RUSI Spring2012

8/12/2019 RUSI Spring2012

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/rusi-spring2012 1/96

For international defence professionals

Royal United Services Institute Spring 2012 Vol 14 No 3

Air Commodore Russell La ForteThe former head of the RAF Regiment

discusses Force Protection in Afghanistan

Guarding high-value assetsChief Inspector Kenneth Pennington (PSNI)

on the importance of protecting people

UK AFV and PPV procurementHow the UOR system rushed protected

patrol vehicles to the front line

Force Protection– saving liveson operations





CAPABILITIES:

TO THE TROOPS

PRODUCT DEPLOYABLE INSTRUMENTED

TRAINING SYSTEM

FUNCTION LIVE TRAINING

DEVELOPED BY SAAB TRAINING SYSTEMS



cae.comone step ahead

Full-mission simulators G round school Tactical control centre

A M 0 9 7

partner

C AE’s sole focus is to provide world-class training services and simulation products

to military forces around the world. Training and simulation is our business. In fact, we

train more than 75,000 crewmembers annually at our military and civil aviation training

centres around the world. From experts performing training systems requirementsanalysis and training systems design, to our in-house manufacture and modification

capability of the most advanced simulation equipment, to our unmatched ability to

provide a full range of training support services, C AE has a unique Training Systems

Integrator (TSI) capability.

O ur M edium Support Helicopter Aircrew Training Facility (M SH ATF) in the United

K ingdom is a perfect example of our TS I capabilities. A t RAF Benson, we offer an

unparalleled training standard to the R AF and other worldwide operators of the M erlin,

Puma and C hinook helicopters. O ur expertise, experience, and simulation technology

leadership come together at the M SHAT F to help our customers stay one step ahead

and achieve their objective: mission readiness.



RUSI DEFENCE SYSTE MS

Editor-in-chief Colette Doyle

Managing editor Barry Davies

Sub-editors Matthew Andrews

Erica Moss

Art editors Jean-Philippe Stanway

James White

Designer Kylie Alder

Production and Malcolm Greendistribution manager

Sales director Martin Cousens

Sales manager Peter Barron

Managing director Andrew Howard

Chief executive Alan Spence

Chairman Paul Duffen

Published by Newsdesk Communications Ltd

5th Floor, 130 City Road, London EC1V 2NW

Tel: +44 (0)20 7650 1600

Fax: +44 (0)20 7650 1609

www.newsdeskmedia.com

© 2012. The entire contents of this publication are protected by copyright. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any

form or by any means: electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. The views and opinions expressed by independent authors

and contributors in this publication are provided in the writers’ personal capacities and are their sole responsibility. Their publication does not imply that they represent the views or opinions

of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) or Newsdesk Communications Ltd and must neither be regarded as constituting advice on any matter whatsoever, nor be interpreted as such. The

reproduction of advertisements in this publication does not in any way imply endorsement by RUSI or Newsdesk Communications Ltd of products or services referred to therein.

Editor Simon Michell

Editorial director Michael Codner

Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall, London SW1A 2ET

Tel: +44 (0)20 7747 2600

Fax: +44 (0)20 7839 1090

Email: [email protected]

www.rusi.org

For international defence professionals

Royal United Services Institute Spring 2012 Vol 14 No 3

Air Commodore Russell La ForteThe former head of the RAF Regiment

discusses Force Protection in Afghanistan

Guarding high-value assetsChief Inspector Kenneth Pennington (PSNI)

on the importance of protecting people

UK AFV and PPV procurementHow the UOR system rushed protected

patrol vehicles to the front line

Force Protection– saving liveson operations

Newsdesk Communications Ltd publishes a wide range of business

and customer publications. For further information please contact

Alan Spence, chief executive, or Paul Duffen, chairman.

Pictures: Crown copyright, Press Association, Reuters

Printed by Buxton Press

ISBN: 978-1-906940-52-2

Cover image supplied by Ministry of Defence Crown copyright





CONTENTS

25 The Defence Enterprise is More Than

Just a Supermarket Chain

Patrick Beautement, from The abaci Partnership LLP, explains

why the UK defence enterprise should not be seen as a single

homogenous activity, similar to a supermarket chain

34 LPPV – Lessons for Defence Procurement

Chris Maughan, managing consultant at Decision Analysis

Services Ltd, examines the two key procurement processes

employed by the Ministry of Defence and highlights lessons

to be learned from the success of the LPPV rapid procurement

DEFENCE INDUSTRY

38 Bandits and T hieves – Sovereign Wealth Recovery

as a Critical Defence Capability

RUSI’s Dr John Louth makes the case that returning stolen

assets to sovereign nations is a vital element of stability

building and should receive greater government support

40 German Defence Exports in Perspective

Dr Henrik Heidenkamp assesses recent developments in

German defence exports and examines how they impact on

the country’s foreign, security and defence policies

DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES – LAND

44 Whatever Happened to Medium-Weight Forces?

Colonel Peter Flach MBE (Retd) explains why air-

transportable, medium-weight armoured vehicles havebecome such a vital component in current operations

46 UK AFV and PPV Procurement Using Urgent

Operational Requirements

Peter D Antill, Jeremy CD Smith and David M Moore explain

how the Ministry of Defence devised urgent solutions to give

better protection to personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan

51 Protected Mobility and Vehicle Modernisation:

Keeping up with Evolving T hreats

Serge Buchakjian of Oshkosh Defense highlights the role

that the company’s vehicle technology is playing in helping

to protect troops travelling on the ground

55 T he Talisman System-of-Systems Approach to Route

Proving and Clearance

Amyas Godfrey and Paul Wathen review the Thales Talisman

counter-improvised explosive device suite of systems

58 People Protection

Chief Inspector Kenneth Pennington, from the Police Service

of Northern Ireland, explains why people and their safety are

an important part of the Critical National Infrastructure debate

61 Bowman Comes of Age

Giles Ebbutt explores the history of the Bowman tactical C4I

system, its positive impact on British military capability and

the root causes for some of the criticism that it has received

EDITOR’S LETTER

11 Protect and survive

By Simon Michell

DEFENCE CONTENTION

12 Defence Exports Need More T han a Minister’s Goodwill

Professor David Kirkpatrick argues that the economic

downturn has made defence exports more important to the

United Kingdom’s financial well-being

DEFENCE ACQUISITION

14 Acquisition Focus Group and the Defence White Paper

The RUSI Acquisition Focus Group analyses the British

government’s February 2012 Defence White Paper,

National Security through Technology

18 Defence Reform – a Precision Attack?

Bob Barton, former managing director of Niteworks,

explains why implementing change at an institution such as

the Ministry of Defence is proving to be so challenging

22 Labour’s Defence Procurement Report and

Shadow Defence Review Launch

Michael Codner, senior research fellow and director

of Military Sciences at RUSI, commends the UK’s Labour

shadow government for its recent report focusing on

defence procurement

46



95% of clients renew their contracts with us...Isn’t it time you took a closer look at Steria?

www.steria.com/uk/defence

Reducing costs through better supply chain management

As the first company to develop a tri-service inventory managementsystem, Steria has supported both the armed forces and original equipmentmanufacturers in the definition of tri-service logistics processes, as well as thedesign, development, support and management of logistics information systems.

Supporting secure interoperability across the defence industry

Steria’s innovative and resilient military information management system

includes a secure electronic messaging service for the UK MOD. This processes2,000,000 messages every month for more than 380,000 users, tracking thedelivery time of all messages.

Revolutionising access control to secure sites

Using cutting-edge technology Steria’s revolutionary Biometrics DataCapture System (BDCS) verifies identity reliably and quickly. Usingmultiple biometric criteria, including fingerprint and retinal scanningit operates in both a static and mobile environment.

Delivering world-class business support

Steria developed and now maintains a unique inter-army

pay management solution which manages the payfor the French MOD’s 400,000 service personneland has enabled the move towardsa paperless administrative service.

Steria LimitedThree Cherry Trees Lane

Hemel HempsteadHertfordshire

HP2 7AH

T: 01442 885600

E: [email protected]

Partnering with agility.

Defence and security solutions deliveringoperational and efficiency benefits.



CONTENTS

DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES – AIR

64 T he RAF Regiment – More T han the Sum of its Parts

The Royal Air Force Regiment provides much more

than its unique perimeter-patrolling capability for NATOand coalition partners, also offering vital capabilities to

UK Defence and the civilian authorities

68 Securing the Fifth Environment: the RAF and the

Importance of Cyber

RUSI’s Elizabeth Quintana examines the development of

cyber-capabilities within the Royal Air Force and looks at

some of the high-tech threats that the service may face

70 UAVs and the Counter-IED Campaign

Avnish Patel, military sciences project manager at RUSI,

assesses a selection of the latest unmanned aerial vehicle

counter-improvised explosive device technology

DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES – SEA

72 Danger from Below

Dr Lee Willett, RUSI’s head of maritime studies, considers

whether the Royal Navy is in danger of relinquishing its

global leadership status in the art of Anti-Submarine Warfare

74 T he ‘Baggers’ – Royal Navy Sea King Mk 7 Airborne

Surveillance and Control (SKASaC) helicopters

Simon Michell reveals the utility of the Sea King Mk 7

helicopter and highlights the crucial contribution that ithas made in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya

76 RUSI Leads the Way on Ballistic Missile Defence

Captain George V Galdorisi, USN (Retd) reviews RUSI’s

1 2th annual Missile Defence Conference and highlights some

of the most pressing international ballistic missile threats

78 Better Submarine In-Service Support

Martin Burns, submarine engineering support manager

at Babcock, looks at the latest developments in the joint

Ministry of Defence/industry approach to submarine support

DEFENCE R&T

80 Electric Dragons – Airborne Electronic Warfare

Capabilities in China

Robert Hewson reveals some of the results of the vast

resources dedicated to military electronics in China

82 IBCS – Integrating Air and Missile Defence Systems

How Northrop Grumman met the challenge of developing a

common battle command system to enhance the US Army’s

integrated air and missile defence capability

85 Delivering Sustainable Air Power

Group Captain Maurice Dixon, from the Royal Air Force,

explains the steps being taken to ensure that the service is

playing its part in achieving a smaller carbon footprint

89 Cyber Security Conference Update

A review of last November’s RUSI event, which brought

together leaders in cyber-crime prevention

INTERVIEW

92 Leading the guardians of the Royal Air Force’s

military soulSimon Michell talks to the former Commandant General

of the Royal Air Force Regiment, Air Commodore Russell

La Forte CBE, to discover the nature of the corps’ work

94 Index of advertisers

82





EDITOR’S LET TER

Protect and survive

The eagerly awaited coalition government Defence White Paper,

National Security through Technology, was published in February

2012 to mixed reviews. On the one hand, the stated ambition

of publishing a 10-year equipment programme is a very welcome move

as it will help the defence systems industry to plan ahead with more

certainty. However, the somewhat circular arguments as to when

national sovereignty issues dictate that equipment should be sourcedfrom a UK contractor or bought off the shelf overseas have left many

people confused. Others are waiting for more information about the

proposed Ministerial Working Group that will endeavour to translate

the published words into practice.

To help guide readers through the main thrust of the White Paper, RUSI’s

Acquisition Focus Group has gone over it line by line and published its

own conclusions in this issue. Furthermore, and in the light of the White

Paper, Mike Codner takes a look at the Labour Party’s own report on

defence procurement to see how the two perspectives differ. And, for

context, Patrick Beautement from The abaci Partnership adds his thoughts

as to why the overall defence enterprise can’t be regarded as a single

homogenous entity in a similar vein as a supermarket chain when procur-

ing and delivering equipment and undertaking operations.

Force Protection

The spring issue of RUSI Defence Systems takes a closer look at Force

Protection in the air, on the ground and at sea. The role that the Royal

Air Force plays in this arena is often overlooked, and so we highlight the

RAF Regiment to show just how crucial this organisation is to UK defence,

and how wide-ranging its skills and capabilities are, from airfield defence

to forward air control and CBRN response. To add further weight to this

argument, we feature an interview with former Commander of the RAF

Regiment, Air Commodore Russell La Forte, weeks before he moved posts.

The RAF’s cyber-security capabilities are also examined, along with a review

of the RUSI Cyber Security Conference, which took place in November 2011.

On the land side, Peter Anthill and colleagues give a fascinating round-

up of how the Ministry of Defence went about bolstering troop protection

through a series of Urgent Operational Requirements that both upgraded

By Simon Michell, editor, RUSI Defence Systems

the existing fleet of wheeled and tracked vehicles and acquired new

bespoke vehicles for use in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Any examination of Force Protection naturally needs to consider the

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat that has wreaked so much havoc

over the past decade. Accordingly, Thales offers an insight into the progress

of its Talisman programme for the British Army and explains how a suite

of robots, engineering/command vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs) has been put together to create an integrated counter-IED solution

(C-IED). We also review a more general C-IED contribution made by UAVs

by highlighting the work of the American Task Force ODIN in Afghanistan

and their use of the AGM-114 Hellfire-armed Sky Warrior.

Force Protection from the sea is covered with a report by George Galdorisi,

from the US Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific, on the RUSI

Ballistic Missile Defence conference that took place last June. Captain

Galdorisi (Retd) reviews the international flavour of the conference and

the excellent work it does for the BMD community. He also highlights the

ballistic threats from China, Iran and North Korea.

Research and technology

Rob Hewson, editor of Jane’s Air-launched Weapons, takes a look at how

the Chinese are developing a formidable array of tactical and strategic

airborne electronic systems to rival those of the West. The tried-and-tested

technique of procure, dismantle, examine and then produce is bearing fruit

for the burgeoning Chinese defence electronics industry.

I hope that there is something of interest for all our readers in this issue,

and may I take this opportunity to alert you that the summer issue of RUSI

Defence Systems will focus on the ‘Kinetic Effect’. Please do not hesitate to

contact me if you would like to make a contribution.

Simon Michell

Editor, RUSI Defence Systems


http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/rusi-spring2012 12/9612 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SPRING 2012

DEFENCE CONTENTION

In the Autumn/Winter 2011 issue of RUSI Defence Systems , Gerald

Howarth MP outlined1 how the Ministry of Defence (MoD) was promot-

ing UK defence exports in order to both enhance national economic

growth, and to reduce the cost of MoD acquisition projects (via economies

of scale). Both of these effects would, in principle, help to reduce the

UK’s public-sector deficit, which is, at present, the paramount priority of

the coalition government. His paper explained how the MoD is promot-

ing defence exports by considering exportability in the early phases of

its acquisition projects and by demonstrating the capabilities of equip-

ment already in service with British forces, as well as how its activities are

coordinated with those of other government departments (Department

for Business, Innovation and Skills, and the Foreign and Commonwealth

Office). However, he did not discuss the scale of the economic costs or the

benefits associated with defence exports, nor how these costs and benefits

are shared between the private and public sectors.

Putting defence exports in perspective

Defence exports attract particular attention as they are often controversial,

raising a variety of political and ethical issues, but it is important to put

them in their proper macroeconomic perspective. Defence exports consti-

tute only a small fraction – no more than three per cent in recent years – of

total UK exports; their value is similar to that of alcoholic beverages, much

Defence Exports Need More

T han a Minister’s GoodwillProfessor David Kirkpatrick argues that the economic downturn has made defence exports more

important to the United Kingdom’s financial well-being, but asks the government to produce

some detailed analysis on the true nature of their net benefits to the Exchequer

smaller than medicines, and significantly smaller than financial services.

Furthermore, the marketing of defence exports incurs substantial costs to

the government, as well as the costs incurred by UK defence contractors.

The government pays for the relevant military and civil service staff (in the

UK and in embassies overseas), and for export credits, service demonstra-

tions, ministerial visits and so on. In the past, some critics have alleged that

there were additional costs from the distortion of both MoD procurement

decisions and of UK foreign-aid programmes.

In 2002, a study of UK defence exports concluded2 that the net economic

effect on the UK government’s budget of a 50 per cent reduction in defence

exports would be an annual loss of about £70 million (equivalent to 0.3 per

cent of the current defence budget), excluding short-term adjustment costs.

A successful export drive needs

an array of complementary

and consistent policies

The Eurofighter Typhoon

has been exported

beyond the consortium

members to Austria

and Saudi Arabia



DEFENCE CONTENTION

This suggests that even a substantial increase in UK defence exports would

not considerably improve the public-sector deficit.

However, much has changed since 2002. Firstly, the UK now has low

economic growth and unemployment well above its natural rate; in this

parlous situation, increased exports from any sector of the economy couldyield a greater benefit to public finances. Secondly, the government is

considering a Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS), proposed by its predeces-

sor3, that would sustain some chosen technological and industrial defence

capabilities within the UK; the cost of this Strategy would be substantially

reduced if exports kept the relevant UK industries above critical mass and

thus avoided the need for special subsidies.

Reassessment may be necessary

Accordingly, if the present economic difficulties are expected to persist for

several years, and if the government does eventually decide to support an

onshore defence industrial base, the MoD should reassess the net costs

and benefits of defence exports. If it has already conducted a reassessment

as part of its work on the DIS, the methodology and results should be pub-

lished to meet the House of Commons Defence Committee’s 19994 demand

for transparency and accountability in this politically sensitive area.

In a campaign to increase UK defence exports, a new Whitehall commit-

tee may be necessary, but it is certainly not sufficient. The campaign needs,

above all, a range of cost-effective UK-made products, and this demands

adequate preceding investment in defence research and development by

government and industry. MoD funding for defence-related research has

been cut drastically since the end of the Cold War and may need to be

addressed5. The MoD must also be prepared to contribute to the develop-

ment of UK-made equipment, modifying where necessary its current inten-

tion6 to procure more off-the-shelf equipment from foreign suppliers.

The UK defence industry must combine technical, analytical and man-agement competences to produce competitive products that achieve their

performance, timescale and cost targets, and must provide well-tailored

marketing, punctual deliveries and good after-sales services to its customer

nations7. A successful export drive – in defence as in other sectors of indus-

try – needs an array of complementary and consistent policies, as well as a

minister’s energy and eloquence.

In designing a campaign to increase UK defence exports, it is important

to be realistic – financial constraints can often dampen initial optimism, as

was witnessed by the Greek Typhoon procurement that has been put on the

back burner8. Furthermore, such exports will inevitably be limited by the

inability of small, poor nations to afford much expensive equipment,

by the preference of large, rich nations to produce equipment to meet their

own needs as far as is practicable, and by the UK’s need to avoid sales ofmilitary equipment to unstable or tyrannical regimes that could use the

equipment to invade their neighbours or to oppress their own people.

In recent decades, ill-judged sales to such regimes have yielded short-

term profits for contractors, but have had adverse consequences for the UK

in the longer term. For all of these reasons, nations with onshore defence

industries generally export less than half – often much less – of the value

of their own budgets for equipment procurement9.

Defence exports can also be regarded as a useful element of foreign policy.

They have the potential to strengthen the UK’s alliances, enhance mutual

understanding between the UK and its customer nations, and contribute to

regional stability. If sufficient relevant evidence could be assembled, then

government support for defence exports might be justified on these non-

economic criteria, even without a particularly strong economic case.

Perhaps, after the MoD’s decision on its defence industrial strategy has

been announced, Mr Howarth or one of his colleagues will contribute

another, more extensive paper on the net benefits of defence exports. ■

The Type 26 Global Combat

Ship is being designed with

export potential in mind



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

In many ways, the White Paper could be viewed as the best that indus-

try might have hoped for. In government – but outside the Ministry

of Defence (MoD) – there are those with a doctrinaire opposition to

any kind of industrial policy, and it is easy to understand that a defence

ministry that is absolutely strapped for cash wants minimal restrictions

on its freedom of action. The White Paper delivers all the flexibility that

the MoD could hope for, while offering British industry a number of

words of support and appreciation. The reiteration of the commitment

to publish the 10-year Equipment Plan to help industry make appropri-

ate preparations is also welcome, as will be delivery on the promise.

However, as a policy statement to guide the recommendations and deci-

sions of officials and ministers, the paper is fundamentally flawed, not least

because of the circular nature of the lines of argument that it advances at

the highest level of procurement strategy. It bequeaths to the future a situ-

ation in which almost any procurement choice will be justifiable by at least

one part of the document. Moreover, at a time of difficulty in the national

economy, it has little concern with the contribution that defence could

make to wider economic success.

The paper offers little incentive for national or foreign defence businesses

to invest in the UK. It offers the prospect that UK forces will be equipped

only with systems that are freely available to others and the potential for

national freedom of action will evaporate. It represents a lost opportunity

to rethink the place of industry and the supply chain in defence.

Stage one: buy on the world market

The headline statement from the White Paper is that the UK’s core position

will be to buy on the basis of competition on the world market.

Acquisition Focus Group and

the Defence White PaperRUSI’s Acquisition Focus Group1 highlights the undoubted weaknesses in the UK Government’s

February 2012 Defence White Paper, National Security through Technology, and laments the lost

opportunity to deliver much-needed direction and genuine industrial policy

‘… we will use competition as our default position... we will look at the

domestic and global defence and security market for products that are

proven, that are reliable, and that meet our current needs.’

‘... applying the principle of open procurement will result in the greatest

possible value for money for our defence forces and security agencies.’

Words similar to these are used at several points in the document and

formed what the MoD presumably wanted to be the lead statement: the

Financial Times, after its interview with procurement minister Peter Luff,

observed ‘MoD will no longer favour British companies’.2

We note that, rather than insisting on UK understanding of how a

system works being a condition of purchase, the MoD appears content

to rely on assurances from a contractor about the performance of the

elements within the system (paragraph 61).

Stage two: take account of national security needs

The paper goes on to recognise that procurement in the defence and secu-

rity area is different from other areas of government purchasing, and notes

‘the need to take action to protect our technological advantage where

essential for national security’. Thus section 3.1 of the White Paper reads:

‘We will take action to protect the UK’s operational advantages and free-

dom of action, but only where this is essential for national security.’

What is essential for national security is a matter of judgement, not

objective fact, and therefore a subject on which honest and informed indi-

viduals can disagree, although in the paper national security is presented

as being concerned with two things: ‘operational advantages’ and ‘freedom

of action’. It is the latter that may have the more significant implications for

defence acquisition.



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

What it means is set out in paragraphs 53 and 54 and its significance is

that it is defined as central to national sovereignty.

53. Freedom of action is the ability to determine our internal and exter-

nal affairs and act in the country’s interests free from intervention by other

states or entities, in accordance with our legal obligations. This freedom isthe essence of national sovereignty. It is also essential to be able to use a

capability effectively…

54. For national security capabilities in general, freedom of action rests on

the assurance that we will be able to use them – or continue to use them –

whenever we need to; and that when we do so, they will perform as we require.

In the field of defence, freedom of action includes being able to conduct combat

operations at a time and place of our choosing.

The paper seeks to assert an argument that not all equipment is central

to UK security, a point that is certainly valid with regard to, say, socks.

It speaks of ‘four general cases’ in which ‘action is likely to be needed in

the interests of national security’ (para 56). These are of potentially great

importance and so should be reported in full.

First, where the capability we require is by its nature fundamental to

our freedom of action as a nation. The leading example of this is secure

information and communications transfer at national level. This covers the

ability of the government to conduct its business securely at the highest

level, including communications with posts overseas and commanders

of deployed forces.

High-grade cryptography remains strategically vital across government.

The need to protect our most sensitive information, wherever it is in the

world, creates a sovereign requirement to control those aspects of crypto-

graphic production, deployment, and support that are critical to the integ-

rity of the product and therefore to our national security.

58. Secondly, where the fulfilment of our requirement, or the operation of

the resulting capability, is heavily dependant upon a supplier having access tohighly classified intelligence information or technologies. In these circumstances

we will only be able to consider suppliers of equipment and support services

that meet the highest standards of trust. The leading example of this is the UK’s

nuclear deterrent, as regards both weapons and propulsion systems.

59. Thirdly, where operational circumstances mandate changes to an in-

service capability that can only be met by having an assured ability to respond

– particularly in terms of technical expertise and knowledge – at the highest

levels of speed and agility. A leading example of this is electronic warfare and

associated defensive aids, where the ability to update deployed capability in

the light of intelligence is essential to survivability. Responding to cyber security

threats is another area where speed of response is critical.

60. Fourthly, where the nature of the UK’s potential operational advantagewhen using a particular capability means we need the highest possible confi-

dence in one or more aspects of its performance.

The paper is not clear as to whether all the major platforms and systems

in the UK’s forces are central to the country’s freedom of action and, thus,

sovereignty. However, there is overarching language that argues that oper-

ational advantage is seen to require that the UK deeply understands most,

if not all the technology that it is using, so that it can exploit the systems

concerned to their limits:

61. A key issue is our ability to assure the operation of critical sub-systems,

which will often include the design and operation of complex electronic hard-

ware and the associated controlling software. This may require us to request

assurances relating to processes and components used in the manufacture of such sub-systems, as well as their subsequent operation and support through

life. Without these assurances we would be unable to judge the level of opera-

tional risk or take appropriate action to mitigate certain threats.

This implies that, without such assurances and knowledge transfer, the

UK should not buy from an external supplier, and is similar to the think-

ing in the 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy that the UK ought to be able

to sustain and modify the equipment that it owns. (It is questionable

whether “assurances” are a sufficient substitute for certain knowledge

about such matters as operational performance and safety.) But the

paper then goes on to add a further qualification, which takes things

back to the beginning.

Stage three: if the route indicated by national security consider-

ations appears too expensive or risky, go back to the buy-from-the-

global-market approach (ie Stage 1)

In the White Paper, even national security considerations do not enjoy any

absolute dominance, perhaps because that would have been a significant

constraint on future action. Thus the paper observes:

“The extent to which we choose to protect our operational advantages

and freedom of action always involves a balance of risk and opportunity

cost. As with all acquisition choices, this is also subject to affordability

and value for money. The decision whether to take action depends on

other factors, particularly the balance of risk, affordability, and value for

money.”3 (para 62)

In plain language, the paper recognises that ‘beggars can’t be choosers’.

Our interpretation of the essentially circular nature of the MoD’s argu-

ment is represented in Figure 1, a contrast with the outwardly linear dia-

gram offered in the White Paper itself.

The paper is fundamentallyflawed, not least because of

the circular nature of the lines

of argument that it advances

The circular logic of the White Paper

Figure 1

Unless national securitydemands are too

expensive or risky

Relegate nationalsecurity factors

Review therequirement

Unless national security(freedom of action andoperational advantage)

implies otherwise

In which case

Buy from theglobal market



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

The role and impact of competition

Significantly, the document contains an argument meant to square the cir-

cle when it asserts that the UK government, by exposing defence and secu-

rity companies to global competition, will stimulate them to become lean,

efficient and successful. This was an emphasis prominent from the 1980swhen, as now, the government fear was that if UK companies felt they were

in a privileged position, they would lose their edge. In a press interview, the

procurement minister Peter Luff used words that reflected the mindset of

Mrs Thatcher and Lord Levene when he was Chief of Defence Procurement:

“One of the drivers of international success for British companies must be

their competitiveness and if you shield them from international competi-

tion you actually undermine their ability to compete.” This is tough love,

being cruel to be kind, and so on.

This argument should only reinforce the reputation of politicians for

a focus only on the short term. The paper fails to consider the medium-

and long-term effects of competition in the high-technology sectors of

defence. The defence market has some well-known attributes. There areonly a small number of customers for highly advanced equipment and it

is almost impossible to secure export orders without an endorsement in

the form of purchase by a firm’s home government. In several sectors,

including combat aircraft and medium-range missiles, governments

place orders only rarely.

A national company bidding in a competition can be under significant

pressure to make a highly optimistic bid in order to win the only contract

that matters. Unsuccessful companies in a competition tend to leave the

sector, ie, sell or abandon their capabilities, rather than pay for them until

the next competition comes along. Finally, in the most demanding areas

of defence, including aerospace systems, the financial, technological and

intellectual barriers to entry for new companies are huge.

The paper does not take account of the fact that the sustained use of

competitive tendering in important defence sectors where there is a need

for a huge intellectual inventory for development and production leads to

the number of companies being reduced to one. The UK has advocated

competition as the central aspect of its procurement policy since the mid

1980s when Peter Levene was appointed Chief of Defence Procurement,

and thus its impact can be assessed over a significant period of time.

We would emphasise that BAE Systems’ centrality in the UK defence

market must be ascribed mainly to others’ desire to abandon defence

and the unavailability of other investors other than US companies: the

cases of Alvis (armoured vehicles) and GEC (shipbuilding and electron-

ics) are central in this regard.

First, many high-tech defence businesses have left the sector. The firms

in Figure 2 were among the MoD’s top suppliers in 1998 and are no longer

active in defence. Many have been taken over by other firms, either BAES

or foreign businesses from the US and Europe, but none was subject to a

hostile takeover; they left of their own accord. Arguably, the British aero-

space and defence electronics sector has been kept afloat by the readiness

of Finmeccanica, Thales, Lockheed-Martin and others to invest in the UK.

Second, the remaining British defence firms have expended large amounts

of resource, not in research and technology to support UK defence, but ininvestments across the Atlantic, where the market is larger and less risky.

Rolls-Royce and BAE Systems have major US subsidiaries from which they

can extract profit but not technology because of US export controls, but

Cobham, QinetiQ and Chemring are important second-tier contractors that

have adopted a similar approach.

If the UK has discovered a remarkable policy approach, we might

expect it to be imitated by others. Looking forward, a policy of buying

off the shelf followed by the rest of Europe, plus the global tendency

of the highest-end capabilities to become vested in a single firm (con-

sider the concentration of defence capabilities within the US) will lead

inexorably to UK dependence on American suppliers, with many other

countries finding themselves in the same position. This would be fine

as long as UK politicians were to abandon explicitly their ambitions that

the UK should be capable of independent military action: see paragraphs

53 and 54 of the White Paper.

We believe that these arguments are well understood in the MoD, even

at the political level, but that there are influential ministers outside whose

ideological commitment to competition is such that they are incapable and/

or unwilling of seeing its negative aspects in the specific defence sector.

We suggest that the MoD takes on board that competitive tendering is

appropriate and viable long-term only for products with a modest intellec-

tual content and where the need for prior capital investment is modest.

Acquisition covers a broad spectrum from simple purchasing (repetitive/

physical) through to complex procurement (non-repetitive/highly intellec-

tual): Figure 3 illustrates the breadth and helps to describe why one size, orone approach does not fit all circumstances.

The paper fails to consider themedium- and long-term effects

of competition in the high-

technology sectors of defence

UK-based contractors paid more than £50 million by the UK

MoD in 1986-87 (Statement on Defence Estimates 1988 Vol2, p15)

No longer independent defence businesses

GEC■

Plessey■

Vickers■

Ferranti■

Hunting■

Racal■

Royal Ordnance■

Thorn-EMI■

STC■

Westland■

Dowty■

Lucas■

Pilkington■

Philips (was Dutch-owned)■

Shorts■

Yarrow■

No longer a defence player

Swan Hunter■ General Motors■

Defence survivors

BAE Systems■

British Telecom■

British Railways Board■

(reorganised for non-

defence reasons)

Rolls-Royce■

Shell■

Esso■

Figure 2



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

The four quadrants in Figure 3 demand tailored approaches and the

top-right quadrant characterises why competitive dogma, simply applied,

will not produce effective results. Here, acquisition solutions must be

drawn from a limited but highly skilled source, and while a competitive

approach works well for repetitive products, with a choice of solutions from

a wide number of sources, it fails to operate effectively where the solution

is unique or non-repetitive.It is this fact that differentiates complex Defence procurements and

destroys the argument for universally simple (‘commercial’) competitive

practice. Non-repetitive procurement depends on a supply base which has

invested in a ‘body of knowledge’, and specialist skills, something that can

only be acquired over an extended period working cooperatively with the

acquiring organisation.

The White Paper and the future of DE&S

The context of the White Paper is not just the resource pressures on the

MoD but also the review of the Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) cur-

rently under way in government. The White Paper surely provides a very

shaky foundation for any effort to establish DE&S with more independence

from ministers, and even government.

The paper as it stands would almost give an empowered DE&S carte

blanche to make the choices it wanted on short-term affordability

considerations or on risks focused on initial cost, time and performance

factors. Academics drafting examination regulations frequently make

use of the term ‘normally’ to ensure that a specific rule can be bypassed:

the White Paper has, as did the Green Paper before it, enough qualifica-

tions in its directions to ensure that a wide range of practices can be

compatible with it.

Conclusion

The paper appears to have been written so that it pins the MoD down to

few firm courses of action that involve significant resources, and almost

any behaviour and decision could be justified by reference to its language.

It might also be seen to incentivise industry to strive harder for efficiency

and effectiveness, although it could also lead more firms to the conclusion

that defence and security is not the sector to inhabit. Certainly the high-

level message of the White Paper gives little reason to foreign firms to

invest in the UK, and it is difficult to imagine that company boards across

Britain will read the document and conclude they should put more of their

shareholders’ money into defence.Inspired by one individual, our group is fond of reflecting that for

every multidimensional and challenging problem there is a clear simple

answer, which is wrong (clarification needed here). The long-awaited

National Security through Technology White Paper released by the MoD

on 1 February reflects both parts of this statement. There is a clear

and simple answer to the challenges of defence procurement, to buy

through open competition on the global market, albeit a response that

is accompanied by qualifying material explaining that may not always

be the sound thing to do.

In the interests of brevity and offering a focused argument, this paper

has not reviewed some important aspects of the White Paper, notably

those sections on SMEs, on R&T spending and the MoD’s need to restore/

preserve/strengthen its status as an intelligent customer. While the support

for SMEs is notable, such firms do not have muscle to lead the defence

export effort in which the government affects interest.

Moreover, the paper has nothing to say on the need for large businesses

with the technology and integration skills to develop large systems and

the financial base to take on significant risk. Nor does it consider the need for,

or shape of, a national technology base that needs to be preserved in the

country as a whole for security reasons.

It can be stated with confidence that the procurement sections of the

White Paper will be implemented, simply because virtually any procure-

ment choice will be able to be associated with some words somewhere

in the document.

Our group has reacted strongly to this paper, using adjectives including

‘dangerous’, ‘useless’, ‘contradictory’, ‘directionless’, and ‘poorly focused’.

The Levene Report made much of the need for more accountability in

defence but we wonder if, in five years’ time as the consequences of this

policy become apparent, the ministers who gave shape to it will be ready

to take responsibility for its results. ■

While the support for SMEs

is notable, such firms do

not have muscle to lead thedefence export effort

The competitive environment

Figure 3

Acquisition covers a range of “products” or “deliverables”.

The approach needs to reflect the nature of thedeliverable – the wrong approach either trivialises

the difficulty or complicates it

OTS procurements are in the bottom left quadrant

Complex systems and platforms are top right

Repetitive

Physicalinventory

Intellectualinventory

New productintroduction

Make tocontract

Mass or standardproduction

Non-repetitive

C o m p

e t i t i

o n s i m p

l e r



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

Managing change in complex environments is tough: managing

change in a complex environment where external influence

(not external market factors) is intrusive and significant, is

even tougher. When the environment in which you are trying to manage

change is constantly ‘disturbed’ by government impatience, government

departments and political imperatives, however, you have a recipe for

failure. This is the world of the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

As the MoD turns its attention squarely to implementing defence reform

in the latest in a long line of radical programmes to put right ‘its poor

performance’, the barriers to success are already apparent and, make no

mistake, are legion. Some of these obstacles were discussed in my previ-

ous paper (RUSI Defence Systems , Spring 2011), but the interim period has

served only to demonstrate the fragility of defence reform and the strength

of the barriers in resisting change. Breaking through these will take a criti-

cal mass, well aimed and strongly directed but, conversely, well distributed;

a precision attack with a difference. At this juncture in the process, it may

be time to reflect on what lies ahead and, consequently, examine what

can be done to break through the barriers preventing change.

Defence Reform – a Precision Attack?Bob Barton, former managing director of Niteworks, explains why implementing change

at an institution such as the Ministry of Defence is proving to be such a challenging task

It is easy to criticise the MoD for the obvious problems arising in defence

acquisition, and yet the environment in which the MoD has to operate – its

‘external environment’ – is almost certainly the primary problem to fix. The

constraints placed on the MoD from outside have a dramatic and debilitat-

ing effect on its ability to perform effectively, and this appears to be getting

worse, not better. Any organisation, if it is to perform well, needs to utilise

every ounce of ability and brain power that it can muster. The external

environment in which the MoD operates has undoubtedly caused a dete-

riorating capability in the acquisition process, and this has led to a level of

dysfunctional behaviour that threatens to defeat any successful change.

The Levene Report does not bring a holistic or sufficiently fresh approach

to the problem. While it highlights a number of critical deficiencies and

identifies a number of solid recommendations on what needs to be fixed,

it is strong on structure and weak on implementation, and this is the really

hard part. It is heavily laced with structural changes (without any idea of

the adverse consequences) and some recycled ideas that seem focused on

symptoms rather than root causes – one such example would be responsi-

bility and accountability. Of course, these need to be aligned, but the key

behaviour change is from government downwards. Government interven-

tion sets the tone: for example, in terms of defence appetite (often too

big), directed solutions (often unaffordable) and competition as the only

means of delivering value (what evidence?). Balance of Investment (BoI)

“For every complex problem, there is a simple solution

– and it is wrong.” Henry Louis Mencken

Reforming the MoD remains a

government priority



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

is not something that happens inside the MoD. The government has to

dictate a defence policy that is affordable at the outset – something it has

consistently failed to do. The result is an unaffordable programme that no

amount of massaging through MoD departments will disguise or mitigate.

There seems to be a resurgence of the notion that industry should begiven prescriptive specifications and should be contracted to undertake

fixed-price development (for example, of bespoke solutions). Fixed-price

development is a contradiction in terms: as a mechanism to encourage

helpful behaviours, it is about as useful as Corporal Jones from Dad’s Army

crying “Don’t panic!” The one area in which the Levene Report could have

really set out some constructive direction – namely industrial strategy,

and the breaking down of barriers that cause inappropriate MoD/industry

behaviours – it has avoided completely.

We now see the emergence of a number of acquisition doctrinal ‘solu-

tions’ that are remedies given to the MoD as if they were obvious. In reality,

there is little or no evidence that they will be effective. It is easy to come up

with simple solutions when objectivity is neglected.

Some of the ideas for fixing the MoD’s problems

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) can lead exports: SMEs

are vitally important; they are the lifeblood of the future industrial land-

scape and help to transition larger companies. But to lead exports? They

simply do not have the infrastructure to do so.

OTS (off the shelf) is the answer: OTS can be a very good solution, but

the blind pursuance of OTS as a panacea belies the problems that come

in equal measure. It is a classic example of a ‘simple’ solution to a com-

plex problem. OTS is just as likely to result in cost growth as reduction, it

certainly fails to deliver any control, and it also leads to a reduction in

capacity and ‘body of knowledge’ (on which defence depends on heavily

in times of adversity) in the UK.Most OTS will be foreign, so how much control will we have over it, its

cost and its supply? Will foreign companies help when we most need it

(for example, with urgent operational requirements)? What happens if the

exchange rate fluctuates out of control?

Partnering is a bad thing: This appears to be against all commercial logic,

and presumably stems from the perception of competition as being the

be-all and end-all, and that industry cannot be trusted. The problem is that

this becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy. As one observer put it: “The oil and

gas industry accepts collaboration and partnering as essential. Why does

defence think it is different?”

More certainty in specification: There are no certainties. Conflicts are

not a certainty, nor is what you find when you get there. The military have

to live with this, and yet acquisition is meant to be a certainty. What is

worse is that, through the MoD process, it is a long gestation – a slow dis-

tillation to a certainty. Pace in acquisition does not happen: surely, time is

the important parameter. It certainly is in industry.

More controls are needed: The greater the controls, the less the respon-

sibility is properly exercised in a thoughtful and intelligent way. Controls

heap complication on complication and remove the ability to veer and haul

and, more importantly, trade. Trading is vital at every stage of the process.

Unlike most industrial situations, where the external environment is

a given, the government can effect a real change if it wishes to, but the

degree of distrust has reached such a level that this is unlikely. However,

an analysis of the key external factors clearly points to this as being an

essential starting point for changing the way that the MoD operates.

Public accountability means that no one wants to be seen to be mak-

ing the wrong decision, so most decisions are put off. This has led to the

endless cycle of option generation, spreadsheet analysis, salami-slicing

and delay. The effect is cost growth, not reduction: it wastes huge amounts

of resources. Industry has to make decisions, even if it gets some wrong;

but decisions must be made.

Changes are now being proposed to the central capability manage-

ment area, to give more responsibility to the front lines for this function.This, in theory, sounds the right thing to do, and for some aspects it

undoubtedly is, but balancing it will be very hard. Will it result in simpli-

fication, fewer parochial decisions, better BoI, more constructive trad-

ing? The historical data would not support this: indeed, this model has

been tried before and changed for precisely the reasons that it biased

or drove single-service priorities. Of course, this time around, the ‘fix’

is the joint area – yet more interfaces and more divergence of views to

manage and resolve?

Why has the central model seemingly failed? Has anyone looked at the

externally imposed constraints under which it operates? The failure to

achieve the difficult decisions at the highest level – to stop the unafford-

able, early – means its operating practices dissolve into endless rework-

ing. Those who have led the Joint Capabilities Board have stated that it

has never really grasped its role effectively. Maybe it operates at too low

a level, but it has never benefited from the high-level (BoI) decisions that

would give it clear space and degrees of freedom in which to operate effec-

tively. This, and the undoubted pressure from individual services, renders a

cohesive approach impossible.

Now, the proposal is to replace this single joint body with three single

service bodies, plus a separate joint one, and retain a central strategic one

(the MilCap area). This feels like a structural focus when the underlying

problems will all remain, and the process will just become more compli-

cated, which is the last thing it needs.

Let us look at the nature of the organisation. The MoD is probably the

most complex government department and undertakes some of the most

challenging, technically difficult and, a fact that is often overlooked, interde-

pendent projects. Ironically, the level of overspend on many large Defence

projects is considerably less than in civil construction and other areas of

government, and often considerably less than that of our US counterparts,

and that despite an artificially suppressed cost basis contrived through the

vagaries of the bidding process. A recent example of comparative over-

spend is Edinburgh’s new tram system which, at £1 billion, is three times

over budget. When was there last a Defence project that ‘overspent’ by

anything like as much?

Complexity is a hallmark of the MoD by nature of what it does, and

the sheer number of stakeholders and interested parties

Complex environments cannot be controlled – either give up the

complexity or drop the control: This first point often leads to suboptimal

change initiatives in an attempt to drive change. Senior MoD heads look

It is easy to come up with

simple solutions for the Ministry

of Defence’s problems when

objectivity is neglected



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

to their own areas and formulate specific changes without account or the

use of the overall context in which outcomes are generated. Furthermore,

they often start by prescribing control mechanisms that serve to constrain

and reduce available thinking power to a minimum. The controls end up

driving the wrong behaviours and destroying effective contributions. The

most obvious example of these are:

Over-detailed specifications■

Over-restrictive budgets (‘P9 line’ approach, preventing trading)■

Annualisation■

Scrutiny■

The dilemma for any government department is to be seen to be exer-

cising adequate control in the public interest (to meet the demands of

public accountability), while not stifling the ability, creativity and problem-

solving mentality that must be harnessed within any successful organi-

sation. We should ask why so many government departments appear to

underperform – are they all bad, or is there something systemic in their

environments that causes poor performance? The control mechanisms,

therefore, need to be thought through at the highest level, in terms of

both positive and adverse consequences, and not allowed to become the

province of individual functions.

Leading the change

Always drive change through the most senior coordinating spon-

sorship body: The tribal nature of the MoD inherently gives rise to inde-

pendent solutions. The absence of a single, coherent change programme

(very senior and full-time) leader who is directing major themes, via a

powerful senior change board, leads to conflict, poor outcome focus (at

the Defence level) and a divisive, turbulent and, ultimately, failing change

process. Every MoD change programme has started with a sworn intent

and ministerial drive to achieve a major shake-up; each has singularly

failed to achieve this.

Too often, the change itself has been delegated to three-star or below,

and this immediately condemns the process to failure. Without singularity

of sponsorship, each functional area or department will try to set about

suboptimal changes in their own areas. While this is well-meaning, it almost

always leads to conflicting agendas, confusion and unnecessary work.

The use of external assistance

Always use an experienced team of very senior external agents or

consultants: This aspect is always problematic, as the pressure not to

use external assistance (EA) is severe. In the past, there have been mixed

If change is to stick in the

Ministry of Defence, it has to be

relentlessly driven from the top

– nothing is more important

Pushing through Defence reform requires

a precision attack with a difference



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

results from the use of consultants, and this further colours the situation.

Too often, however, the instinct to cut costs with EA has led to the engaged

party being forced to use junior or lightweight consultants. These have

little or no content knowledge and, worse, lack the stature and experience

to stand up to resisting players, particularly senior sponsors.

There are such profound cultural and behavioural problems to be

addressed that only the very best consultants can arguably effect any

change and, even then, their resolve must be very strong. Government

has lost confidence in the MoD, leading to excessive scrutiny of its actions.

This is a downward spiral, as it leads to less decision-making and worsen-

ing performance. This spiral can only be addressed by highly competent

exterior support, whose actions cannot be held against them unfairly when

senior behaviour is confronted. Only senior consultants can adequately

challenge the status quo, point out the consequences of inappropriate

senior behaviour and break the damaging cycle of regression.

Perverse incentives

There are only two reasons why people behave ineffectively: either they

are stupid or their environment causes them to do so. The list of perverse

incentives under which MoD staff operate is legion. To name but a few:

Commit as much funding as you can: If you do not commit it, you lose it,

so commit to things that enable fund retention, even if it is unsupportable.

Reward and recognition: The lack of any realistic performance differen-

tial means it is best not to make any decisions. You cannot be wrong that

way, and why take the risk?

Promotion: No one in a single service was ever promoted for offering up

cuts in their own area.

Avoid scrutiny for as long as possible: Helpful challenge is vital – at the

right time. Too much, and at the wrong time, stops creativity. So scrutiny

ends up coming too late.

Do not innovate: This leads to risk, so it is best avoided.

Do not use collaboration: No prizes for fighting for this one, so it is mucheasier to fall into a competition than to argue why not.

Delay = saving: A widely held belief. Delay gives the illusion of saving – in

reality, it always leads to increased cost.

Ignore integration: The cost of adopting a systems approach early is

never identified, because it would mean going over budget and, hence,

cause approval problems. Better, therefore, to ignore it. Someone else can

deal with it later, at a much increased cost.

Over specify: Without understanding the impact on cost and time, it is

easy to overdo it. But it feels safer.

Do not make trades with other areas: This is hard anyway, and the bud-

get lines make it harder, but why offer bigger savings elsewhere when you

have to spend more (but less overall) to do it?

Process is more important than outcomes: Process is now, outcomes

are later. So stick to the process, even if it is clearly not working.

Do not worry if you get it wrong: Almost certainly, the impact will be

felt by your successors, so no need to worry.

In summary, if change is to really stick in the MoD, it has to be relentlessly

and consistently driven from the top – nothing is more important. While

it is right and proper to ensure that the MoD operating model, its culture

and behaviours all change as part of Defence reform, the impact of the

external environment needs to be addressed first and a more informed set

of government demands drawn up as a result.

If the culture is to change, the aforementioned perverse incentives that

abound need to be stripped away and more degrees of freedom given, withmore positive and negative consequences being articulated to encourage

people to use them wisely.

After all this time, it is surely obvious that there is something systemically

wrong with the way MoD operates. Maybe concentrating on the systemic

issues would deliver better results – if those causing them to be sustained

would wake up to the fact. Change starts with your own behaviour.■

The author

Bob Barton, has spent 40 years in Defence and the past 15 years

working very closely with and within the Ministry of Defence

(MoD). He has run several very successful change programmes

and he speaks with practical experience of how change should be

conducted and what makes it stick. His most recent appointment

was as managing director of Niteworks,

an MoD set-up that is charged with

spotting problems early, and helping to

deliver more joined-up, cost-effective

solutions. Three years ago, Niteworks

nearly folded: after a very successful

and rapid change programme

it stands today as a strong and

proven vehicle ready to help the

MoD through a difficult period,

and is in comprehensive use

right across the MoD space.



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

On 23 February 2012, Jim Murphy MP, the UK Shadow Secretary

of State for Defence, announced that the Labour Party was

embarking on a ‘Shadow Defence Review’1. The UK is some

three years from the next Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR),

which are now to be held every five years. It should therefore come

straight after the next general election, unless events were to intervene

and force an earlier one. Hence, it is a good time for the major opposi-

tion party to present its own strategic vision for the future.

This initiative, and the opportunity to lead rather than follow the debate, is

timely. Let us hope that there is some real substance to the outcome and that

Labour comes up with some clear strategy and policy proposals that allow

for a challenging debate. Issues about which a clear ‘side’ is needed include:

the replacement of Trident; the European context; America’s uncertain com-

mitment to the transatlantic partnership and its ‘special’ relationship with

the UK; a realistic take on the value of defence in contributing to global

influence and the premium for this paid by the taxpayer. There is also the

priority to be given to government’s inalienable defence obligations (domes-

tic security and defence of the UK, overseas territories, access for trade

and protection of nationals abroad) over interventions of choice whether

morally motivated, for honour in the global arena, or in support of the

argument that asymmetric wars are better fought abroad than at home.

Labour’s Defence Procurement Report

and Shadow Defence Review Launch Michael Codner , senior research fellow and director of Military Sciences at RUSI, commends the UK’s

Labour shadow government for its recent report focusing on defence procurement, and hopes that

the party’s resultant Shadow Defence Review will bring something genuinely new to the table

The consultation paper2 that accompanied this announcement does to

some extent ‘eat its own sandwiches’ in the discussion; for instance, the

commitment in the 2006 White Paper to replace Trident is reinforced. One

might conclude the outcome will be a continuation of the Blair strategy of

the last government with all the costs, risks of embroilment, and indeed

direct threats to the UK that this vision invited. Fortunately, the questions at

the end of each section challenge these presumptions to some extent. Let

us hope that the outcome answers the question, “Why is Britain the fourth

biggest spender on defence in the world yet the ninth largest in terms of

Gross Domestic Product3 (2011 estimated)?” If not, it should make a strong

argument for more parity in this ratio as one might expect a Labour Party

without the trammels of legacy to do.

Procurement

In this regard, it might be considered a particularly noble effort for Labour

to have put its head above the parapet with its Ideas for Future UK Defence

Procurement: A report for the Shadow Defence Team4, commissioned by

Shadow Defence Ministers Jim Murphy and Michael Dugher and executed

by Admiral Lord West, Bill Thomas and Tony Roulstone. The previous

government devoted extraordinary effort to the reform of defence acquisi-

tion policy and practice from ‘Smart Acquisition’, launched with the 1998

Jim Murphy MP, Shadow Secretary of State

for Defence, commissioned the independent

defence procurement report with his

colleague, Michael Dugher MP



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

Strategic Defence Review5. This initiative was widely accepted as innova-

tive and relevant to the issues of equipment overspend that have dogged

the UK and most other serious spenders on defence for years. In particu-

lar, it redressed the problem of the adversarial relationship between the

government customer and supplier that had emerged from the necessarycompetition-led reforms of Peter Levene as Chief of Defence Procurement

from 1985 to 1991 under the Conservative government.

Smart Acquisition established clear lines of responsibility and it tried to

address the matter of Through Life Capability Management (TLCM) and its

significance for realistic long-term funding of major projects. Outcomes rele-

vant today were that the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) was established

as a ‘Next Steps’ executive agency of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in 1998 in

lavish new premises at Abbey Wood and that the new Equipment Capability

Department in the MoD Central Staff would take control of the defence

equipment budget as the customer to DPA, the supplier. This relationship

was the outcome of the institution of commercial accounting methods

in the MoD with the adoption of Resource Accounting and Budgeting.

However, the reputation of Smart Acquisition fell foul of problems with

legacy programmes and lack of cultural change in management.

The Labour government pursued the matter of the significance of

the UK’s defence and related industries to the economy and to Britain’s

military independence – something the Conservatives had shunned – with

its Defence Industrial Policy7 of 2002 and, more importantly, its Defence

Industrial Strategy8 (DIS) of 2005. The second of these, initiated and driven

by Lord Drayson, was once again perceived widely as a very good thing.

But the much trumpeted follow-on, DIS2, which was to address funding

implications, among other things, never happened. Once again, the prob-

lem presented itself as one of reluctance to change management cultures

in the MoD. Paul Drayson stormed off to pursue other interests. However,

2006 saw Enabling Acquisition Change9, an MoD study led by Tom McKane,

which took forward the conclusion that the DPA should be merged with

the Defence Logistics Organisation into a single entity, Defence Equipment

and Support (DE&S) – no longer an agency with the intended freedoms of

action but rather, once again, a department of the MoD in all but name.

Then, in 2009, the then Secretary of State for Defence, John Hutton,

commissioned Bernard Gray, former City boy, journalist, and government

special adviser, to produce a very comprehensive and detailed report10.

Its focus was much to do with achieving affordability, sorting out the

Head Office functions of the MoD and building structures for clear direc-

tion and accountability – particularly important, because it is the disper-

sion of responsibility that hinders cultural change in management, as of

course does lack of clear vision and authority from the very top. And now,

Bernard Gray is Chief of Defence Materiel. He is expected soon to launch

his Defence Materiel Strategy for the future of DE&S. Something of an

irony here because, while he is poacher turned gamekeeper when it comes

Three years from the next SDSR,

it is a good time for the majoropposition party to present its

strategic vision for the future

to the problems of defence acquisition, Lord Levene, the grandfather of

competition in the UK defence sector, was the poacher who led the 2010

government study of the organisation of the MoD, once again bashing

Head Office and recommending a radical restructuring of the ‘require-

ments customer’ end of the acquisition chain.

Labour ideas for procurement

As John Louth from RUSI has noted, the Labour Party report on procure-

ment contains “a mix of new ideas for the future, along with old concepts

from the past”11. It preceded by some months the long-awaited government

White Paper on technology, equipment and support, on which there is

commentary in this edition of RUSI Defence Systems by the RUSI Acquisition

Focus team12 (see page 14).

Labour’s report contains a number of areas of recommendation:

Balancing the Defence Equipment and Support Budgets: The MoD as

a whole should commit to a 10-year rolling budget. At present, there is a

10-year budget for equipment procurement but other aspects of defence

spending are covered in a five-year plan. Accordingly, there is a resulting

mismatch between the funding of systems procurement and their support

and manning, which compromises TLCM. Also, if under the Levene reforms

the services are to have more control of the allocation of spending across

capabilities in the widest sense, a single budgetary process will allow these

decisions to be more considered and consistent.

The downside for government and the MoD is less flexibility to muddle

through. However, 10 years extends way beyond the life of any particular

government and the typical political perspective. There is also the compli-

cating factor of five-yearly defence and comprehensive spending reviews.

But defence – uncomfortably for the British system of government –

requires a vision that extends to 20 years and beyond. The defence indus-

tries would also welcome greater transparency over the 10-year budgetand longer-term plans to support their own longer-term vision.

Over-Ambition: In the same section the report recommends that capa-

bilities should not exceed ambition and that the premium for perfection

should be avoided – a problem that is well understood in the community.

The solution is not easy, however. On the one hand, there is the need to

adapt culture and processes. On the other, warfare is a matter of prevailing

in competition, and the best capabilities are an essential means to that.

‘Make-Buy’ Decisions: This question is also central to another set of

recommendations. Most capabilities can be bought off the shelf; there are

only a few that need to be developed onshore for particular British needs.

The White Paper also addresses this matter in similar fashion. The question

of appropriate sovereignty was central to the 2005 DIS and there is general

agreement that ‘off the shelf’ purchasing is a route to reducing defence

budgets. Unfortunately, it is not easy to define sovereign capabilities with

any certainty, and the White Paper acknowledges the need for compro-

mises. So much depends on a grand strategic commitment to autono-

mous action in certain circumstances and the scope and scale of these

commitments. A preference for ‘off the shelf’ purchasing from international

suppliers is also not comfortable for the UK defence industry and does not

favour British defence exports with the jobs and return to taxpayers that

government hopes that this will bring.

Firmer and Fairer Contracts with Industry: The White Paper has a very

strong emphasis on competition. The Labour report is somewhat more

realistic about the availability of sufficient numbers of competitors, recom-

mending a minimum of three. Where there is not sufficient competition,

‘fixed price’ contracts must be fair and attractive to industry. They must

also be carefully costed to factor in adaptability but avoid monopoly exploi-

tation. These issues were agonised over even before Smart Acquisition.



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

Procurement Process and Efficiency: The recommendations include

shorter three- to five-year projects with ‘reasonable objectives and

successive phases for incremental capability improvement’. Once again,

there is not much new here; incremental or ‘spiral’ acquisition has beenpart of the agreed way ahead for years. The problem is in operationalising

the concept. Capability-specific acquisition processes and cycles is another

recommendation that harks back to Smart Acquisition as does ‘alliance or

partnering approaches’ and the empowerment of Integrated Project Team

Leaders (IPTL). The report raises the serious issue of the actual role and

responsibilities of the Senior Responsible Owner in relation to the IPTL and

other functionaries. The proposal to review and shut down over-expensive

projects lies very much in the comfort zone of the present government, but

it becomes politically uncomfortable if that government cannot pass the

blame for the failed project to its predecessor and has to account for the

waste of money. Finally, passing more responsibility for project manage-

ment to industry is very much part of Bernard Gray’s recommendations.

But the challenge is retaining and building intelligent customer capacity

without huge costs, and avoiding exploitation and mistakes by industry13.

Professional Procurement and Programme Organisation: The report

recommends that DE&S should become an executive Non-Departmental

Public Body (NDPB) rather than the Government Owned Commercially

Operated (GoCo) entity which was Bernard Gray’s preferred recommen-

dation – and was assumed to be the outcome of his present reforms as

CDM. The argument is one of accountability to government for the scale

of expenditure. That said, Gray’s report limits the budget contracted to the

private sector to the running costs of DE&S. This, of course, leaves acres

of ultimate responsibility within the MoD and the burden of intelligent

customer that this entails. In either the NDPB or GoCo model there is a vast

range of possibilities. As ever, a problem for the UK government is the lack

of models within the peculiarly unique defence procurement sector. One

cannot easily translate lessons from the private sector or other government

models in the UK or abroad to the UK’s future acquisition system.

Conclusion

So once again the UK will be an anxious leader in acquisition reform,

observed with great interest by other governments but sneered at for its

failures by them and its own population. The Labour Party has made a

brave move in putting its own thoughts together up front. Setting asideNDPB/GoCo there is a lot of overlap and potential consensus between this

report, Bernard Gray’s earlier report, and the White Paper. Acquisition is

one area of defence in which a combative debate is probably not helpful

after such a long period of testing and agonising. The key test will be in

enforcing cultural change and that will be for the government in power.

On the wider issue of the Shadow Defence Review, an outcome that pres-

ents a clear and distinctive Labour view would be helpful to the nation.

Some polarity will make for a rich debate in the build-up to the 2015 SDSR

– something that never happened in the run-up to the 2010 review. That

is not to say that consensus is not achievable, but it must be one that is

properly informed and not dogged by legacy decisions by any of the main

parties. A five-year policy and strategy cycle with the sort of general accep-

tance that was achieved in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review would be a

very good thing, provided it is properly costed to 10 years across the board

and builds and implements a strategic vision to 25 years – and all in the

wider context of national security. In that regard, the problem for defence

is that its vision and timelines are necessarily far longer than most other

arms of government and that it will find itself as the reluctant leader.■

Michael Dugher MP, Shadow Minister for

Defence Equipment, Support and Technology,

on the terrace of the Houses of Parliament



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

Would it be a good idea if the whole of the defence enterprise

were organised with repeatable, ‘identikit’ structures, with

standardised barcodes and metadata, and harmonised and

optimised processes from end to end? Surely, this would be a good thing

for efficiency, similar to a supermarket chain? But what about opera-

tional effectiveness? Would there be any unintended consequences

arising from such uniformity and homogeneity? The evidence is that

enterprise-wide adoption of a supermarket chain-like approach would

be damaging to the UK’s ability to carry out operations – especially of

the kind that the nation was involved in during 2011. An alternative

‘agile enterprise’ approach is far more applicable to defence and this

article uses a systematic approach to indicate why.

Characterising enterprises

To characterise enterprises in general, a simple ‘enterprise framework’ will

be used (shown in its most basic form in Figure 1). The framework1 indicates

that there are five interdependent aspects to any enterprise, as follows:

The Defence Enterprise is More

Than Just a Supermarket ChainPatrick Beautement, from The abaci Partnership LLP, explains why the UK defence enterprise should

not be seen as a single homogenous activity, in the same way that a supermarket chain is regarded

Governance hub:■ There is an enterprise ‘governance hub’ that is

responsible for overall strategy, direction, coordination and over-

sight of trade-offs between the other aspects;

‘Customer-facing’ operations:■ The quadrant 1 (Q1) aspect oper-

ates in the real world, and adapts and reconfigures what it is doing

concurrently with changing circumstances;

Policy and vision:■ The quadrant 2 (Q2) aspect is concerned

with policy and vision, and provides design guidance that is

cognizant of the wider external context beyond that of the

immediate enterprise;

Capability acquisition:■ This quadrant 3 (Q3) aspect arranges for

appropriate capability to be researched, designed, built and tested

and delivered to the enterprises’ users;

Development and experimentation:■ This quadrant 4 (Q4)

aspect is where users bring together the available capabilities and

engage in development and integration, including establishing

ways of working, as part of pre-adaptation before deployment.

There is ample evidence to suggest

that adopting a supermarket chain-

like approach across defence would

prove detrimental to the ability of

UK forces to conduct operations



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

The supermarket chain

Let us now consider the characteristics of the supermarket chain. Figure 2

uses the framework to illustrate that supermarkets are largely structured as

homogenous enterprises, as follows:

Front-office activities, customer services, and shop floor ‘shelf-stack-■

ing’ and presentation are part of Q1, which is largely where brand

projection and engagement with customers occurs;

In Q2, market trends and public opinion are monitored, as are policy,■

legislation, the regulatory environment, and the wider activities of

commerce and competitors, as part of strategy development;

Q3 sources the commodities for sale, deals with suppliers, and sets■

up and maintains the back-office services that the whole enterprise

relies upon, eg, logistics and human resources (HR);

Q4 is where staff training is undertaken and where new■

procedures and processes are evaluated before they are rolled out

across the enterprise;

The head office functions direct the overall operations to ensure■

that there is the optimised end-to-end coherence of performance

required for accountability and brand predictability.

It makes sense for this enterprise to be homogeneous, ie self-similar in all

its parts. Every shop has the same look and feel, after all, they are cloned

in line with the brand. Information systems are standardised – from the

barcoded tags on the cows’ ears and on commodities, to customer loy-

alty cards – and strive for a ‘single view of the truth’. Techniques such

as demand-flow technology3 are employed to reduce cost and eliminate

waste, yet be flexible within an envelope of predictable performance.

The defence enterprise

One difference that is immediately obvious between supermarketchains and defence is that defence deploys operational parts that are

semi-independent, stand-alone organisations that must be able to make

sense of their local context, and engage with and shape it .

These deployable parts vary in ways that reflect the military tasks.

The parts can range from, for instance, an adviser team with a satellite

Although this model is very straightforward, it captures all of the essen-

tial elements and relationships needed to characterise different types

of enterprises. Of course, these five aspects do not operate in isolation

– there is continual dialogue between them (omitted from Figure 1 for

simplicity). Therefore, Figure 1 should not be thought of as an anticlockwisesequential cycle.

Instead, each quadrant has its own ‘internal’ patterns of activity

(design principles, organisational structures and ways of working, etc)

and operates semi-autonomously, yet concurrently with the others. The

quadrants are, in reality, semi-independent organisations working within

a ‘federation’. It is the responsibility of all of the parts of the enterprise

to engage in the pan-enterprise interactions that are required for overall

success. The degree of coupling between the quadrants and the extent

of the standardisation imposed determines whether or not the whole

behaves either as a homogenous, single entity (directly under the con-

trol of the ‘governance hub’) or alternatively, more adaptively, as sets of

Communities of Interest (CoIs).

It is simply a design issue to determine where along this continuum

of behaviours it is desired that the enterprise will be positioned at ‘run

time’. For example, a clamped-down organisation will have quadrants

that communicate with each other in stereotyped ways, providing pre-

dictability, but proving to be brittle should the unexpected happen.

In contrast, if agility is required, then this can be realised by facilitat-

ing more flexible interactions within and between the various aspects.

Indeed, the overall behaviour of the enterprise can be ‘tuned’, by chang-

ing the degree and nature of the collaboration.

This tuning can be carried out top-down (for instance, through policy

or by altering permissions, authorities and responsibilities), or bottom-

up (by individuals being innovative and taking the initiative) or through

self-regulation/self-organisation that propagates through various socialstructures (such as via ‘meetings at the water cooler’, ad hoc interest

groups and so on). All of these basic patterns of behaviour, their under-

lying mechanisms and the dynamics of the phenomena that result are

largely understood and have been articulated for use by operators, man-

agers and practitioners2.

Enterprise Framework

Q2 Q1

Q4Q3

Sponsor User

Capability management

Challenges Real-world focus

Technical focusSolutions

Capability employment

Enterprise

‘governance hub’

(Federation

trade-offs)

Policy and vision

(Concepts, guidance,

relevance and utility)

Operate and adapt

(Configuring, doing

and sustaining)

Develop and experiment

(Service integration,

training and exercises)

Capability acquisition

(Research, design,

build and test)

Figure 1 A simple ‘Enterprise Framework’



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

briefcase (as in Sierra Leone) to large deployments, such as those sent to

Iraq for the first Gulf War.

This means that defence has to be able to operate at least two types of

enterprise, with very different characteristics and capability needs, con-

currently. The first is the ‘standing enterprise’, based around the Ministryof Defence (MoD) in Whitehall and at the home bases, that administers

defence capability, in line with national priorities. The second type is the

‘deployed enterprise’ (DE), of which there may be more than one, that

carries out operations under a political mandate in dynamically chang-

ing and uncertain situations.

Why aren’t these two types homogenous? The simple reason is that

they operate within different contexts that are driven by entirely dif-

ferent imperatives. This means that for each type to operate effectively,

they cannot be the same. As can be seen from Figure 3, the DE(s) sit

within Q1 – each of them having their own version of the enterprise

framework configured to suit the situation into which they have been

deployed. Note that the standing enterprise is constituted largely of the

other three quadrants. Let us examine them first .

Characteristics of the standing enterprise

Other than in Q1 (operations), the characteristics of supermarket chains

and the standing enterprise are remarkably consistent. Starting with:

Standing enterprise ‘management hub’: This management hub,

where the senior responsible officers (SROs) are based, is driven by the

need to have a coherent view of the overall defence enterprise, as shown

in Figure 3. The main challenge for the hub is adopting approaches that

accept the necessary diversity of the ways in which the deployed enter-

prises function and in which their activities are valued. The relationship

between the hub and quadrants is a two-way street of reciprocal engage-ment – for example, in establishing the principles, behaviours and engi-

neering necessary to achieve operational agility. The hub’s focus ranges

from days to years, and its activities are driven by the need to be able to

provision, deploy, sustain and support effective operational capabilities

(into Q1) consistent with national aims.

Policy, vision and strategy – Q2: The activities within this quadrant

are shaped by politics, finance, foreign policy, defence priorities and

public opinion. Its focus is on providing long-term direction based on a

‘rational’ assessment of risk/need, looking ahead from years to decades.

The quadrant is driven by the requirement that it should be account-able to a number of stakeholders – especially external ones, such as the

Treasury, and the scrutineers and their metrics – and to the notions of

value they employ that reflect their particular sensitivities.

Capability management, acquisition and manufacture – Q3:

This quadrant’s activities are shaped by concerns over timelines, cost,

quality, technical principles (precision, repeatability), and its focus is on

providing ‘raw’ capability tested against engineered requirements and

valued in those terms. The time horizon for these activities can shift

from weeks to years and is driven largely by financial, engineering and

programmatic considerations, which are informed by innovative research.

Experimentation, integration and exercises – Q4: This quadrant is

shaped by the need to test and evaluate capability against current and

perceived, future operational needs – not simply against technical speci-

fications. The outputs from these activities are not just assessments of the

ability of integrated capability to meet programme needs, but also provide

opportunities for military forces to learn how to adapt and employ the

capability creatively to cope with the unexpected. The time frame of these

activities can range from the immediate to a matter of months, against

Defence has to be able to operate

at least two types of enterprise,

with different characteristics and

capability needs, concurrently

Enterprise Model of a Supermarket Chain

Q2 Q1

Q4Q3

Market User

Capability aquisition

Opportunities Customer focus

Service focusSolutions


Figure 2 Enterprise framework applied to a supermarket chain

Brand projection

C u s t o m

e r s

Technical services

S u p p l i e r s

( e g f a r m e r s )

Policy/legislation

Fashion/trends

Focus groups

Public opinion

Staff training

Process development

Head

office

DirectionStrategy

Criteria

(competence)

Service

agreements

Front office

Customer serviceShop floor

Back office

Product preparation

Packaging

Logistics/HR/finance Optimised end-to-end

coherence, predictability ( e g e a r t a g s o n c o w s )

( e g l o y a l t y

c a r d s )



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

the background of a variety of inevitably ‘contradictory’, real-world,

operational performance criteria.

Despite the similarities with supermarkets, the main difference for

defence is the theme that the operational environment is always an

unknown. Supermarket chains do not usually have to deploy, at shortnotice, to a new country or cope with their shops being blown up.

Characteristics of deployed enterprises – Q1

This quadrant is where the real-world realities come into play and where

the activities of the DEs are shaped by the context, the expectations

on the ground, the dynamics of the current situation and the nature of

possible futures4. Commanders must be able to make sense of this as

it happens. It cannot be fully appreciated and delivered in advance as

activities in this space must lead to self-sustaining change that meets the

outcomes required by politicians, the people and the media etc. There

are many drivers and demands in tension, not least the changing ‘complex

operational realities’ and the mix of perceptions and intentions of the

actors involved, many of whom influence matters behind the scenes.

There are two mutually supporting sides to DEs: the ‘informal’ side –

that is to say, the command and intelligence ‘brain’ that makes sense of

the changing context – and the ‘formal’ one – namely, the control and

administration machine-like ‘nervous system’. There is no dispute about

the fact that these two sides exist. The DSTO-inspired chart5 at Figure

4 has been used at front-line operator and intelligence workshops over

12 years, involving personnel from three-star generals to corporals, and

across NATO to outside defence without there ever being any dissent

about its validity. The issue is that its wider implications have not, in my

experience, been articulated clearly enough in capability terms to gain

traction and to be taken forward into acquisition. The two sides of DEs are

complementary – both are required – and the function of each is as follows:

The informal side, built around the command-intelligence partner-■

ship, provides intent and purposeful leadership drive to controland Intelligence functions. Its activities vary with changes in oper-

ational imperatives, contexts and degree of dominance, that we,

and the forces and communities that we work with, have in any

specific situation. In capability terms, it is more outward looking,

proving perception and sense-making ‘services’ based on human

judgement. These support our own forces and, often in commu-

nities of interest and federations, those of coalition partners and

agencies/other government departments (OGDs) outside defence.

Without this brain, the formal side is a ‘blind machine’.

The formal side, largely managed by staffs, ensures on-going■

accountability of control and administrative functions, such as

issuing of orders, monitoring and reporting, security, logistics,

personnel/finance, medical and office automation, including sig-

nals, messaging, transfer of data, etc. It uses standard operating

procedures (SOPs) and changes little during operations. In capa-

bility terms, it is more inward-looking, providing the kind of stan-

dardised, end-to-end services (very similar to those in supermarket

chains) required for the reliable execution of missions.

Implications for operational effectiveness and acquisition

The spring 2011 edition of RUSI Defence Systems contained articles

concerning acquisition reform, coherence, information superiority,

enterprise architectures and system thinking. A single, largely unspoken,

The Two Defence Enterprises

Q2 Q1

Q4Q3

Sponsor User

Capability acquisition

Challenges Operational focus

Service focusSolutions


Figure 3 Enterprise framework applied to defence showing the deployed enterprise(s) required for operations

Research and development

D e f e n c e i n d u s t r y

Defence policy/doctrine

Vision and guidance

Public opinion

Blueprints for behaviours

Intergration and

experimentation

Direction

I n n o v a t i o n

Strategy

Criteria

(performance)

Contracts

AgreementsAcquisition

Design

Development and test

Exercises and trials

(Simulated operational

environment)

Missions/

Initiative/

Adapt

Deployed Defence Enterprise(s)

CJO

eg COMISAF

Command/

Intelligence/

Intent

Op-Orders/

Rehearsal

Forces Assigned/

Logistics/

Personnel

Challenges Execution

Solutions Preparation

Strategic Operational/tactical

Provision Employment

Real operational environment

SROs

(Standing enterprise)



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

assumption underpins these papers – that defence can be thought of as

a coherent enterprise, in effect, as a ‘single’, unified System of Systems

(SOS), rather like a supermarket chain.

Yet, as already indicated in operational terms, this cannot be so. The UK’s

defence forces usually operate in coalitions with tens or even hundreds of

partners and many of these are ‘come as you are’ elements that may drop

in or out at short notice. This means being able to engage in the kind of

flexible, federated, collaborative working across governments, agencies

and non-governmental organisations that is needed for success.

This diversity and agility is required to cope with the various values,

timescales, drivers and complexities of the situations/actors involved,

which cannot be predicted exactly in advance due to the inevitable

uncertainty. In these situations, one can ask a number of questions, such

as: where are the boundaries of the defence enterprise? What makes

information ‘right’ in a particular time and place that you do not yet

know? What is the extent of the SOS?

It would be a struggle to find the definitive answer if we were to try to

specify a formal supermarket chain-like enterprise. It is apparent that if

UK defence acquired only the capability necessary to support the formal

parts of the enterprise, then it would not be possible for the command

and intelligence partnership to function. For example, how could spe-cial forces, psychological operations and deceptions, agents and double

agents be run if a supermarket chain-like ‘single view of the truth’ were

mandated across defence?

However, Figure 3 shows that, because operational DEs have different

needs to the ‘peacetime’ parts of the defence enterprise, the capabilities

that acquisition must provide for DEs are radically different from those

for the standing enterprise. Furthermore, ignoring this diversity and

treating the defence enterprise as a single homogenous unit has, is, and

will adversely affect the UK’s ability to apply military capabilities effec-

tively – especially in the key areas of command and intelligence.

These realities mean that the assumptions underpinning the ‘defence

as a supermarket chain’ analogy are wrong. There are two distinct, yet

interrelated, types of enterprise at work here, each with specific char-

acteristics (as listed in the table overleaf) and with different implica-

tions for policy, acquisition, experimentation and training, as well as for

operational effectiveness itself. So what are the consequences?

A model for service-based agile acquisition

The starting point for an alternative model of acquisition is the accep-

tance that we cannot fully know the threats we might face and therefore

need to be agile and robust in the face of the unexpected. This implies

the need for a service-based, agile acquisition approach that can be

influenced to continually evolve along capability pathways over time.

We cannot fully know the

threats we might face and needto be agile and robust in the

face of the unexpected

The Deployed Enterprise (DE)

Command-intelligence (Informal)

Conceive futuresSense-make

Control/Direct

‘The Brain’(Context-driven)

‘The Nervous System’(Process-driven)

Control-Admin (Formal)

Command

IntentCOMMANDER CONTROLLER

Mind games with opponents

Competing alternative hypotheses

Espionage, agents, tradecraft

Deception/countermeasures

Cross-agency cooperation

Comprehensive approach with NGOs

Deliberate plans and schedules

Op orders, directives, warnings

SoPs, rules, laydowns

Logistics, admin and personnel

Reporting, alerting, cueing

Coordinate ongoing missions

Authorities

‘Ops’/ISR Team

‘7 Questions’

Dynamic intentShape futures I n t e l l i g

e n c e

C o l l a t e/A n a l

y s e

Information/Status Tasking/Orders

Responsibilities

Execution monitoring

Coordination

Events/Effects in the World

Action/TasksCollectI n f o r m

Information reporting Mission prep

Operate, Sustain, Protect

D i s s e m i n a t e : V K B – C 4 I S T A R s e r v i c e s

P e r c e i v e : V K B – H u m a n j u d g e m e n t

Figure 4 The two complementary sides of deployed defence enterprises



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

Criteria Command and Intelligence Control and Administration

Function Provides leadership, unity of purpose, intent andappreciation of possible futures to deployed enterprises

Provides accountable, assured, secure and reliableperformance of the deployed enterprises’ ‘machines’

Governance

Always working in coalition/federation/CoIs with allies,

OGDs to fulfil its functions. Ownership/leadership more

from operational axis of DE (CJO/JtCap)

Working as a coherent unit, largely standardised inter-

nally with clear ‘technical’ interfaces to allies. Ownership/

leadership from technical axis of DE (info officer)

Scope UK defence and external users/enablers Largely within UK defence

Operational/

risk

Invoked for operations and national security issues;

activities depend on circumstance. Takes risks in the face

of uncertainty – accepts that there is no ‘right’ answer

Largely ongoing. Procedures vary little from operation to

operation. Risk averse, emphasis on certainty and ‘facts’.

Unlikely to act without the ‘right’ information

Capability characteristics

User-configurable tools and services that can be adapted to

current imperatives and possibilities – which enable com-

mand agility/do not constrain option space/wiggle room

Pre-defined, tightly specified systems, repeatable pro-

cesses that ensure an underpinning of certainty to the DE

Ways of working (WsoW)

People work as active problem-solvers, determining the

lines of enquiry based on circumstance supported by

so-called ‘human-machine teaming6, 7

People work as components within systems following

largely predefined processes

TrainingIn leadership, command, tradecraft and the ability to be

cunning, insightful and unpredictable as context requires

In process, procedures, ‘buttonology’ and ensure that the

‘right thing’ is done as trained

Equipment/

‘Processes’

Supports informal ‘sense-making’, collaborative problem

solving as part of exploration/discovery/assessment of

competing hypotheses

Structured process following, via office automation, con-

trol systems, databases push, communications systems

PersonnelLeaders: flexible, adaptable, imaginative and wily,

challenging, devious, insightful

Followers: dependable, reliable, resourceful, precise

Intelligence/

information/

Virtual knowledge base

(VKB)

Access to user-determined indicators/significant evidence

that might exist/be required to support or refute

hypotheses. Contradictory by intent, supported by

morphable ontologies with multiple meanings

Delivery of facts and fact-like information, categorised,

tagged with standardised metadata, supported by

normalised (no duplications) data structures, for example,

a ‘single view of the truth’

Doctrine and concepts Command, Inform, Operate and Collect Operate, Collect, Sustain, Protect

OrganisationAs established by the commander, plus informal and

ad-hoc CoIs, usually with OGDs/NGOs outside defence

Institutional, enduring and largely pre-defined roles and

responsibilities

InfrastructureFlexible, adaptable, ‘come-as-you-are’

plug-and-play components

Pre-defined, based on IERs

Logistics On demand Scheduled

InteroperabilityAdapted as appropriate by circumstance/expediency Largely per-agreed (eg through NATO’s

Standardization Agreements)

AcquisitionNeeds to provide service-based, modular capability that

can be adapted at point of use, people drive it (think

iPhone and Apps)

Needs to provide pre-integrated systems displaying

repeatability, eg, the supermarket chain

Architecture

Collaborative open federations (of SoSs) with no single

owner (think of providing devices and apps into the

global mobile phone market)

SoSs with predefinable boundaries and interfaces. Largely

a ‘closed’ architecture

System engineering

Provide services which can be adapted/configured, at

short notice at ‘run time’. Use dynamic, resource-aware

discovery. Average performance OK. Embrace ‘complexity’to generate novelty, options/exploit degrees of freedom

Provide engineered systems that, as far as possible,

individually and collectively perform in a known way.

Eradicate ‘complexity’, embrace certainty. Predictable,therefore more vulnerable and brittle to change

The differences in approach between the two parts of defence enterprises, and the types of Information and Intelligence (i2) required, are highlighted above. These characteristics

have been widely critiqued both inside and outside defence, and have been found to be sound.

The Two Complementary Sides of Deployed Enterprises: Informal v Formal



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

A mindset change is also required away from, for example, the idea of

building a house (and then paying off the builders) to the idea of the con-

tinual development of a city (where there is an ongoing partnership with

the construction community). As a result, the way in which we do things

would need to change and examples of what needs to be done differentlyare shown in Figure 5 and discussed below.

Governance: For a service-based, agile acquisition approach to work8,

the federation of stakeholders and organisations must be governed and

managed by management hubs that have the authority and oversight to

deal with trade-offs across the enterprise. These hubs (where the SROs

sit) will also need to be responsible for providing common approaches

and enterprise services, while supporting the important differences

between the complementary ways of working in the quadrants.

These hubs are currently absent, as Lord Levene’s Defence Reform

Report published in June 2011 has indicated9 and the mismatch between

the roles, authorities and responsibilities of the various chiefs means that

UK defence is not making the best use of what it has, let alone acquir-

ing what it needs. If appropriate governance is to be provided, which is

focused on delivering ‘plug and play’ services, it needs to facilitate the

cross-domain interdependencies and shape the collaborative dynamic

across the enterprise to achieve operational agility in Q1. To this end,

programmatic certainty may need to be traded for flexibility – especially,

for example, for the flexibility required by commanders of DEs.Required operational behaviours: Strategic defence and security

reviews and pan-government thinking would need to move away from

defining requirements to indicating appropriate behaviours. This means

that only the long-term, aspirational outcomes are specified in Q2 as

blueprints of performance indicators for the range of behaviours that

military forces and capabilities are required to be able to display in Q1.

These include the types of services that need to be made available to

support those behaviours and the interwoven properties of the services

that enable them to be employed in a flexible manner in Q1.

Plug-and-play service acquisition: Programmes initiated in Q3 deliver

a range of tested, robust interoperable services – including core and

enduring common services, such as those specified in the Concept Report

for the ISTAR Virtual Knowledge Base (VKB)10, in the kind of agile man-

ner described in the VKB Implementation Report11. These services are not

The Agile Defence Enterprise

Q2 Q1

Q4Q3

Sponsor User

Capability management

Challenges Real-world focus

Technical focusSolutions


Figure 5 A model of agile acquisition

‘UORs’SDSRs

Agility

trade-offs

Industry

insights

Missions/

Initiative/

Adapt

Deployed Defence Enterprise(s)

CJO

eg COMISAF

Command/

Intelligence/

Intent

Op-orders/

Rehearsal

Forces Assigned/

Logistics/PersonnelOperational adaptation

Challenges Execution

Solutions Preparation

Strategic Operational/Tactical

Provision Employment

Governance, capability

management, common

services, scrutiny etc

Operational lessons

and possible contexts

Employ

Coalition

contributionOperational contexts

(largely unknown)

Plug-and-play

for deployment

Command-led development,integration and exercises

Pools of services

Integration

at ‘point

of use’

Incremental

evolutionary delivery

of robust services

Test interoperability

Application

‘plug-ins’

Information

services

Interface,

infrastructure and

comms services

Provision of

interoperable services

Services and

‘composability’

specifications

Capabilities andoutcomes ‘blueprint’

OGDs and defence policy

Learning by

exploring



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

pre-integrated into fixed capability packages, as is done at present, but

are delivered as a ‘pool of services’, ready to be employed and adapted

by military personnel, in order to meet changing operational needs.

Integration at the point of use: From this pool of services, in Q4,

command-led integration, development and integration (informed bothby new concepts and by ‘learning by doing’) tries out options for ‘integra-

tion at the point of use’ (as the iPhone already enables with the ‘apps’

metaphor) as part of the training and experimentation process.

These are driven in two opposing directions – by an operational prag-

matism to make the best of what is available and a technical correctness

towards repeatability. Feedback enables evolutionary improvement,

update and delivery of service ‘plug-ins’ without dislocating overall

capability. Industry and research are closely involved in offering options

concerning the state of the art and the art of the possible.

Operational agility realised: For operations, in Q1, an appropriate

range of services are selected from the pools based on their suitability to

be deployed/employed in those contexts. If they are service-based, coali-

tion contributions can easily be accommodated and integrated quickly 12.

When, during operations, the inevitable mismatch between the expected

and reality occurs, it can be dealt with ‘in the field’ because the ability to

adapt ‘on the fly’ to the changing operational imperatives has been built

in. This leads to greater force effectiveness, flexibility and a reduction in

urgent operational requirements.

Agile acquisition approaches are also applicable to other domains that

spawn DEs, for instance, for critical national infrastructure, or for events

such as the London 2012 Olympics. Indeed, they would be required for

the kind of cross-government and coalition operations needed if so-called

‘comprehensive approaches’ are to work effectively.

Conclusions

Much has been written about acquisition over the past few decades. There

have been many initiatives launched, such as Smart Acquisition, alterna-

tive methods employed, such as Through Life Capability Management,

and techniques such as Managing Successful Programmes introduced.

Reports have been written concerning the need for agile acquisition 13

and technical strategies expressed14, yet how many of them have, in

enterprise terms, fully articulated that defence in its entirety cannot be a

single, unified ‘system-of-systems’ like a supermarket chain? How many

have managed to acknowledge and articulate the need for the deployed

parts of defence to be necessarily different in ways that cannot always be

fully specified in advance? Which of our system-engineering techniques

can deal effectively with this kind of inevitable openendedness?

This article is a step along the path to express the issues that need to

be addressed if we are to avoid the scenario whereby defence has been

turned into an enterprise as inflexible as a call centre. ■

When, during operations, the

inevitable mismatch between the

expected and reality occurs, it

can be dealt with ‘in the field’



For nearly 30 years the world’s leading defence companies have trusted Green Hills

Software’s secure and reliable high performance software for mission-critical and

safety-critical applications.

From the Joint Tactical Radio System, through naval anti-surface missiles, to the F-35

Lightning II and Eurofighter Typhoon, Green Hills Software has been delivering proven

and secure underpinning technology.

To find out how the world’s most secure and reliable operating system and software

can take the risk out of your defence project, visit www.ghs.com/s4d

Copyright © 2012 Green Hills Software. Green Hills Software and the Green Hills logo are registered trademarks of Green Hills Software.All other product names are trademarks of their respective holders. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd ClassJames R. Evans/Released.

TRUSTED SOFTWARE FOR DEFENCE

SECURE

RELIABLE

SAFE



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

The UK Armed Forces may be tasked to deploy at short notice

anywhere in the world and, on arrival, to undertake many dif-

ferent types of operation. Their ability to succeed in the missions

assigned to them by government is ultimately driven by the quality of

the individual combatants, how they are led and the equipment with

which they are provided.

Budget constraints mean that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) does not

have the money to buy the full range of equipment that may be needed to

cater for all types of operations. Therefore, it currently procures equipment

based on capability priorities, recognising that there will be some capabil-

ity gaps when the capability is deployed. There are a number of different

approaches that the MoD adopts to procure equipment, with the selected

approach being dependent on, among other factors, the urgency of need.

The purpose of this article is to identify whether there any lessons to be

learned with respect to the particular processes that the MoD applies to

procuring equipment. Recognising these lessons, and adopting the neces-

sary changes, is a key factor in the success of future procurements.

How does the MoD procure equipment?

CADMID: There are a number of alternative procurement routes available

to the MoD for the acquisition of capital equipment. The selection of any

particular route is largely driven by whether the equipment can be consid-

ered to be part of normal defence re-equipping or whether it is demanded

by an urgent operational requirement.

LPPV – Lessons for

Defence Procurement Chris Maughan, managing consultant at Decision Analysis Services Ltd, examines the two key

procurement processes currently employed by the Ministry of Defence and highlights the lessons

that should be learned from the success of the LPPV rapid procurement

The conventional acquisition cycle for equipments is defined by the

CADMID cycle (concept, assessment, demonstration, manufacture, in-

service and disposal), which was introduced in 1999 as part of the Smart

Procurement Initiative. Each of the six stages involves executing the plan

agreed in the previous stage, reviewing the outcome and planning for the

remaining stages.

The acquisition cycle is actually relatively simple in concept, but in prac-

tice turns out to be highly process-driven and labour intensive. Significant

plans, analyses and documentation are produced at each stage, with, in

some assessments, insufficient emphasis placed on the relative value that

each truly produces to the eventual output (ie the delivered equipment).

A number of external reviews and audits of actual MoD acquisition

performance over recent years have consistently indicated the poor per-

formance of some high-profile projects, demonstrated through schedule

delays and acquisition cost increases. This all indicates that the conven-

tional acquisition approach, as outlined by the CADMID cycle, is no longer

functioning as intended.

Despite this, it could be said that the various stages defined in the

CADMID cycle are, in principle, sound. After all, the acquisition of any

equipment (from buying a new car to a space shuttle) follows the same

basic steps: establishing a need, defining a requirement, determining how

to acquire an affordable solution to that requirement, placing a contract

and finally, confirming that what has been received is exactly the product

that was requested.

Force Protection Europe’s

Foxhound LLPV will allow troops

to carry out a wide range of tasks



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

Commercial organisations (such as oil companies and cruise-ship opera-

tors, to pick just two of numerous examples) are able to operate such a

procurement process successfully. This would indicate that any failure in

defence acquisition more properly resides in the execution of the process,

rather than the process itself.

UOR: An alternative to the conventional CADMID procurement cycle has

been developed by the MoD as a response to the need for rapid acquisi-

tion of equipment in support of current or imminent operational commit-

ments. This is the Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) process.

The MoD claims that the UOR procurement activities can be achieved

within a timescale that cannot be met by the CADMID acquisition cycle.

UOR projects, driven by the timescale imperative, necessarily focus

on delivery of the 80-per-cent solution, balancing pan-Defence Lines

of Development residual risk (such as long-term supportability issues)

against the need to urgently satisfy the operational capability gap. Given

the inevitable time constraints, in the majority of cases, the purchase

under UOR arrangements have been off the shelf (OTS) or made use of

OTS components. There has also, in many cases, been a requirement for

some integration development.

It has been the expressed view of Front Line Commands1, and widely

reported in the national press, that the UOR process has been successful

in delivering capability more effectively than the conventional acquisition

process. So it must be recognised that there are lessons to be learned from

the UOR process that can be applied longer term, in order to markedly

improve the MoD’s routine acquisition of equipment.

The LPPV acquisition

A third approach to equipment acquisition, in effect a hybrid of CADMID

and UOR, was adopted by the MoD for the procurement of the LightProtected Patrol Vehicle (LPPV). The requirement originated with a public

notice in February 2009 in respect of a potential future requirement for

the supply of up to 400 LPPVs. The notice sought information from indus-

try as to current products available now or under development that could

potentially meet the requirement.

The notice also gave broad capability requirements for the LPPV and

indicated that, following expressions of interest from industry and an

initial down-select activity by the MoD, a pre-qualification questionnaire

(PQQ) with a draft requirements document would be made available in

order to inform industry in more detail of the capability sought.

Following some 30 expressions of interest, 16 PQQs were returned,

evaluated and down-selected. In the event, the technical requirements

issued were so demanding that no in-production vehicle was able to

meet them. The result of this scenario was that all contenders were

developed specifically for the LPPV requirement.

Rather than conduct a protracted paper assessment, the project team

invited industry to provide systems for trial, first of protection levels and

then of performance and reliability. A date and place for the performance

trials was set, and vehicles that were not made available were excluded

from the competition. In this way, Technology Readiness and System

Readiness Levels as well as time became selection criteria, with industry,

in effect, conducting its own initial self-assessment.

In the event, two of the three contenders that had been presented

for initial blast trials were presented for what the project team termed

the Competitive Evaluation Phase (CEP): Supacat’s SPV400 and Force

Protection Europe’s (FPE) Ocelot. The CEP was designed to establish

whether a viable solution to the LPPV requirement could be developed

and procured within the desired timescales. It included the conduct of:

physical trials and reliability evaluations of prototype vehicles■

conducted during a number of Battlefield Missions (BFMs);

further blast and ballistic trials to demonstrate actual performance■

of each vehicle against defined threats and the ability to achieve

the required levels of protection;a risk assessment;■

a supportability assessment;■

an independent analysis of the production capability and capacity■

available to the two potential LPPV suppliers, using experts.

The last of these included analysis of the manufacturing capacity and

readiness of the two potential suppliers, in the event that, should the

project move into a production phase and they were successful in being

awarded a contract for LPPV volume manufacture, production rates

would meet the requirement for delivery. The analysis used a bespoke

Manufacturing Readiness Assessment framework, as well as the US

Department of Defense’s Production Readiness Review criteria to assess

the readiness of both suppliers to meet the MoD’s requirements.

The final outcome of the CEP and the parallel invitation to tender, sub-

mission and assessment of tenders (both apparently close-fought) was

that FPE was selected as the preferred bidder and, following the final

negotiations, was awarded the LPPV contract in November 2010, with the

delivered vehicle to be known in British Army service as the Foxhound.

Deliveries are expected to be completed by early 2012, some three years

after the first advertisement.

Lessons learned from LPPV

The LPPV acquisition could be considered a success in that it has resulted

in the relatively rapid development, procurement, delivery and introduc-

tion into service of a new capability. However, as is the case in any success

story, there are lessons that need to be recognised and adopted, where

appropriate, in terms of future projects and acquisitions. For the various

organisations that are involved in the procurement process, these lessons,

which are not intended to be overtly critical, fall under three categories and

are judged to be as follows:

MoD lessons

Senior MoD officials and approving authorities need to recognise■

that moving as quickly as was achieved in the LPPV project is not

without increased risk. The project team requires ‘management

top cover’, not only because of the risk of failure, but also in order

to avoid the potential destabilisations brought about by lobbying

and internal and external naysayers, eager to criticise and under-

mine the approach;

The LPPV acquisition could be

considered a success. However,

lessons need to be recognised

and adopted in terms of future

projects and acquisitions



DEFENCE ACQUISITION

The MoD needs to recognise that it cannot delegate all work to con-■

sultants and still remain in full control of the evaluation process. Key

management expertise will be needed for success;

There is a need for a clear procurement strategy to be defined at the■

outset, and that includes the down-select assessment criteria;Recognition by the MoD that the UOR approach is not a ‘silver bul-■

let’. It works best for OTS or MOTS (Modified Off-The-Shelf) equip-

ment, where lots of real data and maturity already exists on which to

base rapid decisions. For products that are intrinsically developmen-

tal, this will be more difficult and risky. However, this risk, properly

managed and taken incrementally where possible, may be justified

in achieving acquisition more rapidly;

In conducting the assessment with multiple evaluations going on in■

parallel, the MoD needs to ensure the avoidance of overlap, other-

wise industry is severely inconvenienced by being asked the same

thing under several different guises;

The MoD needs to remain an intelligent-enough customer to under-■

stand what it is being told and the implications for the procurement,

production and support in service;

The MoD needs the ability to be able to check the commercial readi-■

ness of companies to proceed to contract and to have available a

suitable ‘mechanisation readiness’ check metric;

The MoD must include sufficient time in the evaluation process for■

themselves and industry to plan and prepare for assessments, and

to avoid wasted efforts due to poor data and a subsequent need to

revisit areas later.

MoD agents (SMEs/consultants)

SMEs require a depth of understanding, as well as practical experi-■

ence, to be able to understand what they are being shown and tobe able to see beyond the industry ‘sales pitch’. They must have a

breadth of real practical experience of manufacturing and defence

projects, and hence the ability to command respect and be taken

seriously by industry;

They require the ability to identify and focus on key issues, allowing■

industry to present its case without being led to the correct answer

and thus losing any discriminators between competitors;

A clear questioning and assessment structure must be deployed that■

is consistent, objective and fair to all;

The assessment and evaluation of manufacturers needs to include■

the ability to ‘deep dive’ down the sub-contractor supply chain if

specific risks are identified.

Industry

The competitors need to understand the process that the MoD is■

following and how they are expected to deal with it;

Industry must ensure that it fields the correct senior people and■

appreciate the fact that the evaluation process will be time-consum-

ing and perhaps frustrating;

If the evaluation is in all practical purposes a competitive bid in other■

clothes, then industry should form a bid team and prepare properly.

The process adopted for the procurement of LPPV enabled the MoD to

move reasonably quickly from identification of the initial requirement

through trials, down-selection and contract awarding, thus ensuring

the early delivery of capability. There was room for improvement in the

process in several areas, without drifting into the full, conventional,

CADMID procurement route.

The MoD appears to be generally reluctant to adopt alternative acquisi-

tion techniques (such as spiral development or incremental acquisition),

which have the potential to mitigate the consequences of high technical

risk and requirement uncertainty. There is an established and recognised

way to benchmark the technology and system integration risk for any par-ticular project, utilising Technology and System Readiness Levels (TRLs and

SRLs). The MoD should make greater use of readiness reviews, as there is

evidence of the links between TRL at the approval gates and eventual proj-

ect out-turn schedule and cost performance. However, when time is para-

mount, down-selection by deadline has also been shown to be effective.

Smart acquisition was intended to lead to improvements in new equip-

ment delivery performance. This has not materialised, and the practical

application of CADMID by the MoD has been to create an ‘industry’ of sup-

porting processes and management information, which is, arguably, largely

a product of insecurity among decision-makers and their staff. The result

is to direct the focus of teams, perhaps inadvertently, towards feeding the

process and not delivering the product (the equipment to be acquired).

Others have reported that more effective change is required in the MoD,

but any change introduced must result in genuinely different ways of work-

ing and the avoidance of low-value, wasteful or repetitive activities. The

LPPV acquisition has been a success story, drawing on key strengths from

MoD staff and selected technical subject-matter experts.

Despite this success, the major lesson to be learned from UOR acquisi-

tion, and particularly the LPPV, should be that of identifying the minimum

acceptable level of activity to deliver a product. This is the basis of under-

standing the behaviours that cause problems and seeking to change these.

Two quotes from Albert Einstein seem to fit the situation in which the MoD

now finds itself, with the latter particularly appropriate: “Insanity is doing

the same thing over and over again and expecting different results,” and

“Any intelligent fool can make things bigger and more complex... It takes atouch of genius, and a lot of courage, to move in the opposite direction.” ■

Decision Analysis Services Ltd would like to acknowledge the assistance of

the Defence Equipment and Support Combat Wheels Group with this article

The Supacat SPV400 made

it to the LPPV Competitive

Evaluation Phase



When it comes to the nation’ssecurity, you needoutstandingengineering partners with thehighest levels of experience,integrity and creative thinking.

BM T has all these, which is why we’ve

worked with international G overnment

departments and defence agencies, major

defence and industrial contractors and

shipbuilders in the UK and overseas

since 1985.

We don’t just design warships, submarines

and auxiliaries, we also provide

comprehensive acquisition support,

technology management and design

services.

Build a winning partnership with BM T and

we’ll provide you with a watertight business

case, ongoing support and valuable peace

of mind.

Building

engineeringpartnerships forsuccess

email us at [email protected] or visit

www.bmtdsl.co.uk



DEFENCE INDUSTRY

It is often quite helpful to conceive of defence as a confluence of three

elements – government policy, the development of defence capabili-

ties presumably to promote that policy, and forces on operations to

deploy those capabilities – thereby meeting a country’s policy ambition.

These three elements are rooted in:

The political body that debates and decides upon defence policies;■

The military component that advises on future capability require-■

ments and deploys those provided, often to lethal effect;

Industry and commerce providing equipment, services and■

know-how; and

Wider society that enables and ‘permits’ defence activity, as■

well as providing actual recruits for military forces and the defence

industrial base.

Bandits and Thieves – Sovereign

Wealth Recovery as a CriticalDefence Capability Dr John Louth, deputy director for the Defence, Industries and Society Programme at RUSI, makes

the case that returning stolen assets to sovereign nations is a vital element of stability building

and should therefore be supported by more robust government policy

Defence policies, the development of capabilities and military opera-

tions are subjects that are widely reviewed and studied, but one key, niche

ingredient that has been ignored is the stolen-asset recovery actor’s role in

defence; in other words, the contribution made by the specialist accoun-

tant, lawyer and investigator, and the companies that employ them, in

tracking and returning purloined sovereign wealth to a particular state.

Why is this activity significant and what conceivable role can sovereign

wealth recovery professionals contribute towards notions of defence? First,

state-owned assets enable a government to provide core services such as

security, education, healthcare, infrastructure and law and order. A coun-

try’s sovereign wealth is required to pay for these functions. If elements

of a country’s government have raided the national treasury and hidden

funds offshore, state functions are, potentially, severely compromised.



DEFENCE INDUSTRY

Today, this issue is significant, post conflict, in countries such as

Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia and Tunisia. If these states, for example,

are to fully develop a civil society, alleviate poverty and generate a favour-

able climate for continued international investment and economic growth,

then the sovereign wealth misappropriated by corrupt politicians and

officials needs to be recovered to the state as a defence and international

security imperative.

Second, at a global level, the cross-border flow of proceeds from cor-

ruption and crime are estimated by the World Bank at being close to

$1.6 trillion per annum. Corrupt officials and politicians in developing and

transition countries account for approximately $40 billion of this amount

each year. Clearly, the return of these monies to respective national coffers,

the prevention of them leaving a country in the first place, or the inter-

diction of sums of money before they fall into corrupt or criminal hands,

would enable more resources to be available for legitimate, and often criti-

cal, national investment.

Third, there is a correlation between state corruption and international,

organised criminal activity. The National Strategy Information Center in theUS, following extensive multinational research conducted at the turn of the

century, conceptualised a political-criminal nexus, which enabled the con-

centration, fusion and perpetuation of political and professional criminal

power. The argument is that this nexus builds upon political, economic and

cultural conditions within a specific country – especially those in conflict

or post conflict – to generate a permanently corrupt state and an outward

flow of national wealth to offshore safe havens and major international

crime syndicates to fund illicit activities. This, in turn, has the potential to

lead to yet more conflict as tensions rise between the economically dispos-

sessed and the beneficiaries of corruption.

A threat to stability

Fourth, NATO views corruption and the misappropriation of a nation’s

sovereign wealth as a significant threat to stabilisation and reconstruction.

Its 2011 political guidance to members, published following a meeting of

defence ministers in June 2010, emphasised the importance of the transi-

tion of stabilisation and reconstruction activities to a recovering state, with

the judicious return of stolen assets perceived as a critical enabling factor

for operational success.

At any level of analysis, therefore, the practice of sovereign wealth recov-

ery and the battle against this insidiously corrupt political-criminal nexus

present a significant international security issue and defence imperative

for the UK. This does not appear, however, to be widely understood within

the defence community. No guidance can be found within UK national

defence doctrine that highlights the significance of this issue to com-

manders and planners.

Moreover, the professionals working in the area of sovereign wealth

recovery – accountants, lawyers, private investigators and forces of law and

NATO views corruption and the

misappropriation of a nation’ssovereign wealth as a significant

threat to stabilisation

order – while often appearing on the front line in areas of conflict – appear

to work in silos, ignorant of defence policymakers and military practitio-

ners. Also, it is fair to suggest that sovereign wealth recovery specialists are

motivated by different factors: national statute, international law, money,

intellectual curiosity and altruism, to suggest a few.What is needed, then, is a coherent coalition to combat the threat posed

by corrupt political elites and international crime: a coalition involving

international and national courts, law-enforcement agencies, international

financial regulators, professional bodies, practitioners, the military and,

critically, national governments, in partnership with each other. Policy

frameworks need to be developed that clearly identify the threat of corrup-

tion and sovereign wealth theft as major international security, stabilisation

and reconstruction issues. This is critical in 2012, given the nation-building

that is required in countries such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and

Tunisia. It is also critical for the future, as the fragile states of tomorrow

emerge in desperate need of immediate and long-term support from the

international community.

In an era that heralded the Arab Spring and the Western contribution to

the uprising in Libya, understanding state-building post conflict and the

importance of the return of misappropriated sovereign assets and monies

has never been more significant or timely. Efforts must be conceptualised

and promoted as an important international stability and national defence

effort. In this way the accountant, lawyer and investigator working in

sovereign wealth recovery will be rightly seen as valuable components of

national security, and policies developed to further integrate their compe-

tencies into the wider UK defence effort. ■

RUSI Defence, Industries

and Society Programme:Sovereign Wealth RecoveryResearch ProjectRUSI has initiated a Thought Leadership Project on Stolen

Asset Recovery, sponsored by Grant Thornton UK LLP,

with an initial workshop that was held in Whitehall on

6 October 2011. For fragile states and young democracies

alike, the recovery of sovereign wealth and assets is a major

security and development issue, especially post conflict.

The emergence of an independent body of knowledge to

explore the issues around this topic represents an important

contribution to notions of international stability and security.

The interactions and interdependencies between state and

corporate actors, played out within both international and

national jurisdictions, are at the heart of this research,

benefitting from the critique of the academic and analyst,

as well as the expertise of the practitioner.

Two detailed studies are being undertaken. One, a case

study, will address the recovery of sovereign wealth in

Sierra Leone, following the conflict there in 2000. The

second will conceptualise and explore the competencies,

relationships and structures required in the 21st century

to successfully manage a programme of sovereign wealth

recovery, involving many state and corporate professionals,

as part of a broader international security and stability effort.

Findings are due towards the end of 2012.



DEFENCE INDUSTRY

A

ssessing the scope of German defence exports is not an easy

task, as comprehensive figures are not available either from

official or non-governmental sources1. This lack of data reflects

the general opacity regarding German defence exports. Added to that, the

German government also insists on its right to conceal its motivation

for issuing an export licence. Furthermore, it regularly refers to legal

regulations prohibiting the disclosure of corporate information in the

course of licensing procedures2. This situation not only poses a problem

for analysts, but also hampers the political and societal discourse on the

pros and cons of defence exports.

The German government’s annual Defence Exports Report presents the

annual value of individual and collective export licences for ‘Weapons

of War (WoW) and other military equipment’. However, licences do not

necessarily reflect already realised exports in a given year and can be

valid for a couple of years. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish between

the order, delivery and conclusion of defence export deals. The report

accounts only for the actual annual value of exported ‘weapons of war’,

but fails to gather the same relevant information for the far larger sector

of ‘other defence exports’3.

German Defence Exports

in PerspectiveDr Henrik Heidenkamp assesses recent developments in German defence exports and examines how they

impact on the country’s foreign, security and defence policies

Data aggregated by other institutions, such as the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the US-Congressional

Research Service (CRS), also suffers from this problem. Consequently,

figures on German defence exports should be treated with caution.

Current state and trends in German defence exports

As the table opposite indicates, according to the latest annual Defence

Exports Report the total value of export licences fell by about 22 per

cent (€1,548 million) between 2009 and 2010. With a share of almost

87 per cent in 2010, individual export licences represented the bulk

of the total. Whereas these dropped slightly by around six per cent

(€289 million) compared to 2009, collective export licences decreased

sharply by 63 per cent (€1,259 million) in the same period.

According to the report, this decline was mainly the result of technical

reasons. Therefore, the report goes on to suggest that the value of collec-

tive export licences is likely to rise again. Of the total individual export

licences awarded in 2010, some €1.5 billion was allotted to individual

WoW licences (€1.1 billion in 2009), and €3.3 billion was awarded to

individual licences for other military equipment (€3.9 billion in 2009).

Germany’s potentially lucrative export

of Leopard 2 tanks to Saudi Arabia is

proving politically challenging



DEFENCE INDUSTRY

The value of WoW exports rose between 2009 and 2010 by about

60 per cent (€780 million). However, this was mainly because of sub-

marine exports to two of Germany’s NATO allies – Portugal (one U-boat

Kl 209PN) and Greece (one U-boat Kl 214). If one discounts their value,

WoW exports actually decreased by 30 per cent, compared to 20095.

Key ticket items in Germany’s 2010 defence exports efforts (issued

licences and actual exports) were high-value armaments such as sub-

marines, warships and tanks. Some 71 per cent of the individual export

licences related to exports were designated for European Union (EU),

NATO and NATO-equivalent countries, 29 per cent for third countries

(non-members), including India, Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia, Singapore

and the United Arab Emirates. In terms of value, 77 per cent of all

weapon exports in 2010 were designated for EU, NATO and NATO-

equivalent countries, and 23 per cent were delivered to third countries.

Developing countries received German weapons with a total value of€108.5 million (5.1 per cent of all German weapon exports in 2010, com-

pared to 3.9 per cent in 2009).

Limited economic contribution

SIPRI figures for the period 2006-10 show Germany as the world’s third

largest defence exporter after the US (30 per cent) and Russia (23 per

cent), with a global market share of 11 per cent, followed by France (seven

per cent) and the UK (four per cent)6. However, it would be misleading to

conclude that defence exports present a significant share of Germany’s

economic performance. In 2010, the share of WoW exports in all German

exports was around 0.2 per cent. Even when the total value of export

licences is compared with the value of all German exports – which is

problematic as the latter figure represents actual exports and the former

does not – the share is still only 0.6 per cent. These figures suggest that

the economic relevance of defence exports is almost negligible.

The real relevance of defence exports must be identified within the

broader framework of Germany’s foreign, security and defence policy.

With high pressures on domestic demand due to a shrinking defence

budget, exports become a central element of many defence companies’

commercial viability. This is reflected by their elevated interest in stron-

ger governmental sponsorship for potential armament exports as part of

a compensation for cutting orders7.

In this sense, exports help to sustain domestic defence industrial

capabilities, which are a core component of Germany’s national defence

effort, as well as reducing dependence on external suppliers and offer-

ing the ability to influence behaviours of external customers.

Exports can also reduce the costs of programmes to Germany – a polit-

ical and fiscal imperative in an age of austerity. Export customers can

Figures for the period 2006-10

show Germany as the world’s

third largest defence exporter

after the US and Russia

help to spread the costs of fixed assets needed for long-term support

and allow the German government to recoup some of its investments

through levies. If export deals can be secured early in the develop-

ment phase of a project, the often very large non-recurring unit costs

of research and development can be spread over increased productionruns, thereby reducing the unit costs. Moreover, it could be argued that

a healthy German defence industrial base will increase Germany’s influ-

ence within the restructuring of the European defence industry and with

regard to the development of strategic technologies. Germany can only

proactively participate in multinational developments projects if it can

contribute cutting-edge defence technologies.

In addition, defence exports represent an opportunity to advance dip-

lomatic and economic relationships with the recipient country8. When a

government buys a major piece of equipment from an external source,

a long-term high-level relationship may be created between the two

governments because a continuous supply of parts, information and,

sometimes, support services is normally needed.

The explosive nature of defence exports

Despite these aspects, German defence exports are frequently a cause

for concern in the political and societal discourse for the destabilising

impact on international security they may produce. Controversial inci-

dents connected to defence exports have shocked the very foundations

of political parties (Schreiber scandal), almost wrecked government

coalitions (red-green coalition dispute over tank exports to Turkey) and

threatened international cooperation (discussion on additional exports

to finance the A400M military transport aircraft) in the past9.

The most recent occurrence of this political and societal scepticism

towards defence exports relates to the discovery in August 2011 of

German-made Heckler & Koch G36 assault rifles in Libya, which was

under a United Nations weapons embargo at that time. According to

the company, the guns were part of a batch of 608 rifles and 500,000

rounds of ammunition that was licensed by the German government in

2003 for delivery to the Egyptian Ministry of Defence. As yet it is not

known how the weapons made their way to Libya. Heckler & Koch is still

under investigation by the German Public Prosecutor’s office in Stuttgart

for a possible violation of German defence export laws10.

The potential export of up to 270 Leopard 2A7+ Main Battle Tanks to

Saudi Arabia is even more controversial11. Although the actual export has

so far not taken place, the decision by the Federal Security Council to

issue an export licence is highly contested, even within the government.

Critics argue that it breaks with the established policy not to export WoW

to crisis regions and marks a paradigm shift in German foreign policy.

To paraphrase the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, it’s gener-

ally not enough to send other countries and organisations words of

German defence exports4 (€millions)

2009 2010

Total value of export licences

of which:

7,039 5,491

Individual export licences 5,043 4,754

Collective export licences 1,996 737

Total value of exported WoW

of which:

1,339 2,119

Bundeswehr exports 132 43

Commercial exports 1,207 2,076



DEFENCE INDUSTRY

encouragement if Germany shies away from military intervention.

Instead, she suggests that Germany must also provide the necessary

means to those nations that are prepared to get involved. Specifically,

she emphasised that this includes arms exports12. However, as this viewfaces opposition across major parts of the political spectrum and within

broader German society, the Federal Security Council will take up the

tank issue again – only this time the Chancellor will face a more funda-

mental debate13.

A new approach to German defence export policy

Whether the licence remains valid or is withdrawn, the proceedings

around the tank deal highlight the need for Germany to adopt a new

approach. Such an approach has to balance the relevance of exports

for a healthy German defence industrial base and as an instrument of

German foreign, security and defence policy with their country’s interest

for sustaining peace and stability in the international system.

This is already a challenge at the national level, but even more so in

a multinational framework. However, the globalisation of defence com-

panies’ way to market, as well as the future integration of the European

defence market, demands that German policymakers – together with

their NATO and EU partners – advance a common defence exports policy.

This would, without doubt, require a more transparent German policy

that reflects the changing strategic environment for the country’s for-

eign, security and defence policy without sacrificing its political prin-

cipals. The lack of transparency surrounding defence exports and the

tensions they produce no longer seems sustainable. ■

Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel,

has demonstrated increasing support

for defence exports



VBCI

VBCI



The term ‘medium-weight forces’ came to prominence in the late

1990s when the UK and US identified the need for an armoured

capability that was light enough to be deployed easily by air, but

had the lethality of ‘heavy’ armour.

The US was the first to articulate this requirement. General (Gen) Eric

Shinseki, who was appointed Chief of Staff of the United States Army in

June 1999, had been tasked with transforming the US Army from its Cold

War posture, and in the October of that year, he launched his vision of

‘Getting to the Fight Faster’, with the goal of deploying a full division with

15,000 troops within five days, and five full Divisions within a month.

This required armoured forces that could be deployed by air, and in the

next round of the US Budget process, known as the Program Objective

Memorandum, a raft of ‘legacy’ programmes had their funding cut and the

monies diverted to the Future Combat System (FCS) – a range of platforms

that would be C-130 deployable.

At the same time as Gen Shinseki was announcing his vision statement,

the British Army found itself embroiled in a hostage rescue operation in

Sierra Leone. After that operation, Gen Sir Mike Jackson expressed his

frustration at not having the right equipment to deploy. He pointed out that

his heavy forces were survivable and lethal, but not deployable – except by

Whatever Happened to

Medium-Weight Forces?Colonel Peter Flach MBE (Retd) explains why air-transportable, medium-weight armoured

vehicles have become such a vital component in the make-up of current operations

sea – while his light ‘deployable’ forces lacked the necessary survivability

and lethality until heavier forces could arrive.

He explained that he wanted a ‘golf bag’ of capabilities, so that in future

he would have usable armoured forces that could be deployed by air; so it

was that the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) was launched. FRES, like

the FCS programme, had C-130 deployability at its heart and adopted on its

logo the strapline: ‘Go First, Go Fast, Go Home’.

As we now know, the FCS and FRES programmes, as originally conceived,

failed. Inevitably, there were various reasons for that failure, but a major

factor was undoubtedly the difficulty of providing adequate protection

within the C-130 portable envelope of around 18 tonnes. It had been

thought that advances in defensive aids systems would provide adequate

protection against direct fire, as well as allowing for a reduction in armour

and, hence, weight.

A new threat emerges

However, it soon became clear that not only were defensive aids systems

unlikely to provide protection across the range of direct-fire threats, but a

new threat was emerging that they could not deal with – the improvised

explosive device (IED). The British Army had considerable experience of

44 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SPRING 2012

DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES LAND

The Scout SV, winner of

the FRES SV competition,

is just one example of a

medium-weight AFV



IEDs from Northern Ireland, but had not anticipated their widespread use

in other asymmetric conflicts and had certainly underestimated their effec-

tiveness against relatively well-armoured platforms.

As FCS and FRES fell out of favour, so too did the use of the term ‘medium

forces’. Nevertheless, it is recognised that deployable forces with high

levels of survivability and lethality remain a vital component of a modern

army with aspirations to engage in the full spectrum of operations. This is

because there will always be a requirement for protected mobility on the

battlefield to transport men and equipment; and it may well be necessary

to deploy that capability rapidly by air and to operate over terrain and

infrastructure that cannot take heavy armour.

While the current focus in Afghanistan is on dismounted operations, there

remains a requirement to transport troops and equipment to where they are

needed, while protecting them in transit. There is also a range of battlefield

functions that requires utility vehicles capable of carrying equipment and

their crews, including manned reconnaissance, direct and indirect fire,

mobility support, repair and recovery, and casualty evacuation.

This is why the UK and the US have spent billions procuring mine-

protected patrol vehicles, of which the Mastiff, which is derived from the

US Cougar, is a prime example. Typically, these vehicles are wheeled andhave heavily armoured, V-shaped hulls and, while they have excellent mine

protection capabilities, they have limited mobility because of their high

ground pressure and rigid axles, which restricts their selection of routes.

However, a modern force needs more than protected mobility; it needs

a protected manoeuvre capability, so that it can avoid being restricted to

roads where it is vulnerable to ambush and IEDs, and is able to conduct

operations across terrain, and at a tempo, that the enemy cannot match.

What is required, therefore, is a high level of mine protection, coupled with

excellent terrain accessibility and manoeuvrability.

A changing battlefield

A new capability requirement has also emerged. Given how the battlefield

is changing under the scrutiny of persistent Intelligence, Surveillance,

Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), the massing of land com-

bat power against a modern, matched enemy carries the risk of annihila-

tion by the very act of concentration. Under such conditions, the enemy’s

combat power will be destroyed by stand-off attack from indirect systems,

as Colonel Gaddafi’s forces found outside Benghazi in Libya. However, the

recent engagements have shown how important it is to cue those systems

accurately, from protected manoeuvre land platforms that act both with

eyes on the enemy and as ISTAR hubs, as well as from aerial platforms.

Fortunately, there are utility vehicles in the 25-30-tonne region that have

high levels of mine protection, as well as excellent mobility and the capacity

to act as ISTAR nodes. Examples of such vehicles are the contenders for the

wheeled FRES UV programme: Boxer, VBCI and the winning vehicle, the

General Dynamics Piranha V. There are also tracked examples, such as the

winner of the FRES SV programme – the General Dynamics Scout SV. While

the lower end of the weight limit for a medium utility vehicle is driven by

the requirement of protection, the upper end tends to be driven by the

twin requirements of air deployability and terrain accessibility.

Although few countries are capable of transporting large numbers

of armoured vehicles by air, such deployability still features in most

requirements as a constraint and, for the UK, A400M deployability ishighly desirable. An A400M has a payload of approximately 30 tonnes,

which would allow a medium-weight vehicle to fly light and fight heavy.

Reducing the weight of armoured vehicles also helps to reduce the logistic

footprint, which is particularly important during deployed operations when

airlift is at a premium.

There is another, less obvious, reason to reduce weight, and that is the

requirement to operate in developing countries with limited infrastructure.

Deployed forces will never win the hearts and minds of local populations

by deploying 65-tonne battle tanks and destroying the roads, bridges,

water supply and drains of the locals. While there is no absolute defined

weight limit, it is worth noting that the current UK road limit for heavy

goods vehicles1 is 44 tonnes.

The choice of wheels and tracks is usually contentious and can be highly

dependent on terrain and weather conditions. Ideally, an army would have

a mix of wheels and tracks because each has its advantages. However, at

weights far in excess of 30 tonnes, the limitations of tyre technology and

the increasing ground pressure begin to favour tracks; and in straitened

economic times when a nation cannot afford both, tracks have the critical

advantage of better terrain accessibility.

It is perhaps no coincidence, therefore, that the UK Ministry of Defence

(MoD) has selected the Scout SV, a tracked vehicle in the 30-40-tonne

range, to form the core of its future armoured force, and it is no surprise

that other armies are watching the progress of the SV programme with

interest. It would seem that ‘medium forces’, or whatever we choose to call

them in the future, are here to stay. ■

45


The author

Colonel Peter Flach MBE (Retd) served as a Royal Armoured Corps

Officer for 32 years. His acquisition appointments included: OC

RAC sales team at the Armoured Trials and Development Unit,

LSOR1 desk officer for the Challenger 2 Requirement, deputy

project manager MRAV and IPT Leader Tactical Reconnaissance

and Counter-Concealment Enabled Radar (TRACER).

He attended the Long Armour Infantry Course and the Army

Staff Course, and also served on the staff at the Royal Military

College of Science as DS CAFS and DS Armour 1. His last MoD

posting was to the Defence Exports Services Organisation, run-

ning the regional desk responsible for defence exports to the US,

Canada, France, Germany, Benelux, the UN and NATO. He joined

General Dynamics United Kingdom (GD UK) in 2004, working on

vehicle programmes, including FRES. In 2009, he joined Cranfield

University as BD Director in the Department of Engineering

Systems and Management, before rejoining GD UK in 2011 as mili-

tary liaison director, Advanced Programmes and Technology.

Ideally, an army would have a

mix of wheels and tracks becauseeach has its advantages




UK AFV and PPV Procurement Using

Urgent Operational Requirements1

Peter D Antill, Jeremy CD Smith and David M Moore explain how the Ministry of Defence rushed through

a set of urgent solutions to provide better protection for deployed personnel travelling in Armoured

Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) and Protected Patrol Vehicles (PPVs) in Iraq and Afghanistan

During the recent conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the

problems of providing protected mobility to troops on the

ground, especially in view of the limited availability of Chinook

helicopters, has received attention from the media, from coroners and in

Parliament. The equipment in service at the time provided certain capa-

bilities but was either fast and agile, but lacking protection against mines

and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), or was much better protected,

but slow and with relatively high operating costs. These included:

‘Snatch’ Land Rovers – an up-armoured version of the Land Rover■

Defender 110, they were widely used in Northern Ireland and

on peacekeeping missions where the threat environment was

considered low2. Their use in Iraq and Afghanistan has been criti-

cised, because despite being armoured against small arms fire, the

vehicles have proven susceptible to IEDs, and more than 37 casual-

ties have been attributed to the vehicle’s lack of protection 3. Such

was the disillusionment, that armed forces personnel started calling

it the ‘mobile coffin’4.

Warrior – an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) that grew out of the 1970s■

MCV-80 project. Some 789 vehicles were produced by GKN Defence,

the Warrior entering service in 1987 with the 1st Battalion, Grenadier

Guards. Comparatively well armed and armoured (having a 30mm

Rarden cannon and 7.62mm chain gun), they are more than 20 years

old, with increasing maintenance costs, and in need of upgrading5.

FV432 – replaced by the Warrior IFV, the FV432 was built by GKN■

Sankey up until 1971, when more than 3,000 had been produced.

It had a welded, steel hull that provided protection against small

arms fire and shell splinters and came in a number of variants,

including troop carrier, ambulance and command vehicle6.

In addition, it was considered that tracked vehicles are viewed as more

aggressive, while wheeled vehicles are less intimidating, have a greater

range, higher top speed and lower maintenance burden. Pressure was on to

get something done, from the Prime Minister, through Lord Drayson, down

to Sir Peter Spencer of the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA)7 and General

Sir Kevin O’Donoghue of the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO)8.

A Ridgeback armoured vehicle undergoes

rigorous testing at the hands of the CSS

Trials Development Unit at Aldershot




Time is of the essence

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) had three options available to it to fill

what it perceived to be a capability gap – go through the standard acqui-

sition cycle, upgrade any existing capability, or acquire capability using

the Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) process. Using the standardacquisition cycle was not really practical, as time and again, the MoD

had been criticised for the delays (and cost overruns) to projects as they

move through the Concept, Assessment, Development, Manufacturing,

In-Service, Disposal (CADMID) cycle9. The second option has been imple-

mented, in so far as the ‘Snatch’ Land Rover, Warrior IFV and FV432 have

been concerned, with:

Snatch Vixen – deployment started in 2008 with vehicles being■

upgraded by Ricardo Specialist Vehicles and NP Aerospace (NPA)

as the original design authority, the programme being run by the

Specialist & Utility Vehicles Project Team. The main improvements

centre on an improved armour package, with underbody and wheel

arch blast deflectors, as well as an enhanced engine and drive-train

package, essential given that the vehicle now weighs 4.1 tonnes10.

Warrior – has both the Theatre Entry Standard (Herrick) (TES(H)■

and Capability Sustainment Programme (WCSP), covering both the

short- and long-term upgrading of the vehicle. The TES(H) so far has

resulted in around 70 upgraded vehicles that had been deployed

to Afghanistan by mid 2011. This upgrade features a further 30

modifications, done at the Defence Support Group (DSG) facility

at Donnington, and builds on the 70 modifications already under-

taken by BAE Systems under UOR funding. It has additional modular

armour protection, a passive noise-reduction system, enhanced

engine, suspension, brakes and drive train (it is now around 40

tonnes in weight) and two electronic systems to detect IEDs. The

£1 billion WCSP programme was, subject to final contract nego-tiations, been awarded by the MoD to Lockheed Martin UK. The

upgrade was originally to be applied to 643 vehicles, and includes

additional electronics and communications gear along with a new

appliqué armour package, with 449 of these also receiving a remod-

elled turret with a CTAI 40mm Cased Telescoped Cannon. Those

numbers are, however, in some doubt11.

FV432 Mk. 3 Bulldog – in November 2005, the DLO awarded BAE■

Systems an £80m contract (with an additional £15m for support in

early 2006) to upgrade 500 FV432 APCs to a standard that included

an Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA) package, advanced passive

armour, air conditioning, thermal blanket, protected commander’s

position and an IED detection system. A follow-on contract worth

£70 million for an additional 400 vehicles was signed in May 2007,

with final deliveries taking place in early 201112.

But, given both the operational and political urgency (for example, a

ministerial target was set to get Mastiff into Iraq by 31 December 2006)13,

upgrading vehicles currently in service would, while being faster than the

normal acquisition cycle, still take time. It was decided that the require-

ment would be met by a Military-Off-The-Shelf (MOTS) purchase. After a

review by subject-matter experts and capability managers of what was

available, a list of 10 key user requirements was produced. While these

have been applied to the Mastiff acquisition, the MoD has, in fact, bought a

wide range of vehicles in significant numbers to fill the capability gap.

In the market

The first Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles appeared in

Iraq as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and combat engineer vehicles.

The original designs were based on experience of both the South African

and Rhodesian bush wars and generally feature a V-shaped or curved

lower hull that deflects the blast from a land mine or IED around and

away from the vehicle. They also tend to be fully enclosed, a hint as to

their origin as EOD vehicles, with heavy ballistic glass fitted to windscreens

and viewing ports.As the IED threat increased in both Iraq and Afghanistan, MRAP vehicles

were seen as the safest method by which armed forces personnel could

move around in hostile terrain, given that the IED threat was killing hun-

dreds of personnel each year. The early MRAP vehicles, although far better

protected than Humvees or ‘Snatch’ Land Rovers, were not designed as

troop transports, and so were regarded as being a bit too heavy, too tall,

and too bulky for either the urban environment of Iraq or the mountain-

ous regions of Afghanistan. New designs appeared that took into account

the tactical needs of the users and the operating conditions in theatre.

However, some criticism has been voiced as to their effect on the counter-

insurgency effort, encouraging troops to ride in these vehicles rather than

patrolling outside and interacting with the local population14. To cater for

the needs of the British Army with regard to protected mobility, the MoD

has bought Mastiff, Wolfhound and Ridgeback.

Protected mobility UORs

The MoD initially ordered 108 Force Protection Industries Incorporated

(FPII) Cougar MRAP vehicles (known in British service as the Mastiff)15.

The MoD was given a deadline of 23 weeks to have Mastiff in theatre, and

so the basic vehicles16 were upgraded to UK specifications by Coventry-

based NPA at the UK base in Akrotiri, Cyprus, where some REME and

RLC personnel were given training as well. The initial batch of 10 vehicles

was then flown to Iraq to meet the deadline, a classic UOR procurement

where urgency outweighed cost or an extended assurance process.

This initially rushed procurement was followed by the purchase of addi-

tional ‘upgraded’ versions of Mastiff 1, as well as 174 Mastiff 2, a growing

number of Mastiff 317 and 30 ex-USMC vehicles (which entered service in

2009) as training vehicles18. The total number of Mastiff vehicles will even-

tually reach about 470. On top of that, approximately 180 Ridgeback (4x4)19

and about 125 Wolfhound (6x6)20 have been ordered, meaning that the

entire Cougar-based fleet will rise to about 780 vehicles during 2012, mak-

ing a vital contribution to protected mobility and overall force protection.

There had been doubts as to whether something quite so large and

lumbering could fulfil the UOR and in the broader context, not increase

pressure in the equipment programme on the FRES UV project. However,

Mastiff has proven to be an operational success, but there have been other

factors that have complicated things, including:

The commercial environment – NPA took on the task at a signifi-■

cant commercial risk pending the award of an MoD contract. At that

time, the Specialist & Utility Vehicles Integrated Project Team (SUV

As the IED threat increased,

MRAP vehicles were seen as the

safest method by which forces

personnel could move around




IPT) was the design authority but with Mastiff 2, the role passed to

NPA and has since moved to Integrated Survivability Technologies

Ltd (a joint venture between FPII and NPA).

Procurement strategy – Given the timescale, the strategy was to■

look for a MOTS solution, with the key issues being the choice of thebase vehicle, developing enhanced protection and systems integra-

tion. The urgency of the requirement was underlined by a number

of people, including the SUV IPT Leader and Lord Drayson, the then

Minister for Defence Procurement21. The Defence Vehicle Dynamics

Trade Show was useful in showing a number of different contend-

ers, with information also coming from the Defence Science and

Technology Laboratory.

Innovative support – Given the speed at which this procurement■

was undertaken, there was little time to consider innovative support

arrangements, such as ‘contracting for availability’ or ‘contracting

for capability’, although some $4 million of spares were ordered

with the vehicles, based on the only usage model then available, the

USMC, itself based on the understanding that UORs have a one-year

life (later amended to three).

International context – the procurement was also influenced by the■

international nature of the operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan,

with a number of Coalition partners having deployed Cougar-based

vehicles22. While this might have led to opportunities for shared sup-

port and learning lessons regarding interoperability, it actually led

to some unhelpful competition over priorities and resources. At the

time, NP Aerospace was not allowed to source alternative suppliers

of spare parts and had to use US manufacturers, who themselves

were required by US law to satisfy the demands of the USMC first,

with the MoD finding that significant quantities of spare parts

originally intended for the UK were diverted23. While Mastiff andRidgeback were conducted as Foreign Military Sales, Wolfhound was

a Direct Commercial Sale, allowing the UK to have a little more say.

In UK service, the Mastiff family of vehicles includes24:

Mastiff 1 and 1.5: Contract awarded in August 2006; deployed■

– December 2006; first operational use – March 2007. Variants –

troop carrier, battlefield ambulance.

Mastiff 2: Entered service – late 2008; deployed operationally –■

March 2009. Enhancements – improved lights and upgraded brakes.

Variants – troop carrier, battlefield ambulance and enhanced com-

munications vehicle.

Mastiff 3: Entered service – early 2011. Enhancements – increase in■

internal room and integrated communications equipment.

Ridgeback (4x4): Ordered – February 2008; arrived in UK – August■

2008; deployed – May 2009. Variants – troop carrier, battlefield

ambulance, command post vehicle25.

Wolfhound (6x6): Ordered – April 2009; entered service – late 2010.■

Variants – logistics vehicle.

There was some initial resistance to Mastiff, which led to criticism of

some of its capability shortcomings. One area of concern is safety, and this

is being looked at by the Protected Mobility Team and Headquarters, Land

Forces. It is considered a priority, with issues including the vehicle’s ability

to deal with water hazards (canals are common in Helmand) and crew egress

in an emergency. But if allowances are made, it actually fulfils the capability

requirements very well. Indeed, Mastiff has, overall, received a good press,

for example: “The procurement of Mastiff has largely been a real success

story for the MoD and, in particular, for Minister of Defence Equipment and

Support, Lord Drayson”26, warranted by good performance in theatre27.

Vector: The MoD ordered 180 UK-built Pinzgauer Vector alongside the

Mastiffs28. The Vector, originally designed by Steyr-Daimler-Puch of Austria,

was developed and placed in quantity production in less than nine months,

being based on the Pinzgauer (6x6) chassis, with a new armoured body

designed by BAE Systems. It also incorporated power-assisted steering, an

anti-skid braking system, electronic traction control, run-flat tyres, an air-

conditioning system, the Bowman communications system and electronic

counter-measures devices. While better than the Snatch Land Rover, it has

There was some initial

resistance to Mastiff, whichled to criticism of some of

its capability shortcomings




been found that the Vector does not provide the sort of protection against

mines and IEDs that other vehicles do and so has been relegated to use in

lower threat areas. All 180 vehicles had been delivered by the end of 200729.

Foxhound: The Ocelot PPV has been in development by Force Protection

Europe (FPE – a subsidiary of FPII) since early 2009 (with Ricardo SpecialistVehicles) to meet the requirements of the British Army for a light PPV with

a high degree of protection and good mobility. After undergoing trials, the

Ocelot was selected as the preferred bidder in September 2010, over that

of the Supacat SPV400. In November 2010, FPE was awarded a £180 mil-

lion contract covering the supply of 200 Ocelot LPPV (to be known as the

Foxhound in British Army service), plus an initial purchase of spare parts

with deliveries to run from 2011 through to mid 201230.

Panther: The BAE Systems Panther, based on the Iveco Defence Vehicles

LMV (4x4), was chosen to fulfil the British Army’s Future Command and

Liaison Vehicle requirement, with 400 vehicles being ordered, although it

wasn’t accepted for service until mid 2008. Of the 400, a number have

been upgraded to TES with additional ECM equipment, a third roof hatch,

rear-view camera, additional armour and a redesigned engine air intake31.

Warthog: Ordered in late 2008 to replace its direct predecessor the Viking,

the new vehicle includes spall liners, appliqué armour, a mine protection

kit, Bowman communications equipment, devices to counter IEDs, wire

cutters, grenade launchers and a Platt roof-mounted weapon system32.

With an urgent need to counter the growing threat of IEDs in both Iraq and

Afghanistan, and political pressure building due to adverse press coverage

and coroners’ reports, the MoD has successfully filled a specific operationalrequirement in a relatively short period of time, in terms of both upgrading

current capability and acquiring new capability, by utilising the UOR pro-

cess. This is important, as the MoD has recently stated that there will be an

increasing emphasis on buying MOTS solutions where appropriate33. Taking

the Mastiff as an example there have, however, been problems, particularly

in relation to: first, the lack of any real examination of the issues surround-

ing the generation of a ‘through-life capability management’ plan, effec-

tively leaving that to after the signing of the post-design services contract;

second, maintenance and repair, which have been exacerbated by the lack

of visibility of, and difficulties in, the management of spares.

All this, and the lack of an overall fleet management system, means that

there will be a shortage of available information when it comes around

to deciding whether to take these vehicles into the MoD’s core capability

area, a decision that is yet to be taken34, but could swing either way in this

age of austerity. ■

Mastiff 2 is capable of

carrying a total of eight

passengers and two crew




Air Assault Brigade test-drives

the Wolfhound at Camp

Bastion in Afghanistan




The date 7 October 2011 marked 10 years since coalition forces

went to war in Afghanistan. Since then, more than 2,800 coali-

tion military personnel have lost their lives. The number-one

threat facing these forces remains the hidden and extremely dangerous

improvised explosive device (IED).

Outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, IEDs increasingly became the weapon

of choice for global insurgents and terrorists in 2010, with more than 260

IED incidents recorded per month, worldwide. Device effectiveness and

lethality has increased around the world, and counter-insurgencies are

urgently seeking increasingly sophisticated mobility and protection solu-

tions to protect their troops.

Protected Mobility and Vehicle

Modernisation: Keepingup with Evolving T hreats Serge Buchakjian, senior vice-president and general manager of international programmes for Oshkosh

Defense, leads the development, production and sustainment for all the company’s international

programmes and has more than 25 years of worldwide defence industry experience. In this article, he

highlights the role that Oshkosh vehicle technology is playing in helping to protect troops travelling on

the ground, either with enhanced protection, improved suspension or by removing the need for a driver

NATO forces are responding by modernising their fleets to give troops

improved levels of protection and mobility, and an overall edge to combat

the ever-evolving threats that they face in theatre. As engineers refine

and develop new vehicle protection solutions, they aim to keep vehicles

as light as possible, while reducing weight per square foot to give the

armoured vehicles optimal mobility on the battlefield.

Lighter vehicles can traverse more rigorous terrain with improved agil-

ity, allowing troops to operate off-road extensively and deviate from the

predictable, road-based travel routes that they are otherwise limited to

travelling in heavier vehicles. This dramatically reduces the chances of

vehicles encountering IEDs, because enemies can no longer anticipate

Light armoured vehicles, such as

the Oshkosh M-ATV, can cross rough

terrain and avoid roadside bombs




M-ATV uses the TAK-4 system in order to achieve 16 inches of indepen-

dent wheel travel, more than 13 inches of ground clearance and a 70 per

cent off-road profile capability.

These are vital features on a vehicle that needs to drive extensively

across uneven and obstacle-strewn terrain. The TAK-4 system also allows

the vehicle to maintain its full payload capacity, while accepting addi-

tional add-on armour for greater protection against evolving threats.

The M-ATV uses a bolt-on design to accept the latest armour technolo-

gies and meet changing threat levels. Most recently, Oshkosh worked

with the US military to develop and install under-body protection kits

for the M-ATV to further enhance the vehicle’s protection against IEDs

or other explosive threats.

The TAK-4 suspension system’s success on the M-ATV and other

Oshkosh vehicles in Afghanistan led to it being incorporated onto legacy

MRAP vehicles to optimise their manoeuvrability in Afghanistan as well.

To date, Oshkosh has delivered nearly 3,400 TAK-4 suspension kits for

legacy MRAP vehicles, including the RG33, RG31A3 and Cougar MRAPs.

Oshkosh also expanded the M-ATV into a family of vehicles to meet a

wide range of mission profiles, such as an ambulance variant. Oshkosh

is using the TAK-4 system on its Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle (TAPV)

submission for Canadian Forces.

when and where trucks will confront these hidden explosives. The

Oshkosh Defense Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) All-Terrain

Vehicle (M-ATV) redefines standards for mobility and IED protection.

The earlier generation of heavily armoured MRAP vehicles, prior to the

M-ATV, was designed to protect troops against roadside bombs in Iraq.

The vehicles succeeded in Iraq, but they were frequently too heavy to

safely navigate the terrain that troops encountered in Afghanistan, which

lacks paved roads and modern infrastructure.

Weight from the additional armour, combined with straight-axle sus-

pension, restricted the MRAP vehicles’ mobility, forcing convoys to travel

predictable, more easily navigable roads – where enemies were more

likely to plant lethal explosive devices. To fulfil the urgent need for a

heavily protected vehicle that could navigate Afghanistan’s treacherous

cross-country terrain, Oshkosh Defense engineers developed the M-ATV.

New vehicle, proven lineage

The M-ATV incorporates technologies developed for other Oshkosh

Defense vehicle fleets to deliver a calculated balance of mobility, perfor-

mance and protection for operations in Afghanistan. One key component

is the Oshkosh Defense TAK-4 independent suspension system, which

has now been used on more than 20,000 military-class vehicles. The

The Oshkosh M-ATV Multi-Mission Vehicle

(MMV) equipped with Raytheon TOW missiles




Oshkosh Defense engineers continue to examine and develop ways to

improve ride quality by studying military trucks in action and calculating

what is required for optimal manoeuvrability on harsh terrain. Leveraging

their field observations after 10 years of operational experience in the-

atre, Oshkosh engineers developed the next-generation TAK-4 system,known as the TAK-4i intelligent independent suspension, with very low

spring rates and long travel measurements. The TAK-4i system delivers

20 inches of independent wheel travel, which is 25 per cent more than

other vehicles fielded in the US military.

Critical advantage

Testing has verified that vehicles equipped with this advanced

suspension system achieve higher speeds and greater ride quality on

rougher terrain than existing vehicles, providing a critical mobility advan-

tage on extremely challenging battlefields. To date, the TAK-4i system

has completed more than 50,000 test miles. This included completing

the Baja 1000 – a 1,061-mile off-road race through the gruelling Mexican

desert. As with its predecessor, the TAK-4i system is scalable for use on

light, medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles.

As militaries strive to redefine mobility and protection standards, auton-

omous operability has emerged as another key modernisation capability.

Front lines on the modern battlefield have blurred, with troops participat-

ing in logistics missions exposed to threats previously contained in active

battle zones. Autonomous vehicle technology increases a driver’s situ-

ational awareness and can even remove a driver from a vehicle entirely,

reducing exposure to IEDs or other lethal attacks.

Most of the unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) used on the battlefield

today are small robots used to detect and detonate explosives. The

Oshkosh TerraMax UGV system, however, integrates high-power military

computers, intelligent drive-by-wire technology and innovative sensing

systems into already fielded vehicles, allowing them to operate with-

out a driver and with minimal supervision. The TerraMax UGV system

allows supervised autonomous navigation in either a lead or follow con-

voy role, or it can be commanded to semi-autonomously follow a lead

command-and-control vehicle.

The TerraMax system also supports remote control and teleoperation of

the UGV, allowing an operator to utilise those modes for recovery if com-

ponents of the autonomy system are rendered inoperable. In the event of

subsystem degradation or failure, the TerraMax system’s extensive health

monitoring ensures early detection and notifies operators of any poten-

tial maintenance issues.

TerraMax technology uses a multi-sensor system, employing intel-

ligently fused radar, LIDAR and camera systems to compensate for the

weaknesses in one sensing modality with the strengths of another. The

system is enhanced by GPS, inertial and vehicle-to-vehicle data, but does

not depend on any of these data sources. In fact, Oshkosh has success-

fully navigated TerraMax-equipped vehicles on stretches of more than six

miles with the GPS antenna disconnected. The system’s computing solu-

tion provides ruggedised, configurable computing in a compact, conduc-

tion-cooled chassis. It is scalable for use on heavy to light vehicles, andhas proven reliable through hundreds of hours of on-vehicle operation.

Each TerraMax-equipped vehicle is able to navigate to its destination

independently, allowing convoys of TerraMax-equipped vehicles to travel

in tight formation, while remaining flexible to respond to traffic condi-

tions, road blockages or other unique mission needs with short-range

radars that provide 360-degree, close-proximity obstacle detection and

avoidance. The system is designed to retain a vehicle’s original payload

and performance capabilities so that nothing is sacrificed, in order for the

vehicle to achieve autonomy. Designed as a kit, the TerraMax UGV tech-

nology can be integrated on existing military vehicles, including those

made by other manufacturers.

Performance proven

The TerraMax technology recently completed its first limited technical

assessment for the US Marine Corps’ Cargo UGV initiative. The Cargo

UGV programme uses an Oshkosh Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement

(MTVR), equipped with the TerraMax UGV technology, and is sponsored

by the US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory and the Joint Ground

Robotics Enterprise Robotics Technology Consortium. The technical

assessment included numerous tests and produced successful results,

including obstacle avoidance, leader-follower behaviour, water crossings

and navigation without the use of a GPS.

The Cargo UGV initiative’s goal of determining the feasibility of reducing

the exposure of troops to lethal attacks, by replacing some of the manned

vehicles in logistics convoys with unmanned vehicles, is already reachingfruition. After a successful testing phase, Oshkosh began training Marines

to independently conduct autonomous convoy missions for evaluation,

taking yet another step toward increased vehicle modernisation.

While military units are looking to enhance their fleets with well-pro-

tected, highly mobile vehicles, budget limitations prevent forces from

purchasing entirely new vehicles. Solutions such as the TAK-4, TAK-4 i and

TerraMax technologies allow units to upgrade or recapitalise their fleets

in an affordable manner.

Regardless of the manner in which it is carried out, vehicle moderni-

sation is bringing state-of-the-art protection, improved mobility, and

autonomous driving and operating capabilities, to provide troops around

the world with an edge in protected mobility against ever-evolving IEDs

and other threats in theatre. ■

To date, the TAK-4i system has

completed more than 50,000test miles, displaying consistently

exceptional reliability

The TerraMax UGV integrates

drive-by-wire technology into

existing vehicles



LAND WARFARECONFERENCE 20127-8 June 2012Church House

Westminster, SW1P 3NZ

Find out more and register at

www.rusi.org/landwarfare

Supported by:

General Sir Peter Wall KCB CBE ADC Gen

General Raymond T Odierno

DEFENCE, INDUSTRIES AND SOCIETY CONFERENCE 2012

28-29 June 2012

The Defence Industrial Base – A Critical Component ofMilitary Capability

www.rusi.org/DIandSconference




Maintaining freedom of manoeuvre for security forces operat-

ing in asymmetric environments is key to creating and pre-

serving safety and security, not least for local populations. An

effective Route Proving and Clearance (RP&C) capability can help forces

to expand their influence by eliminating ‘no-go’ areas. It will enable

forces to maintain momentum, keep roads clear for civilians and military

alike, and detect and deal with the prevalent threat posed by roadside

bombs and devices effectively.

Beyond recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ability to clear

concealed threats remains essential for forces conducting either expedi-

tionary operations abroad or dealing with domestic issues. The necessity

for maintaining freedom of manoeuvre applies to all types and phases

of warfare, from full-scale combat to counter-insurgency and even to

peacekeeping operations. In recent years, improvised explosive devices

(IEDs) have become one of the most common and lethal threats on the

battlefield and are likely to remain a weapon of choice for insurgents

in future conflicts, due to the significant strategic benefits that can be

gained for relatively little effort and with limited resources. IEDs severely

constrain the ability of land forces to manoeuvre at will, especially if

insufficient specialist Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) resources are

available to deal with large numbers of concealed devices. IEDs can dis-

rupt momentum, choke supply lines and isolate communities, allowing

the insurgent to gain the initiative.

The Talisman System-of-Systems

Approach to Route Provingand ClearanceT-Hawk, Buffalo, Mastiff and a JCB – all are constituent parts of the Thales Talisman counter-improvised

explosive device suite of systems. RUSI’s Amyas Godfrey and Paul Wathen, from Thales UK, review this

important programme and explain the nature of its capabilities

Detect, destroy and avoid

Over the past 10 years, NATO forces operating in Afghanistan have devel-

oped a range of combat engineer ‘detect, destroy and avoid’ capabilities

in order to deliver and maintain the required effect on their manoeu-

vres. This freedom of manoeuvre can only be maintained by having an

effective RP&C capability, which, in military terms, has been described

as the ability to make safe and passable routes that have been subjected

to attack through the use of IEDs or conventional mines. In Afghanistan,

where troops are highly dispersed, this is considered key to the ability to

resupply Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).

Looking across the spectrum of NATO International Security Assistance

Force (ISAF) deployments, the core capabilities of a generic RP&C system

would seem to be the ability to detect the hidden threat, perform ‘imme-

diate investigation’ and then disrupt or neutralise the suspected device,

without the need to call out specialist support. Associated with this are a

number of supporting capabilities, including command and control (C2),

observation, protection and mobility support. The emphasis of C2 in this

context is on the management of the entire system from ‘under armour’,

while remaining in contact with other units and systems: a necessary pre-

caution against potential ambushes or more complex IED emplacements,

such as ‘daisy chains’ or separated trigger and explosive devices.

The requirement for observation from under armour of the immediate

area surrounding the RP&C system – in order to predict ‘come-ons’ and

A line-up of Talisman vehicles




ambushes – is also a lesson learned from experience, as is the more

obvious requirement for protection from the direct effects of the threat

and the ability to provide effective fire when necessary.

Furthermore, in this environment the ability to repair any road or track

damaged by the effects of the device, or even to create new routes ifrequired, are crucial capabilities for maintaining momentum and mobil-

ity support. RP&C systems can also address the need to avoid areas of

danger, for example, by using lane-marking systems, remotely operated

mission systems, and protected-mobility systems to bypass threats.

Taken together, all of the above capabilities address the core require-

ments for a complete RP&C system. Whereas each requirement can be

addressed in different ways – depending on national doctrine and the

environment in which they are operating – each requirement must be

addressed in some way in order to deliver a significant RP&C system.

The Thales Talisman solution

In the late 2000s, an Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) for an

enhanced RP&C capability emerged during British Army operations inAfghanistan, resulting in the launch of the Talisman programme. The UK

Ministry of Defence (MoD) addressed this requirement broadly through a

system-of-systems approach, with key complementary capabilities deliv-

ered by industry to make up the system. The vision was that of several

platforms operating together to provide the capability enhancement.

In July 2009, Thales UK was appointed by the MoD as the Mission

System Design Authority (MSDA) for the Talisman system. This program-

matic approach acknowledged a situation whereby a diverse set of equip-

ment, vehicles, sensors, effectors, communications and capabilities were

being combined to work as a single system, mirroring the operational

merging of capabilities on the ground as envisaged for this requirement.

To this end, the MSDA role included the management of the design,

procurement, installation, test and acceptance of Talisman-specific

equipment into Mastiff and Buffalo vehicles that were provided as

government-furnished equipment by the MoD. The installed equipment

consisted of complex mission systems, interconnected within an elec-

tronic architecture, bringing together the sensors, weapon stations and

a suite of UK theatre-entry protection and communications equipment.

Conscious of the requirements of the realities on the ground, the Mastiff

vehicle in the Talisman system was fitted with a mast-mounted camera,

remote weapon station, local situational awareness system, communica-

tion system and countermeasures. Its investigation capability, based on

a highly protected Buffalo vehicle platform, includes a long-reach rum-

mage arm that provides the ability to probe and unearth suspect buried

devices. The mast-mounted camera, in conjunction with image analysis

techniques, provides a stand-off, close-inspection capability that can

be used to examine suspicious areas and irregularities. Suspect devices

can be destroyed by direct fire from the remote weapon station, all

Thales continues to support

the MoD with upgrades and

enhancements to Talisman as

lessons are learned in theatre

controlled from within the armoured safety of the vehicle. The Talisman

system also includes two types of remotely operated capabilities built

around the T-Hawk micro air vehicle and a Talon remote ground vehicle.

The T-Hawk includes a camera and data link and is used to provide close-

up images of areas of interest, utilising its ability to hover.Talon, a tracked robotic system more commonly associated with spe-

cialist EOD teams, also includes a camera for close-up inspection, and

can be used for charge laying or minor physical probing of suspect

devices. The Talisman system-of-systems is completed by a JCB High-

Mobility Engineering Excavator (HMEE), which is used to reinstate

routes damaged by IEDs, for example, during disposal operations.

Within a year of the MSDA contract award, Talisman entered service

in Afghanistan, following extensive trials and exercises. It is operated

by the Royal Engineers and has proved very effective in enhancing the

safety of convoys travelling though dangerous areas. The MSDA’s role

during the current in-service phase is to ensure maximum availability

and readiness of all the installed mission systems and equipment.

Simulated training

Preparations for using Talisman have been supported by a new collec-

tive synthetic training system based on standard PCs and screens. This

runs a simulation based on the VBS2 gaming engine, within a synthetic

wrap derived from Thales’s open Generic Vehicle Architecture and video-

over-ethernet developments. The training system represents an entire

Talisman Troop, including representative vehicle bays with ‘out-of-the

window’ views and control systems, operator work stations, communi-

cations systems and after-action review facilities. It can simulate events

and entities that would not be possible in live training – such as incom-

ing fire, combined arms actions, weather, day/night operations and local

population movements – thereby significantly enhancing readiness forfinal pre-deployment field training.

Using the new training system, ‘what if?’ situations are played out and

later analysed to help improve operational effectiveness. By simulating

different scenarios, introducing new threats and testing responses, the

crew members rapidly become familiar with operating as a team, while

the command team acquires a better understanding of the interaction

between the platforms and the strengths of team members. The result is

a much higher state of readiness for operations prior to deployment.

Thales continues to support the MoD with upgrades and enhancements

to the Talisman capability, building on the lessons that are being learned

from its employment in theatre. This helps to ensure that UK forces are

able to maintain freedom of manoeuvre so that they can extend their

influence, and that of the Afghan government, to wherever they – and

not the insurgents – choose. ■

T-Hawk UAV



Always in its element.

Iveco S.p.A. Defence VehiclesI-39100 Bolzano - via Volta, 6+390471905111 - [email protected]

Iveco Defence Vehicles UKIveco House, Stat ion Road - WatfordWD17 1SR Hertfordshire +44 1923259728

The Iveco 8 x 8 SUPERAV represents an outstanding advance in thedesign of armoured amphibious vehicles. Capable of supportinglittoral operations beyond Sea State 3, SUPERAV can carry a missionload of over 10 tonnes, including an overhead weapon stationmounting up to a 40mm cannon. With outstanding mobility on land

and in the water, and airportability in a C130, SUPERAV provides anoptimum blend of tactical, operational and strategic mobility.

SUPERAV has an under armour volume of 14m3 and can carry acrew of up to 13 in a highly protected compartment. Designed foroperations worldwide, SUPERAV truly is always in its element.

SUPERAV forms part of Iveco DV’s range of Multirole Vehicles, Tactical

and Logistic Trucks and Armoured Fighting Vehicles, which togethercover the full spectrum of on- and off-road military requirements.




The debate about what constitutes critical infrastructure existed

well before – but was accelerated by – the events of the 9/11 ter-

rorist attacks on New York in 2001. Nevertheless, there has been

some adjustment to what exactly is considered ‘infrastructure’ and what

is deemed ‘critical’. The focus on critical infrastructure has traditionally

been on ‘hard’ assets, key functions and, more recently, ‘cyber’ assets

and ‘icons’. These are generally described as follows:

Hard assets:■ The tangible machinery of the state, transportation,

power plants, food, information systems, water and waste, and the

defence and industrial base;

Key functions:■ The instruments of state that facilitate its function

and control, including education, prisons, emergency services,

and the government;

People ProtectionChief Inspector Kenneth Pennington, from the Police Service of Northern Ireland, explains why people

are an important element of the Critical National Infrastructure debate, as are the measures being

carried out to protect them and the nature of the equipment being used to secure their safety

Cyber assets:■ The secure and continued use of the internet and

IT assets;

Icons:■ Symbolic features and locations, which could represent a

‘signal’ event for that society if attacked.

What is missing from most, but not all, of the debate around critical

infrastructure is the concept of key people as assets. This seems strange

given the predominance given to interdicting high-value targets dur-

ing counter insurgency operations. One person’s high-value target is

another’s high-value asset.

To quote Andrew Staniforth in Blackstone’s Counter-Terrorism

Handbook (second edition): “A successful assassination of a lead-

ing public and political figure allows terrorists an opportunity to draw

A security presence escorts

UK business secretary

Vince Cable (left) during

a demonstration




attention to their cause and to celebrate a momentary victory. It also

serves to raise the fear of terrorism amongst members of the public and

may force governments to react and respond to an embarrassing lapse

in security measures. No such opportunity should be afforded to ter-

rorists, and the security of all in authority is paramount to deliveringeffective counter-terrorism methods.”

The protection of key people therefore, needs to consider both military

targeting models, such as ‘CARVER’, and the various models utilised by

the US’ Department of Homeland Security to identify and prioritise the

protection of key assets. Consideration of how the military selects targets

is effectively ‘red team’ thinking, which represents an attempt to regard

target significance and selection from the aggressor’s perspective.

The adoption of the Homeland Security ‘matrix’ of risks represents

‘blue team’ thinking, with the emphasis on considering risk and conse-

quence from the protector’s perspective. While these approaches may

lead to broadly similar outcomes, they can differ. For example, a lack

of intelligence on the part of the aggressor may mean that they believe

there to be little consequence to the loss of an individual, while the pro-

tector understands that the individual is in fact vital.

What might the aggressor be considering prior to

assassination (using CARVER as a framework)?

Criticality: How critical is this person to the political or economic inter-

ests of the state (enemy)? This may be time specific.

Accessibility: How easy are they to access in terms of their role or fre-

quented locations, do they set patterns, and how easy is an escape?

Recuperability: Can they be easily replaced in their role or function?

Vulnerability: What protection do they receive to their person, transit

or key locations? Do they employ active counter-surveillance?Effect: What are the wider consequences? Can this cause an overreac-

tion by the state?

Recognisability: How high is the individual’s profile? Will that have a

greater potential impact on the populace?

What might the protector consider when determining what

level of protection is proportionate?

Capability: To what equipment does the aggressor have access? What is

the competence of their teams and their intellectual capital? In short, do

they know how to do this?

Intention: Do they want to carry out attacks at this time or on this type

of target? For example, they may be in negotiations with the state and,

depending on the nature of the ideology or ethos of the group, they

might not target certain types of individuals.

Vulnerability: How proximate is the principal to recent attacks? Do they

set patterns? What protection are they afforded? Any test of vulnerability

needs to consider the terrorists’ (or criminals’) attack cycle. An example

of this is described in CJM Drake’s Terrorists’ Target Selection (1998):

Setting up a logistical network;1.

Selecting potential targets;2.

Gathering information on potential targets;3.

Planning of operation;4.

Insertion of weapons into area of operations;5.

Execution of operation;6.

Withdrawal of the operational team;7.

Issue of communiqués.8.

The protection of people needs

to consider military targetingmodels and the various models

used by US Homeland Security

By consequence, interrupting or preventing stages two through to

seven can reduce vulnerability. Is the potential target publicly known/

identifiable? To a lesser extent are they known to the aggressor group

and identifiable by them? For example, a key prosecutor might be largely

unknown to the wider public, but well known to terrorist or criminal

personnel. In terms of impact, what are the political and economic con-

sequences of the principal’s loss? Having considered the level of threat

and the proportionate level of protection required, there needs to be

careful consideration of equipment needs. In broad terms, this covers:

Vehicles: In the protection world, vehicles typically fall into two cat-

egories: ‘hard-skin’ (armoured) and ‘soft-skin’ (unarmoured). Given

the expense of armoured vehicles and the way in which this tends to

increase exponentially towards the top end of the spectrum, the armour

package should be based upon an assessment of the aggressor’s cur-

rent capability, coupled with what operational activity can be taken to

mitigate the risk of attack.

Soft-skin, unarmoured vehicles are not always the poor man’s choice.

When simply in transit, there is a lot of merit in ‘not standing out in acrowd of one’. This covert, low-key approach makes it difficult for the

aggressor to select the target. Intermediate armour systems are also

available that can increase the ballistic protection within the vehicle,

while not compromising the vehicle’s performance.

In any event, the provision of appropriate training to the driver is criti-

cal. He or she must be able to evade hazards and escape an ambush in

the selected vehicle type. Moreover, the vehicle type can significantly

affect the choice of tactics employed. Many will not ram without airbag

deployment and fuel cut-off. Some vehicle types (such as 4x4s) will not

execute violent high-speed turns, while saloon cars remove the ‘off-road’

option. Anyone purchasing vehicles should therefore explore the provi-

sion of training as part of the contract. Equally, do not buy an entire fleet

of one type. This is questionable from both an operational and a practi-

cal perspective. Operationally, changes in vehicles can counter hostile

surveillance. Practically, when your motor transport manager tells you

that the manufacturer has found a fault and wants to recall, you do not

lose your entire fleet. Depending on the operating environment, vehicles

may require countermeasures to prevent the activation of improvised

explosive devices (IEDs).

Air support: This can be employed as a means of transit by itself (pro-

vided ground teams are available to respond). However, air support is

more often employed as ‘top cover’. It can advise the protection package

of hazards ahead and, with the right suite of cameras, can work across

the spectrum to scan for threats. In addition, air support is a very vis-

ible deterrent to those terrorists who are interested in escaping after the

attack. When purchasing air assets it is critical that the platform chosen

can carry the crew and a principal plus a protection officer, as it may be

the only means of removing the principal to a place of safety.




Communications: In principle, communications need to be encrypted,

or else you are not secure and, therefore, vulnerable in terms of infor-

mation and location. The communication can be police- or military-style

radios or increasingly encrypted smartphones with an ‘app’ that allows

‘push to talk’. This use of smartphones is particularly appropriate when

there is a need to keep the protection package low-profile. This also

raises the issue regarding the security of any communications equip-

ment carried by the principal and crews. This needs to be closely moni-

tored and all parties briefed regarding potential security risks.

Site security: High-profile, pre-planned visits require a different secu-

rity regime to impromptu and/or low-profile operations. Where advance

notice is provided then route and site security become issues. For this

type of operation, it is necessary to create secure areas through con-

trolled access points. Scanners and explosive/firearms detection equip-

ment will be essential. Portable CCTV systems can assist with this. It is

also essential to know what other CCTV systems and/or webcams are in

operation on the premises and from where they can be viewed.

Firearms and less-lethal technologies: Protection ‘details’ can be

faced with all types of threats – from the disgruntled, the emotionally

or mentally distressed, right through to a determined terrorist attacker.

The ‘detail’ must be equipped to deal with the range of threats that

they might encounter. The decision as to what is carried is a command

decision based on a strategic assessment of the threat to ensure that

the protection package is proportionate. Given the range of threat sce-

narios, firearms providers will see either a requirement to escalate or

de-escalate the potential lethality of systems. Fully automatic weapons

will be suitable for some areas of operations and not for others.

Equally, the provision of appropriate, less-lethal alternatives helps to

ensure that any use of lethal force is ‘absolutely necessary’. To be profi-

cient in selecting the appropriate response during high-threat scenarios,

personnel need to be exposed to more than just range training. They

need ‘judgemental’ training, exposing them to realistic real-time dilem-

mas, which are video- or scenario-based. This training requires effective

training environments, coupled with simulations and/or Simunitions™.

Protection begins as an assessment of the aggressor, coupled with

an assessment of the principal. This then informs the debate regard-

ing both the level of protection, and the equipment required. The key

word is ‘proportionate’, both in terms of the assets deployed and the

cost incurred. Proportionality is, of course, a subjective and elusive test,

however, that has to be constantly reviewed. Those reviews will drive

the need for equipment changes, so suppliers need to be capable of

meeting the needs of this continuum. ■

The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the PSNI

The key word

in protection is‘proportionate’,

both in terms

of the assets

deployed and

the cost incurred

The Olympic Stadium, Stratford. The 2012

Games in London will provide a logistical

challenge for UK security forces to overcome




The early history of the Bowman programme was an unhappy one.

In the 1990s, a series of consortia – initially Yeoman and Crossbow

and, subsequently, Archer – failed to convince the UK Ministry

of Defence (MoD) of their ability to deliver a sufficiently robust solution

to what had originally been envisaged as a replacement for the Clansman

combat net radio system.

By 2000, with original in-service dates long past, the MoD initiated

a new competition, which was won by a team led by CDC Systems UK

(subsequently General Dynamics UK – GDUK) in 2001. The GDUK solu-

tion aimed to capitalise on the similar, though smaller, Iris programme it

had run for the Canadian Department of National Defence.

The initial contract was to provide the new tactical communications

system, which included secure high-frequency and very-high-frequency

Bowman Comes of AgeThe Bowman tactical C4I system has been one of the most significant programmes for the UK’s armed

forces over the past decade. Its impact on British military capability, particularly in the land environment,

has been considerable and mostly positive. Giles Ebbutt traces the history of this complex project to

highlight its undoubted value and uncover the root causes for some of the criticism that it has received

(VHF) voice and data radios, plus an ultra-high-frequency, high-capacity

data backbone network. In 2002, it was followed by the awarding of

the contract to provide the Bowman C2 capability, including software,

hardware and interfaces for systems in armoured fighting vehicles.

This consists of the Common Battlefield Application Toolset (ComBAT),

Infrastructure (I) and armoured Platform Battlefield Information System

Application (P-BISA), collectively known as CIP.

It is known in its entirety as Bowman CIP or BCIP and is intended to

provide a mobile, battlefield-wide ‘tactical internet’, capable of provid-

ing a high-capacity data network, automated positional information and

secure voice communications for mounted and dismounted users.

ITT and Harris, the principal subcontractors providing the communi-

cations equipment, established major manufacturing facilities in the

A soldier from 24 Commando Engineer Regiment

uses the ‘Makefast’ engineering tool that is

supplied with the Bowman suite of applications




UK to produce the radios, and embarked on the considerable produc-

tion runs required. This also had to be matched to a vehicle-conversion

programme organised by GDUK, which was running at more than 100

vehicles per week at its peak.

The conversion programme was a major evolution for the military, par-ticularly the Army, and was considered to have the equivalent impact of

a medium-scale operation in its own right, in terms of the effect it would

have on the Army’s operational commitments’ plot and unit availabil-

ity. The programme included: the training/familiarisation of more than

74,000 personnel; the conversion of more than 15,000 vehicles, both

‘core’ and Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR)-funded; and installa-

tions in 120 maritime platforms and 60 helicopters. More than 50,000

radios were supplied, together with more than 22,000 computer termi-

nals. It has been, by any reckoning, a huge undertaking that has had

considerable unsung success, as well as more high-profile criticism.

What was not expected in the planning for conversion was Operation

TELIC (second Gulf War) and subsequently HERRICK (Afghanistan

campaign), which meant that at the peak of the conversion period

the Army’s operational programme had to absorb the effects of three

medium-scale operations. According to Brigadier (Brig) Ivan Hooper, the

current Bowman and Tactical Communications and Information Systems

Delivery Team (BATCIS DT) leader, it was “an immense G3 [Operations

Staff] challenge: really painful.”

Field trials took place during 2003 and 2004, and despite a number

of shortfalls in performance, the decision was taken that 12 Mechanised

Brigade (12 Mech Bde) would deploy to Iraq in early 2005, equipped

with key elements of BCIP, principally using voice, but also with some

limited data capability. This represented a significant milestone, but at

the time there was a wide range of criticism of the equipment’s perfor-

mance, weight and ergonomics. Some of this was well-founded, somebased on hearsay and some on unfulfilled, overambitious expectations.

Nonetheless, as Brig Hooper observes: “It is very easy to forget that

when 12 Bde brought up its formation and battlegroup secure voice nets

in Basra, it was a huge step up in capability.”

A mixed response to the system

The successors of 12 Mech Bde’s 7 Armoured Brigade (Armd Bde), deployed

as the first fully ‘Bowmanised’ Brigade, with what was known as BCIP4F

(Fielded). This provided secure voice and a limited tactical internet, but

still fell short of offering all the capabilities that were expected. Among

continuing negative publicity there were some positive testimonials from

armed forces personnel, such as: “It took me 15 minutes to issue orders

that would have taken two hours with Clansman”, and “the battle group

is impressed and happy with Bowman”. However, there is no doubt that,

at that time, the system was suffering from a poor reputation.

The fielding of BCIP4F continued, and by late 2007 some 10,000 vehi-

cles had been converted. Further spiral development of the system was

in progress, including a number of iterations that were never fielded,

partly because of the impact of operational commitments on the forma-

tion cycle. Eventually, the operational field trial of BCIP5 took place in

the UK and Germany, towards the end of that year.

Following the acceptance of an interim version (5.2.1) in 2008, BCIP

5.4 was contracted in mid 2009. Fielding began in 2010 and the system

was deployed to Afghanistan in mid 2011. Brig Hooper notes that this

“probably saw the realisation of what most people intended or expected

it to be at the outset” and that, overall, it was a rapid implementation.

BCIP 5.4 now provides the following: robust tactical internet that was

needed to make data communications a reality; improved situational

The conversion period was

considered to have the

equivalent impact of a medium-

scale operation in its own right

awareness; better hardware; more flexible and usable software; better

batteries; and the ability to host the engineer, fire-support and air-defence

BISAs. Brig Ed Davis Royal Marines, the outgoing Commander of Task

Force Helmand, commented in August 2011: “This… will not only enable

a step change in positional situational awareness for the battle group/company commander/staff, but will also provide automatic updates on

tactical ground reporting. All in all, a substantial enhancement in capabil-

ity that is already helping to tip the balance our way in the campaign.”

So what caused the earlier problems? A major difficulty was one of

expectation management. The programme cut across all three environ-

ments. It included all three frontline commands and covered everything

from the dismounted soldier through to vehicles, warships and aircraft,

as well as fixed headquarters. Furthermore, the programme had a

smaller budget, but still carried unchanged expectations in the minds

of most customers.

According to Brig Rick Bounsall, previously head of DEC CCII (Director

of Equipment Capability for Command and Control Information

Infrastructure) and then BATCIS DT leader during the key period: “Thiswas the biggest problem I had to overcome. If this had been a commer-

cial programme, we would have rebranded it.”

Brig Hooper notes that: “Although there was recognition within the

programme that the full CIP capability would follow the initial fielding,

this was not widely understood throughout the field army. We could

have managed expectations better. Your particular view of Bowman

depended on where you met it; therefore, we had to get it all right. Get

one bit wrong and it coloured the entire perception. Some elements

weren’t what was expected, particularly for the dismounted user: that

was 40 per cent of the user population.”

Furthermore, users were used to seeing similar-looking technology

being introduced rapidly and successfully in the commercial world while,

with Bowman, they were apparently being denied capabilities that they

already had on their mobile telephones.

In Brig Bounsall’s view: “In retrospect, many of the problems were not

as significant as they appeared at the time.” Some were original design

faults that needed revision, but others, such as the weight and the power

requirement, were as much caused by the requirement for secure voice

and integrated GPS as anything else.

Much of the equipment represented the technical solutions that were

available in 2001, and some suffered in comparison to commercial or

competing military solutions only four years later, such is the speed of

technological development.

The programme required an incremental development approach

incorporating a series of spiral developments to arrive at the desired

capability, as opposed to the linear one with a process of design, experi-

ment, test, trial, accept, field – which is the accepted model. However,

at that stage, the understanding within the MoD of how to manage an




incremental programme was still immature, with limited appreciation of

the phasing of design, experimentation and trials that is required. Partly

due to GDUK’s work as systems integrator, there is now much greater

use of simulation and low-level experimentation prior to BCIP trials,

which themselves are far more tightly prepared and controlled.

More complex than anticipated

Significantly, the MoD lacked an accurate appreciation of the immensity

of the impact across all of the Defence Lines of Development, includ-

ing training, equipment accounting and logistics. This resulted in the

constant need to adjust the training programme to account for skills

fade and personnel availability, which turned out to be far less predict-

able and controllable than expected. That said, the support solution has

matured rapidly, partly driven by the demands of current operations.

In addition, the vehicle conversion programme was significantly more

complex than had been anticipated. Ultimately, more than 15,000 vehi-

cles of 114 different types, each with sub-variants, have been converted.

Not surprisingly, every type or variant presented a new problem. The

vehicles also included a number of UOR platforms, such as the MRAPs

that were not planned within the contract.

Vehicle presentation standards also differed considerably from those

expected, with vehicles appearing in unexpected configurations, and

availability for conversion soon departed from the programme. These

difficulties were overcome by the MoD and GDUK, essentially by aban-

doning the strict letter of the contract and working in partnership to

conduct the conversion in the most effective way possible.

There was also an issue with ‘installation versus integration’, as the

process of vehicle conversion involved more than just putting kit into

vehicles. Moreover, there was an inadequate understanding of the

impact on the BCIP installation of adding more subsystems to a platformor changing its configuration.

For example, the poor performance of VHF in one type of vehicle was

eventually traced to the fact that Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)

profiling had been conducted by the MoD on the first example of the

vehicle to arrive in the UK, for which a suitable installation was designed,

but subsequent vehicles had a different windscreen-wiper motor withdifferent characteristics, thus changing the EMC profile.

On the basis of the subsequent contract to take over the integration

of the vehicles, GDUK could claim to have become the leading vehicle

integrator in the UK, having so far successfully delivered 15,000 inte-

grated vehicles.

As for BCIP, it is more than just a new radio system; it is a new digitisa-

tion regime, and there was a widespread lack of appreciation, particu-

larly across the Army, where the bulk of the impact was felt, of what it

was they were taking on. Several years of use, mostly on operations,

have been instructive in maturing the land forces’ view of what they

have got and where they want to go.

Doctrine is now maturing, and formation commanders understand the

capability and what it offers them, and this continues to be developed

through improved Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, drawing on the

experience gained from current operations.

As far as the future is concerned, “I don’t think we’d ever do a ‘Big

Bang’ approach again, even if it were affordable,” says Brig Hooper. BCIP

is now part of a suite of systems that includes some core programmes,

some UOR and some others; this will need to be developed into an

effective Tactical CIS capability.

Commercial and military systems that are available will address the

capability requirements beyond 2012, some of the obsolescence from

2016 onwards, and the needs of the Army’s Future Force 2020, and

Bowman will be a part of this. The challenge will be to keep this pro-

gramme aligned with other land environment programmes, such asScout SV and Dismounted Situational Awareness. ■

Some 15,000 vehicles, including the

recently acquired Warthog (pictured),

have been equipped with Bowman



DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES AIR

On 21 January 1920, a dozen RAF de Havilland DH9A biplanes

began a three-week bombing campaign in British Somaliland

that devastated numerous Dervish insurgent bases in British

Somaliland, effectively ending the 20-year uprising masterminded by

Muhammad Abdul Hassan – the notorious “Mad Mullah”.

An unintended consequence of this campaign, which was dubbed the

“cheapest war in history” by Leo Amery, the colonial under-secretary,

was the decision by Winston Churchill, the secretary of state for war

and air, to extend this new doctrine of Air Control and put the vast

swathes of new British protectorates in the Middle East under the steward-

ship of the RAF. It is this decision that led to the formation of the RAF’s

Armoured Car Companies around 90 years ago, and to the start of a

tradition of soldiering within the Air Force.

T he RAF Regiment – More

T han the Sum of its PartsThe Royal Air Force Regiment provides a unique capability to NATO and coalition partners in the force

protection of airfields. It is, however, far more than just a perimeter-patrolling organisation, providing

a raft of vital capabilities to UK Defence and the civilian authorities. Simon Michell explains

Fast forward to May 1941 and the German invasion of Crete. The Germans

had concluded that the operational centre of gravity on the island was,

in fact, the RAF airfield at Máleme. They correctly surmised that once

this fell, the defence of the rest of the island would inevitably crumble.

Consequently, the Germans launched an airborne invasion which, although

extremely costly, managed to take the airfield and, with it, the island.

This invasion was the catalyst for the formation, once again at

Churchill’s behest just over 70 years ago on 1 February 1942, of an organic,

integrated force that would take sole responsibility for the defence of

airfields – the RAF Regiment, into which the Armoured Car Companies

were subsumed. From that moment on, the RAF would have the means

to maintain a permanent Force Protection (FP) posture inside and

outside its deployed air bases.

Protecting a base as large as Camp Bastionin Afghanistan requires dedicated C2 and

systematic patrolling outside the wire




Six Corps capabilities

In its core function, today’s RAF Regiment provides FP Command and

Control (C2) alongside air operations and under command of the base

commander, to integrate the entire range of security tasks inside a base, on

its perimeter, and in the Ground Defence Area (GDA) outside the base.RAF Regiment field squadrons operate within this GDA (typically up to

500 sq km around an airfield) to prevent stand-off attack against the air-

field and the aircraft flying in and out.

As a fully integrated, air-minded element of the RAF, the Regiment’s

tactics and doctrine evolve within the framework of the RAF’s three-

dimensional operating environment. In order to defend airfields (and the

aircraft flying in and out of them), air operations cannot be separated from

the FP operations that facilitate them – the two must occur in seamless

harmony, requiring an intrinsic understanding termed ‘air-mindedness’,

across the operational spectrum. Not only does the RAF Regiment under-

stand what is going on in and around airfields from an air operations point

of view, but the air operations component also understands exactly what

the Regiment is capable of and how it operates. This understanding has

implications beyond FP C2 and ground combat – important as that is.

It links to air power doctrine, aircraft tactics and equipment procurement.

For example, aircraft defensive-aids procurement decisions are made in

the knowledge of what elements of the required suite of consolidated FP

measures need to be delivered from the air in terms of systems such as

chaff, flare and electronic countermeasures, but also what can be delivered

from the ground by the RAF Regiment. Furthermore, if a threat is identified

in the proximity of an airfield, it has to be neutralised as quickly as possible

in such a way that the safety of aircraft is not put at risk. The tasking of a

mortar team to take out an insurgent aiming a handheld missile at an air-

craft, for example, needs to take into account that a mortar bomb flying at

10,000 feet across a runway approach is capable of downing a helicopter

or fixed-wing aircraft. In addition, if GDA patrols uncover a threat to the air-

field, they need to communicate with those directing aircraft movements

and directly with aircrew to give them early warning, and vice versa.

The RAF Regiment currently provides six distinct functions.

Force Protection C2 and Integration: Control of the air has to be won

both in the air and on the ground. Therefore, the Force Protection C2 inte-

gration forms the link between air operations, security within the base and

the field squadrons patrolling outside the wire. This is done by co-locating

one of the Corps’ eight FP Wing Headquarters with air operations under

overall command of the airfield commander.

Ground Combat: This is provided by the RAF Regiment’s eight Field

Squadrons, each of which has its own C2, logistics and fire support. The 174

Gunners of the Squadron are responsible for dominating the GDA around

the base through a combination of patrolling, observation and joint fires.

Threats can come in the form of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), small

arms and rocket fire, mortars and man-portable anti-aircraft missiles, as

well as suicide bombers who might try and penetrate the camp.

Another key ground combat role is providing protection for the

Chinook helicopters that ferry the Medical Emergency Response Teams

(MERTS) to evacuate casualties on the ground. Beyond this, the RAFRegiment provides tactical air-control party (TACP) and ground combat

elements in support of Special Forces.

Air-Land Integration: The job of finding targets and directing aircraft

to them is routinely carried out by a Forward Air Controller (FAC). This

arduous and dangerous task requires an understanding of soldiering and

aircraft, and so naturally the RAF Regiment is a breeding ground for these

troops. The Regiment provides around 50 per cent of UK TACPs, including

those for 16 Air Assault and 3 Commando Brigades. TACPs and FACs are

trained at RAF Leeming’s Joint Forward Air Control Training and Standards

Unit ( JFACTSU), under command of a RAF Regiment squadron leader.

CBRN Defence: Airfields are prime targets for attack using Weapons

of Mass Destruction (WMD). Consequently, since the outset of the Cold

War, the RAF has had to invest huge amounts of time and effort in work-

ing out how best to survive an attack and then return to operations as

quickly as possible. This resulted in 1999 in the RAF becoming the Lead

Service for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence.

Hence, when the Joint NBC Regiment (subsequently renamed the Joint

Kandahar Airfield – an FP model

Before the RAF Regiment deployed there in 2005, Kandahar

Airfield (KAF) in Afghanistan was perceived as a garrison

that just happened to have an airfield on it. Although it came

under the overall command of the US forces, it was somewhatschizophrenic, with a US Army Colonel in charge of the

garrison and a US Air Force Colonel in charge of the airfield.

Initially, the area outside the wire was occasionally

patrolled by NATO forces. But after losing men to improvised

explosive device (IED) strikes, their governments took a

political decision to withdraw the external patrols. The

result was that the base came under frequent attack from

the Taliban. After two RAF GR9 Harriers were irreparably

damaged by rocket fire, the decision was made to deploy

an RAF Regiment FP Wg HQ in 2005. On arrival, the small

team took over the command and control of around 750

people – 150 from the RAF and the rest from the multinational

force responsible for general security duties. The results

were immediate. For the first time, everything to do with

the protection of KAF was integrated into a single command

structure. This gave a much clearer situation awareness of

what was happening inside and outside the perimeter.

After reorganising the internal base security, the next

step was to bring in an RAF Field Squadron to create a

Ground Defence Area (GDA) measuing 500 sq km and to

reinstitute a thorough and systematic regimen of GDA

patrolling to deter stand-off attack by insurgents. Having

carried out this task for six years, the RAF Regiment undertook

a phased handover in February/March 2011. The US Army then

took on the responsibility, using the procedures and structures

put in place by the RAF Regiment, which now focuses its

efforts on the FP of Camp Bastion.

Air operations cannot be

separated from the FP operations

that facilitate them – the two

must occur in seamless harmony




CBRN Regiment) was established in 1999, it came under RAF command.

It remained under RAF leadership until it was disbanded on 14 December

2011 as part of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), and

replaced with the Defence CBRN Wing (20 Wing RAF Regiment), based at

RAF Honington and wholly manned by the RAF Regiment.

The Wing includes highly specialist detection, monitoring and decontami-

nation capabilities, including the Sampling and Identification of Biological

Chemical and Radiological Agents (SIBCRA) task. Small teams will go out

to an area where a WMD event has occurred or where it is suspected that

some sort of CBRN weapon is being developed. Once there, they take

samples and bring them back for testing at Porton Down. RAF Regiment

CBRN specialists also provide support to the civil authorities as part of the

UK Nuclear Event Response Organisation (NERO). A further example of the

support to the civil authorities was the RAF Regiment team that was sent

out to Tokyo last year after the Fukushima nuclear emergency in order to

monitor the atmosphere near the British embassy.

RAF FP Training: When new recruits join the RAF and are inducted

either at Cranwell (officers) or Halton (airmen and women), between

40 and 60 per cent of their Phase 1 training is in basic military skills

– weapons, fieldcraft, first aid, CBRN, drill and ceremonial and so on – all

of which is provided by RAF Regiment instructors. Furthermore, follow-

ing initial training, all RAF personnel have to maintain their militaryskills and are, therefore, regularly tested. For example, before airmen can

go on guard duty they have to refresh their weapons skills. Every year

they have to undergo Common Core Skills training when they requalify

their weapons skills, CBRN first aid and other capabilities. Again, this

continued training and testing is provided by the FP Training Flight,

which is located at every RAF station. Before deploying on operations,

all RAF personnel require thorough pre-deployment training; once again,

this is provided by FP training flights.

In all, around 42 per cent of RAF Regiment NCOs, and a large number of

its officers, are employed on FP training tasks – duties that are undertaken

after employment on Field Squadrons.

“Guardians of the Military Soul” of the RAF: Successive Chiefs of

the Air Staff have used this phrase to describe this key function of the

Corps. A lesson that the RAF learned very early on, and reinforced daily in

Afghanistan, is that the defence of an airfield and the response to an attack

are everyone’s business, irrespective of their branch and trade. Thus, the

instilling of a “warfighting spirit” is essential, and the Service looks to its

dismounted close combat specialists in the RAF Regiment to generate and

safeguard this ethos. This warfighting spirit is inculcated from the outset in

regular FP training for all personnel; the RAF Regiment is also tasked with

the RAF’s formal ceremonial tasks, including Public Duties – principally

through the Queen’s Colour Squadron (dual-roled as a field squadron).

The provision of all these tasks makes the RAF Regiment an indispensably

effective and efficient arm within the RAF and for Defence – confirmed

once again most recently by the SDSR. ■

For further details on the impact of the SDSR on the RAF Regiment, see

the RDS interview with Air Commodore Russell La Forte on page 92

The RAF learned early on thatthe defence of an airf ield is

everyone’s business, irrespective

of their branch and trade

An RAF Regiment gunner

provides force protection

to Army colleagues during

a casualty evacuation



2012

RUSI,

futuremaritime operationsconference 2012

www.rusi.org/maritimeconference

Prestigious Sponsor Invitations

Chesney Gold

Medal

RUSI Medal for

Military Literature

RUSI Annual Essay

Prize

Michael Rose, Executive Director, RUSI

|

www.rusi.org/awards




In the 20th century, air and then space power provided an asymmetric

edge over adversaries. In the 21st century, militaries face “uncertain

superiority in an age of information”1. The rise of mobile technology

and social media, coupled with the desire by nation states to undermine

Western military superiority through asymmetric means, has given cyber

an increasing importance.

The RAF was an ‘early adopter’ of cyber-capabilities, following in the foot-

steps of the United States Air Force. In 2010, ahead of the publication of

the UK’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), Air Chief Marshal

Sir Stephen Dalton made several speeches highlighting the RAF’s ability to

operate in air, space and cyberspace2. Some saw it as a land grab at a time

when cyber-security was becoming trendy within government (and when

cuts across defence were imminent). However, others recognised that the

RAF was already making a significant contribution in this area. Indeed, it

was one of the first services to war-game the effects of cyber on future

operations. Today, some 75 per cent of all manpower in Corsham, the

MoD’s Information Systems and Services hub, comes from the RAF, which

also maintains a team of cyber-experts in its Air Warfare Centre.

Securing the Fifth Environment: the

RAF and the Importance of CyberRUSI’s Elizabeth Quintana examines the development of cyber-capabilities within the Royal Air Force (RAF)

and looks at some of the high-tech threats that the service may face from adversaries in cyberspace

Since the publication of the SDSR, cyber has indeed become more of

a departmental effort. The new Joint Forces Command, which will stand

up in April, is likely to take ownership of both cyber and other C4ISTAR

capabilities across the department and will provide a cadre of information

specialists. Individual services will still use, and be affected by, cyberspace

in different ways.

Cyber-operations have an impact on every part of defence, with three

main applications:

Cyber-defence■ The requirement to protect all computers and

information systems from the effects of a direct cyber-attack, cyber-

espionage or malware that may have been intentionally or uninten-

tionally downloaded.

Cyber-situational awareness (intelligence or espionage)■ Using

the internet or other means to gain access to information stored

on computers, servers or other information storage devices. It

may also refer to the data mining and exploitation of information

that is already available on the internet, which may provide an

additional intelligence collection tool. The information can then be




verified against other information feeds. Finally, it may provide a

cost-effective and anonymous form of communication with locals or

informants in difficult parts of the world.

Cyber-attack■ The use of the internet or other communications net-

works to tamper with information stored on a device, interfere withthe device’s ability to function, or cause it to self-destruct. Stuxnet,

which was a virus designed to target the control systems of the

Iranian nuclear programme, is probably the most famous example.

The RAF was among the first services to ‘mainstream’ cyber, to ensure

its personnel was aware of the opportunities and the risks that cyberspace

posed. Taking these three areas in turn, we can examine what they might

mean for air forces and give some examples of how they have been used

by the RAF and other air forces in recent years.

Cyber-defence

Military organisations, like any other user of commercially available soft-

ware, can be affected by malware. In 2009, for example, the Conficker

worm was found across a number of military networks and temporarily

grounded French Navy aircraft. Militaries are also facing a growing num-

ber of direct attacks to their networks from hacktivists or state actors: in

2010, former deputy defense secretary William Lynn exposed a particularly

vicious attack against US military CIS systems that took place in 2008 at

the instigation of a foreign spy agency3, while in the UK the Ministry of

Defence (MoD) foiled more than 1,000 attacks from criminals and foreign

intelligence agencies in 2011. Many of these threats can be minimised by

educating personnel in ‘cyber-hygiene’, for example understanding how to

spot a suspicious email and minimising the amount of information freely

available on the web through Facebook or LinkedIn. The RAF has had a

training scheme in place for a number of years to raise awareness.

The RAF has always been a very information-rich service, producing,

analysing and disseminating large amounts of ISTAR data, so the require-

ment for cyber-defence spans all areas. Layered defence is important in

such a fast-moving environment and the RAF is exploiting a wide range of

expertise to solve the problem. The RAF Police has been asked to apply its

security expertise, and the RAF Regiment its understanding of force protec-

tion; intelligence officers know how to rapidly develop an understanding of

the threat, and CIS experts provide the technical expertise. The MoD is also

investigating the future role of the reserve force, and certainly this is an

area where sponsored reserves might provide valuable expertise.

Cyber-defence will also become important in new ways as the service

relies more on networked synthetic trainers, which could be a great source

of intelligence and an attractive target for those with malicious intent.

Remotely Piloted Aircraft are also likely to continue to rely on satellite

communications, given the public nervousness about fully autonomous

armed aircraft. The downing of the US Sentinel stealth UAV in Iran late last

year was a clear warning that such links represent vulnerabilities, regardless

The RAF was an ‘early adopter’

of cyber-capabilities, following in

the footsteps of the US Air Force

of whether the aircraft was lost through a technical fault or whether the

Iranians managed to hack into the link and redirect the aircraft down on to

Iranian soil, as they claim.

Cyber situational awarenessMilitary intelligence officers now look to exploit ‘all source intelligence’, rec-

ognising that some open-source information, such as the internet or news

media, can be as accurate as classified military intelligence. The publication

of Cyber Dawn: Libya, which aimed to gather all open source information

on Libya’s ICT structure and vulnerability to cyber-attack, is one example4.

Verifying the accuracy of the open-source material remains a challenge and

it is often only used if it can be backed up by a more credible source.

NATO’s Operation Unified Protector over Libya was perhaps the first

operation to exploit social media and was driven in some ways by the lack

of ground troops. Jordanian intelligence officers were monitoring social

media networks on behalf of NATO to gather strategic trends, while British

Intelligence Officers used social media to directly communicate with trusted

contacts in the country. Such information was fused with other sources of

intelligence to gain a richer picture of events as they unfolded. News media

and other material gathered online also enabled NATO to gain some basic

battle-damage assessment on targets that they had hit and provided some

feedback from locals about the effectiveness of the campaign.

Cyber-attack

This is perhaps the most controversial use of cyberspace by the military

and is where much of the government’s new MoD funding was focused.

While much of the focus is on ‘cyber-weapons’ delivered via the internet,

existing technologies also produce ‘cyber-effects’ and can be delivered by

air. Classic electronic warfare or high-power microwaves (directed energy

weapons) can disrupt or interfere with electronic equipment. The RAFalready has, or has signalled interest in obtaining, both technologies.

In 2007, Israeli aircraft attacked a Syrian facility that they claimed was

developing nuclear weapons. The Syrian Air Defences were allegedly fooled

by software the Israelis planted on the Syrian system and did not spot the

incursion. Given that many European nations (including the UK) have given

up SEAD capabilities, cyber has been suggested as an interim solution.

However, with all forms of cyber-attack capabilities, there is a need to

develop cyber-battle damage assessment in order to analyse the effective-

ness of the attack, and both the RAF and USAF are investigating different

ways to achieve this. Understanding the second-order effects of an attack

and being able to look for them will be key.

Cyber-security and cyber-operations will inevitably be a feature of the

future operating environment. While this capability will be developed

through a joint organisation, there are specific applications for each of

the services, and the RAF has established expertise in a number of fields.

This is, however, a relatively new capability and a layered, multidisciplinary

approach will be essential to maximise the benefits of both. ■




The effectiveness of the Talisman counter-improvised explosive

device (C-IED) capability with UK Armed Forces serves to illustrate

the emergence of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) component

of such systems, epitomised by the Honeywell T-Hawk UAV. The reliance

on drones, with their ability to provide rapid, actionable intelligence in

locating IEDs, is integral to operations in Afghanistan.

Task Force ODIN in Afghanistan

Airborne surveillance has been vital to US C-IED operations for some

years. It is exemplified by Task Force (TF) ODIN (Observe, Detect, Identify

and Neutralise), which has been the benchmark for the conduct of

Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting and Acquisition (RSTA) C-IED

operations since its inception in 2006. Initially set up to eliminate road-

side bombs in Iraq, ODIN was reconfigured for Afghanistan, where it

searches for IEDs by patrolling major roads and supply routes. Attached to

the 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade as part of Task Force Falcon, Task Force

ODIN-Afghanistan (TF ODIN-A) operates joint manned and unmanned

missions, and coordinates with ground forces to neutralise targets, as

well as provide warning of enemy activity, including the planting of IEDs.

Integral to TF ODIN-A is Sky Warrior (Predator/I-Gnat derivative)

– the extended-range, multipurpose UAV that is manufactured by

UAVs and the Counter-IED Campaign Avnish Patel, military sciences project manager at RUSI, assesses a selection of the latest unmanned

aerial vehicle counter-improvised explosive device technology

General Atomics. It provides a constant Intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance (ISR) capability, via its electro-optical/infrared or syn-

thetic aperture radar payloads, and carries both laser range-finder desig-

nators and laser target markers.

While featuring an arsenal of up to four AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, its

main utility is to capture full-motion video to provide division command-

ers with instant, actionable intelligence, as well to as provide troops with

knowledge and an awareness of the terrain around them. Sky Warrior

can also engage the enemy with its Hellfire missiles.

The US is funding programmes to

develop both small, autonomous,runway-independent and rotary-

wing UAVs to detect IEDs

A rail-launched Bat UAV

prepares for launch




The Sand Dragon programme

Building on the success of ODIN, the US is funding new programmes

to develop both small, autonomous, runway-independent and rotary-

wing UAVs to detect IEDs. Possessing high-definition, electro-optical

sensors and able to detect unintentional electromagnetic emissions, thisnew generation of UAVs is being designed as part of overall convoy and

route-patrol protection, flying in advance to monitor roads and tracks.

The Sand Dragon Tier II UAV for the Route Surveillance Programme is

a US Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) initiative to develop innova-

tive technologies and integrate new unmanned systems for operating

in an irregular warfare environment. In particular, there is a need for

a medium-altitude, long-endurance small tactical UAV that is runway

independent (rail-launched and net-recovered), equipped with a heavy

fuel engine ( JP-5/JP-8) with a minimum of 45lb/500W sensor payload,

and command and control via a ground station.

At the time of writing, the AFRL at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base had

awarded contracts totalling $44.74 million to ChandlerMay ($16.4 mil-

lion in 2010; $2.14 million in 2011) and Northrop Grumman Aerospace

Systems ($26.2 million in August 2011) to develop and deploy UAVs with

C-IED capabilities. ChandlerMay’s contribution is the Fury UAV, which is

capable of flying C-IED missions lasting up to 24 hours at a time, fitted

with a dual-band radar and electro-optical sensor.

It can also support missions during which radar, visual, infrared and

acoustic detection is to be avoided1. Northrop Grumman’s contribution

to the Sand Dragon Programme covers the fully autonomous Bat 12 UAV,

which can be configured with differently sized fuel tanks and sensor

payloads to conduct ISR operations, as well as target acquisition and

communications relay2.

Rotary-wing UAVsThe addition of rotary-wing UAVs with enhanced sensors and imaging sys-

tems into the C-IED inventory is a development that points towards future

trends. The Northrop Grumman-developed Airborne Surveillance, Target

Acquisition and Minefield Detection System (ASTAMIDS) demonstrated in

late 2010 that it could detect simulated IEDs in a US Army evaluation when

flown on an MQ-8B Fire Scout UAV3. The ASTAMIDS system is a lightweight,

multi-capability (multi-spectral, electro-optical and infrared imaging) sen-

sor that would provide reconnaissance, surveillance and target-acquisition

capabilities via laser-guided munitions.

Three remotely piloted Boeing A160 Hummingbird rotary-wing UAVs,

equipped with the Autonomous Real-Time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance-

Imaging System (ARGUS-IS), are due to be deployed in Afghanistan in May

or June this year4. The Hummingbird has endurance in excess of 20 hours,

carrying a payload of more than 300lbs, and will fly at an estimated top

speed of 140 knots at a ceiling of 30,000 feet, as well as having unprec-

edented hovering capabilities5.

The BAE Systems’ designed ARGUS-IS was developed for the US DARPA

(Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) organisation for $18.5

million and the technology was based on a 1.8 gigapixel camera that can

provide real-time video streams at the rate of 10 frames a second – suf-

ficient to track people and vehicles from altitudes of more than 20,000

feet, across 65 square miles6.

Operators on the ground have access to 65 ‘Predator-class’ steerable

video streams that can be operated independently of the others, either

providing continuous imagery of a fixed area on the ground or being

designated to keep a specified target in the window automatically.

Additionally, these targets can be tracked even if they are all moving in

different directions7.

Future trends will see the development of capabilities such as texture-

recognition systems, with the ability to determine whether soil has been

recently turned in order to locate where IEDs may have been buried. There

is a continuing need to develop, procure and deploy new capabilities.

Certainly, the Joint IED Defeat Organisation ( JIEDDO), among others, wantsto tap into industry research and development, and harness innovative

C-IED capabilities that are able to counter the evolving IED threat and take

into account the latest technical and tactical trends in the field. ■

Boeing’s A160 Hummingbird

is expected to deploy to

Afghanistan during 2012



DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES SEA

Traditionally, the Royal Navy has been a global leader among

navies in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). From the North to the

South Atlantic, as well as much further afield, the operational

fruits of the Royal Navy’s decades of labour and investment in the ASW

skills, capability and ethos required to be, perhaps, the world’s state-of-

the-art ASW force, have been borne out clearly.

However, three trends highlight a potential growth in the gap between

the UK’s ASW requirement and the Royal Navy’s capability:

First, operational trends have required navies to broaden the roles under-

taken by their ships and submarines; in the case of ASW, the Royal Navy’s

fleet of nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines (SSNs), which spent

the Cold War hunting Soviet submarines and surface ships in the North

Atlantic, now occupies a much greater proportion of its time inserting spe-

cial forces, gathering intelligence from the strategic to tactical levels and

firing Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles ashore.

Second, the demise of the Soviet (now Russian) Navy at the end of the

Cold War, coupled with – as yet – no other navy emerging to fill the gap as

a traditional maritime rival, meant that the requirement to conduct ASW

in its traditional sense was, for a while, much reduced. Third, as a direct

result of these first two trends, since the 1990s there has been a relatively

reduced level of financial investment in ASW as a capability.

Danger from Below Dr Lee Willett, RUSI’s head of maritime studies, considers whether the Royal Navy is in danger

of relinquishing its global leadership status in the complex art of Anti-Submarine Warfare

In both relative and absolute terms, the Royal Navy remains one of the

most capable ASW navies in the world. Today, its Type 23 Duke-class ASW

frigates, its EH-101 Merlin Mk 1 and Lynx Mark 8 surveillance helicopters,

and its Trafalgar- and Astute-class SSNs weave together to provide a lay-

ered ASW capability for the UK. At some point in the future, these layers

will be strengthened further when the Type 26 frigate arrives, replacing the

Type 23s and bringing a significant step up in ASW capability – and, it is

hoped, the same number of platforms. However, strategic, operational and

capability overstretch, when coupled with ongoing financial challenges,

Many countries are investing in

submarines, which help nationsto ‘jump the queue’ in both

naval and national power terms

Not only does the Royal Navy have some of

the world’s most powerful submarines – such

as HMS Astute – but, for the time being at

least, it is also expert at hunting them down




arguably have caused a lower level of investment and practice in ASW

capability. Moreover, with the withdrawal of the Nimrod airborne surveil-

lance capability under the October 2010 Strategic Defence and Security

Review (SDSR), the UK’s national ASW capability is arguably weaker overall,

as Nimrod provided the surveillance glue that bound other layers together.More broadly, the unstable international balance mandates the

enduring global need for major navies to maintain presence, conduct

engagement and capacity-building, and carry out a range of operations

in support of international stability, as and where required. The forward-

deploying of such navies requires sea control, access and logistics

support, as well as the ability to keep open critical sea lines of communi-

cation and choke points through which the world’s maritime trade flows.

Conversely, such control, access and support can be put at risk by the

possible presence of a submarine.

Growth in global submarine capability

Submarines remain a fundamental tool for increasing both naval and

national power. Large numbers of countries around the world are investing

in both conventional and nuclear-powered submarines, which help nations

to ‘jump the queue’ in both naval and national power terms, to use the

words of Dr Andrew Davies.

This advantage applies to both navies with emerging submarine capa-

bilities and also to traditionally more powerful navies. In the Kosovo crisis,

Western naval forces in the Adriatic kept a close eye on the single Serb

Sava-class diesel-electric (SSK) submarine – even though it never left

port. Moreover, during the United Nations-led intervention in East Timor,

‘aggressive probing’ from Indonesian submarines presented a significant

operational challenge. More recently, Iran’s decision to move its main

submarine base from Bandar Abbas to Jask, at the mouth of the Straits of

Hormuz, underlines the strategic utility of submarines to threaten Westernassumptions of superiority in sea control and access.

In the case of more established navies, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir

Putin built what can be seen as a minor renaissance of Russian global

military power around his navy and, in particular, its submarine force. The

US is increasingly focused on China’s military expansion, and the security

questions this raises for the West. Yet, rather than any potential US-China

hostilities emerging over issues in the Western Pacific – risks that have

prompted the Chinese Navy to begin to develop significant anti-access

capabilities – perhaps more immediate risk can be found in the increasing

Chinese presence elsewhere around the world today. One of China’s earliest

deployments into the Indian Ocean to support the international counter-

piracy operation, in 2009, saw reports of its task group being followed into

the Gulf of Aden by an Indian Kilo-class submarine. It should be noted, too,

that each of the ‘BRIC Bloc’ navies – Brazil, Russia, India and China – either

have already, or aspire to operate, nuclear-powered submarine fleets, with

India aspiring also to join Russia and China in basing a proportion of its

nuclear deterrent on its submarines.

Future technological developments that can augment, optimise and

maximise the contribution of underwater battlespace to defence and

security operations include improvements in propulsion for SSKs, the

use of unmanned systems – including offboard capabilities – for both

SSKs and SSNs, sound quieting, the enduring relevance of subsurface

land-attack and covert force-insertion requirements, the use of flexible

payload options, and the increasing importance and capabilities of

submarines themselves.

Nuclear power continues to be both an aspiration and an option for some

submarine forces, not just because of the political and military power

offered by the ability to remain submerged indefinitely, but also because

of the need to overcome the tyranny of distance as many navies seek to

operate more widely around the world.

However, perhaps the key issues are the overall strategic importance

that submarines continue to offer many nations – especially given the

unique flexibility, capability and operational output they can generate –and the risks to which navies expose themselves if ASW becomes a lost

art. In addition, it is worth noting that as the US now faces strategic and

budgetary challenges of its own and may look for other navies to carry

a greater share of the international maritime security burden, there may

be a risk that a reduction in Royal Navy ASW capability – often a

particular niche provided to coalition operations by the UK – will see

the UK’s overall operational influence decline. ■

HMS Monmouth , one of the

Royal Navy’s 13 Duke-class

Type 23 frigates, is at the

forefront of Anti-Submarine

Warfare capabilities




T he ‘Baggers’ – Royal Navy Sea King

Mk 7 Airborne Surveillance andControl (SKASaC) helicoptersThe Sea King Mk 7 has already proved its worth during the course of three campaigns and has

introduced new capabilities to UK Defence. Simon Michell reveals the utility of the helicopter

and highlights the crucial contribution that it has made in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya

A Royal Navy Sea King

Mk 7 on the flight

line at Camp Bastion,

Afghanistan, with an RAF

Chinook (CH-47) flying

past in the background




Licence-built by AgustaWestland in Yeovil, the Sea King is based on

the ubiquitous Sikorsky S-61 helicopter. The current Royal Navy fleet

of Sea Kings comprises three variants – each with a specific role. The

green Mk 4s, known as ‘Junglies’, are primarily troop-transport helicopters;

the red and grey Mk 5s are used for search and rescue and, until 2003, thegrey Mk 7 Airborne Surveillance and Control helicopters’ main task was to

defend ships from low-flying aircraft and missiles by detecting them and

then directing additional assets to destroy them.

The Mk 7 ‘Baggers’ – aptly named to describe the large, grey bucket

radome that hangs off the right-hand side, in which the Thales Searchwater

2000 radar system is housed – were converted from the Airborne Early

Warning Mk 2 variant by AgustaWestland (then GKN Westland) with Racal

Radar Defence Systems (now part of Thales UK) as prime contractor at an

original contract value of $155 million under the Cerberus Mission System

Update1. The first Mk 7 conversions were delivered in 2002, with a further

eight completed by 2004. Once the upgraded aircraft re-entered service,

they introduced a step change in terms of Royal Navy ISTAR (Intelligence

Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) capability.

In essence, the Mk 7 became the first advanced surveillance and control

helicopter in the world, able to undertake missions that, prior to its intro-

duction, had usually been assigned to much larger, fixed-wing aircraft. The

combination of the mission system computer, the pulse-Doppler radar,

the Rockwell Collins Joint Tactical Information Distribution Systems Link

16 ( JTIDS Link 16) terminal, secure voice communications and inertial/

GPS navigation systems enabled the helicopter to transform itself from a

‘one-trick pony’ (airborne early warning) to a multi-functional ISTAR asset

capable of tracking ground targets through the use of its Ground Moving

Target Indicator capability and then linking these data feeds to other assets

either on the ground, at sea or in the air.

Their first operational use took place in the run up to 3 Commando

Brigade’s amphibious assault on the Al Faw peninsula during the second

Gulf War. For three weeks prior to the assault, the Mk 7s flew missions off

HMS Ark Royal around the area, in order to gain a ‘pattern of life’ picture

on the ground. During the actual attack, they then went on to identify and

locate threats on the ground and link the data directly to the Royal Marines2.

The successful employment of the Mk 7s in Iraq effectively resulted in a

new line of business for the Royal Navy’s 849 Squadron, which was subse-

quently split into 854 and 857 Naval Air Squadrons in 2006.

After Iraq, the Mk 7s were deployed to landlocked Afghanistan in May

2009 with NAS 854 and 857, where they are still operating out of Camp

Bastion, having completed their 1,000th mission in July 2011. Since arriving

in theatre, they have played a key role in the campaign against improvised

explosive devices (IEDs) and drug runners, once again by creating a ‘pattern

of life’ picture and looking for the abnormal – people and vehicles avoiding

normal tracks and roads, moving at night or diverting around checkpoints.

Since arriving in theatre, the

MK 7s have played a key role in

the campaign against improvised

explosive devices and drugs

With a typical mission lasting up to three-and-a-half hours, and with

crews often flying twice a day, the radar is switched on within five minutes

of being airborne and it remains in operation until touchdown. Everything

within its range is recorded for later analysis back at base. A particular

benefit of having a trained data analyst on board the helicopter as anobserver is that the mission system and radar can be re-tasked in the air at

a moment’s notice, delivering significant flexibility3.

In 2011, yet another operational role was found for the ‘Baggers’: this

time the support of five British Army Air Corps’ Apache attack helicopters

based on HMS Ocean, off Libya. During Operation ELLAMY, the British ele-

ment of the UN-mandated Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, Mk 7s were

used not only to supply ISTAR situational awareness and force protection

to the multinational ships off the coast of Libya, but also to prepare ingress

and egress routes for the Apaches to enable them to safely engage targets

ashore. This could perhaps be seen as the introduction of a new capability

to UK Defence – that of attack-helicopter strike from the sea.

With all of the Sea Kings nearing the end of their service lives, and with

the acceptance in the Strategic Defence and Security Review that the

Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers will be completed and at least one

of them routinely operated, there has never been a greater need for the

Mk 7 capability. The Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control require-

ment remains as clear as ever. Although not all of this will necessarily

be delivered by manned aircraft, there remains a robust case for a Mk 7

replacement, via the Merlin helicopter.

In July 2010, AgustaWestland and Thales showcased an enhanced ASaC

capability at Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton, during the Fleet Air Arm’s

annual Air Day. The two companies unveiled a potential successor that

deploys a palletised Searchwater radar through the rear ramp aperture,

which can then be stowed in the cabin when it is not in use. According to

Nick Whitney, senior vice-president of the UK Government Business Unitat AgustaWestland, the replacement system represents a “cost-effective

and low-risk capability” that builds on the substantial investment that

has already been made in the system. ■

The Royal Navy ASAC Sea King

Mk 7 helicopters are playing

a vital role in the ongoing

campaign against IEDs




As one of the world’s premier think tanks, RUSI has within its

ranks informed policymakers, strategists, military personnel,

academicians, industry representatives and the informed pub-

lic, all of whom can turn their attention to issues of importance – not

just to the UK, but also to Europe and the world at large. Now, fully 180

years after the Duke of Wellington founded RUSI in 1831, the institution

continues to drive the focus on cutting-edge issues through its publica-

tions, as well as through its diverse series of professional conferences.

Nowhere is this more telling than in RUSI’s Missile Defence Conference

series. There are many reasons for this. Firstly, because RUSI identified mis-

sile defence as a critical issue over a decade ago and made the decision to

convene an ongoing series of conferences to maintain focus on this issue

– not as a one-time event, but as an annual gathering that has built up a

critical mass of informed discussion.

Secondly, as missile defence – and especially Ballistic Missile Defence

(BMD) – has become such an enormous challenge for Europe, and the

world, RUSI has gathered prominent experts in this field to highlight the

issue, and to begin to search for multilateral solutions upon which nations

and militaries can agree. By gathering those at the very top of numerous

communities of interest to challenge conference participants to open up

their individual apertures, it becomes possible to look for collective solu-

tions to bedevilling challenges.

RUSI Leads the Way on

Ballistic Missile DefenceCaptain George V Galdorisi, USN (Retd), director of the Corporate Strategy Group at the US Space and

Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific, reviews RUSI’s 12th annual Missile Defence Conference, while

drawing attention to some of the most pressing international ballistic missile threats

The 12th RUSI Missile Defence Conference, held in June 2011, was, argu-

ably, a classic in its field and placed an emphasis not only on the impor-

tance of missile defence, but also on the extent to which this singular

issue has the attention of top political, military, industry and other leaders.

The bar has been set high. Leading the discussion were, among others,

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO secretary general; Lieutenant General

Patrick O’Reilly, director, United States Missile Defense Agency; Ambassador

Dmitry Rogozin, permanent representative of Russia to NATO and special

envoy of the president of Russia for interaction with NATO on missile

defence; Dr James Miller, principal deputy under secretary of defense for

policy, US Department of Defense; Roberto Zadra, deputy head, WMD Non-

Proliferation Centre, NATO Headquarters; and Ellen Tauscher, the under

secretary for arms control and international security, US Department of State.

Diverse views on addressing the challenges

At some conferences there is ‘group think’ and a certain amount of ‘preach-

ing to the converted’. However, the diverse group of individuals brought

together for this event, while all generally agreeing that missile defence,

and BMD in particular, was essential, differed – sometimes dramatically –

in the solutions that they proposed to these challenges. Nowhere was this

more apparent than in the panels that convened to deal with subsets of

the missile defence conundrum.

NATO secretary general

Anders Fogh Rasmussen

was among the speakers

at the 12th RUSI Missile

Defence Conference




These panels focused specifically on the following areas:

Setting the Agenda;■

Tectonic Shifts in the Middle East and North Africa – Implications for■

Missile Defence;

European Contributions to NATO Territorial Defence;■

NATO’s New Strategic Concept and Missile Defence Cooperation■

with Russia;

Capabilities and Operational Developments;■

Integrating United States PAA Systems with NATO ALTBMD for■

Territorial Defence;

Missile Defence, New START for Arms Control■

While a one-line panel title cannot begin to capture the essence of the

discussion of the senior panel participants, they do, nevertheless, help to

define the depth and breadth of the issues surrounding missile defence.

The lively – and often heated – discussions during each panel spoke vol-

umes about the importance of the issue of missile defence.

Emerging threats from BMD

While not the sole theme of the conference, BMD was the core topic. This

was exemplified in NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s key-

note address. Rasmussen defined the challenge in a compelling fashion.

The need for effective BMD has increased in the 21st century; in 2012, more

than 30 countries have deployed ballistic missiles, compared with only

nine in 1972. Potential enemies possess ballistic missiles and Weapons of

Mass Destruction (WMD), and today’s rogue leaders view WMD as weap-

ons of choice, not of last resort. In the last year for which complete records

are available, potential adversaries launched 120 ballistic missiles in tests

and demonstrations. These ballistic missile launchings, especially in the

short- to intermediate-range category, were particularly pronounced in thePeople’s Republic of China, North Korea and Iran.

The broadened ballistic missile threat, moreover, crosses the strategic-,

operational- and tactical-level boundaries. Since their inception in the late

1980s, the main driver of current BMD systems has been the threat posed

by rogue nations, such as Iran and North Korea. Today, it is Iran’s organic

missile development that poses perhaps the most immediate, technically

developed threat to NATO and European interests. Iranian firings have con-

tinued, with several mid-range ballistic missiles launched during the past

several years. In 2011, Tehran launched numerous ballistic missiles during

its ‘Great Prophet’ exercise. As Rasmussen pointed out, some of these mis-

siles were capable of striking European nations.

The threat from Iran’s ballistic missile development takes on a new

urgency when juxtaposed with that nation’s WMD programme. Leon

Panetta warned in 2010, when he was director of the CIA, that in a

mere two years, Iran would be able to threaten other nation states with

nuclear warheads mounted on ballistic missiles. Likewise, the US Defense

Intelligence Agency has reported that by 2015, Iran could field a WMD-

armed Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the US1.

Coupled with its determination to acquire WMD, Iran’s missiles pose the

gravest immediate threat to Europe2.

Ballistic missile threat planning at both the regional and strategic level

must also take into account North Korea, which has already conducted

a nuclear weapon test. North Korea possesses a growing ballistic missile

force that includes the short-range Scud C, medium-range No Dong and

intermediate-range Taepo Dong 1 missiles, some of which have also been

transferred to other nations. South Korean defence minister, Kim Kwan-

jin, told his country’s parliament in June 2011 that North Korea may have

already developed nuclear warheads small enough for ballistic missile

RUSI will continue to lead in

focusing international attentionon the challenges of BMD

payloads. Also in 2011, former US defense secretary Robert Gates said

that North Korea’s missiles and nuclear weapons will pose a threat to the

United States within five years3. Far from being a ‘distant threat’ to Europe,

North Korea’s practice of exporting military technology could readily place

its technologies in the hands of other rogue nations or terrorist groups.

C2 interoperability is the goal

As the delegates to the 12th RUSI Missile Defence conference were often

reminded, at the end of the day, sovereign interdependence and interop-

erability will remain core attributes of any collective BMD enterprise.

Indeed, many speakers noted, the Aegis BMD system will form the basis

of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to ballistic missile

defence, and long-term integration with NATO’s Active Layered Theatre

Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme is the ultimate goal. To

this end, the NATO ALTBMD has been tested to demonstrate Shared

Situational Awareness with the US Command, Control, Battle Management

and Communications (C2BMC) system, with the ultimate goal of true C2

interoperability. The 28 NATO allies are in the process of deciding whether

to connect the European/NATO short- and medium-range theatre missile

defence systems to the US long-range missile defence system. According toAllied officials, this move would only cost €200 million ($260 million)4.

RUSI will continue to lead the way in focusing international attention on

the challenges of ballistic missile defence and, in so doing, will ensure that

this compelling issue continues to receive the focused attention it so richly

deserves. To do anything less is not in RUSI’s character or charter.■



DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES SE A

Better Submarine In-Service Support Martin Burns, submarine engineering support manager at Babcock, looks at the latest developments

in the joint Ministry of Defence/industry approach to submarine support under the Submarine

Engineering Support Contract, to ensure alignment with the wider maritime change programme

When the Submarine Engineering Support Contract (SESC)

was awarded to Babcock in 2009, it heralded a shift in

culture in the complex field of submarine support, moving

from the traditional, rigidly defined scope and distinct customer/supplier

relationship, to one of partnering at a new level, with an integrated joint

Ministry of Defence (MoD)/industry team approach. Now, two years into

the 10-year contract, fresh advances have been made in establishing and

implementing a development strategy to improve joint effectiveness in

the delivery of submarine in-service support over the next two years.

SESC is performance-based, rather than volume-driven, and provides

support for in-service design and engineering technical services to the

entire Royal Naval submarine flotilla, through Babcock’s Submarine

Support Management Group (SSMG). This group is an industry team with

Babcock as prime contractor, supported by the BMT Group and SEA, and

working with the MoD’s In-Service Submarines project team (ISM PT).

SESC has always been seen as an enabler to driving cost reduction and

efficiencies within the submarine support enterprise. Furthermore, it was

always recognised that SESC would need to evolve across its 10-year dura-

tion to meet the challenges of the evolving submarine enterprise. This is

now being achieved. Over the first two years of the contract, some impor-

tant steps forward have been seen in implementing the vision of co-located

joint team working, enabling the move from transactional to relational,

including developing joint team members’ relationships along partnering

lines. In a further important step forward, plans are in place and are being

implemented to take SESC to the next stage.

A team has been established to drive this, via a change-management

programme, to effect the transition to the next stage. Importantly, given

the potential size of the programme and the limited resources available, the

SESC joint steering group has established controls to manage the change

programme, allowing the available resources to be prioritised, in order

to support the most strategically important and beneficial changes, while

maintaining the day-to-day output in supporting the submarine flotilla.

The overriding vision is to establish clear links between the work that

is undertaken and the results achieved, to ensure value for money and

correct prioritisation. Equally, it is about delivering integrated planning

and streamlined processes to drive efficiencies, and marshalling scarce

submarine Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP) to sustain

the delivery of safe, capable and available platforms. Further, the vision

includes supporting implementation of Flotilla Output Management (FOM);

the initiative to develop improved, collaborative in-service submarine

support, for greater assurance of safety-approved submarine availability, at

reduced cost, on a sustainable and performance-driven basis.

Plans to achieve this have been put in place across a number of areas

or work streams, each with identified goals and priority issues and actions

HMS Trenchant , a hunter-

killer submarine, receives

attention as part of the

Submarine Engineering

Support Contract



DEFENCE CAPABILITY PROGRAMMES SE A

Though there is work to do with regard to defining information-manage-

ment requirements at the enterprise level and wider initiatives across

DE&S, which will provide both opportunities and constraints, there is

a need to define the in-service model within that. It is the intention,

therefore, to create the information-management framework needed forthe effective delivery of day-to-day, in-service support, while setting the

requirement to pull information from future submarines into the in-service

environment. This will include a platform systems design record, joint team

use of a shared working environment, and process workflows providing

a common, single source of project information and records. In turn, this

will enable more effective use of enterprise information, more informed

decision-making, and enhanced safety across the submarine flotilla.

Relationship development is a further key area in terms of taking SESC

forward. With the Submarine Enterprise Performance Programme (SEPP)

(an MoD–industry collaboration with Babcock, BAE Systems and Rolls-

Royce), Babcock’s Terms of Business Agreement (ToBA) with the MoD

(a long-term strategic agreement confirming Babcock as the MoD’s key

support partner in the maritime sector), and FOM all influencing the envi-

ronment in which the joint team operates, there is a need to define a clear

end-state objective; with relationship development and measurement

being key activities. The goal is to build on the joint team shared values

to establish and implement an ongoing process for the development of

joint team roles and working relationships, in accordance with the strategic

direction set by the joint SESC Steering Group.

Linking outputs to costs

Over the first two years of SESC, by working as an integrated joint team,

SSMG and ISM staff have gained a better understanding of each other’s

perspectives, and the joint team now has a better understanding of the

detail of the changes to take forward. The identified initiatives across the

eight work streams, led by the change team, are set to deliver a number of

benefits over the next two years. Many of these, such as delivery of proj-

ects and programmes to agreed milestones, enhanced allocation of joint

SQEP resource, more effective use of enterprise information, and reduced

platform, system and equipment downtime, are in direct correlation to the

FOM programme and blueprint.

Importantly, as the various work streams implement their plans, agreed

process change will become fully embedded to deliver identified benefits.

These include a clear linkage between input costs and submarine outputs

(ensuring that SESC continues to deliver value for money), and robust proj-

ect planning to deliver the right products at the right time. There will also

be a marshalling of the scarce SQEP across the submarine enterprise to

sustain the delivery of safe, capable and available submarines, while also

supporting the implementation of FOM, coherent with wider maritime

change. Building on a successful first two years, SESC is set to improve joint

effectiveness in the delivery of submarine in-service support. ■

to be undertaken. These encompass: a joint In-Service Submarines (ISM)

engineering plan; submarine support process improvement; availability,

reliability and maintainability (AR&M) service improvement; resource man-

agement; governance and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs); joint work-

force planning; relationship development; and information management.

Submarine engineering plan

The joint ISM engineering plan, for instance, aims to develop and imple-

ment processes for the management of an ISM engineering programme

to capture, plan and define resource requirements to deliver the agreed

submarine requirements or outputs. This will facilitate enhanced allocation

of SQEP resources and more informed prioritisation of work, and help to

deliver projects and programmes to schedule.

The submarine support process review will look at ISM processes with

the aim of having effective, coherent and truly end-to-end ISM business

processes in place by 2013. The objective is to integrate and align these with

the processes of other key submarine support stakeholders, with clear MoD

ownership and process-management responsibilities placed with industry

(SSMG). This review also aims to achieve commonality of processes across

submarine support in their interfaces with ISM, as an enabler to enacting

the developing FOM construct for future submarine support arrangements.

This process integration and alignment is expected to result in the more

effective use of SQEP resource with less duplication of effort, improved

end-to-end coherence and standardisation, better use of enterprise infor-

mation, enhanced safety assurance across the flotilla, and an improvement

in the quality of service, in terms of output and timeliness.

Improvements are also being targeted in the AR&M service. The vision

here is to deliver an AR&M service capable of accurately identifying key

cost and availability drivers, analysing the causes and impacts of those

drivers, and providing justified recommendations for their resolution(also enabling transfer of in-service experience into the design and build

programmes). This will clearly be beneficial in enabling informed prioritisa-

tion of equipment improvement, underpinned by a better understanding

of the wider impacts and benefits of addressing individual problems.

Another area being explored is resource management, with a view to

defining and implementing processes for the planning and allocation of

the resource to support joint team delivery of ISM platform engineering

programme requirements. This will involve developing resource allocation

and planning tools, and the development of processes and procedures to

manage the interface between the different resources. It will be led by

a pilot project looking at the Platform Systems Group (PSG) engineering

resource support to ISM. Key benefits will again include the improved

allocation of SQEP resource, the projects and programme delivering to key

milestones, and informed prioritisation of work. As a pilot project, this may

be applied to other submarine project teams, where relevant.

In reviewing governance and KPIs, the goal is to ensure joint team KPIs,

aligned with MoD Joint Business Agreements that balance improvement

projects, sustainability of support and the need to deliver availability and

capability today. This should improve end-to-end coherence and reduce

duplication, enhance safety assurance across the flotilla, and ensure joint

team governance, focused on delivery of safe submarine outputs. A further

area under review is the management of submarine SQEP, with a view to

establishing a singular approach. A joint team would be able to plan best

use of submarine SQEP to meet specific requirements, with the flexibility to

deploy SQEP to cover unplanned shortfalls. This would contribute to ensur-

ing a sustainable SQEP resource to support the submarine programme.

Information management is another important area. While there is

already some common data storage, there is room for further development.

Fresh advances have been made

in establishing and implementinga development strategy to

improve joint effectiveness



DEFENCE R&T

As an element of China’s current air-power capabilities, elec-

tronic warfare (EW) assets appear to be less advanced than

other key People’s Liberation Army (PLA) air-combat systems,

such as weapons and radars. However, the huge resources that have

been devoted to military electronics in China are bearing fruit. Outside

observers can now see two distinct EW competencies emerging within

the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) – with the fielding of ‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’

frontline systems. China also has immense confidence in the domestic

industry it has established to produce and develop the highly sophis-

ticated hardware and software components that modern EW demands.

However, one question remains unanswered: does all of this produce a

combat capability that actually works?

The vast China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) and its

many associated research institutes and manufacturing entities is at the

Electric Dragons – Airborne Electronic Warfare Capabilities in China

China’s airborne electronic warfare (EW) skills development has followed the same path as the rest of its

formidable defence aerospace industry. Starting from a low experience base, Chinese technicians have

bought equipment from overseas, used it, studied it, copied it and then built a version of their own.

Robert Hewson reveals some of the results of this evolutionary capability

core of China’s EW industry. Conversations with CETC officials over the

years have shown that they have a surprisingly deep understanding of

Western EW systems – and how to counter them. China has also gained

immense benefit from its extensive access to Russia’s EW designers and

manufacturers, whose business was sustained by Chinese orders over

the long period when funding from Moscow dried up. Elsewhere, strong

links are maintained with EW specialists in Ukraine – a country that

plays an important part as a supplier of niche military technology, such

as missile-seekers, to China.

China’s modern era of airborne EW systems began with the acquisition

of Sukhoi Su-27SK fighters from Russia in the early 1990s, along with

their associated L-203 Gardenia wing-tip countermeasures pods. Later,

the more advanced L-005 Sorbtsiya jamming system was acquired and

carried by Su-30MKK strike fighters and late-model Su-27s ( J-11A in

The Y-8G, which first flew

in 2004, is believed to be

a heavyweight electronic

countermeasures platform.

It is one of several Chinese

EW and Elint platforms

based on the Y-8 airframe



DEFENCE R&T

PLAAF service). China is now building a developed, indigenised version

of the Su-27 as the multi-role J-11B. These aircraft carry a podded EW sys-

tem that closely resembles the Russian designs, but with several notable

differences. An examination of the systems and subsystems that China

has exhibited publicly shows airborne jammers that may be less power-

ful than their Russian equivalents, but with more modern and modular

designs, based on the efficient integration of line-replaceable units. This

approach should make these systems rapidly adaptable and upgradable

– allowing them to better counter and defeat the threat systems that

China expects to face.

A second key platform in China’s tactical frontline force is the Xian JH-7

and JH-7A – the large, twin-engined strike fighter now emerging as the

PLAAF’s dedicated defence-suppression and electronic-attack aircraft.

JH-7s and upgraded JH-7As have been observed operating with a suite of

large, underwing jamming pods. Judging from their size and configura-

tion, each pod is dedicated to a different frequency range, indicating

that the JH-7A could operate as an escort jammer (with a strike package)

or a stand-alone electronic attack system.The JH-7A has been integrated with a range of dedicated defence sup-

pression weapons, including the YJ-91, China’s version of the Russian

Kh-31P (AS-17 ‘Krypton’) high-speed, anti-radiation missile. A mix of

armed and ‘podded’ JH-7As would make an effective US missile-seeking

aircraft or ‘Wild Weasel’ defence-suppression team.

Strong links are maintained with

specialists in Ukraine – a countrythat plays an important part as

a supplier of niche technology

China’s airborne EW systems will take another step forward once the

enhanced Chengdu J-10B enters service. This much-improved version

of the baseline J-10A will introduce the PLAAF’s first electronic fighter

radar (although it remains unclear whether it is a passive or active array

design). This lays the groundwork for the potential use of such a largeantenna system as an EW emitter. The J-10B also appears to have an

integral EW system unlike any other found on a Chinese fighter, with a

pair of jammers built into underwing hardpoints.

To feed this ‘tactical’ force of EW combat assets, the PLAAF has a modest,

but active, fleet of ‘strategic’ electronic surveillance aircraft, the task of

which is to collect the raw data needed to programme China’s EW-threat

libraries. These aircraft, known as Y-8JB, have been sighted on missions

off the Japanese coast. A wide array of special-missions platforms has

been developed from the venerable Shaanxi Y-8 four-engined turbo-

prop. This includes a number of large, specialist EW platforms, such as

the Y-8CB, Y-8G and others. Unlike the electronic intelligence-gathering

Y-8JBs, these aircraft have a full-spectrum active EW mission and are

part of China’s expanding electronic-attack forces. The modernised and

improved Y-9 platform will soon enter service and will provide a signifi-

cant performance boost for future special-missions platforms.

China’s military planners are well versed in concepts such as net-

enabled and asymmetric warfare. At public events, the PLA had shown

future combat scenarios that demonstrate a tight integration between

its air, land and sea forces, using UAVs, guided weapons and electronic

systems. The EW aspect of these plans is every bit as important as

the kinetic aspect, which has been China’s priority thus far. China has

striven to reach an acceptable (near-peer) level of conventional military

capability with land, sea and air platforms (eg tanks, ships and planes).

Confident that this scenario has been achieved, China’s military planners

will focus on unconventional assets and improved combat support capa-bilities, all of which will call for the further expansion of an offensive EW

force that is already on a solid foundation. ■

Robert Hewson is the editor of Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons and has studied

the Chinese aerospace scene over three decades

The Xian JH-7 strike fighter

is a key PLA electronic

warfare asset and has

taken on a dedicated

electronic attack role with

this jamming pod fit



Northrop Grumman’s approach to integrating the existing sensors,

weapons and Command and Control (C2) tools is transforma-

tional, and comes from decades of battle management, C2 and

system-of-systems integration expertise. The intention was to put into

practice lessons learned from past conflicts, taking advantage of technol-ogy advancements and industry best practices. With the new approach,

the Integrated Air and Missile Defence Battle Command System (IBCS)

will also make C2 – or battle command – a powerful weapon system

that vastly improves the cost-effectiveness of integrated air and missile

defence (IAMD), as well as its capability for delivering situational under-

standing and flexibility for adapting to the spectrum of operations.

Converting lessons observed into lessons learned

The experiences gained from Operation DESERT STORM, Operation

IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM are merely lessons

observed until solutions are made available to address them.

The issues observed from recent conflicts include:

Fewer than one-in-four aircraft have■ proper identification on all

C2 systems;

Unrecognised cruise missiles;■

Spurious attacks;■

Airspace fratricides;■

No ability for collaborative planning.■

The integration of sensors and shooters would have improved these situ-

ations significantly.

Today, our IAMD systems have unique C2 tools that do not communicate

well with each other. Warfighters require an integrated approach to C2, so

they are not inundated with so many tools that there is insufficient time for

effective usage, especially in a highly dynamic threat environment. IAMD is

joined up by its very nature. The tools must allow for collaborative planning

and execution, otherwise significant combat power is lost and the risk of

fratricide or failure to protect friendly forces increases.

IBCS – Integrating

Air and MissileDefence SystemsIn December 2009, the US Army awarded

Northrop Grumman its Integrated Air and Missile

Defence Battle Command System contract to

address myriad Command and Control problems

encountered in recent wars. The programme

objective was to develop a common battlecommand system for various sensors and weapons

to enhance the US Army’s integrated air and

missile defence capability. The company explains

how it met the challenge

Integrating sensors will help create situational understanding that can

mean the difference between life and death. This understanding should

come from all C2 systems having a common understanding of the air

situation – seeing the same ‘truth’ of a Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP).

The SIAP is the product of fused, common, continuous, unambiguous

tracks of all airborne objects in the surveillance area, so that joint military

operations share a single graphical representation of the battlespace. Each

object, whether friendly or a threat, should be represented by a single

symbol on the screen and associated with a single identification. There

should not be a picture for ballistic missiles and a separate picture for

air-breathing airborne objects, and certainly not multiple symbology repre-

senting the same airborne object.

Situational understanding goes beyond situational awareness by

adding the warfighter’s cognitive understanding of the environment.

Unprecedented connectivity and value-added information has to be in the

right form to enable warfighters to take effective and timely action. Making

sure that the system capabilities are intuitively useable for the soldier is

absolutely critical when split-second, life-saving decisions have to be made.


DEFENCE R&T



Design philosophies that ignore the warfighter will result in system limita-

tions that force warfighters to create inefficient workarounds.

In addition, the warfighter needs tailorable decision aides. Decision aides

that are hard-coded into the software during system design and develop-

ment often do not meet the needs of specific situations. The system has

to be scalable and adaptable to the changing threat environment, and the

range of operations from tactical through strategic.

Making use of technology advances and industry best practices

The IAMD components are a mix of newly fielded systems fighting along-

side weapons fielded decades ago. For example, the Patriot missile was

first fielded by NATO during the mid 1980s and is expected to be around

for at least the next 20 years. This creates an integration challenge, since

technology, especially information technology, changes faster than our

procurement systems can keep up with.

One way to integrate two components is to define the interface between

them for sharing data. However, if a third component is added, there is

no guarantee that the three components will share all the same data. In

addition, whenever one of the components changes, the interface is

broken and costly to re-establish. Similarly, sensors and shooters that are

tightly coupled with their own C2 components are a hindrance to complete

integration and achieving full combat power.

The military is not alone in this integration challenge. With no tolerance

for approaches that cannot keep up with competition, the commercial world

concluded the environment in which our tools will operate is always likely to

be heterogeneous. Thus, it uses an open-systems approach embracing this.

83

DEFENCE R&T

The system has to be scalable

and adaptable to the changing

threat environment

The Integrated Air and Missile Defence Battle Command

System (IBCS) produces a distributed Single Integrated

Air Picture (SIAP) among sensors and shooters



Assuming that military operations will also be conducted in a heteroge-

neous environment, the non-proprietary Northrop Grumman approach for

IBCS uses a Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA)-based enterprise

architecture. This is not the software architecture of the components – the

enterprise architecture determines how the heterogeneous componentsinteract. Therefore, the enterprise can persist while individual components

can come and go. In this manner, the Northrop Grumman solution will

have the flexibility to allow for evolving missions, and the technologies for

achieving optimal information access, high performance and affordability

over the system’s life cycle.

While threats evolve and technologies change, the one constant is the

warfighter. Given advancements in technology, the IBCS programme is also

using extraordinary means to ensure that system capabilities are intuitively

usable for time-critical IAMD decisions. The Northrop Grumman IBCS

development team includes a human-computer interaction group of infor-

mation architects, communication scientists, cognitive and experimental

psychologists and graphics developers. IBCS features the user-centred

design philosophy that focuses on the needs, wants and limitations of the

warfighter. It involves prototyping concepts prior to development and vali-

dation testing of the design concepts with actual users.

Making battle command a more affordable, powerful weapon system

With the user-centred design philosophy that validates concepts with

warfighters before the software is built, the IBCS programme significantly

reduces its development costs. IBCS will deliver a more affordable battle

command capability by embracing the principles of modular open systems

to allow competition that drives down costs. In addition, IBCS will lower

system life-cycle costs by streamlining the training required for and main-

tenance of multiple, disparate systems.

By integrating the stovepiped systems in an open systems enterprise

architecture, the IBCS will provide major benefits in terms of performance

and operational flexibility. The IBCS creates a common C2 battle commandframework so warfighters can share the best information from all of the

sensors on the network for the same view of the integrated battlespace.

The system creates standard interfaces to ensure that current and future

systems can be easily incorporated, allowing warfighters to take advantage

of expanded sensor and weapon-system combinations.

In September 2011, IBCS played a key role in the Composite Track Network

Bridging Capability Demonstration that connected sensors and systems

from the US Army and other services for unprecedented real-time data

exchange to form a SIAP. Northrop Grumman’s IBCS track manager mod-

ules passed associated measurement reports from diverse sensors ‘over

the air’, which allowed participating service nodes to create the SIAP.

“This was a remarkable event to establish the foundation for real-time

sharing of extremely accurate information between ships, aircraft and

land-based air defence units for more effective engagement,” said Kelley

Zelickson, Northrop Grumman’s vice-president of air and missile defence

systems. “Northrop Grumman products clearly demonstrated the ability to

allow modular interoperability among disparate systems and networks.”

Northrop Grumman’s innovative approach to IBCS will allow the modu-

larity, scalability and adaptability required for collaborative missions and

dynamic battle execution in an integrated environment. The IBCS not only

maximises the power of existing assets, it is robust and flexible enough to

address emerging threats and the needs of tomorrow. ■


DEFENCE R&T

The US Government’s view of MOSA

Open System

A system that employs modular design, uses widely supported and consensus-based standards for its key interfaces and has been subjected

to successful validation and verification tests to ensure the openness of its key interfaces.

Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA)

MOSA is an

integral part of all

acquisition strategies

to achieve affordable,

evolutionary and

joint combat

capability

Establish enabling environment Ease of change

Reduced total ownership cost

Reduced cycle time

Enabling joint integratedarchitecture and interoperability

Risk mitigation

Employ modular design

Designate key interfaces

Select open standards

Certify conformance

Vision Principles Benefits

Business TechnicalIndicators



DEFENCE R&T

A

ir superiority enables Intelligence, Surveillance, Target

Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), logistics and person-

nel battlespace mobility freedom, and the ability to deliver

weaponry in a rapid manner to any part of the battlefield. Air Vice-

Marshal (then Air Commodore) Stuart Atha, Air Officer Commanding

No 1 Group, Air Command, stated: “We set the condition for success, and

air power has an important role to play. We’re not going to win the will

of the Afghan people through air power alone, but through our actions

and the way we conduct those actions, we can win their support, and

thus make progress.”1 The use of air power in past conflicts set the same

conditions for success, most recently in Libya, in 2011.

Modern air platforms require large logistical footprints (airbases, per-

sonnel, weapons, consumables, operating and technical support) at high

fixed and variable costs, especially of energy. A recent study revealed that

military fuel usage has increased from 0.1 gallons/day/soldier during the

Second World War to 22 gallons/day/soldier in Afghanistan. When con-

sidering the associated supply chain, logistics, casualties and security,

the fully burdened cost of energy at the battlefield point of use can be

greater than the original purchase cost. Energy security, peak oil, fuel

Delivering Sustainable Air PowerGroup Captain Maurice Dixon, from the Royal Air Force, outlines the reasons why air power sustainability

is important and explains the steps being taken by the RAF to ensure that its bases, aircraft, equipment

and personnel are all playing their part in helping to achieve a smaller carbon footprint

shortage from the lack of availability, conflict (such as the current tensions

with Iran) and cost concerns in coming decades have focused militaries on

reducing their dependency on fossil fuels. The US Department of Defense

(DoD) has been advised to become independent of petroleum fuels for

all of its systems by 2040.

Unsustainable approach

Shrinking military budgets, increasing environmental legislation and

greater scarcity of critical resources make modern air power’s current

approach unsustainable. In 2010-11, RAF stations consumed more than one

billion kWh of energy, costing £51 million and emitting more than 345,000

tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2). They used three million litres of water and

produced 36,500 tonnes of waste. UK military aviation2 consumed 792 mil-

lion litres of fuel – costing £370 million and producing two million tonnes

of CO2 – as well as using some 64 per cent of the 1.2 billion litres of Ministry

of Defence (MoD) operational fuel consumed in 2010-11. RAF flying activity

uses 82 per cent of military aviation fuel and accounts for an increasing

percentage of the RAF budget, even more so as fuel prices rise. The wider

application of ‘green’ taxation and government ‘sustainable development’

An RAF Typhoon on a mission

over Libya adds to the UK

military’s aircraft fuel costs of

£370 million in 2011



DEFENCE R&T

targets further drive the consideration of more sustainable options to

provide aviation training and force readiness, logistics support and the

delivery of operational effect on the battlefield.

It is increasingly important to address the future sustainability of deliv-

ering air power, be it logistical, operational or environmental. This article

focuses on environmental sustainability, but will also highlight the military

benefits that this delivers. A recent study conducted by the RAF addressed

six elements of delivering sustainable air power: external factors, decision-

making, airspace, infrastructure, air platforms and people behaviours.

External factors include UK political aspirations for global leadership

in sustainability, the introduction of European Union-wide legislation to

include aviation in carbon-trading schemes, increasing climate change and

the pressure on scarce resources to consume less. The MoD’s proactive

approach to sustainability has already influenced policymakers, enabling

it to fulfil its roles and obligations. Positive engagement with the UK

Government’s sustainability agenda has resulted in recognition of climate

change as a security threat multiplier in national security strategies, has

delivered wind farm-resilient radars, and initiated many energy efficiency

and clean energy projects, saving the MoD millions of pounds. Continued

forward-thinking, innovative sustainability engagement and leadership will

bring further MoD and UK benefits, with low-carbon and lean-resource

sustainable military solutions.

Strategy, force structure and procurement decision-making can deliver

direct and tangible benefits in whole-life cost, as well as in wider sustain-

ability. Procuring energy- and resource-efficient equipment and infrastruc-

ture, lean maintenance support services and training can generate more

effective capability with reduced costs and less impact on the environment.

The myth that ‘going green costs money’ has been countered many times

in the commercial world, and the ‘triple bottom line’ benefits (people,

planet, profits) apply just as much in the military context.

Savings through greater sustainability

However, sustainability investment decisions require a greater understand-

ing of likely whole-life consumables, fuel, disposal and other cost drivers.

Designing equipment to use less material and energy, fewer consumables,

and be reusable or recyclable, while delivering the specified output,

requires a refocus of procurement specifications. As already proven by

innovative Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) organisation project

teams, whole-life sustainability approaches deliver substantial savings

through imaginative contracting. A more flexible MoD financial structure

would further encourage greater sustainable decision-making, particularly

if Resource Department Expenditure Limits (RDEL) and Capital Department

Expenditure Limits (CDEL) could be better coordinated across the budget

boundaries of capability providers and users.

Current air traffic management procedures and the limitations of older

military radars to deal with complex clutter (such as wind farms), result

in suboptimal airspace usage. This leads to extended flight times, reduced

aircraft handling capacity, increased aviation fuel use and cost, and higher

emissions and environmental impact. The MoD is fully engaged with civil

aviation authorities to share airspace use when not required for military

operations. The MoD is also in the vanguard for finding mitigation/adapta-

tion options to radar interference from wind farms, upgrading navigation

UAVs, such as the MQ-9 Reaper,

have a role to play in reducing

the military’s carbon footprint





DEFENCE R&T

and reduced costs and environmental impact: the military triple-bottom-line benefits to people, profit/projected power, and planet.

UASs are routinely used today to deliver munitions and ISTAR on opera-

tions, and remotely piloted helicopters deliver logistics to US Marines in

Afghanistan. Undeniably, many UAS challenges remain, such as the desen-

sitisation of warfare through remote targeting, communications band-

width and lost communications procedures, and civil airspace operations.

Fortunately, UAS developments are rapidly addressing these issues. The

removal of piloted vehicle constraints will no doubt take air power doctrine,

tactics and operational effectiveness to a new level, improving all three sus-

tainable air power requirements (operational, logistical, environmental).

New principles must be embraced

Defence personnel attitude and behaviour is critical to delivering opera-

tionally essential, sustainable air power. The most sustainably defined,

designed and delivered equipment and airbase can be undermined by the

way they are operated. The MoD needs all personnel to understand and

embrace new principles to deliver the benefits of a sustainable military

capability. Every pound wasted in perpetuating the unsustainable procure-

ment, use and disposal of capability deprives the front line of thousands of

pounds cumulatively, and exacerbates future risks.

Delivering coherent, sustainable air power requires multinational

cooperation and coordination to ensure military interoperability. The RAF

is sponsoring Defence Science & Technology Laboratory research and

development programmes that collaborate with commercial sustainable

aviation, the DoD and other military sustainable aviation programmes. The

RAF and USAF are also collaborating on how to reduce fuel and energy use.

Fossil fuels, while the lifeblood and enabler of air power, are also its

Achilles’ heel. A sustainable approach generates the benefits of significant

reputational advantages, energy independence from fossil fuels, opera-tional resilience and business continuity. Energy, water and waste-efficient

airbases will reduce environmental impact, through-life costs, and site

energy vulnerability, especially by exploiting the potential of on-site

clean energy. Collaborating and maintaining low-carbon energy interop-

erability with allies will increase operational effectiveness, flexibility

and sustainability. Lighter, agile, mission-adaptable and fuel-efficient

UASs will take air power to a new level, evolving RAF doctrine beyond

the current limitations of manned aircraft.

The MoD increasingly understands its growing supply chain, logistics,

energy, operational and environmental vulnerability to delivering future air

power. Becoming more resource and fuel efficient significantly reduces the

burden on the logistics chain, minimises the impact on the environment,

lowers costs and increases operational endurance and resilience, especially

when deployed. The RAF and DE&S have proactive and successful pro-

grammes under way, addressing many sustainability risks, especially the

certification of all aircraft on a 50:50 synthetic/fossil fuel blend by 2013.

The move to fully integrate sustainable air power is already delivering

substantial environmental, logistical, cost and operational benefits to the

RAF. Sustainable air power is efficient, effective, resilient and future-proof

air power. The RAF recognises it as both fundamental and mission critical

to its future operational effectiveness. ■

The RAF will certify all of its

aircraft to use 50:50 synthetic/

fossil fuel blends by 2013



DEFENCE R&T

On 15 and 16 November 2011, RUSI’s Cyber Security Conference

looked at the challenges facing national security from a range

of cyber-threats. Over the two days, speakers from government,

industry, academia and law enforcement presented some frightening

statistics as to the extent of national vulnerabilities in cyberspace. In

short, unless comprehensive and rigorous measures are taken to secure

data, almost nothing is safe. Even the scoreboard at 2011’s Wimbledon

tennis championship was attacked no fewer than 80,000 times, accord-

ing to IBM’s Chris Nott.

The conference speakers highlighted the complexity of the issues and

reinforced the message that crime on the web covers a multitude of dif-

ferent activities, from child abuse to the theft of intellectual property and

Cyber Security Conference UpdateLast November’s RUSI Cyber Security Conference brought together leaders in cyber-crime prevention

and underlined the need for everybody to tighten their security procedures. Simon Michell reports

classified government information, as well as threats to critical national

infrastructure. Some of it is state-funded, while some other aspects are

perpetrated by organised crime. Political activists are using the web to

influence and/or coerce government organisations and commercial com-

panies to take notice of their views, as witnessed by the Wikileaks saga.

Some of it is just vandalism. Moreover, even petty thieves are monitor-

ing social networks to see, for example, when homes are empty so that

they can be burgled – a lesson to us all not to announce to the world

that we will soon be taking a short break in the sun.

The cyber dimension is now so pervasive that any effective defence

has to involve almost everybody, whether they own a computer, smart-

phone, PDA, tablet or not. This presents governments with a massive

RUSI’s two-day Cyber Security

Conference got under way on

15 November 2011



DEFENCE R&T

problem as, according to Andrea Rigoni, director general of the Global

Cyber Security Center, almost 78 per cent of the internet is in private

hands. However, promoting the secure use of the internet and sharing

best practice are tasks that have to be taken on by governments, but are

not those that they can easily enforce.

A strong conference theme was the need for information sharing.

Despite the natural propensity for organisations to try and hide their

vulnerabilities and security lapses, delegates were told that they should

now think in terms of needing to share information in order to keep

pace with the cyber threat. But this should be done in a tactical way.

But, according to the head of KPMG’s UK Cyber Response Team, Martin

Jordan: “You have to carefully decide what information you need to

share and why. It is important to steer clear of information overload.”

Information sharing

Genuine signs that a ‘dare to share’ attitude is becoming more wide-

spread do exist. There are, for example, already groups within commerce,

banking, pharmaceuticals and retail that have become competent at this.

This message was reinforced by Ronald E Plesco Jr, president and CEO of

the US-based National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance, which spe-cialises in real-time sharing of intelligence to quickly neutralise cyber-

threats. Plesco revealed how the UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency

had expressed an interest in joining his organisation.

Police forces worldwide have also introduced a successful information-

sharing infrastructure and ethos that sees them regularly handing over

significant data with international partners over the internet.

But before this can be done in a systematic and productive manner,

trust must be built. “Sharing information is regulated by trust, but there

is no trust without understanding of cultural differences,” explained

Delegates were told that they

should now think in terms ofneeding to share information

Interpol’s Kris D’Hoore, before emphasising the need for effective pro-

tection of that information exchange to further enhance that trust.

The conference took place two weeks before the publication of the

UK Government’s cyber-security strategy, ‘Protecting and Promoting the UK

in a Digital World’, in which Government Communications Headquarters(GCHQ) is given a pivotal role. Jonathan Hoyle, director general for

Government and Industry Cyber Security, used the conference to under-

line that GCHQ is fast becoming the central hub for UK cyber-security.

This is alongside numerous newly created UK organisations, not least

the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA), the

Metropolitan Police Service’s Central e-Crime Unit, as well as three key

Cyber-Emergency Response Teams – the UK Government Computer

Emergency Response Team (GovCert UK), MoD Computer Emergency

Response Teams and the Combined Security Incident Response

Team (CSIRTUK).

The proceeds of cyber-crime

Hoyle recounted how GCHQ shares information with industry in a number

of ways, in some cases by ‘shock and awe’ visits in which a GCHQ team

reveals to a company the full extent to which they have been penetrated.

During a fascinating question-and-answer session, industry delegates

revealed a certain amount of frustration, however, with what they and

their colleagues perceived as a one-way street in information shar-

ing with the UK Government. Part of their frustration concerned the

bureaucratic nature of the system in which information supplied to a

UK Government organisation found itself being classified and then

not available to others. A possible solution to this problem, in terms

of defence-industry contractors, might be the establishment of the UK

Niteworks partnership as an information-sharing hub.

The presence of the Metropolitan Police Service at the conference,headed by Detective Superintendent Charlie McMurdie, provided a

salient lesson for the overall debate. True, the loss of intellectual property

and state secrets must be prevented, but the other side of cyber-crime is

what happens to the vast sums that are stolen over the internet.

Much of this money is reinvested in even more criminal activity, includ-

ing a black market in cyber-tools in which the loan of the Zeus Trojan

used for stealing banking information was valued at £5,000. Alarmingly,

an enterprising hacker managed to reproduce the virus and has put it on

sale at a greatly reduced rate. ■

The Cyber Security Conference

panels were kept busy with a

barrage of questions



RUSI/Cranfield Defence

Acquisition Reform23 May 2012Defence Capability Centre, Shrivenham

Following the Chicago Summit, this will be

30-31 May 2012

www.rusi.org/events

Missile Defence Conference 2012

structural reform within the Ministry of Defence

www.rusi.org/defenceacquisition2012

www.rusi.org/missiledefence



RDS INTERVIEW

What exactly is the RAF Regiment?

The RAF Regiment was formed by a royal warrant awarded by George VI

on 1 February 1942 to protect RAF airfields from attack. As a distinct Corps

that is totally integrated within the RAF, we are unique within UK Defence.

While our raison d’être remains the specialist defence of airfields, in all

we provide six core functions that are vital for the RAF, UK Defence and

the civil authorities. In short, these are: Force Protection (FP); Command

and Control (C2) and integration; ground combat; FP training; Chemical,

Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence; and air-land integra-

tion. We also embed the warfighting spirit throughout the entire RAF as

the so-called ‘Guardians of the Military Soul of the RAF’. Our main task,

however, is to defend airfields.

Why can’t the Army do that?

In its core function, the RAF Regiment provides FP C2 to integrate the

entire range of security tasks inside a base, on its perimeter, and in the

Ground Defence Area (GDA) outside the base. RAF Regiment field squad-

rons operate within this GDA (typically up to 500 sq km around an airfield)

to prevent stand-off attack against the airfield and the aircraft flying in and

out. In theory of course, the Army could reconfigure to defend RAF air-

fields, just as the RAF Regiment could reconfigure to perform a number of

Army functions, but in both cases neither as effectively nor efficiently.

The reason we are so effective is because we are a fully integrated air-

minded element of the RAF. The simple fact is that in order to defend air-

fields (and the aircraft flying in and out of them) you cannot separate air

operations from the FP operations that facilitate them – the two require

an intrinsic understanding that we term ‘air-mindedness’ across the opera-

tional spectrum. Not only does the RAF Regiment understand what is going

on in and around airfields from an air operations point of view, but the

air operations component also understands exactly what we are capable

of and how we operate. This has implications beyond FP C2 and ground

combat – important as that is. It links to air-power doctrine, aircraft tactics

and equipment procurement, and it embeds the Regiment into the ethos

of the RAF right from the day that a man or woman joins the RAF.

The reason why the RAF Regiment is so efficient is the value for money

it offers by providing a number of related capabilities in addition to FP C2

and air-minded ground combat. More than 40 per cent of our NCOs are

responsible for the FP training of RAF airmen and women throughout their

careers in core military skills. We also have a vital contribution to air-land

integration through the command of Forward Air Control (FAC) training for

Leading the guardians

of the Royal Air Force’smilitary soul Simon Michell talks to the former Commandant General of the Royal Air

Force Regiment, Air Commodore Russell La Forte CBE, to discover the

nature of the work carried out by the corps and outline the impact of

the latest Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)

UK Defence and the provision of around 50 per cent of the UK’s Tactical

Air Control Parties (TACPs) – including for 3 Commando Brigade and 16 Air

Assault Brigade. With the RAF as lead service for CBRN, the Regiment also

provides all of the UK’s specialist counter-CBRN capabilities.

So a better question would be: could the Army fulfil all of the RAF

Regiment’s capabilities in as effective and cost-efficient manner? As con-

firmed once again in the SDSR, the answer is no.

Why do airfields need to be defended?

Control of the air is essential to success in any military endeavour, and air

power requires secure airfields from which to deliver it. Airfields are invari-

ably the centre of gravity of military operations – they are logistic, as well astactical, hubs. They are a magnet for all sorts of other units and capabilities,

and they contain some very expensive assets in the form of fast jets, trans-

porters as well as ISTAR (Intelligence Surveillance, Target Acquisition and

Reconnaissance) platforms – all of which are vulnerable on the ground.

Afghanistan is a classic example of the need to defend airfields. Air power

is NATO’s asymmetric advantage over the Taliban, and the Taliban know it.

The Soviets failed to secure control of the air from the ground when the

Mujahadeen acquired MANPADs (man-portable air-defence systems) – and

after losing more than 450 aircraft over a 10-year campaign, suffered stra-

tegic failure as a result. When NATO forces stopped patrolling outside the

wire of Kandahar Airfield (KAF), the Taliban was able to attack it almost at

will. They regularly sent in rockets and launched suicide attacks on the base.

It was only after RAF Regiment FP C2 integrated base security and pro-

vided GDA patrolling that the threat level to KAF receded to acceptable lev-

els. Now, if the dismounted close combat forces defending KAF were not

tied to that role under Air Component command, there would be pressure

to redeploy them to other duties.

What has the RAF Regiment been doing recently?

Our main deployments have been in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, we were

the last UK ground-holding troops to leave Iraq when we vacated Basra

Airport in 2009. Since then, our primary effort has been in Afghanistan.

For a short while we were in Kabul as part of ISAF 1, but from 2005 to 2011

we were FP lead at KAF. During part of that time we were in both KAF and

Camp Bastion, but now we are centred on Bastion, where we work along-

side the US Marine Corps (USMC), which is co-located at Bastion in Camp

Leatherneck. The UK is the Airfield Operating Authority at Bastion, and the

Regiment provides the FP C2 and a squadron for GDA patrolling. While



RDS INTERVIEW

we work for the airbase Commander (an RAF Group Captain), off base we

work through the USMC HQ Group at Camp Leatherneck. This works very

well. The USMC is a highly professional organisation, with which we have

an excellent relationship.

We do have units elsewhere providing discrete capabilities for other UKagencies, and we have 16 men mentoring the Afghan police. We also have

people at constant readiness to support the civil authorities and we contrib-

ute people to the Joint Counter Terrorism Training Advisory Team (JCTTAT)

that helps with counter-terrorism capacity-building in certain countries.

Sadly, there is a cost to this high tempo. Over the past four years we have

lost 11 men killed in action, as well as a larger number seriously wounded.

What was the impact of SDSR on the Corps?

Currently, the RAF Regiment field force is organised into eight FP Wing

Headquarters (FP Wg HQs) responsible for integrated C2 and eight field

squadrons that undertake GDA patrolling. There are also two CBRN and

eight RAuxAF (Reservist) Squadrons – one of which is CBRN.

As part of SDSR, by 2015 (until which time we are fully committed to

Afghanistan) we will lose two of these FP Wg HQs and two field squadrons

– in sum, 25 per cent of our field force, about 350-400 men.

The second outcome will be a commensurate reduction of our Reserves,

which may take place before 2015. The exact number will be determined

as part of a wider review of RAF Reserves, but will entail the re-roling (not

disbandment) of some RAuxAF FP squadrons.

The third outcome concerns CBRN. Following an MoD decision to dis-

pense with certain CBRN capabilities, provided by the Army element of

the Joint CBRN Regiment, the unit was disbanded on 14 December 2011

and replaced with the Defence CBRN Wing (20 Wg RAF Regiment), wholly

manned by the RAF Regiment.

What are the RAF Regiment equipment priorities?

If I had a shopping list of things I need, most of it would be ISTAR equip-

ment. This would include a range of base ISTAR assets, and so, naturally,

we are an interested party in Project Outpost, which is attempting to

draw in some of the base ISTAR procured under the Urgent Operational

Requirement (UOR) system into the overall Equipment Programme (EP).

Some of this work is ongoing as part of the work that the Cortez Team

is undertaking on an integrated suite of measures – everything from bal-loons/aerostats to cameras, ground sensors and radar for FOBs and larger

hubs. But, what I would really like is good, persistent, tactical ISTAR cover-

age across the GDA. This could include aerostats such as the one deployed

north of KAF GDA at FOB Luke, or perhaps UAVs. As airborne assets near

an airfield, they would need to be employed under a FP Wg HQ to ensure

safe integration with air operations.

As far as vehicles on operations in Afghanistan are concerned, we draw

what we need from the existing pooled system. This covers a suite of

vehicles from Jackals, WMIKs (stripped-down Land Rovers with Weapons

Mounted Installation Kit) and Ridgebacks. What we need are relatively

small, fast all-terrain vehicles that allow us to get off the main tracks and

paths where most of the IEDs (improvised explosive devices) are set. Like

the ISTAR equipment, there is an aspiration to draw these into the EP

as permanent assets. We have identified what we need for a contingent

operation – not specifically Afghanistan.

Of course we are not doing this in isolation from the rest of the dis-

mounted close combat community. The Army and Royal Marines will be

identifying their requirements as well. For us though, it is important to be

fast and agile and not to be enclosed within an armoured box. The GDA is

our real estate, complete with local inhabitants. They do not like what they

perceive as big tanks tearing through their villages ripping up their roads

and scaring the children. This creates resentment. Having an open-topped

vehicle allows us to get eye contact with the locals – form a relationship

with them, listen to the mood music in the villages. This is extremely

important for insurgency operations – it’s a ‘hearts and minds’ thing. ■

For further details on the RAF Regiment’s history and roles, see ‘The RAF

Regiment – More Than the Sum of Its Parts’ on page 64

RAF Regiment gunners keep watch

during a meeting with a local shopkeeper

in Helmand province, Afghanistan



INDEX OF ADVERTISERS

Babcock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

BMT Defence Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

CAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Finmeccanica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96

Green Hills Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Iveco Defence Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

L3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Nexter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Objectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54, 67, 91

Saab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Steria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8



YOUR MISSION-CRITICAL DATA...

DELIVERED



Documents

RUSI Spring2012