Rusi Defence Systems,Volume-3, 2012

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EDITORS LET TER

An Eventful Summer

The Summer of 2012 was a remarkable period for the United

Kingdom. In the midst of the continuing financial downturn, the

Diamond Jubilee, followed closely by the London 2012 Olympic

and Paralympic Games, were highly successful showcases for Britain.

They proved beyond doubt that not only could Britain organise and

run mass public events safely and according to schedule, but also, as a

nation, we retain the ability to complete huge and complex construction

projects on time and more or less to budget.

However, in the run up to the Olympics the worst fears of many of the

nations commentators appeared to have come true. The security arrange-

ments were thrown into turmoil when the private company that had been

awarded the contract to supply the bulk of the security boots on the

ground, G4S, embarrassingly had to admit that it had bungled the project.

The response to this abject failure was impressive. The Ministry of Defence

(MoD) stepped into the beach and filled the void with Armed Forces man-

power supporting the Police. Although much, if not most, of the effort had

been planned in advance and was always going to be a feature of the secu-

rity task, the publicity brought into close focus just what the uniformed

services were contributing to the national effort.

The British Army, Royal Air Force, Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliaryhad been working for months if not years putting together a complex and

coordinated plan to ensure that security would be maintained on land, at sea

and in the air. A panoply of the countrys military assets was brought into play

fast jets, helicopter-borne snipers, surveillance aircraft, a helicopter carrier,

assault ships, counter-IED (improvised explosive device) equipment, commu-

nications hubs, anti-aircraft missile systems in short enough equipment and

manpower to stage a small war. To mark this successful mission, RUSI Defence

Systems has included a range of articles that look at the way the security

planning was put in place and what these defence systems actually achieved.

However, with the summer now fading into the distance and the feel-

good factor rapidly diminishing, the challenges facing the MoD remain. Bob

Barton, former head of Niteworks, offers the MoD a number of suggestions

to help the reform process. Peter Antill and Jeremy Smith from Cranfield

Universitys Centre for Defence Acquisition, pitch in with their thoughts on

defence acquisition in an age of austerity as well. Both conclude that main-

taining momentum will be difficult if past experience is any guide.

By Simon Michell, editor, RUSI Defence Systems

The failed merger between EADS and BAE Systems has thrown up some

interesting questions about which company would have benefited most

from the marriage and why the political intervention should be a cause

for concern in the future. Dr John Louth takes a closer look at this attempt

to create a European defence giant. Neither company came out of the talks

with their heads held high, but it seems that BAE Systems has the most

work to do to calm its shareholders and convince them that an effective

strategy exists to take them through the continued economic doldrums.

With regard to technology, the MBDA Meteor Beyond Visual Range Air-

to-Air Missile (BVRAAM) is getting closer to its in-service date with the

Swedish Air Force on its Saab Gripen C/D multi-role fighters, closely fol-

lowed, it is hoped, by the RAF on its fleet of Typhoons. Robert Hewson

updates the programme and looks at some of the complexities that will

have to be addressed if Meteor is to be exported around the world.

NATOs $1.7 billion (1.1 billion) Air Ground Surveillance procurement con-

tract awarded in the summer to Northrop Grumman will see the Global

Hawk Block 40 take centre stage of the Alliances joint intelligence, surveil-

lance and reconnaissance setup. If all goes well, a capability gap that was

highlighted during the first Gulf War in 1991, and more recently during the

2011 Libyan Operation, Unified Protector will be filled sometime between2015 and 2017. The vexed question of the relevance of the main battle tank

(MBT) is addressed by Dr Jeffrey Bradford who suggests that its future is

in jeopardy if the designers of the next generation of MBTs do not fully

take into account the integration of UAVs into their plans. Doubtless some

nations will retain the MBT in their armoured units but this no longer seems

a foregone conclusion for all. RUSI Defence Systemswill revisit this topic and

I welcome any thoughts from potential contributors on this and any other

defence systems subject.

Simon Michell

Editor,RUSI Defence Systems


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Iremember one afternoon sitting in a command post in Iraq, listening

to a discussion between two individuals concerning the potential use

of heavy armour (thats tanks to the layman) in the counter-insur-

gency (COIN) campaign. It struck me as a leitmotif of a fundamental

misunderstanding of the role of armed forces in COIN operations, but

a fairly natural consequence of the doctrine and nature of the armed

forces deployed there.

At their core, military forces exist to fight and win wars. For years their

training and raison dtre has been to fight toe-to-toe with the industrial

war-fighting machine of another sovereign power. Given the history of

recent conflict across the globe, it might be judged that the international

Te Other Side of the COIN

Former UK Police Officer,Stuart Harrison, contests that the application of conventional military force to

address a counter-insurgency is not the right way to achieve a lasting success

community has failed to learn the lessons of the recent past, and that while

preparing for intervention in COIN operations they might have been better

repositioning elements of their deployable forces towards engagement in

prolonged low-intensity COIN operations, instead of all-out war.

It has long been the presumption of military hierarchies that in prepar-

ing for operations, that which can do a lot can also do a little. In essence,

their argument maintains that strong preparation for high-intensity

industrial warfare allows them to downsize their effort to cope with low-

intensity insurgency when required.

It is my contention that the over-riding lesson of recent COIN opera-

tions is that nothing could be further from the truth, and that counter-

Counter-insurgency operations are better suited to

armed community policing units than war fighters

10 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMSAUTUMN/WINTER 2012

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insurgency has much more in common with armed community policing

than it has with state versus state industrialised warfare. It might then

follow logically that it is because of this insistence on the ability of the

conventional military to downsize to meet a lower threat argument so

frequently deployed by the industrial military machines of various nations,that it is only now that a true understanding is being developed, or rather

re-learned, about what is required for truly effective counter-insurgency.

I do not criticise military hierarchies for deploying such arguments.

Vital national interests do, on occasion, demand the threat or projection of

military power in an industrial format. The military provide a vital element

in national security and have their part to play in COIN operations too, but,

as Sir Gerald Templer said during the Malayan Emergency, the shooting

side of this business is only 25 per cent of the trouble.

Given the nature of COIN operations, it seems self-evident that cur-

rent international military force structures, doctrine, equipment and train-

ing have had to develop a form of Constabulary operations, which are

fundamentally outside of their normal doctrinal role. If we look at some of

the similarities that COIN operations share with community policing (CP),

it is hard to make a case for the military being the preferred vehicle for

the delivery of successful counter-insurgency campaigns. COIN operations

and CP both involve:

collaborative efforts with citizens to improve security;

shared ownership, decision making and accountability;

a need to demonstrate legitimacy, including the minimum use of

force supported by a non-partisan commitment to security under

the rule of law;

a transparent, sustained, and shared commitment to public safety

by all sections of society;

building trust and confidence within the population;

provision of skills and knowledge at a local level to support com-

munity security initiatives;

an appreciation of the fact that political factors are primary;

a need to address the genuine grievances of the population;

empowerment of staff and citizens at the lowest levels local solu-

tions designed to deal with local threats;

a willingness to address the root-cause of problems for long-term

solutions;

identifying, confronting, arresting and prosecuting (in court) ele-

ments intent on causing insecurity; and

neutralisation of threats to security through community intelligence-

driven operations.

The military as community policemen

I would argue that it is the lack of sufficient Constabulary- or Gendarmerie-

type forces available for deployment by the international community that

has caused such a military-centric approach to COIN in the recent past. It

is my experience that the military forces deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan

have had to morph over time from industrial war-fighting machines into

armed CP organisations utilising a whole panoply of advanced policing

techniques, from forensic scene-assessment and evidence-gathering to

analytical tracking of criminal networks and anti-gang style activities far

removed from normal military roles and functions.

I might also argue that the merging and blurring of police and military

missions in the wider international counter-terrorism (CT) arena creates an

unhealthy tension that plays into the hands of the opposition. My view,

developed over many years of experience, is that a military-centric CT

strategy dignifies the enemy with the tag of warrior rather than dismiss-

ing them as common criminals. Such an approach gives the enemy aid

The lessons of counter-insurgency

and counter-terrorism show

that more policing, not more

soldiering, is required

and succour, and is an inefficient way of taking down what is, in essence,

a sophisticated but vulnerable criminal network. While conventional mili-

tary forces should have a fairly dominant position in the clear phase of the

classic counter-insurgency clear, hold, build approach, there are, I would

suggest, fundamental problems with allowing military primacy in thehold and build phases, when history gives clear demonstration that civil

primacy is the key to success.

The lessons of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism show that

more policing, not more soldiering, is required. We would not mobilise the

police to fight a war, so why then do we ask the military to take on what

is essentially an armed policing task? The answer to this question is that,

apart from small, deployable Gendarmerie-style elements provided by

European nations, stabilisation-policing elements do not exist in sufficient

numbers to allow adequate deployment or effectiveness on the ground.

In the past, policing of the type most suited to managing the hold and

build phases of a COIN campaign was developed as a colonial specialism.

Both the British and the French, not to mention numerous other Colonial

Troops from 5 SCOTS mentoring the Afghan police officers who

are increasingly taking over security responsibilities in the area

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powers, formed para-military constabulary-type organisations comprising

rank and file locals, often officered by ex-patriots whose primary role was

to provide a vital peace-support/stabilisation policing capability. The

Frontier Constabulary of British India (still going strong and keeping to

its traditions in the guise of the Pakistan Frontier Constabulary), the IraqiConstabulary of the British Mandate, the British Palestine Police and

numerous African colonial police forces all took on this model as a basic

necessity of colonial administration.

Doubtless there are many who might consider these historical organi-

sations to be little more than hired guns, intent on oppressing the masses

in the interests of the colonial masters, but it is interesting to examine the

practical effectiveness of these organisations over time, and their ability

to fulfil their function. In many cases they did this rather effectively from

the standpoint of their colonial masters cheaply, with relatively small

numbers, scattered over wide areas, and with no great application of hard

power. Indeed, when looked at in comparison with the numbers of con-

ventional military forces deployed in what are considered relatively safe

areas of Afghanistan today, some of the examples of colonial policing are

even more remarkable.

While I do not suggest that these organisations were universally a

force for good, or that effective military organisations cannot provide a

very passable police-type function, there is perhaps something in the role

Police, out of necessity and

doctrine, are working withand within the people

of civil police as an interlocutor between the state and its citizens that

creates a different dynamic than the presence of what might seemingly

appear as an occupying military force. Police, out of necessity and doctrine,

are working with and within the people, relying on their ability to operate

with a greater or lesser degree of consent in order to fulfil their function.

In COIN operations, military forces can and should provide the big stick

back-up to the less overtly confrontational style of the police, but the very

counter-balancing of these separate functions, I believe, plays to each indi-

vidual organisations advantage. Without this yin and yang of COIN capabil-

ity, I would argue that we are missing a trick.

Of course, today any proposal to officer a post-colonial, largely indig-

enous COIN police organisation with home-grown adventurers and then

Mass civil disobedience, like looting,

that can result from regime-change

campaigns is better addressed by

the police than the army


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to attempt to impose such an organisation on partner nations would be

greeted with derision. We are no longer in the business of imposing any-

thing on anyone when it comes to nation building, but it seems that the

ability to practice an effective model of COIN policing still eludes us, and

that the lessons of the past might be worth examining further in an effort

to prepare for the future. While I do not underestimate the challenges fac-

ing the creation of an effective security infrastructure in any COIN cam-

paign, let alone that in Afghanistan, I do believe we have yet to find a truly

workable solution, and that our inability to provide sufficient COIN-ready

policing resources limits our opportunity for future success.

I would suggest that it is hard to argue against the premise that the

USA and Britain find it almost impossible to deploy their own effective and

genuine policing expertise in COIN operations. The USA relies on commer-

cial organisations such as DynCorp International and police officer reserv-

ists serving within standard military units. The former do not appear to

have been terribly effective, the latter neither visibly effective nor numer-

ous enough. The UK relies on contractor consultants and small numbers of

deployed, but I would argue that these are inadequately trained Ministry of

Defence (MoD) police and a hotchpotch of equally unprepared secondees

from UK police forces. I am sure all enter the fray enthusiastically, but dothe results really give us a sense of impending success?

An opportunity missed

I was, at one time, at the behest of the UK MoD, involved in trying to get

a commitment from UK police forces and the UK Home Office to support

the creation of a 500-strong, deployable International Policing Group made

up of seconded staff from UK police forces trained, equipped, inoculated

and available for deployment in support of UK military and host-nation

forces engaged in COIN operations. The initiative had the support of the

then DCDS(C) (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff [Commitments]), general Sir

Peter Wall, and the then president of ACPO (Association of Chief Police

Officers), Sir Ken Jones, but the initiative floundered from lack of local UK

police and Home Office commitment. I believe that even such a modest

commitment as this could have had a major strategic effect, and that the

current arrangements for providing a UK component to stabilisation polic-

ing still remain inadequate to the task.

The issue of having a lack of sufficient, properly trained and resourced

policing assets and expertise operating in a disciplined and effective way in

support of ISAF operations in Afghanistan is, I believe, a limiting factor in

the effectiveness of the overall international approach to developing a suc-

cessful COIN strategy. It is probably too late for Afghanistan, but I suggest

that the issue needs careful consideration before the international com-

munity decides to intervene in any further nation-building efforts.

Working in Support ofCounter-Terrorism Practices

Stuart Harrison is a recently retired senior UK Police Counter-

Terrorism professional, who has spent the past 10 years in a

unique role at the very centre of UK Government efforts within

international counter-terrorism.

In his last full-time post he worked as the Military

Liaison Officer (MLO) for the UK Association of Chief

Police Officers, closely supporting the UK Foreign andCommonwealth Office and the UK Ministry of Defence in

developing its COIN and counter-terrorism practices in

support of operations both inside the UK and overseas.

Harrison has worked across the Middle East, supporting

UK and coalition partner-nations. He has supported counter-

terrorism operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and

Yemen working with both local indigenous forces and

UK Special Forces.

Harrison now operates as an independent crisis, risk

and security consultant for a variety of international clients,

including the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He

is also a member of the UK Department for International

Developments Stabilisation Unit cadre of deployable civilian

experts. Contact: [email protected].

An Afghan National Army officer searches his crime

scene investigation kit for the necessary tools to

process forensic evidence during a training scenario

Some 80 per cent of the worlds heroin is

grown in the poppy fields of Afghanistan, but

the illegal trade is a civil not military matter

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It is clear that the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has had a variable

track record in planning effectively for the future and in using the

resources available to it to obtain the best value for money for UK

taxpayers. As well as numerous reports by the National Audit Office

(NAO) and the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts,

both the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 20101 and

Lord Levenes Defence Reform report of 20112 again drew attention to

the situation and highlighted a number of underlying reasons for the

departments poor performance, along with a series of recommenda-

tions on how it could address them. Such a situation, where the MoD

has to conduct major transformation while managing a vast portfolio of

activity, has been made all the more critical by the impact of the finan-

cial crisis and economic recession, which has necessitated an effort to

United Kingdom Defence Acquisition

in the Age of AusterityPeter D. AntillandJeremy C. D. Smithfrom Cranfield Universitys Centre for Defence Acquisition, based

at the UK Defence Academy, review the challenges facing the Ministry of Defence (MoD) as it steers a

course through transformation and austerity

bring government spending under control to reduce the UKs budgetary

deficit. Defence, although not hit as hard as some other departments,

is still expected to deliver its share of savings, estimated at 4.3 billion

by 2014-153. This article looks at the current issues that are facing the

UK MoD during this time of transition in respect of defence acquisition,

including the reform of the MoD, the reform of Defence Equipment and

Support (DE&S), the restructuring of the UK Armed Forces and their

support with Future Force 2020, the Whole Force Concept (WFC) and

the Total Support Force (TSF), and the on-going inventory problem.

While it is encouraging that the MoD has recognised that there is a

need for change and has put in place a set of governance structures in

order to enable that to happen, to work effectively these arrangements

need the following4:

Success in Afghanistan is a major priority

within the MoDs new defence vision


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a unified vision of what the Department should look like, if it is to effi-

ciently, effectively deliver defence capability, and how to get there;

necessary cultural change to be determined, then such change to be

led and sustained, and revised processes and procedures introduced;

united, consistent and strong leadership across the military, civilianand political arenas throughout the entire (decade-long) process; and

the Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) to have the appropriate

responsibility and authority to undertake this transformation and to

be able to hold those responsible for its delivery to account.

In line with this transformation programme, the MoD published a

new defence vision in its most recent business plan5, which included the

following priorities:

succeeding in Afghanistan;

continuing to fulfil our standing commitments;

succeeding in other operations we are required to undertake;

restructuring the Armed Forces and their capabilities;

implementing the new Defence Operating Model; and

delivering defence in the most effective, efficient and sustainable

way possible.

With regard to the last two priorities listed, a transformation package

consisting of a portfolio of 37 programmes with an additional 10 deliver-

ables was put together, which are split into tiers Tier One (the most criti-

cal programmes and subject to detailed oversight by the Defence Operating

Board Transformation), Tier Two (other change programmes) and Tier

Three (additional security and defence commitments). This activity is led by

the Defence Operating Board (Transformation), which meets once a week

and is chaired by both the Second PUS and Vice Chief of the Defence Staff,

with the Director General Finance being the other permanent member

and both the Director General Transformation and Director Corporate

Strategy attending regularly. The Board is supported by the Defence

Transformation Unit and holds those delivering the transformation activity

to account, as well as looking at portfolio risks, issues and dependencies.

Each transformation programme is supposed to have a senior responsible

officer, with those for the Tier One programmes being formally appointed

by the PUS and accountable to the Defence Board6.

However, the emphasis on cutting non-frontline costs (frontline costs

are expected to fall after the UK starts pulling out of Afghanistan in 2014)

has meant an emphasis on short-term cost reduction. The Defence bud-

get, unlike other departmental budgets, has a relatively high level of fixed

costs in the short term, and a significant proportion, in both operational-expenditure terms and procurement terms, is committed years in advance.

As a consequence, the MoD is left with relatively little room for manoeuvre

when it comes to trying to reduce spending, especially in the short term.

Given that personnel costs comprise over one third of the budget, a large

proportion of the savings the MoD needs to make will come from reducing

personnel numbers, both in the armed forces themselves and within the

Departments civil servants. The numbers outlined in the SDSR were sub-

sequently revised upwards in the spring of 2011 to 29,000 civilians (34 per

cent of the total) and 25,000 military (14 per cent of the total)7.

Given that the MoD is still developing the details associated with Lord

Levenes new operating model despite it being introduced in December

20118 the reductions in personnel numbers will be well advanced before

the final details have been worked out, which means these reductions

have been put into effect while there is still a significant lack of clarity as

to exactly what the MoDs requirements will be with regard to its future

workforce, in terms of both numbers and makeup. There is therefore a

significant risk of additional skills gaps developing, making the Department

increasingly reliant (in the short to medium term) on external expertise

the cost of which has grown from 6 million in 2006-07 to 270 million in

2010-11. In being pressured to reduce costs in the short term, and looking

to do so by reducing the numbers of both civilian and military personnel,the MoD faces a serious impact on morale as well as critical-skill shortages

in the future, with consequent effects on its consultancy expenditure

something that should have been forecast9.

Reform of DE&S

The MoD has a long history of reforming the way it buys and supports

equipment and services, going back to the creation of the Procurement

Executive (1971), the Defence Procurement Agency/Defence Logistics

Organisation (1999) and, most recently, Defence Equipment and Support

(DE&S) in 2007. Reform of DE&S was a key part of Lord Levenes report into

reforming the MoD10, but is also built upon the Defence Materiel Strategy

(DMS)11, as well as Bernard Grays report of 200912. While some progress

has been made, with the Chief of Defence Materiel (CDM) being a member

of the new Defence Board, having the lead for commercial and industrial

policy across defence, and the independent costings available from the

Cost Assurance and Analysis Service (CAAS) now being mandatory in the

Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) capability (Cap) area (which will be

extended to the Frontline Commands as part of the wider reform of financial

management), there is still much to do. Over the past 15 years, numerous

initiatives have attempted to reform defence procurement/acquisition,

including Smart Procurement, Smart Acquisition, the Defence Acquisition

Change Programme and the Defence Acquisition Reform Programme, withonly moderate success as there still exist major cost and time overruns in

defence acquisition, with the average being a 40 per cent increase in the

projected cost and an 80 per cent increase in the time taken to enter into

service. Analysis identified three underlying causes, these being13:

an overheated programme;

a weak interface between DE&S and the wider MoD resulting in

poor discipline and change control contributing to the Conspiracy

of Optimism and Specification Creep; and

insufficient levels of business capability in DE&S for the size and

complexity of the programmes it is asked to deliver in other words,

a shortage of commercial skills.

In order to address these problems, the DMS has considered various

organisation-design options to move away from the current structures that

have hindered past attempts at improving defence acquisition, with three

options being presented to ministers14:

In being pressured to reduce

costs in the short-term, theMoD faces a serious impact on

morale as well as critical-skill

shortages in the future

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a Trading Fund (TF);

an executive, non-departmental public body with a strategic partner

(ENDPB/SP); and

a government-owned contractor-operated (GOCO) entity.

While the MoD was seemingly moving towards favouring the GOCO

option15, with the GOCO outsourcing at the Atomic Weapons Establishment

(AWE) one of the major examples cited by both ministers and the

Department, it is difficult to establish exactly how successful that has been,

as it has not been fully open to public scrutiny (for obvious national security

reasons), plus a GOCO DE&S would be on a much larger scale altogether. In

addition, a number of questions remained unanswered, which included16:

What would be the impact on timelines, the decision-making process

and autonomy?

Would bureaucracy increase or decrease?

What impact would it have on the opportunities for smaller businesses?

How would the larger companies leverage this position in terms of

providing a more efficient solution for the government in terms of

what they procure?

How would a lead company to run DE&S be chosen?

How long would the contract be for?

Would the DE&S lead company be able to make decisions or simply

give advice?

How could any DE&S lead company make money while the MoD

saves money?

How would a DE&S lead company handle UK involvement in existing

and prospective international projects?

What financial risks would any DE&S lead company be asked to take

on board?

How would a GOCO be held accountable by Parliament?

Would a DE&S lead company have responsibility for safety and envi-

ronmental impact?

Unfortunately for the MoD, events over the summer seem to have

thrown this preference for the GOCO option into doubt. This was due to

the failure by security contractor G4S to provide enough guards for the

Olympic Games. G4S had been contracted to provide 10,400 person-

nel but fell short by some 4,700, which meant that the difference had

to be made up by military personnel. This was in part down to the very

different performance models used by the MoD and armed forces com-

pared with that of an organisation in the private sector. This failure has

meant that the Secretary of State for Defence is rethinking his attitude toprivate-sector procurement and learning about when it was appropriate

to adopt either model17.

Future Force 2020, the Whole-Force Concept and Total-Support Force

The SDSR outlined the model towards which the UK Armed Forces will

evolve in the next eight years, entitled Future Force 2020. Underpinning

this is a new set of Defence Planning Assumptions (DPAs) that includes an

ability to conduct18:

a medium- to long-term stabilisation operation at brigade level

(approximately 6,500 personnel) with air and maritime support,

along with one short-term complex intervention (around 2,000

personnel) and one short-term simple intervention (1,000 person-

nel), or;

three short-term operations if there is no existing long-term stabili-

sation operation, or;

for a limited time and with sufficient warning, a major one-off

intervention of around 30,000 personnel (three brigades) with air

and maritime support.

In addition, forces will generally be in one of three states at any one time19:

the Deployed Force forces currently engaged on operations;the High-Readiness Force forces kept at a high level of prepared-

ness to rapidly respond to a threat or crisis; and

the Lower-Readiness Force forces that have recently returned from

operations, stepped down from high readiness or about to rotate

into a state of high readiness.

For the armed forces themselves, this means that:

the Royal Navy will continue to provide maritime defence of the UK

and the Overseas Territories (including the Falklands), maintain a

continuous-at-sea deterrence (with the four Vanguard-class subma-

rines being replaced after 2028) and play a major role in UK for-

eign policy around the world. The Royal Marines of 3rd Commando

Brigade will maintain the capability to rapidly deploy a commando

group of around 1,800 personnel at short notice20;

the British Army will continue to contribute to the UKs stand-

ing commitments, provide light specialist forces for short-term

interventions, keep in readiness sufficient multi-role forces to

undertake more complex interventions or a stabilisation opera-

tion, and retain the ability to command UK and allied forces up to

theatre level. It will restructure around two elements - the Reaction

Force (a divisional HQ with three armoured infantry brigades and

16th Air Assault Brigade) and the Adaptable Force (a divisional HQ

with seven regionally-based brigade HQs), along with a pool of

support units; 21

the Royal Air Force (RAF) will continue to provide air defence of

the UK and the Falklands Islands, an expeditionary capability to

support enduring land operations, tactical and strategic airlift (both

fixed-wing and helicopters), specialist support such as ISTAR and

the RAF Regiment. Its fast-jet fleet will eventually coalesce around

the Typhoon and Joint Strike Fighter, while the transport fleet will

coalesce around the C-17, A330 and A400M22;

While being couched in terms of making the UK Armed Forces more rel-

evant and effective for the 21st Century, if viewed alongside the changes

mentioned above, it is a major reduction in defence capability for the UK in

order for the MoD to balance its books as23:

the Royal Navy is having to reduce its personnel by more than 5,000

(to 30,000), its frigate and destroyer force will shrink from 23 to 19,

its carrier force from three to two (with only one of these at sea at

any one time), lose a Bay-class amphibious support ship and have no

fixed-wing aircraft until the JSF enters service (around 2020) as the

Sea Harriers were retired early in 2006;

the British Army is having to reduce its personnel from 102,600 to

around 82,00024(leaving it the smallest its been since the Boer War25),

reduce the infantry force by five battalions, reduce the numbers of

Challenger II tanks by 40 per cent and heavy artillery by 35 per cent,

and effectively reduce the number of deployable brigades to four; and

the RAF will have to reduce its personnel by over 7,000 (to around

33,000), has lost the Harrier force, will not receive the Nimrod

MRA4 (despite the programme being virtually complete and over

4 billion already spent it was decided to scrap them 26), will lose

the VC10/TriStar fleet and lose the C-130 Hercules fleet 10 years

earlier than planned.


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The WFC was one of a range of ideas and initiatives to emerge from the

SDSR of 201027. It was subsequently formalised in Key Recommendation 11

of the Defence Reformreport, which stated that28:

In line with the overall capability planning and financial manage-

ment model, the Department should afford greater priority to man-

aging its human capability as a strategic resource, to ensure a better

balance with its consideration of equipment capability. Specifically, it

should develop the Whole-Force Concept, which seeks to ensure that

Defence is supported by the most cost-effective balance of regularmilitary personnel, reservists, M0D civilians and contractors.

The WFC is therefore said to be built upon three pillars: the Regulars

and Reservists who serve in the Armed Forces; the civilians who work along-

side them; and the contractors who support them on operations. It is, as its

name suggests, conceptual and, as was emphasised by the Independent

Commission to Review the UKs Reserve Forces29, should not be thought

of as representing a rigidly definable structure. The Commission stressed

the dynamic nature of the WFC: that at any given time the contributions

the three pillars make to the Whole Force should aggregate up to represent

what is most operationally relevant and cost effective.

In addition to a review of reserve forces, a number of other enabling

studies and initiatives underpin the WFC. Among them are: a review of

the estates implications; a review of existing terms and conditions of ser-

vice, and how a new employment model, as the MoD terms it, could be

structured. This will be based on flexible structures, segmented careers,

categories of readiness, and the mix of Regulars and Reserves with gradu-

ated commitment, set within a tri-Service structure, with options for full-

and part-time working30. Other reviews have focused on strategic force

development and force generation. An important subset of the WFC is

the Total Support Force (TSF) that will be explained in more detail below,

but it is worth noting that to turn the concepts of both the TSF and the

WFC into concrete reality will require that the mix of Armed Forces Regulars

and Reservists, MoD civil servants, and contractors, is optimised. In order

to achieve this, optimisation will demand the balancing of affordability

and operational risk.

The Independent Commission to Review the UKs Reserve Forces rec-

ognised the critical contribution of the reserves to the WFC, but also the

need for their quality and availability to be guaranteed. This would, they

said, require an improvement in the proposition (prospects, responsibilities

In addition to a review of

reserve forces, a number of

other enabling studies and

initiatives underpin the WFC

HMS Dauntlesspatrolled round the Falklands on

her maiden voyage. Defence of the islands is a

key standing commitment of the UK

17

DEFENCE ACQUISITION


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and rewards of reserve service) to the Reservists, a change to legislation to

enable more routine mobilisation, better employer support and employ-

ment protection, and better methods to achieve the integration of Regularsand Reservists. Within the UK MoD, the Defence Medical Services are

considered to be leading practitioners of the WFC, but work done by the

Commission to review the Reserve Forces suggested that the UK could

also learn much from the experience of its ABCA partners31, who employ a

whole-force approach in particular the US and Canada.

Total Support Force

The TSF, on the other hand, was proposed by SDSR Support Study 3.4.

The MoDs vision for the TSF is of an end-to-end support force capable of

deploying and operating with fully integrated support capabilities derived

from a pre-planned mix of military and civilian individuals and organisa-

tions32. The TSF requires that Reservists and contractors from industry be

integrated into regular-force structures against readiness assumptions and

agile force generation requirements. It envisages the greater planned use

of contractors on operations, in functions that are commensurate with the

category of threat level in order to accommodate force protection and duty

of care responsibilities, normally with an increasingly higher proportion of

contractors on successive roulements for enduring operations33.

The UK MoD has outsourced much of its support capability: achiev-ing support for many of its major platforms and equipment assets through

long-term contracts for availability (CfA), and securing the provision of

commodities and services through a range of other, often shorter dura-

tion, contracting arrangements. One obvious manifestation of the extent

of this outsourcing activity has been the number of contractors deployed

in support of UK operations approximately 6,000 in Afghanistan

currently, representing a ratio of two contractors for every three uni-

formed military personnel34. These contractors provide vital support to

UK operations in logistics, infrastructure support, and the maintenance

and operation of battle-winning equipment. However, the provision of

this support, while vital to operational success, has not been as coherent

as the MoD, and in particular operational commanders, would wish it to

have been. The intent behind the TSF is that it brings this coherence to

the integration of Regulars, Reservists and industry personnel, creating a

single-support force. A successful TSF should deliver assured support for

the operational commander, a safe and secure working environment for

An employee of the Defence Support Group

repairs the crane on a MAN SVR recovery

vehicle at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. The UKs

Total Support Force will see even greater reli-

ance on civilian contractors during operations


DEFENCE ACQUISITION


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industry personnel, good value for Defence, and an acceptable reward for

industry. It should be pre-planned and end-to-end. The TSF vision sees

industry and the MoD working together to deliver assured support from an

established home base, along the Joint Support Chain and into the theatre

of operations. The scale and scope of industry commitment to operationswill be shaped by their attitude to risk and what they deem to be an accept-

able balance of risk and reward. To make such an informed assessment

will require the sharing of information, including that associated with the

physical risk taken with deployed operations. This will require a change of

mindset, based on the principle of need to share rather than need

to know, and it will also demand greater integration of MoD and industry

information systems.

It is envisaged that the TSF will comprise several categories of person-

nel, among them: Regular Servicemen and women, trained and available

to deploy at short notice, to provide immediate support to operations;

Reservists, mobilised and trained to deliver support at longer notice; con-

tractors from industry who will provide equipment and logistic support

under CfA arrangements; and civilian workers who may be recruited locally

to provide unskilled labour. Industry personnel are envisaged to fit into

three broad categories: Integrated Partners, who will be part of the mili-

tary-force structure and who will plan, train and deliver together; Essential

Contractors, who the MoD needs to deliver into operational effect, but who

require limited support from the MoD, and who deliver a specific service

such as freight distribution; and Ancillary Contractors, who will provide

generic services that are probably freely available on the commercial

market and may be sourced locally. Categorising support personnel in

this fashion is expected to bring greater coherence to the planning and

delivery of support, both in the home base and in the theatre of operations

that the MoD requires.

Currently, Navy, Army and Air Commands are engaged in a range of

TSF feasibility studies and implementation initiatives. Inevitably, financial

pressures are influencing where the Commands are focusing their work,

as well as constraining them. Successful implementation of the TSF will

be dependent on the new employment model referred to above, under-

pinned by the appropriate legal framework, and a basing strategy that

enables a strong link between the Home Base and the operational area 35.

The ability of industry to contribute to force generation and then sustain

a cost-effective, enduring capability, noting political and legal constraints

that might apply in the build-up to conflict, is key. The associated risks

must be understood and clearly stated36.

The inventory problemIn its June 2012 report on the Defence Inventory37, the National Audit Office

(NAO) observed that the Departments inventory holdings are increas-

ing, which is the result of a number of factors: an increase in operational

activity over the past decade, and the procurement of new equipment to

prosecute operations, including capabilities procured against an acceler-

ated timescale via the Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR) process; a

failure to dispose of inventory it no longer requires; the purchase of more

inventory than it uses; and the creation of greater visibility of its stock

levels by recording more inventory on its IT systems. Amyas Morse, Head

of the NAO, observed that in the current economic climate where the

Department is striving to make savings, it can ill-afford to use resources

to buy and hold unnecessary levels of stock, and it clearly does so. The

root cause of excess stock, which the Department is seeking to address,

is that management and accountability structures currently fail to provide

the incentives for cost-effective inventory management38. The Gross Book

Value (GBV) of the Defence inventory39, at the time of the Reports

publication, was 40.3 billion a value that continues to increase at a rate

of approximately 200 million per month.

The MoD has been aware for some time of the financial value tied up

in its inventory, of its inherent complexity, and of the shortfalls in its inven-

tory management (IM) processes across maritime, land and air domains.It has instigated a number of initiatives aimed at improving its inventory

position, among them the Defence Inventory Effectiveness Transformation

(DIET) project that originated in the IM Diagnostic Study, which ran from

January to July 2007, and the Stock Transition Programme (STRAP), that

followed DIET and has become the Defence Stock Transition Programme

(DSTP). Both DIET and DSTP focused on the classification and segmentation

of the inventory, with the aim of implementing more appropriate and cost-

effective management systems, and on disposal of surplus inventory. DIET,

in particular, also directed attention to the paucity of qualified and experi-

enced inventory managers and put in place an up-skilling programme to

address the shortfall.

Responding to the NAO report

In responding to the NAO report, the MoD has taken what is arguably a

more strategic approach. It has commissioned the development of a

Strategic Inventory Management Plan that is expected to be published in

the near future. It has also vested ownership of the Defence inventory in

the appointment of Director General Resources in DE&S, and he has issued

direction to the DE&S Operating Centres aimed at improving the scrutiny

of equipment-support solutions, including their provision for inventory

management. A number of other studies and research projects are under-

way, some of them focusing on what has been an enduring problem for

the MoD: the disjointed nature of its logistics information systems and the

quality and availability of its spares demand and consumption data.Supply chain theory has long recognised that to enable the efficient and

effective flow of materiel downstream from the supplier to the ultimate

user, there must be an accurate and timely flow of demand and consump-

tion data upstream. As the NAO observed in its 2011 report on The Use of

Information to Manage the Logistics Supply Chain,the MoD has not been

able to achieve this effective information flow because its information

systems have been disjointed and lacking in required functionality. The

NAO concluded that the Departments use of information to manage its

supply chain falls short of general logistics industry best practice40. The

NAO also reported on the new logistics information systems being devel-

oped under the Logistics Network Enabled Capability Programme, and their

deployment should make a significant contribution to improving the flow

of logistics information as they are rolled out.

The MoD will continue to manage its stock within its broad account-

ing categories, which are: raw materials and consumables, capital spares,

and guided weapons, missiles and bombs. It is also expected to continue

In a more strategic approach,the MoD has commissioned

the development of a Strategic

Inventory Management Plan

19

DEFENCE ACQUISITION


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the work done in DIET and DSTP to segment the inventory, using

appropriate measures, such as the rate at which it turns over (slow-

mover, non-mover, and so on), financial value, procurement lead-time, or other criticality measure, in order to develop and apply stock

management regimes that make sense. In many cases these will

be automated; in others they will require a higher level of manual

intervention, ideally by a more appropriate number of qualified and

experienced inventory managers.

Conclusion

For most organisations, any one of these issues would be a major chal-

lenge, involving a significant amount of time and effort to properly and

effectively deal with it in such a way as to leave the organisation in

good shape to face the future. Such a challenge would be complicated

by having to do it during a time of austerity, with pressure to make

savings in its budget, itself a major driver of the restructuring process.

The MoD has to restructure itself, its central acquisition body, and the

Armed Forces themselves as well as deal with a significant problem

with regard to an ongoing accumulation of inventory, a problem that

will only get worse once the drawdown from Afghanistan begins. All

this, including a major reduction in both civilian and military person-

nel numbers, is assessed to have made morale somewhat fragile in

both the Armed Forces and Civil Service. To bring this to fruition, the

MoD needs an effective and workable change-management strategy

that also needs to alter the culture of the organisation and staff behav-

iours. They have made a start only time will tell if they succeed.

The MoD has to restructure itself,its central aquisition body, the

Armed Forces as well as deal with

ongoing inventory accumulation

A Naval Strike Wing Harrier rises from HMSArk Royals

hangar. HMSArk Royalwas decommissioned in 2011. With the

withdrawal of the Harrier, the Royal Navy no longer operates

any fixed-wing frontline aircraft


DEFENCE ACQUISITION


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HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The1.

Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm7948, October 2010, availablehere: www.number10.gov.uk/news/strategic-defence-review/ as of

1 October 2012.

Lord Levene, Defence Reform: An Independent Report into the Structure2.

and Management of the Ministry of Defence, June 2011, located at

www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/B4BA14C0-0F2E-4B92-BCC7-8ABFCFE7E000/

0/defence_reform_report_struct_mgt_mod_27june2011.pdf as of

1 October 2012.

HM Treasury, Spending Review 2010, Cm7942, October 2010, paragraph 2.84,3.

located at cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sr2010_completereport.pdf as of 1 October 2012.

National Audit Ofce, Reforming the Ministry of Defence, Brieng for the4.

Committee of Public Accounts, February 2012, p. 6, at www.nao.org.uk/

publications/1213/reforming_the_mod.aspx as of 5 October 2012.

Ministry of Defence, Business Plan 2012-2015, 31 May 2012, located at www.mod.5.

uk/NR/rdonlyres/21363C3C-5452-435D-9D6C-7B73069B6E27/0/mod_plan_

nal_11_06_12_P1.pdf, as of 5 October 2012.

Op Cit. NAO, February 2012, p. 8.6.

National Audit Ofce, Ministry of Defence: Managing Change in the Defence7.

Workforce, HC1791, February 2012, p. 5, at www.nao.org.uk/publications/1012/

defence_workforce.aspx as of 9 October 2012.

Ministry of Defence, Defence Reform Blueprint for the Future Department, 168.

December 2011, located at whitehall-frontend-production.s3.amazonaws.com/

system/uploads/attachment/le/425/85_20111216_Departmental_Blueprint_

Dec_11_nal_for_circulation-U.pdf as of 10 October 2012.

House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Ministry of Defence: Managing9.

Change in the Defence Workforce, HC1905, pp. 3-5, currently located at www.

publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubacc/1905/1905.pdf as of

9 October 2012.

Op Cit. Lord Levene, 2011, pp. 50-52.10.

Ministry of Defence, New Defence Materiel Strategy Announced, Defence Policy11.

and Business News, 31 May 2011, located at www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/

DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/NewDefenceMaterielStrategyAnnounced.

htm as of 10 October 2012. For an update, see Hammond, Rt Hon Philip,

Defence Materiel Strategy Update, dated 17 July 2012, located a t www.parliament.uk/

documents/commons-vote-ofce/July_2012/17-07-12/10-Defence-Material-Strategy-

Update.pdf as of 10 October 2012.

Grey, Bernard, Review of Acquisition for the Secretary of State for Defence12.

An Independent Report by Bernard Grey, October 2009, located at www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/78821960-14A0-429E-A90A-FA2A8C292C84/0/

ReviewAcquisitionGrayreport.pdf as of 10 October 2012.

House of Commons Defence Committee, Defence Acquisition:13.

Written Evidence from the Ministry of Defence, DAQ001, 21 May 2012, located

at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/

acquisition/m01.htm as of 10 October 2012; Pannu, Amman, How would GOCO

procurement work in practice?, 17 August 2012, defencemanagement.com, located at

www.defencemanagement.com/feature_story.asp?id=20517 as of 10 October 2012.

Op Cit. HCDC, 21 May 2012.14.

Hopkins, Nick, Private company could take over armed forces supply in The15.

Guardian, 17 July 2012, at www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jul/17/private-company-

armed-forces-supplies as of 10 October 2012.

RUSI Acquisition Focus Group, The Defence Materiel Strategy and the GOCO16.

Proposal for Abbey Wood, July 2012, at www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/GOCO_

Brieng.pdf as of 10 October 2012; Op Cit. Pannu, 2012.

Editorial, Hammond: G4S issues force private sector rethink, 14 August 2012,17.

Footnotes

defencemanagement.com, at www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.

asp?id=20586 as of 10 October 2012.Cabinet Ofce, National Security Strategy Fact Sheet No. 5: Future Force 202018.

Summery, located at www.cabinetofce.gov.uk/sites/default/les/resources/

Factsheet5-Future-Force-2020.pdf as of 18 October 2012.

Ibid.19.

Cabinet Ofce, National Security Strategy Fact Sheet No. 6: Future Force 2020 20.

Royal Navy, 2010, located at www.cabinetofce.gov.uk/sites/default/les/resources/

Factsheet6-Royal-Navy.pdf as of 18 October 2012.

British Army, Transforming the British Army, July 2012, located at www.army.mod.21.

uk/documents/general/Army2020_brochure.pdf, as of 18 October 2012.

Cabinet Ofce, National Security Strategy Fact Sheet No. 8: Future Force 2020 22.

Royal Air Force, 2010, located at www.cabinetofce.gov.uk/sites/default/les/

resources/Factsheet8-RoyalAirForce.pdf as of 18 October 2012.

Starting gures taken from: IISS, The Military Balance 2011, 2011, pp. 157-161,23.

London: Routledge.

Rogers S. and Sedghi, A, Army Cuts: How Have UK Armed Forces24.

Personnel Changed Over Time? in The Guardian, 5 July 2012, at

www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/sep/01/military-service-personnel-total

as of 19 October 2012.

BBC, Cutting of 17 Army Units Faces Criticism on the BBC News website, 5 July25.

2012, located at www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18731157 as of 19 October 2012.

Gordon, L, Sadness as scrapping of 4bn Nimrods gets under way on the26.

BBC News website, 2011, at www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12297139 as of

22 October 2012.

Chris Mace, (D DSR), A Strategic Vision for Defence Support, DSR/VP/001,27.

15 November 2010.

Op Cit. Levene, 2011.28.

Ministry of Defence, The Independent Commission to Review the29.

United Kingdoms Reserve Forces, July 2011, located at www.mod.uk/NR/

rdonlyres/263D5F71-30CE-45BC-9442-398B1DC12C93/0/futurereserves_2020.pdf

as of 25 October 2012.

DCDS (Personnel), Service Personnel New Employment Model (A Report by30.

DCDS(Pers)), SDSR Study 1.1, 16 July 2011, D/DCDS(Pers)/40.

America, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.31.

ACDS (Log Ops), Total Support Force - What it means for Defence and Industry,32.

Presentation to RUSI, 21 March 2011.

Op Cit. Mace, 2010.33.

SO2 Force Policy, ACDS (Logs Ops), Contractor Support to Operations and the Total34.Support Force, Presentation to the MoD Acquisition Employment Training Course,

UK Defence Academy, 19 September 2012.

Op Cit. Mace, 2010.35.

Ibid.36.

National Audit Ofce, Managing the Defence Inventory, HC 190, 28 June 2012,37.

available here: www.nao.org.uk/publications/1213/managing_the_defence_inventory.

aspx as of

25 October 2012.

Amyas Morse (Head of the National Audit Ofce), 28 June 2012, quoted here:38.

www.nao.org.uk/publications/1213/managing_the_defence_inventory.aspx as of

25 October 2012.

GBV is the gross value without adjustment for depreciation.39.

National Audit Ofce, Ministry of Defence: The Use of Information to Manage40.

the Logistics Supply Chain, HC 827, 31 March 2011, available here:

www.nao.org.uk/publications/1011/logistics_supply_chain.aspx as of

25 October 2012.

21

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Nearing its first century since deployment in the European

battlefields of the First World War, the main battle tank (or

MBT) remains arguably the most potent symbol of land war-

fare. Highly manoeuvrable, heavily armoured and possessing devastat-

ing firepower, the tank was regarded, until the 1970s, as impervious to

anything other than another of its kind. In recent decades, analysis has

focused despite armoured warfare successes in the Middle East on

the vulnerabilities and obsolescence of the king of land warfare.

This article is concerned with the proposition that employment of

armour has both changed and needs further to change fundamentally.

However, the tank remains a supreme symbol and tool, providing a unique

Olympus under Threat: ArmouredWarfare and the Future of the MainBattle Tank (2012-40)

Dr Jeffrey Bradfordponders the future of the main battle tank, and suggests that the tank is in real dangerof losing its supremacy on the battlefield if it does not incorporate an unmanned aerial vehicle doctrine

into its tactics, techniques and procedures

range of capabilities not least of which, in an era of drone warfare, is its

persistence. The timeline in the title is implied to cover the period in which

we could anticipate the armoured platforms that are immediately recognis-

able to continue in service, such as the western M1 Abrams, the Challenger II,

Leopard and T-72 variant main battle tanks.

Considering the future environment in which armour will find itself

employed is an interesting exercise. Fast-moving crises, where nationals

abroad are at risk, do not match well with the timeline to deploy the heavi-

est armour formations and logistics tail. The 1990-91 Gulf War saw a multi-

month logistical movement of armoured assets, supplies and personnel to

enable the swift-manoeuvre warfare campaign of February 1991 .

Main battle tanks such as the British Armys

Challenger II still deliver unique capabilities


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It could be suggested that the future environment will be character-

ised by medium-weight armour assets being flown into theatre in order

to commence operations within hours rather than weeks. However, this

is dependent, aside from doctrinal refinement, on the outcome of two

technological lines of development alongside the significant peacetimeissue of whole-fleet management.

Technological issues

The first technological issue is the reduction of weight while maintaining,

or indeed enhancing, armour protection. Similar to the automotive indus-

try, albeit facing the challenge to meet ever more stringent environmental

targets (such as applying exotic metal alloys, composites and carbon fibre

are all done with the objective of reducing weight to enable better perfor-

mance) is, for example, the new 2013 Range Rover, which will be 15 per

cent lighter that the previous model. The issue for the defence environ-

ment, although with smaller production runs, is how to ensure a suitable

spare parts stockpile designed from exotic materials. Defence industry eco-

nomics does not tend to favour low-unit cost, given the extensive research

and development and political vagaries affecting the overall acquisition.

The second issue driven largely by technology is shrinking the

logistics support required for armour formations. From the perspective

of crisis responsiveness and military readiness this is as important as the

design trade-offs between firepower, armour protection and mobility.

Looking to developments in civil society, interest is growing in

energy efficiency, matched by political desires for energy independence

wherever possible. The defence establishment is currently piloting a range

of schemes, from experimenting with the use of biofuels to power a

naval task force, to the US Marine Corps and Army evaluating tents with

built-in solar energy generation.

The whole fleet-management issue has arguably been complicated

for the leading Western armed forces by the conflicts in the Middle East

and Afghanistan. The pace of operations and the ongoing threat from

IEDs led to a series of urgent operational requirements for mine-resistant

vehicles which, aside from cost escalation, could be seen as derailing

the Future Combat Systems (FCS) programme of the US and the UKs

Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) programme.

On a positive note, the result of the UOR acquisitions offered the

opportunity to evaluate a wide variety of vehicles in actual operations.

However, the negative side of this is that there may be a reticence, coupled

with lack of political will, to consider a major new MBT and infantry fight-

ing vehicle (IFV) programme in the near future.

Manoeuvre formation

The assumption is that the two technological lines of development will

deliver and result in more compact armour formations that are capable of

speedy deployment in the operational environment.

In this environment, armour will operate in smaller formations and

be far more of an integrated combined asset than ever before. Given the

almost exponential development of UAVs, it is extremely likely that auton-

omous anti-armour equipped UAVs will come into being. One can also

foresee anti-UAVs being deployed by armoured formations.

Given that future conflicts will, in light of population dispersal trends,

tend to be in and around urban areas, the ability to block cellular commu-

nications will be a key electronic warfare (EW) asset to protect the manoeu-

vre formation. Today, every citizen with a smartphone camera is potentially

an ISTAR reconnaissance asset. Imagine the early 1990s experience of the

United Nations and US peacekeeping forces were the Somalis to have

had modern smartphone communications. Armour will move increasingly

A US Army M1 Abrams MBT fires

a 120mm round during training

at night, in small formations, with sophisticated EW to avoid improvised

explosive devices and jam potential telegraphing of their operations.

In considering the role of armour, and the future of the main battle

tank in particular, it is very clear that while the nature of its capabilities and

contribution to military capability (the what question) is obvious, how it

will be employed (the how question) is not so clear.

The era of sweeping large-scale manoeuvre operations such as

those seen in the Second World War standing as sentinel during the Cold

War convention stand-off between East and West, and then two sweep-

ing armour-dominated operations in the Middle East, perhaps represent

the aberration when compared with the multitude of small wars or low-

intensity operations in complex terrain and/or urbanised environments.

Additionally, in operations focused on hearts and minds or winning over

the support of the civilian population, it could be argued that the MBT defi-

nitely focuses minds, though may have less effect on hearts.

The future of the MBT is clear, both conceptually and doctrinally the

issue is how fast will technologies evolve to enable faster employment and

greater endurance within a smaller logistical footprint, while keeping the

characteristics that make it the king of the battlefield. The lesson, quick for-

gotten of combined arms operations, needs to be relearnt fast. Akin to the

1980s, when the helicopter gunship became the core threat to armour, the

2010s are seeing the rapid evolution of drone warfare, and the MBT needs

to embrace the drone as an extension of its own capabilities or else risk

sinking one rung further down on the pecking order of military assets. n

Interest is growing in energy

efficiency, and the defenceestablishment is currently

piloting a range of schemes

23

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CplLee

Sang-Jun


17/74

In 2011, NATO intervened in Libya to protect the civilian population,

and contributed to the fall of Muammar Gaddafis dictatorial regime.

Launched at a time of strategic uncertainty and budgetary crisis, and

without the leading role of the United States, the campaign was certainly

unusual.1However, and most importantly, it achieved its tactical goals.2

The coalition campaign, while showing significant improvements in

comparison with previous experiences like Kosovo, still highlighted several

problems and drawbacks.3While the NATO 2012 Chicago Summit partially

addressed some of those issues, many others remain on the table.

The Libyan campaign was unusual for many reasons but, in particular,

it provided a good insight into how future NATO operations are likely to go,

and NATO and its members can learn several lessons from the campaign.4

This work looks at procurement and force structures, drawing from talks

with defence officials from NATO headquarters, NATO members and NATO

partners participating in operation Odyssey Dawn/Unified Protector.5

Procurement Lessons from theWar in LibyaAndrea Gilli, a Visiting Fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (Paris), investigates

some of the procurement lessons from the 2011 NATO-led operation against Libyan Government forces,

and suggests some possible courses of action

Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) played a central role in the Libyan

campaign. Since Kosovo, European countries have made significant prog-

ress in this area: they all possess PGM stockpiles, while their current com-

bat aircraft are capable of air-to-ground precision strikes.6 However, the

Libyan campaign highlighted at least two problems in this realm. Firstly,

in some cases, stockpiles were easily depleted. Secondly, no established

mechanism was in place to promptly resupply allies during operations.

At the 2012 Chicago Summit, NATO took two important decisions (with

its Smart Defence package) to address the latter.7With respect to limited

stockpiles, many interviewees are of the opinion that a reform of procure-

ment planning at national level, emphasising capabilities rather than plat-

forms, would probably be needed in some cases.

The Libyan campaign highlighted the chronic lack of certain military

equipment in Europe. The two most common examples are tankers for

air-to-air refuelling, and medium- and high-altitude drones, such as the

An RAF Tornado GR4 aircraft is prepared for

operations to enforce the no-fly zone over Libya


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Reaper and the Global Hawk. National governments and NATO are trying

to address these issues. However, the campaign also highlighted the lack

of smaller capabilities. For example, close-range unmanned aerial systems

(UAS)8: France and Britain decided to deploy attack helicopters only late in

the campaign, mostly because of casualty aversion.Rotary UAS would have provided a similar capability without putting

troops at risk. However, no European country had a reliable, strike-capable

rotary UAS programme in its force structure at the time. While technologi-

cal readiness certainly accounts for this situation, many interviewees also

hinted at bureaucratic resistance: in several European countries, armed

forces have a strong grip on military procurement. As a result, they are

sometimes able to prevent the adoption of innovations that harm their

branch or service interests. Governments have two standard solutions to

address this problem: they can either promote competition among mili-

tary services to stimulate innovation, or they can directly intervene in their

armed forcess procurement choices.9

Identifying common needs

Historically, logistics has been one of the key operational aspects of war-

fare.10 Back in the 1990s, European countries identified their common

needs with respect to logistics for example, in the realm of strategic lift

capabilities. This need resurfaced during the Libyan campaign. However,

operation Odyssey Dawn/Unified Protector highlighted other important

issues. For example, because of security measures, some countries were

subjected to tight space constraints in their forward-operating bases in

the Mediterranean. As a result, they could host only limited stockpiles,

which, in turn, called for weekly resupply flights from their home coun-

tries. This had several disadvantages, including costs, diversion of capa-

bilities, and also risks as European skies became more crowded. Many

interviewees suggested that the newly created NATO Support Agency

could play a more active role in logistics; for example, by providing hubs

for hosting stockpiles during operations and, consequently, reducing the

burden on transport capabilities.

Force structure

The final lessons of the Libyan campaign go beyond procurement and

touch upon force structure. Two issues in particular deserve attention. First,

the Libyan campaign cast new questions about the future role of carriers.

On the one hand, carrier strike capabilities are very important in that they

provide enormous flexibility. On the other hand, the campaign showed

that, with the growth in range and accuracy of naval cruise missiles, coun-

tries can achieve deep strike capabilities at significantly lower costs than

through carriers. Similarly, given the dramatic role played by UAS platforms

in the Libyan campaign11, it is not clear how naval airpower may adjust in

the near future12. Regardless, for some European countries, the question of

whether current carriers provide an efficient solution may emerge.

The second main issue relates to personnel. During the campaign inLibya, NATO witnessed a chronic shortage of skills in key areas, such as

legal affairs, intelligence assessment and foreign languages. As a result

of this, some countries provided an overwhelming share of the necessary

workforce, while others had to redeploy their troops from Afghanistan

to support the Libyan operation. Although controversial, there was a

consensus among various interviewees that NATO should introduce

some benchmarks (or strengthen existing ones) in order to support the

Alliances readiness and effectiveness.

Progress in campaigns

The war against Libya strongly recalls the war in Kosovo. A comparison

between the two campaigns shows enormous progress, both in terms of

force modernisation and war-fighting effectiveness. However, as warfare

changes faster than political and military institutions, NATO countries must

continue to adapt and modernise. n

Footnotes

Jonathan Eyel, Lee Willet, Elizabeth Quintana, Michael Clarke, Malcolm Chalmers,1.

Mark Phillips, Shashank Joshi, Accidental Heroes: Britain, France, and the Libya

Operation, RUSI Interime Libya Campaign Report, September 2011, London: RUSI;

Adrian Johnson and Saqeb Mueen (eds.), Short War, Long Shadow: The Political and

Military Legacies of the 2011 Libyan Campaign, Whitehall Report, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2012,

London: RUSI.

Erica D. Borghard and Costantino Pischedda, Allies and Airpower, Parameters, Vol. 42,2.

No. 1, Spring 2012, pp. 63-74.

Eric Schmitt, NATO Sees Flaws in Air Campaign Against Qadda, The New York Times,3.

14 April 2012.

For further lessons, see Damon M. Wilson, Learning from Libya: The Right Lessons for4.

NATO, Issue Brief, September 2011, Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United

States; and Amitai Etzioni, The Lessons of Libya, Military Review, Vol. 42, No. 1, January-

February 2012, pp. 45-54.

The author is thankful to RUSI and the Center for Transatlantic Relations (Johns Hopkins5.

University-SAIS) for the support in coordinating these interviews, and to the several

individuals who took their time to share their views and insights.

Bastian Giegerich and Alexander Nicoll (ed.), European Military Capabilities: Building6.Armed Forces for Modern Operations, 2008, London: IISS. For a more recent discussion,

see Bastian Giegerich and Alexander Nicoll, The Struggle for Value in European Defence,

Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2012, pp. 53-82.

The Chicago Summit endorsed the proposal to adopt a common interface for all7.

munitions, thus enabling ghter jets to use munitions from various sources and nations; it

promoted solutions allowing exible exchange of munitions among allied nations.

Gordon Adams and Ben Guy-Ari, Transforming European Militaries: Coalition8.

Operations and the Technology Gap, 2006, London: Routledge.

For an analogous discussion, see Harvey M. Sapolsky, Advice for the SecDef (or, What9.

You Wont Hear at a Brookings Seminar), Proceedings Magazine, Vol. 135, No. 1, January

2009, online version.

Milan Vego, Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice, 2010, London: Routledge.10.

Spencer Ackerman, Libya: The Real Drone War, 20 October 2011, www.wired.com/11.

dangerroom.

Ian Shields and James Spencer, An Unmanned Future for Naval Aviation: UCAV Carriers,12.

RUSI Journal, Vol. 156, No. 6, 2011, pp. 48-54.

The Libyan campaign highlighted the need for a range

of UAVs, not just large platforms like the Global Hawk

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We have had many decades of attempted defence reform,

and more initiatives and proposed changes than most of uscan remember. In my previous article (RUSI Defence Systems,

volume 14, no. 3) I asked the question: why is it so hard to effect real

change? In this article I seek to answer what drives some of the behav-

iour and ask if there is anything deeper that causes us such difficulty.

We are about to implement a number of new changes that are, argu-

ably, more difficult than the ones we have failed to see through to date. We

should therefore try to understand how to proceed with commitment, but

also with caution, if that is not a contradiction. We need pace, but we also

need to be clear that we are fixing the root causes. Lastly, we need to stop

making the solutions so detailed and specific that their sheer complexity

leads to stalling, and then failure. As an exemplar, consider TLCM: it had

huge common sense, broad agreement and some simple principles, but

instead of driving these home, we heaped complexity and control on it all.

The rest, as they say, is history.

Following the major reports by Gray and Levene, we now have the

implementation of a number of radical proposals aimed at improving both

A Pause for Thought on Defence ReformBob Barton, former Managing Director of Niteworks, returns to the vexing theme of change in the MoD,

and asks whether its inability to understand the root causes of inefficiency prevents the successful

implementation of new processes and concepts

defence acquisition and MoD expenditure. The fact that radical action is

needed is beyond doubt; change is not driven by timidity. It is important,however, to ensure that radical is rooted in the right basis, and this only

comes with a good understanding of what is wrong. When examining

some of the proposed changes it would not be unreasonable to describe

some key solutions as based on questionable leaps of abstraction based

on opinion rather than real analysis.

The creation of four front line areas for capability management, put-

ting more control with the front line, seems entirely reasonable, but the

inherent complications this produces must surely compound and exacer-

bate already fraught interfaces? What is the rationale that has predicated

this move and does it address the root cause? The same could be asked of

the creation of a more independent Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S)

or the limit of a government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) model.

Again, a superficially attractive solution, but does it really solve the root-

cause problems it is designed to fix, without creating problems elsewhere?

It is by no means clear that in proposing many changes a proper causal

analysis has been used to identify the genuine root causes, and this must

UK Secretary of State for Defence, Philip

Hammond, addresses HMS Liverpoolscrew

following its successful deployment off Libya


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make it doubly difficult for new and relatively inexperienced players who

are being asked to approve or implement such changes.

Leaps of abstraction are dangerous: when something is apparently

out of control, the desire to add measures of rigidity, and thus reduce

degrees of freedom, are attractive. But does such action really achieveresults? As an example, little has been said about one of the outstand-

ing root causes of several decades of defence over-expenditure I refer

to the specification problem. Both of the above key changes will almost

certainly lead to layer upon layer of additional controls, contracts and

checks to make them work. Interfaces will increase, arguably by four times

n, where n is certainly more than one! Specification will get harder and

more definitive as the more fragmented and autonomous parts of the

new structure try to ensure that their needs are met, and that their own

level of risk is reduced. This will have the effect of increasing overall costs

and reducing effectiveness through adding unhelpful controls. It will also

exacerbate the latency of the acquisition process, which is itself a root

cause of unnecessary expenditure.

Delay and procrastination cost money

Several decades ago, and long before the current problems in Japan,

Konosuke Matsushita wrote a telling indictment of Western industrial

behaviour. His words ring just as true today when trying to understand

why we struggle in the UK to get the best from our organisations and

people. The first part of his text read:

We are going to win and the industrial West is going to lose out:

theres nothing much you can do about it, because the reasons for

your failure are within yourselvesfor you the essence of manage-

ment is getting the ideas out of the heads of the bosses and into the

hands of labourfor us, the core of management is the art of mobilis-

ing and putting together the intellectual resources of all employees in

the service of the firm.

Konosuke Matsushita, Why the West will Lose

For the immediate period they did indeed win, but it is the implica-

tions of the words he used to describe the dominant Western management

behaviour that continue to demonstrate why our efforts to excel industri-

ally are often constrained. Moreover, it is a phenomenon that is especially

evident in government, and particularly in defence.The term command and control also gives us a clue. Adequate control

is hard to achieve without dictation and the strangulation of ideas.

It is not possible to control what you do not understand, and yet we

can and do witness legion examples of over-control and over-regulation,

which stifle the inventiveness and creativity that are essential ingredients

in any enterprise. Of course, control is important, but too often in our

culture we take the notion of control too far. For example, we appoint

accountants to run companies; now dont get me wrong, accountants

have a key role, but do they have the vision and strategic visibility to effec-

tively take organisations forward? If we take people who are very good at

looking backwards, lets not be surprised that they are far too risk averse

to drive forward with invention.

Over-control has the exact opposite effect to the one required it

breeds the need for more control, and in many organisations we have

seen the way in which control levels have been ratcheted up because

something is going wrong. This was never truer than in the case of gov-

ernment organisations where the public accountability factor increases the

pressure to do something. Doing something should be to understand the

root causes of behaviour, not to assume the answer is yet more control.

The money to buy the British Armys

next-generation fleet of medium-weight

armoured vehicles has been accounted

for in the 2012 Planning Round (PR12)

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The MoD has more difficulty here than most because measuring its out-

put is extremely hard, and when there is no obvious currency available,

controls rule. Unfortunately, the MoD has achieved the notable double of

being over-controlled and yet apparently out of control. There should be a

lesson in there somewhere.Let me return to my original issue: that of requirements. Without

doubt, setting requirements in the defence scenario is extremely difficult.

The approach currently taken is predicated on control, and yet the ability

to project even a year into the future is weak. What is needed is a radical

overhaul of the whole requirements process to allow it to cope with rapid

and ever-changing circumstances.

The current process of requirements setting, and in particular the

obsession with over-prescriptive requirements, is probably the best exam-

ple of what Matsushita was referring to. If we stand back from some of

the requirements disasters of the last few years, then Bowman, Nimrod

and FRES amply demonstrate the consequences of control-inspired over-

prescription and endless vacillation. Not many of those involved in those

tortuous acquisitions would deny this, but do we learn? After Bowman

(which started over 30 years ago), surely a radical rethink was obvious?

This must mean that the reasons for such behaviour run so deep that

it is difficult to shift. It is, I believe, so embedded in our culture that with-

out almost Machiavellian behaviour on the part of any of the leadership, it

will not be beaten. It is undoubtedly another aspect of the immune

system, but my belief is that this practice runs even deeper. Matsushita

was right; we cannot help ourselves.

We seem to have lost the crucial ability to think strategically. We

change structures before process (the Levene recommend

Documents

Rusi Defence Systems,Volume-3, 2012