Sierra Fria Corp. v. Evans, 1st Cir. (1997)

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USCA1 Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

_________________________

No. 97-1294

SIERRA FRIA CORP. AND RODRIGO ROCHA,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

DONALD J. EVANS, P.C., ET AL. (GOODWIN, PROCTER & HOAR),

Defendants, Appellees.



_________________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Morris E. Lasker,* Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________

_________________________

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge, _____________

Coffin and Campbell, Senior Circuit Judges. _____________________

_________________________

Stephen L. Braga, with whom Miller, Cassidy, Larro__________________ _______________________

Lewin, L.L.P. was on brief, for appellants. _____________

David S. Blatt, with whom John K. Villa, Willia________________ _______________ ______

Connolly, James J. Dillon, and Goodwin, Procter & Hoar wer________ ________________ _______________________

brief, for appellees.



_________________________

October 9, 1997

________________________

________________

*Of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation

SELYA, Circuit Judge. St. Ambrose is said toSELYA, Circuit Judge.

_____________



advised St. Augustine that "[w]hen . . . at Rome, live in

Roman style." John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 113 (Ju

____________________

Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992). In this case, the defendant

Boston law firm and its constituent partners (hereina

collectively Goodwin, Procter), counselled their erst

clients that when acquiring real estate in Aruba there

material risks associated with doing so in the Aruban style.

plaintiffs demurred and instead traveled a path consistent

St. Ambrose's counsel. Costly problems surfaced after the

was done.

Unwilling to absorb the loss in silence, the cli

sued for malpractice. The district court found in the lawy

favor. See Sierra Fria Corp. v. Evans, ___ F. Supp. _____ _________________ _____



Mass. 1997) [No. 95-CIV-10106-MEL, slip op.]. The cli

appeal. We affirm.

I. TROUBLE IN PARADISE I. TROUBLE IN PARADISE

Inasmuch as the appellants profess not to contest

facts as found by the lower court, we lean heavily upon

opinion below in recounting the relevant events. See id. at___ ___

[slip op. at 2-18].

In 1991, plaintiffs-appellants Sierra Fria Corpora

and Rodrigo Rocha (hereinafter collectively Rocha) acquire

option to purchase two Aruban resort hotels, the Divi Divi

the Divi Tamarijn, from Grape Holding N.V. (Grape)

approximately $35,000,000. Rocha engaged Goodwin, Procter



2

lead counsel, with overall responsibility for coordinating l

due diligence involved in the transaction. The law firm assi

a partner, Michael Glazer, and an associate, Minta Kay, to

on the acquisition. Both attorneys specialized in real es

law, but neither previously had handled an Aruban transaction

Kay received a draft title memorandum based on Ar

land records from Ingrid Bleeker, an attorney affiliated



Smeets, Thesseling & Von Borkhorst (a firm that one of Roc

joint venturers had hired for its familiarity with Aruban

Dutch law). Kay, who had hoped to obtain either title insur

or an as-built survey or both, expressed concern that

memorandum lacked solid title assurances. Bleeker informe

that title insurance was unavailable in Aruba and that Ar

real estate transactions customarily proceeded without as-b

surveys. The prevailing practice, she said, was to requisiti

title opinion from a local notary. Bleeker also informe

that, if an as-built survey could be obtained at all, it

necessitate an extremely costly and time-consuming proc

Frank Zeven, a more senior member of the Smeets firm, spoke

Glazer and confirmed Bleeker's depiction of Aruban real es



practices.

Based on these conversations, Glazer and Kay unders

that if Rocha purchased the hotels according to Aruban custo

risked not knowing exactly what assets he was acquiring. T

concern heightened when they realized that a time-share co

(Dutch Village) adjoined the Divi Tamarijn Beach Resort and

3



no clearly visible dividing line separated the properties. T

Kay spoke to Christopher DeChiario, Rocha's long-time aide.

explained the hazards of proceeding without a survey,

DeChiario promised to discuss the matter with Rocha. Gl

later spoke directly to Rocha about the risks attendant to

absence of a survey. Rocha indicated that he was

particularly concerned. Consequently, Goodwin, Procter di

commission a survey and Kay continued to work with Bleeke

determine precisely what assets were located on the hot

properties.

Bleeker eventually mailed several maps of

properties to Goodwin, Procter. Kay informed DeChiario that

maps did not answer the boundary questions and again expla

that, without a survey, Rocha lacked assurance that he



purchasing all the improvements. DeChiario told Kay to pres

with the transaction notwithstanding the absence of a survey,

to focus her efforts on securing a cross-use agreement with

Village that would permit Divi Tamarijn guests to use

Village's facilities, and vice-versa.

When Glazer and Kay met with Rocha and DeChiario

iron out some wrinkles in the proposed cross-use agreement,

once again explained that, absent a survey, a purchaser coul

know whether the envisioned property encompassed all of

hotels' facilities. Rocha stated that he was not intereste

obtaining a survey and that he was willing to consummate

seemingly lucrative transaction without one. Kay then draft

4



memorandum detailing her concerns and sent copies to Rocha

DeChiario.

During a subsequent conference call with Rocha

other investors, Kay again voiced her worries about the loca

of various facilities. Rocha grew impatient and made it c

that speed was his highest priority. He expressed eagernes

take control of the hotels during the height of the 1991-



tourist season, and he indicated a willingness to rely on

cross-use agreement and the customary Aruban title assurances

protection.

Goodwin, Procter received a standard Aruban t

opinion from Maria Eman, an Aruban notary, firmed up the cr

use agreement, and thereafter consummated the transaction

February 11, 1992. The closing did not bring clos

approximately one year later, Rocha learned that assets havin

appraised value in excess of $4,000,000 tennis courts, par

spaces, and an administrative building housing the hot

laundry facilities lay on land belonging to Dutch Village.

After unsuccessfully attempting to gain title to

assets, Rocha invoked diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C___



1332(a) (1994), and brought suit against Goodwin, Procter.

his complaint, Rocha accused the defendants of negligence

breach of a contractual obligation to perform legal ser

skillfully, prudently, and accurately. Goodwin, Procter de

Rocha's charges.

The United States District Court for the Distric

5



Massachusetts, Morris E. Lasker, District Judge, conduct

five-day bench trial. The judge then authored an opinio

which he identified the controlling issue as whether Goo

Procter "informed Rocha of th[e] risk [of proceeding witho

survey] with sufficient emphasis and particularity to

certain that his decision on whether to consummate the purc

was intelligent and knowing." Sierra Fria, ___ F. Supp. at___________

[slip op. at 3]. He resolved this issue in the defenda

favor, basing his decision primarily on an assessment of

relative credibility of Glazer, Kay, and Rocha. In particu

Judge Lasker credited the attorneys' testimony that

repeatedly had warned Rocha about the dangers attendant

purchasing the hotels without a survey and found incre

Rocha's denial that they had uttered such warnings.1 See i



___ _

___ [slip op. at 16].

II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE

Goodwin, Procter is a Boston-based firm, retaine

Massachusetts. Although the firm devoted its labors to prop

located abroad, neither party disputes that Massachusetts

supplies the substantive rule of decision. We therefore su

Massachusetts legal malpractice law to determine whether Goo

Procter's conduct falls safely within its boundaries. See Bo ___ _

v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 370, 375 (1st Cir. 19

__________________________

____________________

1The court also ruled against Rocha on a variety of o

claims. See Sierra Fria, ___ F. Supp. at ___, ___ [slip op___ ___________

23-24, 28]. None of those rulings has been appealed



therefore, we take no view of them.

6

Moores v. Greenberg, 834 F.2d 1105, 1107 n.2 (1st Cir. 1987). ______ _________

In general, Massachusetts law requires a client

legal malpractice case to show that the attorney had a dut

the client, that he breached the duty, and that his br

proximately caused the plaintiff's harm. See Fishman v. Bro ___ _______ __



487 N.E.2d 1377, 1379-80 (Mass. 1986). The first elemen

indigenous to the attorney-client relationship; in Massachuse

as elsewhere, an attorney owes his or her client a duty

exercise a reasonable degree of care and skill in the perfor

of legal tasks. See Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 218

___ _________ _____

Cir. 1987); Pongonis v. Saab, 486 N.E.2d 28, 29 (Mass. 19 ________ ____

The second element is of critical importance here. Under it,

plaintiff "must demonstrate that the attorney failed to exer

reasonable care and skill in handling the matter for whic

attorney was retained." Colucci v. Rosen, Goldberg, Sla _______ ____________________

Levenson & Wekstein, 515 N.E.2d 891, 894 (Mass. App. Ct. 19 ___________________

The third element is standard fare in tort actions and requ

no discussion in connection with Rocha's central theory



liability; if, on these facts, closing without a su

constituted malpractice, then the harm to Rocha is manifest.

Of course, generalized concepts of duty and breach

be adapted to fit particular contexts. Thus, when a client s

advice from an attorney, the attorney owes the client "a dut

full and fair disclosure of facts material to the clie

interests." Williams v. Ely, 668 N.E.2d 799, 806 (Mass. 19 ________ ___

This means that the attorney must advise the client of

7



significant legal risks involved in a contemplated transact

and must do so in terms sufficiently plain to permit the cl

to assess both the risks and their potential impact on

situation. Consequently, in a legal malpractice action

implicates an attorney's performance of his counseling funct

the trier of fact must determine whether the attorney's a

permitted the client adequately to weigh the risks involved

given course of action. See id. ___ ___

III. ANALYSIS III. ANALYSIS

Although Rocha presents a multifaceted asseverati



array, his appeal boils down to two interlocking claims of er

We examine them sequentially.

A. A. __

The appellant posits that the district court's opi

violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) and thereby precludes effec

appellate review. This proposition is unfounded.

In terms, Rule 52(a) dictates that, in a bench tr

the court "shall find the facts specially and state separa

its conclusions of law." This directive "impose[s] on the t

court an obligation to ensure that its ratio decidendi is

_____ _________

forth with enough clarity to enable a reviewing court reliabl

perform its function." Touch v. Master Unit Die Prods., Inc._____ ___________________________

F.3d 754, 759 (1st Cir. 1995). But this imperative ha



practical, commonsense cast. Rule 52(a) requires trial ju

neither to pen exhaustive dissertations nor to make findings

conclusions that are exquisitely precise. As long as the t

8

court clearly relates the findings of fact upon which

decision rests and articulates in a readily intelligible ma

the conclusions that it draws by applying the controlling la



the facts as found, no more is exigible. See Peckha___ _____

Continental Cas. Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 830, 842 (1st Cir. 19

__________________________

Judge Lasker's twenty-eight page opinion clears this hurdle

room to spare.

We need not tarry. The judge's rescript recapitul

the trial testimony of the key witnesses, limns a series

credibility calls, delineates reasons for crediting the testi

of some witnesses and discounting that of others, and traces

inferences that flow from the credited testimony. The ju

thorough exposition of his factual findings stands in ma

contrast to the unsupported generalizations that have trig

Rule 52(a) concerns in the cases upon which Rocha relies.

e.g., Touch, 43 F.3d at 758-59; Pearson v. Fair, 808 F.2d



____ _____ _______ ____

166 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam).

Rocha tries to minimize the district cou

thoroughness. Regardless of the battery of factual findings

says, the judge made only a single conclusion of law and, t

did not comply with Rule 52(a). This is little more

whistling past the graveyard. Rule 52(a) announces

qualitative, not a quantitative, standard and here, Goo

Procter either was or was not guilty of negligence in

representation of Rocha. Since the judge made the solitary l

conclusion necessary for resolution of the action, our in

9





The judge then applied the standard to the discerned facts.

Sierra Fria, ___ F. Supp. at ___ [slip op. at 17-18]. In___________

doing, he provided a clearly marked roadmap that shows ho

reached a decision in this case. The jurisprudence of Rule 5

does not require more exegetic treatment. See, e.g., Faso ___ ____ ___

Foods Co. v. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 961 F.2d 1052, 1058_________ __________________________

Cir. 1992); Westside Property Owners v. Schlesinger, 597_________________________ ___________

1214, 1216 n.3 (9th Cir. 1979).

B.

B. __

Next, Rocha (who is represented by fresh counsel

appeal) mounts a direct challenge to the lower court's deci

on the merits. His new lawyer says that he is contesting



the court's legal conclusion, not its factfinding. Therefore

argues, we must undertake de novo review of the decis

Goodwin, Procter not only defends Judge Lasker's decision,

also disparages Rocha's attempt to import a de novo standar

review into the case. We address this standard-of-re

imbroglio before turning to the various facets of Rocha's

10



claim.

1. 1.

We have made it pellucid that "appeals in the fe

court system are usually arrayed along a degree-of-defer

continuum, stretching from plenary review at one pole to hi

deferential modes of review . . . at the opposite pole." I

Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1327 (1st Cir. 1993).______________________

the ordinary case, this paradigm requires the court of appeal

scrutinize the trial court's answers to purely legal question

novo and to assess the trial court's answers to straight fac

questions for clear error. See id. ___ ___

There is, however, a middle ground which consist



the trial court's answers to mixed questions of law and fa

and that middle ground is not amenable to a single standar

review rubric. Rather, the applicable standard of review va

depending upon the nature of the mixed question; the more f

dominated it is, the more likely that deferential, clear-e

review will obtain, and the more law-dominated it is, the

likely that non-deferential, de novo review will obtain. See__

at 1328.

Putting the issue that Rocha seeks to raise in

proper place along the law/fact continuum ends the ins

standard-of-review controversy. Though Rocha casts his argu

artfully, it is perfectly plain that determining whether Goo

Procter exercised due care in representing Rocha is a f

intensive exercise, see Brennan v. Hendrigan, 888 F.2d 189,



___ _______ _________

11

(1st Cir. 1989), and the district court, sitting without a j

appropriately treated it as such. The proof of the puddin

precedential; we consistently have reviewed adjudications

negligence arising in the course of bench trials by referenc

the clearly erroneous test.2 See, e.g., La Esperanza de P ___ ____ _________________



Inc. v. Perez y Cia. de P.R., Inc., ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st____ ___________________________

1997) [No. 96-1904, slip op. at 11]; Clement v. United Sta _______ _________

980 F.2d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 1992); DeGuio v. United States,______ _____________

F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1990); Obolensky v. Saldana Schmier,_________ _______________

F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1969).

Under this format, we may reverse the district ju

conclusion that Goodwin, Procter did not act negligently only

"after careful evaluation of the evidence, we are left wit

abiding conviction that those determinations and findings

simply wrong." State Police Ass'n v. Commissioner, ___ F.3d__________________ ____________

___ (1st Cir. 1997) [No. 97-1319, slip op. at 9]; accord Cump ______ ___

v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 19 _____________________



Moreover, to the extent that Rocha seeks to evade the applica

of this standard by the heavy-handed expedient of crea

labelling, he is painting with an empty palette. See Reli ___ ___

Steel Prods. Co. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 880 F.2d 575,_________________ ________________________

(1st Cir. 1989) (declaring that this court "will not pe

____________________

2This does not mean that clear-error review applies up

down the line. For example, a judge's determination whet

plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence to create a questio

fact on the issue of negligence is itself a question of

subject to de novo review. See Cort s-Irizarry v. Corpora___ _______________ ______

Insular de Seguros, 111 F.3d 184, 187, 189-91 (1st Cir. 19

___________________

Coyne v. Taber Partners I, 53 F.3d 454, 457 (1st Cir. 1995). _____ ________________

12



parties to profit by dressing factual disputes in `le

costumery").

2. 2.

The merits need not detain us. Here, the dist

judge accepted the facts surrounding the transaction very muc

stated by Glazer and Kay, rejecting Rocha's contrary account.

do not find the judge's decision to disbelieve Rocha's testi

clearly erroneous. Ample evidence controverted Rocha's pro

that he was unaware of the dangers inherent in closing witho



survey, including the lawyers' testimony and various documen

evidence (notes, memos, and letters). Credibility determinat

fall squarely within the trier's preserve, see, e.g., Anthon___ ____ _____

Sundlun, 952 F.2d 603, 606 (1st Cir. 1991), and for good rea _______

where a judge presides at a bench trial, observes the witnes

demeanor, and hears their words as they are uttered, he is

better equipped to gauge their veracity (or lack of verac

than is an appellate panel consigned to sift a paper record a

the fact. Hence, we decline the appellant's implicit invita

to disturb the judge's credibility-based findings.

This determination does not end our work. We s

must evaluate the judge's conclusion, based on his acceptanc

the attorneys' testimony, that Goodwin, Procter was



negligent. Having performed this evaluation, we find no erro

The losing party always faces an arduous climb whe

attempts to impugn a factbound finding (such as a finding o

negligence) that results from a bench trial. Here, howe

13

Rocha's difficulties are twice compounded. For one thing,

ascent becomes steeper when the loser bears the burden of p



on the issue. For another thing, the grade increases still

when the trier rests the challenged finding on a credibi

judgment. Recognizing the inhospitable nature of the terr

Rocha argues that, even accepting Glazer's and Kay's narrati

what transpired, Goodwin, Procter's unfocused advice

particularly the firm's inadequate explanation of the cost

time requirements of an Aruban survey and its failure to su

a post-closing arrangement as an alternative protective mecha

did not allow Rocha to weigh his options realistically.

In assembling this argument, Rocha overstates

relevant standard of care. Massachusetts law requires

attorney performing a counseling function to advise the clien

a manner that permits the latter intelligently to assess



risks of taking (or declining to take) a particular action.

lawyers even high-priced lawyers ordinarily are

guarantors of favorable results. It is neither fair, practi

nor legally appropriate to benchmark an attorney agains

standard of prescience. Thus, lawyers are not obliged to re

in exquisite detail every fact or circumstance that

conceivably have a bearing on the client's business decision

to anticipate remote risks. See Williams, 668 N.E.2d at 806.___ ________

the same token, lawyers are not expected to persist relentle

when clients especially clients who are sophistic

businessmen choose to go forward after being suitably info

14



of looming risks. See Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, P.C., 678___ _______ _____________________

1060, 1069 (N.J. 1996) (stating that "an attorney has

obligation `to lie down in front of a speeding train' to pre

a bad deal"); Horn v. Moberg, 844 P.2d 452, 455 (Wash. Ct.____ ______

1993) (similar); Gill v. DiFatta, 364 So.2d 1352, 1354-56____ _______

Ct. App. 1978) (similar); see generally Ronald E. Malle___ _________

Jeffrey M. Smith, 2 Legal Malpractice 20.2 (4th ed. 1996). _________________



Then, too, expert testimony almost always is requ

to establish the standard of care in a legal malpractice act

See Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 218-19; Pongonis, 486 N.E.2d at___ _________ ________

This case falls comfortably within the sweep of that abeceda

rule. And given the facts as found, the expert testimony ad

at trial does not support the claim of negligence, but, rat

confirms that Goodwin, Procter adhered to the applicable stan

of care when it advised Rocha of the risks inherent in procee

without a survey.

The parties each offered one expert witness who

substantively with the standard of care applicable to attor

practicing in Massachusetts.3 Rocha's expert, Stoddard Pl

testified that Goodwin, Procter had two viable options



addressing the survey problem: to locate and commission Du

speaking surveyors to fly to Aruba and map the properties, o

warn Rocha about the perils of closing without a survey

____________________

3While Rocha presented an additional expert wit

(Professor Richard Perlmutter), he served only to confirm

the substantive testimony of Rocha's principal expert (whic

been cast in terms of the New York standard of care) app

equally in Massachusetts.

15



permit him to make an informed decision about whether to proc

For the purpose of his testimony, Platt assumed that Goo

Procter never warned Rocha about these hazards and the

transgressed the standard of care. Goodwin, Procter's exp

Phillip Nexon, started from a different premise. He assume

truth of Glazer's and Kay's testimony that they repeat

cautioned Rocha and concluded that these warnings satisfie

standard of care.

Once the judge resolved the assumptions underlying

expert's testimony in Goodwin, Procter's favor, any substan

dissonance vanished. Rocha's expert admitted as much when

acknowledged that if "the client was brought in, . . . the is

were discussed with the client and the client decided to pro

without a survey," then Goodwin, Procter fulfilled



obligations to Rocha. That, of course, is precisely

happened here or so the trier supportably found. In lig

this testimonial harmony, we have no warrant to set aside, u

principles of clear-error review, the district court's conclu

that Goodwin, Procter did not negligently advise Rocha.

3. 3.

On appeal, Rocha attempts to blunt the force of

reasoning by insisting that Goodwin, Procter negligently fa

to explore the possibility of offsetting the absence of a su

by constructing some type of post-closing arrangement.



16

argument founders on evidentiary shoals.4

First, Platt Rocha's expert testified that he

never consummated a real estate transaction that included a p

closing survey component. This jibed with the testimony of

Goodwin, Procter's expert who classified post-closing sur

as "not customary." Further, Rocha adduced no evidence

another type of post-closing arrangement could have remedie



boundary problems, much less that customary Massachus

practice suggested some such arrangement.

Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, the re

contains no expert testimony that the Massachusetts standar

care required Goodwin, Procter to recommend any post-clo

arrangement to Rocha. We reiterate that Rocha's expert testi

that the lawyers could conform to the standard of care eithe

commissioning a survey or by warning Rocha of the risks

proceeding without one. To avoid this evidentiary obsta

Rocha appears to argue that even after he made an info

decision to proceed without a survey, Goodwin, Procter had

residual duty to suggest a prophylactic post-closing arrange

Yet, Rocha points to no expert testimony that supports



formulation of the standard of care. While "expert testimon

not essential where the claimed legal malpractice is so gros

obvious that laymen can rely on their common knowledge

____________________

4In point of fact, Goodwin, Procter did discuss

implement a post-closing arrangement the cross-use agreeme

in an effort to ameliorate the risks inherent in purchasin

hotels without an as-built survey.

17



recognize or infer negligence," Pongonis, 486 N.E.2d at 29,________

narrow exception to the expert testimony requirement does

encompass Rocha's sophisticated theory of negligence.

We summarize succinctly. Given the evidence of rec

it is readily apparent that the district court's conclusio

not poisoned by Goodwin, Procter's failure to suggest a p

closing arrangement as an antidote to the absence of a survey

4. 4.

Rocha's last asseveration is a variation on t

themes. He maintains that he agreed to proceed without a su

only on the condition that he receive the same title assura

as the prospective first mortgagee, Bank of Nova Scotia (B

To the extent that Rocha couches this contention in terms o



implied contract, he failed to raise it below and there

cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. See Correa___ _____

Hospital San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1191 (1st Cir. 1995), c ______________________

denied, 116 S. Ct. 1423 (1996); Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d______ ________ _____

987 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 515 (1995). _____ ______

Even if Rocha had not waived this contention, it

fail on the merits. Glazer testified that when he told

that he would receive the same assurances as BNS, he meant

Rocha would receive the same title report prepared by the

Aruban notary. Glazer further testified that Rocha

fundamentally the same [assurances], or lack of assurances,

BNS. The trial judge reasonably credited all of Glaz

testimony. Under these circumstances, the appellant's attemp



18

transmogrify this factual issue into an issue of law fizz

See Reliance Steel, 880 F.2d at 577. ___ ______________

IV. CONCLUSION IV. CONCLUSION

We need go no further. The district court warrant

found that Goodwin, Procter warned Rocha time and again about



risks inherent in completing the transaction without a sur

that Rocha failed to heed those warnings, and that Rocha pai

price for his hubris, both literally and figuratively. S

those warnings fully complied with the standard of care

Massachusetts law requires of practicing attorneys, we are no

liberty to reverse the entry of judgment in the defenda

favor.

Affirmed. Affirmed. ________



19

Documents

Sierra Fria Corp. v. Evans, 1st Cir. (1997)