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Security Infrastructure Panel: Implications for Network Engineering Dave Dittrich, U. Washington Gary Dobbins, Notre Dame Gerry Sneeringer, U. Md - College Park Jack Suess, U. Md. - Baltimore County

Security Infrastructure Panel: Implications for Network Engineering Dave Dittrich, U. Washington Gary Dobbins, Notre Dame Gerry Sneeringer, U. Md

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Page 1: Security Infrastructure Panel: Implications for Network Engineering  Dave Dittrich, U. Washington  Gary Dobbins, Notre Dame  Gerry Sneeringer, U. Md

Security Infrastructure Panel: Implications for Network Engineering

Dave Dittrich, U. Washington Gary Dobbins, Notre Dame Gerry Sneeringer, U. Md - College Park Jack Suess, U. Md. - Baltimore County

Page 2: Security Infrastructure Panel: Implications for Network Engineering  Dave Dittrich, U. Washington  Gary Dobbins, Notre Dame  Gerry Sneeringer, U. Md

Institutional Differences

Big difference in size Big difference in complexity Big difference in degree of centralization Less difference in staffing

Page 3: Security Infrastructure Panel: Implications for Network Engineering  Dave Dittrich, U. Washington  Gary Dobbins, Notre Dame  Gerry Sneeringer, U. Md

Security Concerns

Securing Windows, DoS attacks - wash User practices, policy formation, policy

adherence, vendor products, and security products that scale - ND

Access controls/IDS at Gigabit speed, coordinating decentralized admins, Resnet - UMCP

Increasing security requirements (HIPAA/GLB), disaster recovery and contingency planning, host security - UMBC

Page 4: Security Infrastructure Panel: Implications for Network Engineering  Dave Dittrich, U. Washington  Gary Dobbins, Notre Dame  Gerry Sneeringer, U. Md

Border Security

All but UW use ACL’s, UW is open UMBC implementing border firewalls ND and UMCP are researching firewall

Is there value in border firewalls?

Page 5: Security Infrastructure Panel: Implications for Network Engineering  Dave Dittrich, U. Washington  Gary Dobbins, Notre Dame  Gerry Sneeringer, U. Md

Interior Network Security

Interior firewall for sensitive areas UW uses logical firewall Snort IDS used by all but UW Security VLAN’s being implemented by UMBC VPN available by all

Should security model be 1-size fits all?Who is responsible for interior security?

Page 6: Security Infrastructure Panel: Implications for Network Engineering  Dave Dittrich, U. Washington  Gary Dobbins, Notre Dame  Gerry Sneeringer, U. Md

Wireless Security

All run open wireless networks All encourage VPN UW prototyping UW-only UMCP implementing Veneer UMBC moving to limit unauth wireless

How are campuses architecting wireless?Is authentication critical?

Page 7: Security Infrastructure Panel: Implications for Network Engineering  Dave Dittrich, U. Washington  Gary Dobbins, Notre Dame  Gerry Sneeringer, U. Md

Host Application Security

Cooperation among security, networks, and sysadmins is critical

Host firewalls being used by all All encourage encryption to varying degrees Virus scanning is done to some degree by all

How do you get cooperation among groups?How do you encourage encryption?How do you encourage Host firewalls?

Page 8: Security Infrastructure Panel: Implications for Network Engineering  Dave Dittrich, U. Washington  Gary Dobbins, Notre Dame  Gerry Sneeringer, U. Md

Recent Security Problem and Cause

Discuss a recent or upcoming security problem Windows - poor user passwords SQL Slammer Hacks for spamming, students paid to spam Sendmail buffer overflow

Does security staff handle RIAA or Spam complaints?

How is policy developed?

Page 9: Security Infrastructure Panel: Implications for Network Engineering  Dave Dittrich, U. Washington  Gary Dobbins, Notre Dame  Gerry Sneeringer, U. Md

Questions and URL’s

Campus Security URL’s www.washington.edu/itsecurity Itsecurity.umd.edu www.nd.edu/~ndoit/virusalert www.umbc.edu/oit/security

QUESTIONS???