Shanghai Cooperation Organization

MAPPING MULTILATERALISM IN TRANSITION NO. 2

DECEMBER 2013STEPHEN ARIS

In the immediate years following its formation in 2001, the ShanghaiCooperation Organization (SCO) attracted a lot of international attention.During this period, it was often cast as a joint Russian-Chinese attempt tocounteract the geopolitical influence of NATO and the US in Eurasia andbeyond. Since the late 2000s, however, interpretations of the SCO based solelyon this grand geopolitical narrative have become less numerous. This isbecause it has become evident that there is more to the SCO than simplyfunctioning as an anti-Western balancing alliance. Furthermore, the SCO hasnot come to exercise the extent of influence over the foreign policy of itsmember states and the region that such grand narratives afforded it. Althoughit is now into its second decade, questions remain about its effectiveness,robustness, and future trajectory. While not progressing as rapidly as many predicted, the SCO has carved outa role for itself as a hub for the coordination of specific aspects of security andeconomic policy, and it has become one of several important voices shapingregional politics and security in Eurasia. Indeed, an important role it has cometo play is in representing its collective membership’s viewpoint on interna-tional issues, which—given that its membership includes China and Russia—provides it with a significant role within the international community. Indeed,the SCO appears to be placing itself at the center of the ongoing negotiation—or renegotiation—of the relationship between global and regional levels ofgovernance.

History and Structure

FROM BORDER TALKS TO FORMAL ORGANIZATION

During the early 1990’s, against the background of a number of unresolvedborder demarcation issues between China and the Soviet Union and thedisintegration of the Soviet Union, the leaders of the newly independent statesof Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan found themselves in the position ofhaving to negotiate the settlement of territorial disputes and border delimita-tions with China. To this end, a process of negotiations and confidence-building measures were established within a loose multilateral framework. Asboth the Central Asian leaderships and China were aware of Russia’scontinued practical role and influence in the region, Moscow was also invitedto participate in these negotiations. This process can be seen as an example ofChina’s “good-neighbor” policy aimed at ensuring friendly relations with, andstability within, the states on its borders. It was also a product of Beijing’s desire to demystify and defuse its negativeimage within Central Asia, with a view to the long-term aim of establishing

The global architecture of multilat-

eral diplomacy is in transition and a

comprehensive understanding of

the new dynamics, players, and

capacities is needed. The Mapping

Multilateralism in Transition series

features short briefing papers on

established but evolving regional

organizations and select cross-

regional organizations. The papers

aim to: (1) identify the key role and

features of the organizations; (2)

assess their current dynamics; and

(3) analyze their significance for the

overall regional and global geopolit-

ical context.

This paper examines the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization, a princi -

pal Eurasian regional organization

comprised of China, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and

Uzbekistan.

Stephen Aris is a senior researcher

at the Centre for Security Studies

ETH Zurich. The views expressed in

this publication represent those of

the author and not necessarily those

of the International Peace Institute.

IPI owes a debt of thanks to its

donors who make publications like

this one possible.

2 MAPPING MULTILATERALISM IN TRANSITION

itself as an important economic player in theregion.1 Indeed, while arguably in a position toforce territorial concessions from the Central Asianrepublics, China accepted resolutions that could bepresented by the Central Asian leaderships asmutually-beneficial agreements, an importantconsideration for them as they sought to consoli-date their new nation states. At the same time, theinvolvement of Russia was an indication that allsides acknowledged that Moscow still had a signif-icant role to play in the region, and from theChinese side that it was not seeking to advance itsposition at the expense of Russia, but ratheralongside it. The relative success of these open multilateralborder negotiations was seen by the signing of theTreaty of Deepening Military Trust in BorderRegions in 1996 and the official bilateral settlementsof border demarcation in subsequent years. On theback of these border negotiations, these statessought to regularize their efforts at cooperation byestablishing the Shanghai Five. This informalformat focused on developing further confidence-building measures and investigating other areas ofmutual interest, with an emphasis on transnationalsecurity challenges—most notably terrorism—emerging in the late 1990s. In 2001, Uzbekistanjoined these five states in the ShanghaiCooperation Organization. The SCO is designed to facilitate intergovern-mental cooperation at a variety of different levels

supported by a permanently functioning bureau-cracy made up of representatives from the memberstates. There are also organs dedicated to specificareas of activity. The SCO does not seek sovereign control over itsmember states or have the authority to enforce itsdecisions and recommendations. There is noformal codified procedure of decision making. TheSCO operates on the basis of informal discussion,and consensual approval is needed for a decision tobe adopted. Taking these governing arrangements intoaccount, the SCO’s model of a multilateral cooper-ative framework can be characterized as closer tothat of the Association of South East Asian Nations(ASEAN) than that of the European Union (EU). Itis governed by a code of interaction similar to thatof the “ASEAN way,” which emphasizes anapproach of informal interaction and consensusbuilding to generate trust and goodwill among itsmembers without a “highly institutionalized legalframework.”2

INTERGOVERNMENTAL FORUMS ANDMEETINGS

• The Council of Heads of State: The Council ofHeads of State is composed of the state leaders ofthe member states and is the main decision-making body of the SCO. In normal circum-stances, the council is only convened at theannual summit of the SCO and defines the

1 Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse, The “Chinese Question” in Central Asia: Domestic Order, Social Changes, and the Chinese Factor (London: Hurst andCompany, 2012).

2 Samuel Sharpe, “An ASEAN Way to Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia?,” The Pacific Review 16, No. 2 (2003): 231–250.

MEMBERSHIP AND ASSOCIATION

2001 Formal establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, comprising China,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

2004 Mongolia given observer-state status2005 India, Iran, and Pakistan given observer-state status2009 Belarus and Sri Lanka given dialogue-partner status2012 Afghanistan given observer-state status2013 Turkey given dialogue-partner status

N.B.: The status of an observer or dialogue-partner is not clearly defined by the SCO. Indeed, it is uncertain how engaged eitheran observer or dialogue partner is in cooperation within the organization. It is usual for the head of state, or another high-levelofficial, from the observers and dialogue-partners to attend the annual SCO Heads of State summit.

direction of the organization for the forthcomingyear.

• Other Intergovernmental Councils: Below thelevel of national heads of state, there are regularand routine meetings of national governmentdepartments and agencies (e.g., Council of Headsof Government, Council of Ministers of ForeignAffairs, etc.). These meetings are integral to thedevelopment of commonly agreed programs forcooperation and arranging the implementationof coordinated approaches and policies acrossthe member states. In addition, the Council ofNational Coordinators acts as an administrativeorgan “that coordinates and directs day-to-dayactivities of the Organization” (Art. 9, Charter ofShanghai Cooperation Organization).

• SCO Forum: The SCO has in place a discussionforum of nongovernmental experts, academics,

and policy analysts, from designated researchcenters across the member states. They are taskedwith researching and analyzing key issue areasand questions of significance to the SCO. PERMANENT ORGANS

• The Secretariat: Located in Beijing, theSecretariat is the standing administrative organ“responsible for the provision of organization,technical and information assistances to activitiessupported within the framework of the SCO”(Art. 11, Charter of Shanghai CooperationOrganization). It is composed of officials fromthe member states, who are permanentlyassigned to the Secretariat to work on a nonpar-tisan basis. The number from each member isdetermined by their contributions to the SCObudget.

• Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS):

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION 3

The Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

4 MAPPING MULTILATERALISM IN TRANSITION

Established in 2004 with its headquarters inTashkent, RATS is detailed with countering whatthe SCO has identified as the “three evil forces” ofthe region: terrorism, extremism, andseparatism. It is composed of two bodies. Acouncil made up of the ministers responsible ofcounterterrorism efforts in the respectivemember states, which is convened regularly to setthe direction and agenda of activities. And apermanently functioning executive committeebased at headquarters, which is responsible forthe functional implementation of the agenda setby the council.

• Interbank Association: Formed in 2005, theInterbank Association is a forum for engagementand coordination between major national banksfrom each member state. It aims to evaluate andprovide credit and funding for joint-investmentprojects.

• Business Council: Created in 2006 with itsheadquarters in Moscow, the Business Council isa nongovernmental mechanism designed tosupport the implementation of SCO projects byfacilitating interaction and collaboration betweenthe business communities and financial institu-tions of its member states. It also serves as asource of independent advice on improving the

effectiveness of these projects and helps investorsto find funding for the projects.

Main Areas of Cooperation

The SCO facilitates cooperation in the areas ofsecurity, economics, and culture. The organiza-tion’s budget is limited to the running of theSecretariat and the programmatic organs.Otherwise, the majority of project funding comesfrom member states and consortiums arrangedwithin the Business Council or InterbankAssociation to support specific projects on an adhoc basis. The creation of an SCO DevelopmentFund is currently being discussed, which would seeeach member state contribute directly to a fundthat could then be used for the realization of agreedSCO projects. However, cooperation on commonsecurity concerns remains the backbone of theSCO.SECURITY

Beginning with the talks to resolve tensions overborder demarcation in the early 1990s, the SCO’ssecurity agenda has been expanded to focus mainlyon transnational issues, which could not beeffectively addressed by one member’s effortsalone. Initially, this entailed a concentration on

Map of SCO area

tackling terrorism, but has since been expanded toencompass a range of new issues during the lastdecade. The security component of the SCO iscentered on supporting the primary concerns of itsmembers’ political leaderships: the maintenance oftheir regimes and the stability of their states. The struggle against what is termed as the “threeevil forces” (terrorism, extremism, andseparatism), said to be active in the region, has beenthe mainstay of cooperation within the SCO sinceits formation. It should be noted that althoughsome have suggested that this focus on counter-acting terrorism was an opportunist reaction to theinternational climate following the September 11thterrorist attacks in the USA, the ShanghaiConvention on Combating Terrorism, Separatismand Extremism was signed three months beforethese attacks. Indeed, this agenda had beendeveloped against the backdrop of instability inCentral Asia during the 1990s, such as the civil warin Tajikistan (1992–1997), a series of armedincursions by anti-regime groups (taking andholding sovereign territory of Tajikistan,Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000), andongoing concerns with internal insecurity in bothChina and Russia. To implement the aforementioned ShanghaiConvention, the SCO established a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in 2004, tasked withcompiling and continually updating a database ofterrorist, separatist, and extremist actors across theregion, and serving as a hub for sharing intelligenceand harmonizing legislation and approaches tocounterterrorism among its member states. Overthe last decade, the RATS has come to be seen as avaluable and important tool in the fight againsttransnational terrorism by its members’ leader-ships. However, it should be noted that the RATShas been criticized by human rights advocates ontwo fronts. First, the vagueness of its definitions ofterrorism, separatism, and extremism is such thatthese categories could be extended to cover anyactors opposing the incumbent regimes. Second,questions have been raised about the secrecy andopaque nature of its activities in developingblacklists and databases, and in particular thepractice of mandatory extradition of individualswanted as terrorist, separatist, or extremist suspects

by other member states.3

While the struggle against the “three evils”remains a central feature of the SCO securityagenda, the inclusion of other issues has beenongoing since the mid-2000s. Indeed, the SCO hasargued that a holistic approach is required to bringstability to the region, whereby issue-areas that donot represent a direct physical “existential” threat,but have underlying and long-term implicationsfor security also need to be addressed. As such theSCO has developed programs to address organizedcrime, the illegal narcotics trade, economic andsocial deprivation, monitoring of elections, anddeveloping structures for the collective response tonatural disasters. The illegal narcotics trade has become aprominent focus since the mid-2000s. This issuehas become more pressing in the last five years asgreater insecurity in Afghanistan has served tointensify the activity along the trade route for illegalnarcotics from the poppy fields of Afghanistan,through Central Asia, Russia, and eventually toEurope. The SCO has adopted an anti-narcoticsstrategy for 2011–2016, and it is working towardthe coordination of its members internal policies toform a region-wide united response. Furthermore,the SCO is working with other regional and globalframeworks focused on tackling illegal narcotics. In2010, the RATS signed a protocol of cooperationwith UNODC’s Central Asian RegionalInformation and Coordination Centre, wherebythe two bodies collaborate on efforts to tackle theillegal narcotic trade as a source of funding forterrorist organizations in the region. Although focused on acting as a hub for thecoordination of responses to nontraditionalsecurity challenges and underpinned by a doctrineof noninterference, the SCO holds regular militaryexercises. Following a few previous joint-militaryexercises, in 2007 the SCO laid out an agreementon the holding of regular military exercises, knownas the “peace missions.” Since then, exercises ofdifferent scales with different levels of participationby different members have been held in 2007, 2009,2010, 2012, and 2013. These exercises tend to bedominated by Russian and Chinese troops, withKazakhstan playing a notable role, whileKyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have minor roles.

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION 5

3 Human Rights in China, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights: The Impact of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (New York: Human Rights in China, 2011).

Uzbekistan—traditionally against any involvementin multilateral military formats—usually declinesto take part. The scenarios on which these exercises are basedtend to revolve around common responses to asecurity crisis created by the “three evil forces,”such as an armed uprising against an existingregime in Central Asia. The nature of the scenarioshas led to a debate about whether the SCO shoulddevelop a capacity to act militarily in the face ofsuch security crises, or even play a role as apeacekeeping force (for more information see thesection below). However, at the present time, thereis little prospect of the SCO establishing a commonmilitary unit or force. Instead, the main role of thepeace missions is as a confidence-building measurebetween SCO member states. Since the mid-2000s, the SCO has increasinglybegun to interpret regional stability as under threatfrom actors conspiring to cause regime changefrom within by way of “political technology.”Indeed, the use of the Internet by opposition actors,and their perceived proxies, to undermine regimesand organize anti-regime activities are consideredto have been an important component in both the“color revolutions” of Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and theUkraine and the “Arab Spring.” In response, the SCO argues that its “informationspace” must be securitized, in order to prevent theinfiltration of politically destabilizing voices fromoutside the region. As outlined by Alica Kizekova,“the SCO advocates restraining dissemination ofinformation which provokes the ‘three evils’(terrorism, extremism, separatism) and preventingother nations from using their core technologies todestabilize economic, social, and political stabilityand security.”4 At the 2007 SCO annual summit inBishkek, the Action Plan on Ensuring InternationalInformation Security was approved by all memberstates. While, in 2011 the SCO submitted anInternational Code of Conduct for InformationSecurity for consideration by the United Nations. Afghanistan has always been an important issuefor security in Central Asia, because of the porousnature of its borders with Afghanistan. In the pastthe region has been subject to spillover from

insecurity in Afghanistan. These concerns havebeen magnified by the announcement in 2011 thatthe US and NATO intend to withdraw, or at leastdrawdown significantly, their military presence inAfghanistan by the end of 2014. As a result, the SCO’s elites are increasinglyfocused on developing a regional approach toAfghanistan. Initially, activity within the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group was stepped up, and in2012 Afghanistan was awarded observer status ofthe SCO. There has been discussion of joint SCOoperations against the production of opiates inareas of Afghanistan. In addition, the SCO isseeking to draw on its observer membership to actas a hub for negotiation and coordination betweenAfghanistan’s neighbors to the end of managingthe potential effects of further instability inAfghanistan for the region. ECONOMICS

Since the mid-2000s, economic cooperation hasemerged as a twin-priority for the SCO alongsidesecurity. In 2003, the SCO published an ambitiousprogram of multilateral trade and economiccooperation, which set out over 100 projectscovering collaboration on finance, trade,transportation infrastructure, telecommunications,agriculture, and energy. A plan for the realizationof this program was announced a year later,followed by the creation of the SCO InterbankAssociation and the SCO Business Council inconsecutive years after this. As detailed above, bothorgans serve as coordination hubs, working to helpactors promote, plan, and enact the projects agreedupon by the member states. To date, economic cooperation has focusedoverwhelmingly on macroeconomic projects todevelop state infrastructure, in particulartransportation routes. The SCO has sought to playa central role in the development of projects tobuild a road between Volgograd (Russia),Astrakhan (Russia), Atyrau (Kazakhstan), Beyneu(Kazakhstan), and Kungrad (Uzbekistan), as wellas the on-going discussion about the constructionof a railway between Andijan (Uzbekistan),Torugart (Kyrgyzstan), and Kashgar (China). Inconnection with its work on transportation

6 MAPPING MULTILATERALISM IN TRANSITION

4 Alica Kizekova, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Challenges in Cyberspace,” Rajaratnam School of International Studies Commentaries, No. 33 (February22, 2012).

infrastructure, the SCO works collaboratively withthe Asian Development Bank and UN Economicand Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific(UNESCAP).5

The concentration on large-scale economicinfrastructure projects is perhaps unsurprisinggiven that the SCO positions security andeconomics as heavily interlinked. Some of theCentral Asian republics are among the leasteconomically developed states in the internationalsystem, and as a result attracting foreign invest-ment in the development of state infrastructure is apriority for their leaderships. Via the framework ofthe SCO, China has become an important source ofsuch investment, and this dynamic has been amajor component of the SCO’s economic agendathus far. Notably, in the wake of the global financialcrisis of 2008/9, the SCO—or rather China—offered to provide $10 billion worth of loans “tomember states of the Shanghai CooperationOrganization (SCO) to shore up their economiesamid the global financial crisis.”6 Coming againstthe background of another offer by China of $900million in loans to SCO members in 2004, thisdevelopment can be seen as illustrative of Chinesedominance in the economic dimension of the SCO.However, the political implications of acceptingthese loans are not uncontroversial. Concernsamong the other member states remain that bytaking this money they are in some ways surren-dering political sovereignty over their economicdecision making to Beijing (for more on this seesection below).7

Beyond the aforementioned transportationprojects—and some other large state infrastruc-tural projects—the implementation of themultitude of projects set out in 2003 has been verylimited. The SCO has recognized that there hasbeen a lack of progress in implementing itseconomic program, and it has laid out plans toincrease the speed and effectiveness of enacting itsprojects. An important component of this is thelong-muted creation of an SCO DevelopmentFund, which was discussed at the 2013 annualsummit and seems likely to be established in thenear future. Under this arrangement, the member

states would allocate funds directly to theDevelopment Fund for the realization of SCO jointprojects. Taking into account its prior provision ofloans to the other members, China would presum-ably make a significantly greater contribution thanthe other members. One major economic cooperation initiative thatattracted a lot of attention was Vladimir Putin’sproposal to create an SCO energy club at the 2006Summit. The concept of an energy club wouldlikely entail an internal energy market arrangementamong SCO members, and possibly observer states,and joint projects to develop energy resources andpipelines. However, the idea has faded from view inrecent years, although it appeared to regaincurrency during the last summit. There aredivergent interests among the SCO’s membership,which contains both producers and suppliers.There are competing interests between producersover who supplies major new markets and betweenproducers and consumers due to their respectiveinterests in price-maximization and ensuring thesecurity of supply. Thus, at least in the short term,the establishment of a formal energy club seemsunlikely. Until now, cooperation on microeconomicprojects has been negligible. This is mainly becauseof the concerns among the other members thattheir economies will not be able to compete withthe strength of the Chinese economy. The Chineseleadership considers the removal of tariff barriersto open up new markets for its booming consumerindustries as one of its primary aims for the SCO. Iteven proposed an SCO free-trade zone in 2011. Tothis end, Chinese elites perceive that it is necessaryto invest in the development of the Central Asianrepublics, in order to realize their aim of a customsunion in the long term. Thus China regularlyprovides Central Asian republics with extensiveloans for state infrastructural development. While the other members support the agenda ofdeveloping the economic base of the weakermembers, they are less enthusiastic about reducingtrade barriers. Moscow considers that withunrestricted access to the Central Asian market

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION 7

5 Julie Boland, “Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Lost Decade? A Partner for the US?,” 21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper, June 20,2011.

6 “China to Provide 10-Billion-dollar loan to SCo Members,” Xinhua, June 16, 2009.7 Laruelle and Peyrouse, The “Chinese Question” in Central Asia.

place, China will come to threaten Russia’sprominent place in the regional economy. And theCentral Asian leaderships take the view that ifcheap Chinese goods were to flood theireconomies, there would likely be a loss of sovereigncontrol over economic stability. They are alsoconcerned that such a scenario would result insocioeconomic problems because their ownpopulation would be unable to compete with theprices offered by Chinese traders.8 Therefore, theother members have moved to block Chineseinitiatives aimed toward free trade. CULTURE

Security and economics are the main areas ofcooperation, but in recent years several other areasare beginning to be developed. In part, this isdriven by a desire to become a multifunctionalframework, with the aim of forging a collaborativeregional unit out of its member states, including acommon cultural space. To this end, a number ofSCO initiatives and projects have been undertakento establish greater connections between thepopulations of its member states. In so doing it ishoped that greater understanding, trust, andcommon interest would emerge in the region. Programs have been announced that aim atcreating common education standards recognizedacross its member states as well as creating a jointSCO university. There is also a Chinese-sponsoredprogram providing other SCO member states’students a number of scholarships to study inChina. A joint SCO exhibition was held at theWorld Expo in Shanghai in 2010. And an SCOsponsored art exhibition “Fairy Tales Drawn byChildren”—in which children from each memberstate drew pictures of how they imagined the otherSCO member states—has toured the region.

The Geopolitics of the SCO

INTERNAL DYNAMICS: THE WEIGHT OFTWO REGIONAL POWERS

The SCO actively notes the diversity of its member-ship in terms of their political and economicsystems, scales of diplomatic and economicprowess, religions, cultures, and geography. In

noting this diversity, the SCO claims to represent anew model of inclusive regional cooperationcapable of encompassing all its members,sometimes referred to as the “Shanghai Spirit.”Indeed, an implicit, but very important role playedby the SCO is as a mechanism for improving andmanaging the relationships between its memberstates, stemming from its roots as a mechanism forconfidence building. Nonetheless, its capacity andsuccess in managing some of these tensions inpractice has been questioned. The most significant of the relationships betweenthe SCO members for the long-term viability andeffectiveness of the organization is the Russian-Chinese relationship. The SCO has evolved inparallel with the steady improvement in theRussian-Chinese relationship over the last twodecades. In spite of this upward trajectory, someanalysts consider that in the long term the Russian-Chinese relationship is likely to deteriorate due toconflicts of interest and competition.9 Against thisbackground, the SCO is an important mechanismfor managing any divergence in interest andcompetitive dynamic both bilaterally and region-ally in Central Asia. To date it has done this quitesuccessfully by binding the two sides into a cooper-ative framework. However, certain analysts have noted adivergence between Chinese and Russianapproaches to the SCO. According to this view,Russia is cooling its interests in the SCO, seeing itas overly dominated by a Chinese agenda not inkeeping with its own interests. In particularMoscow wishes to restrict Chinese efforts toadvance a free-trade agenda, preferring to keepsuch cooperation within regional frameworks ofwhich China is not a member.10 Taking this intoaccount, the SCO will have to work to keep bothactors engaged in the organization and to facilitatecontinued cooperation with one another. From the perspective of the Central Asianrepublics, the SCO represents a unique forumwithin which they can engage with two regionalpowers simultaneously. The presence of bothRussia and China is seen as a positive dynamicensuring that the agenda will not be dominated by

8 MAPPING MULTILATERALISM IN TRANSITION

8 Alyson Bailes and Pal Dunay, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as a Regional Security Institution,” in The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, edited byAlyson Bailes, Pál Dunay, Pan Guang, and Mikhail Troitskii (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Policy Paper No. 17, 2007), pp. 1–29.

9 Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience Moscow, Beijing, and The New Geopolitics (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008).10 Joshua Kucera, “Russia ‘Increasingly Distrustful’ of SCO,” Eurasianet, March 4, 2013.

a single dominant external sponsor. In otherwords, it has been suggested that the Central Asianleaders have more opportunities to pursue theirinterests within the SCO, than they would in aframework containing only Russia or only China.11This dynamic perhaps explains Uzbekistan’scontinuous membership of the SCO as comparedwith its approach to Russian-led regional organiza-tions. Although established in the early 2000s,Uzbekistan declined to join both the CollectiveSecurity Treaty Organization (CSTO) and EurasianEconomic Community (EurAsEC) until the mid-2000s and has subsequently withdrawn from both(in 2012 and 2008 respectively), citing excessiveRussian influence over these frameworks as aprime reason for their decision to withdraw. Although it is commonplace to characterizeCentral Asia as a single entity, there has been amarked lack of political and economic engagementbetween the post-Soviet Central Asian republicssince the collapse of the Soviet Union. Indeed, thedominant theme in relations between some of thesestates has been more competitive than cooperative. Due to the vagaries of Stalin’s division of ethnicand linguistic groups in the Central Asian spaceinto five Soviet republics, there are significantdisagreements over border demarcation andtensions regarding minority populations. Thistension is most pronounced among the three statesthat have territory within the Ferghana Valley,which at times has led to border skirmishes,between Uzbekistan and both Tajikistan andKyrgyzstan. Another source of tension concerns control overwater resources. The main sources of water in thearid Central Asian region flow down from themountainous areas of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistanand through the rivers of Kazakhstan,Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Due to a lack ofother natural resources for generating energy, theupstream states focus on building dams for hydro-electric power generation. This comes intofrequent conflict with the interests of downstreamstates, who rely on a strong flow of water for theirrigation of crops, in particular of cotton, that area major source of national income. Tensions in thisregard are particularly acute between Uzbekistan

and Tajikistan. Currently, Dushanbe is seeking topush ahead with the Rogun Dam project, withTashkent responding in turn by cutting off gassupplies that Tajik industry is reliant upon. The SCO will need to play an important role inmanaging these tensions between its Central Asianmembers to ensure that these bilateral disputes donot disrupt the wider functionality of the organiza-tion.RELATIONSHIP TO THE BROADERINTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Ever since its formation, the SCO has been seen asa potential global actor, as well as a regional one.This is a consequence of having China and Russiaas members. Indeed, the SCO has often beendiscussed in relation to a number of statistics aboutthe combined size and significance of its member-ship, which represents one-quarter of the world’spopulation and three-fifths of the territory of theEurasian continent, and includes two nuclearpowers with permanent seats on the UN SecurityCouncil (and this is excluding its observermembers). However, as noted above, the SCO has notdeveloped into the externally-focused behemoththat such statistics may tend to imply. Instead, itsfocus has primarily been on developing a limitedrole for itself within its region. At the same time, ithas increasingly been used as an important stagingpost for collective statements on both regional andglobal affairs, particularly between China andRussia. Aside from developing programs andmechanisms for countering the “three evils,” theSCO plays an important legitimizing role for itsmember states’ security policies. In this regard, RoyAllison has outlined that an important politicalfunction of the SCO “is that of protective integra-tion—the solidarity it offers provides symbolicpolitical legitimacy and equality to Central Asianregimes that struggle to assert this on the broaderinternational stage.”12 The role of the SCO indefending its member’s regimes from externalcriticism was most evident in the SCO’s publicsupport for the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan at itsannual summit in 2005, following heavy criticism

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION 9

11 Bailes and Dunay, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as a Regional Security Institution.”12 Roy Allison, “Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structures and Regime Security in Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey 27, No. 2 (2008): 185–202.

from the West for its actions in putting down anuprising in its Andijan province. In this way, the SCO functions as a mechanismfor resisting “efforts by others to impose externalvalues on their member states,” which uses“language that tends to assert the relativity ratherthan universality of human rights.”13 In otherwords, the SCO seeks to stand up for what itconsiders as the sanctity of the principles ofnational sovereignty and territorial integrityagainst what it sees as attempts by mainly Westernactors to rewrite the fundamental rules of theinternational system. In particular it strives todefend the right of its members’ governments topursue whatever security policy they see fit. Thisstance of asserting regional relativity over univer-sality has led to criticism of the SCO as a defenderof repressive practices in its region.14

The SCO is often depicted as a counterbalance toNATO and the West in general. Indeed, the SCO’sgeopolitical discourse on many issues—bothinternational and regional—does contrast itspositions with those of the West. Yet, in practice,the SCO’s relationship to the West is moremultifaceted than a straight forward binary opposi-tion. In spite of tensions and disagreements overthe norms that shape and drive contemporaryinternational relations, and criticism of what itcharacterizes as the West’s antagonistic interfer-ence in Eurasia, the SCO has also identified areas ofcommon interest. Most notably it highlights thepotential for greater collaboration with the West inthe global fight against terrorism and to manageongoing insecurity and drug trafficking in andaround Afghanistan. Hence, the SCO has a two-pronged approach toits geopolitical relationship to the West: • It seeks to close, or limit, the space available tothe West within what it considers its ownregional jurisdiction; but

• at the same time it seeks to open space for collab-oration with the West on issues beyond Eurasia.

The SCO has consistently noted that it considersthat the international system is becoming increas-ingly regionalized and interdependent, and that theUN should play a central role in this changing

international system. At the same time, the SCOhas noted that elements of the existing structures ofglobal governance set up after WWII should bereformed in line with the contemporary context. In line with this interpretation of the interna-tional system, the SCO has highlighted the need forit to build up a broad coalition of regional andglobal partners. Beyond its relationship with theWest, the SCO is actively seeking to developrelationships with a range of actors. This hasmanifested itself in establishing diplomatic connec-tions and partnerships with other multilateralinstitutions and structures (e.g., memorandums ofunderstanding with ASEAN, the Commonwealthof Independent States [CIS], CSTO, EurAsEC,Economic and Social Commission for Asia and thePacific [ESCAP], and Economic CooperationOrganization [ECO]), and developing a workingrelationship and cooperation with the UN (e.g.,Joint Declaration on SCO/UN SecretariatCooperation, signed in 2010). Within an increas-ingly complex network of relationships across theinternational system, the SCO is seeking to play therole of representing Eurasia at a global level.

Looking Forward

LIMITATIONS TO THE SCO’SDEVELOPMENT

The SCO has not become the dominant regionalpowerhouse that some in the West had feared.Instead, it has carved out a significant role for itselfas a forum for regional cooperation on specificissues and as a platform for common geopoliticalviewpoints. Nonetheless, the SCO’s developmenthas not been without difficulty. Several factors havelimited its effectiveness and current role. Indeed,SCO officials have acknowledged some of thechallenges that it will have to address to developfurther and establish itself as a significant regionaland global actor. The major challenge facing the SCO is whether itcan ever effectively implement its declaredprograms of cooperation. The SCO has beencharacterized by some as little more than a “talkingshop,” highlighting a lack of conversion of politicalrhetoric and program announcements into

10 MAPPING MULTILATERALISM IN TRANSITION

13 Ibid.14 Human Rights in China, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights.

practice. While this verdict is a little unfair, asconcrete steps and developments have been takenin some areas (e.g., the RATS and joint transporta-tion projects), there is certainly a gap betweendiscourse and practice. Explanations for this vary. One interpretation emphasizes that this is aconsequence of the SCO’s strict interstate system ofgovernance, whereby the members’ nationalpolitical leaderships set the agenda and oversee theimplementation of agreements. In other words, theSCO as an institution has very limited means toensure that its member states put commonagreements into practice. According to some, thislack of supranational authority restricts the speedand effectiveness of the SCO as an implementingactor. Such perspectives are generally based onunfavorable comparisons to the EU and its recordof implementation. In addition, it has beenhighlighted that a number of essentially bilateral ortrilateral agreements between its member stateshave been labeled as SCO projects, although theSCO has had very little role in their development. Another consideration is the divergence ofviewpoints and interests between its members oncertain issues, in particular on economic coopera-tion. Progress in economic cooperation remainssome way behind that in security. The economicinterests of the SCO members are not immediatelycompatible in certain sectors. There are alsosubstantial differences in economic capacity, fromthe powerhouse of China to the strugglingeconomies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.Furthermore, while China is an advocate of freetrade in the region, several of the other membersare unwilling to relinquish tight political control oftheir economies. And, as outlined above, China’sprovision of significant loans to the other memberstates to fund large infrastructural developmentprojects is a politically contentious issue. As such,lingering concerns about loss of political controlrestrict the degree to which the SCO is able toutilize the financial spending power of havingChina as a member, and has led to uneven and veryslow implementation of agreed projects.15

As detailed already, an integral dimension to theSCO is its role as a security actor. However, the

nature of this role is the subject of both confusionand disagreement. The primary question iswhether the SCO should and/or is able to intervenein security crises on the ground. Until now, theSCO has always referred to its noninterventiondoctrine to suggest that its role is as a hub for thelong-term gathering of intelligence, identificationof threats, and harmonization of practices and notas a direct security enforcer or peacekeeper. The SCO’s inaction during the Osh riots (June2010) led to widespread criticism of its utility as asecurity provider. The SCO declined to intervene inspite of a request from the Kyrgyz interim govern-ment for external assistance to bring the violentsituation in the city and its environs under control.As the Osh riots did not represent an immediateexistential challenge to the incumbent regime, theSCO’s nonresponse “was consistent with itsnonintervention policy, as well as its emphasis onstate/regime security.”16 In this respect, the SCO’svalues and rasion d’être seem to collide. It remainsunsure of how it should respond to situationswithin its member states that represent a threat toregime-state security.17 It has yet to answer thisquestion definitively, but by its inaction over Osh,it would appear in practice that noninterferencecurrently takes precedence. Another important factor shaping the develop-ment of the SCO is that many of its members arealso part of other regional organizations that coversimilar geographic contours and areas of coopera-tion. The CSTO is primarily focused on militaryand security cooperation, the EurAsEC is centeredon economic cooperation, and the SingleEconomic Space (SES)—which from 2015 willbecome the Eurasian Union—is a customs union.Both the CSTO and EurAsEC contain four SCOmember states, plus Armenia and Belarus, and theSES/Eurasian Union includes two SCO members,Russia and Kazakhstan, plus Belarus. The SCO’s scope to expand its activities in bothof its main areas of cooperation is restricted bythese other frameworks. The CSTO is more likelyto play an active role as a security provider on theground than the SCO, owing to its development ofthe permanently-operative Collective Operational

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION 11

15 Stephen Aris, Eurasian Regionalism: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).16 Stephen Aris, “The Response of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to the Crisis in Kyrgyzstan,” Civil Wars 14, No. 3 (2012): 451–476.17 Richard Weitz, “What’s Happened to the SCO?,” The Diplomat, May 17, 2010.

Reaction Force. While, the progression of theSES/Eurasian Union project represents a moreactive and advanced structure for trade andcustoms integration than the SCO. The parallel existence of the SCO, CSTO,EurAsEC and SES/Eurasian Union is, to a largeextent, a reflection of the concerns among Russiaand the Central Asian members of the SCO aboutundertaking military and free-trade cooperationwith China. As already discussed, Moscow is waryof the SCO becoming a format in which it will loseits influence in Central Asia to China. It has thusinvested resources and political will into multilat-eral integration on key areas within exclusivelypost-Soviet frameworks, over which it leveragesgreater influence. Similarly, the Central Asian members considermilitary and trade cooperation as highly sensitiveareas, and are more accustomed to, and arguablymore comfortable, working collaboratively in theseareas with Russia than with China. At the sametime, however, they view excessive dependence onRussian-led regional mechanisms as detrimental totheir interests and policy options. From a CentralAsian perspective, the parallel existence of theseorganizations acts as a form of network of regionalbalances against the concentration of excessivepower in any single organization.18

Until now, the Chinese leadership appearsunperturbed by the existence of these regionalorganizations of which they are not a member.However, in the long term it would seem inevitablethat clashes of jurisdiction and agenda-develop-ment will occur between the SCO and these post-Soviet organizations. THE EXPANSION QUESTION

As highlighted by the above summary, the SCO hasestablished itself as an important mechanism forcooperation in certain areas of security andeconomic policy, but other aspects of its agendaand its capacity to play other roles remainsuncertain. Several important issues and questionswill need to be resolved in the years ahead, which,in turn, will have a significant influence ondetermining its future trajectory. Ever since the allocation of observer status to

India, Iran, and Pakistan in 2005, the questionabout a possible expansion of membership hashung over every SCO annual summit. Within theSCO, divergent views on the value of an expansionof membership exist. Those that are enthusiastictend to be so because they envision the creation ofa huge economic framework, bringing togetherlarge and small states, suppliers and consumers ofenergy, manufacturers and customers, and modernand traditional trading partners. According to thisview, massive transportation projects could beundertaken to better connect Central and SouthAsia, opening up huge new markets for trade andother economic cooperation, including potentiallya pan-Eurasian energy network. Alongside these voices of optimism, doubterspoint to the geopolitical and technical challengesthat expansion would bring. They raise concernsabout the geopolitical effects of omitting observerstates that have problematic relations with the US,such as Iran and Pakistan, on both its members’bilateral relationships with the West and also theperception of the SCO among the internationalcommunity. The clarification of a draft criterionfor membership at the 2010 summit that excludedstates under UN sanctions from joining, neatlyallowed the SCO to avoid the issue of omitting Iran,until such time as these sanctions have beenremoved. Beyond the concerns about geopoliticalperception, there are doubts raised about theimpact of exporting external political conflicts intothe SCO. A major challenge to cohesion would bethe inclusion of both India and Pakistan, and theirtense bilateral relationship. According to thisviewpoint, the granting of full membership statusto the current observers could introduce a numberof new political dividing lines into the existingenvironment, leaving the SCO hamstrung byinternal division. In essence, the debate around an expansion ofmembership is centered on a fundamentalquestion: what is the scope and aim of the SCO? Isit geographically limited to a focus on Central Asiawith a specifically defined agenda? Or is it a widerpan-Asian framework, embracing a wide-rangingand loose agenda?19 There are differences betweenthe existing member states on the issue. The

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18 Bailes and Dunay, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as a Regional Security Institution.”19 Aris, Eurasian Regionalism.

Central Asian leaderships are perhaps moreardently against expansion than Russia and China.They consider that an expansion would shift theSCO’s focus from Central Asia and their primaryconcerns to South Asia. A further difference isevident between China and Russia. The Chineseleadership is the most enthusiastic aboutexpanding membership, as part of a wider foreignpolicy goal of increasing its influence in Asia andopening up market opportunities in South Asia. Asopposed to China, neither the Russian nor theCentral Asian regimes consider that they have thecapacity to develop large-scale economic exchangesand linkages with the rest of Asia. In recent years, those arguing in favor ofexpansion have made up a lot of ground, and withthe official establishment of regulations onaccepting new members in 2010, many considerthat it is only a matter of time until the SCO isexpanded. However, as these regulations are closedto the public, and the issue continues to beeffectively muted largely by the SCO, it remainsdifficult to judge the likelihood of an expansion atthe present time.

Conclusion: ChallengesAhead

The SCO is still a relatively young organization,and as such its future trajectory is not entirelycertain, and it faces a number of challenges in theyears ahead. Indeed, the strength, vitality, andendurance of the SCO will likely depend on twomain considerations: the effective implementationof its cooperative agenda, and a clarification of itsidentity and role as a multilateral framework. The SCO acknowledges that it needs to prove itcan implement its already agreed upon programsmore effectively and comprehensively, and thusbecome a trusted and valued mechanism forsecurity and economic cooperation for its memberstates. To achieve this, it will have to enhance itscapacity to move from agreement to implementa-tion, and a vital step in this regard would be thecreation of the proposed SCO Development Fundto give the SCO access to its own resources forimplementing its agenda. At the same time, by its

very nature as an intergovernmental framework ofmultilateralism, the SCO will continue to rely onthe goodwill of, and the investment of resources by,its members. It is thus important for the SCO tomaintain a relative degree of harmony among itsmembership. To this end, it will need to managesources of tension between Russia and China aboutthe direction of the organization and betweenTajikistan and Uzbekistan over water resources. The future evolution of the SCO will in large partbe determined by how it comes to define its rolewithin the political landscape of Eurasia. A numberof dimensions to this are yet to be firmlyestablished:• Is the SCO working toward the development of afree-trade zone among its membership?

• Does its role as a security actor include interven-tion on the ground during security crises?

• What is its relationship to the CSTO andEurasian Union, and how will their respectiveagendas interact with those of the SCO?

• Does it intend to expand its membership andfocus so that it becomes a pan-Asian frameworkcovering Northeast, Central, and South Asia?

The resolution of these questions will go a longway to clarifying and establishing the boundaries ofits role in Eurasia and beyond. The factors noted above are complex and will notbe resolved in the short term, but what does seemlikely is that the formulas offered by the SCO willendure in at least the medium term. It also seemslikely that its role in negotiating the relationshipbetween its region and the international system isdurable and may perhaps grow even further. It hasestablished itself as a forum for discussion andrepresentation of common issues on internationalissues, as illustrated recently by the 2013 summit’sdetailing of a common position on the ongoingSyria crisis. Furthermore, by virtue of its recogni-tion and engagement with other regional organiza-tions, its emerging role as a hub for discussion ofpost-2014 Afghanistan and its attempts to play arole in setting global norms and standards oncyber/information security, the voice of the SCOwill likely be heard on the global stage for sometime to come.

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