Stockholm University

Institute of Political Science

C paper

Teacher: Bertil Nygren

Securitization or Politicization

of the Movement System

Analysis of the Ugandan presidential election 1996

and the 2000 referendum

Fredric Stany 700426

ii

ABSTRACT

Securitization or Politicization of the Movement System: Analysis of the Ugandan

presidential election 1996 and the 2000 referendum

Fredric Stany

The Movement system in Uganda – a “no-party democracy” - was supported by 90 percent of

the voters in the June 2000 referendum on political systems, although the opposition did

encourage many people to boycott the referendum. The purpose of this paper is to find out

whether securitization of the Movement system – in the eyes of a particular audience - has

occurred or not during the presidential election 1996 and the 2000 referendum. The empirical

objective of this paper is to generate knowledge about securitization as a phenomenon in

Ugandan politics.

The results indicate that president Yoweri Museveni and his leadership within the Movement

have been designated existential threats through statements related to security differently

constructed depending on the targeted audience. The signs of acceptance of these stated

conditions and realities are few among the enlightened and educated people. But it seems as

an understanding is that there exists no connection between the introduction of a multiparty

system and the achievement of reconciliation - a political logic repeatedly emphasized

through the speech acts of president Museveni. Among the non-enlightened people, where

security more or less seem to be the one and only political issue, the logics seems to have

been generally accepted by the audience. In this sense, a securitization of the Movement

system has occurred in the eyes of these people. In addition, the forced passing of a new

referendum act in only three hours just a month before the 2000 referendum can be seen as

Museveni breaking free from constitutional procedures – a measure that seems to have failed

to gain public support and could instead have contributed to the boycotting of the referendum.

Key words: Securitization, No-party democracy, Movement system, Multiparty system,

Museveni, political language.

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ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................. II

BACKGROUND....................................................................................................................... 1

RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................................................................................. 2

PURPOSE.................................................................................................................................. 2 RESEARCH QUESTION.............................................................................................................. 2 OPERATIONALISATION ............................................................................................................ 3 REAL WORLD IMPORTANCE AND CONTRIBUTION TO SCHOLARLY LITERATURE........................ 4 THEORY CONNECTION............................................................................................................. 5 RESEARCHER STANDPOINT......................................................................................................6 METHODS, RESEARCH DATA AND DEMARCATIONS................................................................. 7

Discourse Analysis............................................................................................................. 7 Reflective interviews........................................................................................................... 8

ANALYTICAL DESIGN....................................................................................................... 10

OBOTEPHOBIA....................................................................................................................... 10 (NATIONAL ) UNITY ............................................................................................................... 12

ANALYSIS.............................................................................................................................. 13

HOW (BY WHICH SPEECH ACTS) AND BY WHOM (THE SECURITIZING ACTOR) HAS THE

EXISTENTIAL THREAT BEEN DESIGNATED?............................................................................. 13 Democratic Party leader is bringing back Milton Obote ................................................ 13 …and organizing death squads........................................................................................ 15 Multipartyism behind past atrocities................................................................................ 16 A vote for Ssemogerere and multipartyism means increased sectarianism..................... 17

WHICH ARE THE PROCEDURES OR RULES THE SECURITIZING ACTOR MAY HAVE MANAGED TO

BREAK FREE FROM AND WHICH HE OR SHE OTHERWISE WOULD BE BOUND TO? ..................... 20 WHICH ARE THE SIGNS OF ACCEPTANCE BY THE PEOPLE?...................................................... 22

Polls and election results................................................................................................. 23 The fear of multipartyism................................................................................................. 24 Manipulation of the rural based and non-enlightened people......................................... 25 The importance of reconciliation and security................................................................ 26 Sectarianism..................................................................................................................... 28

CONCLUSIONS..................................................................................................................... 29

LIST OF REFERENCES ...................................................................................................... 32

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BACKGROUND

The political system in Uganda - often named as a “no-party democracy” by president Yoweri

Museveni – was supported by 90 percent of the voters in the June 2000 referendum. President

Museveni’s statement that political party activities support conflicts between ethnical groups,

is conflicting with the vision of the endogenous democratization progress in the country.

Instead, his vision is that all citizens should work together united within the same political

movement - the Movement system.1 The significance of public acceptance of these statements

can be questioned; the political opposition did encourage the people to boycott the

referendum, and only 50 percent of the voters did participate.2

Since 1986 independent political parties have been prohibited to exercise political activities.3

The Ugandan government often responds to criticism of the Movement system by arguing that

such criticism is insensitive to the Ugandan context, and a form of western imperialism.4 The

movement presides over what it calls a "No-Party" system - later renamed as the Movement

system - (but which is virtually indistinguishable from a state-funded political party) and has

consolidated its monopoly on the political power through an exclusive access to state funding

and political education programs, as well as an exemption from the stringent constraints

placed upon the opposition political parties.5

One goal with the “movementocracy” may have been to reduce identity-based tensions, and

the Movement did insist that political parties in Uganda have undermined rather than

furthered or defended democracy, and that multipartyism is not the only, nor the best form of

democracy for Uganda. It has been repeatedly emphasized that election times for parties are

1 Utrikespolitiska Institutet. Landguiden, Uganda. http://www.landguiden.se/. Printed 23/1-05. 2 Utrikespolitiska institutet. 3 Up until just recently. 4 Human Rights Watch. Hostile to democracy. http://hrw.org/reports/1999/uganda/Uganweb-05.htm#P505_67990. Printed 24/2-05. 5 Human Rights Watch. World Report 1999. “Uganda Silences Political Parties With Harassment and Oppressive Laws” by Peter Bouckaert, Uganda Researcher for the Africa Division. http://www.hrw.org/press/1999/oct/ug1012.htm. Printed 24/2-05.

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not a time to educate and unite the people along “national” lines, but another opportunity to

divide them along “sectarian” lines.6

When speaking of security politics, fear can be seen as a precondition for the existence of a

society. Peoples´ fear and their need of belonging, the need of security and freedom from

experienced threats makes a society possible.7 Hence, this insight may lead to an intentional

move taken by a political leader to securitize a political system in order to guarantee

hegemonic power.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to find out whether securitization of the Movement system in

Uganda has occurred or not.

The explanation model is intentionalistic8: President Museveni has securitized the Movement

system, by the designation of an existential threat – an increase of sectarianism and conflicts

between tribal, ethnical and religious groups – with the intention to legitimize a continuous

ban on multiparty democracy (and thereby a cancellation of the endogenous progress of

democratization) to ensure hegemonic power.

Research Question

The explanation model leads us to the following research questions:

- How has the Movement system been successfully securitized in Uganda?

6 The Movement political philosophy rests on the position that Uganda’s political culture is not particularly conducive to a Western-style democratic system built around political parties and periodic elections contested by candidates sponsored by the parties. What is needed is said to be a social movement that is able to champion the task of mobilizing the people to be part and parcel of decision-making at the various levels where their livelihood is affected. The task of educating the populace generally and politically, of promoting national integration, and building a national civic identity/culture are important goals which such a movement should spearhead. See discussions in Olukoshi, Adebayo O. The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa. Elanders Gotab, Stockholm, Sweden. 1998:180-181. 7 See also discussions in Eriksson, Johan (red.); Utrikespolitiska Institutet, säkerhetspolitiska rådet, Hotbildernas politik, Elanders Gotab AB, Stockholm 2001:ii (Förord). 8 The intentionalistic explanation model is discussed in: Rosing, Hans. Vetenskapens logiska grunder (Elfte upplagan). Lovisa Östra Nylands tryckeri AB. 2002:159-162.

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o How (by which speech acts) and by whom (the securitizing actor) has the

existential threat been designated?

o Which are the procedures or rules the securitizing actor may have managed to

break free from and which he or she otherwise would be bound to?

o Which are the signs of acceptance by the people?

Operationalisation

The distinction between Politicization and securitization is such that while the former are

issues widely recognised as forming part of the political agenda9, the latter are issues being

presented as an existential threat and that are widely accepted as a security issue by the

relevant audience10.

As a starting-point, the securitization terminology is transformed into the conception used in

this paper, by using the definition by Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde:

“[T]he exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment

of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects. […] If by means

of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has

managed to break free from procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are

witnessing a case of securitization […] but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience

accepts it as such. […] Securitization is not fulfilled only by breaking rules nor solely by existential

threats but by cases of existential threats that legitimize the breaking of rules.”11

But the conception used in this paper is though developed by considering the approach

advocated by Charlotta Wagnsson, suggesting to focus on whether an issue is securitized in

the eyes of a particular audience – successfully or not.12 Further, Wagnsson suggests each

scholar to set her/his own criterion for when an issue is to be regarded as securitized, since the

criterion may depend on what audience, and what issue, the scholar focuses upon.13 Finally,

and again following Wagnsson´s more dynamic approach of the securitization theory:

9 Wagnsson, Charlotte. Russian Political Language and Public Opinion on the West, NATO and Chechnya - Securitisation Theory Reconsidered. Akademitryck, Edsbruk. 2000:32. 10 Wagnsson, 2000:32. 11 The definition of a “successful” securitization by Buzan, Barry; Weaver, Ole; de Wilde, Jaap. A New Framework For Analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado. 1998:25. 12 Wagnsson, 2000:18. 13 Ibid:19.

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"[S]eemingly securitized issues do not always result in emergency measures and violent deeds. Even if

the securitizing actor reach securitization, for example in relation to the general public, they have not

necessarily managed to legitimize the use of emergency measures."14

As a result, this paper is mainly focusing on the designation of an existential threat and the

acceptance of the people. The third research question - the breaking free from procedures and

rules – serves as a complement to the first two questions in order to give more strength to the

discussion, rather that being a determining factor, on whether securitization has occurred or

not.

Real world importance and contribution to scholarly literature

Are these questions of importance in the real world?15

The democratization process in Uganda has attracted much attention by governments as well

as NGOs. The issue has been highlighted in several reports by the Human Rights Watch16 and

Amnesty International17. The Swedish government has increased its cooperation with Uganda

in accordance with the progress of democratization in the country.18 Whereas some argue that

the excessive focus on multiparty/competitive elections in the current African democratic

practice and discourse is both too narrow and limiting, others take the view that the acid test

of Africa’s democratic transition lies in the way succession politics is conducted as evidenced

by the manner in which future elections are handled and victory and defeat managed.19

The empirical objective of this paper is to generate knowledge about securitization as a

phenomenon in Ugandan politics, or more specifically: knowledge about how the political

language used in two election campaigns – the presidential election 1996 and the referendum

in 2000 – have designated an existential threat which may have legitimized the violations of

political rights through gaining significant public acceptance. By using the securitization

approach in security studies the paper will also detect strengths and weaknesses related to the

defined criteria (see Theory connection section below). Thus, this research project may

14 Ibid:28. 15 A research question should be consequential for political, social, or economic life, for understanding something that significantly affect many people’s lives, according to King, Gary & Keohane, Robert O. & Verba, Sidney. Designing Social Inquiry. Princeton University Press, New Jersey. 1994:15. 16 Such as World Report 1999. 17 Such as Report 2002, Uganda.http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2002.nsf/afr/uganda!Open 18 Regeringskansliet. http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2575/a/13899. Printed 8/1-05. 19 See discussions in Olukoshi, Adebayo O. The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa. Elanders Gotab, Stockholm, Sweden. 1998:10.

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contribute to scholarly literature20 in two significant ways: First, by providing the theories of

securitization with a relevant African case study that, with its uniqueness, can bring new

insights to the security subject and which may result in new, extended research projects within

this framework of security analysis. The second contribution may be seen as a validation or

test of the usefulness of the methods and techniques related to the securitization theory (see

Method section below).

Theory connection

The theory on securitization, developed by the Copenhagen School, describes it as an extreme

version of “politicization”, since it may motivate acts such as human rights violations.21 By

using the above definition by Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, a successful securitization is

dependent on the legitimacy of committing such acts as a result of the acceptance of these

violations by a significant public. Securitization theory is the authors´ answer to, or solution

to, the traditionalists´ criticism on “wideners” approach to security studies22 - a criticism that

consisted of the undesirable and uncontrolled “spill over” of the broader range of security

issues into other sectors and the elevation of security into a desired condition - and it

combines both the state-centered traditional and the wideners’ views on security studies.23

But, as Charlotte Wagnsson put it, the Copenhagen School lacks in clarifying the criteria that

should be met for an issue to be regarded as successfully securitized; the acceptance of a

“significant” audience.24 She also criticizes the permanent categorization of actors and of the

audience suggested by the Copenhagen School and suggests that each scholar sets her/his own

criterion for when deciding on an issue as securitized. Wagnsson´s proposal on detaching the

sector approach is also adopted in this paper, and thereby avoiding the risk of impeding from

discerning security statements that do not fit into any of the sectors identified by the

Copenhagen School.25

20 ”Making a contribution” means ”[…] locating a research design within the framework of the existing social scientific literature” and that the investigator understand the “state of the art” so that duplicating will not occur, according to King, Keohane & Verba. 1994:16. 21 Wagnsson, 2000:1. 22 Buzan, Weaver, de Wilde. 1998:2: The “wide” versus “narrow” debate grew out of dissatisfaction with the intense narrowing of the field of security studies imposed by the military and nuclear obsessions of the Cold War. 23 Buzan, Weaver, de Wilde. 1998:1-5. 24 Wagnsson. 2000:18. 25 Ibid. 2000:26.

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By using the approach and definitions suggested by Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde as the

framework when designing this research project, and by considering the dynamics of the

political context unique for the topic of this paper, based on the reconsiderations of

securitization theory by Wagnsson, hence the theory foundation is defined. The important

acceptance criteria will thus be continuously developed and finally defined parallel to the

collection, analysis and interpretation of the research data.

Researcher standpoint

My epistemological position has both realist and interpretist elements (which is in analogy

with Chris Hays´ and David Marsh’s position26), i.e. there may be “real” processes “out

there”, but the political actions and outcomes are affected by how these phenomena is

designated or mediated by the discursive construction. This epistemological position makes it

possible to investigate – by using discourse analysis as the method - if and how a securitizing

actor has securitized the Movement system, by the designation of an existential threat with the

intention to legitimize a continuous ban on multiparty democracy. The “real” processes of, for

instance, democratization may thus be interpreted by the securitizing actor and the public in

similar or in different ways, but the speech acts, as part of the construction of the discourse,

will, in turn, be interpreted by the people (voters). This may affect the outcomes in the

election and referendum, but may also – depending on the significance of the acceptance -

legitimize the violations of political rights. In line with the argument by Wæver, I understand

security as not being something "out there" with an objective existence and a priori ontology,

something that one should strive to acquire as much of as one possibly can. On the contrary,

security is an act that comes into play by the very utterance of the word security.27

My position regarding the “structure-agency” question28 is dialectical. This approach means

that individuals are affected, but not limited, by the structures of the society. But the stronger

the structure, the lesser room for individuals to act independently; i.e. the essence of this

paper is the investigation of the dynamics of how well the speech acts as part of a discourse

26 Marsh, David & Stoker, Gerry. Theory and Methods in Political Science, Second edition. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 2002:35. 27 Jaeger, Oyvind, Securitizing Russia: Discursive Practices of the Baltic States, http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/Jaeger72PCS.htm 28 Marsh, Stoker. 2002:271: The structure-agency question is debated to be the most important theoretical issue within the human sciences. The issue concerns the ability to shape our destiny (agency) as against the degree our destiny is determined by external forces (structure).

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(structure) may result in the individuals’ (agencies’) acceptance of the violations of political

rights.

Methods, Research data and Demarcations

This longitudinal case study29 consists of the analysis of two events: The Uganda presidential

election 1996 and the referendum on the political system held in year 2000. In Article 69 in

the 1995 Constitution, it is provided that the people of Uganda have the right to choose and

adopt a political system of their choice through free and fair elections or referenda. More

specifically, in Article 271 (3) it was provided that during the last month of the fourth year of

the term of the first parliament elected under this constitution, a referendum would be held to

determine the political system the people of Uganda wish to adopt.30 The research methods to

be used will be both discourse analysis and reflective interviews. The reason to combine these

two is to obtain a deepened understanding of the public acceptance and its significance, and

hence to enable the distinction between securitization and politicization.

Discourse Analysis

The discourse analysis material will be limited to include primary and secondary sources of

documentation related to daily newspapers, parliamentary debates (official reports,

“hansards”) and campaigns before the presidential election 1996 and the referendum in 2000.

The focus on discourses in debates and policy statements means that the primary documents

will consist of official reports of the Parliament of Uganda from after the announcement of the

start of the election campaigns (i.e. that is around one month before the events).31 In case of

the 2000 referendum, can be found on the Parliament website.32

29 A time-ordered analysis. Jensen, Jason L., Rodgers, Robert. Public Administration Review. “Cumulating the Intellectual Gold of Case Study Research”. Vol 61, No.2, March/April 2001:238. 30 Sabiti-Makara, Tukahebwa Geoffrey B., Byarugaba Foster E. Voting For Democracy in Uganda - Issues in Recent Elections. LDC Publishers, Kampala, Uganda. 2003:255. 31 Presidential candidates were not allowed to address public rallies before the official opening of campaigns. Official campaigns started immediately after the nominations on 27 March 1996, while the polling day was scheduled for 9 May 1996. The official campaigns lasted only 39 days. This means that each candidate only had a single day to campaign in the entire district since there were 39 districts in the country then. Moreover, Museveni took advantage of incumbency to campaign while other candidates were not allowed before the official opening of campaigns. Museveni had reached every county in the country on a crusade that he termed “poverty alleviation campaign”. Sabiti-Makara, Tukahebwa Geoffrey B., Byarugaba Foster E. Voting For Democracy in Uganda - Issues in Recent Elections. LDC Publishers, Kampala, Uganda. 2003:43. 32 http://www.parliament.go.ug/hansard/hans_browse.jsp, Reports between 1995 and 1998 are not available on this site, nor at the Parliament library or the Centre For Basic Research (CBR) library.

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Official reports regarding the 1996 election has been collected on site in Kampala, with help

from the Centre of Basic Research (CBR) and the Makerere University. Secondary documents

will mainly consist of the relevant daily newspapers - The New Vision and The Monitor. The

choice of these two can be explained by the objective to avoid twisted interpretations since

there were significant differences regarding the news coverage on the Movement and on the

Boycotting political parties during the referendum.33

The aim of discourse analysis is to expose and explain the role of discourses and how they

contribute to political processes – here, securitization. Thus, the designation and association

of an existential threat of multipartyism and the justifications for the Movement system in

Uganda can be investigated by applying the discourse analysis in the study of the topic

securitization. There are two important, and interconnected, arguments behind the use of the

method here. The first is that discourse is to be seen as a result of hegemonic speeches aiming

to establish a political as well as a moral-intellectual leadership in society. The second

argument is that such speeches always do involve the construction of social antagonisms by

positing a threatening outside through the exclusion of social identities.34

By explaining and clarifying the analyzing tool and the procedures carefully (see Analytical

Design section below) the reliability (or intersubjectivity) will increase.35 When making

inferences (drawing conclusions), the problems with generalization when using case study

research can be reduced by studying two events – i.e. the 1996 election and the 2000

referendum - and to increase the amount of observations36. Additionally, by studying two

events a comparison over time can be made.

Reflective interviews

The reflective interviews are theme based, in order to obtain the combination of freedom and

control in the interviews. By using the Thomsson model, the key was to interpret, understand

and reflect upon the respondent stories and thus being able to ask follow-up questions during

33 The New Vision carried almost three times more coverage of the Boycotting political parties than about the Movement; while The Monitor did the opposite. Coverage by both papers of the Multiparty is about equal. Africa Action. Africa Policy E-Journal, Referendum 2000, NGO Monitoring Cluster. http://www.africaaction.org/docs00/ugan0004.htm. Printed 28/2-05. 34 Those arguments goes well in line with the Laclau and Mouffe (Anglo Saxon School) strand of discourse analysis. See Torfing, Jacob, New Theories of Discourse, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999. 35 Burnham, Peter, Gilland, Karin, Grant, Wyn & Layton-Henry, Zig. Research Methods in Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 2004:260. 36 The ”crucial maxim” according to King, Keohane, Verba. 1994:47.

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the interviews.37 The sampling technique used was the snowball method38. By asking the staff

at the Centre of Basic Research and at the Makerere University in Kampala to name

individuals, then out of these a more suitable choice of respondents was made.39 Each

interview loop was ended by transcribing the tapes and coding in accordance with the

overaching themes, see below the Analytical Design section. The amount of respondents were

limited to 4, because of reasons related to time. Furthermore, the respondents were found in

different electoral districts: Kampala, Jinja, Bweyongerere and Mukono. Thus, all districts are

from the Southern parts of Uganda, which may have affected the results. Finding respondents

throughout the country and in the rural areas40 would have required interpreters which in turn

would have made the reflective interviews hard to accomplish.

Five different interview themes were used during the interviews: voting, democracy, freedom,

rights and identity. The idea behind the identification of the interview themes has been to

avoid direct questions related to security, or the overaching themes discussed below, and

thereby enable an unbiased inquiry of the respondents associations related to the political

logic in question, see section below. Still, with these five themes, connections can be made to

the election and the referendum. Thus, this approach allows room to interpret, understand and

reflect upon the respondent stories - the very key of reflective interviews.

In order to increase validity in qualitative interviews, a critical view by controlling (try to

obstruct a twisted interpretation), to question (“what” and “why” to be answered before the

question of “how”) and to theorize (to decide whether a method investigates what it should be

investigating, a theoretical idea of what is investigated is required) was adopted.41

Under the analysis section of this paper, references are indicated only as “#1-4” together with

the name of the district/city of the residence of the respondent, and the date of the interview.

This is in order to protect and to guarantee the security and integrity of the respondents. Only

with the purpose to check the validity and reliability of the results in this paper, the

transcribed material can be presented – but not copied - upon request and with the permission

of the author.

37 Thomsson, Heléne. Reflexiva intervjuer. Studentlitteratur, Lund. 2002:59. 38 The problem may be when to stop; the ”snowball” gets larger and larger. Burnham, etc. 2004:207. 39 How to find respondents is discussed in Thomsson. 2002:63. 40 The level of acceptance of political measures may be significantly different among people in the true rural areas of Uganda compared to people in urban areas. 41 Kvale, Steinar. Den kvalitativa forskningsintervjun. Studentlitteratur, Lund. 1997:218-221.

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ANALYTICAL DESIGN

With the purpose of structuring the analysis, the identification of an analytical tool to capture

and organize most of the language in question is of significance. The initial, exploratory

reading of president Museveni´s (and his top leadership within the Movement/NRM) speeches

before the presidential election 1996 and the 2000 referendum, indicate that a major part of

the statements related to security could be arranged within two overaching themes, linked to

the violent past in Uganda: One which can be described as “Obotephobia” – referring to fears

of the previous president Milton Obote - and a second related to (national) unity. The

distinction is purely analytical, but might clarify what kind of political logic is at work in

situations related to these elections.

These overaching themes constituted the "glasses" used during the continued reading of the

texts, but also as the "hearing aid" when performing the interviews. The latter contribute to a

deeper understanding on how the respondents associate this political logic on discussions

related to the five chosen interview themes, see section above. Before entering into the

analyzing section of this paper, the two overaching themes - Obotephobia and (national) unity

- requires a presentation in order to enhance the understanding of the Ugandan context,

although it is impossible to grasp its complete extent and complexity in this paper.

Obotephobia

The former Ugandan president, Milton Obote, who lives in exile in Zambia since the

overthrow of his second government in 1985, still played a relevant role in the political

discourse during the 1996 election and the 2000 referendum campaigns. The atrocities carried

out by the state against its population during Obote´s second regime (“Obote II”), 1980-1986,

is by many people seen as possibly the worst in Ugandan history.42 Obote is, for example,

held responsible by the Baganda – the people of the Buganda kingdom in the Southern

Uganda - for the killings in the “Luweero Triangle“.43 After the allegedly rigged elections in

1980, which brought Obote back to power, the army (again) was dominated by northern

42 See Hammargren, Henrik; Muhereza, Frank; Ottosson, Åse; Ssenkumba, John. Peace, Democracy and Human Rights in Uganda - a string of fragile pearls. A draft report for Sida, June 1999:2. 43 Luweero was for long a part of Buganda Kingdom and is also widely regarded as the centre of Uganda’s liberation struggle of the early 1980s. See also Sabiti-Makara, Tukahebwa Geoffrey B., Byarugaba Foster E. Voting For Democracy in Uganda - Issues in Recent Elections. LDC Publishers, Kampala, Uganda. 2003:189.

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Uganda nationalities and, supported by the political leaders, an exercise of genocide started in

the districts of Arua and Moyo and thousands of people ran into exile. 44

At that time, Uganda had a multiparty political system but the opposition parties were

allegedly preoccupied with seeking and protecting their own private positions and privileges

that they could not be counted on to defend the population effectively against state terror. The

crisis during this particular period centered on broad questions of democracy such as the

imbalance in the social composition of military organs, but also the ineptitude on the part of

the politico-military leadership.45 Thus, in this case, although there were no evidences of a

constitutional state governed by law, the appearance of a multiparty democracy was not

enough to bring peace to the Ugandan people and that experience may have affected the

Ugandans in their approach to multipartyism today, and in the future.46

Also worth to mention when discussing the impact on large parts of the Ugandan people when

using the name of the former president Obote in the political language is the “unitary”

constitution introduced during Obote´s first government twenty years earlier. The constitution

abrogated all of Buganda´s federal powers - the largest single ethnic group in Uganda, and

still the most central and influential in national politics - after that the government used its

armed forces against the kingdom in the Southern Uganda. This can be seen as another case of

ethnic contradictions, but also as a situation were a constituted multiparty democracy may

have been expected to prevent the undemocratic measures taken by the government.47

The word “Obotephobia”, as used here, thus reflects people’s fear of chaos, state terror, an

uncontrolled army and a regime unable to protect the Ugandan people, or groups of people,

from atrocities – even under a constituted multiparty democracy.

44 On the question of why Uganda has been politically unstable since 1966, there are interpretations of the root-cause which are based on political personalities especially of Obote and the former president Idi Amin, the nature and training of the Army, the external factors of destabilization, religious-political groupings, racial and developmental differences between north and south, and the political ignorance of the masses. See Hansen, Holger Bernt, Twaddle, Michael. Religion & Politics in East Africa. Fountain Publishers, Kampala, Uganda. 1995:106, 115. 45 See Makubuya, E. Khiddu; Mwaka, V.M.; Okoth, P.G. Uganda: Thirty Years of Independence 1962-1992. Makerere University Printery, Kampala, Uganda. 1994:151. 46 See also discussions in Olukoshi, Adebayo O. The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa. Elanders Gotab, Stockholm, Sweden. 1998:182. 47 See also discussions in Mamdani, Mahmood. Politics and Class Formation in Uganda. (First Printing.) Monthly Review Press, New York.1976:245-246.

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(National) Unity

Allegedly, the main causes of division in Uganda stem from tribal, ethnic and religious

rivalries and Uganda is by some scholars considered as being among the most severely

divided societies.48 Even though the problem of ethnic rivalries began way back during the

pre-colonial era, colonialism arguably intensified the tensions between Uganda kingdoms and

added another dimension of religious conflicts – between Catholics and Protestants.49 The

antagonisms between South – privileged by colonial rule in terms of political and economic

influence as well as development in physical and social infrastructure - and the largely left

undeveloped and uneducated North, and between religiously aligned political parties50 were

violently exploited by the rulers and competing elites in the post-colonial period – and thus

during the rule under multipartyism.51 Expulsions of non-nationals, with the aim of fighting

class struggles, are also evident in the Ugandan history, both during the Obote regime

(Kenyan workers) and the Idi Amin era (Asian bourgeoisie).52

Another phenomenon affecting the national unity of Ugandans is that the country did not

emerge after independence with one ruling petty bourgeoisie, a section of it controlling the

state power. Instead, two separate petty bourgeoisies came forth - one Buganda and one non-

Buganda – with the kulaks at the core of the former and the governing bureaucracy at the core

of the latter.53 This fact constitutes one of the features of the African democracy discourse -

48 In pre-colonial times, thirty different ethnic groups inhabited the area which later was designed and named Uganda by the colonialists. 49 See Halsteen, Ulrik, Human Rights in a Ugandan context – A discussion of liberal human rights and Ugandan political discourse in the 1990s, Roskilde University, 2000:43. 50 Catholics (44 percent of the population) are traditional allies of the Democratic Party, DP, and the Church of Uganda (Anglican, 39 percent of the population) allies of the Uganda People’s Congress, UPC, and the churches have in this respect been a dividing force. But in some areas the churches however do join hands, as in the Joint Christian Council where the Roman Catholics, the Church of Uganda and the orthodox church come together. Hammargren, Muhereza, Ottosson, Ssenkumba, 1999:20. 51 One explosive political problem that the post colonial government handled constitutionally was the long-standing dispute between the Bunyoro and Buganda kingdoms over the “lost counties” issue - tracts of land that belonged to Bunyoro before the onset of colonialism, but which were given to Buganda for assisting the British to defeat Bunyoro. This “democratic” solution of the problem provoked more antagonism between Buganda and Bunyoro. See discussions in Sahli, M.A. Mohamed & Markakis, John. Ethnicity and the State in Eastern Africa. Elanders Gotab, Stockholm. 1998:182-183. 52 See Mamdani, Mahmood. Politics and Class Formation in Uganda. (First Printing.) Monthly Review Press, New York.1976:316. 53 The formation of the petty bourgeoisie in Uganda included three distinct social groups: the kulaks in the agricultural sector, the traders in the commercial sector, and the bureaucrats within the state apparatus. Economically these social groups were unequally developed which gave rise to the most advanced section of the petty bourgeoisie, the kulaks, who were primarily situated in Buganda. See discussions in Mamdani, Mahmood. Politics and Class Formation in Uganda. (First Printing.) Monthly Review Press, New York.1976:228-229.

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the basic African social structure, which, it has been argued in some quarters, does not

embody the social forces that are compatible with (western) democratic forms of rule.54

Thus, the word (national) unity, reflects the extensive need of an end to the violence related to

sectarianism in Uganda - a frequent phenomenon in the history of the country, during times of

a multiparty political system as well as during colonialism and one-party rule. Speeches

involving these two overaching themes of Obotephobia and (national) unity - constituting the

existential threats - can thus be seen as articulations that strongly may contribute to the

construction of incentives used to legitimize the existence of the Movement system.

ANALYSIS

How (by which speech acts) and by whom (the securitizing actor) has the existential

threat been designated?

Democratic Party leader is bringing back Milton Obote

The organization of the pro-multiparty Inter-Political Forces Cooperation (IPFC) - a political

allied force during the 1996 presidential election campaigns - grouped the old rivals

Democratic Party (DP) and Milton Obote´s Uganda People’s Congress (UPC). Since the DP

leader Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere – the main challenger of the president title and maybe the

keenest advocate for multipartyism - was picked as the IPFC candidate, president Yoweri

Museveni started saying “[…] the IPFC was a ploy to return Obote to power”.55 The pro-

Museveni camp’s publication Naked Truth two weeks earlier publicized details of allegedly

Obote-written speeches which the DP candidate Paul Ssemogerere was supposed to read at his

rallies, and there were tens of pamphlets in the Luganda language56 with photos of Milton

Obote meeting Ssemogerere as leader of the Opposition in Obote II regime.57

Museveni continues using the theme of candidate Ssemogerere to bring back old leaders

during the campaigns. On a campaign rally at Ntwetwe sub-county in Kiboga district, the

54 One perspective, focusing on the social classes, suggests that the low level of capitalist development that is the lot of virtually all African countries, and the associated absence of strong social classes, including especially the problems posed by a weak but avaricious bourgeoisie which is based on the state. See Olukoshi, Adebayo O. The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa. Elanders Gotab, Stockholm, Sweden. 1998:176. 55 The Monitor, Museveni “killed” Ssemogerere with Obote in Buganda, May 6, 1996. 56 Luganda is spoken by Baganda, the people of Buganda kingdom. 57 The Monitor, The secret dirty campaign that doesn’t happen at rallies, April 24, 1996.

14

western neighbor of Luweero district, he displayed a copy of the newspaper New Vision,

which had said: “Ssemogerere to bring Obote back”, after Ssemogerere earlier told he would

invite back former president, and told the rally that Ssemogerere would “[…] invite back Idi

Amin as well”. Museveni continued saying “[…] returning Obote could lead Uganda into

political turmoil” and that “Obote committed numerous crimes and when we [the Movement]

granted amnesty we were discriminative”.58

These cases are examples of where people of Buganda and Kiboga districts are the targeted

audience. Showing photos of Obote seem to have one obvious reason: to demonstrate that a

vote for IPFC, and multiparty democracy, means new atrocities (such as in Luweero). By

using names such as the former president Idi Amin creates a charged audience, not at least in

areas such as the Kiboga district since Amin´s Uganda is regarded as an era of “Nubi rule” -

with its defining characteristics of Islam and Arabic language - Museveni direct his

designations of existential threats to a broader audience and also brings the element of

religion into the political discourse.59 These two different speeches also reflect a seemingly

well thought out construction of the articulations, depending on the targeted audience, with

the aim of designating an existential threat.

One element in president Museveni´s language is the repeated statements on the (older)

candidate Ssememogerere incapability of running the country and as being a weak person.

Commenting the IPFC coalition, Museveni told rallies in Luweero and Mukono, that “[t]hey

are using Dr Ssemogerere as a soft, weak door which they will easily crash down to capture

power in the country”60. Referring to the horrible killings in the Luweero district during the

Obote II government in the 1980s, he continued saying: “A new enemy is coming. This

enemy used to be here but now is back in another color”.61 Museveni clarified that the leaders

of the past who used state machinery to kill Ugandans since 1966 to 198662, were now coming

back as “lizards”: “These were originally snakes but now are using Ssemogerere and are

coming back to destroy Uganda in a lizard’s skin”.63

58 The New Vision, Invite Amin back also – Museveni, April 4, 1996. 59 The Nubi sided with Obote before the Amin era. 60 The New Vision, ”Past killers only using Ssemogerere”, April 2, 1996. 61 Ibid. 62 During this period, Obote I, Idi Amin and Obote II governments were completely dominating. 63 Ibid.

15

The above examples reveal a pattern of the political language used by Museveni and his camp

during the presidential election campaigns in 1996: It continuously threatens the Ugandan

people of bringing the old leadership fashion back in power. Only ten years after the atrocities

carried through during the 1980s, why would they risk the stability gained during the recent

last years?

At a campaign rally at Nkumba, Mpigi district in the Buganda region, Museveni told that

multiparty advocates, led by candidate Ssemogerere, want to return Uganda People’s

Congress into power: “I was together with Ssemogerere in DP [and] when I used to tell them

Obote had taken away peace from Uganda, DP used to say let us pray to God. As UPC was

killing people, DP used to be a spectator. Now the same people want to return again”.64 In the

same district, Museveni told a rally that “[p]residents are supposed to be his Excellency, but

in the 1960s, 70s, and the 80s, it was these presidents who ordered people to go and kill others

extra judiciary. The state which was supposed to prevent crime promoted it instead”.65

…and organizing death squads

The Naked truth continued telling a story about members of IPFC “[…] organizing death

squads against non-Baganda landlords and pro-Museveni supporters […]”.66 Here, an

exclusion mechanism is used – “non-Baganda” - and may allude on the antagonisms between

the privileged South – to a large extent identified with the Buganda kingdom - and the

undeveloped North. A statement like this may reawaken the memories of past atrocities

among the people of the northern districts.

But the probably most evident designation of existential threat during the presidential

campaign was directed primarily to the people of Buganda and was manifested in April 29,

1996, by posters displayed with the text: “THINK. Don’t forget the past: Over one million

Ugandans, our brothers, sisters, family and friends lost their lives. Your vote could bring it

back: In 10 years under Museveni, peace and development has come to our country. Let ´s

keep it. VOTE MUSEVENI. Peace. Unity. Democracy. Modernization.”67 In the middle of

the advertisement, a big picture of the skulls of Luweero Triangle, was displayed.68

64 The New Vision, Museveni: Prayers won’t stop killings, April 6, 1996. 65 Sunday Vision, Museveni attacks football analogy, April 7, 1996. 66 The Monitor, The secret dirty campaign that doesn’t happen at rallies, April 24, 1996. 67 The poster was also a full side page in the New Vision, April 29, 1996, page 21. 68 The Monitor, Museveni”killed” Ssemogerere with Obote in Buganda, May 6, 1996.

16

One reflection is that the Obotephobia element in the political discourse seems to be primary

directed to the Baganda and the groups of people with a social relation to the victims of the

Obote II guerilla war during the 1980s, while speeches containing the national unity elements

seems to be more generally directed to Uganda excluding Buganda.

Multipartyism behind past atrocities

But how evident are the relation between the designations of existential threats and the

political system? According to Museveni himself, as saying before the 2000 referendum on

political system, the “real” referendum was in 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections

because that is when “[…] the historical struggle between the two ideas [multipartyism and

Movement] were put to Ugandans”.69 All presidential candidates, except Museveni, advocated

multipartyism, and if Museveni had lost the presidential election, consequently this would

have resulted in a shift of the political system as well, after the following parliamentary

elections. Actually, it is not a daring statement that the presidential election 1996 was all

about one single political question: No-party democracy or multiparty democracy – the NRM

(Movement) or the IPFC – Museveni or Ssemogerere.

In the “referendum debates” - continuously published in the New Vision before the

Referendum 2000 - the Movement National Referendum Committee states that: “While under

the multiparty system people used to be detained without trial, bodies turning up on the

roadside in the morning, insecurity of person and property, all these are now a distant

memory”.70 A connection between the killings during the Obote II regime and the political

system, multiparty, is made. Thus, a political, democratic system, are blamed of having

enabled political coalitions that have sanctioned these killings: “The lovers of democracy

gave full support to Amin, the consequences of which support we need not go into […]”71

The boycotting of the referendum by the DP and the UPC, i.e. the two major parties

promoting multipartyism, came to shape a large part of the political debate. Addressing a rally

at Kawempe three days before the referendum was held, Museveni said the multipartyists

“[…] are trying to usurp rights of citizens to choose” and that “[…] these leaders want to

69 The Monitor, Museveni says Referendum won in 1996, July 5, 2000. 70 The New Vision, The Movement government has transformed Uganda, (Referendum debate – Movement View, May 10, 2000. 71 The New Vision, NRM loves democracy, people too, May 31, 2000.

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plunge this country into darkness”. Again, Museveni brought the Obotephobia element into

his speech, by saying “[…] even in the 1980 election […] Obote rigged and usurped power”

and that “[…] Obote thought the army was all he needed to rule the country […] and

Ssemogerere also thinks he only needs DP (Democratic Party) to rule and has also failed”.72

The construction of a logical connection between multipartyism and the violent past,

seemingly rigorously planted into the 1996 presidential election campaigns, is still inherent in

the political discourse as shaped by the Movement and Museveni before the 2000 referendum.

When addressing a public rally at Lugogo, after having met the leaders of the Kampala

district, Museveni told the rally why the Movement is a stable political force able to steer

Uganda into the future: “Obote and Amin thought they could cook using only one stone to

balance the pot and failed […] We are using five stones”, and he named the five stones as the

people, local councils, the army, the economy and foreign friends.73 The designation of an

existential threat by an explicit cause-effect connection between multipartyism and anarchy

was not only present in the speech acts, but also in the free copy campaign folders distributed

before the referendum. “Multipartyism has never done Uganda good. It has been the cause of

the turmoil that has taken the country backwards.”74

A vote for Ssemogerere and multipartyism means increased sectarianism

In a speech during the referendum campaign, president Museveni warned the residents of

Tororo that not to forget 1966 when Milton Obote misplaced the key of freedom by using the

army to overthrow the constitution and that “[i]it’s the Movement which looked for the

misplaced key and brought it back to you” and that “[…] Ssesemogerere could plunge the

country into total chaos if entrusted with leadership”.75

An important journalist supporting the Museveni camp during the 1996 presidential election,

the New Vision special correspondent, writes that “[w]e [the country led by the Movement

government] have made great strides from ethnic and religious based politics to patriotic and

all-embracing politics” and that “[i]t is now a question of either returning to the old politics or

endorsing the new politics of uniting all Ugandans”.76 At a massive campaign rally of about

72 The New Vision, Museveni attacks partyists, June 26, 2000. 73 The New Vision, Movement stable, says Museveni, June 23, 2000. 74 The Monitor, Referendum 2000, Choosing a political system for Uganda – Where are we now?, May 2, 2000. 75 The New Vision, “UPC, DP messed up Uganda’s politics”, June 12, 2000. 76 The New Vision, Why Museveni will win, April 22, 1996.

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20.000 in Gulu77, Museveni said that “[t]he fact that atrocious killers like Joseph Kony are

intimidating the Acholi people to vote for Ssemogerere means the country’s new political

process has brought all thugs of the past and present together” and continued saying “[…]

since they have decided to help us by isolating themselves as one gang, let us beat them on

May 9 […]”.78

By a continued use of a language, seemingly aimed to threaten of religious fragmentation,

Museveni addressed a rally at Boma grounds in Mbara municipality that “[c]andidate

Mayanja Kibirige would introduce sharia law in Uganda if elected president […]”, a claim

that was dismissed by the candidate.79

The (national) unity element is significantly present also in the 2000 referendum debate when

the Movement side claims “[i]n the past, under multipartyism, political party differences

could not bring together a UPC member and a DP supporter in one village […]”80. Later, the

Movement Referendum Committee states that each sides of the parties in a local council

“[w]ould oppose the other for the sake of opposition, hence harmony and unity would be

stifled”81 and that “[…] there is no way a person can be expelled from the Movement like

parties expel members […] This is what is meant by the Movement being all-inclusive and

non-partisan”82.

The last statement may bring the thoughts of the Ugandans to the expulsions of Kenyan

workers and Asian bourgeoisie during the Obote and Amin era of multipartyism. Referring to

the implementation of the Local Councils (LC)83 - the corner stone of the Movement

decentralization process in the country - “[t]here are Federalists, Multipartyists,

Movementists, Protestants, Muslims and Catholics and so on in one council. As a result, there

is political harmony and unity in the villages. There is no ruling party or an opposition party

in these councils. Therefore, friction is minimized.”84

77 Gulu is a district in the North where the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), lead by Joseph Kony, is highly present. 78 The New Vision, Uganda’s future at stake – Museveni, May 1, 1996. 79 The New Vision, Mayanja refutes Sharia claim, April 18, 1996. 80 The New Vision, The Movement allows everyone to participate, June 7, 2000. This is repeated in e.g. The New Vision, Why should Ugandans vote for the Movement?, June 21, 2000. 81 The New Vision, Why should Ugandans vote for the Movement?, June 21, 2000. 82 The New Vision, The Movement allows everyone to participate, June 7, 2000. 83 Starts at the village level (LC1), and progress through the parish (LC2) to the sub-county (LC3), county (LC4), and district (LC5). 84 The New Vision, The Movement allows everyone to participate, June 7, 2000.

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The characteristic pattern of the discourse and its inner logic, in order to ensure the survival of

the one-party Movement system, seems to be that multipartyism will lead to a war between

different ethnical, religious and tribal groups rather then to protect minorities. The Movement

view is that a movement system allows people of different political opinion to solve their

local problems together and also that “[i]n practice, interests of marginalized groups are never

represented under parties”.85 In the referendum debate, the committee states that “[t]he

Movement system […] has brought political harmony and unity in the villages [and that] it

would not be possible to bring villagers of different parties to sit together on one council as

each side would oppose the other for the sake of opposition, hence, harmony and unity would

be stifled”.86

When analyzing the political discourse and the speeches that dominated the 1996 presidential

election and the 2000 referendum, the preconditions for a political-rhetorical process to deal

with collective fear seems all to be present: The problem framing for a new reality

description, and, how the threat is linked to the security of individuals and thereby being

existential in its nature. The Obotephobia and the (national) unity elements constitute the

political discourse framework of an explicitly logical connection between the presidential

(Multipartyists) candidates in 1996 election, and the multiparty side in the referendum four

years later, and the survival of Ugandans.

The frequent designation of existential threats by President Museveni, the Movement

Referendum Committee, and other political leaders within the Movement camp, seems to

have constituted a corner stone of the political discourse during the presidential election 1996

and the 2000 referendum. The repeated reminders of the atrocities in the past, as a result of

the former president Obote and his regimes during the 60´s and the 80´s, the designated links

of the 1996 UPC and DP coalition – IPFC - and their wish to bring Obote back in order to

plunge Uganda into anarchy and chaos are threats directed to each and every citizen of the

country. In the context of the Ugandan history and the peoples´ fears of having an

uncontrolled army, anarchy, insecurity of person and property, these threats have the potential

of being existential among the people.

85 The New Vision, Why should Ugandans vote for the Movement?, June 21, 2000. 86 The New Vision, Why should Ugandans vote for the Movement?, June 21, 2000.

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The importance of security and (national) unity is relevant. The frequent speech acts blaming

multipartyism being a political system that enhance ethnic, religious and tribal fragmentation

and that will stifle the harmony and unity, that has been brought by the one-party Movement

system, are also a strong contributor to the designation of an existential threat. The

Obotephobia element and the (national) unity element are linked in forming a political

discourse that leaves the people alone with two alternatives only: One is that of a continuous

Movement politics which provides security, harmony, unity and an army under control. The

other alternative means the opposite: state founded killings, violence between ethnic, religious

and tribal groups, and anarchy. The complete reduction of the political, multiparty alternatives

during the elections 1996 and 2000 as being politics of a fig-tree-leaf syndrome in order to

bring Milton Obote back to the country and to continue with the murdering of the citizens

(“These were originally snakes but now are using Ssemogerere and are coming back to

destroy Uganda in a lizard’s skin”).

Another reflection is that it is not possible to make a clear distinction between the discourse in

the presidential election 1996 and the 2000 referendum; the presidential candidates in 1996

Ssemeogerere and Myanja are being addressed as multipartyists and the insight on the effects

of the political system (parliamentary elections where to be followed the same year) if a

multiparty candidate had been elected president. So, when analyzing the political discourse

during the 1996 election and the referendum four years later, it should be interpreted as a

consistent process: The seemingly conscious plantation in 1996, by Museveni and his camp,

of a language in which signs of equality between the candidates, and a multiparty system,

with the violent past are resulting in the designation of existential threats – which here are

categorized as elements of Obotephobia and (national) unity - directed to the people and

citizens of Uganda, and it continues during the 2000 referendum. But even if the general logic

of securitization seems to be quite clear at this stage, still it may only be considered as a

securitization move, unless the audiences accept it as an existential threat, which is discussed

below. But before doing that, we shall take a look into potential procedures Museveni may

have managed to break free from.

Which are the procedures or rules the securitizing actor may have managed to break

free from and which he or she otherwise would be bound to?

During the 2000 referendum, a major happening was covering the front pages on the

newspapers after June 7th. It arose after the first Act (The Referendum and Other Provisions

21

Act, 1999) was nullified having been successfully challenged by the DP President, Kawanga

Ssemogerere on the grounds that it was passed without a quorum contrary to the provisions of

Article 88 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995.87 Instead of await the

Constitutional Court’s ruling on the act (which later ruled that it had been passed improperly,

since there was no quorum in parliament at the time it was passed), Museveni and the

Movement allegedly did intimidate MPs into passing a new referendum act. By calling the

136 Movement MPs to a Caucus, Museveni allegedly ordered them to pass the new

referendum law, and suspended the rules of Parliament which required three days notice of

motions and lengthy committee procedures, by back-dating the law to July 1999.88

This action undertaken by Museveni, was compared by oppositional politicians and media to

the 1966 “pigeon hole” constitution undertaken by Milton Obote and when MPs, as they

arrived to the parliament, where told to pass the new constitution without having even read

it.89 The Movement-dominated parliament suspended the rules of procedure and passed the

Bill in a record 3 hours on 7 June 2000 in order to ensure that nothing stops the June 29th

referendum elections.90

This seemingly desperate measure undertaken by president Museveni in order to ensure that

the 2000 referendum actually could take place as planned, reflects the political importance of

the event on June 29. The main political challengers DP and UPC – the mainstream

multipartyists - were boycotting the referendum. The reason behind the positioning on this

third side – the Movement (“bus”) and the Multiparty side (“dove”) were the other two sides –

is the DP and UPC view on multiparty democracy as a fundamental human right which never

can be subjected for a vote. Participation would simply have legitimized a (continuous) one-

party democracy promoted by the Movement.

The friction between democracy and a state governed by law is very evident during the

referendum 2000. The Movement side pressuring the importance of an inclusive democracy in

87 Sabiti-Makara, Tukahebwa Geoffrey B., Byarugaba Foster E. Voting For Democracy in Uganda - Issues in Recent Elections. LDC Publishers, Kampala, Uganda. 2003:265. 88 Sunday Monitor, Insight: Museveni, Kategaya vs. Obote, Nkangi, June 18, 2000. 89 Obote unilaterally abolished the semi-federal independence constitution of 1962. The parliament was surrounded by soldiers and tanks and Obote told the MPs that they could find their copies of the April 1966 constitution in their pigeon holes, mail boxes, on the way out. Sunday Monitor, Insight: Museveni, Kategaya vs. Obote, Nkangi, June 18, 2000. 90 Sabiti-Makara, Tukahebwa Geoffrey B., Byarugaba Foster E. Voting For Democracy in Uganda - Issues in Recent Elections. LDC Publishers, Kampala, Uganda. 2003:265.

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which a united people, in harmony, can participate within the different levels of decentralized

councils, confident of that the participation mechanism itself would obstruct the

fragmentation and insecurity. Therefore, according to Movementists, the right of minorities

does not have to be protected by law. The existential threats designated by Museveni and the

Movement camp, as have been scrutinized and rendered above, are telling the Ugandans that

they should fear multipartyism as the since it brings back the violent conflicts of the past.

But can the passing of the new referendum law in three hours undertaken by Museveni be

seen as an emergency act in the Ugandan context? This is not obvious. The knowledge and

the significance of the Ugandan Constitution among the Ugandans are different depending on

the level of education and the living conditions. When the Movement (NRM) government did

design the Uganda Constitutional Commission, the bishops called on all Ugandans to take it

as a moral duty to actively participate in the making of the new Constitution. The past

political tensions of 1961-1962 occurred during and immediately after the discussions

preceding the Independence Constitution of 1962. The “pigeon-hole” constitution of 1966 led

the country into chaos in subsequent years. Hence, the importance of a national constitution in

the Uganda context can hardly be overemphasized.91 But, as elections are not real

opportunities to choose between policy alternatives but might be seen as tests of loyalty, this

has created a gap between electoral victory and political legitimacy which can also explain

part of the indifference and cynism that have come to afflict many Ugandan voters.92 “Those

who understand the constitution do care”, as one of the respondents expressed. “People care,

people react. But as long as the avenues are not very open, there is a limit to which people can

react.”93

Which are the signs of acceptance by the people?

The dramatizing of scenes of old terror seems to be evident, as well as breaking free from

procedures and rules. But were those designations of threats interpreted as existential threats

and were the measures accepted by the Ugandan people? Nine years after the presidential

election, one of the interview respondents summarizing the situation during the election

campaigns: “In 1996 during the presidential election, they drum up a threat of war. They show

91 Hansen, Holger Bernt, Twaddle, Michael. Religion & Politics in East Africa. Fountain Publishers, Kampala, Uganda. 1995:117. 92 Hammargren, Henrik; Muhereza, Frank; Ottosson, Åse; Ssenkumba, John. Peace, Democracy and Human Rights in Uganda - a string of fragile pearls. A draft report for Sida, June 1999:13. 93 Respondent #1, Bweyongerere, May 8, 2005.

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you that they have all the powers to start a war. It was just to click the trigger and there is a

war in this country. That is if you choose anybody else [than Museveni]. If Museveni looses

power, war will start immediately. They sing war on radio, they re-enact scenes of the old

terror that we suffered during those days, road drops where people have been terrorized. They

put them on TV, they dramatizing those things, and everywhere you see armed men passing

around.”94

Polls and election results

Polls before the 1996 presidential election revealed that on the question which candidate

would best handle the “national issues” such as peace, security, national unity, poverty,

constitution, health, human rights, democracy and corruption, Museveni led in all categories.

On the question which candidate will restore multiparty politics, Ssemogerere was garnering

75% and Museveni only 17% of the voters. But on the question on which candidate could

keep the army in check, Museveni pulled 75%, and not a single respondent, 0%, thought

candidates Ssemogerere or Mayanja could discipline the army.95 Three weeks later, just a

week before the election day, respondents mentioned peace and security as the number one

factor that will influence candidates´ chances of being voted, and, in most districts, Museveni

was the candidate to ensure these factors. Except districts such as Apac, Gulu and Lira – areas

in which it occurred battling armed opposition groups – Museveni was leading with a

whopping percentage.96

The results above can be seen as an indicator of the success of Museveni´s promotion and

upholding of a constitution of the people, to provide security, and to plan for smooth change

to avoid chaos in order to modernize Uganda. It may also be seen as the result of a

securitization of the Movement system, or a combination of both. The question here is

whether these results would have been the same without the speech acts and the political

language used?

The 2000 referendum was won by the Movement by receiving as much as 91,5% of the votes.

Again, except the districts of Apac, Gulu, Lira, and Kitgum, Museveni did win a major

victory over the multiparty side. But, this time only 45% voted, which in fact can be seen as a 94 Respondent #3, Kampala, May 17, 2005. 95 A country-wide opinion poll of nearly 1700 randomly selected Ugandans was interviewed. The Monitor, Polls say Museveni will win elections by 62%, April 19, 1996. 96 The poll had a confidence level of 95%. The Monitor, Can Ssemogerere ambush Museveni as polls give Kaguta 56-60% of the vote?, May 7, 1996.

24

huge defeat for Museveni and the Movement system. Another factor that might have had an

impact on the low turn-up was the heavy rains in Kampala district, and the fact that voters did

not see a reason to vote since they thought the Movement would win anyway, or, that it was

little at stake (political system) compared to a presidential election.97

The very low participation by the people in the referendum might be a determining factor in

answering the question whether securitization of the Movement system did occur or not

during the referendum. If half of the people entitled to vote were boycotting the referendum, it

can reflect a situation where an important part of the population was not enough effected by

the designations of the existential threats so that they felt they had to vote for the Movement

system. Rather, the speeches could have had an opposite effect preventing those from voting.

Likewise, Museveni breaking free from rules – in this case the Constitution - and enforcing

the passing of the new referendum act, could have strengthening the opposition. How many of

the 65% that actually did boycott the referendum and how many of these were prevented to

vote is not known and we can only speculate. However, what is important when determining

whether we are witnessing a securitization or just a “move” is what audience we focus upon

in this particular case: The Ugandan people as a whole, all the entitled Ugandan voters, the

45% of the audience of which more than nine out of ten voted for the Movement system, or

the people who voted for Museveni in the 1996 election? The answer to the securitization

question may be different depending on the audience. Different groups of the Ugandan rural

and urban people certainly were affected in different ways by the political language and the

campaigns. In order to get a deeper understanding of how the Ugandan people interpret the

courses of events during 1996 and 2000, the results from the interviews need to be analyzed.98

The fear of multipartyism

As have been discussed earlier the construction of a logical connection between multipartyism

and the violent past seems to have been a significant part of the political discourse during both

the election and the referendum. One respondent explains his view on multipartyism by

saying: “When we go to parties, then people are going to use them in an unhealthy way. That

one is a fact.”99 The meaning behind the expression “unhealthy way” is here understood as

97 See discussions in The Monitor, July 5 and June 30, 2000, and The Sunday Monitor, July 2, 2000. 98 Not to forget that the interviews was performed 9 years after the 1996 election and 5 years after the 2000 referendum - a fact that should be considered when discussing the relevance of the designations of existential threats. 99 Respondent #3, Kampala, May 17, 2005.

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bringing different people against each other which will lead to sectarianism and political

turmoil. He continued saying “[o]ur leaders here have always misused the parties […]

Museveni kept arguing, and his argument was bought by many, that you see, when we go into

these political differences, that is why we have these troubles.”100

The last sentence can be seen as a feed back on the interpretation of the existential threats

concerning multipartyism that has been continuously designated by Museveni: “[…] his

argument was bought by many […]”. The logical connection between the multiparty systems

and political turmoil seems to be well rooted in people’s minds: “In 1986 when the Movement

took power, you could not stand anywhere and start campaigning against Museveni or let’s go

multiparty or that kind of thing. Because actually, at that time, people still were arguing that

multiparty was the cause behind that turmoil, which was just recent.”101 Another respondent

explains that “Museveni strictly pins that multipartyism is really bad and he has brainwashed

so many people of how politics is and what you gain out of politics.”102

The utterances above reveal two important things: First, multiparty system is understood to be

accepted by many Ugandans as a cause behind the past atrocities. Secondly, it is understood

that Museveni continuously argues this causal connection.

Manipulation of the rural based and non-enlightened people

One important factor in the discussions on securitization is the targeted audience. It may not

be an unfamiliar thought that it is easier for the securitizing actor to win acceptance of the

logic behind the designation of existential threats among non-enlightened, often rural based

people, than among the educated, often urban people. One respondent says that “[i]n our kind

of society, the people with the vote, are mainly the rural based. And they are the less

enlightened. We, the ones who went to school, we are able to assess issues, vote on

specifically issues, but unfortunately, we are a minority, we are very few. So, it becomes very

easy to manipulate people.”103 Another respondent mean that “[p]eople in the rural areas, they

don’t even understand what a referendum is. What they are after, when they are electing, is

who the leader is. Now, they know Museveni. People fear, there is some bit of fear actually,

of the system. You know when you are campaigning to be president and you know you are

100 Respondent #3, Kampala, May 17, 2005. 101 Respondent #3, Kampala, May 17, 2005. 102 Respondent #4, Mukono, May 18, 2005. 103 Respondent #1, Bweyongerere, May 8, 2005.

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campaigning against somebody that is the incumbent president, there is a lot of fear […] You

have to talk with reservation, because of fear of the security around them and so.”104

It seems as manipulation, or the designation of existential threats, is understood to have been

most successful in the rural areas and among the non-enlightened Ugandans. The last sentence

also reveals an interpretation of an existing – and existential - fear of the ruling governance,

the movement system, which forces them to vote for the incumbent leader. But there is also

another utterance which needs some attention: “In 1996 though, the Movement are still very

strong and solid. With or without intimidation, the parties could not have been able to win.”105

First, it is understood as if the confidence of the Movement among the people has been

weakened in between 1996 and 2000. Secondly, the element of intimidation seems to be a

constituted part of the campaigns. One question to ask is how continuous intimidations by

designations of existential threats did affect on the apprehensions of the strength and solidity

of the Movement?

The importance of reconciliation and security

Earlier discussions on the Ugandans fears of having an uncontrolled army and a state of

anarchy, as a result of past atrocities and genocide, may explain the importance of security

and reconciliation among the people, as well as it may constitute a “specification of

requirement” during the construction of a political language which aims to threat people. One

of the respondents brings up Obote when discussing the 1996 election, meaning “[t]he idea of

Obote was introduced by the Movement itself into this hard debate […]” and explains that

“[i]t was exactly the same that happen during the 2000 referendum.”106 An awareness of a

conscious construction of articulations by the Movement seems to exist. Another respondent

reveals the impact of involving Obote in the speech acts during the 1996 election: “`Oh, here

is the man [DP candidate Ssemogerere], he wants to bring back Obote!´ You remember the

atrocities which were committed by Obote? And the Baganda [the people of the Buganda

kingdom] is saying: let him come, we should not accept him entering Kampala. And he will

die there, I’m telling you. Because, attacking the palace of the King, the Baganda will never

forgive him.”107 The feedback on the interpretations of the impact of using the element of

Obotephobia in the political language is important: It may not have been understood as

104 Respondent #2, Jinja, May 14, 2005. 105 Respondent #1, Bweyongerere, May 8, 2005. 106 Respondent #3, Kampala, May 17, 2005. 107 Respondent #4, Mukono, May 18, 2005.

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constituting an existential threat among the Baganda – a targeted audience for the speech acts

of this kind.

Another respondent brings up the necessity of reconciliation in the country: “[…] Given our

kind of history, we have been through a lot, […] people are so weak and they are really

looking more towards reconciliation than retribution. I can say Museveni has contributed

amazingly to the progress in this in this country, in all aspects. With the respect to unity,

initially, there was this move towards creating a nation of unity and reconciliation.”108 The

understanding is evidently that security and reconciliation is regarded as a demand of priority

among the Ugandans. But, the understanding is also that the Movement and Museveni

actually has contributed to an increased stability and enhanced unity in the country. A third

respondent can verify the statements by explaining that “[t]he common man in the village is

after a few things: you want security […] In those days, they used to suffer a lot, but they can

now see the difference. Security is very important. You know the voters, all they want is

security, and they want an army which is tamed and which can be controlled properly.”109

A reflective question is that under preconditions before the 1996 election and the 2000

referendum as described so far, how can it be possible to convince a majority of the people

that security and reconciliation can be gained through a multiparty system - especially since

such a system is understood to be accepted by many Ugandans as a cause behind the past

atrocities? “Multipartyism is not primary, it is secondary. It is not the most important, but

when we’re talking politically, it [multipartyism] is a necessary condition. Reconciliation, that

is primary.”110 The understanding seems to be that there is no logical connection between a

multiparty system and an enhanced reconciliation and the latter one is more important than

the system. This statement may reveal an acceptance of the constructed logic behind the

speech acts performed by Museveni and the Movement. The respondent continues by saying:

“[…] they were associating multiparty with the previous regimes where there were lot of

terror and such things, putting skulls…the skulls of Luweero…that one definitely affected

especially the rural people. If you do a mistake, voting for multipartyism, do you want to die

108 Respondent #1, Bweyongerere, May 8, 2005. 109 Respondent #2, Jinja, May 14, 2005. 110 Respondent #1, Bweyongerere, May 8, 2005.

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again? You know that kind of propaganda. People have seen a lot of blood shed, and nobody

wants to get into that again. All they want is tranquility and reconciliation.”111

The interpretation of that the threat of “skulls of Luweero” did affect mainly the rural people

is interesting. The acceptance of existential threats designated by Museveni and the

Movement may have been most evident among the rural based people. This may be a fact that

needs to serve as an input into the conclusive discussions on whether securitization has

occurred or not since the determination depends on the audience in question.

Sectarianism

As discussed earlier in this paper, one characteristic pattern of the logic behind the political

discourse seems to be that a multiparty system will result in an increased sectarianism. One

respondent talks about an “unhealthy sectarianism” as a phenomenon when people “[…] who

starts using their ideological, religious, ethnical or tribal identity against other people with

other identities” and explains that “[t]hose differences, cleavages, ethnic, religious kind of

thing, are there in the society. The people who are greedy, who are unscrupulous, selfish, use

them [the differences] in an unhealthy way. But these differences being there is actually

healthy.”112 The Movement claims the importance of an inclusive one-party democracy where

the mechanism of participation itself would obstruct the fragmentation and insecurity. The

respondent continues by saying that “[n]ot even the multiparty actually can help us to build

the stability in this country, they cannot. Our people are so selfish, whoever gets to the top

want to remain there and wants to take advantage over the others […] The state doesn’t

belong to anybody, so whoever is there owns it and uses it to the very maximum and as long

as he is there, he has control of it.”113 It seems like the understanding is that some people uses

the “healthy” differences in an “unhealthy” way, something that is described as a mechanism

in the Ugandan society. A mechanism that is understood not can be solved by a multiparty

system. A question is whether the people would prefer the “all-inclusive” and “non-partisan”

Movement system as the political system able to prevent increased sectarianism?

Different groups of the Ugandan rural and urban people certainly were affected in different

ways by the political language and the campaigns. It seems as if the designation of existential

111 Respondent #1, Bweyongerere, May 8, 2005. 112 Respondent #3, Kampala, May 17, 2005. 113 Respondent #3, Kampala, May 17, 2005.

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threats, are understood to have been most successful in the rural areas and among the non-

enlightened Ugandans. A fear of the ruling governance, the movement system, which forces

them to vote for the incumbent leader, seems also to exist among rural people. One conclusion

might be that securitization among the rural and non-enlightened people have occurred during

the 1996 election and the 2000 referendum.

CONCLUSIONS

On the question by which speech acts and by whom the existential threat been designated, the

answer is yes. President Museveni and his leadership within the Movement are continuously

during the presidential election campaigns 1996 and during the 2000 referendum delivering

speech acts with a seemingly evident aim of designating existential threats. The many

examples of those articulations are in detail presented in the analysis section in this paper. The

various speech acts shape a reality description where the threat is linked to the security of

individuals and thereby being existential in its nature. They all can be arranged within the

overaching themes – “Obotephobia” and (national) unity – and they include threats

concerning the comeback of former president Milton Obote, the multiparty leaders organizing

death squads, multiparty system as a cause behind past atrocities and increased sectarianism

and ethnic fragmentation. The construction of the political discourse during the campaigns

leaves the people alone with two alternatives only: One is that of a continuous Movement

politics which is told to provide security, harmony, unity and an army under control. The

other alternative means the opposite: state founded killings, violence between ethnic, religious

and tribal groups, and anarchy. Bearing the Ugandan context and its history in mind, the

substances of the threats are not surprising and the interpretation cannot be other than that

they are constructed with the very aim of being existential among the Ugandan people.

Another conclusion to be made is that different speech acts are directed at different audiences.

As speeches including the Obotephobia element are more frequently directed to people of

Buganda and nearby areas than for instance the northern parts of Uganda, speeches including

the element of national unity are primary directed to non-Baganda citizens.

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On the question whether the securitizing actor – president Museveni and the leadership within

the Movement – managed to break free from procedures or rules, the answer is a doubtful yes.

The comparisons made between the passing of the new referendum act and the “pigeon-hole”

constitution reveals much about the excitement and attention to that emergency measure taken

by Museveni just shortly before the referendum. Since the referendum actually was held, it

could be seen as Museveni and the Movement actually managed to break free from

procedures that otherwise would have at least delayed the referendum. On the other hand, the

extensive boycotting of the referendum – which may have been as big as close to half of the

entitled voters – can be seen partly as a result of a widespread non-acceptance of the passing

of the new referendum act. Anyway, when drawing conclusions, there should be little room

for speculations, so what is important here is actually the fact that Museveni seems to have

put his credibility at stake in order to ensure the performance of the referendum since bringing

significance to the constitutional process has been one important task for the Movement in

fostering the Ugandan people in democratic procedures.

Finally, on the question of which are the signs of acceptance by the people, the answer is

depending on what the audience we intend to focus upon. If we focus on enlightened and

educated people, primary in the urban areas of Uganda, the conclusion is that there are few

signs of acceptance. The ability to assess political issues at stake and to criticize and see

through the speech acts seem to be better among this audience compared to non-enlightened

people mainly in the rural areas. But, the research also indicates that there may be certain

logics that are valid even among the enlightened group. One is that reconciliation is primary

and multipartyism secondary, which may reveal an understanding that there exists no

connection between the introduction of a multiparty system and the achievement of

reconciliation, and, where the latter is considered as the most important. A conclusion is that

the logic behind this belief may be affected by the political discourse constructed by

Museveni and the Movement, achieving national unity through a broad participation by an

inclusive movement system as the only way forward and not by considering a constitutional

protection of the rights of minorities through a multiparty democracy and a state governed by

law. Rather, multiparty system is repeatedly told to be the cause behind past atrocities and

increased sectarianism. In this sense, a conclusion can be that a securitization of the

Movement system may have occurred even among the enlightened people in Uganda and the

consequence is that it has prevented parties such as DP and UPC to gain enough support

during the presidential election 1996, but also during the 2000 referendum.

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If we focus on the non-enlightened, uneducated people, primary based in the rural areas of the

country, the conclusion is that one can assume that a securitization of the Movement system

did occur during the election 1996 and the referendum 2000. Polls and interviews are

indicating that among this audience, security is of absolute importance and that the logic

behind the existential threats directed at these people have been generally accepted by the

audience. The launch of campaigns of securitization by Museveni and the Movement

leadership, such as the “skulls of Luweero”, the organization of death squads against

landlords, bodies turning up on roadsides during multiparty rule, etc., seem to have gained

support from the audience.

The impact of the securitization of the Movement system, in the eyes of a large part of the

Ugandan people, during the end of the 1990´s, on the Ugandan democratization process

during the first five years of the new millennium may be the scope for another research

project.

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Mamdani, Mahmood. Politics and Class Formation in Uganda. (First Printing.) Monthly Review Press, New York.1976. Marsh, David; Stoker, Gerry. Theory and Methods in Political Science, 2nd edition. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 2002. Mugaju, Justus & Oloka-Onyango, Joe. No-Party Democracy in Uganda - Myths and Realities. Fountain Publishers Ltd, Kampala. 2000. Olukoshi, Adebayo O. The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa. Elanders Gotab, Stockholm, Sweden. 1998. Palmberg, Mai. National Identity and Democracy in Africa. Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden. 1999 Sabiti-Makara, Tukahebwa Geoffrey B., Byarugaba Foster E. Voting For Democracy in Uganda - Issues in Recent Elections. LDC Publishers, Kampala, Uganda. 2003. Sahli, M.A. Mohamed & Markakis, John. Ethnicity and the State in Eastern Africa. Elanders Gotab, Stockholm. 1998. Thomsson, Heléne. Reflexiva intervjuer. Studentlitteratur, Lund. 2002. Wapakhabulo, J F. “Democratization of Uganda and the Constitution Making Process”, out of Transformation of Uganda - from Chaos to Stability and Development. Rapport 2/96, FUF. 1996. Wagnsson, Charlotte. Russian Political Language and Public Opinion on the West, NATO and Chechnya. University of Stockholm. 2000. Hansards Wednesday 7th June, 2000: The Referendum (Political Systems) Bill, 2000. Printed May 20, 2005. Newspapers The New Vision, March – May, 1996; April - June 2000. The Monitor, March – May, 1996; April - June 2000. Interview respondents Respondent #1, Bweyongerere, May 8, 2005. Respondent #2, Jinja, May 14, 2005. Respondent #3, Kampala, May 17, 2005. Respondent #4, Mukono, May 18, 2005.