Seventh HIW Graduate Student Conference April 28 2017, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY, KU LEUVEN

GSC 2017

Simona AndrejováAudun Benjamin BengtsonFirat M. HaciahmetogluKeunho Hong

GSC 2017 Team

Kelee Kyongeun LeeMarit PepplinkhuizenAxel Constant PruvostBerend Rigter

Abdus Sajud Shuman Alexandra Monell SingerDeva Waal

II-A Political Philosophy II: Politics and Utopia (ROOM A)Chair: Dr. Dimitris Gakis | Moderator: Sophie Lauwers

ABDUS SAJUD (MA)‘Hardt and Negri: the Biopolitical City’MARIJKE DOMS (MPhil)‘Roger Scruton and Jan Patocka: Spiritual Leadership from Dissidence?’GREET MASSELINK (MPhil)‘Buber vs Freire: Education and Utopia’

II-B Continental Philosophy I (ROOM N)Chair: Prof. Karin de Boer | Moderator: Molly De Cleene

WOUNGHEE YOON (MA)‘Understanding Arendt’s ‘Wordlessness’ in Two Ways’ARIANE POISSON (MA)‘Reframing the Animal Question: A Cixousian Reinterpretation of Heidegger and Levinas’SIMONA ANDREJOVA (MPhil)‘Master and Slave Morality in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals’

II-C Analytic Philosophy and Ethical Thought (Room S)Chair: Prof. Stefaan Cuypers | Moderator: Haiyu Jiang

IRIKEFE PAUL (MA)‘The Final Value of Knowledge and Achievements’FELIPE MORALES (PhD)‘Knowing what is Possible Atemporally and at All Times’ALEXANDRA M. SINGER (MA)‘Imagine all the People – Moral Dilemmas as Experiments and Experience’JAKUB BETINSKÝ (MA)‘Elizabeth Anscombe on ‘Intention’: Is There a Contradiction in Her Early and Late Use of This Concept ’

11:00-11:15 COFFEE BREAK (RAADZAAL)

11:15-13:00 SESSION II

13:00-14:00 LUNCH (RAADZAAL)

Sandwiches and beverages will be provided. Seafood and vegetarian options are available. Please come, enjoy a bite to eat, and continue your discussions from the morning sessions!

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April 28 2017, INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY, KU LEUVEN

GSC 2017 Programme and Index for AbstractsSeventh HIW Graduate Student Conference

I-A Political Philosophy I: Race, Ethnicity and Gender Dysphoria (ROOM A)Chair: Prof. Helder De Schutter | Moderator: Ariane Poisson

MAHUA AGRAWAL (MA) ‘Citizenship, Human Rights, and State-Hospitality in the Context of Gender Dysphoria’SOPHIE LAUWERS (MA)‘From Race to Racialization: Understanding Islamophobia as a Form of Racism’SHIERWIN AGAGEN CABUNILAS (PhD)‘The Problem of Ethnic Representation in a Multi-Ethnic State and How to Solve it’ FIRAT HACIAHMETOGLU (MPhil)‘Germany vs. The West: Heidegger and a Critique of Cosmopolitanism’

I-B Philosophical Anthropology: Psychology and Emotions (ROOM S) Chair: Prof. Paul Moyaert | Moderator: Simona Andrejova

PHILIP D. KUPFERSCHMIDT (PhD)‘Schizophrenia, Speech Examination and the Problem of Fragmentation’MARTIN MAIRA SOTOMAYOR (MA)‘Binswanger’s Authentic Being-With-Others’MATTHEW DEVINE (MA)‘Strong Mood, Weak Resonance : Phenomenological Investigations of Melancholia

I-C Philosophy of Religion I: Medieval (ROOM C) Chair: Prof. Russell Friedman and Dr. Can Loewe | Moderator: Zhuran Li

JING FENG MA (MA)‘On the Relationship between ‘Evil’ and ‘Free Will’ by Aquinas’TINA LASQUETY-REYES (MA)‘Hildegard of Bingen’s Cosmology and its Relationship to Humanity’GABRIELLE JOHNSON (MA)‘Thomas Aquinas’ Transcendentals as Modes of Being: The Role of Participation’

I-D Phenomenology I: Ethics and Friendship (ROOM N) Chair: Dr. Daniel O’Shiel | Moderator: Greet Masselink

KEUNHO HONG (PhD)‘On Husserlian Reduction and its Ethical Implication’PRESTON LOSACK (MA) ‘Phenomenology of Edith Stein on Friendship and the State’RIKUS VAN EEDEN (MA)‘Reading Levinas as a Tragic Thinker’

8:30-9:00 BREAKFAST (RAADZAAL)

9:00-9:15 OPENING REMARKS (MERCIERZAAL)

9:15-11:00 SESSION I

PROF. BART RAYMAEKERS Dean of the Institute of PhilosophyCONFERENCE ORGANIZING TEAM

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IV-A Political Philosophy IV: Tocqueville, Locke and Marx (ROOM A)Chair: Prof. Matthias Lievens | Moderator: Preston Losack

MARIT PEPPLINKHUIZEN (MPhil)‘Merging Individual Interest and the General Good: Rousseau’s and Tocqueville’s Republicanism’MATTEO SCOPEL (MA)‘Tocqueville the Federalist? The Problem of Tocqueville’s Federal Argument’JASON KEYSER (MA) ‘Nature in Locke and Marx: Is it Valueless or Invaluable?’

IV-B Continental Philosophy II: The Self (ROOM S)Chair: Prof. Roland Breeur | Moderator: Berend Rigter

SHARI DEDIER (MA)‘The Gateway Named Augenblick: The Existential Moment in Nietzsche and Jaspers’ANASTASIA ARIEFIEVA (MPhil)‘Cotard’s Syndrome as a Challenge to the Theories of the Self’ALEJANDRO ALVELAIS (MA)‘Freedom in the Face of Passions and Habit. The Role of Attention in Ricoeur’s Analysis of the Will in The Voluntary and the Involuntary’XUE DONG (MA)‘The Bergsonian Self: An Interpretation of the Deep-Seated Self in Bergson’s Time and Free Will’

IV-C Phenomenology III: Topics in Husserlian Phenomenology (ROOM N)Chair: Dr. Diego D’Angelo | Moderator: Moses Ogunade

TARUN JOSE KATTUMANA (MA)‘Husserlian Response to Meillassoux’s Charge of Correlationism’ZHURAN LI (MPhil)‘Husserl and Brentano on the Descriptive Science of Consciousness’DI HUANG (MA)‘Unity and Multiplicity in Husserl’s Analysis of Time-Consciousness’MARY LEONE (MA)‘An Exploration of Semantic Essence in Husserl’s Logical Investigations’

16:00-17:45 SESSION IV

17:45-18:00 COFFEE BREAK (RAADZAAL)

Chair: Prof. Russell FriedmanKEYNOTE SPEAKER : PROF. ANTOON BRAECKMAN‘Beyond the Confines of the Law. Foucault’s Genealogy of the Modern State.’

19:15 RECEPTION (RAADZAAL)

18:00-19:15 GSC2017 KEYNOTE SPEECH (MERCIERZAAL)

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III-A Political Philosophy III: On Sovereignty (ROOM A)Chair: Prof. Tim Heysse | Moderator: Alice Rotich

ARISTEL SKRBIC (MA)‘What is Constituent Power? The Argument for Constituent Representation’BEREND RIGTER (MA)‘Public Debt and the Political Agency of the Marktvolk’KATRINA MICHELLE CANO (MA)‘A Shift in Sovereignty’

III-B Phenomenology II: Pain, Suffering and Repentance (ROOM N)Chair: Prof. Nicolas de Warren | Moderator: Martin Sotomayor

MENGDI HU (MPhil)‘I Suffer from Your Suffering: Phenomenological Approaches to Others’ Sorrow’JEREMY HEUSLEIN (PhD)‘Pain and Collapse of Subjectivity’KYLE LEENSTRA GAFFIN (MA)‘Scheler and Jankelevitch on Repentance’

III-C Philosophy of Religion II (Room C)Chair: Prof. Henning Tegtmeyer | Moderator: Jenny Lushaba

MAX MORRIS (MA)‘The Challenge of Revelation and the Possibility of Philosophy’MICHAËL BAUWENS (PhD)‘The Metaphysics of Marriage’SEN SU (MA)‘Historicity and Eschatology: The Philosophical Breakthrough in Early Heidegger’

III-D Philosophy of Science and Technology (ROOM S)Chair: Prof. Ullrich Melle | Moderator: Mahua Agrawal

JOYCE CONINGS (MA)‘Efficient, yet Bored’ NICHOLAS JOHNSTON (MA)‘Standing Reserve and Total Mobilization: Heidegger and Jünger on Technology’ILJA POSTEL (MA)‘The Empirical Turn: Opening the Black Box of Technology’MASSIMILIANO SIMONS (PhD)‘How to Listen to Scientists (and Ignore Them when Appropriate)’

14:00-15:45 SESSION III

15:45-16:00 COFFEE BREAK (RAADZAAL)

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It was the autumn semester of 2010, and a group of graduate students studyingphilosophy in Leuven, both in the MA and the MPhil programmes, came to Emilia Brodencova with an idea: shouldn’t the Institute of Philosophy host an event where students in the masters and the doctoral programmes would present their own conference papers? Thus was the HIW Graduate Student Conference born. With some help from Emilia, some financial assistance from the Institute, and a good deal of hard work by the student organizers, in March 2011 the first conference went off without a hitch. Student organizers acted as ‘timekeepers’ at the parallel sessions, limiting every paper to a strict 20 minutes; academic staff members served as chairs for each session; and dozens of students gave presentations dealing with their thesis or dissertation research and dozens more attended the sessions, listening intently and asking questions.

Since then, the Institute of Philosophy’s Graduate Student Conference has become an annual event. In 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 and now in 2017, different groups of students have come forward to act as organizers, putting their own individual and group stamp on that year’s conference. But behind each of these iterations of the conference stands one big idea: this is a conference by Institute of Philosophy graduate students for Institute of Philosophy graduate students. It’s an opportunity for some of our students to try their hand at organizing a really big event in all of its complexity. And it’s an opportunity for a large number of our masters and doctoral students to do what researchers do: present their own work in a (friendly) academic environment, in the process practicing indispensable paper delivery skills, and often getting some helpful comments and questions. Research isn’t only about sitting and reading and thinking: it’s just as much about communicating, about putting your ideas before your peers and hearing what they have to say.

On behalf of the Institute of Philosophy, we’d like to thank the student organizers, Emilia Brodencova, Sofie Keyaerts and Fran Venken for making the 2017 Graduate Student Conference possible, as well as Prof. Antoon Braeckman for agreeing to give the Conference’s ‘Keynote Speech’. We wish everyone a stimulating and a fun day.

For the Institute of Philosophy’s International Programme,Russell FriedmanBart Raymaekers

Introduction

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The Problem of Ethnic Representation in a Multi-Ethnic State and How to Solve it

My aim in this paper is twofold: first, to argue for an adequate political system for multi-ethnic states; and second, to discuss how it can adequately respond to the problem of representation of ethnic groups that are locked into a single state. For this purpose, I identify the prospects of what I call ethno-democratic model.Broadly conceived, ethno-democracy refers to a political system that synergizes and blends Western theories of democracy and indigenous principle/normativity. The ethno-democracy model can best be illustrated by contrasting it with two paradigms in the liberal tradition: majoritarian chauvinism and political individualism. The former promotes assimilationist views, annihilating the fact of difference between ethnic identities. The latter promotes blind-difference approach, resisting the demand for a politics of difference at the expense of collective group rights. Ethno-democracy is a more suitable model of political arrangement that can best represent ethnic minorities than the two other paradigms for a multi-national state because it guarantees (1) the right to customary laws on settling disputes over land and property and domestic affairs, providing alternative avenues other than what political and legal institutions of the state can offer, (2) the right to self-government within existing states, stimulating a stronger cultural and political identification and a sense of a ‘we-feeling’ for common objectives, (3) representation rights at the national and international political institutions on matters pertaining directly to them, and (4) protection rights from external agents to defend their systems of governance. As will be argued, while ethno-democracy appropriates democratic values as understood in Western political tradition, it is strongly sensitive to cultural resources especially in public decision-making to respond to the demands of justice for national/ethnic minorities.

Germany vs. The West: Heidegger and a Critique of Cosmopolitanism

Although we today consider Germany a western country, recent studies suggest that modern German history up until the Third Reich is marked by a confrontation with ‘the West’. A similar confrontation can be seen today between non-western, specifically postcolonial, nations and ‘the West’. This study begins with the hypothesis that ‘the West’ in both confrontations can be analyzed as a peculiar way of disclosing the world which consists in emptying the places of the other peoples of their inherent meaning in order to advance one’s own place forward in time. Decolonial scholars thus argue that there is always a darker side to ‘the West’ which expresses itself mostly in reactionary ways. This paper explores the emer-gence and significance of the phenomenological project of Martin Heidegger who engaged philosophically in Germany’s con-frontation with ‘the West’ in order to raise a non-reactionary critique of cosmopolitanism, which may be called pluriversalism.

SHIERWIN AGAGEN CABUNILAS (PHD)

FIRAT HACIAHMETOGLU (MPHIL)

Chair: Prof. Helder De Schutter | Moderator: Ariane PoissonPolitical Philosophy I : Race, Ethnicity and Gender DysphoriaGSC SESSION I-A

Citizenship, Human Rights, and State-Hospitality in the Context of Gender Dysphoria In The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), Hannah Arendt introduces the novel idea that the acquisition of one’s human rights is contingent upon being politically active and which, in turn, is dependent on having citizenship. My paper applies this idea to the case of gender-dysphoric and sex-reassigned individuals in order to contend that such persons—until they are officially recognised as members of the gender that they claim to belong to—are deprived of meaningful citizenship which could enable politically significant action. As a result, these individuals are also denied the opportunity to(re)claim their human rights. I assert that the lack of active citizenship—for such individuals—occurs despite the presence of the natal citizenship that they acquire at birth. In a certain sense, this aspect of their predicament renders it even more acute than that of other groups, like refugees, who too suffer a loss of citizenship. The paper culminates with the claim that if gender-dys-phoric and sex-reassigned individuals’ rights are to be honoured, a formal recognition of their true gender by political states is imperative. It is when states begin to show hospitality towards such individuals in this special sense that these persons can acquire a politically meaningful citizenship and, consequently, their human rights.

From Race to Racialization: Understanding Islamophobia as a Form of Racism

Muslims are increasingly stigmatized and discriminated against in Western societies. In both academic and pub-lic debates, however, there is little agreement about whether to categorize ‘ Islamophobia’ , the hostility against Muslims, as a form of racism. Opponents argue that ‘ racism’ should only refer to colour-based exclusion, and that we should see Islamophobia rather as religion-based discrimination or “cultural fundamentalism”. I, however, argue that we should place Islamophobia within the field of racism, for both analytical and practical reasons. First, I will argue for a new definition of racism which focuses on the process of ‘ racialization’ , the essentialization of a socially constructed group, based on both biological and cultural characteristics. Second, I will describe which historical and contemporary reasons we have to believe Islamophobia involves a racialization of ‘ the Muslim’ , based on both colour- and religion-based exclusion. Third, I will argue why placing Islamophobia within the field of racism is constructive, rather than destructive, for anti-racism and anti-discrim-ination strategies.

MAHUA AGRAWAL (MA)

SOPHIE LAUWERS (MA)

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Strong Mood, Weak Resonance : Phenomenological Investigations of Melancholia

It is often mistakenly thought that melancholia is a case of severe sadness, where the distinction between sadness and melancholia is thought to be only a matter of degree. I argue that such a description fails to account for deep existential alterations in melancholia experiences which are not characteristic of sadness. I start by outlining Sartre’s early work on emotion to demonstrate that melancholia is not appropriately described as an emotion in his sense. Next, I compare Sartre’s account of emotion to Heidegger’s account of Befindlichkeit, where Dasein always already finds itself attuned to the world in some way. Lastly, I discuss melancholia as a kind of mal-attunement (Verstimmung), and introduce why it therefore must be understood as an embodied phenomenon: in melancholia, there is the experience of being ‘out of tune’ with the world, and this is blamed on the body which fails to resonate. The two main aims of this presentation are 1) to situate melancholia as a mood and therefore as distinct from an emotion like sadness, and 2) to demonstrate that melancholia, as a strong mood, must be described with reference to bodily resonance, an aspect largely left unaccounted for by both authors above.

MATTHEW DEVINE (MA)

Chair: Prof. Paul Moyaert | Moderator: Simona Andrejova

Binswanger’s Authentic Being-With-Others

This paper will compare the notion of being-with-others (Mit-Dasein) in Martin Heidegger’ s Being and Time with one of the appropriations of this notion in the work of Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger. One of the major figures in existential psychology, Binswanger devised a psychotherapeutic method he called ‘ daseinsanalysis’ . This method drew extensively from, but was not always strictlyfaithful to, the existential phenomenology of Heidegger’ s Being and Time. Crucially, the idea of being with other people, and the potential ways to develop authentic relations with others, differs greatly in the work of these thinkers. In the analysis conducted in this paper, the existential human dimension of being-with-others will be both the intersection and the disjunction in our consideration of Heidegger and Binswanger’ s thinking.

MARTIN MAIRA SOTOMAYOR (MA)

Philosophical Anthropology: Psychology and EmotionsGSC SESSION I-B

Schizophrenia, Speech Examination and the Problem of Fragmentation

What exactly do we hear when listening to the speech of persons suffering with episodes of schizophrenic psychosis? I contend that a rigorous conceptualization of said speech can help us to answer broader questions about the nature of schizophrenia in general. My investigation draws from two main sources: phenomenological models and clinical examination methods. In its most dominant contemporary form, the phenomenological approach to schizophrenic speech focuses less upon the structure and more upon its spoken content; particularly as this content relates to the examinee’s subjective attitudes. I suggest that this focus neglects other key features of the speech phenomena, most notably those that indicate the splitting-apart and re-assembling of percepts and concepts. These phenomena suggest that the disturbances found in the speech follow after a particular form of underlying cognitive fragmentation. I therefore introduce some of the dynamics set in motion by the fragmentation, and consider what this could mean for our understanding of schizophrenia as a whole.

PHILIP D.KUPFERSCHMIDT (PHD)

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Thomas Aquinas’ Transcendentals as Modes of Being: The Role of Participation

Aquinas offers his most concise account of the transcendentals (the qualities coextensive with general being) in the first article of his De Veritate. There, he claims that, while one cannot add to being, because everything that exists is a being, there are certain things – the transcendentals – which can predicate something of being. They (the transcendentals)express a certain mode not expressed by the bare term ‘being.’ The topic of my inquiry is the use of the term ‘mode’ (modus essendi) to describe the transcendentals. Drawing from the work of Tomarchio, Aertsen, Fabro and other historians of philosophy, I show that the expression ‘mode of being,’ as used by Aquinas, generallysignals an attempt to determine analogous terms and that the different modes of being can be understood as varied degrees of participation in the paradigmatic case of being: God. In short, the modes of being are different levels of participation in supersubstantial being and the multiplicity caused by divine unity. However, while this explains the categories (the so-called special modes of being), the transcendentals must be understood as modes of being of a different kind.

GABRIELLE JOHNSON (MA)

Chair: Prof. Russell Friedman and Dr. Can Loewe | Moderator: Zhuran LiPhilosophy of Religion I: Medieval GSC SESSION I-C

On the Relationship between ‘Evil’ and ‘Free Will’ by Aquinas

This paper will demonstrate how the concept free will functions in Aquinas treatise on evil, and argue that the existence of free will allows the possibility of the evil of human acts and passions (moral evil). There are two kinds of evil in the Summa Theologica, namely ontological evil and moral evil, which are linked by their both lacking of some goodness or rightness that they should have. On the former, Aquinas concludes that the cause of ontological evil is something good except God. On the latter, he merely provides several specific criteria of moral evil. Based on the link between two kinds of evil, a general principle underlying the specific criteria of moral evil, i.e. the cause of moral evil is possibly implied in the Summa. Since Aquinas takes free will to be the prerequisite of moral responsibility, which also requires moral evil, and relates will to evil for several times, it is worthwhile to clarify the relationship between free will and evil so as to find the cause of moral evil. Furthermore, free will might be that cause since it belongs to the power of agent, which is possibly the source of moral evil according to Aquinas’ text.

Hildegard of Bingen’s Cosmology and its relationship to Humanity

Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1179) was a visionary from the Rhineland. In the eleventh to twelfth centuries, a visionary was a public figure with the capacity to receive knowledge from a divine source, namely, God. In this paper, I examine the role of humanity within the twelfth-century Christian framework, which would have primarily emphasized the divine. This presentation draws from my research on Hildegard’s understanding of cosmology, cosmogony, and the possible philosophical influences contributing to the development of her thought. My claim is that Hildegard offers a cosmology that is consistent with the ancient and medieval thought of her time whilst contributing, rather originally, her own insights on the role of woman and man. To argue my claim, I principally refer to her texts on cosmology: Scivias and Liber divinorum operum.

JING FENG MA (MA)

TINA LASQUETY-REYES (MA)

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Reading Levinas as a Tragic Thinker

Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy is known for its constant reiteration of a single ‘big idea’: the primacy of the ethical relation to the Other. Recent Levinas scholarship has illuminated another side of Levinas by emphasising themes in his philosophy which have been neglected by more orthodox interpretations. One such theme, which has received modest scholarly attention, is tragedy. In this paper, I retrieve the theme of tragedy from his early works and use it as a lens to reexamine the preface to his magnum opus Totality and Infinity. This preface, with its references to war, history, and eschatology, is at first sight difficult, almost esoteric, and out of joint with the main body of the book. However, by reading the preface from this new perspective, I argue that the theme of tragedy allows us to see more clearly the background concerns which informs Levinas’ ‘big idea’. Drawing attention to two works from the 1930’s, Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism and On Escape, I show how Levinas’ conception of tragedy and his reading of the state of nature as tragic accentuate a critique of liberalism operating in the background of Totality and Infinity.

RIKUS VAN EEDEN (MA)

Chair: Dr. Daniel O’Shiel | Moderator: Greet MasselinkPhenomenology I: Ethics and FriendshipGSC SESSION I-D

On Husserlian Reduction and its Ethical Implication

Husserl’ s concept of the reduction has been challenged heavily since its introduction in Ideas I. Amongst the criticisms, the reduction has also been questioned for its motivation: that is, why should one conduct thephenomenological reduction from the first place? This paper attempts to engage with this question from the perspective of understanding the reduction as a “change of attitude.” By explaining the reduction in this view, I approach the reduction as a method which allows one to open oneself towards the possibility of a “rigorous science”and “freedom.” These two motivations act as the theoretical motivation and the practical motivation of the reduction respectively, and they are fundamentally grounded upon what Husserl views as the “ethical vocation”: that is, the call to live self-responsibly. By reading into what Husserl describes as ‘ ethics’ , I argue that Husserlian phenomenology and its reduction does not merely strive after the rigorous science itself, but through its call for a change of attitude and a self-responsible life, it also demands for a “renewal” and development of the personhood of the phenomenologist.

Phenomenology of Edith Stein on Friendship and the State

The corpus of research about friendship in the history of Philosophy has, to date, shown us thinkers after thinkers who ask the question, “What is Friendship?” They may arrive at such varied conclusions that make the prospect of finding decisive answers about the definition of friendship seem impossible, so it is prudent to adopt another approach.Therefore, this paper analyzes of various functions of friendship via a reading of Edith Stein’s early philosophical works in light of the ongoing discussion about friendship. By focusing on the application of three of her texts to friendship, we can further provide description over univocal definition for the study of friendship. The concepts by Stein that will be explored are taken from her works On the Problem of Empathy to find the mechanism by which two friends relate, Individual and Community for understanding friendship as basic community, and An Investigation Concerning the State for the political relevance of friendship.

KEUNHO HONG (PHD)

PRESTON LOSACK (MA)

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Buber vs Freire: Education and Utopia

Through the ages, people have been longing for a better life, often imagined in an imagined paradise. Philosophers prefer to call this ‘utopia’, the realization of a perfect society. Education seems necessary to make people fit for life in such a society. Utopia and education have a common ground: they are future orientated. Both, Buber and Freire have written on education and utopia. Buber developed his ideas during the revolutionary wave of 1917 in Central Europe and described them in Path of Utopia. Buber’s utopian socialism is based on his philosophical anthropology outlined in ‘I and Thou’. Although Freire’s background is entirely different from Buber’s, his starting point is the same: a better society with an important role for educators as illuminators on the path toward humanization. I will focus on Buber and Freire’s ideas about utopia and education. Have theirrespective backgrounds formed their ideas? What is for them the role of education? Are there similarities or differences in their way of thinking about the role of education.? Finally, does the outcome of their investigations have any significance for current debates within the philosophy of education?

GREET MASSELINK (MPHIL)

Chair: Dr. Dimitris Gakis | Moderator: Sophie LauwersPolitical Philosophy II: Politics and UtopiaGSC SESSION II-A

Hardt and Negri: the Biopolitical Cityale

In Commonwealth, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri state that one major effect of globalisation is to provide a possibility for the creation of a common world. The common wealth of the world includes what is part of the earth (air, land, etc.) and also the results of social production (knowledge, language, etc.). They argue for the multitude (a revolutionary, immanent, collective social subject) to realise their ability to take ownership of the common against the threats of neoliberal privatisation. This requires taking control of the production of collective political subjectivity, which ultimately leads to the possibility of revolution. One site of the production of subjectivity is within what Hardt and Negri term as the ‘biopolitical city’, or the ‘metropolis’. In essence, this presentation will explicate the meaning of this concept as described in Commonwealth. By comparing how Foucault originally defined the concepts of biopower and biopolitics, I will show how Hardt and Negri appropriated these terms for their own purposes. This will allow for an analysis of the meaning of the ‘biopolitical city’. Lastly, I investigate whether the modern capitalist city as we see it today supports or obstructs thedevelopment of collective political subjectivity.

Roger Scruton and Jan Patocka: Spiritual Leadership from Dissidence?

This talk explores the philosophical connection between Roger Scruton and Jan Patočka. These at first sight radically different thinkers are connected through their commitment to Czechoslovakian dissidence, which started to in the late seventies, right before Patočka’s death in 1977. Scruton arrived in Prague shortly after, in 1979. Even though there was no personal encounter, Scruton mentioned several times that his thinking was significantly influenced by Patočka’s. However, so far no philosophical research has been conducted on the nature of this influence. The purpose of this talk consists precisely therein. The focus lies on both author’s conceptualization of the spiritual nature of the human being in relation to the political community, as well as the relation between spiritual leadership and dissidence. First, I provide a brief sketch of thehistorical circumstances of Patočka’s and Scruton’s dissident activities in Czech underground academia. Second, I will track traces of Patočka’s ideas on the meaning of humanity, spiritual authority and truthful life in Scruton’s oeuvre. Finally, I investigate the relevance of their social status as a kind of Socratic figure and what we, members of contemporary European societies, can learn from these unconventional outcasts.

ABDUS SAJUD (MA)

MARIJKE DOMS (MPHIL)

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Master and Slave Morality in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals

It is often claimed that metaphysics ends with Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. However, we should not forget that critique of metaphysics, with particular reference to the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, still belongs to metaphysics tradition. Nietzsche ́s criticism of metaphysics and Christianity can be traced through his whole productive period, and this presentation focuses on the relationship of master and slave morality in one of Nietzsche ́s later works, On the Genealogy of Morals. The fundamental slave formula, you are evil, therefore I am good, shows us, as Gilles Deleuze notes that “the creature of ressentiment ... wants others to be evil, he needs others to be evil in order to be able to consider himself good.” What is so persuasive about the words “you are evil” that the bird of prey is able not only to believe them, but also internalize them? What is this weak side of master morality? By this simple accusation, growing out of ressentiment, hating everyone and everything different from himself, the lamb, or the person of slave morality, is able to turn the bird of prey, symbolizing master morality, against himself, without his realization. Slave morality thus not only saves itself, but also prevails in our society and culture.

SIMONA ANDREJOVA (MPHIL)

Chair: Prof. Karin de Boer | Moderator: Molly De CleeneContinental Philosophy IGSC SESSION II-B

Understanding Arendt’s ‘Wordlessness’ in Two Ways

The concept of worldlessness, in the thought of Hannah Arendt, elucidates the most basic problem of modern existence. The world, for Arendt, means the space between men, where the human beings come to make claim, communicate with others, and finally construct themselves in and through the world. In this sense, “worldlessness” is defined as the condition of those who share nothing in between or the condition destroys the world. Nevertheless, according to Arendt, the concept of worldlessness is not simple opposition to or negation of the world nor is what we can eliminate. This is because worldlessness is not simply pervasive condition of modernity, but it is the very structure of the human existence. This paper carefully examines two ways of interpreting the concept of wordlessness. First position understands the worldlessness as the form of ideology, while another view posits worldlessness as the very condition of all forms of human life and thereby of the world. By comparing these two different positions, I put emphasis on the way in which worldlessness is intertwined with the world itself and it is to be understood only through this notion of worldlessness underlying the world.

Reframing the Animal Question: A Cixousian Reinterpretation of Heidegger and Levinas

The purpose of this presentation is to examine how Hélène Cixous’ interpretation of the animal question plays with Martin Heidegger’s claim that the animal is world-poor, and Emmanuel Levinas’ claim that the ethical is given through the face of the Other. Cixous argues that the genuine touch, gaze, or breath of an animal—especially those animals categorized as pets, vermin, or slaughterable—ruptures the socially expected relations of things, calling into question the validity of those expectations. The first section of this presentation will examine the Heideggerian theory of animals as an example of the standard Western philosophical approach, which posits a strict hierarchy between the human and the animal. The second section will examine Levinas’ ambivalent approach to the animal, which, nonetheless, falls back again upon the traditional assumption of human superiority. The third section and the bulk of the presentation will provide an in-depth explication of Cixous’ analysis of the animal in “ Birds, women, and writing,” and argue that Cixous does not disagree with Heidegger and Levinas at face value, but calls into question each philosopher’s framework. Finally, I will suggest that Cixous’ reinterpretation of the traditional Western framework remains anthropomorphic in its understanding of the animal.

WOUNGHEE YOON (MA)

ARIANE POISSON (MA)

20 21

Imagine all the People – Moral Dilemmas as Experiments and Experience

What if you could save five unsuspecting railroad workers from being struck by a runaway trolley car by diverting it onto a side track where another victim lies in wait? In the horror of the moment, to what extent is it permissible to contemplate the unthinkable (e.g., sacrificing one to save five)? As compelling as it is irksome, the infamous “Trolley Problem” is a paradigmatic thought experiment in ethics, appropriated by consequentialists and deontologists to test and explain the moral salience of acts and consequences in exceedingly bizarre scenarios. Regardless of theoretical slant, the original narrative of the imagined scenario is supposed to generate a unique solution, corresponding to underlying principles, rights or intuitions. While a solution is an essential feature of any experiment, this article reconsiders what it means to solve ethical thought experiments, particularly moral dilemmas. I begin with a methodological analysis of traditional approaches to formulating and solving a moral dilemma, taking the problem-narrative as given. I then draw on CoraDiamond’s quasi-Wittgensteinian defence of abstract cases in ethics to revisit classic interpretations of the Trolley Problem. Ultimately, solving the problem may require re-evaluating theoretical assumptions in the problem-narrative to be morally insightful.

Elizabeth Anscombe on ‘Intention’: Is There a Contradiction in Her Early and Late Use of This Concept

Thought experiments have become a commonplace among philosophers. One of the very influential ones is the so-called “cave explorer” experiment and it was introduced by Elizabeth Anscombe in her 1982 paper ‘ Action, Intention and “Double Effect”’ . The main dilemma is this: if there is a cave explorer stuck in the exit of the cave, water level is rising, and the only way out for his fellow soon-to-be-drown explorers is to move a rock next to his head which would cause his immediate death, can they do it? The aim of this experiment is to draw out attention to the nature of ‘ intention’ . John Finnis, in his paper ‘ Intention and Side-Effect’ of 1991, argues that if Anscombe doesn’ t allow that it is possible to both move the rock and not to intend to kill the poor fellow, then she clearly contradicts her earlier grasp of ‘intention’ as presented in her Intention of 1957 via the thought experiment of a man pumping poisoned water. However, Luke Gormally in his 2013 paper ‘ Intention and Side Effects: John Finnis and Elizabeth Anscombe’ defends her consistency in employing ‘ intention’ , and it is the goal of my paper of assess how plausible Gormally’ s critique is, and if it is really true that it is actually Finnis who departs from Anscombe’ s specification of ‘ intention’ to which he claims fidelity.

ALEXANDRA M. SINGER (MA)

JAKUB BETINSKÝ (MA)

Chair: Prof. Stefaan Cuypers | Moderator: Haiyu JiangAnalytic Philosophy and Ethical ThoughtGSC SESSION II-C

The Final Value of Knowledge and Achievements

John Greco argues that we can answer the final value problem of knowledge by thinking of it as a kind of achievement. But if so, how is this value possible in dis-valuable achievements? Two prominent proposals that address this question include the performance normativity of Sosa and the overriding argument of Pritchard. In this paper, I argue for a novel and third position, namely, the value inheritance of knowledge. Relying on the distinction between tokens and types, I contend that the distinctive value of knowledge is inherited and transmitted by knowledge-types to knowledge-tokens. This allows that some knowledge-tokens may be worthless or dis-valuable. While earlier responses to the question have assumed that every token of knowledge must be defended, this approach sees things differently, and thus avoids their pitfalls. To this end, I discuss first Greco’s virtue-theoretic account of the value of knowledge and the problem of wicked achievements. Next, I consider Sosa’s and Pritchard’s responses to rescue it and show why they fail. Finally, I consider a more promising approach that relies on token-type distinction.

Knowing what is Possible Atemporally and at All Times

Vetter (2016) has proposed that we should develop modal epistemology along Williamsonian lines (cf. Williamson 2007), taking ‘can’ statements as the entry point into modal space. She argues that to reach metaphysical possibility from the more ordinary possibility expressed in ‘can’ statements (‘potentiality’), we should abstract from both times and context. Scepticism about metaphysical modality can be rejected by pointing out that knowledge of the truth of ‘can’ statements allows knowledge of metaphysical modality, in the assumption that the former entail the latter. However, it is unclear whether this approach can give a satisfying account of the sufficiency of generalized knowledge of capacities for modal knowledge. Vetter herself points out that to give an account of de dicto possibility one must either a) accept the Barcan formulas and claim that de re possibility is the same as de dicto possibility, or b) give a more revisionist account of the link between potentiality and metaphysicalmodality. Williamson takes the former route, while Vetter takes the latter. Here, I consider some issues about conceptualizing knowledge of metaphysical modality in this second way, by examining the commitments that abstracting from times might entail, and in particular, the issue of time-insensitive potentialities.

IRIKEFE PAUL (MA)

FELIPE MORALES (PHD)

22 23

Public Debt and the Political Agency of the Marktvolk

Debt has become one of the defining political issues of our age. Ever since the financial crisis of 2008, some of the most urgent political challenges have revolved around debt, especially within the EU. Many states have incurred high levels of public debt over the course of decades, and have become dependent on new investments in sovereign debt to finance further deficits and/or interest payments on existing loans. That means that the capacity of states to finance their policies has come to depend in great part on their relative creditworthiness, as perceived by investors. This has led Wolfgang Streeck to argue that many contemporary democracies are in fact responsive to a dual constituency: the citizenry (Staatsvolk) and creditors (Marktvolk). Governments must legitimise their policies not merely to their citizens, but also to potential investors. In my presentation I will critically assess and develop the suggestion that contemporary states respond to a dual constituency. What kind of political agency is “the financial market”? What is a constituency, and could a state have more than one? What would it mean for democratic sovereignty if the Martkvolk were to be understood as a second constituency?

A Shift in Sovereignty

In light of the increasingly globalized international platform, the traditional notion of sovereignty is evolving. Evidence for the inevitability of an evolving state sovereignty is made apparent in Dieter Grimm’s text, Sovereignty. Acknowledging this imminent evolution, this paper will juxtapose two prominent positions in the contemporary sovereignty debate. By considering the “post-national” position of Jürgen Habermas and the “constitutional pluralism” position of Jean Cohen, this study will situate the consequences of globalization on sovereignty from both perspectives, and offer two respective proposals for how sovereignty should evolve today. This juxtaposition will enhance the current discussion about the future conception of sovereignty by weighing the costs and benefits of two possible avenues for sovereignty’s evolution. Ultimately, this paper will analyse whether the concept ofsovereignty is one that can, or needs to, be sustained.

BEREND RIGTER (MA)

KATRINA MICHELLE CANO (MA)

Chair: Prof. Tim Heysse | Moderator: Alice RotichPolitical Philosophy III : On SovereigntyGSC SESSION III-A

What is Constituent Power? The Argument for Constituent Representation

Ever since Abbe Sieyès first coined the terms pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitué, saying that the first is ‘prior to everything’, the metaphysics of presence has lingered behind most versions of the concept of constituent power. By following the secularisation theorem as employed by Martin Heidegger I uncover the theological foundations of such immanentist metaphysics and argue against its continued use in constitutional discourse. In its stead I embrace the contributions made by Raf Geenens et alland Hans Lindahl who argue that the two powers are co-original, meaning that constituent power is symbolically ‘created’ through an act of the constituted power and yet always remains elusive to its control, thus preserving a space of indeterminacy. My original contribution consists in bringing this approach into conversation with Bernhard Waldenfels’s paradox of substitution which results in juxtaposing ordinary political representation with constituent representation. While ordinary representation is a representation of the ‘said’, constituent representation takes place on the level of saying in which the saying of the representative and of the represented partially cover each other, rather than the first standing in as a replacement for the latter. This aspect of politics comes to the fore in foundational moments of a polity, as the principle which generates some form of collective selfhood.

ARISTEL SKRBIC (MA)

24 25

Scheler and Jankelevitch on Repentance

In The Bad Conscience, Vladimir Jankélévitch offers a critique of what he calls the “ethics of repenting.” He is particularly critical of Christian notions of repentance, and mentions specifically Max Scheler’s remarks in “Repentance and Rebirth” as representative of this tradition. Since Jankélévitch offers no extended critique of Scheler’s position, I want to draw out more explicitly how Jankélévitch might argue against his view of repentance. First, I argue that Jankélévitch sees the theological notion of “prevenient grace” at work in Scheler’s text, such that repentance becomes a “game” in which the outcome is known from the start. This self-assured repentance then begins to treat forgiveness as something that one might “merit,” and tends to minimize the gravity of one’s misdeeds. For Scheler, fault is thus reduced to a felix culpa. In Jankélévitch’s view, all of this belies the notion that such repentance truly expresses a bad conscience. To this view of repentance, he thus opposes remorse, for which fault retains its full weight as the Irrevocable. Since Jankélévitch’s criticism of Scheler shows how such theologically grounded views of repentance diminish the character of moral fault, I argue that Jankélévitch thus compellingly demonstrates how problematic Christian conceptions of repentance can be.

KYLE LEENSTRA GAFFIN (MA)

Chair: Prof. Nicolas de Warren | Moderator: Martin SotomayorPhenomenology II: Pain, Suffering and Repentance GSC SESSION III-B

I Suffer from Your Suffering: Phenomenological Approaches to Others’ Sorrow It is an ethical phenomenon in human nature that I not only understand others’suffering, but am also deeply affected by their pains in the sense that their misery stirs pains in me. To investigate this phenomenon, the leading question of this paper is “how it is possible that I am affected by others’ inward’s grief”. I begin with empathy as an epistemological approach to others’ pain and reveal its failure in solving the problem of other minds, and thus empathy fails to expound how others’ suffering interacts on me. Then, I introduce Levinas’s ethical account for “my suffering for others’ suffering” in terms of the “compassionate suffering”, and employ his ethical relation – the-one-being-responsible-for-the-other – to disclose the problem of other minds faced by empathy. However, Levinas’s account is not radical enough to explain the legitimate foundation of my feeling responsible for others’ suffering, so I propose a possible way of laying the foundation for being-responsible-for-the-other, by radicalizing the self-other relation in the light of self-dialogue and give my own account for “my suffering from others’ suffering” in terms of the “self-condemning”. All of the three approaches – empathy, ethics, and self-dialogue – situate within the framework of intentionality.

Pain and Collapse of Subjectivity

The phenomenology of pain has been reintroduced as a problematic of philosophical discourse by thinkers like Saulius Geniusas and Fredrik Svenaeus. While both the historical scholarship onand the neurological elements of pain are being investigated, there remains a lacuna in the effects of pain on transcendental subjectivity. Inmy paper, I argue that pain, and especially severe, unintentional pain, suspends the horizons constituted through embodiment, causing the meaningful world to collapse back into the bodyof the subject in pain. First, I will present the scholarship connected to this research, and then I will use acts of torture as a paradigm toevaluate these types of pain and their consequences on subjectivity.

MENGDI HU (MPHIL)

JEREMY HEUSLEIN (PHD)

26 27

Historicity and Eschatology: The Philosophical Breakthrough in Early Heidegger

From anti-Modernist Catholicism to un-dogmatic Protestantism and the a-theistic philosophical method, Martin Heidegger’s strong religious background had a decisive influence on his philosophy. From 1917 to 1921, Heidegger changed his personal beliefs and made a breakthrough in his philosophical thinking. Focusing on Heidegger’s The Phenomenology of Religious Life, I will explore his early philosophical breakthrough and argue that the religious dimension is the most decisive factor in his philosophical breakthrough. Moreover, I will show how Heidegger’s religious inspirations have been transformed to his philosophical concepts, which play important roles in his philosophical development. Then we can see the similarity and tension between Heidegger and his contemporaries.

SEN SU (MA)

Chair: Prof. Henning Tegtmeyer | Moderator: Jennz LushabaPhilosophy of Religion II GSC SESSION III-C

The Challenge of Revelation and the Possibility of Philosophy

Leo Strauss claims that philosophy and revealed religion must but cannot refute one another, for both refutations would presuppose faith in revelation. Yet, the theologian is capable of merely dismissing philosophy, while the philosopher must prove the impossibility of revelation. Since, if revelation is possible, philosophy is possibly not the right way of life. Philosophy is, in that case, based on something akin to faith, which amounts to a self-refutation. However, I will defend the view that it is through this conflict that Strauss attempts to revive what he takes to be the Greek conception of philosophy. I will argue as follows. Strauss accuses modern philosophy of merely dismissing revelation. But philosophy cannot rule out the possibility of revelation without asserting that it can gain knowledge of the whole. Thus, modern philosophy assumed its own possibility. In restoring the apparent irrefutability of the biblical premise, then, Strauss forces philosophy to question its own basic premise. But this challenge does not rely on ‘the Bible’, ‘Jerusalem’ or ‘orthodoxy’, for it was the theme of Greek philosophy. Thus, I will argue that the conflict between ‘Athens and Jerusalem’ is the struggle of Greek philosophy to prove its own possibility.

The Metaphysics of Marriage

The goal of this paper is to develop an ontology of marriage in order to gauge the extent towhich social ontology can clarify the debate over same-sex marriage. It starts from an ontology of a person as a specific combination of an ability space and a liberty space. Persons occupy positions in a mutual network of matching rights and obligations, which can be contingently actualized or modified, constituting their liberty spaces. A marriage is then the highest possible degree of ontological unification reachable between persons, fully merging their liberty spaces. There are many kinds of relations thinkable between persons, but ‘unity’ provides a unique reference point vis-à-vis these other possibilities. Indissolubility and exclusivity are two further properties that follow immediately from unification. The traditional and nowadays contested essential link with procreation can be grounded in the unique ability of a united male and female ability space to generate new persons into existence. Incontrast with the essence of another key institution, the state is marked by its unique right to employ lethal force and thereby end the existence of persons. Marriage, on that conception, establishes and regulates natural – hence necessary and non-contingent – relations between persons, in contrast with other types of relations, like labour contracts or commercial contracts, establishing merely contingent relations between persons.

MAX MORRIS (MA)

MICHAËL BAUWENS (PHD)

28 29

The Empirical Turn: Opening the Black Box of Technology

In the last decades of the 20th century, social science has seen the rise of a new discipline: Science and Technology Studies (STS). Influenced by STS theories such as the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) and Actor-Network-Theory (ANT), Peter Kroes and Anthonie Meijers –two Dutch philosophers of technology– argued for an empirical turn, claiming that within the philosophy of technology, technology itself often remains ‘black-boxed’. Offering a practical and interdisciplinary way of looking at things, the empirical turn provides a ‘joint course’ for the philosophy of technology and STS, focussing on technology-in-the-making rather than overarching theory – and in this way opening the black box of technology. In other words, post-STS Philosophy of Technology claims to open the black box. But do they – and is this a new development? STS-influenced philosophers have combined valuable insights from various philosophical disciplines (e.g. phenomenology and ethics) to gain more insight into artefacts and their philosophical implications and actively advocate using these insights in fields such as design and engineering, transcending a continental-analytic distinction. The goal of this essay is to analyse the philosophy-STS relationship: to what extent has STS steered philosophers of technology to look at artefacts ‘case-per-case’ and is this a new development?

How to Listen to Scientists (and Ignore Them when Appropriate)

Philosophy of science is mainly associated with analytic philosophy, but continental traditions exist as well. This paper will focus on one of them, namely French philosophy of science, ranging from Gaston Bachelard to Bruno Latour. Within this tradition a very specific conception of the relation between science and philosophy cab be found. Instead of the traditional model of correcting science or helping science, one finds the model of listening to science: philosophy of science should make itself as flexible as the scientific practices are. What such a vision implies will be explored through the work of two diverging examples within French philosophy of science, namely Louis Althusser and Isabelle Stengers. The presentation will end with a discussion of potential criticisms of this approach, centred around the question whether one can listen too much to the scientists and when it is appropriate to go against what they are saying.

ILJA POSTEL (MA)

MASSIMILIANO SIMONS (PHD)

Chair: Prof. Ullrich Melle | Moderator: Mahua AgrawalPhilosophy of Science and TechnologyGSC SESSION III-D

Efficient, yet Bored

Whereas premodern technology was aimed at revealing the potential of the world, modern technology serves to fulfil the human privilege to construct and transform the world. Gradually, everything is transformed into instruments or cogs to serve the main end of modern technology: productivity. The essence, however, of technological activity is efficiency: it aims at achieving the end of productivity with a minimum amount of resources. The principal resource is that of time. Eventually, all spheres of life are aimed at the efficient use of time. In this paper, I argue that the all-encompassing orientation on efficiency associated with modern technology, results in a novel manifestation of boredom. Specifically, I show that modern technology is an opportunity for boredom to arise. It creates free time that cannot be spent meaningfully. In contrast to previous times, every sphere of life is posited in function of efficiency rather than revealing the potential of the world which was considered inherently valuable. This changed the meaning of free time. I argue that the shift in significance and interpretation of free time under the influence of modern technology, gives rise to a novel form boredom that is characterized by constantly killing time.

Standing Reserve and Total Mobilization: Heidegger and Jünger on Technology

A reading of Heidegger’s Question Concerning Technology can be well illuminated through the writings of Ernst Jünger. In some instances, Heidegger borrows from Jünger’s works, such as Total Mobilization and Der Arbeiter especially, which he also submits to scrutiny. To Heidegger, Jünger may have represented more of a prosaic soldier than a proper philosopher, whose perspective was symptomatic of a romanticism and an optimism regarding technology, neglecting the danger Heidegger had pronounced. This paper will discuss how Heidegger and Jünger share broad insights which had shaped their views on history in relation to modernity and their perspectives on technology. Following these shared insights, the paper aims to identify where and why Heidegger, who draws much from Jünger, concludes that Jünger’s work Der Arbeiter represents a forgetting of Being. To do this, the paper will focus on Heidegger’s indebtedness to Jünger in their shared language of ‘standing reserve,’ and locate their point of divergence by exploring their rejection and embrace of total mobilization respectively.

JOYCE CONINGS (MA)

NICHOLAS JOHNSTON (MA)

30 31

Nature in Locke and Marx: Is it Valueless or Invaluable? The recent economic recession has placed income inequality at the center of political debate. Arguments usually fall on one of two sides: the leftist response that inequality is systemic, and the rightist response that inequality is the result of choice. These well-worn positions are, at least partially, based in the writings of John Locke and Karl Marx. Locke argues in his Second Treatise of Government that the appropriation of natural resources is inconsequential because uncultivated nature is almost worthless. Mixing labor with a natural product produces nearly all value. If labor produces value, then labor is the originator of inequality. As long as others are free to act in like manner Locke’s theory of value allows him to justify present inequality. Marx challenges Locke’s view by showing that nature is the basis of all value and so its acquisition is extremely consequential. In Anarchy, State, and Utopia Robert Nozick attempts to bypass the Marxian critique by shifting the Lockean justification from the value of nature to the original acquisition. My research adds to this conversation by clarifying the nature of the Marxian critique to Locke’s argument and explaining why Nozick’s attempt to bypass this critique fails, forcing us to reject Locke’s justification of present inequality in favor of Marx’s condemnation. For Locke, value and inequality result from labor and intensify via money. I will argue that nature, the basis of all value, is invaluable and that its appropriation is consequential. This appropriation leads to the inequality discussed in politics today. Thus, we must reject the claim that current inequality is the just result of personal choice.

JASON KEYSER (MA)

Chair: Prof. Matthias Lievens | Moderator: Preston LosackPolitical Philosophy IV : Tocqueville, Locke and Marx GSC SESSION IV-A

Merging Individual Interest and the General Good:Rousseau’s and Tocqueville’s Republicanism

When Alexis de Tocqueville came back in France after his trip to America in 1831, he wanted to convince his countrymen about the long-term benefits of civil and political associations. Earlier theorists, such as Rousseau, thought factions led to anarchy and promoted unity instead. Tocqueville, in contrast, thinks that promoting unity can turn into despotism if not offset by healthy pluralism. For Tocqueville, pluralism is identified with active citizen engagement, or, putted differently, with exercising political freedom. He sees this kind of pluralism as the solution for all the ills of democratic society, among them despotism. However, I will argue that, following Charles Taylor, Tocqueville missed a point: the danger for democracy is not actual despotic control, Taylor maintains, but fragmentation- that is, a people increasingly less capable of forming a common purpose and carrying it out. If the political body is fragmented in such a way, I argue, active citizen engagement is impossible, and, therefore, it cannot be regarded as the solution for all the ills of democracy. To deal with this outcome, we will first look at Taylor’s ideas of fragmentation and contrast this with Tocqueville’s ideas about active citizen engagement. After that we will delve into the question how to create a healthy associational life. Lastly, we will consider if there are other solutions for the ills of democracy than active citizen engagement.

Tocqueville the Federalist? The Problem of Tocqueville’s Federal Argument

In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville provides a detailed account of the “novelty” of the American federation, a polity in which two governments, on the national and on the provincial level, divide sovereignty according to different competencies. The problem is that federalism tries to secure two opposite ends: on one hand, the local states want to maintain their identity and sovereignty; on the other, they want to unite and form a common government. In this paper, I will argue that Tocqueville does not view favourably the local states, and, thus, the whole federal system. First, I will introduce the basic elements of Tocqueville’s argument: the structure of American federalism, the distinction between governmental and administrative centralisation, the town as a “school of liberty”. Secondly, I will show how Tocqueville portrays the sovereignty of the local states as a threat for both the national government and the towns. In conclusion, Tocqueville sees the conflict between the opposite ends of federalism as difficult to solve, thus preferring to it a strongly decentralised national state. Ultimately, however, he recognises the priority of social circumstances over theory in determining the fortune of a polity, leaving open the possibility of a successful federation.

MARIT PEPPLINKHUIZEN (MPHIL)

MATTEO SCOPEL (MA)

32 33

Freedom in the Face of Passions and Habit. The Role of Attention in Ricoeur’s Analysis of the Will in The Voluntary and the Involuntary

Attention remains one of the most fascinating phenomena in the study of consciousness. One interesting anglewhich remains less explored is its relationship with affection, which is fundamental for a proper phenomenologicall understanding of the latter (Lotz 2007) and has generated interest in recent Husserlian scholarship. In order to contribute to this line of inquiry, in this paper I will present Paul Ricoeur’s account of the role of attention involuntary action. I will focus on two obvious texts: Ricoeur’s earlier phenomenological study, Attention, and The Voluntary and the Involuntary. Based on them, I will provide a phenomenological account which elucidates how, without being itself effort or interest, attention is the initial act which allows the embodied subject to relate to habit and emotions (including passions, the recalcitrantform of the emotions) in a way that is no longer passive. I will try to show 1) how this possibility helps us to understand the voluntary and the involuntary as a continuum, as suggested by Ricoeur, and 2) the implications that the emerging picture may have on the current understanding the embodied consciousness, suggesting that perhaps some strong claims equating the ego with its body have to be moderated.

The Bergsonian Self: An Interpretation of the Deep-Seated Self in Bergson’s Time and Free Will

My present paper is an attempt to interpret Bergson’s deep-seated self in his book Time and Free Will. Although Bergson introduces his concept of true self when he deals with the problem of free will, he does not clearly indicate what his deep-seated self is. Therefore, my aim in this paper is to articulate a potential interpretation of Bergson’s fundamental self. I argue that Bergsonian true self is a pure duration which lies in the immediate consciousness. Through this paper, I will show that it is in the pure duration, which is a purely internal intensity of psychic states without any attempts of spatialization, that a true identity is seated. I also argue that it is the misconception of true self; which brings space into our internal immediate consciousness, that gives rise to the discussion of the free will in the first place. However, one of the most intellectual difficulty in understanding duration as a self-identity is to understand how could something constantly involving and becoming as a pure duration can be a static self-identity. The present paper offers a potential interpretation which fundamentally engages with and hopefully ease this tension.

ALEJANDRO ALVELAIS (MA)

XUE DONG (MA)

Chair: Prof. Roland Breeur | Moderator: Berend RigterContinental Philosophy II: The Self GSC SESSION IV-B

The Gateway Named Augenblick: The Existential Moment in Nietzsche and Jaspers

The main aim of my thesis is to examine the idea of the ‘exalted’ or ‘decisive’ moment (Augenblick) in Friedrich Nietzsche and Karl Jaspers. In the third book of Also sprach Zarathustra, Friedrich Nietzsche discusses a ‘gateway’ called ‘moment’ where two paths meet: the eternal past and the eternal future. He describes this ‘moment’ as where the circle of time closes itself, resulting in eternal recurrence. By embracing the idea of eternal recurrence, Nietzsche argues, one can come to self-affirmation. In a similar fashion, Karl Jaspers discusses the idea of the Augenblick in his Existenz-philosophy. Like Nietzsche, Jaspers also argues that man makes existentially significant decisions in which he experiences a moment of eternity and a ‘soar’ of his innermost self (Existenz). However, on closer examination both views seem to have very different implications for what it means for man to affirm himself in time. By comparing these two thinkers, I will show that Nietzsche runs into untenable paradoxes when we read him as situating the Augenblick in time as the meeting point of past and future. Jaspers’s view of the Augenblick as something ‘timeless’ will then allow us to revisit Nietzsche and neutralize these problems.

Cotard’s Syndrome as a Challenge to the Theories of the Self

Cotard’s syndrome is a mental condition characterized by a person’s claiming to be dead or non-existent. While the syndrome is not well-researched itself, it has been used by contemporary researchers in the philosophy of mind to support or explain their theories of selfhood. Metzinger argues that Cotard’s syndrome supports his no-self doctrine. By contrast, Zahavi contends that selfhood is preserved even in Cotard’s syndrome. I defend a third view on Cotard’s delusion, which follows Zahavi’s line of thought in that it argues for the necessity of selfhood for any conscious experience to take place at all. This view is suggested by Thomas Fuchs and it maintains that Cotard’s delusion is not an absence of selfhood as such, but a disturbance of only onedimension of pre-reflective selfhood, that is, embodiment and affectivity. The syndrome, on this view, is the inability to be affected and not an absence of selfhood. On the example of Cotard’s syndrome I will defend an embodied notion of selfhood. First, I will show why the syndrome cannot successfully support theno-self doctrine; second, I will show why selfhood cannot be found among substances and things; and third, I will show in what sense selfhood is real.

SHARI DEDIER (MA)

ANASTASIA ARIEFIEVA (MPHIL)

34 35

Unity and Multiplicity in Husserl’s Analysis of Time-Consciousness

Unity and multiplicity are the basic structure of intelligibility. Husserl’s phenomenology, as an investigation of the constitution of meaning in consciousness, fundamentally has to do with unity and multiplicity. In his analysis of the various layers in the constitution of time, the structure of unity and multiplicity is also played out on different levels. Otherwise different though these levels are, the structure of unity and multiplicity remains formally the same through them if the absolute consciousness is conceived in the content/apprehension schema. With the critique of the schema, however, a radically new sense of unity and multiplicity is obtained, where multiplicity does not exist prior to unity, and both unity and multiplicity are generated together. I will rely on Husserl’s own theory of parts and wholes to analyze this peculiar interpenetration of unity and multiplicity. Finally, I will demonstrate on the basis of this analysis that Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness is neither a form of intentionalism nor a variant of extensionalism, and that it constitutes an interesting alternative to the two major positions in contemporary discussions of temporal experience.

An Exploration of Semantic Essence in Husserl’s Logical Investigations

The meaning of the term ‘semantic essence’ in Husserl’s Logical Investigations is not as thoroughly explored as the notion of ‘intentional essence,’ to the effect that some philosophers believe the two terms are a distinction without a difference. ‘Intentional’ and ‘semantic’ essence are certainly closely related – for as Husserl explains in LI VI, section 8, “…the intentional essence of the act of intuition gets more or less perfectly fitted into the semantic essence of the act of expression.” But the semantic essence, I will seek to show, is distinct from the intentional essence – perhaps most importantly because semantic essence pertains only to expressions, while intentional essence pertains to a wider range of acts. In this paper, I will endeavour to show the significance of semantic essence, quite apart from intentional essence, and clarify its important relationship to expressions. I will seek to introduce and explain some of Husserl’s terminology and definitions as a foundation, subsequently analyse the term ‘semantic essence’ in expressive acts and understand how it applies to the notion of ‘identification’ and ‘belongingness’ in intentional acts, and suggest reasons why the term is a meaningful distinction for Husserl.

DI HUANG (MA)

MARY LEONE (MA)

Chair: Dr. Diego D’Angelo | Moderator: Moses OgunadePhenomenology III: Topics in Husserlian PhenomenologyGSC SESSION IV-C

Husserlian Response to Meillassoux’s Charge of Correlationism

This paper aims to evaluate Husserl’s Phenomenology against Meillassoux’s charge of ‘correlationism’. According to Meillassoux, science proposes ‘ancestral statements’that make claims about entities that occur anterior to the emergence of life. In contrast, correlationist philosophies including phenomenology argue that to rationally deal with an entity it must be adequately present to consciousness. Ancestral statements clearly violate this principle and puts correlationism on a collision course with scientific realism. Scientific realism argues that scientific categories and theories are irreducible to immediate experience and that such entities constitute the ontology of the real world. By advocating that ancestral statements should be taken at ‘face value’, Meillassoux argues for a strong variant of scientific realism. Against this backdrop, the paper situates Meillassoux’s charge of correlationism as an attack on the transcendental approach and aims to formulate a Husserlian response. In doing so, the paper focuses on Husserl’s transcendental idealism and critical evaluation of science in the Crisis. I argue that while the particular nature of Husserl’s transcendental idealism does make him a correlationist, his position is not opposed to scientific realism.

Husserl and Brentano on the Descriptive Science of Consciousness

This paper aims to shed light on Husserl’s claim that phenomenology is a descriptive eidetic science of the region of consciousness by comparing the stances on description in Brentano’s descriptive psychology and Husserl’s phenomenology. By description we distinguish different separable and merely distinguishable parts of consciousness as well as their laws of combinations. Brentano takes that description reveals the universal truth of consciousness by inductive generalization, which is prior to the probable causal laws studied by genetic psychology. Husserl investigates the regional ontology of consciousness in which description is the method to study morphological essences and the criterion of justification is eidetic intuition. Furthermore, though both discover intentional correlation to be a general and exclusive part-whole relation of consciousness, the transcendence of intentional objects leads Husserl to further claim that the region of consciousness is the primordial ontological region over other regions of beings.

TARUN JOSE KATTUMANA (MA)

ZHURAN LI (MPHIL)

GSC2017 Keynote Speech

Beyond the Confines of the Law. Foucault’s Genealogy of the Modern State.

During his teachings at the ‘Collège de France’ (1970-1984), Foucault ventures upon a ‘genealogy of the modern state’. Its underlying intuition is that the modern state has its origin in two different power arrangements (dispositifs de pouvoir): sovereign power and governmentality, and that the state as we know it today is the result of an increasing ‘governementalization of the modern state’.In this paper it is claimed that in his genealogy of the modern state, Foucault is tracing a form of power which is intrinsically excessive, and although emanating from the state, cannot be contained by the state – because it operates beyond the confines of the law.

PROF. ANTOON BRAECKMAN