Salazar vs Alchacoso Full Text

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    Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

    EN BANC

    G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

    HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,

    vs.HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacityas Administrator of the Philippine OverseasEmployment Administration, and FERDIEMARQUEZ, respondents.

    Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

    SARMIENTO, J.:

    This concerns the validity of the power of theSecretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest andseizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code,prohibiting illegal recruitment.

    The facts are as follows:

    xxx xxx xxx

    1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a swornstatement filed with the Philippine OverseasEmployment Administration (POEA for brevity)

    charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:

    04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon aynarito atnagbibigay ng salaysay.

    S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECCCard ayayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. HortySalazar 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.

    05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawangpanloloko saiyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?

    S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.

    06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?

    S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako.Kinuha

    ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ngbooking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa PhilsAy hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ngibang company pero ayaw niyang ibigay andPECC Card ko.

    2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent AttyFerdinand Marquez to whom said complaint wasassigned, sent to the petitioner the following

    telegram:

    YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFOREFERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGALRECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSACOR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ONNOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILEDAGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OFLAW.

    4. On the same day, having ascertained that thepetitioner had no license to operate a recruitmenagency, public respondent Administrator Tomas

    D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE ANDSEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:

    HORTY SALAZARNo. 615 R.O. Santos StMandaluyong, Metro Manila

    Pursuant to the powers vested in me underPresidential Decree No. 1920 and ExecutiveOrder No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE oyour recruitment agency being operated at No615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manilaand the seizure of the documents and

    paraphernalia being used or intended to be usedas the means of committing illegal recruitment, ithaving verified that you have

    (1) No valid license or authority from theDepartment of Labor and Employment to recruitand deploy workers for overseas employment;

    (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibitedunder Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relationto Article 38 of the same code.

    This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminaprosecution under existing laws.

    Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day oNovember, 1987.

    5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director onLicensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espirituissued an office order designating respondentsAtty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and AttyErnesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to

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    implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205.Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyongpolicemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of thePeople's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Todayproceeded to the residence of the petitioner at615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.

    There it was found that petitioner was operatingHannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place,the team served said Closure and Seizure orderon a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarilyallowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. FloraSalazar informed the team that Hannalie DanceStudio was accredited with MoremanDevelopment (Phil.). However, when required toshow credentials, she was unable to produce any.Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelvetalent performers practicing a dance numberand saw about twenty more waiting outside, Theteam confiscated assorted costumes which wereduly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan andwitnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.

    6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEAthe following letter:

    Gentlemen:

    On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O.Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, werespectfully request that the personal propertiesseized at her residence last January 26, 1988 beimmediately returned on the ground that saidseizure was contrary to law and against the will ofthe owner thereof. Among our reasons are thefollowing:

    1. Our client has not been given any prior noticeor hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure OrderNo. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "dueprocess of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III,of the Philippine Constitution.

    2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of thePhilippine Constitution which guarantees right ofthe people "to be secure in their persons, houses,

    papers, and effects against unreasonablesearches and seizures of whatever nature and forany purpose."

    3. The premises invaded by your Mr. FerdiMarquez and five (5) others (including 2policemen) are the private residence of theSalazar family, and the entry, search as well asthe seizure of the personal properties belongingto our client were without her consent and weredone with unreasonable force and intimidation,together with grave abuse of the color ofauthority, and constitute robbery and violation of

    domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the RevisedPenal Code.

    Unless said personal properties worth around TENTHOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and whichwere already due for shipment to Japan) arereturned within twenty-four (24) hours from yourreceipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legaaction, civil and criminal, to protect our client's

    interests.

    We trust that you will give due attention to theseimportant matters.

    7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA couldanswer the letter, petitioner filed the instantpetition; on even date, POEA filed a criminacomplaint against her with the Pasig ProvinciaFiscal, docketed as IS-88-836. 1

    On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suitfor prohibition. Although the acts sought to be

    barred are alreadyfait accompli, thereby makingprohibition too late, we consider the petition asone for certiorari in view of the grave publicinterest involved.

    The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: Maythe Philippine Overseas EmploymentAdministration (or the Secretary of Labor) validlyissue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest)under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also anissue squarely raised by the petitioner for theCourt's resolution.

    Under the new Constitution, which states:

    . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shalissue except upon probable cause to bedetermined personally by the judge afterexamination under oath or affirmation of thecomplainant and the witnesses he may produceand particularly describing the place to besearched and the persons or things to beseized. 2

    it is only a judge who may issue warrants o

    search and arrest.3

    In one case, it was declaredthat mayors may not exercise this power:

    xxx xxx xxx

    But it must be emphasized here and now thatwhat has just been described is the state of thelaw as it was in September, 1985. The law hassince been altered. No longer does the mayohave at this time the power to conductpreliminary investigations, much less issue orders

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    of arrest. Section 143 of the Local GovernmentCode, conferring this power on the mayor hasbeen abrogated, rendered functus officio by the1987 Constitution which took effect on February2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipinopeople. Section 2, Article III of the 1987Constitution pertinently provides that "no searchwarrant or warrant of arrest shall issue exceptupon probable cause to be determined personallyby the judge after examination under oath oraffirmation of the complainant and the witnesseshe may produce, and particularly describing theplace to be searched and the person or things tobe seized." The constitutional proscription hasthereby been manifested that thenceforth, thefunction of determining probable cause andissuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest orsearch warrants, may be validly exercised only by

    judges, this being evidenced by the elimination inthe present Constitution of the phrase, "suchother responsible officer as may be authorized bylaw" found in the counterpart provision of said1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, mightconduct preliminary investigations and issuewarrants of arrest or search warrants. 4

    Neither may it be done by a mere prosecutingbody:

    We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar SaltingTask Force exercises, or was meant to exercise,prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, itcannot be said to be a neutral and detached"judge" to determine the existence of probablecause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a

    magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested inthe success of his case. Although his office "is tosee that justice is done and not necessarily tosecure the conviction of the person accused," hestands, invariably, as the accused's adversaryand his accuser. To permit him to issue searchwarrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is tomake him both judge and jury in his own right,when he is neither. That makes, to our mind andto that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 asamended by Presidential Decree No. 2002,unconstitutional. 5

    Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, asnow written, was entered as an amendment byPresidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of thelate President Ferdinand Marcos, to PresidentialDecree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislativepowers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister ofLabor merely exercised recommendatory powers:

    (c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorizedrepresentative shall have the power to

    recommend the arrest and detention of anyperson engaged in illegal recruitment. 6

    On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgatedPresidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowedpurpose of giving more teeth to the campaignagainst illegal recruitment. The Decree gave theMinister of Labor arrest and closure powers:

    (b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shalhave the power to cause the arrest and detentionof such non-licensee or non-holder of authority ifafter proper investigation it is determined that hisactivities constitute a danger to national securityand public order or will lead to furtheexploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shalorder the closure of companies, establishmentand entities found to be engaged in therecruitment of workers for overseas employmentwithout having been licensed or authorized to doso. 7

    On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcospromulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, givingthe Labor Minister search and seizure powers aswell:

    (c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or hisduly authorized representatives shall have thepower to cause the arrest and detention of suchnon-licensee or non-holder of authority if afteinvestigation it is determined that his activitiesconstitute a danger to national security andpublic order or will lead to further exploitation of

    job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search o

    the office or premises and seizure of documentsparaphernalia, properties and other implementsused in illegal recruitment activities and theclosure of companies, establishment and entitiesfound to be engaged in the recruitment oworkers for overseas employment, withouhaving been licensed or authorized to do so. 8

    The above has now been etched as Article 38paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.

    The decrees in question, it is well to note, standas the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in itstwilight moments.

    We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, nobeing a judge, may no longer issue search oarrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must gothrough the judicial process. To that extent, wedeclare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the LaboCode, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

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    The Solicitor General's reliance on the caseofMorano v . Vivo9 is not well-taken. Vivo involved a deportation case,governed by Section 69 of the defunct RevisedAdministrative Code and by Section 37 of theImmigration Law. We have ruled that indeportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirablealien) ordered by the President or his dulyauthorized representatives, in order to carry out afinal decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is valid,however, because of the recognized supremacyof the Executive in matters involving foreignaffairs. We have held: 11

    xxx xxx xxx

    The State has the inherent power to deportundesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). Thatpower may be exercised by the Chief Executive"when he deems such action necessary for thepeace and domestic tranquility of the nation."

    Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the ChiefExecutive finds that there are aliens whosecontinued presence in the country is injurious tothe public interest, "he may, even in the absenceof express law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco

    Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In reMcCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).

    The right of a country to expel or deport aliensbecause their continued presence is detrimentalto public welfare is absolute and unqualified (TiuChun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner ofImmigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil.

    949, 956).12

    The power of the President to order the arrest ofaliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It(the power to order arrests) can not be made toextend to other cases, like the one at bar. Underthe Constitution, it is the sole domain of thecourts.

    Moreover, the search and seizure order inquestion, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that itwas validly issued, is clearly in the nature of ageneral warrant:

    Pursuant to the powers vested in me underPresidential Decree No. 1920 and ExecutiveOrder No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE ofyour recruitment agency being operated at No.615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manilaand the seizure of the documents andparaphernalia being used or intended to be usedas the means of committing illegal recruitment, ithaving verified that you have

    (1) No valid license or authority from theDepartment of Labor and Employment to recruitand deploy workers for overseas employment;

    (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibitedunder Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relationto Article 38 of the same code.

    This ORDER is without prejudice to your crimina

    prosecution under existing laws.13

    We have held that a warrant must identify clearlythe things to be seized, otherwise, it is null andvoid, thus:

    xxx xxx xxx

    Another factor which makes the search warrantsunder consideration constitutionally objectionableis that they are in the nature of general warrants

    The search warrants describe the articles soughtto be seized in this wise:

    1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paperink, photo equipment, typewriters, cabinetstables, communications/ recording equipmenttape recorders, dictaphone and the like usedand/or connected in the printing of the "WEFORUM" newspaper and any and aldocuments/communications, letters and facsimileof prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

    2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leafletsbooks, and other publications to promote the

    objectives and purposes of the subversiveorganizations known as Movement for FreePhilippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6Movement; and

    3) Motor vehicles used in thedistribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" andother subversive materials and propagandamore particularly,

    1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate NoNKA 892;

    2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate NoNKV 969;

    3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;

    4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with PlateNo. PBP 665; and

    5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate NoNGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang."

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    In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrantwhich authorized the search for "books, records,pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda,pictures, recordings and other writteninstruments concerning the Communist Parties of

    Texas, and the operations of the CommunityParty in Texas," was declared void by the U.S.Supreme Court for being too general. In likemanner, directions to "seize any evidence inconnection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 orotherwise" have been held too general, and thatportion of a search warrant which authorized theseizure of any "paraphernalia which could beused to violate Sec. 54-197 of the ConnecticutGeneral Statutes (the statute dealing with thecrime of conspiracy)" was held to be a generalwarrant, and therefore invalid. The description ofthe articles sought to be seized under the searchwarrants in question cannot be characterizeddifferently.

    In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls

    to mind a notable chapter in English history; theera of disaccord between the Tudor Governmentand the English Press, when "Officers of theCrown were given roving commissions to searchwhere they pleased in order to suppress anddestroy the literature of dissent both Catholic andPuritan." Reference herein to such historicalepisode would not be relevant for it is not thepolicy of our government to suppress anynewspaper or publication that speaks with "thevoice of non-conformity" but poses no clear andimminent danger to state security. 14

    For the guidance of the bench and the bar, wereaffirm the following principles:

    1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, whomay issue warrants of arrest and search:

    2. The exception is in cases of deportation ofillegal and undesirable aliens, whom thePresident or the Commissioner of Immigrationmay order arrested, following a final order ofdeportation, for the purpose of deportation.

    WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38,paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declaredUNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. Therespondents are ORDERED to return all materialsseized as a result of the implementation ofSearch and Seizure Order No. 1205.

    No costs.

    SO ORDERED.

    Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdeaand Regalado, JJ., concur.

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