Scherner German

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German Industrial Productivity and Exploitation of Occupied Europe

During World War II:

New Insights from Revised German Import Statistics

Jonas Scherner

German Historical Institute, Washington D.C.

and

University of Mannheim, Department of Economics

Abstract

According to estimates made by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey after World War

II, German industrial labour productivity grew significantly during the war, especially in 1940

and 1941. These estimates are based on the assumption that the intermediate inputsale

ratios in the different industrial sectors remained constant over time. However, after the

beginning of the war, German armament producers started to outsource the manufacturing of

intermediate goods to other companies, especially to firms in occupied Europe. In order to

trace the impact of such outsourcing, German imports are re-estimated on the basis of

information given about payment flows because the official German import data are highly

distorted, suggesting that German net imports during the war were almost insignificant.

Instead, this re-estimation shows that Germany imported a huge amount of goods from

occupied countries, especially intermediate inputs for the armament production.Consequently, Germanys industrial labour productivity grew much less than assumed by the

study of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey.

November 2008

Preliminary

Please do not cite without permission


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1. Introduction

Based on data provided by the German Armament Ministry, labour productivity in the

German armament industry during World War II only increased significantly after 1942the

event known as the so-called armament miracle.1 In this year, Albert Speer was appointed

armament minister and implemented measures which allegedly caused this growth. However,

the data provided by the armament ministry has several shortcomings.2 Adam Tooze recently

questioned whether this data really reflects the production of armaments at least in the first

years of the war.3 His critique is based on figures of the Industrial Sales Report, a survey

compiled by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), which was never

published and which was rediscovered by Tooze.

According to this report, labour productivity in German industry grew significantly

throughout the duration of World War II. The growth was particularly impressive during the

first two years of the war. It was mainly caused by the productivity growth of the metal-

working sector which included the bulk of German armament industries.In light of these

figures, and given that the share of armament production on metalworking sectors total

production made up about 70%, Toozes recent conclusion seems to be plausible, namley that

labour productivity in the armament industry could not have decreased during the first years

of warin contrast to what the data of the armament ministry suggest. Otherwise, labour

productivity of the civilian metalworking production must have increased in an amount not

1R. Wagenfhr,Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939-1945, Berlin1954, p. 125; D. Eichholtz, Geschichte der

deutschen Kriegswirtschaft, Vol. 2: 1941-1943, Berlin 1985; R. J. Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich,

Oxford 1994, p. 344; W. Abelshauser, Germany: Guns, Butter and Economic Miracles, in: Harrison, M. (ed.),

The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison. Cambridge, 122-76.

2J. Scherner/J. Streb, Das Ende eines Mythos? Albert Speer und das so genannte Rstungswunder, in:

Vierteljahrschrift fr Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 93, 2006, pp. 172-96.3J. A. Tooze, No Room for Miracles. German Industrial Output in World War II Reassessed in: Geschichte

und Gesellschaft2005/31,3, pp. 439-44.


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credible. However, growth rates in 1940 are a little bit misleading: First, the adaption process

from a peace to a war economy which led to significant productivity losses, as often reported,

took place during the last four months of 1939. Second, the adaption process meant that at its

end a big share of workers was re-allocated from civilian sectors which had an under-average

value-added per worker (such as the textile industry) to industries which had a over-average

value-added per worker (such as the metalworking sector. Finally, labour productivity

numbers were calculated on the basis of the survey of workers conducted each May of the

respective year. Whereas in the years from 1940 on, the May-figure represented more or less

the average monthly employment figure in the respective year, it also represented the peak of

employment in 19394, such that the use of this figure led to an underestimate of true labour

productivity in this year. However, even if we consider that the growth rate of labour

productivity in 1940 calculated by the Industrial Sales Report is exaggerated, Toozes

conclusion mentioned above seems to be valid, given that the second highest growth rate of

the metalworking sectors labour productivity is reported for 1941.

Table 1: USSBS Estimate of Labour Productivity Growth (% p.a.; 1939-prices)

1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

Whole industry9,5 3,1 3,1 5,0 0,5

Whole industry without

metal-working sector 6,2 -1,7 1,4 2,3 -8,2

Metal-working sector13,2 8,6 4,8 7,5 7,0

Source: National Archives, RG 243, Records of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, European Survey,

Special Paper No 8, Industrial Sales, Output, and Productivity, Prewar Area of Germany

4Bundesarchiv (herafter BArch) R 3901/20238, employment in the industry, fol. 143.


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This contradiction regarding a fundamental aspect of the German war economythe

performance of the industrial labour productivity, especially labour productivity growth in the

armament industrysuggests checking the data: those provided by the armament ministry

and those employed by the USSBS. In another project, I am checking in conjunction with

Adam Tooze and Jochen Streb the data of the armament ministry. Here, I am going to check

the USSBS figures. How were these figures derived? Labour productivity is measured by the

ratio of real value-added (sales minus value of intermediate inputs) and working hours of the

workforce. Prices, sales, and working hours were surveyed continuously by the German

authorities. Intermediate inputs value in the different industries was estimated by employing

the intermediate inputs-sales ratios erstablished by the industrial census in 1936.5

However, did the ratio between intermediate inputs and sales really remain constant over

time? Today we know that in some branches of the German armament industry, especially

those manufacturing technical complex armaments such as tanks or aircrafts, outsourcing of

intermediate goods within the metal-working sector (wings of aircrafts or other parts of

armament goods) increased dramatically during the war, especially at its beginnings, due to

several reasons.6 Before the war, armament production was concentrated in central Germany

because these regions were out of the range of foreign aircrafts attacks. However, after the

5About the industrial census in 1936, see especially R. Fremdling, The German Industrial Census of 1936.

Statistics as Preparation for the War, in:Jahrbuch fr Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2005/2, 155-65; R. Fremdling/R.

Stglin, Die Industrieerhebung von 1936: Ein Input-Output-Ansatz zur Rekonstruktion der

volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechung fr Deutschland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundertein Arbeitsbericht, in:

Vierteljahresschrift fr Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 90, 416-28. R. Fremdling/H. De Jong, H./M. P.

Timmer, British and German Manufacturing Productivity Compared: A New Benchmark for 1935/36 Based on

Double Deflated Value Added, in:Journal of Economic History, Vol. 67, No. 2, 2007, pp. 350-78; J. A. Tooze,

Statistics and the German State 1900-1945: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge. Cambridge 2001.6For details, see J. Scherner/J. Streb/J. A. Tooze, Armament Production in the Third Reich, working paper,

2008.


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war had started, some problems arose. The military placed a huge amount of armament

demands on the firms in central Germany, exceeding both the capacities of these plants and

their workforce. The latter did not seem to be a problem, given that raw materials were mainly

allocated to the war-production after the war had started, effecting especially metalworking

companies of the border regions which, as mentioned, produced only civilian goods. These

companies had to reduce production such that many workers of these companies could be

released. And based on the law on Dienstverpflichtung enacted in 1938, these workers

could and were commanded by the authorities to the armament firms in central Germany.

However, armament producers were not at all satisfied with the performance of these forced

German workers (Dienstverpflichtete).7 These workers obviously tried to prove their

incompetence in the hopes that they would be released and returned to their families. Also

these forced workers were much more prone to sickness than normal workers. 8 This

unwillingness, coupled with the complaints of regional Nazi leaders of border regions in

which metalworking companies were threatened to close down due to the lack of military

orders and the rationing of raw materials for civlian production led, some months after the

beginnings of the war, to a major change of the procurement policy. The authorities issued an

order which stated that armaments assembled as a finished product should be produced in

central Germany, whereas intermediate inputs (such as parts of weapons) should be produced

also in border regions. This decision was also influenced by the fact that the procurement

agencies were aware that a division of labour would increase labour productivity in the long

run.

7See for example L. Budra/J. Scherner/J. Streb, Fixed-price Contracts, Learning and Outsourcing: Explaining

the Continuous Growth of Output and Labour Productivity in the German Aircraft Industry during World WarII,Economic History Review (forthcoming).

8Scherner/Streb/Tooze, Armament Production in the Third Reich.


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This outsourcing is shown in table 2, citing the example of companies which produced the

engines of the JU 88 and of firms which were involved in the final assembly of this heavy

bomber. Notice that the share of the JU 88 on the total German aircraft production between

1939 and 1943 amounted to about one third and a half, and that the aircraft production had a

share on total German munitions production of more than 40%.9 The JU 88 production was no

exception in the aircraft production. Whereas the ratio between suppliers workforce and

workers of companies involved in final assembly and engine production amounted constantly

to 0.3 between mid 1936 and summer 1939, it increased sharply after the war had started to

0.45 until May 1940.10 Also, in the production of another technical complex armament good,

tank, we can observe a similar development as such shown in table 2.11

Table 2: Share of intermediate goods in total costs in the German aircraft industry

Junkers Siebel Mimo Weser ATG

1939 56% 53% 58% 41% 59%

1940 63% 66% 64% 47% 58%

1941 71% 63% 66% 43% 62%

1942 79% 69% 68% 54% 63%

1943 88% 72% 72% n.a. 71%

Source: Budra/Scherner/Streb, Fixed-price Contracts, Learning and Outsourcing.

9Budra/Scherner/Streb, Fixed-price Contracts, Learning and Outsourcing.

10Bundesarchiv-Militrarchiv (hereafter BA MA) RL 3/2638; workforce of the aircraft inustries, monthly data,

1933May 1940. Unfortunately, data for the later period are not avialable.

11

See for example the case of the tank producer Alkett. The share of intermediate goods in total costs of thiscompany was about 26% in 1938/39; 38% in 1939/40, and 58% in 1940/41. BArch R 2301/5517; audit reports of

Alkett.


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This data clearly suggests that the labour productivity figures calculated by the USSBS by

employing constant input-sales ratios in the metalworking sector are highly distorted.

However, the basis, given the data, for calculating the total distortion due to the outsourcing

in the German armament industry is small. Only data for some single firms, such as reported

in table 2, is available. However, the final producers did not only outsource to German firms,

but also to companies in occupied Europe.12 And in this case, as will be shown later, complete

data is available for analysis.

The USSBS was aware of the outsourcing to companies in occupied Europe; however, backed

by the official German Import Statistics it assumed that the impact of foreign deliveries was

insignificant. However, German imports were dramatically underreported in the official

statistics. German authorities were aware of this, as noted the Economics Department of the

Reichsbank in mid 1944: According to confidential information of the German Statistical

Office the German foreign trade statistics only captures exports correctly, whereas the import

figures do not reflect in any way true imports.13 The Germans published this data for

propagandistic purposes, because this data show that Germany did not exploit occupied

Europe, in contrast to the claims made by the Allies.14 The official data suggests that

Germanys trade during the war was more or less balanced, and that in the case of some

occupied countries, such as Poland, Germany was even a net exporter. Moreover, as shown in

the last line of table 3, net imports from all occupied countries were surprisingly small.

12For details, see J. Scherner, Europas Beitrag zu Hitlers Krieg. Die Verlagerung von Industrieauftrgen der

Wehrmacht in die besetzten Gebiete und ihre Bedeutung fr die deutsche Rstung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, in:

Christoph Buchheim (Ed.), Europische Volkswirtschaften unter deutscher Hegemonie. (forthcoming)

13BArch R 2/13502, Economics department of the Reichsbank, memo, 8. July 1944

14

BA-MA RW 19/3189, Europapress-Wirtschaftsdienst, 6.7.1944, fol. 63; Neue Zricher Zeitung, 30.6.1944,Deutschlands Auenhandel im Krieg, fol. 66; press conference of the German Government, 20.6.1944, fol. 67-

72.


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Table 3: German foreign trade 1940-44 according to German trade statistics (m. RM,

current prices)

1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 Sum 1940-44

Imports 5021 6925 8691 8258 6827 35,722

Exports 4867 6840 7559 8558 6767 34,591

German net imports 154 85 1132 -300 60 1,131

German net imports from

occupied countries

261 256 1,552 1,141 1,999 5,209

Sources: Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland, Munich 1949, p. 394 (1940-43); BArch R 3102/6039 (1944);

BArch R 3/1626a, report about Germanys foreign trade, written for the military court IV in Nuremberg,17.7.1948.

Yet, this result should have given rise to serious doubts with regard to the official import

datas credibility, given the financial dues occupied countries were expected to pay to

Germanyoccupation costs and clearing credits they had to grantmade up during the war

to a total of about 110 bn. RM. And this calls into question how Germany spent this money

obviously only a small fraction for financing net imports if we believe that the import

statistics figures are true. Anyway, official import data is used until today in the literature and

is normally not questioned. 15 However, as mentioned before, given our patchy knowledge

about the total amount of outsourcing, our analysis of industrial labour productivity would

benefit if we could find information about true German imports and the amount of

intermediate input goods.

15See for example, A. Ritschl, Nazi economic imperialism and the exploitation of the small: evidence from

Germanys secret foreign exchange balances, 1938-1940, in:Economic History Review, LIV, 2 (2001), pp.324-

45; W. Rhr, Forschungsprobleme zur deutschen Okkupationspolitik im Spiegel der Reihe Europa unterm

Hakenkreuz, in: Bundesarchiv (Ed.), Europa unterm Hakenkreuz, Die Okkupationspolitik des deutschen

Faschismus (1938-1945), 8, Analysen, Quellen, Register, Heidelberg 1996, p. 25-343, here: 236. However, some

authors had doubts whether the import statistics is correct. See e.g. W.A. Boelcke,Deutschland alsWelthandelsmacht 1930-1945, Stuttgart 1994, pp. 126-8; B. H. Klein, Germanys Economic Preparations for

War. Cambridge/Massachusetts 1959.


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This paper is organized in the following sections: In section 2 we explain why the German

import statistics do not capture all imports and which imports are not included. In section 3, a

lower limit of true German imports is estimated employing both the re-discovered detailed

German clearing statistics and the data of the military authorities about armament goods

produced abroad, which are collected in several archives. Based on this data, we can illustrate

how Germany experienced a huge import boom during World War II. German net imports

from occupied countries did not amount to only 5 bn. RM, as suggested by the official

German import statistics, rather at least to 35 bn. RM. Huge shares of these imports were

intermediate inputs for the German armament industry, as shown in section 4. This in turn, as

will be shown, has important implications for our knowledge about the performance of labour

productivity in the German industry. Section 5 provides a brief conclusion. The paper is

mainly based on archival evidence unknown or ignored until today in the literature.

2. Distortion of the German import statistics

The German trade statistics were based upon the customs declaration method. Both importers

and exporters had to declare quantity, type and value of the products exported or imported in

the German customs area.16 Import values were based on cif-prices, those of export goods on

fob-prices.17 Importers and exporters had to pay a statistic fee. Customs authorities had a

control right. On 19.9.1939, a decree of theReichsfinanzminister(Reich Minister of finance)

established that the so called Wehrmachtgut, i.e. goods ownedby the army or goods which

were imported to be usedby the army, were exempted of import duties, consumption taxes,

16The German customs area increased during the war. For details, see Statistisches Reichsamt, Sondernachweis.

Der Auenhandel Deutschlands, Januar und Februar 1944, Berlin 1944, p. 1; Statistisches Handbuch vonDeutschland, Munich 1949, p. 390.

17BArch R 3102/3587, Introduction in the Trade Statistics, 1941.


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and the statistic fee. Further, those goods were to be controlled neither by the customs

authorities nor to be registered by the import statistics.18 In May 1940, the decree was

modified, establishing that only such goods fulfil the characteristics ofWehrmachtgutwhich

are accompanied by soldiers or by persons charged by the army. Also goods, which were

transported by the railways with a so called Wehrmachtticket, were accepted as

Wehrmachtgut.19 From the end of 1940 onward, a further modification occurred and the army

had to certify that the goods imported were really Wehrmachtgut.20

Why would Wehrmachtgutbe treated differently compared to normal goods? The dominant

reasons were to accelerate the transport of such goods and to reduce administration costs,

reasons which overruled the interests of the German authorities to collect import data in an

accurate way.21 Besides, in the case of goods looted by the army it was normally not possible

to establish the country of origin.22

A decree from August 1940 extended the customs duties exemptions to so called armament

goods (Rstungsgut), i.e. goods which could not only be munitions (or intermediate inputs of

these) in a narrow definition, but also civilian goods for the German market. The idea was that

the more civilian goods demanded in Germany were produced abroad, the more German

companies, which in peacetime manufactured such goods, were enabled to convert their

18BArch R 3102/10087, finance ministry, decree O 1005 Z6 II, 19.9.1939; BArch R 3102/4051,note, finance

ministry m, 19.9.1939, fol. 201; finance ministry, Z 2056-120II, 10.3.1942.

19BA MA RW 19/1903, finance ministry, decree O 1005 Z, 18.5.1940. The same regulations were in force for

goods looted in the occupied countries and imported by the Wehrmacht. BArch R 3102/3480, German Statistical

Office (SRA) to customs authorities, 12.9.1940; main customs office Stettin to SRA, 23.8.1941.

20BArch R 2/58087, customs authorities Nordmark, Kiel, to finance ministry, 25.2.1941, fol. 164-5.

21

BA MA RW 19/1903, aviation ministry to finance ministry, 31. 7.1940, fol. 26; economic department of theHigh Military Comand, note, 13.8.1940, fol. 33-4.

22BA MA RW 19/1903, Wifo GmbH to High Military Comand (OKW), 18.7.1940, fol. 29.


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production to armament production.23 In the case of all these goods, customs declarations

would be normally accepted by the customs authorities without controls in order to accelerate

transportation.24 Although, as well as in the case ofWehrmachtgut, the statistic fee was not to

be paid for armament goods, they would be registered in the import statistics. The military,

the armament ministry, or theReichswirtschaftsministerium (economic ministry) had to

certify that such goods were to be considered armament goods according to the decree. The

driving force for the implementation of this decree was the Reich aviation ministry based on

the desire to exploit the occupied countries for the planned massive expansion of the air

force.25

All these decrees led to many misunderstandings during the following years and contributed

to the fact that real imports exceeded by far those captured by the import statistics. First,

customs authorities often assumed, due to the fact that no statistic fee had to be paid for

armament goods, that these were also exempted from the import statistic. 26 Second, the

concepts ofWehrmachtgutand armament goods often led to a confusion among the

customs authorities. For example, a letter written at the end of 1941 by the military

commander of occupied France to the customs department of the Reich ministry of finance

stated: As observed during an inspection of the German customs authorities at the western

border, they are sometimes confused with regard to the concept of armament goods.

Sometimes they assumed that armament goods are the same as Wehrmachtgut and that for

23BA-MA RW 19/1614, finance ministry to OKW, 7.11.1941, fol. 27.

24BA-MA RW 19/1603, finance ministry, decree 0 1oo5Z Allg. 190 II, 31. August 1940, fol. 19.

25BA-MA RW 19/1603, aviation ministry to finance ministry, 31.7.1940, fol. 25-8. Generally about the

expansion of the airforce from autumn 1940 on and the strategic considerations, see Lutz Budra,

Flugzeugindustrie und Luftrstung in Deutschland 1918-1945, Dsseldorf 1998; Adam Tooze, The Wages of

Destruction. The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, London 2006.26

See for instance BArch, R 3102/4067, General customs office to SRA, 21.3.1941; SRA to General customs

office, 27.3.1941, Hochtief AG to SRA, 5.6.1941.


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this reason these goods should not be registered.27 Third, control possibilities during the war

were reduced compared to peacetime: Often armament goods were transported with army

trucks without correct customs declarations, i.e. without information regarding quantity,

weight or value.28 However, sometimes the transport officers were not disposed to allow

inspections of the customs authorities, emphasizing the urgency of the transport. In other

cases, the customs authorities accepted the incorrect customs declaration in order to avoid

traffic hold-ups at the borders.29As a consequence of these procedures, often armament

goods would not be registered by the import statistics.

But the concepts ofWehrmachtgutand armament goods were also incorrectly used by

military authorities for different reasons. The army sometimes misinterpreted the meaning of

armament goods. They assumed that all imports which eventually were used by the army

fulfilled the conditions ofWehrmachtgutregardless if these goods were finished armaments

(such as weapons) or not (such as shell casings or wings of warplanes). In other words, they

treated also the latter as Wehrmachtgut.30 Often parts of armaments were imported by army-

owned armament producers or were sent first to acceptance test departments of the army,

thereby fulfilling the norms of the decree according to which all goods which are ownedby

27BArch R 2/59000, military commander in France to customs department of the finance ministry, 12.9.1941;

BArch R 2/58993, Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft mbH to finance ministry, 13.6.1941, fol. 148-9;

customs office Hannover to Reichsfinanzministerium, 7.7.1941, fol. 150-2.

28See for example BArch R 3102/4068, customs office Wehr to SRA, 2.12.1941; BArch R 2/58986, customs

office Kln to finance ministry, 1.3.1943.

29See for example BArch R 2/58088, customs office Niederdonau, Wien, to finance ministry, 19.11.1941, fol.

26-7; customs office Kln to finance ministry, 27.5.1942, fol. 100.

30For this interpretation, see BArch R 2/58088, transcript of a meeting in the OKW, 26.10.1943, fol. 379. See

also BArch R 2/58993, note, May 1941, fol. 109; BArch R 2/58087, OKW to finance ministry, 9.9.1941, fol.

304; customs office Kassel to finance ministry, 30.9.1941, fol. 309; finance ministry to OKW, 8.10.1941, fol.

310; R 2/58088, customs office Berlin-Brandenburg to General customs office, 14.7.1942, customs officeDanzig-Westpreuen to finance ministry, 25.7.1942, Bl. 140; finance ministry to Schichau AG, 31.7.1942, Bl.

142;. BArch R 3102/4067, military procurement agency to SRA, 29.9.1941; SRA, note, 4.10.1941.


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the army have to be classified as Wehrmachtgut.31 In other cases, the army consciously

certified imports of intermediate inputs for armaments as Wehrmachtgutin order to avoid

delays of deliveries. Wehmachtgut, as already mentioned, were not be controlled by the

customs authorities, and Wehrmachtguthad also a priority compared to other goods in the

case of transport shortages or transport stops which occurred often.32 The army was interested

that the firms who were producing armaments receive the parts as soon as possible in order to

rapidly produce weapons. However, the authorities were aware of the misuse of these

certificates. In order to provide the incentive for the army officers to correctly certify goods,

the authorities implemented in 1942 the rule that transportation costs of those goods were to

be paid automatically by the army, which were delivered by the railways and declared to be

Wehrmachtgut.33 However, the implementation of this rule did not bring with it the desired

effect because the officers of the occupation armies who were responsible to issue certificates

normally assumed that money is no problem.34 In fact, in the case that in an occupied

country the occupation revenue was exceeded by expenditures, the Germans normally

increased the amount to be paid by the respective country. Therefore, the officers responsible

for the expenditure of the occupation army were never able to manage and control expenses in

31See for example BArch R 8 IX/15, aviation ministry to Firma Mikron Optisch-Przisionsmechanische und

elektrotechnische Werksttten, Belgrad VII, 7.5.1942;BArch R 2/58087, OKW to finance ministry, 9.9.1941,

Bl. 304; customs office Kassel to finance ministry, 30.9.1941, fol. 309; finance ministry to OKW, 8.10.1941, fol.

310.

32See for example BArch R 3/3029, military administration in France, instruction for German orders in France,

fol. 20; BArch R 2/58088, transcript of a meeting in the OKW, 26.10.1943, fol. 379; BA MA RW 32/6, German

military procurement agency in Italy, monthly report, 30.4.1943, fol. 76.

33BArch R 2/58088, transportation ministry to finance ministry and to OKW, 29.10.1942. This norm created

also new confusion among the army. For details, see for example BArch R 2/58088, High Army Comand (OKH)

to OKW, 2.1943, fol. 354; BArch R 3102/4051, finance ministry, letter, 10.3.1943; BArch R 2/58091, OKH tofinance ministry, 17.12.1943.

34BA MA RW 7/1710a, OKW to finance department of the OKW, 24.12.1942, fol. 190.


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an efficient way.35 Also, the fact that authorities of occupied countries did not have the right

to control those exports which were labeled Wehrmachtgutgenerated an incentive to

incorrectly certify goods because by doing so the extent of occupied countries exploitation

could be concealed.36

In summary, it has been demonstrated that the facts

(i) that from 1939 on imports of so called Wehrmachtgut(goods ownedby the military or

goods which were imported to be used directly by the military) were exempted of

statistical registration;

(ii) that the several regulations were confusing, and

(iii) that these regulations were also intentionally interpreted in a very broad way by the

military authorities who were in charge to issue certificates forWehrmachtgut,

explain why the German import statistics included less than claimed in the previously written

literature. This literature relies on the information provided by the Statistical Handbook for

Germany, published in 1949.37 In this compendium, based on the import statistics of the SRA,

it is stressed that only import goods which were already usedby the army abroad are not

included in the import statistics. 38

However, the import statistics are distorted for further reasons. Normally, imports of country

A are the goods which are delivered form foreign countries in the customs area of country A.

These imports are basically registered by the method used in Germany. Yet, during the war,

exports of foreign countries for the benefit of Germany did not necessarily have to cross the

35Vgl. z.B. BA MA RW 7/1711a, OKW, instruction for the military finance department in Denmark, 14.1.1944,

fol. 65-6.

36H. Umbreit,Der Militrbefehlshaber in Frankreich 1940-1944, Boppard 1968, p. 317; BArch R 2/58993,

note, May 1941, fol. 109; BA-MA RW 35/262, Final Report of the military government in France, fol 13.37

See e.g. W.A. Boelcke,Deutschland als Welthandelmacht 1930-1945, Stuttgart 1994, pp. 126-7.

38Statistisches Handbuch, p. 391.


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German borders, for example gasoline from Rumania which was directly delivered to the

German troops at the eastern front.39 Besides, the imports of the so calledProtektorat, i.e.

Bohemia and Moravia, are not registered in the German import statistics from March 1939 on.

The same is true for imports resulting from black market purchases of German authorities in

the occupied countries, which were declared Wehrmachtgut, as well as from black-market

purchases of German soldiers.

3. Estimate of true imports

In order to estimate true imports, we use information provided in different sources about

payment flows between Germany and foreign countries. One source is the statistics about

Germanys payments to foreign countries, compiled by the German Statistic Office and the

Reichsbank. These compilations subdivide all payments made by Germany according to the

method of payments, i.e. whether payments were for example made in foreign currency or

within clearing agreements. Also, the use of these payments is broken down, i.e. payments for

imports of specific goods, for capital transfer, for the supply of services, and so on. 40 Unlike

the import statistics, the import figures of the payments statistics also include the imports in

favour of Germany which did not cross the Germanys borders. Unfortunately, import values

given by the payments statistics and subdivided for different countries are only available for

1943. This problem, however, can be solved by utilizing the detailed clearing statistics, which

between 1941 and 1944 are available.41 Due to foreign exchange controls, transactions with

foreign countries required the permission of the state from the beginnings of the 1930s on.

39BArch R 2501/7127, economics department of the Reichsbank, The clearing problem, 15.11.1943; BArch R

3/XX, Industrie, Bl. 11; Statistisches Handbuch, p. 390.

40

BArch R 3101/33632, German payments 1943; BArch R 3101/33635, German payments 1942.41

Politisches Archiv des Auswrtigen Amts (hereafter: PA AA) R 106483, annual reports of the German

Clearing Bank.


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16

Given that during the war almost all payments to foreign countries, especially to occupied

countries, were made within clearing agreements, the annual clearing statistics can be used as

a substitute for the payments statistics.42Imports were basically registered by the clearing

account goods traffic; broken down in subaccounts for each country and for different

categories of goods (e.g. grain from France; steel from Belgium).

However, for several reasons, a part of industrial imports in favour of the Wehrmachtwere

financed in a different way. Both the import values of the payments statistics and the clearing

statistics include only imports which are made by regular import payments, i.e. payments

according to the German currency legislation, which were registered by the so called Reich

entities (Reichsstellen). They do not include payments for imports in favour of the military

and other state authorities made (i) by the service account of the German Clearing Bank

(DVK) (exactly subaccount: payments of governmental agencies), and (ii) those made by

occupation tributes.43

Originally, occupation tributes should, according to the Hague Convention, only to be used to

finance the needs of the occupation army.44 Yet, in reality, occupation tributes were also used

for financing such transactions which could not be subsumed under the needs of the

occupation army.45 A decree stipulated that least all directdemands the military placed in

42BArch R 3101/34749, interrogation, 14. Aug. 1945, fol. 5-7; BArch R 184/186, memo of the German Clearing

Bank (DVK). For example, import fob-values in 1943 according the clearing statistics made up 11.8 bn. RM and

according to the payments statistics 12.1 bn. RM.

43BArch R 3101/33641, economic ministry, internal letter, 1.9.1944, foll. 144-5.

44BA MA RW 7/1711b, OKW to different Reich authorities, 21.10.1941, fol. 154.

45BA MA RW 7/1710a, OKW to different Reich authorities, 2.3.1944, fol. 173. For the different countries, see

for example BA-MA RW 35/262, Final report of the department of trade, money and insurance of the German

occupation administration in France, fol. 32, 34, 65; C. Buchheim, Die besetzten Lnder im Dienste derdeutschen Kriegswirtschaft whrend des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Ein Bericht der Forschungsstelle fr

Wehrwirtschaft, Vierteljahrshefte fr Zeitgeschichte 34, 1986, S. 117-145, here 129-31; BArch R 3101/32287,


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17

occupied countries were to be financed by occupation tributes.46 Black market purchases

made by German soldiers and by German governmental agencies were also financed in this

way.47

Why did the Germans violate this principle mentioned above regarding the use of occupation

tributes? Firstly, clearing debts were debts, which at least in theory had to be redeemed after

the war. Therefore, different German agencies, especially the finance ministry, did not want

clearing debts to increase too much.48 Secondly, there were occupied countries, whose

governments appealing to Art. 56 of the Hague Convention, did not want to see Germany pay

the cost of armament imports through clearing measures.49 Thirdly, financing with the

clearing method required more administration efforts than financing with occupation tributes,

which is why Hans Frank, General Governor of occupied Poland, supported financing as

much as possible by occupation tributes, emphasizing that in the end the Polish would incur

anyway all expenses in Poland which would be favourable for the German war economy.50

Finally, financing exports with occupation tributes was a method consciously employed by

the Germans in order to conceal from the occupied countries the amount of goods exported in

Final report of the armistice delegation, Salzburg, 15. 12.1944, p. 12.; BArch R 184/128, DVK to foreign office,

29.4.1942; BA MA R 19/1602, OKW, economic department note, fol. 20; payment instructions for Belgium, fol.

79; OKW, internal letter, 14.10.1940, OKW, internal letter, 21.10.1940; OKW, note, 28.4.1941, fol. 55; BArch

R 2/14117, finance ministry, 26.9.1941, fol. 374.

46PA AA R 107000, economic ministry, decree, 30.1.1941.

47See for example PA AA R 129064, internal letter, foreign office, 25.11.1941; OKW to finance ministry,

26.6.1942.

48See for example BArch R 3101/33636, fol. 22-3; BArch R 2/14117, aviation ministry to finance ministry,

11.3.1942, fol. 391. BArch R 3102/3551, Institute of Defence Economy, 3.11.1942, fol. 1-11.

49

BArch R 2/14117, note, 17.6.1942, fol. 396-8; BArch R 8 IX/19, economic ministry, decree no. 36/44 D.St./27/44 R. St., 22.8.1944.

50BA MA RW 7/1710a, note, 22.2.1944, fol. 211-3.


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favour of Germany, as explicitly emphasized in the case of France.51 For similar reasons,

imports were also financed via the service account of the clearing operations. 52

Unfortunately, neither the service account nor occupation tributes are allocated according to

their use. However, the amount of imports in favour of the Wehrmachtfinanced in this way

can be estimated in an indirect way by employing further statistics: (i) the statistics of

armament production in occupied countries; (ii) clearing account goods traffic/clearing

subaccount: industrial goods imported with currency permissions of the Reich entity for

Technical Products (Reichstelle fr technische Erzeugnisse) (RTE).

The statistics of the armament ministry reported monthly figures for the armament production

between October 1940 and summer 1944 in almost each occupied country.53 Armament

productions of the countries included in these statistics after summer 1944 were probably

insignificant for Germany, because from this point of time on, countries were liberated who

had significantly contributed to Germanys armament production, such as France, Belgium

and Poland. The statistics of the armament ministry include only industrial orders which were

exported to Germany. Yet, these statistics do not include the armament production in

Bohemia and Moravia, Hungary, and Italy. However, other sources provide the information

necessary for a complete picture of German armament imports.

51PA AA R 107000, German Embassy, Paris, to foreign office, 13.2.1941; economic ministry to foreign office,

3.3.1941.

52With this subaccount also imports of the military were finally financed, which before werefor several

reasonsprovisionally paid by occupation tributes. BA MA RW 7/1711b, OKW to different military branches,

26.6.1942, fol. 156; BA-MA RW 19/1602, note, OKW, economics department, 26.8.1940, fol. 3; note, fol. 66;

OKH, payment instructions for armys industrial purchases in France; BA-MA RL 3/2638, aviation ministry,office Paris, 3.8.1940.

53For the following, and for the data, see Scherner, Europas Beitrag.


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19

For the armaments imports financed by regular import payments, we are able to estimate

an upper bound. This upper bound relies on the currency permissions issued by the RTE,

which had to issue these permissions for all industrial orders of the Wehrmachtabroad, which

were financed by regular import payments.54 Yet, the RTE did not only issue currency

permissions for armament goods, but also for civilian goods produced mainly by the

engineering industries, such as sewing machines. Thus, we can conclude that the currency

permissions issued by the RTE constitute an upper bound of the import of armament goods

import financed on the basis of the currency legislation. Therefore, we can estimate an lower

bound for the industrial Wehrmachtimports notfinanced by regular import payments. This

lower bound is the difference between industrial Wehrmachtorders abroad and the currency

permissions issued by the RTE.55

Moving further, we can estimate true imports by adding up the payments made for regular

imports and the lower bound forWehrmachtimports financed by the service account and by

occupation tributes. This method is checked with an estimate made by the so called plan

office. Why did this agency estimate true imports? The plan office (Planungsamt), founded

in the autumn of 1943 as an agency of the armament ministry, was responsible for planning

the German imports, which was also a precondition for planning the German balance of

payments.56 Based on the import plans, the economics ministry, responsible for planning the

54BA-MA RW 19/2397, OKW, economics department, note, 18.2.1941, fol. 60; BArch R 8 IX/19, economic

ministry, decree, no. 10/41 D. St./14/41 R. St., 30.1.1941; BArch R 8 IX/15, aviation ministry to RTE, 15.3.44.

55These values represent fob figures. For calculating cif-values, we employed the normal cif-fob ratio, which

can be calculated on the basis of the clearing statistics for each country in the different years.

56R.-D. Mller, Albert Speer und die Rstungspolitik im Totalen Krieg, in: B. R. Kroener/R.-D. Mller/H.

Umbreit, Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs. Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und

personelle Ressourcen 1942 - 1944/45. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 5/2, Stuttgart 1999,

pp. 275-776, here p. 505; BArch R 3101/15263, agreement between the economic ministry and the plan office,fol. 142-4. BArch R 3101/33641, internal letter, economic ministry, 1.9.1944, fol. 144-5. About the plan office,

see R.-D. Mller, Albert Speer, p. 343-8.


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20

exports, prepared negotiations between Germany and foreign countries. Yet, planning imports

required correct information about true imports.57 Given that the German authorities were

aware of the shortcomings of the import statistics, they decided to estimate true imports. For

purposes of propaganda, the Reich did not want to publish these statistics.58 However, the

estimation of detailed true import figures was probably never finished due to military

events.59Only some rough estimates for some countries exports to Germany in 1943 were

effectuated.

Table 4:Estimates for true imports from Belgium and France and official Figures 1943;

m. RM)

Belgium France

Regular German payments for imports1

1,442 3,098

+ Armament imports paid through the service accountand occupation tributes (cif)

659 644

=True imports 2,101 3,742

Estimates of the plan office 2,200 3,800

Published official import figures (cif) 681 1,416

1

Imports financed by the clearing account goods traffic (cif).

Source: See text.

57BArch R 3101/33414, internal letter, economic ministry, 1.8.1944, fol. 7; BArch R 3101/33641, economic

ministry to SRA, 13.6.1944, fol. 112; economic ministry, draft of a letter, 18.5.1944, fol. 119.58

BArch R 3101/33641, draft of a letter, 17.5.1944, fol. 119.

59BArch R 3101/33641, internal letter, economic ministry, 7.9.1944, fol. 110.


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21

These estimates were reported in a survey about the German war economy, written by the

plan office in first half of 1944.60 Unfortunately, the report does not explain the way in which

these values were estimated. But, we know that the plan office had access to the same data we

do. The comparison of these estimates with our estimates suggests that the method applied by

us is appropriate, given that the results are almost the same, as shown in table 4. And both

estimates exceed by far the official import figures.

However, this method cannot be employed in order to estimate true imports made from all

countries in favour of Germany. Neither the Netherlands nor Bohemia and Moravia were

included in both the payments and the clearing statistics.61 In the case of the Netherlands, this

is due to the fact that the currency border between the Netherlands and Germany was

suspended in 1941.62 From this point of time on, imports from Netherlands could be paid in

RM. The suspension of the currency border, however, did not imply that the customs controls

between the two countries were suspended. Even if tariffs were also suspended, imports and

exports until the end of the war were controlled and registered by the customs authorities in

order to fight the so called war corruption.63Thus, in order to estimate true imports from

60J. Scherner, Bericht zur deutschen Wirtschaftslage 1943/44. Eine Bilanz des Reichsministeriums fr Rstung

und Kriegsproduktion ber die Entwicklung der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft bis Sommer 1944. Vierteljahrshefte

fr Zeitgeschichte, 55, Heft 3, 2007, 499-546.

61BArch R 184/186, DVK, annual report 1944, Appendix 7.

62BA MA RW 19/1602, decree, economic ministry, no. 29/41 D.St /13/41 R.St., 31.3.1941, fol.44; BArch R

184/188, DVK, report about clearing operations.

63BArch R 3102/SRA to Firma Frans Maas, 24.4.1941. BA MA RW 19/1602, decree, economic ministry, no.

29/41 D.St /13/41 R.St., 31.3.1941, fol.44; BArch R 43 II/371 b., note, 9.2.1942, fol. 12; G . Aly,Hitlers

Volksstaat: Raub, Rassenkrieg und nationaler Sozialismus. Frankfurt am Main 2005, S. 168; BArch R 2/58987,

finance ministry, decree, no. 21/43 D. St./11/43 R. S. , 29.3.1943; BArch R 2/58988, economic ministry to Reich

entities, 28.6.1943. The currency border between Germany and the Netherlands was re-implemented in 1944;however, without including the Netherlands in the clearing operations. Aly,Hitlers Volksstaat, p. 167; R

2/56059.


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22

the Netherlands, we use the information given by the official import statistics and data

provided by the occupation administration about finished goods exported to Germany. The

difference between finished goods officially imported from the Netherlands and the figures

provided by the occupation administration is added to the official imports. This estimate is

very close to one made by the plan office for the true imports from the Netherlands in

1943.64 In the case of Bohemia and Moravia, where not only the currency but also the

customs borders with the Reich were suspended on October, 1, 1940, import estimates are

available.65In the case of Italy true imports from 1943 on are estimated in a different way

than by the method described above because for this country data about the amount of imports

financed by occupation tributes is available. 66

Table 5: Estimate of German Import Statistics 1941-44 (bn. RM; Current prices; excluding

looted goods and black market purchases)

1941 1942 1943 1944 Sum 1941-44

Import estimate 12.8 15.5 20.7 17.5 66.5

Official imports 6.9 8.7 8.3 6.8 30.7

Sources and method: see text.

Given these considerations, and relying on the estimate method described above, we are able

to estimate a lower limit for true imports from all countries between 1941 and 1944. The

annual aggregation of all countries exports in favour of Germany is shown in table 5. As

mentioned, occupation tributes were also used for financing imports of goods purchased in

64The plan office estimated that the value of imports amounted to 1.6 1.8. bn RM in 1943, whereas our method

led to a value of 1.734 bn. RM. For the amount of finished goods exported in favour of the Germans, see Barch

R 3101/33188, annual report 1943, fol. 33.

65BA-MA RW 19/1603, note, OKW, economic department, 14.10.1940, fol. 11; J. Krej, The Bohemian-

Moravian War Economy, in: M. C. Kaser/E. A. Radice (Hgg.), The Economic History of Eastern Europe 1919-1975, Volume II, Oxfrod 1986, pp. 452-94, here p. 462 Tab. 19.9.

66Scherner, Europas Beitrag.


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23

black markets of occupied countries. Given that detailed annual information is not available

for all countries, we have chosen not to include such imports in our estimate. However, we

can assume that such black markets imports in nominal values were considerable: for France

alone black market purchases amounted to 1 bn. RM in average at least per year. We have

also neglected to include looted goods transported to Germany, because there is not enough

data available on this topic.

4. Implications

Our estimate shows that true imports were significant for the German economy, citing that

for example the German GDP between 1941 and 1944 made up to about 500 bn. RM.

Considering that the financial exploitation of occupied Europe amounted to about 110 bn. RM

(about 30 bn. enforced clearing credits from occupied countries to Germany and about 80 bn.

RM occupation tributes), we can see, that according the revised import statistics, financing of

German net imports had a significant impact. If one includes black market purchases, far

more than one third of the financial exploitation served to finance the German import surplus

in contrast to the official numbers, according to which German net imports had only a small

share on use of the money occupied Europe had to pay to the Germans.

Table 6: Real Imports and Import Structure (constant 1928-prices)

Imports

(1928=100)

Share of manufactures for

final use (%)

Share of manufactures not for final

use (%)

1928 100 6.2 6.7

1936 62 2.8 4.4

1940 53 2.2 6.0

1941 109(67) 34.4(11.3) 13.3(9.6)

1942 121(72) 38.4(22.1) 21.0(12.1)

1943 147(58) 44.7(23.1) 20.3(9.3)

Sources and method: see text.


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But does this nominal import boom also imply a boom in real numbers, given the remarkable

inflation tendencies we can observe in some occupied and allied countries? Yes! Relying on

import price indexes calculated by different German agencies, an estimate of real imports

shows (table 6, estimate in bold letters; official figures in italics) that from the beginnings of

the war real imports rose dramatically.67 We can also observe that the import structure

changed significantly: Germany became a country, which predominately imported

manufactured goods, such that Germanys import structure during the war was more similar

to Germanys current trade situation than to the import structure before the Great Depression.

Table 7: The Impact of Occupied Europe on the German Armament Production

(I)

Armament production in occupied Europe

(m. RM; current prices)

(II)

(I) in percent of true

imports

1940 756 15

1941 4,226 32

1942 7,292 47

1943 8,976 43

1944 11,397 65

Source: Scherner, Europas Beitrag.

Who benefitted from this import boom?not surprisingly the Wehrmacht. Basically, for

security reasons, often only parts of armament goods were manufactured in occupied

67For the price index forofficial imports, see Statistisches Handbuch; fort he price index of armament goods,

see Scherner, Europas Beitrag.


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25

countries. 68 About 50% of armament goods produced abroad were not finished weapons but

such parts. 80% of manufactures not for final use shipped to Germany were parts of

armaments.

Maybe the most important implication pertains to our knowledge about labour productivity

growth in the German industry during World War II. According to our import estimate, the

metal-working sectors imports of manufactures not for final use (such as parts of armaments)

amounted to 4.5 bn. RM in 1943 instead of 600 m. RM (official figure). This means that the

intermediate inputssales ratio of the German metal-working sector increased significantly

compared to 1936 (industrial census) as a result of the outsourcing of intermediate goods in

occupied countries metalworking sectors. If we consider this, as shown in table 8, labour

productivity, both in this sector and in industry as a whole, grew much less than suggested by

the figures calculated in the Industrial Sales Report of the USSBS.

Table 8: Labour Productivity in German Industry 1940-44 (% p.a.)1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

Whole industry (USSBS) 9.5 3.1 3.1 5.0 0.5

Wohle industry (Re-estimate) 8.7 -0,3 0.9 4.5 -1.1

Metal-working sector (USSBS) 13.2 8.6 4.8 7.5 7.0

Metal-working sector (Re-estimate) 11.1 1.2 0.6 7.3 6.0Source: See text.

One should note that the figure for 1940 is misleading for several reasons besides those

mentioned already in the introduction. First, outsourcing in occupied countries was still taking

place on a relatively limited basis in this year. Second, outsourcing within the German

68Scherner, Europas Beitrag.


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26

metalworking sector, which increased heavily when the war started, is not included. But there

is evidence, based especially on firm level data, that except for 1940 the trend of total

outsourcing resembled that of the outsourcing in occupied countries. In other words: The

intermediate goods-sales ratio in the metalworking sector seems to have increased throughout

the war, but the growth rates were decreasing.So it seems that except for 1940the trend of

the growth rates of the labour productivity figures estimated in table 8 is reminiscent of the

trend we would uncovered when one includes data regarding Germanys outsourcing.

Given these considerations, the result supports the hypothesis that labour productivity in the

armament industry increased only merely in a significant way during the last years of the

war.69 This is in line with preliminary results of a research project of Jonas Scherner, Jochen

Streb and Adam Tooze, who are checking and adjusting the armament ministry figures based

on monthly data. According to this data, labour productivity was in the annual average more

or less stagnating during the first years of the war and only increasing later.70

5. Conluding remarks

The published German trade statistics underreported significantly true German imports

because of registration problems. The results of the estimates presented in this paper

contributes first to our knowledge for which purposes the Germans spent the money occupied

countries had to pay them. Second, the results of the estimate reveal who benefitted from

these importsunsuprisingly in a significant and increasing way the Wehrmacht, especially

because intermediate inputs for armaments were imported in a remarkable amount. And given

69For this hypothesis, see Scherner/Streb, Das Ende eines Mythos.

70Scherner/Streb/Tooze, Armament Production in the Third Reich.


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27

the import of the latter, it seems finally that labour productivity in the German industry grew

much less than previously assumed.


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28

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