPolice Force (TPF). This force wasconstructed in stages from the original

Serb milicja, with Croatian police beingadded gradually as the months passed.The quality of the TPF improved overtime, but due to their naturalsympathies with local Serbs and thehistorical fact that the early stages ofthe Serb/Croat confrontation had seenviolence and shooting within thepolice, the Serb members of the TPFcould never be totally relied upon totake action against local Serbs.

Thus, it was necessary to keep the goalstraightforward�to get as manyunauthorized weapons, ammunitionand explosives off the streets and outof the hands of the civilian population.Keeping this goal simple helpedconsiderably in the design of apracticable and achievable program.

Discussions withCroatian authorities

Within UNTAES it was clear that, asno one in the local population wasgoing to surrender weapons voluntarilyand without reward, success could onlybe achieved by purchasing weapons forcash. But UNTAES had no money topurchase weapons, even if it had beenpossible to overcome the positiongenerally adopted by the UN that theorganization should never be in thebusiness of purchasing weapons. Whowould have interests strong enough tofind money for such a program? Theanswer was: the Croatian government.

Exploratory discussions with theCroatian authorities began in June1996, between the Deputy Minister ofthe Interior and the DeputyTransitional Administrator ofUNTAES. Initially, and perhapsunderstandably, the Croatian reactionwas that rather more direct methodsshould be used to relieve Serbs of their

weapons as the idea of paying Serbsmoney from the Croatian public pursedid not seem likely to attract muchsupport in Zagreb. However, thepractical value of such a program wasquickly recognized, particularly as therewas already a similar program inoperation in Croatia now that conflictwas over.

Once the principle of a Croatian-financed buy-back was accepted, detailsof the arrangement were discussed.The Croatian position was that personsoffering weapons should hand in theweapon, leave their names andaddresses and then return for cash at alater date, by which time it would havebeen possible to carry out checks onthe weapons. UNTAES declared thatin those circumstances, Serbs wouldnot come forward. UNTAES insistedthat returns should be anonymous andcash payments should be made on thespot. The Croats also wanted to pay inthe Croatian currency, kunas, to whichUNTAES responded that the Serbsused Yugoslav dinars and would notaccept kunas on principle. Recognizingthat it would be equally unacceptablefor the Croats to pay in dinars, thesolution was found in using Germanmarks (DM).

UNTAES wanted weapons collectionprocedures that would be controlledand monitored by UNTAES, but withthe assessments of weapon conditionand value being made by Croatianexperts at the site of collection.Moreover, in order to preclude the riskof any subsequent allegation over themishandling of cash, UNTAES askedthat the payments should be madedirectly by the Croatian representativesto Serbs without any money evertouching the hands of UNTAESpersonnel.

Regarding the disposal of weaponscollected, UNTAES wanted them all tobe destroyed. However, the Croatsobjected on the grounds that as theweapons would be purchased withCroatian money they would then beCroatian property and should behanded over for Croatian disposal asthey saw fit. UNTAES argued that

ProgramDesign and

Implementation

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Serbs would not participate if theythought that weapons in goodcondition might soon be re-issued bythe Croatian authorities and evenperhaps used against Serbs. Eventually,a satisfactory compromise arrangementwas found (see section on �Weaponstorage and disposition� below).

These discussions, the establishmentof price lists, and the setting up ofworkable arrangements withinUNTAES for receipt and storage ofweapons took about three months. Theweapons buy-back program began inearnest on 2 October 1996.

Program elementsand inception

Operational structure

As discussions with the Croatianauthorities proceeded, extensiveconsideration was given withinUNTAES to the procedures to beadopted to ensure that the programwould be successful. It was clear thatthere must be well-controlledarrangements for the acceptance andcustody of weapons, and that thesecould only be provided by theUNTAES military. The ForceCommander instructed his staff todraw up an Operation Order based onthe concept that there would be fourWeapons Buy-back Locations (WBL),one at each battalion headquarters(Belgian and Pakistani battalions in thenorth, and Russian and Jordanianbattalions in the south). Each battalionwas required to provide security for theWBL and tobe prepared to storeweapons under secure conditions. Inaddition, each battalion was required tomake arrangements to storeammunition and explosives for a fewdays until they were removed fordestruction.

It was decided that each WBL wouldbe open Monday to Friday, from 09.00to 16.00. Each battalion wasresponsible for escorting a Croatianweapons expert into and out of theregion, and for his security. Theprocess of handing in weapons wasanonymous, with no identification ofpersons bringing them to the WBL.Anyone seen taking photographs orvideo was stopped and the filmdestroyed unless the person concernedwas in possession of writtenauthorization by UNTAES. Weaponswere separated from ammunition andexplosives, so that the type andcondition of the weapon could beassessed by the Croatian representativeand a military expert, and the price tobe paid determined by the Croatianexpert. The money was then paid incash directly to the person who hadhanded over the weapon or weapons.

Comprehensive records weremaintained and submitted daily toUNTAES headquarters, together withan updated daily report. Weaponsidentified for retention were separatedfrom those identified for destruction.The latter were subsequently destroyedat each WBL, whereas ammunition andexplosives were kept separately and insafe custody for (approximately)weekly collection and transfer tospecial explosive ordnance disposalsites for disposal by UNTAES experts.It was made clear that the Croatianexperts could witness thosedestructions if they so wished.

In order to guard against any risk ofdangerous incidents, whetheraccidental or malevolent, privatevehicles bringing weapons and explosi-ves to the WBL were not allowed toenter the battalion compounds. Theitems were transferred to battaliontransport and conveyed to the WBLunder UNTAES custody. This gave riseto consideration of what action shouldbe taken if the person with the weapon

did not accept the price offered (or inthe event that the Croatian expertshould have insufficient cash). In suchcases, if the weapon was one thatcould be legitimately held andregistered under the arrangementsdescribed earlier, it was taken intocustody and a receipt was provided tothe person concerned. Once he hadregistered the weapon properly withthe police and had a registrationcertificate, he could return and recoverthe weapon in exchange for the receipt.All other weapons were taken intocustody by UNTAES and a namelessreceipt was issued, which the personconcerned could exchange for cash at alater date if he so chose. In nocircumstances were weapons allowedto leave the military compound, unlessthey were weapons that could belegitimately held and had been properlyregistered.

Public awareness

In order to inform the local populationof the arrangements for weapons buy-back, an extensive publicity campaignwas mounted. Posters were printed, inSerbian and Croatian,3 announcing theprogram and giving examples of thebuy-back prices (see Appendices II andIII). Special articles were also publishedin the UNTAES Bulletin, a newssheetprepared and published in bothlanguages by UNTAES Public Affairsapproximately every ten days (seeAppendices IV and V). In addition, theleadership of UNTAES made specialbroadcasts on the local radio toannounce the program and respond tocall-in questions.

3 UNTAES carefully used both the Serbian(Cyrillic) script and the Croatian (Latin) script inits printed matter. The UNTAES Bulletin,printed in broadsheet form, was reversible withone language on one side and the secondlanguage on the other. So that UNTAES staffwould be able to read the Bulletin, it was alsoprinted in smaller numbers in English, which isthe version shown in Appendices IV and V.

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It was made clear that there would beno enforcement by UNTAES of thebuy-back program, but that it was ineveryone�s interests that the weapons inthe region should be significantlyreduced�and here was a way of doingit that raised money, with no questionsasked, at the same time. Notice wasalso given that anyone found with aweapon, but not in possession of avalid registration or authorization,would have the weapon confiscated onthe spot.

In announcing the program, UNTAESmade clear that it was open to allpeople living in the region, with nodistinction being made between men,women, ex-combatants, Serbs,Hungarians, Ruthenes, and so on.UNTAES promised that the procedurewas deliberately simple andanonymous, and ensured that thatpromise was kept. The public was toldthat any weapons would be accepted,except mines which were highlydangerous and should be reported sothat UNTAES demolition expertscould deal with them in situ. Once theprogram was in operation, UNTAESkept the population well informed ofits progress, including of an occasionwhen two men had brought in 70 anti-tank rocket launchers and had received,at the declared price of DM 155 each,the sum of DM 10,850 in cash. Thepublic was also told where thedestruction of ammunition andexplosives would take place, so that thenoise of explosions would not createmisunderstandings.

Adequacy of the incentivestructure

At first, it was announced that theprogram would last only from earlyOctober 1996 to early January 1997,but subsequently the program wasextended and eventually did not enduntil 19 August 1997. Payment inGerman marks continued for longer

than originally expected, before shiftingto payment in kuna in Spring 1997.Throughout the period there weresome criticisms in the Croatianparliament and the media that Serbsshould not be paid money for theirweapons. Another factor regardingpayment in kuna was the markedpsychological rejection by local Serbsof the kuna as a currency. This was dueto the historical and symbolicassociations of the kuna which, notsurprisingly, carried the Croatiannational flag. One of the challengesfacing UNTAES was how and when toshift the currency of the region fromYugoslav dinars to the Croatian kuna.Following preparatory steps, such aspayments in kuna to public employeesof the region, this was eventuallyachieved over a two month period inMay/June 1997, following which dinarswere no longer legal tender.

The buy-back prices were set entirelyby the Croatian authorities and pricesand types of weapons listed wereadjusted by the Croats as experiencewas gained. Care was taken to avoid, asfar as possible, the creation of a marketthat would attract weapons fromoutside the region. From time to timeduring the program, there were someconcerns that weapons were beingbrought in or smuggled across theborder with Serbia, but it was neverpossible to prove this conclusively.

Early experiences were oftensurprising, as may be seen from Figures1 and 2. For example, in the first twoweeks of the program, the JordanianWBL received 1,188 grenades(including rifle-grenades and anti-tankgrenades), almost twice as many of thistype as the other three WBLs together.In the same period, the Russian WBLand the Jordanian WBL togetherreceived 2,163 light anti-tank weapons.This number compared with the 171light anti-tank weapons received by thetwo Belgian and Pakistani WBLs. Inaddition, the Russian and JordanianWBLs, both situated in the southernpart of the UNTAES region, receivedover 400,000 rounds of ammunitionand explosive charges.

These results gave rise to a number oftheories. First, it was possible thatpeople thought it �easier� to dobusiness with the battalions in thesouth than in the north. On the otherhand, it indicated that there were moreweapons available in the south than inthe north. This was highly likely, as aCroatian tank attack from the west hadbeen long expected by the Serbs andthe number of anti-tank weaponsindicated the reception that such anattack might have received. Anotherfactor could have been the comparativeopenness of the border with Serbia inthe south, providing opportunities forsmuggling from Serbia or even Bosniaand Herzegovina.

One of the effects of the highnumbers of returns was that on severaloccasions the Croatian expertsexhausted their supplies of cash earlyand the WBLs had to be closed aheadof the daily schedule.

Evaluation and adjustment

After the first two weeks, sufficientexperience had been gained to reviewthe implementation of the programand make adjustments. In addition, theCroatian authorities expressed theirunhappiness with several aspects. On16 October a meeting was thereforeheld, at ministerial level, between theCroatian authorities and UNTAESrepresentatives. Items raised by theCroats included:

the success at some of the WBLswas due to the fact the program wasanonymous, and so individualscould sell weapons that did notbelong to them;

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Figure 1: Buy-back program results bybattalion, 2�18 October 1996Ammunition figures in thousands.

Note: Figure recreated from charts supplied by the author.

BB: Belgian BattalionPB: Pakistani BattalionRB: Russian BattalionJB: Jordanian Battalion

Figure 2: Buy-back program results by type,2�18 October 1996Ammunition figures in thousands.

Note: Figure recreated from charts supplied by the author.

a number of vehicles bringingweapons had foreign (i.e., especiallyYugoslav) license plates, indicatingthat weapons were being broughtinto the region for sale to the buy-back program;

some members of the TransitionalPolice Force (TPF) wereconfiscating weapons from peopleen route to the WBLs and thisattitude discouraged individualsfrom participating in the buy-backprogram;

UNTAES supervision of weaponswas not sufficiently secure and so itmight be possible for weapons toreappear in the hands of civilians;

ammunition and explosives werenot being destroyed daily;

weapons were not being storedsatisfactorily and would deteriorate;

Croatian experts were not beinggiven sufficient protection;

payments would continue to bemade in German marks, but thetime would come when paymentswould be made in kuna.

In response, UNTAES representativesmade the following points:

the success of the program showedhow valuable it was to have theprinciple of anonymity, and thiswould be maintained;

many of the vehicles in the regionstill had Yugoslav license plates andthere had been no evidence to provethat weapons were being broughtinto the region, but UNTAESwould tighten up its checks forweapons at the border crossings;

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BB PB RB JB

Battalion

Rifle

MG

Grenade

Law

Ammo

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

Rifl

e

MG

Gre

nade

Law

Am

mo

Type

BELBAT (BB)

PAKBAT (PB)

RUSBAT (RB)

JORBAT (JB)

20 B·I·C·C

brief 12

the allegations against the TPFwould be investigated,4 but the TPFhad been given general instructionsto confiscate unregistered weaponsas part of their responsibilities tomaintain law and order. Moreover, itwas known that there wereorganized criminal elements atwork, probably seeking to takeadvantage of the buy-back program;

UNTAES was confident thatweapons handed in were keptsecurely and there was no risk ofthem being �recycled�, but thearrangements would be checked;

regarding daily destruction ofammunition, it had been found thatthe amounts handed in and theother destruction tasks (e.g., dealingwith mines and other explosiveitems that were in great abundancein the region) was proving to bemore than the UNTAES ordnancedestruction teams could safelyhandle on a daily basis. Destructionwould therefore be carried out everyfew days rather than daily;

the problem of proper storage forweapons and arrangements formaintenance needed furtherconsideration;

the issue of protection would beconsidered as part of generalsecurity issues, including handlingof public gatherings at the WBLs,and discussed with the TPF;

a special UNTAES-Croatianworking group would be establishedto address the issues ofimplementation.

Although it was apparent that therewere indeed some initial difficulties inthe implementation of the programthat had to be resolved, it was alsoclear that in general the arrangementsfor the buy-back program had beenwell thought through and weresuccessful. This was important as itconstituted yet another step in buildingconfidence and trust.

Weapon storage anddisposition

As described above, the arrangementsnegotiated with the Croatianauthorities provided for the assessmentof weapon type and condition to bemade by a Croatian expert at eachcollection site. Weapons that were oldor in bad condition were kept byUNTAES for destruction. Small armswere crushed and heavier weaponswere disabled by pouring concrete intothe barrel. Ammunition and explosiveswere destroyed under controlledconditions by UNTAES demolitionteams organized by the Force Engineerat special sites well away from publicareas. Arrangements were made toenable Croatian representatives to bepresent, if they so wished, to satisfythemselves that UNTAES was carryingout the destruction satisfactorily.

The issue of how and where to storeweapons in good condition was notresolved until some weeks after thebuy-back program had started. Initiallythe Croatian authorities wanted themto be in Croatian custody, butUNTAES insisted that they shouldremain in UNTAES custody on thegrounds that the Serb populationmight quickly develop mistrust in theprogram if they thought that theweapons were being handed directly tothe Croats.

This impasse was resolved by anagreement that UNTAES shouldtransport the weapons to secure andappropriate storage at Pleso Airport,Zagreb, where they would be keptunder guard by UNTAES military untilthe end of the UNTAES mandate.This solution neatly achieved the aimsof removing serviceable weapons fromthe region, and therefore out of reachof any recovery, and yet keeping themin UNTAES custody. It also gaveCroatian military personnel convenientaccess to the weapons for maintenancepurposes until the end of theUNTAES mandate in January 1998.

In early November 1996 it wasestimated that by the end of the buy-back program there might be some3,500 weapons to be stored inUNTAES custody at Pleso.5 AnUNTAES team was given the task offinding suitable, secure storage thatwould be cost-effective and provideopportunities for Croatian weaponexperts to carry out any necessarymaintenance. The team was instructednot simply to pay lip service to theprovision of security as, if any of theweapons were stolen or went missingwhile under UNTAES guard, theembarrassment to the UN would besignificant. Even the possibility thatsome informal group of Croats mightdeliberately seek to embarrass the UNin this way was not overlooked.

4 As there were no Croatian members of theTPF at this juncture, these allegations wereinteresting in themselves: they indicated that theCroats either had sources of information insidethe region, or were operating covertly to gatherintelligence.5 At that time, the end of the buy-back programwas announced as January 1997. It was alwaysassumed that this date would be extended butthe ultimate duration was unknown. By the timethe program ended on 19 August 1997, over10,000 weapons were stored at Pleso.

21B·I·C·C

Two strengthened military aircraftshelters in the UN compound at Plesoairport were identified as suitable, eachwith a floor space of about 50 squaremeters. A watchtower and specialfencing were installed, and the site putunder guard by Jordanian soldiers ofUNTAES. The first four containers ofweapons for safe custody weretransported by UNTAES to Pleso inlate November. On 5 December 1996,following careful inspection, countingand preparation by UNTAES andCroatian experts, the weapons weremoved to the storage under UNTAESguard and with a double-key system foraccess. A UN container was placed toblock the gates, with instructions that itcould be moved only withauthorization of the UN MilitaryLiaison Officer Zagreb.

On 27 May 1997, by which time morethan 7,000 weapons were in storage,the Croatian Minister of Interior wroteto the Transitional Administrator ofUNTAES, informing him of a requestby authorized trade agencies of Austriaand Germany to purchase the longfirearms in custody, for �decorativepurposes.� Such a sale was attractive toCroatia as it would result in recoveringsome of the costs of the buy-backprogram. The Minister confirmed thatthe firearms in question would bedeactivated to the German standard fordeactivating firearms so that theywould be no longer usable and, if theproposal was accepted by UNTAES,the deactivation should be monitoredand supervised by UNTAES experts.

Following approval from UNHeadquarters in New York, andsubject to the weapons being renderedpermanently unusable, on 20 JuneUNTAES replied positively to theCroatian proposal and requested acopy of the German deactivationstandard (German Federal Ministry ofScience, 1979). It was ascertained thatthe intention was to deactivate some2,000 weapons over a period of severalweeks, starting by mid-July. By earlyAugust, 362 weapons had been

deactivated and removed fromUNTAES custody for sale by theCroatian authorities but thereafter theprogram stopped and was notsubsequently resumed during theperiod of the UNTAES mandate.

Following the end of the buy-backprogram, on 19 August 1997, the finalconsignment of weapons for storagewas transferred to Pleso and by 12September there was a total of 10,136weapons in UNTAES custody. Withthe end of the UNTAES mandate insight, during the summer of 1997UNTAES began its military drawdownand contingents began to return totheir respective countries. It wasdecided that the Jordanian platoonwould be repatriated on 15 Octoberand on 24 September the ForceCommander wrote to the Croatianauthorities requesting that they takeover the full time guard of theweapons storage from 14 October.

Custody of the weapons, however,remained an UNTAES responsibilityand, with the full cooperation of theCroatian authorities, the double-keysystem of access was continued.Croatian officials wanting access to theweapons had first to inform the UNCivil Liaison Officer who, in turn, wasrequired to obtain clearance fromUNTAES headquarters in Vukovar andthen maintain a full time presencethroughout every Croatian visit.

On 16 January 1998, with the end ofthe UNTAES mandate, the UNcontainers were removed from theirpositions in front of the storage doorsand the UN keys were formally handedover to the Croatian authorities,thereby transferring the entire controlof the remaining weapons to theCroatian government.

design andimplementation

22 B·I·C·C

brief 12

An element of abroader strategy

One of the primary objectives ofUNTAES was to hand over the regionto the Croatian authorities at the endof the UNTAES mandatedemilitarized, safe and secure. Thisentailed, in the first place, taking adeeply apprehensive Serb populationwith access to large numbers ofweapons to a situation where law andorder could be effectively maintainedby the TPF, under monitoring andsupervision by UNTAES Civil Police.Once that had been achieved, it set thestage for the gradual introduction ofCroatian members of the TPF andprepared the local population for thearrival of Croatian authority on thedeparture of UNTAES. The weaponsbuy-back program was therefore animportant part of this broader strategyof keeping the region peaceful andsecure while progressive steps weretaken by UNTAES to shift it fromSerb control to Croatian control over aperiod of two years.

This had to be achieved in the face ofthe unreliability of local Serb TPFmembers, their reluctance to tacklearmed mafiosi gangs and theirunwillingness to deal robustly withoccasions of Serb crowd violence. Onseveral occasions UNTAES waspressed by the Croatian authorities tocarry out raids on private homes andother inhabited places that weresuspected of harboring weapons.Unless there was direct evidence ofillegal activity UNTAES resisted suchpressure, on the grounds thatUNTAES was not in the business ofestablishing a police state. On thecontrary, UNTAES wanted to generatea level of confidence and trust as partof moving towards a society in whichpeople could live together once more.The buy-back program contributedsignificantly to this by reducing thenumbers of weapons available tocivilians but without doing that in sucha way as to antagonize the localpopulation.

Program Outcomeand Impact

Items 7 March 1997a 19 August 1997b

Rifles (including automatic and semi-automatic) 3,590 9,146

Rocket launchers and anti-tank weapons 4,777 6,375

Grenades (hand, rifle, anti-tank) 10,274 14,521

Ammunition (rounds) 723,200 over 1,900,000

Numerical results andcosts

Table 1 presents a comparison ofreported and published numbers ofweapons collected at the program�smid-way point and at its conclusion.

These numbers do not fully reflect therange of weapons and explosiveshanded in. In addition there were asmall number of handguns, variousmines, over 100 mortars, detonators,explosive charges and even, towardsthe end, some hand-held ground-to-airmissiles. The condition of the weaponsand ammunition varied from verygood, and sometimes still in theoriginal packing, to antique, rusty anddownright dangerous.

The Croatian government provided allthe money for the payments made inexchange for weapons andammunition. As stated earlier, in theearly months payments were made inGerman marks, and subsequently inCroatian kuna. The provision of thismoney was not without politicaldifficulties for the Croatiangovernment. There were voices in theCroatian parliament and in the mediathat objected strongly to the idea ofpaying Serbs money for their weapons.There were many in Croatia who haddeep and bitter memories of incidents

Sources: a Appendix VI, b Vercernji List (Croatian newspaper), 20 August 1997

Table 1: Mid-term and final collection results

23B·I·C·C

of violence and brutality committed bySerbs in 1991 and 1992, and to themthe concept of using scarce Croatianfinancial resources to benefit Serbswhile the scars of war had not yet beenrepaired was anathema. It may havebeen for these and similar reasons thatthe Croatian government never madepublic the overall cost of the program.

Shifting perceptions

In October 1996, the general attitudeof the local Serb population to theprogram was very skeptical. This wasnot surprising when one bears in mindhow much had happened in theprevious eighteen months. Since May1995, the Krajina and Western Slavoniahad been lost to Croatian militaryaction, some 200,000 Serbs had fledfrom their homes, the Serb cause inBosnia and Herzegovina had sufferedmajor reverses from NATO bombingand the deployment of the combattroops of IFOR. Eastern Slavonia hadseen the arrival of many thousands ofdisplaced Serbs who had little morethan whatever they had been able tobring with them in their panickedflight. Politically, by the Basic Agree-ment signed at Erdut in November1995, the region had been negotiatedaway to be transferred to Croatianauthority, without most of the peoplebeing either consulted or even properlyinformed by their Serb leadership.

In early 1996, following the arrival of anew, stronger UN presence, the Serbarmy had melted away and had beendemilitarized. The people wereconfused, deeply fearful and looking invain for leadership in which they couldhave confidence. Then, in October1996, Serbs were being invited to ridthemselves of their remaining defensi-ve weapons. They were being told byCroatian television that UNTAESwould be present only for a few moremonths.6 Who would protect themwhen UNTAES had gone?

Recognizing these fears, UNTAES, inits civil affairs programs, was activelytrying to maintain public calm andplant the seeds of confidence for thefuture, for example:

for the first time in five years maillinks had been restored with otherparts of Croatia;

the border in the Baranja withHungary had been opened forlimited use;

joint Serb/Croat discussions weretaking place to find ways of movingforwards in health, education,agriculture;

a weekly market was being held onthe road in the no-man�s landbetween the Serb and Croatian areasthat allowed families and friends tobe reunited;

UN agencies and non-governmentalorganizations were givingconstructive assistance to thedisplaced and the needy.

In these circumstances, it tookconsiderable time for the public atlarge to take a positive attitude to thebuy-back program. Despite the effortsof UNTAES to promulgate the detailsof the arrangements widely, manypeople in the villages seemed not toknow about the program. Some werehostile as they viewed the programsimply as a means to remove the Serbability to defend themselves when theCroats returned.

There were others, however, who sawthe opportunities for profitimmediately. For some it was a quickway of making money in exchange forweapons, several of which wereunusable or virtually so�even if theywere still in their manufacturer�spackaging. The persons staffing theWBLs began to see several faces on aregular basis. It became clear that somepeople, either criminals oropportunists, were going to villagesand obtaining weapons, either by

offering low prices or by bullying, andthen taking them to the WBLs for sale.In retrospect, it may be surmised thatmuch of the large quantities brought induring the first few weeks probablycame from hidden caches of armsknown to a limited number of people.Exchanging them for cash was toogood an opportunity to be missed.

Overall, as the program was extendedand the Serb population saw thegeneral situation move steadily towardsthe end of the UNTAES mandate, thepublic attitude to the handing in ofweapons became more positive. In thefinal weeks of the program, in August1997, there was an upsurge in businessas people felt that they might as wellget money for weapons as long as theprogram lasted, as once it ended theywould receive nothing and thecontinued possession of firearmsmight well lead to difficulties. Indeed,on the last day the Croatian officialsquickly ran out of cash and severalhundreds of weapons were handed inwithout payment. Additionally, as theTransitional Administrator reported on22 September 1997, despite the end ofthe buy-back program, residents of theregion continued voluntarily to turn inmilitary weapons. In the monthfollowing the end of the program, atotal of 204 rifles, 11 anti-tank rockets,238 grenades, and 55,000 rounds ofammunition were handed in (UnitedNations Department of PublicInformation, 1997).

6 By October 1996, the Croatian governmentand media were already agitating strongly forUNTAES to leave in January 1997, but inNovember the UN Security Council helped tocalm the situation considerably by extending themandate until January 1998.

outcome and impact

24 B·I·C·C

brief 12

Addressing theavailability andvisibility of weapons

Supply and demand

In a broad sense, the issue of supplyand demand for weapons in the regionwas not relevant. The buy-backprogram removed the excess supply,but UNTAES suspected that manySerbs secreted at least one weapon inattics or outhouses for possible use ifphysically threatened by returningCroats.

With the demilitarization of the Serbarmy in May/June 1996, UNTAES haddeclared the import of weapons to theregion as forbidden. Vehicles crossingthe three bridges over the Danubefrom Serbia were liable to search andany weapons discovered wereconfiscated. But the border with Serbiawas, deliberately, never made totallywatertight by UNTAES controls assuch actions would have beenperceived by the local Serbs as stepstowards closing the border altogetherwhich, in turn, could have led to panicand mass evacuation. Moreover, it wasimpossible to patrol by boat or on landthe length of the Danube flowingthrough the region, and to the south ofthe region the border with Serbia ranthrough wooded land and open fields.Determined smuggling of weaponscould therefore not be prevented but,as recounted earlier, there was neverany hard evidence that organizedsmuggling was taking place.

While there can be no certainty, it ishighly unlikely that there has been anysubsequent supply of weapons. Thecircumstances that brought about thepresence of such high quantities ofweapons and ammunition in the regionno longer exist and have been replacedby a totally different situation. With theend of the UNTAES mandate on 15January 1998, the region passed to thefull sovereign authority of the Croatiangovernment and therefore the laws ofthe rest of Croatia became fullyapplicable in Eastern Slavonia, Baranjaand Western Sirmium.

A changed environment

The difference in atmosphere betweenthe situations at the start and the endof the UNTAES mandate was marked.At the beginning, the region was verymuch in a military mode, with elementsof the local Serb army and the Serbmilicja very much in evidence. Theatmosphere was tense as the dramaticevents of 1995 (the evacuation ofSerbs from the Krajina and WesternSlavonia, followed in September by therobust NATO action in Bosnia andHerzegovina, the Dayton Accords andthe Basic Agreement signed at Erdut inNovember 1995) were only a fewmonths old.

The establishment and deployment ofUNTAES in the early months of 1996steadied the situation considerably.With the demilitarization of the localSerb army, the firm assertion ofUNTAES control, and theintroduction of civil measures to movethe population towards peace andstability�of which the weapons buy-back program was one�there was aprogressive decrease in the visibility ofweapons in the region. UNTAES madeit clear that the carrying of weapons inpublic would not be permitted, exceptfor properly authorized sporting orhunting rifles. For the most part theseinstructions were respected. Therecontinued to be incidents ofcriminality in which handguns, andoccasionally automatic weapons, wereused. There were also occasions whengrenades were used in family disputesor to settle old scores. In general,however, the readiness to resort to theuse of weapons steadily diminished astime passed. The existence of the buy-back program certainly contributedpositively to this change in attitude.

At the same time, it must berecognized that in the long run thetraditional cultural acceptability ofweapons will probably be littleaffected. As noted earlier, firearms arean accepted feature of life and oftenfired into the air at times of celebrationand commemoration. Croatian lawdoes not prohibit the possession offirearms, except certain classes of

weapons, provided that they aredeclared and properly licensed.Moreover, firearms in the hands ofSerbs will inevitably be regarded byreturning Croats as potential threats tolife and limb, and by Serbs as theirultimate method of self-defense foruse in the last resort. Probably in aclear effort to show that undeclaredweapons would not be tolerated onceCroatian authority was in place, whenthe buy-back program ended in August1997 the Croatian government made apublic announcement to the effect thatpersons who did not turn in theirweapons would be liable to prisonpenalties of up to ten years (GlasSlavonije, 19 August 1997).

Easing the potential forviolence

The transfer of large quantities ofweapons and ammunition from civilianhands or access into the custody ordestruction of UNTAES certainlydecreased the potential for violence.However, for the most part, whileUNTAES was present there was littleactual civil violence. UNTAES was notseen by the Serbs as an �enemy� and theCroats were still outside the region.The potential for real violence appliedonly to the risk of Croatian militaryintervention or Serb para-militaryforays across the separation zone,neither of which occurred nor werethreatened.

The other risk of violence could haveoccurred after the departure ofUNTAES in January 1998, when fullauthority passed to the hands of theCroatian government. No organizedviolence has taken place, and withisolated exceptions firearms andexplosives have not been used inclashes between Serbs and Croats. TheCroatian police have conductedweapon searches in houses, but usuallyfor other reasons�such as suspicionof drugs or other criminality�ratherthan indiscriminate intrusions intohomes.

25B·I·C·C

Nevertheless, the early months havenot been easy and many dispiritedSerbs have left the region and movedinto Serbia or abroad. The elected Serbleadership and the Croatian authoritieshave worked together, not easily andnot with much mutual trust, to rebuilda future for the region. Some leaders,on both sides, have worked hard andconscientiously to establish a processof reconciliation, but all too often theirefforts have been undermined byothers who have had narrower agendas.The Transitional Police Force (TPF)has been absorbed into the nationalCroatian police structure under firmbut fair control and the bridges acrossthe Danube are now internationalborder crossings, with workable transitarrangements for local persons residentin Croatia but with relatives and friendsin Serbia.

Overall assessment ofthe program

As a part of the overall UNTAESeffort, the weapons buy-back programwas an undoubted success. It could nothave been carried out without the fullcooperation of the Croatiangovernment which provided themoney, in the face of some oppositionin certain quarters in Zagreb, and theexperts to assess the types andcondition of the weapons handed in.The terms of the program werenegotiated amicably between UNTAESand the Croatian authorities and theprinciples of anonymity and cashpayment on the spot proved to be ofsignificant importance. Once the initialproblems with implementation hadbeen ironed out, for the most part theprogram worked well. The insistenceby UNTAES that no UNTAESpersonnel would handle the money atany time was also a valuable aspect as iteffectively precluded anymisunderstanding or risk of subse-quent allegation of misappropriation.

Among the observations andimpressions formed by members ofthe UNTAES military who took part inthe program were the following:7

in the early months, many peoplesuspected that somehow theirnames would be noted and recordskept of who handed in weapons,therefore there was a �wait and see�attitude;

others were afraid to hand in theirweapons and ammunition, partlybecause they wanted to retain someform of self-defense;

some tried to bring their weaponsdiscreetly, (e.g., in large paper bags,or by asking a UN MilitaryObserver to act as an intermediary)in order to avoid being seen by theirneighbors;

despite wide announcements of theanonymity of the program, somemen sent their wives or children tohand in weapons;

as time passed, it became clear fromtheir repeated visits that somepeople were �middlemen�, sellingweapons on behalf of others, oreven �brokers� who bought weaponsin the villages then sold them to theprogram for a profit;

the number of handgunssurrendered was small, due probablyto the greater ease with whichpistols could be retained and hiddenand also due to the tradition ofpossessing a weapon;

many waited until the final days ofthe program before handing inweapons and ammunition;

despite UNTAES efforts to givewide publicity to the program byradio, television and print media,there were still many who professednot to know about the program.This might have been a combinationof genuine ignorance, illiteracy,general mistrust or simple pretense;

notwithstanding the positiveresults�in the form of numbers ofweapons and ammunitionsurrendered�at the end of theprogram the general feeling inUNTAES was that there were stillconsiderable quantities that had notbeen handed in.

All these comments are of a practicalnature and not critical of the programitself. Informal exchanges withindividual members of UNTAES,military and civilian, and with some ofthose involved on the Croatian sidehave all confirmed that there was ageneral satisfaction with the objectivesand implementation of the program.

The primary goal of the program wasto reduce the numbers of offensiveweapons and ammunition in the regionand thereby reduce the risks ofviolence. In UNTAES� view everyweapon, explosive or round ofammunition handed in at the WBLswas one less available on the streets orin the hands of the civilian population.In this, the buy-back program wassuccessful far beyond expectations inthe quantities of weapons that wererecovered. The program did notremove all weapons from the region,nor was that result ever expected. Butthe program contributed significantlyto the overall aims of UNTAES andthe Croatian government of bringingthe region�demilitarized, safe andsecure�under the authority ofCroatia.

In the light of the UNTAESexperience, there would appear to belittle doubt that in appropriatecircumstances a weapons buy-backprogram�sensitively designed andcarefully implemented�can be ahighly useful contribution to widerefforts to restore peace and stability incivil societies in the wake of war.

7 Extracted from the final reports to UNTAESheadquarters by the Belgian and Russianbattalions, dated 25 August and 16 September1997 respectively.

outcome and impact

26 B·I·C·C

brief 12

German Federal Ministry of Science.1979. �Merkblatt über Kriterien fürdie Unbrauchbarkeit der Kriegs-waffen der Nummer 29a-c derKriegswaffenliste (KWL) sowie derRohre und Verschlüsse für dieseKriegswaffen (Nr. 34 und 35KWL).� 16 February.

United Nations Department of PublicInformation. 1997. �United NationsPeacekeeping Operations: Croatia�UNTAES.� [http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/untaes_b.htm]

United Nations Security Council. 1995.�Report of the Secretary-General.�UN Security Council DocumentS/1995/1028, 13 December.

United Nations Security Council. 1996.UN Security Council ResolutionS/RES/1037 (1996), 15 January.

United Nations Security Council. 1997.�Report of the Secretary-Generalon the United Nations TransitionalAdministration for EasternSlavonia, Baranja and WesternSirmium.� UN Security CouncilDocument S/1997/767, 2 October.

References

27B·I·C·C

appendix I

Appendix I:Basic Agreement

28 B·I·C·C

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29B·I·C·C

appendix I

30 B·I·C·C

brief 12

Appendix II:Promotional

Poster�Serbian(Cyrillic) script

31B·I·C·C

Appendix III:Promotional

Poster�Croatian(Latin) script

appendix III

32 B·I·C·C

brief 12

Appendix IV:UNTAES Bulletin,

Issue No. 16(October 1996)

33B·I·C·C

appendix V

Appendix V:UNTAES Bulletin,

Issue No. 17(October 1996)

34 B·I·C·C

brief 12

Appendix VI:Weapon Buy-back

Program Resultsto 7 March 1997

35B·I·C·C

36 B·I·C·C

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BICC series such as brief, report andpaper are published either in English(with a German summary) or inGerman (with an English summary).

report 1:Edward J. Laurance andHerbert Wulf, with the assistance ofJoseph Di Chiaro III, Conversion and theIntegration of Economic and SecurityDimensions, January 1995

report 2:Nicola Mögel, Thomas Sachse undHans-Henning Schröder, Chancen undProbleme der Rüstungskonversion in derGemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staaten:Konversionsprofile ausgewählter Regionen -Nizhnij Novgorod, Republik Udmurtien,Ekaterinenburg, Republik Belarus [Pro-blems and Prospects of Defense Conversion inthe Commonwealth of Independent States:Conversion Profiles of Selected Re-gions�Nizhnii Novgorod, Udmurtiya,Yekaterinburg, and Belarus], March 1995

report 3:Joseph Di Chiaro III (ed.), Conversion ofthe Defense Industry in Russia and EasternEurope, Proceedings of the BICC/CISACWorkshop on Conversion, 10-13 August1994, April 1995

report 4:Keith Cunningham and AndreasKlemmer, Restructuring the US MilitaryBases in Germany: Scope, Impacts andOpportunities, June 1995

report 5:Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma andHerbert Wulf (eds.), Military Conversionfor Social Development, July 1995

report 6:Petra Opitz, Krisenmanagement in derrussischen Rüstungsindustrie - Regionale undunternehmensbezogene Konversionsstrategien[Crisis Management in the Russian DefenseIndustry], October 1995.

report 7:Corinna Hauswedell, Paul Klemmerand Herbert Wulf (Hg.), Konversion -Herausforderung für Wissenschaft undForschung (Konferenzdokumentation)[Conference proceedings], December 1995

report 8:Ulrike Lindemann and JØrgenKlußmann, Konversion militärischerLiegenschaften - Eine weltweite Herausforde-rung, Konferenzreportage [Base Closures�AGlobal Challenge, Conference proceedings],Oktober 1996

report 9:Jörn Brömmelhörster, KONVER II:Konversionsförderung durch die EuropäischeUnion/Fostering of Conversion by theEuropean Union, March 1997

report 10:Ksenia Gonchar, Research andDevelopment (R&D) Conversion in Russia,May 1997

report 11:Keith Cunningham, Base Closure andRedevelopment in Central and EasternEurope, July 1997

report 12:Kiflemariam Gebrewold (ed.),Converting Defense Resources to HumanDevelopment, Conference Proceedings,October 1998

brief 1:Ksenia Gonchar, Yevgeny Kuznetsovand Alexander Ozhegov, Conversion ofthe Post-Soviet Defense Industry: Implicationsfor Russian Economic Development,February 1995

brief 2:Anke Habich, Werner Voß und PeterWilke, Abhängigkeit der Werften imOstseeraum von der Rüstungsproduktion[Dependence of Shipyards in the Baltic SeaRegion on Defense Production], March 1995

brief 3:Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf(eds.), Coping with Surplus Weapons: APriority for Conversion Research and Policy,June 1995

brief 4:Kees Kingma and Vanessa Sayers,Demobilization in the Horn of Africa,Proceedings of the IRG Workshop, AddisAbaba, 4-7 December 1994, June 1995

brief 5:Werner Voß and Michael Brzoska,Eurofighter 2000: Consequences andAlternatives, February 1996

brief 6:Michael Renner, Cost of Disarmament:An Overview of the Economic Costs of theDismantlement of Weapons and the Disposalof Military Surplus, March 1996.

brief 7:Edward J. Laurance, The New Field ofMicro-Disarmament: Addressing theProliferation and Buildup of Small Armsand Light Weapons, August 1996

brief 8:Pawel Wieczorek and KatarzynaZukrowska, Conversion in Poland: TheDefense Industry and Base Redevelopment,November 1996

brief 9:Greg Bischak, US Conversion after theCold War, 1990-1997, Lessons for Forginga New Conversion Policy, July 1997

brief 10:Yitzhak Shichor, Peaceful Fallout: China�sMilitary Nuclear Complex to Civilian Use,October 1997

brief 11:Joseph Di Chiaro III, ReasonableMeasures: Addressing the ExcessiveAccumulation and Unlawful Use of SmallArms, August 1998

brief 12:Derek Boothby, The UNTAESExperience: Weapons Buy-back in EasternSlavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium(Croatia), October 1998

Publications

37B·I·C·C

paper 1:Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma andHerbert Wulf, Demilitarization andConversion, World Social Summit,Copenhagen, March 1995

paper 2:Andreas Klemmer, United NationsPublications Related to the Subject ofConversion: An AnnotatedBibliography, April 1995

paper 3:Yevgeny Kuznetsov (ed.), Learning toRestructure: Studies ofTransformation in the Russian DefenseSector, June 1996

paper 4:Mersie Ejigu and Tekalign Gedamu,Conversion in Africa: Past Experience andFuture Outlook, June 1996

paper 5:Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T.Wezeman, Dutch Surplus Weapons, July1996

paper 6:Joseph DiChiaro III, Conference onDismantlement and Destruction of Nuclear,Chemical and Conventional Weapons, 19-21May 1996, Conference Summary,December 1996

paper 7:Irmgard Nübler, Human ResourcesDevelopment and Utilization inDemobilization and Reintegration Programs,January 1997

paper 8:Denise Spencer, Demobilization andReintegration in Central America, March1997

paper 9:Stacy Larsen, An Overview of DefenseConversion in the Ukraine, June 1997

paper 10:Moses Kiggundu, Retrenchment Programsin Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications forDemobilization, July 1997

paper 11:Ian Davis and Steve Schofield, Upgradesand Surplus Weapons: Lessons from the UKDisposal Agency, August 1997

paper 12:Susanne Kopte, Nuclear SubmarineDecommissioning and Related Problems,August 1997

paper 13:Peter O'Meara Evans, Destruction ofAbandoned Chemical Weapons in China,September 1997

paper 14:Ksenia Gonchar; Conversion within theContext of Economic Reform: The Case ofNizhniy Novgorod Oblast, May 1998

books:

Michael Brzoska and Werner Voss(eds.), Auswirkungen und Alternativen desEurofighter 2000 [Consequences andAlternatives of the Eurofighter 2000],Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, 1996

BICC, Conversion Survey 1996. GlobalDisarmament, Demilitarization andDemobilization, Oxford University Press,UK, 1996

BICC, Conversion Survey 1997. GlobalDisarmament and Disposal of SurplusWeapons, Oxford University Press, UK,1997

BICC, Conversion Survey 1998. GlobalDisarmament, Defense IndustryConsolidation and Conversion, OxfordUniversity Press, UK, 1998

Ulrike Lindemann und UlrichSchirowski, Truppenabbau und Konversionin NRW, Handbuch für Kommunen[Handbook for Communities in NRW],January 1996

publications

Jörn Brömmelhörster and JohnFrankenstein (eds.), Mixed Motives,Uncertain Outcomes�Defense Conversion inChina, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO,1997

forthcoming:

report 13:David DeClerq, The Disposal of SmallArms and Light Weapons: A Survey andPractical Guide to Destruction Methodologies,Winter 1998/99

brief 13:Yudit Kiss, The Transformation of theDefense Industry in Hungary, Winter 1998

About the CenterThe Bonn International Center forConversion (BICC) is an independentnon-profit organization dedicated topromoting and facilitating the process-es whereby people, skills, technology,equipment, and financial and economicresources can be shifted away from thedefense sector and applied to alterna-tive civilian uses. Through research andanalysis, technical assistance and ad-vice, retraining programs, publications,and conferences, BICC supportsgovernmental and non-governmentalinitiatives as well as public and privatesector organizations by finding ways toreduce costs and enhance effectivenessin the draw-down of military-relatedactivities. As a result, BICC contrib-utes to improved post-conflict settle-ment and structural development.

BICC�s six program areas are:

Defense expenditures andbudget reallocation

Civilian applications formilitary R&D

Industrial conversion andrestructuring

Demobilization and reintegration

Base closure and redevelopment

Dismantling and disposal ofsurplus weapons

BICC is an international think tank,which conducts research, makes policysuggestions and facilitates and medi-ates the conversion process at alllevels�local, national and global. TheCenter provides consulting services toa range of public and private organi-zations. In order to function as aninternational clearing-house, BICCactively collects data and informationon all conversion program areas, andproduces a variety of publications

analyzing the international conversionprocess, such as its annual conversionsurvey, its series of reports, briefs, andpapers, as well as its Internet serviceConverNet.

BICC was established in 1994 withgenerous support from the GermanState Government of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). The Center�sshareholders include the states ofNorth Rhine-Westphalia andBrandenburg as well as the West-deutsche Landesbank Girozentrale(WestLB), Düsseldorf/Münster andthe LandesentwicklungsgesellschaftNRW. BICC cooperates with multi-lateral institutions, German andinternational organizations andfoundations.

Published by© BICC, Bonn 1998Bonn International Center for ConversionDirector: Dr. Herbert WulfPublishing management: Michael DedekAn der Elisabethkirche 25D-53113 BonnGermanyPhone +49-228-911960Fax +49-228-241215E-mail: bicc@bicc.uni-bonn.deInternet:http://bicc.uni-bonn.de

ISSN 0947-7322

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