Searching for principles of war across the history of French military

thinking, from Antiquity to the present day

By Colonel Fabrice Clée, Head of the Research and Forward planning Department of

the CDEC

"War, like all other human activities, undergoes

changes: it does not escape the law of evolution.

"[3] - Marshal Foch

The principles of war can be just as easily viewed

as tenets of strategy and tenets of maneuver. As

a political and operational dual field, they

prompt us to understand them, either as invari-

ants, i.e. timeless and universal laws, or as con-

jectural rules of action, interpretable via tech-

nical, temporal and spatial contingencies. In

practice, differences in military cultures and

command styles, issues, levels, specificities and

contexts of engagement, generally lead to the

highly variable application of these principles.

Since ancient times, European war theorists

have been searching for fundamental rules that

would allow strategists and tacticians to gain

control over an opponent. Drawing inspiration

from each other over the centuries, they have

contributed to the emergence of a common cor-

pus, which each nation now applies according to

its own military culture. Those principles of war

known as "fochiens" (Foch’s principles), current-

ly recognized by the French Army, stem from

multiple influences.

In the fields of the art and science of war, early

Western military thinkers such as Xenophon,

Frontinus or Vegetius, to name but a few, tried

to determine some general rules. At a time

when deception was the dominant factor in the

art of warfare, these rules were primarily related

to the concept of stratagem, e.g. a situation or

device that could be replicated. The term

"principle" only acquired the definition, "rule of

action" from the 16th century onwards with

Machiavelli[4]. Later, Montecuccoli, Vauban,

Frederick II and Napoleon developed maxims;

general proposals stated as constants, intended

to serve as reference points for action. However,

not all strategists and strategy officers were in-

volved in this search. Some authors were reluc-

tant to structure their theories based on princi-

ples. For example, Marshal de Saxe stated that

"all sciences have principles, apart from war

June 2019—1

The Doctrine and Command Teaching Center will organize an international forum on the princi-

ples of war in 2035 on the 12th and 13th of June 2019. This study is in line with the reflections initi-

ated in 2017 by the Joint Centre for Concepts, Doctrine and Experiments (CICDE)[1] and by the

June 2019

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june 2019—2

alone ". The Prince de Ligne even went as far as to refuse them

outright, "My first principle is not to have any".

In the mid-18th century, the Welsh Army Officer, Henry Lloyd

was the first to describe three "essential properties" of war,

the combination of which would enable a deployed army to

perform at its best. Lloyd identified force ("collective vigor"),

agility (the speed with which an army executes its movements)

and universal mobility (designing a formation that can be

adapted "to any kind of terrain and against any kind of

troops"). In 1755, Lieutenant General de Bourcet [6] explained

the need to adapt the principles of war to different environ-

ments. French military theorist, Puységur[7] and Joly de Maïze-

roy[8] later tried to formalize, both empirically and scientifical-

ly, the elements that were starting to be labelled as invariants

of war and strategy. However, it was the analysis of the Napo-

leonic campaigns by two leading theorists, Jomini and Clause-

witz, followed by Marshal de Marmont, Colonel de Fonsco-

lombe and Prussian General von Bulow, that would lay the

foundations for reflection on timeless principles and the rela-

tivity of their application.

As such, according to Jomini[9], "the principle is [...] a law for

action, but without any formal and definitive aspect. It is part

of the spirit and meaning of a law, but allows sufficient room

for maneuver in judgement given the multiplicity of the real

world, as long as it has not been possible to condense it in the

form of a law. In cases where

the principle is unusable, and

the judgment must rely solely

on itself, the principle be-

comes a reference point, like

a polar star, for those in-

volved in combat"[10]. For

Jomini, there was a prevailing

fundamental principle in the

art of war: to focus the bulk

of its forces, successively, on

the decisive points of a thea-

ter, and to ensure this bulk of forces is engaged against only

fractions of the enemy forces. Similarly, for Marmont, "the

general principles for the conduct of armies are few in number,

but their application gives rise to a host of combinations that

are impossible to predict and establish as a rule. "[11]. Fonsco-

lombe stated:"[...] we have analyzed the mistakes that must be

avoided, we have traced the rules of conduct to be followed in

all positions, we have supported our principles with examples

drawn from the history of the greatest captains. While all these

rules are not invariable in all cases, it is nevertheless true that

the study of military art and tactics provides us with general

data that will indicate to the officer the best course of action,

help him to appreciate his position and that of his enemy in

whatever situation he may find himself, and enable him to

make the most of it. "[12] Finally, Bulow stated: "It seems natu-

ral to me that what is believed to be a certainty is first stated in

the form of a theorem and then demonstrated on the basis of

assumptions provided by experience."[13]

Clausewitz took a more nuanced view of universal principles.

He drew the line between a law and a principle. According to

him, "The law reflects the relationship of things and their mutu-

al effects". A law could not then

refer to a theory of war, as the

notion of causality is jeopard-

ized by the unpredictability of

the players involved and the

impossibility of fully addressing

friction. However, in his view, a

principle did not have the uni-

versality or finality of a law. It

could therefore only constitute,

"a reference point for action, a

star to follow", the application

of which is no guarantee of victory. The Prussian theorist

therefore refrained from advocating the adoption of fixed

principles: "Only the analytical part of these attempts at theory

constitutes progress in the field of truth; their synthetic part,

their prescriptions and their rules are completely unusable.

They target certain quantities, whereas in war, everything is

uncertain and all calculations are made with variable quanti-

ties. They consider only material greatness, while the act of war

is entirely imbued with spiritual and moral forces and their

effects. They only take into account the activity of one side,

whereas war is based on the never-ending action of the two

sides against each other. "[14]

At the end of the 19th century, Foch’s work became a signifi-

cant landmark in the history of Western military thinking. Foch

attempted to merge the approaches put forward by Clausewitz

and Jomini. Like Ardant du Picq[15], Foch stressed the im-

portance of moral forces. While

he was head of the course on

military history, strategy and gen-

eral tactics at the former Ecole

Supérieure de Guerre, the future

Marshal Foch set out a series of

principles as early as 1893, with-

out intending it to be exhaustive.

It refers in particular to the fol-

lowing: "principle of the economy

of forces; principle of freedom of

action; principle of the free dis-

RÉFLEXION

posal of forces; principle of security; etc. "16] Foch was deliber-

ately vague about the precise definition of these principles. He

encouraged each of his trainees to develop a personal culture,

method and line of thinking that would enable him to deter-

mine the appropriate scope and conditions for applying these

principles. Citing Clausewitz, for whom "war is a chameleon

that changes in nature according to each engagement."[17],

Foch invited his trainees to develop and become familiar with

"fixed principles, to be applied in a variable way, according to

the circumstances, in each case which is always individual and

that requires individual attention."[18] For Foch, these princi-

ples are general rules designed to avoid becoming pinned

down by the enemy and to ensure superiority on the points

chosen, via swift action. They are understood as unchangeable

over time and beyond the influence of technology, making

them constants that cannot guarantee victory but whose ne-

glect would guarantee defeat. In 1921, Charles de Gaulle, who

was teaching history at Saint-Cyr, said that, "These principles,

gentlemen, dominate the wars of all time. The form of warfare

changes with equipment. The philosophy of war does not. This

philosophy of war must permeate the officers of Napoleon's

homeland. This very philosophy inspires action on the right

days and after all, it is in your work that the future will be

shaped"[19].

Moving away from the Clause-

witzian conceptual approach, two

British military theorists would

draw on Foch to have a major

influence over the development

of the principles of war in the dec-

ades that followed. In the 1920

paper, Principles of War, J.F.C.

Fuller, who was heavily influenced by Lloyd and Jomini, re-

tained eight principles. These were not so much aimed at in-

spiring the conduct of war than at truly informing the doctrine

used to wage it. Fuller put forward economy of forces as the

primary principle and built his theory around it. Fuller's work

was unique in inspiring American strategic thinking, which cur-

rently sets out nine principles: ob-

jective; offensive; mass; economy

of forces; strategic mobility; unity

of command; surprise; security;

simplicity.

In the early 1950s, Liddell Hart de-

veloped his theory of the indirect

approach[20]. He outlines this ap-

proach via eight principles. Six are

described as "positive": adjust the

end to the means; keep the object

in mind; choose the line of least expectation; exploit the line

of least resistance; take a line of operation which offers alter-

nate objectives; ensure that both plans and dispositions are

flexible. He added two "negative" principles to them: not to

throw your weight into a strike while the opponent is on

guard, not to renew an attack along the same line after it has

once failed.

The three alledged "Fochien" principles, as we refer to them

today, would take nearly a century to become a true part of

French military culture. A study of regulatory documentation

from 1905 to the present day showed that the three principles

did not appear in doctrine until 1913. At that point, the princi-

ples were associated with two processes viewed as major: the

imperatives of scouting and ensuring security. The three prin-

ciples fell away at the end of the First World War, only to reap-

pear in 1936 with training on the tactical employment of major

units[21]. The principles then appear across several regula-

tions, sometimes highlighted in the foreword, a warning, a

chapter identified as "principles of war" or "guidelines", some-

times in a chapter dedicated to the exercise of command, or in

"employment", "the enemy", or well hidden within an uniden-

tified paragraph, or spread throughout the same document.

Nuclear fire played an important role in determining the incor-

poration of these principles into force employment doctrine.

However, this did not shed any more light on them. In 1943, in

a guidance note on the use of infantry, a never-seen-before

hierarchy was established in how the principles of war were

laid out. Freedom of action, as the ground rule, took prece-

dence over security. Nevertheless, in a 1956 directive on the

tactical use of land forces, the reverse became the case. Simi-

larly, the concept of agility takes precedence, putting an end to

the concept of mass, which is still mentioned in the provisional

notice on the use of Division 59, 1964, where fluidity also ap-

pears. In the 1965 Infantry Combat Regulations, surprise was

mentioned as a determining factor for success (it is even

written in bold: "the most cunning prevails!") and the 1965

provisional notice on the use of mechanized groups and sub-

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groups states that "the importance of morale is more decisive

than ever in a nuclear environment".

Between 1967 and 1990, regulatory documents point to an

often confusing amalgam of principles and processes. Concepts

continue to appear such as: imposing one's will on the enemy,

unity of action, achievement of the final goal, shock power,

ability to maneuver and intervene, efficiency, progressive-

ness, discretion, speed of execution, decisive effect, anticipa-

tion. In the mid-1920s, the principles of war concerned the

battalion level. From 1976 onwards, however, the principles of

war made frequent appearances in regimental regulations,

without becoming an absolute rule. As such, sometimes the

principles are cited, sometimes not, without any apparent

branch logic. Finally, in the 1973 General Instruction on Land

Forces, the principles of war were joined, for the first time, by

five rules (initiative, surprise, aggressiveness, continuity of

action, simplicity), some of which had prevailed, prior to that

date, as principles. These discontinuities and amalgams seem

to indicate a certain "intellectual drift" in the very understand-

ing of the principles and how they are defined. The 1994 Gen-

eral Instruction of the Land Forces simplified the scope of the

principles, attributing them exclusively to Foch. The document

retained three principles that had implicitly prevailed since the

1970s: freedom of action; unity of effort; and the economy of

means. Later, they would be included in the 2008 document,

FT-02, which does nonetheless specify that "The methods of

application for these principles must be surprise-oriented in all

aspects because causes a permanent delay in the enemy’s ac-

tion"[22]

Reflections on these principles do not stop there. In the early

1990s, Vice Admiral Labouérie highlighted three essential fac-

tors to guarantee operational success: "the primacy of will; the

primacy of technology and the primacy of environmental con-

trol"[23]. Through his analysis, he proposed supplementing the

three traditional principles with the concepts of uncertainty

and speed, both closely linked to surprise. The stabilization

operations of the 1990s and early 2000s gave rise to new ways

of thinking on how the principles could be interpreted and ap-

plied. In 2005, the commander of the Licorne Force, Major

General Irastorza considered the classic principles as necessary

but insufficient. He stated: "The principles have retained all

their relevance over time, but an officer at the beginning of this

century can no longer have quite the same reading as his fore-

father in the previous century. However, he can always draw

from what is nothing more than a reference point. This taste

for the tangible, this gift for measurement, this sense of reality

that encourages boldness, inspires maneuver and fuels ac-

tion"[24]. These three principles must be supplemented by

three complementary principles: the legitimacy of action add-

ed to freedom of action, the preservation of loss and damage

added to the economy of means and the gradation of effects

added to the concentration of efforts "25]. In 2008, these com-

plementary principles were incorporated into the document,

FT-02. For a Force to maintain freedom of action while know-

ing how to properly dose its kinetic actions, it must refer to

certain principles; the legitimacy of the action undertaken

thereby takes form "both with international bodies and nation-

al opinions as well as with local populations". Legitimacy is also

based on the principle of necessity, "namely the fair sufficiency

of the application of force to the objectives sought". This cre-

ates an imperative for moderation "taking into account the

ethics of war, media and legal dimensions that are very present

in operations". Forces are also organized to limit "human losses

and material damage and to favor a faltering enemy over an

obliterated one": it is the reversibility of the action as well as

the refusal of escalation.

And so, in the end, which principles are we talking about to-

day? To answer this question, in 2012, General Guy Hubin[26]

developed a particularly interesting analysis of the French

school of thinking. This would be both fueled and hindered by

its three principles, among which the principle of unity of effort

has become culturally dominant. According to him, this tro-

pism systematically leads to favoring an "axial maneu-

ver" (direct approach) to the detriment of a "zonal maneu-

ver" (indirect approach). "From our own perspective, where the

likelihood of a total and decisive struggle is fading, where the

likelihood of a symmetrical battle remains, and where the likeli-

hood of having to confront an asymmetrical adversary is not

reduced, we must review the balance and the foundation of our

principles to develop our combat model in such a way that we

can respond to the two strongest likelihoods by our desire to

not revisit the third. "[27] He therefore concludes that the re-

flections on the principles of war should focus on the applica-

RÉFLEXION

tion of Foch’s three principles extended to the triptych

"Knowledge - Will - Power"[28]:

- freedom of action: principle that fixes or extends Power;

- economy of forces: the principle of Knowledge that allows

the calculation of risks;

- unity of effort: the principle of Will, the will to achieve the

objective.

French joint doctrine currently sets out, via the 2013 Concept

of Force Employment (CEF)[29], three major principles: free-

dom of action, economy of forces, unity of effort. These prin-

ciples, inspired by the studies of the future Marshal Foch at the

end of the 19th century, were included and completed in 2013

in the Army glossary[30] (ex TTA 106). Foch’s principles, plus

the principles defined at the end of the 20th century by Vice

Admiral Labouérie, uncertainty and speed, were listed in the

forward planning document, Future Land Action[31] in 2016.

However, the principles have not been updated in previous

land force doctrine documents, which still only mention the

first three. Such an update would encourage new thought on

the very nature of these principles, as well as the procedures

for their combination and execution procedures, allowing gen-

uine superiority over the enemy, whatever the context.

—————————

1] CICDE, Reflections on the principles of war: initiative, freedom of

action and efficiency, Joint Prospective Reflection (RPIA)-2017/003 n°

133/ARM/CICDE/NP of 7 July 2017.

2] CDEC, The Principles of War: Semantic Clarification, Point of Situa-

tion and Starting Framework for New Doctrinal Reflections, Doctrine

Letter, No. 09, January 2018. https://fr.calameo.com/

read/005141509e5aa4af7ce93.

3] Foch, Ferdinand, Principles of War. Lectures given at the École supé-rieure de guerre, Berger-Levrault, 1903, (http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k86515g), Économica, 2007. 4] Machiavelli, Nicolas, L'art de la guerre, 1520, reprinted 2011, Tem-pus. 5] Bonaparte, Napoleon, Maximes de guerre et pensées de Napoléon

Ier, Jacques Dumaine military bookshop, 1863, (http://gallica.bnf.fr/

ark:/12148/bpt6k864783), reed. Hachette, 2012.

6] De Bourcet, Pierre-Joseph, Principles of Mountain Warfare, Nation-al Printing House, 1755, reed. Hachette, 2016. https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k86486q.image 7] De Puységur, Jacques-François, Art de la guerre par principes et par règles, Jombert, 1749. (https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k865562.image) 8] Joly de Maïzeroy, Paul-Gédéon, Théorie de la guerre, 1777, Au dé-triment de la Société, (http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k86537s). 9] Jomini, Antoine-Henri, Précis de l'art de la guerre, or Nouveau ta-bleau analytique des principales combinaisons de la stratégie, de la grande tactique et de la politique militaire, Anselin, 1838, (http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k86539g), reprinted 2008, Tempus. 10] Von Clausewitz, Carl, De la guerre, 1832, reed. Tempus, 2014. 11] Viesse de Marmont, Auguste-Frédéric-Louis, De l'esprit des institu-tions militaires, Librairie militaire, J. Dumaine, 1845 (http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k96164s). 12] De Fonscolombe, Philippe, Historical summary of the progress of

military art from the earliest times to the present day, Military

Bookstore, J. Dumaine, 1854 (http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/

bpt6k939702z?rk=21459;2), cited in the thesis for the doctorate in

history of Michel Delion at the École pratique des hautes études, His-

toire de la méthode de raisonnement militaire, 2014 (http://

www.theses.fr/2014EPHE4037).

13] Von Bülow, Dietrich, Esprit du système de guerre moderne, destiné aux jeunes militaires, 1799, (http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k86490z) quoted in Coutau-Bégarie, Hervé, Traité de stratégie, Economica, 1999, reprinted 2011. 14] Von Clausewitz, Carl, quoted in Motte, Martin (ed.), La mesure de la force, traité de stratégie de l'Ecole de Guerre, Tallandier, 2018. 15] Ardant du Picq, Charles, Études sur le combat : combat antique et combat moderne, Hachette & Dumaine, 1880, reprinted Economica, 2004. ). 16] Foch, Ferdinand, Principles of War. Lectures given at the École supérieure de guerre, Berger-Levrault, 1903, (http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k86515g), Économica, 2007. 17].Von Clausewitz, Carl Op. cit.

18] Foch, Ferdinand, Op. cit. 19] De Gaulle, Charles, quoted in Gallo, Max, De Gaulle, volume 1: L'appel du destin, Robert Laffont, 1998. 20] Liddell Hart, Basil, Henry, Strategy (The strategy of indirect ap-

proach), Perrin Editions, "tempus" series, 1941 (reprinted 1998).

21] Military Academy Heritage Library, Doc. Reg. 21.

22] CDEF, Land Forces 02, General Tactics, EMAT, 2008 (https://ct-

pmd.intradef.gouv.fr/sites/CDEFDoctrine/DOCTRINE/REFERENTIEL%

20CDEC/ref_doc/0_doc_fond/FT02/ft-2_hq.pdf).

23] Labouérie, Guy, Stratégie, réflexions et variations, ADDIM, 1992, (http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k3329664n). 24] De Gaule, Charles, Le fil de l'épée, 1932, reprinted Tempus, 2015. 25] Irastorza, Elrick, Commander of the Unicorn Force, The Principles

of War, Basic References, Doctrine, 2005 (http://portail-

cdec.intradef.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/doctrine07/version_fr/

doctrine/art4.pdf).

26] Hubin, Guy, La guerre, une vision française, Economica, 2012. 27] Hubin, Guy, Op. cit.

28] General Hubin refers here to an article written in 1906 by Captain

(commissioned) George Gamelin, Etude philosophique sur l'Art de la

guerre.

29] CICDE, Joint Concept (CIA)-01: Concept of Force Employment, EMA, 2013 (http://www.cicde.defense.gouv.fr/spip.php?article202). 30] CDEF, EMP 60 641 : Glossaire Français/Anglais de l'armée de terre, EMAT, 2013 (https://ct-pmd.intradef.gouv.fr/sites/CDEFDoctrine/DOCTRINE/REFERENTIEL%20CDEC/ref_doc/5_planification/5_2_terminologie/IA_EMP/20130128_EMP_60_641.pdf). 31] Future land action, Tomorrow is won today, EMAT, 2016 (http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/la-vie-du-ministere/action-terrestre-future-demain-se-gagne-aujourd-hui).

June 2019—5