SEA5000 CEP TKMS Case - Australian Naval Institutenavalinstitute.com.au/wp-content/uploads/SEA5000-CEP.pdf · SEA5000 CEP: Critical Capability Considerations for the Future Frigates

SEA5000 CEP Crit ical Capabil ity Considerations for the Future Frigates

Sam Goldsmith

29 Apri l 2016

© 2016 Sam Goldsmith Al l R ights Reserved

SEA5000 CEP: Critical Capability Considerations for the Future Frigates 2

TABLEOFCONTENTS

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................... 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................................... 4 I. SEA5000 PROGRAM ........................................................................................................................... 7 II. PROJECTED THREAT ENVIRONMENT ................................................................................................ 8 III. FUTURE FRIGATE CAPABILITY CONSIDERATIONS ............................................................................ 9

1) Low Crewing Requirement ................................................................................................... 9 2) RAN Combat Capability Preferences .................................................................................. 10 3) Flexibility ............................................................................................................................. 11 4) Ship Survivability ................................................................................................................. 12 5) Growth Margins .................................................................................................................. 13

IV. THE SUPREME IMPORTANCE OF SURVIVABILITY .......................................................................... 14 V. SEA5000 COMPETITIVE EVALUATION PROCESS ............................................................................. 15 VI. TKMS A-400 FRIGATE DESIGN ........................................................................................................ 16 CONCLUDING REMARKS ...................................................................................................................... 19

TABLEOFTABLES

Table 1. Different Payloads for the Mk-41 VLS ................................................................................... 10

Table 2. Suggested Measures to Increase Ship Survivability .............................................................. 12

Table 3. Growth Margin Parameters .................................................................................................. 13

Table 4. TKMS MEKO A-400 Design: At a Glance ............................................................................... 15

Table 5. TKMS MEKO A-400 Frigate .................................................................................................... 18


GLOSSARYOFACRONYMS

AAW:Anti-AirWarfare

ADF:AustralianDefenceForce

AO:AreaofOperations

ASBM:Anti-ShipBallisticMissile

AAW:Anti-AirWarfare

ADF:AustralianDefenceForce

AO:AreaofOperations

CEC:CooperativeEngagementCapability

CIC:CombatInformationCentre

CIWS:CloseInWeaponsSystem

DOS:DenialofService

DWP:DefenceWhitePaper

EW:ElectronicWarfare

FCS:FireControlSystem

GPS:GlobalPositioningSystem

HELO:Helicopter

OTH:Over-The-Horizon

PAR:PhasedArrayRadar

RAN:RoyalAustralianNavy

RHIB:RigidHullInflatableBoat

TAS:TowedArraySonar

TEU:Twenty-footEquivalentUnit(container)

TKMS:ThyssenKruppMarineSystems

VDS:VariableDepthSonar

VLS:VerticalLaunchingSystem


EXECUTIVESUMMARY

The SEA5000 Program will oversee the acquisition of nine high-capability Future Frigates for

the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). These major surface combatants will be capable of Anti-Air

Warfare (AAW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), with a strong emphasis on Anti-Submarine

Warfare (ASW).

Over the period to 2035 the Asia-Pacific security environment will change markedly. Non-

state actors are likely to become increasingly capable, as will state actors. Asia-Pacific state

actors are anticipated to significantly upgrade and/or expand their military capabilities. By

2035 around half of the world’s advanced submarines and combat aircraft will be in the Asia-

Pacific region. Over the same timeframe increasing numbers of Asia-Pacific countries will

gain access to sophisticated ballistic missile, long-range missile, directed-energy weapons,

hypersonic, space, stealth and high-altitude aircraft technologies. The culmination of all

these developments will be a considerably higher-threat future operating environment for

the RAN.

As a result of this forecasted higher-threat environment, the SEA5000 Frigate Design should

satisfy five critical capability criteria.

1. Low Crewing Requirement: Due to RAN personnel shortages, the Future Frigates

must be capable of safely operating with crews of less than 174.

2. RAN Combat Capabil ity Preferences: The Future Frigates must be capable of

supporting the CEAFAR S/L/X radar suite with the SAAB 9LV Combat System and Aegis

Fire Control System (FCS). It is also inferred that the RAN will insist on the inclusion of

the multi-purpose Mk-41 Vertical Launching System (VLS) as the ships principal

weapons battery.

3. Flexibi l ity: The Future Frigates must be capable of accepting mission-specific

modules, as well as providing full hangar and logistics support for two MH-60R

helicopters.


4. Ship Survivabil ity: The Future Frigates must be capable of operating in the

projected higher-threat environment of future decades, even without access to

‘external support’i. The Future Frigates must also be capable of remaining partially

functional even after suffering battle damage, and particularly due to the higher-

threat operating environment of future decades. Ship survivability is a pivotal aspect

of the Future Frigate design since the RAN major surface combatant fleet is

numerically finite, thus cannot lose a single ship without severe repercussions for the

RAN’s capacity to sustain ship deployments over protracted periods.

5. Growth Margins: The Future Frigates must have sufficient surplus space, weight,

electrical power and industrial-grade cooling to accommodate new ‘game-changing’

technologies as they mature in the period through 2035. For instance, high-energy

directed energy weapons are anticipated to mature over this period and promise to

revolutionise naval operations.

On 18 April 2016 Prime Minister Turnbull and Minister for Defence Payne announced that

the SEA5000 Competitive Evaluation Process (CEP) would commence shortly. The

announcement clarified that only BAE Systems, Fincantieri and Navantia would be allowed to

participate. The problem with this decision is that it clearly excluded the highly experienced

naval shipbuilder ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) that had proposed a relatively

mature design with considerable merit.

TKMS had proposed the MEKO A-400, a variation of the F-125 Class Frigate that is currently

undergoing first-of-class trials with the German Navy. In fact the A-400 design and F-125

share over 80% commonality, implying that the MEKO A-400 is a relatively mature design.

The A-400 design offers unique advantages over other competing designs, partially due to its

impressive array of weapons, sensors and payloads.

What makes the A-400 unique is its outstanding survivability characteristics. These include

two ship sections that are capable of operating independently, even if the other is

incapacitated by battle damage. This provides a level of redundancy that other designs will

find very difficult to match, not the least due to the designs two 360 degree radar islands.

i‘ExternalSupport’includesaccesstosatellitecommunications,satelliteimagery,GlobalPositioningSystemnavigation,resupplyshipsandthefleetCooperativeEngagementCapability.


Given the importance of survivability, it seems highly illogical that the TKMS A-400 design

was not included in the SEA5000 CEP. Notice that considering the A-400 design as part of the

SEA5000 CEP would not guarantee its selection, but rather allow for the design to be

examined in forensic detail. Indeed this article does not advocate that the TKMS A-400

design should be blindly selected, but rather is a design with considerable merit that

warrants a more detailed examination.

Far from detrimental, including the A-400 design in the SEA5000 CEP would increase the

variety of alternative options that the National Security Committee of Cabinet can select

from. The bottom line is that the Australian Government has ruled out a design that, by its

merits, would appear to warrant a considerably more detailed examination.


I.SEA5000PROGRAM

The SEA5000 Program will oversee the acquisition of nine high-capability Future Frigates, to

replace the RAN’s existing eight ANZAC class frigates.1 The construction phase of SEA5000

will commence in 2020, with construction to be executed in South Australia.2 The total

SEA5000 Program cost is anticipated to exceed $30 billion AUD.3

These nine Future Frigates will be “optimised for Anti-Submarine Warfare”, but will also be

capable of AAW and ASuW.4 This is because the Future Frigates must be capable of

operating in low threat as well as high-threat war-fighting environments, particularly without

depending on friendly air cover (land or carrier based), as might be encountered in the

distant reaches of the Indian or Pacific Ocean’s.5

The Department of Defence (DOD) has listed several “top level requirements” for the

SEA5000 Future Frigates;

• Superb ASW capabilities.6

• Capacity to contribute to “Task Group Air Defence”7

• Capacity to contribute to execute “stand-off maritime strike”8

• Capacity to carry Helicopters (HELO) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)9

• Capacity to carry multi-mission modules.10

• Preference for the CEAFAR and CEAMOUNT Phased Array Radar (PAR)ii.11

• Preference for the SAAB 9LV Combat System and Aegis Fire Control System (FCS).12

• Preference for crewing requirements not to exceed the ANZAC Classiii.13

The types of capabilities that the successful SEA5000 Frigate Design must possess will be

determined not only by these top-level requirements but also by the future projected threat

environment.

iiTheCEAFARincludesS-bandandL-bandPhasedArrayRadarpanels,supportedbytheCEAMOUNTX-bandfire-controlilluminator.iiiANZACClassFrigateshavecrewsofaround174.


II.PROJECTEDTHREATENVIRONMENT

The future security outlook for the Asia-Pacific region is complex with threats from non-state

and state actors. Non-state actors are becoming increasingly capable, partly through the

availability of low-barrier-to-entry fields such as cyber warfare, but also in terms of the

weapons that can be accessed.14 One example is the suicide bombing of the Arleigh Burke

Class Destroyer, the USS Cole, in 2000.15 Another example is the terrorist organisation

Hezbollah’s 2006 attack on the Israeli ship INS Hanit, with a Chinese designed subsonic sea-

skimming anti-ship cruise missile.16 Both attacks demonstrate the increasing sophistication

of non-state actors. However the 2006 attack on the INS Hanit demonstrates that non-state

actors can gain credible access to technologically sophisticated weapons that were once the

preserve of state actors.

State actors in the Asia-Pacific region are also becoming increasingly capable. As identified

by the 2016 Australian Defence White Paper (DWP), many countries in the Asia-Pacific are

rapidly modernising and/or expanding their military forces.17 Over the next 20 years “half of

the world’s submarines” and “at least half of the world’s advanced combat aircraft armed

with extended range missiles” will be based in the Asia-Pacific.18 The DWP also forecasts that

in the years through 2035 increased numbers of Asia-Pacific countries will gain access to

sophisticated high-end war-fighting capabilities, particularly in regard to ballistic missile,

directed energy weapons, long-range weapons, hypersonic, stealth, space and high-altitude

surveillance technologies.19

Ultimately, the rapidly evolving capabilities of state and non-state actors will result in a

higher-threat Asia-Pacific environment. This means that future deployed RAN forces will face

a markedly increased risk of incurring battle damage during combat operations.


III.FUTUREFRIGATECAPABILITYCONSIDERATIONS

As a result of top-level requirements, and the forecasted higher-threat environment, the

successful SEA5000 Frigate Design should satisfy five capability criteria:

1. Low Crewing Requirement

The DOD has made it clear that the SEA5000 Frigate Design must be “personnel neutral”.20

This means that the successful design must have the capacity to safely operate with a crew

not exceeding 174 personnel, as required by the current ANZAC Class Frigates.21

The importance of minimising the Future Frigate crewing requirement is driven by systemic

shortages of trained naval personnel. For instance two ANZAC Frigates were unable to

deploy during the 2010-2011 Financial Year as a result of crippling crew shortages.22 Another

reason for minimal crewing requirements is that naval personnel account for around 50% of

a ships Operating and Sustainment lifecycle costs.23 Both factors mean that finding a low

crewing requirement Future Frigate design is likely to be a critical determinant in the

Australian Government’s selection.


2. RAN Combat Capabil ity Preferences

The DOD has stated its preferences for the combat capabilities of the SEA5000 Future

Frigates. These include the CEA Technologies S/L/X radar suite, the SAAB 9LV combat system

and Aegis FCS.24 It is also highly likely that the RAN will have a preference for the Mk-41 VLS

since it is already in service with other RAN ships, it facilitates interoperability with the US

Navy and provides a multi-mission weapons battery capability (see Table 1).

A) CEA Radar Suite: • CEAFAR: S-band and L-band Phased Array Radar (PAR) panels for detection.25 • CEAMOUNT: X-band target illuminators.26

B) SAAB 9LV Combat System & Aegis FCS.27

C) Mk-41 VLS cells to store/fire a variety of weapons (e.g. 48 or more cells) (see Table 1)

Table1.DifferentPayloadsfortheMk-41VLSWeapon #WeaponsPerCell Purpose

SM-2iv 1 long-rangeanti-airdefence(AAW).28

SM-6v 1 advancedlong-rangeanti-airdefence(AAW).29

SM-3vi 1 theatreBallisticMissileDefence(BMD).30

LRASMvii 1 advancedlong-rangeanti-shipstrikes(ASuW).31

TLAMviii 1 advancedlong-rangeland-attack(Land-Attack).32

ASROCix 1 long-rangeanti-submarinedefence(ASW).33

ESSMx 4 medium-rangeanti-airdefence(AAW).34

ivStandardMissile2vStandardMissile6viStandardMissile3viiLongRangeAnti-ShipMissile(LockheedMartin)viiiTomahawkLandAttackMissileixAnti-SubmarineRocket:containsalightweighttorpedoxEvolvedSeaSparrowMissile


3. Flexibi l ity

The DOD has clarified that the Future Frigates must be capable of rapidly adapting to meet

specific mission requirements.35 One aspect of this flexibility requirement is that the Future

Frigates must be able to accept modular multi-mission containers. For instance, naval

operations in the Western Pacific may necessitate enhancing the Future Frigates capacity to

detect and strike at Over-The-Horizon (OTH) maritime targets, thus necessitating the carriage

of multiple UAVs.

Another aspect of this flexibility is that the Future Frigates, partly due to their ASW focus,

must be able to carry, support and hangar at least two MH-60R ASW HELOs. This is because

one HELO can only operate for around 10 hours of flight operations out of every 24 hours.36

By carrying two MH-60R HELOs each Future Frigate would have the flexibility of offering ADF

Joint Commanders a persistent ASW flight operations capability or a surged ASW capability

for a short period.


4. Ship Survivabil ity

The projected high-threat environment to 2035 is considerably less benign than in previous

decades. This operating environment will be characterised by more capable regional military

forces, particularly in terms of advanced submarine, advanced combat aircraft, ballistic

missile and anti-ship missile technologies. 37 But this future environment will also be

characterised by regional powers fielding more capable Denial of Service (DOS) capabilities

including anti-satellite weapons, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Cyber Warfare capabilities.38

These future environment characteristics indicate that the Future Frigates must be able to

simultaneously detect, track and destroy multiple threats (air, surface, sub-surface), over

protracted periods of time and without depending on ‘external support’. ‘External support’

refers to satellite communications, satellite imagery, Global Positioning System (GPS)

navigation, access to resupply ships and the task force Cooperative Engagement Capability

(CEC).

The considerably higher-threat future operating environment significantly raises the risk of

Future Frigates sustaining battle damage. As a result, the Future Frigates must have the

capability to survive the initial effects of direct weapons firexi, successfully contain and fix the

effects of battle damagexii, all whilst retaining some capacity to defend the damaged ship

from subsequent attacks. This will require the Future Frigate design to include multiple

backup systems and layers of redundancy (see Table 2).

Table2.SuggestedMeasurestoIncreaseShipSurvivability# Type RoleinShipSurvivability

2 Radarislands Eachislandprovides360degreeradarcoverage

2+ CloseInWeaponsSystem(CIWS) CIWSprovidesterminaldefenceagainsthostilethreats

2 Mk-41VLSbatteries Prevents‘missionkill’bydistributingtheweaponsbatteries

2 CombatInformationCentres(CIC) ProvidesaredundantCICtodirecttheshipsweaponsfire

- Backuppowersystems Reducestheriskofa‘mission-kill’throughdistributedpowergeneration

- Automateddamagecontrol Assistscrewmembersincontrollingsecondaryeffectsofbattledamage

xiInitialexplosion,concussiveforceoftheblastwave,flyingdebrisectxiiCompartmentflooding,firesordamagedshipsystems


5. Growth Margins

Over the period to 2035 a wide range of new technologies will mature and be fielded by

various Asia-Pacific countries including; directed-energy weapons, hypersonic technologies

and advanced stealth aircraft. 39 Some of these technologies, such as directed-energy

weapons, promise to revolutionise naval warfare to a ‘game-changing’ extent. For instance,

laser point-defence units could replace multi-million dollar SM-3 missiles as the principal fleet

defence against Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM). Not only would each shot likely cost “tens

of dollars” but would intercept hostile targets at the speed of light and provide a virtual

magazine capacity that would only be limited by the ship’s ability to generate electrical

power.40

The Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has estimated that a multi-megawatt

laser is likely to be required to successfully defend ships against ballistic missiles.41 Even if we

assume that a two megawatt laser would be required, a ship is likely to need more than one

laser turret, resulting in a surplus power generation margin of at least four megawatts.

Given the multi-decade service life of the SEA5000 Future Frigates and the significant

potential for new technologies to revolutionise naval operations, it is only prudent to select a

design that has sufficient growth margins to accept new technologies as they mature, and

particularly directed energy weapons. In practical terms this means that the successful

SEA5000 design must have significant surplus space, weight, power and cooling margins

factored into the initial design (see Table 3).

Table3.GrowthMarginParameters

Space Sufficientavailable/reconfigurablespacetohouseandoperatenewtechnologies.

Weight Sufficientavailable/reconfigurablebuoyancyreservestoaccepttheweightofnewtechnologies.

Power Sufficientsurpluselectricalpowergenerationcapabilitytopowernewtechnologies.

Cooling Sufficientindustrial-gradecoolingcapabilitytoenablethesustainedoperationofnewtechnologies.


IV.THESUPREMEIMPORTANCEOFSURVIVABILITY

The future RAN fleet will only have nine Future Frigates and three Hobart Class Air Warfare

Destroyers (AWD), for a total of 12 major surface combatants.42 The RAN’s problem is that it

only has 12 major surface combatants to defend a total coastline of 34,000 kilometres and

maritime interests spanning 15 million square kilometres (including Territorial Sea, Exclusive

Economic Zone and Extended Continental Shelf rights).43 This task will be challenging, even if

all 12 ships are available for tasking, and near impossible after accounting for deployment

ratios.

Navies that continuously keep ships deployed, in local or distant theatres, work on

deployment ratios of at least 1:2. In its simplest form this means that every ship deployed

will require two additional ships in reserve, one preparing to deploy and one undergoing

scheduled maintenance.44 When ships are continuously deployed into distant theatres this

ratio increases to 1:3 or 1:4, since ships require time to transit the distance between their

homeport and the Area of Operations (AO).45

The ratio that a navy requires is greatly determined by three factors, the length of patrols

within a given AO, the transit time and the maintenance time required after each ship returns

from deployment.46 For instance, the RAN may need to continuously deploy one major

surface combatant (AWD or Future Frigate) in the North East Pacific as part of the US 7th

Fleet. If we assume that the time spent patrolling the AO is two weeks, a transit time of two

weeks and two weeks of maintenance, a deployment ratio of 1:3 would be required. One

ship on patrol in the AO, one in transit, one undergoing pre-deployment training and one

undergoing maintenance.

Under a deployment ratio of 1:2, only four out of the RAN’s major surface combatants would

be available for tasking at any given time. Under a deployment ratio of 1:3 this number

would decrease to just three major surface combatants. These ship availability estimates

assume that no ships are lost or rendered inoperable during combat operations, an outcome

that as explained earlier appears to be increasingly unlikely. Consequently, the Future

Frigates must be survivable so as to prevent RAN ship losses, by allowing battle-damaged

ships to continue operating and/or limp to a friendly port for repairs.


V.SEA5000COMPETITIVEEVALUATIONPROCESS

On 18 April 2016 Prime Minister Turnbull and Minister for Defence Marise Payne announced

that the SEA5000 CEP will commence shortly.47 In the high likelihood that the SEA5000 CEP

follows the model of the SEA1000 CEP, its purpose will be to select the SEA5000 Design

Partner.48

According to the press release by the Prime Minister’s Office, only three companies have

been invited to participate in the SEA5000 CEP, BAE Systems (United Kingdom), Fincantieri

(Italy) and Navantia (Spain).49 BAE Systems will be developing a modified Type 26 Frigate, as

originally intended for the Royal Navy. Fincantieri will be developing a modified FREMM

Frigate and Navantia will be developing a modified F-100 Frigate.50 All three companies that

have been selected for SEA5000, BAE Systems, Fincantieri and Navantia are highly capable

naval shipbuilders.

An observation of the SEA5000 CEP announcement is its mysterious exclusion of the highly

experienced naval shipbuilder TKMS, that proposed a relatively mature MEKO A-400 design

with considerable merit across all five critical capability considerations (see Table. 4)

Table4.MEKOA-400Design:AtaGlance

1)LowCrewingRequirement YES(Crewof120)

2)RANCombatCapabilityPreferencesYES

(AccommodatesCEAFAR&CEAMOUNTplusSAAB9LVCombatSystemandAegisFireControl)

3)Flexibility YES(x4TEUcontainers)

4)ShipSurvivability YES(twoislanddesign)

5)GrowthMargins YES

Source: ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems51


VI.TKMSA-400FRIGATEDESIGN

The A-400 is a direct descendant of the F-125 Frigate that is currently in production for the

German Navy, with commonality between the two designs exceeding 80%.52

The lead F-125 ship was launched in 2014 and is currently undergoing sea trials and design

verification studies. The lead F-125 frigate will be commissioned into active service with the

German Navy in 2017.53 The second F-125 ship will be launched in 2016, the third in 2018

and the fourth by 2020.54

Due to its direct descent from the F-125 and over 80% design commonality, the A-400 design

is assessed to have very similar physical dimensions and properties as the F-125. 55

Subsequently the A-400 is likely to displace greater than 7,000 tons, to be around 149 meters

long, 18.8 meters wide and with a draft of five meters (see Table 5).56

The A-400 design carries 48 Mk-41 VLS cells, two dual torpedo launchers, two quad-packed

anti-ship or land-attack missile launchers, a five inch gun, two 20mm Mk-15 Phalanx CIWS,

plus two mini-typhoon deck guns (see Table 5).57 The A-400 sensor suite is comprised of two

radar islands with 360 degree sensor coverage (one forward and one aft).58 Each radar island

is fitted with CEAFAR S-band and L-band panels, augmented by CEAMOUNT X-band

illuminators.59 These PAR islands are augmented by a hull-mounted sonar (forward) and a

Towed Array Sonar (TAS) or Variable Depth Sonar (VDS) to the aft of the ship.60 All weapons

and sensors aboard the A-400 design would be integrated by the SAAB 9LV Combat System

and supported by an Aegis FCS.61

The A-400 also has a significant payload capability. The ship can carry two MH-60R HELOs in

on-board hangars, along with four 10 meter Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIB) and four

Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) multi-mission containers.62

Operationally, the A-400 is designed with a maximum range exceeding 8000 nautical miles at

12 knots.63 The A-400 is also designed to operate with a crew of 120 for around 5000 hours

at sea per year.64 The ships are also capable of operating for 24 months without heavy

maintenance.65


In terms of survivability the A-400 features two CICs, multiple blast resistant bulkheads,

independent power supplies, high-grade protection for mission-critical systems, in addition

to sophisticated fire and damage control systems.66 The A-400 is also divided into two

fighting-unit sections that can operate independently should the forward or aft sections be

disabled or degraded by battle damage.67 Both forward and aft sections of the A-400 feature

the following;

• x1 Radar Island with 360 degree coverage.68

• x1 Sonar system (hull-mounted forward + TAS/VDS aft).69

• x1 Mk-41 VLS missile battery (32 cells forward + 16 cells aft).70

• x1 ASuW capability (5” gun forward + two quad-packed missile launchers aft).71

• x1 Mk-15 Phalanx 20mm CIWS.72

• x1 CIC.73

• x1 Ship control station.74

• x1 Electrical power generation centre.75

Overall, the A-400 design is relatively mature, stemming from its close relation to the F-125.

It has excellent performance, weapons and sensors, combined with a substantial payload of

HELOs, RHIBs and TEUs. These features are augmented by a decent operational range and

low crewing requirement, as well as the ability to operate for 24 months without heavy

maintenance. However, what makes the A-400 distinctly superior to comparable frigate

designs is its high survivability. This capability is the direct result of the A-400 “two island

concept”.76


Table5.TKMSMEKOA-400Frigate

Displacement 7,276tonsxiii

Length 149metersxiv

Beam 18.8metersxv

Draft 5metersxvi

Speed 28knots

Range 8000+nauticalmiles(12knots)

Draft 5metersxvii

Crew 120xviii

Weapons

• x48cellMk-41VLS(32forward&16aft)• x2Dualtorpedolaunchers(port&starboard)• x2Quadmissilelaunchers(8anti-ship/land-attackmissiles)• x1Lightweight127mmGun(foredeck)• x2Mk-15Phalanx20mmCIWS(aft)• x2Mini-Typhoonguns(aft)

Sensors

• x2RadarIslandswith360degreecoveragexix(withCEAFARS-band/L-bandandCEAMOUNTX-bandilluminators)

• x1Hullmountedsonar(forward)• x1TowedorVariableDepthSonar(aft)

CombatSystem SAAB9LVCombatSystem

FireControlSystem Aegis

NavalAviation x2MH-60Rhelicopters

WaterCraft x4RHIBs(10meach)xx

Modularity x4TEUcontainersSource: ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems77

xiiiAssumedtobeverysimilartotheF-125ClassFrigatethatsharesgreaterthan80%similaritywiththeA-400design.xivAssumedtobeverysimilartotheF-125ClassFrigatethatsharesgreaterthan80%similaritywiththeA-400design.xvAssumedtobeverysimilartotheF-125ClassFrigatethatsharesgreaterthan80%similaritywiththeA-400design.xviAssumedtobeverysimilartotheF-125ClassFrigatethatsharesgreaterthan80%similaritywiththeA-400design.xviiAssumedtobeverysimilartotheF-125ClassFrigatethatsharesgreaterthan80%similaritywiththeA-400design.xviiiAssumedtobeverysimilartotheF-125ClassFrigatethatsharesgreaterthan80%similaritywiththeA-400design.xixEachwithCEAFARS-band/L-bandandCEAMOUNTX-bandilluminators.xxAssumedtobeverysimilartotheF-125ClassFrigatethatsharesgreaterthan80%similaritywiththeA-400design.


CONCLUDINGREMARKS

Over the next 20 years the Asia-Pacific security environment will become more complex, with

state and non-state actors becoming increasingly capable. Regional militaries will acquire

advanced air, surface, sub-surface, space, ballistic missile and long-range weapons

technologies in the period through 2035. This will result in a higher-threat operating

environment for the future RAN, necessitating above all else that the SEA5000 Future

Frigates are highly survivable.

This means that the Future Frigates must be capable of surviving and functioning in denied

environments, over protracted deployments and without reliance on support from satellite

imagery, satellite communications, GPS navigation and resupply ships. It also means that the

Future Frigates must be capable of surviving battle damage, and particularly given that the

RAN’s numerically limited major surface combatant fleet cannot afford even a single ship loss.

On the 18th of April 2016 the Australian Government announced that the SEA5000 CEP would

include BAE Systems, Fincantieri and Navantia. In doing so this announcement clearly

excluded the highly experienced naval shipbuilder TKMS that had proposed its relatively

mature MEKO A-400 design.

Although the A-400 is relatively mature and features an impressive array of features, its most

unique advantage is its outstanding survivability qualities. The survivability of the A-400

design is due to its division into two separate ship sections that can operate independently,

even if the other section is disabled by battle damage. This is a level of redundancy and

survivability that any shipbuilder would find difficult to match, particularly given the designs

two 360 degree radar islands.

Given the pivotal importance of survivability to the RAN Future Frigate fleet, it seems that a

meritorious design has been prematurely excluded from a more forensic examination.

Indeed, this article does not advocate that the A-400 design should be selected, but rather

that the TKMS A-400 design should be examined in a level of excruciating detail that only a

CEP can provide.

Including TKMS in the SEA5000 CEP could only lead to a better outcome, by increasing the

variety of options that the National Security Committee of Cabinet will have to consider when


it selects the SEA5000 Design Partner. The bottom line is that the Australian Government has

ruled out a design that appears, on its merits alone, to warrant a considerably more detailed

examination.


ENDNOTES

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