Safety at sea, article, Century magazine

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SAFETY AT SEA^

IN T H E L I G H T O F T H E TITANIC D I S A S T E R

BY R EAR -ADM IRAL CHAR LES D. SIGSBEE, U. S. N .

IN the practice of navigation, r isks are

inevitable. Some are und ertak en vol

untarily , but the acceptance of others isforced. State d broadly , there should be

the promise of commensurate gain in

every cri t ical r isk tha t is assumed. Eth i

cally, as between human life and private

gain, the latter should give way, though

frequently we see this order reversed.

Apparen t ly we have a g lar ing example in

the loss of the Titanic on the night of

Ap ril 14 last .

From my naval exper ience , I wi l l g ive

one case of a r isk voluntarily undertaken

by myself, and another of a risk forced

upon me. In the spr ing of 1897 , wh en Itook command of the Maine, which was

af terward b lown up a t Havana, no ba t t le

ship had ever made the passage of Hell

G a t e . The management o f a ba t t le - sh ip

and also of twin-screws being new to me,

I longed for a test of management which

wo uld be in the na tur e of a climax. So,

without a pilot , I took the Maine t h r o u g h

Hel l Ga te f rom Long I s land Sound . I

met other vessels, one an unwieldy float,

at the most dangerous turning of that

t idew ay of violent cross cur ren ts. Afte r

crit ical moments, the Maine effected thepassage wi th out damage. M y com

mander-in-chief strongly disapproved my

choice of route, and at once issued Gen

eral Order No. 16, forbidding other ves

sels of his command to attempt the same

feat. I accepted the ord er as an open

rebuke of myself. Although no l i fe was

risked, and my experience in piloting was

uncommonly large, I now think I ven

tured too much in piloting a f ive-mill ion-do l lar ba t t le - sh ip th rough Hel l Gate ,

where I had no local knowledge and was

compelled to depend upon the chart alone.

Later , when in the East River wi th

th e Maine, between the navy-yard and

Brooklyn Bridge and proceeding to Staten

Island, I was confronted with a very

difficult situ atio n. A str on g ebb-tide

was runnin g . T h e r iver was congested

with vessels, some of which were under

questionable management in that locali ty

of stro ng eddies. Finally , an excursion-

s teamer , loaded down wi th women andchildren and coming fast , opened out to

view close aboard and nearly ahead. She

gave a whistle signal to the Maine wh ich ,

had I accepted i t , would surely have re

sulted in sinking the frail steamer and

dro wn ing most of her people. I there

fore reversed her signal by counter-signal

—gave her the r ight of way and steered

th e Maine into pier No. 36 on the New

Y or k side of the r iver . Lyin g at the pier

was a huge f loat carrying ten freight-cars.

T h e Maine struck one corner of the float,

which sank, carrying with i t the cars;then, head on, the batt le-ship ate into the

pier as if it were cheese, but backing hard

on her engines, and with water- t ight doors

closed and coll ision-mat already over the

side—splendid ly qu ick work . A naval

board invest iga ted and repor ted . T h e H on .

Theodore Roosevel t , Act ing-Secre tary o f

ISe e also " Compulsory Lane Rou tes of the North Atlantic " proposed by Captain Horatio iVIcKay, in T H E

CENTURY for Novenaber, 1881 ; and "Safe ty a t Sea " by L. Frank Too ker, in T H E CENTURY for July,

1909, which described new and old devices for navigating in fog and d a r k n e s s . — T H E EDITOR.



462 T H E C E N T U R Y M A G A Z IN E

the Navy, then wrote me a letter in flattering terms, highly commending my action in risking the Maine to save the liveson board the excursion-steamer. I hadbelieved that I would damage the Maine

to the extent of hundreds of thousands ofdollars, but by strange good fortune and

by taking the wharf head on, she sufferedno damage beyond the power of her ownmen to repair. Th ere was a gratifyingsequel. W he n my commander-in-chiefread M r. Roosevelt's letter, he promptlyissued General Order No. 17, revokingGeneral Orde r No . 16. Also my actionwas lauded by the press and my brother-officers of the navy.

Having thus borne testimony for andagainst my own risks, perhaps I may venture to discuss the risks taken by the Ti

tanic. She carried more than two thou

sand people, and was forewarned of iceahead; yet she continued at night on theprescribed "ocean lane" with undiminished speed—that is to say, about twenty-one and a half knots an hour. He r w ater-line length was eight hundred and fifty-two feet. By stopping her engines andimm ediately reversing them full speed, shecould not have come to a dead-stand shortof six times that length, or until she hadpassed over a distance of eight tenths of asea mile, or knot—nearly one statute mile.This is a conservative estimate. Her third

engine was turbine, and of low efficiencyfor backing. Evide ntly she chose to depend on a quick change of compass courseto avoid danger sighted dead ahead. Ha dshe struck when going ahead even at half-

speed, probably she would have rippedopen her bilges quite the same by the lessforceful blow; but, on the other hand, shewould have made the vision of her lookouts more effective, and would haveshortened her head-reaching against fullbacking power.

Seemingly the advantage in view by

ven turin g high speed was business prestige.H ad the ice-field been fifteen miles wid e onthe line of the Titanic s course, and had shesucceeded in passing through at half-speed,she would thereby have delayed her arrivalat N ew Y ork only forty-two minutes. Butwe now know that passage through wasimpossible. At noon on the day of the Ti-

tanic's collision, the Mesaba of the Atlantic Transport Line sighted the packand was obliged to go many miles- south

in order to round it. H er captain reported by letter to the Naval Hydro-graphic Office at Washington, accordingto Captain John J. Knapp, the chief hy-drographer, that the ice was a solid packabout fifteen feet high and extending oneach hand as far as the eye could reach.

Successive reports indicate that it was asolid mass of pack-ice and bergs aboutfive miles wide from east to west andforty-one miles long from north to south.A French steamer also had to change hercourse and pass around far to the southward of her intended route. T he actualconditions could not have been known toCaptain Smith, who would not have essayed the impossible.

T h e Titanic was due in New Yorkshortly after midday, several days ahead,therefore a brief delay did not involve an

arrival at night. W hile giving no important advantage to her passengers, shewas risking their lives. W e may inferthat her passengers, in their choice of vessel, had paid not only for a quick passagewith the acme of comfort and luxury, butabove all for a safe one. W e now knowthat the exploitation of the Titanic s supposed unsinkable quality was not justified,and that the carrying capacity of herboats was inadequa te. H ad a high seabeen running, it is probable that^aione ofher passengers would have been saved

from those ice-cold wa ters. Th ou gh wemay question Captain Smith's judgmentof the moment, we must assume that soeminent a seaman was above professionalignorance. Fo r his example of manhoodin accepting the ethics of the sea, in theiruttermost requirement, his memory willglorify tradition, for he went to his deathnobly.

The natural peril of the sea is everlasting. It comes in many forms and farmore frequently than passengers conceive.The details and scope of special judg

ment, even "speculative judgment," thatmust be exercised to meet recurring perils successfully are probably not imaginedby the average passenger, else many nervous persons would not go to sea at all.On the other hand, it may be said that,through long experience, a seaman by thetime he reaches command afloat has become very resourceful. In fact, whenseemingly unconcerned in view of thepassengers, his mind may be working in



S A F E T Y A T S E A 463

man y channe ls for the i r sa fety . No ne

can te l l wha t expedients were in the mind

of Captain Smith, even though they fai led

him . I myself have directed the ma nage

ment of two vessels , dissimilar in size and

qua l i t ie s , throug h a whole s torm -area of

hurr icane force wi thout leaving my cabin

except for a casual look above the hatchonce or tw ice. I did i t by repo rts from

the deck and by stud yin g the fluctuations

of the ba rom ete r in my cabin . T h e di

rect management of each vessel was left

to he r own capta in , but , throug h f requent

reports , I knew precisely how each vessel

was fa r ing . Fo r the adva ntage of the

smaller vessel, I decided to cross the fore

front of the storm-center, expecting to

pass the center c lose—and succeeded.

Af t e rw a rd i t p rove d t ha t my j udgm e n t

wa s rig ht in every phase of the stor m. In

i t s fur the r o nw ard movem ent tha t s tormdid great damage in the open sea and on

the coast of En gla nd . Prob ably few peo

ple on board my flag-ship real ized that I

remained be low the be t te r to se rve my

own me t hod o f work i ng .

T o discuss in detai l the peri ls of th e

sea and the recourse of the seaman in

avoiding them would f i l l a volume, but

they may be touched on here . A mo ng the

na tura l pe r i l s a re s torms, currents , fog ,

ice , shoals, outlying islands and headlands,

deep wate r ,—tha t i s to say , "no sound

ings" close to shore,—and overcast sky,which shuts out the heavenly bodies tha t

are used for obtaining the ship's geograph

ical pos i t ion . A mo ng wh a t may be s ty led

the artificial perils are vessels and float

ing derel ic ts . O f the peri ls inhe rent in

the ship he rse l f a re under-manning; poor

t ra in ing and disc ip l ine ; faul ty cons t ruc

t ion; unseaworthiness due to long usage ;

low freeboard; o ld boi le rs and engines ;

bad s towage ; the osc i l la t ion of f ree wa te r

in damaged compartments as e ffec t ing

stabil i ty; fi re , perhaps from spontaneous

combust ion in the coa l -bunkers ; heavyweights fe tching adr i f t in s torms, e tc .

Let me discuss a few points as I may.

Oceanic s torms have los t much of the i r

fo rme r t e r ro r fo r ma r i ne r s t h rough ou r

be t te r knowledge of a tmospher ic c i rcula

t ion in s torms, a knowledge which ex

tends back hardly more than seventy-five

years . T h e records show tha t in the

"olden days" sai l ing-ships and even whole

fleets went to certa in destruct ion through

mi sma na ge me n t i n t he s t o rm-a re a . W i t h

the knowledge now possessed by every

competent capta in , most s torms, wh en the

vessel has plenty of sea-room and is stanch ,

may be reduced in their effect to discom

fo r t i ng h i nd ra nc e s ; bu t whe re t he ma n

agement is bad, the vessel may st i l l be

endangered . Smashing in jury somet imesoccurs w hen the g reat l in er, in the prid e of

her power , p lunges reckless ly through the

enormous s torm-wave for a quick passage .

I t i s then tha t we read about the " t id a l

wa ve , " a phe nome non of t he At l a n t i c

s team routes f requent ly repor ted , but

which I have never encountered in al l my

travels over the surface of the waters.

The grea t oceanic current s t reams a re

no w we l l char te d . O uts id e of these , the

surface currents commonly f low wi th the

win d. T o the vessel und er way the re i s

alwa ys difficulty in est im ating the stren gthand di rec t ion of a cur rent w hen the ob

jects whereby she fixes her geographic po

si t ion from t ime to t ime are obscured,

whether these objects be of the heavens

above or the ea r th benea th . N o ins t ru

ment has been invented that wil l give by

di rec t measurement the s t rength and di

rect ion of a current to a vessel which is

und er way . Fo g br ings danger of col l i

s ion and gro und ing. T h e audibi l i ty of

fog-signals is very er rat ic , and depends

largely on the direct ion of the wind rela

t ively to the signal and the vessel. Apowerful whis t le may be heard a t a d i s

tance of ten miles, and yet not at a dis

tance of one mile or even less. T h er e

a re ins t ruments , however , of more or le ss

dependence , to indica te approximate ly the

dire ction of a fog-sign al from a vessel. I

have known seven bat t le-ships, compelled

to steam at e leven knots a t a distance

apar t of four hundred yards , to mainta in

good distance in column for many hours

together in fog so thick that no vessel in

the column ever saw another vessel of the

squadron, and when the wea ther was suchthat no vessel could hear the constantly

recurr ing whis t le -b las t s tha t were passed

down the column except those of the ves

sel next ahead and next astern of her.

Under such condi t ions I have known the

fog to l i ft suddenly and disclose to view a

me rchan t vesse l sa i l ing through the column.

Under my command the d iv is ion of

four war-vesse l s of the John Paul Jones

Expedit ion had a t rying experience in a



464 T H E C E N T U R Y M A G A Z I N E

thick fog which continued for eighteen

hours immedia te ly preceding the a r r iva l

of the division at Ch erb ou rg. T h e vessels

were steaming in column at eleven knots

along the rock-bound coast of France in

the varying, cur ren ts of tha t loca l i ty . In

all those eighteen hours no land was

sighted nor any shore signals heard or seen.Very rarely did any vessel sight any other

vessel in the colu mn . W irele ss signals

failed us, and toward the end our posit ion

was somew hat in doub t . Necessar i ly the

naviga t ion w as a l l by dead reckoning .

The course was changed several t imes by

whistle signals, but with diff iculty, and

once or twice the column was stopped by

gun signals to make sure of accurate

sou ndin gs. A t al l t imes i t wa s less haz

ardous to keep on than to stop except mo

men tar i ly in those s t ron g cur ren ts . I s tood

in for the land when supposedly off theentrance, intending to anchor at sea, if

need be; but to approach that coast in a

fog w ith four vessels wa s ven tureso me

naviga t ion. Suddenly the fog c leared a

litt le, an d fr om m y flag-ship, the i?roo^/j;re,

t he e n t r a nc e t o Che r bour g ha r bor w a s

sighted dead ahead and about three quar

ters of a mile distan t . O ne af ter ano the r

my vessels emerged from the fog-bank,

st i l l in column, but opened out a l i t t le .

In thick weather , close proximity to ice

bergs and land is sometimes disclosed by

t iming the echo of ships ' s team-whis t les .Vessels have been saved from destruction

by this recourse. '

For tuna te ly ice i s encountered only in

certain regions. T h e ice of the Titanic's

pack was swept south by the Labrador

Current se t t ing over the Grea t Bank of

Ne wfo und land . I t s extensive a rea this

year is probably due to the heavy storms

which swept the coast of Labrador las t

winter and broke contact in the ice-f ield.

Routes in common, styled ocean lanes,

have been established between the English

Channel and New York by genera l agreement of the At lant ic s teamship l ines . The

object is to confine all westbound passages

to one route and all eastbound passages to

a s imi la r route somewhat fa r ther south,

and this to minimize the danger of coll i

sion consistently with the best practicable

advantage for quick passages, and to pro

vide for help in case of accident. Fr om

Ja nu a r y 15 to A u gus t 14 t he s t a nda r d

lanes lead south of the Grea t Bank of

New foun dlan d to avoid ice . Fro m Au

gust 15 to January 14 they cross tha t

bank as far north as lat i tude 46 degrees.

T h e Titanic struck at 10130 P . M . on A pr i l

14 in la t i tude 41° 44 ' nor th , longi tude

50° 14 ' west , whi le pursuin g her regu lar

route . She sank a t 2:2 0 A. M. the same

night . Imme dia te ly the hydro graphic off ice set to work to establish temporary

lanes more to the southward of the Grea t

Ban k, in ord er to clear the ice-f ield. Af ter

c l e ve r w or k by L ie u t e na n t John G r a dy ,

U. S . N. , in charge of the branch hydro-

graphic off ice at New York, al l trans

atlantic steamship l ines agreed, and on

Apr i l 19 the change was made; but the

drif t of the ice wa s so rapid t ha t a no ther

change of lane to the southward was made

through the hydrographic oi f ice on May

I I , a nd s t i ll a no the r on M a y i g . By M a y

13 ice had reached as far south as latitude 38° 50 ' . Dou bt less in good t ime the

former lanes will be reestablished.

Floating derelicts are dangers the drif t

and position of which it is difficult to pre

dict . Some drif t a year or mo re before

breaking up; others a re des t royed by gov

ernm ent vessels. I need har dly discuss at

length the dangers or peri ls inherent in

the vessel herself. Most of these can be

met successfully in their incipiency. Spon

taneous combustion of coal may occur in

oily waste or rags, or in coal-dust which

has been stowed for a long t ime in hotbunke r s . D u r ing the Spa ni sh W a r I c om

manded the At lant ic l iner St. Paul, w hic h

had been t ransformed into an a rmed scout

cruiser. On ce we were endangered by the

spontaneous combustion of coal in a full

bunker which conta ined two hundred and

fifty tons.

In the event of accident l ike that of the

Titanic, the f irst inte ntio n is to keep th e

vessel af loat and retain her people aboard.

T h e last resort is to aban don her . I t is

attempted, therefore, to make vessels non-

s inkable f rom ordinary damage , by subdividing them into water - t ight compar t

ments , whereby the inroad of water may

be res t r ic ted to one or more compar tments

only , leav ing the vessel sufficient buo yan cy

to rema in af loat . T h e Titanic had fifteen

water - t ight compar tments , in addi t ion to

those of her double bottom, which ex

tended only to the upward turn of her

bilge. Since she was con structe d to

carry much cargo or freight, her space



S A F E T Y A T S EA 4 6 5

below decks was conserved as much as

possible in order to return a good invest

ment on the money expended in her con

s t ruc t ion and opera t ions . W it h her wate r

t ight s t ruc ture thus l imi ted, she should

have car r ied more boats .

W ate r - t i gh t subdivis ion is car r ied to it s

extreme in batt le-ships, which are l iableto be torpedoed and rammed or to be in

jured by gun- f ire in many par ts . T h e

Uni ted Sta tes ba t t le - ship Delaware, of

20,0 00 tons displacement , has 427 w ater

t ight compar tm ents . Some of these a re

closed by removable plates, but she has

292 wa ter - t ig ht doors . In a ba t t le- ship

the double bot toms extend vi r tua l ly the

whole length of the vessel and up her sides

to the water - t ight , protec t ive deck tha t

overspreads boilers, engines, magazines,

bunke rs , and s torerooms. Both t ransverse

and longi tudina l bulkheads a re every

wh ere . T h e coa l -bunkers a re winge d, or

built in along the side of the vessel, as are

a lso cer ta in other com par tm ents . I t is

clearly recognized, however, that a close

para l le l cannot be drawn be tween a ba t

t le-ship and an ocean-liner . Nev ertheles s,

some ocean-liners have win ged coal-bunk

ers . W it h a dde d c om pa r tm e nt s , i nspe c

tion and caretaking becomes increasingly

burdensom e. T h e f requent inspect ions of

a ba t t le - ship ' s compar tments and doors by

many responsible people are carefully re

corded.

At night a l l water - t ight doors and pla tes

on board our war-vessels are kept shut ex

cept those necessary for passageway. Cer

ta in water - t ight doors can be opera ted

from the decks above. Collision dri l ls are

frequen t. Rec ently the cruiser Maryland

was accidentally perforated by a torpedo

head in the wake of a coal-bunker , but the

inroad of water was confined to that

bunker , and the damage was easily re

pa i red tempo rar i ly . T h e Un i ted Sta tes

torpedo-dest royer Warrington had her

whole stern cut off by coll ision, but remained af loat .

In the design of every merchant vessel

of great size there are many compromises

which tax her des igner severe ly. No t

wi ths tanding the l imi ta t ions forced on the

designer , I venture to predic t an extended

use of winged coal-bunkers and of double

botto ms. I t is also conceivable tha t pas

senger service and freight service afloat

wi ll be by sepa rate conveyance, follow ing

in that respect the railroad practice on

shore. Indee d, there is already an ap

proach to this change by the Lusitania and

the Mauretania, which are mail- and pas

senger -car r ie r s . Th ey never take more

than a thousand tons of f re ight ,—com

monly only f rom four hundred to s ix hun

dred ton s ,—an d have winged coa l -bunkers .

Amer ican war -vesse ls car ry enough boats

to accommodate only from forty to sixty

per cent, of their people. T h e object is to

have enough for general transit purposes

and to land armed parties of men . In the

event of grounding, several tr ips would be

necessary to land all han ds. Com mo nly

batt le-ships cruise in company, and are

mutually helpful in the event of accident.

Naval men are t ra ined oarsmen, and are

a lso taug ht swim ming . T h e rac ing crew

of the batt le-ship Kentucky w on the

Drexel Cup for three years successively.

The crew was composed of men from the

engineer force. I un ders tand they we re

trained for two years at least by the chief

engineer . T h e boats conta in tools and

mater ia ls for repa i r s , dr inking water , and

enough concent ra ted "emergency ra t ions"

to serve their full complement of passen

gers w ith three meals for three or four

days . "A ban do nin g ship" is a dr i l l which

is frequently practised. Life-raf ts have

been discarded, b ut the re is a full supply

of cork jacke ts . Du r in g the wa r wi th

Spain, the American war-vessels off Santi

ago re ta ined only two pul l ing boats and

their two steam-launches, the lat ter for

picket service.

I t is cr i t ical wor k to lowe r a boat from

its davits in a heavy sea. T h e higher th e

free-board of the vessel, the more difficult

t he unde r t a k ing . H a n gin g f rom her

tackles, the boat consti tutes a heavy pen

dulum, swinging out f rom the ship on one

roll , and str iking against the side of the

ship wi th t rem endo us and disconcer ting

force on the reverse roll . W h en ne ar the

water she may be struck by a sea, andthro wn agains t ' the ship wi th grea t vio

lence. T o detach her from her tackles,

bow and s te rn s imul taneously, when near

the water , a lever in the boat is pulled,

and she drops bodily . W er e or . ; end

dropped f irst , the upward heave of the

vessel might send the free end under

water . Many l ives have been lost in acci

dents of this kind . T h e Tilanic's boat -

deck was seventy feet above the water .



466 T H E C E N T U R Y M A G A Z I N E

T o low er her boats in a heavy sea wou ld

have been a trying operation to the best

of sea me n. I find it difficult to conceive

how the officers of ocean-liners can com

mand the si tuation under the stress of an

emergency l ike that of the Titanic. U n

disciplined bodies of people, whether sol

diers, sailors, or civilians, are likely to beimpetuous and clamorous in sudden emer

gency . Even many wh o volun teer he lp

are l ikely to be "all f ingers and thumbs"

in the mechanics of the mo me nt. In the

main , the conduct aboard the Titanic ap

pears to have been amazingly f ine, and re

f lects great credit on Captain Smith, his

officers, and many of the passengers.

T h e diff iculty in provid ing enough

boats to accommodate all hands, even for

a great vessel like the Titanic, is not in

superab le . Th ey could be ar ranged on

the boat-deck in rows or t iers, but mighthave to be lowered in succession from a

few davits. W h en one boat has been low

ered, anoth er cannot be lowere d from the

same davits unti l the falls or tackles are

rounded-up and the preceding boat is

clear of the ship's side. A gai n, if the

vessel herself be listed much, all boats

might have to be lowered from one side

only .

At lan t ic l iners are in por t so l i t t le tha t

I cannot see at this moment how oars

manship can be accomplished unless the

men are required to give certificate ofqualif ication on joinin g the vessel. Per

haps qualif ied men might be given a l i t

t le additional pay.

No qual i ty o f s t ruc ture or equ ipment

can be given a vessel without bringing

forward the serious question of added

weig ht . T h e log ica l a im of development

is unsinkability of the vessel herself. I

have i t f rom an expert source that af ter

modera te subdiv is ion below the water -

l ine, a l iner could be so constructed as to

have, above the water- l ine, a great sub

divided structure which would be, in effect , an enormous habitable pontoon of

sufficient buoyancy to float the vessel even

after grea t f looding below . T h e pontoon

wo uld be wi t hou t a i r -por ts , bu t l igh ted

and ventilated by artif icial means, such

as we f ind in the navy at the present t im e.

There would be water - t igh t doors o r

hatches. I have heard experts surmise that

wh en th e Titanic's f o r war d co mp ar tmen t s

were injured she inclined by the head

so much as to bring their burst ceil ing-

decks below the water- l ine, and that the

water then f lowed aft and down the

hatches of o ther p ro tec t ive compar tments .

Detachable deck-houses , bu lwarks , and

other parts of the upper works have been

proposed. Th ese are intended to be pas

senger-carrying, and to f loat independentlywh en th e vessel sinks, but they have never

met wi th favor . Th ey are dangerous and

cumbrous weights to be set adrif t at a t ime

of supreme peril and difficulty, perhaps

in a heavy sea or from a vessel inclined

from the norm al. In fact , they mig ht not

be detachable at all in a great swirl of

w ate rs. T h e use of compressed air forced

into the compartments of the vessel has

also been proposed, simulating the prin

ciple of diving -arm or. T h e mechanism

would l ie dormant during the l ifetime of

most vessels in which i t was used, and yetwould require the constant care needed

for all air- t ig ht app arat us. Seemingly the

suggestion represents a principle of more

value for deliberate use, such as wrecking,

tha n for sudden emergency. A t least i t

has more promise than most expedients

whic h have been proposed. Com pressed

air is already used for expelling water

from the diving-tank s of subm arines. I

pass by the many other expedients for sup

plementing boats in the event of abandon

ing ship. Al l are makesh if ts, requir in g

manual or mechanical effort at cr i t icalt imes. If launched into the w ate r indis

criminately, they would be l ikely to im

pede the low erin g of l ife-boats. Con fu

sion should not be invited.

W irele ss is a great recourse, as was

found in the case of the Titanic, but p ro

vision should be made for constant atten

dance by opera tors. I t was only by a hair

tha t the Carpathia caught the message of

the Titanic. T h e Carpathians opera tor

wa s on the point of tur nin g in. Int er

ference by irresponsible amateurs can,

and should, be stopped. I t is grea tly tobe condemned that the amenity of the sea

should suffer through the assertion of one

patent-r ight over another , by one com

pany against ano ther company. A t the

very root of the grant of patent monopo

lies by governments is the recognition of

publ ic benefi t th rough invent ion . W ir e

less is steadily developing. W e may hope

much from it .

It is safe to pred ict tha t s earc h-ligh ts



S A F E T Y A T S E A 467

will be imperat ively prescribed for high-

powered ocean- l ine rs . M an y of the smal l

s teamers of our in land wate rs now carry

them. In Ju ly , 1898, the St. Paul, u n d e r

my c omma nd , wa s a t Ne w York a nd un

der urgent orders to take a regiment and

supplies to the rel ief of General Shafter

a t S a n t i ago . P re s i de n t M c K i n l e y h i mself urg ed exped it ion. I decided to pu t

to sea a t n igh t . T h e St. Paul was then

dow n to twen ty-nin e feet dra f t . Hea vy

project i les for the navy had been stowed

in the hold, set t ing her compasses awry—

about two whole compass points , a s we

found la ter. She w ou ld be obliged to

pass obliquely to the usual channel routes

throu gh two se ts of mines . T h e range-

l ights of the channels were obscured, and

so w ere th e l ights of the gas-buoys at th e

narrow oute r ent rance off Sandy Hook.

A draft as deep as twenty-nine feet hadnever been taken out of New York a t

n i gh t unde r a ny c i r cums t a nc e s. T h e

first pi lot who presented himself refused

to a t tem pt the p i lo tage . I demanded an

other pi lot , and accepted al l responsibi l

i ty . T h e second pi lo t was hear t i ly wi l l

ing to p i lo t the vesse l . W e s ta r ted w i th

only one engine opera t ive ; the o the r en

gine was un der temp orary repa i rs . Off

S ta ten Is land the second engine was put

in oper at ion. Eac h successive chan nel-

buoy was picked up by our search-l ights,

and not one was passed unti l I myself

had read the number pa in ted upon i t .

The passage was made wi thout mishap.

Thus a grea t publ ic se rvice was pe r

formed which would have been impossible

wi thout the use of sea rch- l ights .

Navy sea rch- l ights i l lumina te objec ts a t

a distance of from tw o to five miles. T h e

night lookout of the Titanic was s ta t ioned

aloft , probably a hundred feet above the

wa te r . In tha t pos it ion he saw dis tant ob

jec t s projec ted aga ins t the da rk wa te r in

stead of against the l igh ter sky. In th e

masted ships in the old navy the mastheadlookout was ca l led down a t sundown and

the deck lookou ts we re sta t ioned . I submit

tha t n ight lookouts should be s ta t ioned

as low down as pract icable on board ocean-

l ine rs . A sea rch- l ight nea r the w a te r

throw s a beam a long the wa te r . Fr om a

posi t ion high up i t throws a bri l l iant

el l ipt ical spot , but makes the operat ion

of "sweeping" for an object more diffi

cul t . O n c lea r n ights the proxim i ty of

vessel s i s mad e know n by the i r " r un nin g

ligh ts," wh ite , green, and red. Since im

movable objects are dangerous only when

ahead, in the line of the vessel 's course,

the zone to be "swept" for such dangers

i s na rr ow ly l imi ted . In th ick fog sea rch

l ights and lookouts have l i t t le or no effi

c iency. It is then tha t wh ist le , lead, log,engine counter, hearing, and caution are

at their highest value . Fo r the man age

ment of ships at sea, re la t ively to one an

other , we have the manda tory , in te rna

t iona l " r u le s of the road " as revised by

an in te rna t iona l mari t ime congress as

sembled in Washington some years ago.

Decisions of courts rest on these rules.

A similar congress is soon to meet in

Lo ndo n. T h e ru les for wi re less t rans

mission, l ike the "rules of the road,"

should not be left to the judgment of

pr iva te companies . Wire less having be

come general , i ts guiding rules should be

established with the stabil i ty that can be

obta ined only throu gh in te rna t iona l

agreement and cont ro l .

American war-vessels , in their varied

cruising, receive aboard all classes of good

people, from the plainest c i t izens up

through the highest aristocracies, includ

ing roya l ty itself. The i r a pa r t me n t s a re

comfortable and a t t rac t ive , but a re not

burdened wi th use less ornamenta t ion and

appointments of the kind which has been

qualified by a foreign wr i ter as " br ut all u x u r y . " T h e P u l l m a n C o m p a n y h a s

done away, in i ts coaches, with much

senseless embellishment in favor of steel

cons t ruc t ion and dus t less s impl ici ty . O ur

great ocean-l iners might well draw a les

son f rom th is improvement , and put the

mon ey saved thereb y into useful features

of construc t ion a nd safety, as we ll as into

the comfort of c rew and emigran ts . T h e

environment of passengers aboard these

vessels covers less than one week, yet in

a l l the world the re can hardly be found,

wi th in a smal l envi ronm ent , a more of

fensive contrast between the upper world

and the underworld than exis t s in these

l iners between the upper decks and the

low er decks. Stra nge to say, the ut ter

most , senseless extreme of luxury is

reached when the ocean service caters to

dem ocrat ic Am erica. I am not a Social

ist , nor do I need be, in order to take note

of such unw ise differentia t ion. T h e ex

pend i ture should be d i s t r ibuted ra t iona l ly .

Documents

Safety at sea, article, Century magazine