Jimenez vs BazThe principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations  is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. However, where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned.BSP vs COAYes. BSP is a public corporation andits funds are subject to the COA's audit jurisdiction.The BSP is a public corporation whose functions relateto the fostering of public virtues of citizenship andpatriotism and the general improvement of the moralspirit and fiber of the youth. The functions of the BSPinclude, among others, the teaching to the youth of patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues,are undeniably sovereign functions enshrined under theConstitution. Any attempt to classify the BSP as aprivate corporation would be incomprehensible since noless than the law which created it had designated it as apublic corporation and its statutory mandate embracesperformance of sovereign functions. The manner of creation and the purpose for which the BSP was createdindubitably prove that it is a government agency.Moreover, there are three classes of juridical personsunder Article 44 of the Civil Code and the BSP, aspresently constituted under Republic Act No. 7278,fallsunder the second classification.The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in order to implement a Statepolicy declared in Article II, Section 13 of theConstitution.Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special lawto serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutionalmandate, comes within the class of "public corporations"defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code andgoverned by the law which creates it.Feliciano vs CoaThe Constitution under Sec. 2(1), Article IX-D and existing laws mandate COA to audit all government agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters. An LWD is a GOCC with an original charter. The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-owned or controlled corporations created by special charters. Under existing laws, that general law is the Corporation Code.Obviously, LWD’s are not private corporations because they are not created under the Corporation Code. LWD’s are not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Section 14 of the Corporation Code states that “all corporations organized under this code shall file with the SEC articles of incorporation x x x.” LWDs have no articles of incorporation, no incorporators and no stockholders or members. There are no stockholders or members to elect the board directors of LWDs as in the case of all corporations registered with the SEC. The local mayor or the provincial governor appoints the directors of LWDs for a fixed term of office. The board directors of LWDs are not co-owners of the LWDs. The board directors and other personnel of LWDs are government employees subject to civil service laws and anti-graft laws. Clearly, an LWD is a public and not a private entity, hence, subject to COA’s audit jurisdiction.PSPCA vs COAThe charter test cannot be applied. It is predicated on the legal regime established by the 1935 Constitution, Sec.7, Art. XIII. Since the underpinnings of the charter test had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, the test cannot be applied to PSPCA which was incorporated on January 19, 1905. Laws, generally, have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. There are a few exceptions: (1) when expressly provided; (2) remedial statutes; (3) curative statutes; and (4) laws interpreting others.None of the exceptions apply in the instant case.The mere fact that a corporation has been created by a special law doesn’t necessarily qualify it as a public corporation. At the time PSPCA was formed, the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the applicable law and no proscription similar to the charter test can be found therein. There was no restriction on the legislature to create private corporations in 1903. The amendments introduced by CA 148 made it clear that PSPCA was a private corporation, not a government agency.PSPCA’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any agency of the State. Like all private corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily and solely by the petitioner, and may exercise powers generally accorded to private corporations.PSPCA’s employees are registered and covered by the SSS at the latter’s initiative and not through the GSIS.

The fact that a private corporation is impressed with public interest does not make the entity a public corporation. They may be considered quasi-public corporations which are private corporations that render public service, supply public wants and pursue other exemplary objectives. The true criterion to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporate to the State. It is public if it is created by the latter’s own agency or instrumentality, otherwise, it is private.Pelaez vs Auditor Gen.Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative.Mun. of San Narciso vs MendezExecutive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order.Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State’s recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515.At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts “organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded.Camid vs Office of the PresMunicipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription. What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by instrumentalities of the state. Camid’s plaint should have undergone the usual administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would have had the power to make the necessary factual determinations. Petitioner’s seeming ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the present petition, cannot be countenanced.The question as to whether a municipality previously annulled by the Supreme Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative/reimplementing statute has never been decided before. The effect of Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants explanation.

EO 107 which established Andong was declared “null and void ab initio in 1965 by the Supreme Court in Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965), along with 33 other EOs. The phrase ”ab initio“ means “from the beginning”. Pelaez was never reversed by the SC but was rather expressly affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya. No subsequent ruling declared Pelaez as overturned/inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating the Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities yet limited it’s nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. With the promulgation of the LGC in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled – Sec. 442(b) of the LGC deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under.There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact that the EO creating Andong was expressly annulled by the SC in 1965. Court decisions cannot lose their efficacy due to sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.Sec. 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm/reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities which had been previously created by presidential issuances/EOs. The provision only affirms the legal personalities of those municipalities which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved remain inexistent unless recreated through specific legislative enactments.The legal effect of the nullification of a municipality in Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of the voided town back to their original municipalities.If there is only a strong impulse for the reconstitution of the municipality nullified in Pelaez, the solution is through the legislature and not judicial confirmation of void title. The time has come for the light to seep in and for the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to legal reality.League of Cities vs COMELECWe grant the petitions.The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.League of Province vs DENRNo. In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the authority to nullify the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-Scale Mining Program is subject to control by respondent DENR. Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." Under said provision, the DENR has the duty to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining law in the provinces is made subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR under the Local Government Code of 1991, while the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the People’s Small-Scale

Mining Program is to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government agencies. The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local governments sovereign within the State. The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the country's natural resources.Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.(2) No. The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in accordance with the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DENR Secretary's power to review and decide the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with "substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.Roble Arrastre vs CA

YES. The power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments, which declares:

SEC. 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

2. YES. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. The fact that Resolution No. 93-27 is a "mere" resolution can do nil to support petitioner’s cause. The proper action is certiorari to determine whether grave abuse of discretion had been committed on the part of respondent mayor in the refusal to grant petitioner’s application. Petitioner’s petition for mandamus is incompetent against respondent mayor’s discretionary power. Thus:

"Discretion," when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law or acting officially, under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. A purely ministerial act or duty in contradiction to a discretional act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

FERNANDO VS. ST. SCHOLASTICA

. No. The local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.

Section 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance are pertinent to the issue at hand, to wit:Section 3. The standard height of fences of walls allowed under this ordinance are as follows:(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences in excess of one (1) meter shall be an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru;x x x x x x x x xSection 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking area allowance located between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial establishments and educational and religious institutions.

The respondents, thus, sought to prohibit the petitioners from requiring them to (1) demolish their existing concrete wall, (2) build a fence (in excess of one meter) which must be 80% see-thru, and (3) build the said fence six meters back in order to provide a parking area.

The Court first turns its attention to Section 5 which requires the five-meter setback of the fence to provide for a parking area. The petitioners initially argued that the ownership of the parking area to be created would remain with the respondents as it would primarily be for the use of its students and faculty, and that its use by the public on non-school days would only be incidental. In their Reply, however, the petitioners admitted that Section 5 was, in fact, invalid for being repugnant to the Constitution.

2. No. Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent domain, provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that the ownership of the property will continue to remain with the respondents. It is a settled rule that neither the acquisition of title nor the total destruction of value is essential to taking. In fact, it is usually in cases where the title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. The Court is of the view that the implementation of the setback requirement would be tantamount to a taking of a total of 3,762.36 square meters of the respondents’ private property for public use without just compensation, in contravention to the Constitution.

3. No. Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, as amended, are, thus, invalid and cannot be enforced against the respondents. Nonetheless, "the general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if susceptible to being separated from the invalid, may stand and be enforced."42 Thus, the other sections of the assailed ordinance remain valid and enforceable. CITY OF MANILA VS LAGUIAO

The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

Mun. of Par. Vs VM RealtyUnder Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.

MMsMC vs ToledoYes. Although the RRCTA does not explicitly sanction extensions to file a petition for review with the CTA, Section 1, Rule 7 thereof reads that in the absence of any express provision in the RRCTA, Rules 42, 43, 44 and 46 of the Rules of Court may be applied in a suppletory manner. In particular, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9282 makes reference to the procedure under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. In this light, Section 1 of Rule 42 states that the period for filing a petition for review may be extended upon motion of the concerned party. In other words, the reglementary period provided under Section 3, Rule 8 of the RRCTA is extendible and as such, CTA Division’s grant of respondents’ motion for extension falls squarely within the law.The CTA Division did not overstep its boundaries when it admitted respondents’ Petition for Review despite the aforementioned defects "in the broader interest of justice."

2. No. Section 196 of the LGC reveals that in order to be entitled to a refund/credit of local taxes, the following procedural requirements must concur: first, the taxpayer concerned must file a written claim for refund/credit with the local treasurer; and second, the case or proceeding for refund has to be filed within two (2) years from the date of the payment of the tax, fee, or charge or from the date the taxpayer is entitled to a refund or credit.Records disclose that while the case or proceeding for refund was filed by petitioners within two (2) years from the time of payment, they, however, failed to prove that they have filed a written claim for refund with the local treasurer considering that such fact – although subject of their Request for Admission which respondents did not reply to – had already been controverted by the latter in their Motion to Dismiss and Answer.

PELIZLOY CORP vs. PROV OF BENGUET

Indeed, theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia are bound by a common typifying characteristic in that they are all venues primarily for the staging of spectacles or the holding of public shows, exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be viewed by an audience. Accordingly, ‘other places of amusement’ must be interpreted in light of the typifying characteristic of being venues “where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances” or being venues primarily used to stage spectacles or hold public shows, exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be viewed by an audienceAs defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary, ‘show’ means “a spectacle or display of something, typically an impressive one”; while ‘performance’ means “an act of staging or presenting a play, a concert, or other form of entertainment.” As such, the ordinary definitions of the words ‘show’ and ‘performance’ denote not only visual engagement (i.e., the seeing or viewing of things) but also active doing (e.g., displaying, staging or presenting) such that actions are manifested to, and (correspondingly) perceived by an audience.Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots cannot be considered venues primarily “where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances”. While it is true that they may be venues where people are visually engaged, they are not primarily venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display, stage or present shows and/or performances.Thus, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots do not belong to the same category or class as theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia. It follows that they cannot be considered as among the ‘other places of amusement’ contemplated by Section 140 of the LGC and which may properly be subject to amusement taxes.

NAPOCOR VS. PROVINCE OF QUEZON

No. The test of exemption is the nature of the use, not ownership, of the subject machineries.At any rate, the NPC’s claim of tax exemptions is completely without merit. To successfully claim exemption under Section 234(c) of the LGC, the claimant must prove two elements:

a. the machineries and equipment are actually, directly, and exclusively used by local water districts and government-owned or controlled corporations; and

b. the local water districts and government-owned and controlled corporations claiming exemption must be engaged in the supply and distribution of water and/or the generation and transmission of electric power.

As applied to the present case, the government-owned or controlled corporation claiming exemption must be the entity actually, directly, and exclusively using the real properties, and the use must be devoted to the generation and transmission of electric power. Neither the NPC nor Mirant satisfies both requirements. Although the plant’s machineries are devoted to the generation of electric power, by the NPC’s own admission and as previously pointed out, Mirant – a private corporation – uses and operates them. That Mirant operates the machineries solely in compliance with the will of the NPC only underscores the fact that NPC does notactually, directly, and exclusively use them. The machineries must be actually, directly, and exclusively used by the government-owned or controlled corporation for the exemption under Section 234(c) to apply.Even the NPC’s claim of beneficial ownership is unavailing. The test of exemption is the use, not the ownership of the machineries devoted to generation and transmission of electric power.[28] The nature of the NPC’s ownership of these machineries only finds materiality in resolving the NPC’s claim of legal interest in protesting the tax assessment on Mirant. As we discussed above, this claim is inexistent for tax protest purposes.

FIGURACION VS. CRESENCIANO

NO. The case filed by the spouses Libi is actually a reversion case. Reversion is a proceeding by which the State seeks the return of lands of the public domain or the improvements thereon through the cancellation of private title erroneously or fraudulently issued over it. The one crucial element which sets it apart from all other actions involving possession or title to property is the positive averment in the complaint of state ownership of the property in dispute. The cause of action involved in the case at bar being, in reality, one for reversion of public land, respondents cannot be considered the proper parties therein.Requirements of a valid reconveyance:1. Land is alienable. 2. The former owner or his successors-in-interest have the right to repurchase said property.LGUs’ power to open and close roads:General rule: Local roads used for public service are considered public property under the absolute control of Congress; hence, local governments have no authority to control or regulate their use. Exception: 1. Under Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code, Congress delegated to political subdivisions some control of local roads, viz.:Section 21.Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the Sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided. (b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed without making provisions for the maintenance of public safety therein. A property thus permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local government unit concerned may be lawfully used or conveyed: Provided, however, That no freedom park shall be closed permanently without provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site.2. Through the Revised Charter of Cebu City (RA 3857), Congress specifically delegated to said political subdivision the following authority to regulate its city streets:Section 31.Legislative powers. Any provision of law and executive orders to the contrary notwithstanding, the City Council shall have the following legislative powers:(34)To provide for the laying out, construction, improvement and maintenance, including lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets, avenues, boulevards, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places, and to regulate the use thereof; to provide for the construction and maintenance and regulate the use of bridges, viaducts and culverts; to close any city road, street, alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the city may be lawfully used or conveyed.NEW SUN VALLEY vs SBBSVNo. NSVHAI failed to establish the legal basis, such as its ownership of the subject roads, which entitles petitioner to the remedy prayed for. The local government unit’s power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under the Local Government Code, Section 21 of which provides:

Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. – (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.The requirement under the Local Government Code that the closure and opening of roads be made pursuant to an ordinance, instead of a resolution, is not applicable in this case because the subject roads belong to the City Government of Parañaque. The areas in Rosemallow and Aster Streets have already been donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision to, and the titles thereto already issued in the name of, the City Government of Parañaque since the year 1964. This fact has not even been denied by the NSVHAI in the proceedings below nor in the present recourse. Having been already donated or turned over to the City Government of Parañaque, the road lots in question have since then taken the nature of public roads which are withdrawn from the commerce of man, and hence placed beyond the private rights or claims of herein NSVHAI. Accordingly, the NSVHAI was not in the lawful exercise of its predicated rights when it built obstructing structures closing the road lots in question to vehicular traffic for the use of the general Public. Consequently, SBBSVs’ act of passing the disputed barangay resolution, the implementation of which is sought to be restrained by NSVHAI, had for its purpose not the opening of a private road but may be considered merely as a directive or reminder to the NSVHAI to cause the opening of a public road which should rightfully be open for use to the general public.

2. Yes. The petitioner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies by applying for injunctive relief instead of going to the Mayor as provided by the Local Government Code. Petitioner’s recourse in questioning BSV Resolution should have been with the Mayor of Parañaque City, as clearly stated in Section 32 of the Local Government Code, which provides:Section 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective Barangays. - The city or municipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise general supervision over component barangays to ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence.It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangay’s actions to see if it acted within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Indeed, this is a local problem to be resolved within the local government.

LIGHT CORPORATION VS. CITY OF MANILA

NO. Although the ordinance is rooted in the police power as conferred on LGUs by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause, it did not fulfill the test of a valid ordinance.A. Test of a valid ordinance: 1. Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute2. Must not be unfair or oppressive3. Must not be partial or discriminatory4. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade5. Must be general and consistent with public policy6. Must not be unreasonable.B. The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is strict scrutiny, which is the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms.

The ordinance, in seeking to curtail illicit relationships by limiting “short time” hours in motels, will also be curtailing legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected.

The ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. Section 3 of the ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.

The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation

The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the ordinance was struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. ATIENZA

The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City Mayor of Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to put into effect Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by the courts.

On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding were contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. There is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the city of Manila to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

SBMA VS. COMELECYES.COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law.In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation. 2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law.The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.

SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC

NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order

of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.

Mun. of Hagonoy vs. Dumdum

Petitioners, advocating a negative stance on this issue, posit that as a municipal corporation, the Municipality of Hagonoy is immune from suit, and that its properties are by law exempt from execution and garnishment. Hence, they submit that not only was there an error committed by the trial court in denying their motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment; they also advance that it should not have been issued in the first place. Nevertheless, they believe that respondent has not been able to substantiate her allegations of fraud necessary for the issuance of the writ.[32]

Private respondent, for her part, counters that, contrary to petitioners' claim, she has amply discussed the basis for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment in her affidavit; and that petitioners' claim of immunity from suit is negated by Section 22 of the Local Government Code, which vests municipal corporations with the power to sue and be sued. Further, she contends that the arguments offered by petitioners against the writ of preliminary attachment clearly touch on matters that when ruled upon in the hearing for the motion to discharge, would amount to a trial of the case on the merits.[33]

The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that the state and its political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent. Otherwise put, they are open to suit but only when they consent to it. Consent is implied when the government enters into a business contract, as it then descends to the level of the other contracting party; or it may be embodied in a general or special law[34] such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which vests local government units with certain corporate powers --one of them is the power to sue and be sued.

Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability and liability. As held in City of Caloocan v. Allarde,[35] where the suability of the state is conceded and by which liability is ascertained judicially, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to satisfy the judgment or not. Execution may not issue upon such judgment, because statutes waiving non-suability do not authorize the seizure of property to satisfy judgments recovered from the action. These statutes only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provisions for its full satisfaction. Thus, where consent to be sued is given by general or special law, the implication thereof is limited only to the resultant verdict on the action before execution of the judgment.[36]

Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[37] citing Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego,[38] is instructive on this point. In that case which involved a suit on a contract entered into by an entity supervised by the Office of the President, the Court held that while the said entity opened itself to suit by entering into the subject contract with a private entity; still, the trial court was in error in ordering the garnishment of its funds, which were public in nature and, hence, beyond the reach of garnishment and attachment proceedings. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the writ of preliminary attachment issued in that case be lifted, and that the parties be allowed to prove their respective claims at the trial on the merits. There, the Court highlighted the reason for the rule, to wit:

The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriations as required by law. The functions

and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects. x x x[39]

With this in mind, the Court holds that the writ of preliminary attachment must be dissolved and, indeed, it must not have been issued in the very first place. While there is merit in private respondent's position that she, by affidavit, was able to substantiate the allegation of fraud in the same way that the fraud attributable to petitioners was sufficiently alleged in the complaint and, hence, the issuance of the writ would have been justified. Still, the writ of attachment in this case would only prove to be useless and unnecessary under the premises, since the property of the municipality may not, in the event that respondent's claim is validated, be subjected to writs of execution and garnishment -- unless, of course, there has been a corresponding appropriation provided by law.[40]

Anent the other issues raised by petitioners relative to the denial of their motion to dissolve the writ of attachment, i.e., unenforceability of the contract and the veracity of private respondent's allegation of fraud, suffice it to say that these pertain to the merits of the main action. Hence, these issues are not to be taken up in resolving the motion to discharge, lest we run the risk of deciding or prejudging the main case and force a trial on the merits at this stage of the proceedings.[41]

There is one final concern raised by petitioners relative to the denial of their motion for reconsideration. They complain that it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have denied the motion on the ground that the same was filed by an unauthorized counsel and, hence, must be treated as a mere scrap of paper.[42]

It can be derived from the records that petitioner Ople, in his personal capacity, filed his Rule 65 petition with the Court of Appeals through the representation of the law firm Chan Robles & Associates. Later on, municipal legal officer Joselito Reyes, counsel for petitioner Ople, in his official capacity and for petitioner municipality, filed with the Court of Appeals a Manifestation with Entry of Appearance[43] to the effect that he, as counsel, was "adopting all the pleadings filed for and in behalf of [Ople's personal representation] relative to this case."[44]

It appears, however, that after the issuance of the Court of Appeals' decision, only Ople's personal representation signed the motion for reconsideration. There is no showing that the municipal legal officer made the same manifestation, as he previously did upon the filing of the petition.[45] From this, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was as if petitioner municipality and petitioner Ople, in his official capacity, had never moved for reconsideration of the assailed decision, and adverts to the ruling in Ramos v. Court of Appeals[46] and Municipality of Pililla, Rizal v. Court of Appeals[47] that only under well-defined exceptions may a private counsel be engaged in lawsuits involving a municipality, none of which exceptions obtains in this case.[48]

The Court of Appeals is mistaken. As can be seen from the manner in which the Manifestation with Entry of Appearance is worded, it is clear that petitioner municipality's legal officer was intent on adopting, for both the municipality and Mayor Ople, not only the certiorari petition filed with the Court of Appeals, but also all other pleadings that may be filed thereafter by Ople's personal representation, including the motion for reconsideration subject of this case. In any event, however, the said motion for reconsideration would warrant a denial, because there seems to be no matter raised therein that has not yet been previously addressed in the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals as well as in the proceedings below, and that would have otherwise warranted a different treatment of the issues involved.

Mun. of Camiling vs LopezIn the case at bar, except for the lack of said approval, the contract of lease is a perfectly legitimate one. The subject thereof are fisheries belonging to the municipality, subject to management and administration by itself. Neither is there anything in the contract of lease which would taint it with illegality, like a violation of public order or public morality, or a breach of a declared national policy. The contract is not ipso facto absolutely null and void. It could have been ratified after its execution in the ordinary course of administration. It is merely voidable at the option of the party who in law is granted the right to invoke its invalidity.

On the one hand, it should be noted that Article 1302 of the old Civil Code provides that persons capable of entering into a contract may not invoke the incapacity of those with whom they contract. In accordance with the above provision, the

lessee in the case at bar could not allege that the contract could not be enforced against him because the contract was not approved by the governor.

On the other hand, we must take into account that the Defendant, who was the lessee, actually entered into the possession of the fisheries subject of the lease and paid the rentals for two years, except the amount of P1,779.17 sought in the action, without questioning the validity of the contract because it was not approved by the governor. The Defendant could have raised the objection against the enforceability of the contract before its terms were carried out. But he did not do so and actually waived the objection thereto, entering upon the fisheries subject of the lease and paying the rentals agreed upon for two years. After he had taken advantage of the contract, entering upon the possession of the fisheries and enjoying its fruits, with knowledge of the existence of a defect in the said contracts, which knowledge is presumed, he should not thereafter be permitted to attack it on the ground that the contract did not bear the approval of the provincial governor as required by law. (Tuazon vs. Domingo Lim, 10 Phil., 50; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryPP. Agustinos Recoletos vs. Lichauco, 34 Phil., 5; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryBehn, Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. Rosatzin, 5 Phil., 660; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryChamber of Commerce, vs. Pua Te Ching, 14 Phil., 222.)