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Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

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Page 1: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

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Page 2: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

Myth I: Courts Are EverythingEverything

• 2/3rds of firms in Investment Climate surveys have never sued to collect an overdue bill

• Percentage of Firms Using Courts in Last Dispute --

39

30

25

20

6

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Poland Slovakia Romania Ukraine Russia

Page 3: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

Myth II: Courts Are Irrelevant

How Romanian firms enforce contracts

02468

10

Futurebusiness

Courts ADR

Source: Peter Murrell, “Firms Facing New Institutions: Transactional Governance in Romania,” Journal of Comparative Economics 31(4): 695-714 (2003)

Page 4: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

Contract Prerequisite: Property Rights

Two essentials. Rights must be:

Secure � protected from theft, fraud and other crimes and from uncompensated seizure by government; and

Verifiable � ownership readily determinable through registries and legal rules

Page 5: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

Contract Basics

• Exchange of goods or services– written document unnecessary– enforceability by court irrelevant

• Terms– price– quantity– quality– timing of performance

Page 6: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

Contracts: Cash & Carry

� Characteristics� price and quantity determinate� quality observable� simultaneous performance

� Examples:� flea markets� kiosks/street vendors

Page 7: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

Complex Contracts

Staggered performance: trade credit, payment by check, deposit or guarantee, goods made to order

Quality: 2nd or 3rd party inspection,�best efforts,� �timely manner�

Price: formula (e.g. cost plus)Quantity: exclusive dealing, requirements

Page 8: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

SimpleContracts

Repeat business important?

cash & carry

�� Bilateral

•Hostages

•Tying Agreements

•Franchising & Distribution

Unilateral Commitments

Multilateral

•Reputation & Sanctions

•ADR

•Courts

•Regulatory Agencies

Contract Enforcement Mechanisms

Complex Contracts

��

Involve third party?

no yes

Page 9: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

Policy Interventions: Unilateral

• Advertising– access to state-owned media, reasonable rules

governing deception

• Irreversible investments– ownership/long-term leases of land and buildings

• Trademarks/Brands– strengthen registries, deter infringement (private

as well as public enforcement)– create links with international firms (Uganda)

Page 10: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

• Hostages– Advance Payment/Postdated check– Security interest/Leasing– Mutual exchanges

• Tying agreements– Credit to sales

• Exclusive dealing arrangements– Franchising/Other supplier distributor

relations

Bilateral Enforcement Mechanisms: Types

Page 11: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

• Scrub competition law to remove hurdles to self-enforcing contracts

• Establish registries for moveable property

• Ensure land registries provide “official looking” title documents

• Self-help? Post-dated checks, Repo men & Debt collection agencies

Bilateral Enforcement Mechanisms: Policy Interventions

Page 12: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

Policy Issues: Reputation

• Trade Associations– distinguish anticompetitive boycott

from sanctions for contract breach • Credit Bureaus

– balance privacy with right to circulate information

– free entry of international firms• Certification/BBBs

– Underwriter’s Lab/Argentine CPA

Page 13: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

ADR: Characteristics

• Voluntary decision to use neutral third party to resolve dispute

• Types: arbitration, mediation, conciliation

• Advantages–accuracy, speed, less

contentious, less costly (?)

Page 14: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

ADR: Types

• Free Standing: –Local Chamber of Commerce,

NGO, Trade Association, World Bank

• Court-Connected: –B-H, Albania, Ecuador, Bolivia

Page 15: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

ADR: Some Early Results

027346/14%3192B-H

-674214/24%88810Ecuador

170/0%816Albania

643/23%1312WB/Gaza

PendingNot resolved

Resolved/ % of total

Total Cases

Time (months)Country

Page 16: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

ADR: Some Early Results

888

319

13 8

214

463 0

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Ecuador B-H WB/Gaza Albania

Num

ber

of C

ases

Blue: Cases Referred to ADRRed: Cases Resolved

Page 17: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

ADR: Why Results Meager

Page 18: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

ADR: Government-Investor Disputes

Means: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Regional Trade Agreements (NAFTA, CAFTA), ICSID, ICCAre International Arbitrators Biased Against LDCs?

50%50%

Governments Firms

Page 19: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

ADR: Policy Interventions

� Law should permit parties to choose:� arbiter � governing law � form of decision

� Narrow permitted court challenges�within 90 days of award� only for incapacity, notice, bias, public

policy

Page 20: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

Judicial Reform: Donor Projects

• Bank experience:– Only in past 12 years, mix of

approaches, no standard project design

– Early results mixed: few successes (Venezuela, Tanzania, Slovakia), many question marks

• Other donors’ experience similar

Page 21: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

Judicial Reform: Early Success

0100200300400500600700800

Barquesimeto CiudadBolivar

Median days to resolve case

Impact of Reform on Debt Collection Cases

BeforeAfter

Page 22: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

Judicial Reform: Bank Record

•Stand alone:

– 5 for 8 or .625

•Africa components:

– 13 for 21 or .619

Page 23: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

Judicial Reform: Lessons

• Can be highly political – Commercial courts – Opposition from lawyers, judges,

clerks, litigants (debtors, tenants)• Evidence based dialogue essential

– Develop reform– Tame opponents

• Altering incentives key

Page 24: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

Judicial Reform: New Directions

• Greater emphasis on quantitative analysis -- focus on performance measurement

• Expanding scope to complementary institutions–Enforcement of court judgments–Effect of regulation on price and

quality of lawyer and notarial services

Page 25: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

Debt Contract Reforms

050

100150200250300350400450500

OECD EAP S A ECA SSA MENA LAC

Days to Enforce Contract

Page 26: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

Judicial Reform: Debt Collection

• Allow specialized collection agencies

• Verify creditors’ story (Mexico)• Permit cognovit notes or equivalent• Assure fast-track procedures/small

claims court function• Revise enforcement methods

Page 27: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

Regulatory Agencies

• Contracts between government and private firm

• Arose from need to renegotiate concessions for water, street car lines, and other utilities in 19th century

• Unlike other third-party mechanisms, regulator affiliated with one of the parties

• Hence need for devices to assure impartiality

Page 28: Session 3.1 Messick - Business Environment · Microsoft PowerPoint - Session 3.1 Messick.ppt Author: Jim Tanburn Created Date: 12/6/2005 22:52:23

• Analytical and Advisory– Review advertising, trademark, and

competition laws and those governing credit bureau establishment and operation

– Ensure party to ICSID and regional and bilateral treaties with dispute provisions

• Operations– Support credit bureaus, trade groups,

BBBs,and other certification agencies

Translating into Operations