Management Assessment for Implementation of the

Accelerator Safety Order at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory

Scott Davis, Team LeaderMarch 13, 2009

SC DDFO established fiscal year 2009 Annual Performance Plan and assessments objectives, which included this review.

The purpose of the assessment was to evaluate all aspects of implementation of the DOE Order and the elements of SCMS relevant to accelerator safety at Fermilab.

Purpose

Scott Davis, SC, Team Leader – DOE Order 226.1A and SCMS Requirements, DOE Site Office, DDFO Assessment Items

Michael Epps, TJ Site Office – Training and Qualification, Written Procedures, DOE Order 226.1A and SCMS Requirements (Training), DOE Site Office Accelerator Safety Responsibilities

Russell Kelly, ORO – SADs, ASEs, Shielding Policy

Scott Wenholz, SLAC Site Office – USIs, ARRs, Internal Safety Review System, DOE Order 226.1A and SCMS Requirements

Karen Brown, Parallax – Coordinator/Editor

Team

Strengths: 3Level 2 Findings: 6Level 3 Findings: 1

Summary of Results

STR-ISSS-1: Historically, the ES&H group and the FSO have conducted regular scheduled and spontaneous walkthroughs of all the Fermilab facilities during all aspects of construction and operation.

  STR-ISSS-2: All Fermilab Department Heads now report to their

respective Division/Section/Center Heads, and the ES&H Director reports directly to the Laboratory Director. The laboratory has thus removed layers of management to improve communications.

STR-DOE-1: The working relationship between the FSO and Fermilab is excellent, with open lines of communication. For example, Fermilab involves the FSO Facility Representative in new project planning long before the stage when these projects would normally be brought to DOE’s attention.

Strengths

FIND-SAD/ASE-L2-1: The Fermilab SADs should contain sufficient descriptive information and analytical results pertaining to the specific hazards and risks identified during the safety analysis process to provide an understanding of the risks presented by the proposed operations.

FIND-SAD/ASE-L2-2: Fermilab lists the safety class SSCs in FESHM Chapter 3010, Significant and Reportable Occurrences, but the listed items are not consistent with the engineered controls identified in the various Fermilab SADs.

Level 2 Findings

FIND-SAD/ASE-L2-3: The ASE must contain the critical controls that are necessary to attain acceptable risk.

FIND-USI-L2-1: Fermilab does not have a formal USI procedure. FESHM Chapter 2010, Planning and Review of Accelerator Facilities and Their Operations, is partially equivalent, but it does not fully meet the requirements.

Level 2 Findings (cont.)

FIND-ISSS-L2-1: The Fermilab Director’s Policy Manual, No. 13.000, Revision 0, requires, “At a minimum, all documents shall have Document number, Revision, Issue and Date in the heading of all controlled documents.” This policy does not appear to be consistently applied based on the documents reviewed.

FIND-DOE-L2-1: Two of the ASEs (A0 Photoinjector and Vertical Cavity Test Facility) do not have DOE approval, and an ASE has not been developed for the D Zero Test Calorimeter.

Level 2 Findings (cont.)

FIND-ISSS-L3-1: Seven of the 11 SADs are beyond the five-year review due date. Fermilab’s schedule to bring all out-of-date SADs into compliance with the internal five-year review schedule is in the planning stages.

Level 3 Finding

This assessment team identified the following key results:

The assessment team validated the accelerator inventory.

The assessment resulted in numerous opportunities for improvement in the accelerator safety documentation.

The safety management systems supporting accelerator safety are being implemented; however, we recommend better consistency and control of documentation.

Conclusion

Fermilab has done a good job in tracking training for operations and support personnel.

The accelerator activities that the team observed demonstrated a good safety culture.

The issues identified in the area of accelerator safety documentation and identified program areas can be used to strengthen the FSO Oversight Program.

The team determined that the FSO implements its responsibilities for accelerator safety activities.

Conclusion (cont.)

Support from the FSO and Fermilab was outstanding. In particular, the team would like to recognize the following people:

Dennie Parzyck, FSO Mary Ann Burt, FSO Don Cossairt, Fermilab John Anderson, Fermilab Chicago IT Staff (especially Daryl)

Thanks