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ARQUERO vs COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 168053 September 21, 2011
Peralta, J.Doctrine: Te petitioner !o "ile# te action in i# name m$#t pro%e tat e i# entitle& to te
#$b'ect p$blic o""ice.
Facts:
(n (ctober 2, 2003, petitioner "ile& te Petition "or )$o *arranto !it Pra+er "or ##$ance o"
Temporar+ Re#trainin- (r&er an&or n'$ncti%e *rit be"ore te RT/ o" Pala!an a-ain#t p$blican& pri%ate re#pon&ent#. Te ca#e !a# &ocete& a# /i%il /a#e No. 385. Petitioner ar-$e& tat
te &e#i-nation o" pri%ate re#pon&ent &epri%e& er o" er ri-t to eerci#e er "$nction an&
per"orm er &$tie# in %iolation o" er ri-t to #ec$rit+ o" ten$re. /on#i&erin- tat petitioner !a#
appointe& in a permanent capacit+, #e in#i#te& tat pri%ate re#pon&ent# &e#i-nation a# (/ o"te PNS i# n$ll an& %oi& tere bein- no %acanc+ to te po#ition. Petitioner t$# pra+e& tat te
RT/ i##$e an or&er -rantin- te !rit o" 4$o !arranto en'oinin- pri%ate re#pon&ent "rom
a##$min- te po#ition o" (/ o" te PNS, &eclarin- te 4$e#tione& &e#i-nation n$ll an& %oi& an&
!ito$t operati%e e""ect, an& &eclarin- petitioner to be entitle& to te o""ice o" te principal o" tePNS.
Issue:
*eter or not petitioner a# a ri-t to in#tit$te ti# 4$o !arranto procee&in- a# to te conte#te&
p$blic o""ice an& o$#t pri%ate re#pon&ent "rom en'o+ment tereo"
Ruling:
e#. 4$o !arranto procee&in- i# te proper le-al reme&+ to &etermine te ri-t or title to te
conte#te& p$blic o""ice an& to o$#t te ol&er "rom it# en'o+ment. t i# bro$-t a-ain#t te per#on!o i# alle-e& to a%e $#$rpe&, intr$&e& into, or $nla!"$ll+ el& or eerci#e& te p$blic o""ice. t
ma+ be bro$-t b+ te Rep$blic o" te Pilippine# or b+ te per#on claimin- to be entitle& to#$c o""ice. n 4$o !arranto, te petitioner !o "ile# te action in i# name m$#t pro%e tat e i#entitle& to te #$b'ect p$blic o""ice. n oter !or, te pri%ate per#on #$in- m$#t #o! a
clear ri-t to te conte#te& po#ition. (ter!i#e, te per#on !o ol te #ame a# a ri-t to
$n&i#t$rbe& po##e##ion an& te action "or 4$o !arranto ma+ be &i#mi##e&. t i# not e%ennece##ar+ to pa## $pon te ri-t o" te &e"en&ant !o, b+ %irt$e o" i# appointment, contin$e# in
te $n&i#t$rbe& po##e##ion o" i# o""ice.
MORO vs. DEL CASTILLO, JR.
G.R. No. 184980 March 30, 2011
ABAD, J.:
Doctr!"#In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject public
office.
$act%#
Ombudsman charged respondent Del Castillo, Chief Accountant of the General eadquarters !G"# Accounting
Center of the A$%, with dishonest&, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. 'he
Ombudsman alleged that Del Castillo made false statements in his (tatement of Assets and )iabilities from *++ to
-/ and that he acquired properties out of proportion to his salar&. G" reassigned Del Castillo to the %hilippine Air
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$orce !%A$# Accounting Center. 0oro, then Chief Accountant of the %hilippine 1av&, too2 over the position of Chief
Accountant of the G" Accounting Center.
Ombudsman placed Del Castillo under preventive suspension for si3 months and eventuall& ordered his dismissal
from the service. 'he penalt& imposed on him included cancellation of eligibilit&, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and
perpetual disqualification from reemplo&ment in the government. Del Castillo filed a 04, which is pending to this date.
After the lapse of his si35month suspension Del Castillo attempted to reassume his former post. 6ut, he was unable to
do so since 0oro declined to &ield the position. Del Castillo filed a petition for quo warranto against 0oro with the
4'C. Del Castillo claimed that 0oro was merel& detailed as G" Chief Accountant when the Ombudsman placed
Del Castillo under preventive suspension. (ince the latter7s period of suspension alread& lapsed, he was entitled to
resume his former post and 0oro was but a usurper.
0oro pointed out in his Answer that his appointment as G" Chief Accountant was a permanent appointment.
Indeed, the G" had alread& reassigned Del Castillo to the %A$ Accounting Center even before the Ombudsman
placed him under preventive suspension. 4'C dismissed Del Castillo7s petition. Del Castillo filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA. CA reversed the 4'C Decision. 8ith the denial of his 04, 0oro filed this petition via 4ule /9.
I%%&"#
8hether or not respondent Del Castillo is entitled to be restored to the position of Chief Accountant of the G"
Accounting Center that he once held.
'"()#
1o. An action for quo warranto under 4ule of the 4ules of Court ma& be filed against one who usurps, intrudes
into, or unlawfull& holds or e3ercises a public office. It ma& be brought b& the 4% or b& the person claiming to be
entitled to such office. In this case, it was Del Castillo who filed the action after his preventive suspension ended. e
argues that, assuming his reassignment to the %A$ Accounting Center was valid, the same could not e3ceed one
&ear.
6ut, as 0oro points out, he had been authori:ed under (O +* to serve as G" Chief Accountant. Del Castillo, on the
other hand, had been ordered dismissed from the service b& the Ombudsman. Consequentl&, he cannot reassume
the contested position.
Del Castillo of course insists, citing )apid v. Court of Appeals that onl& decisions of the Ombudsman that impose the
penalties of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than a month or a fine of one month salar& are
final, e3ecutor&, and unappealable. Consequentl&, when the penalt& is dismissal as in his case, he can avail himself
of the remed& of appeal and the e3ecution of the decision against him would, in the meantime, be held in abe&ance.
6ut, the )apid case has been superseded *+ I! th" Matt"r to D"c(ar" ! Co!t"-t o Co&rt 'o!. S"o! A.
Dat&a!o!/, S"cr"tar+ o D'.'he Court held that an appeal shall not stop a decision of the Ombudsman from
being e3ecutor&.
In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject public
office. Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo
warranto ma& be dismissed. ere, Del Castillo brought the action for quo warranto in his name months after the
Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from service. 'he dismissal order was immediatel& e3ecutor& even pendingappeal. Consequentl&, he has no right to pursue the action for quo warranto or reassume the position of Chief
Accountant of the G" Accounting Center.
Rule 66 Case Number 3
RENALD F. VILANDO vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND
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HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES
G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149 August 23, 2011
Mendoza, J.:
Doctrine: A petition for quo warranto is not a means to oblige the HRET to reopen naturalization
proceedings for a determination of the citizenship of the ascendant of Limkaichong.
Facts: Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental in 2007.
Limkaichong won over her rival Paras, and on July 23, 2007, she assumed office. Her opponent,
Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong before the
COMELEC, alleging that Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because
when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mother, lost her Filipino citizenship by
virtue of her marriage to Limkaichongs father.
These petitions were consolidated with the petition for certiorari filed by Limkaichong, assailing the
Joint Resolution issued by the COMELEC which resolved the disqualification cases against her. TheCourt granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the Joint Resolution of the Comelec,
dismissed the three (3) other petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by
way of a petition for Quo Warranto.
Vilando, as taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district concerned,
filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET. These petitions
were consolidated by the HRET. They invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of
Limkaichongs citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization
certificate of Julio Sy, Limkaichongs father. Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen. She averred that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular
and in order and had already attained the status of res judicata. Further, she claimed that the validity
of such citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack.
The HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the
House of Representatives. Vilando filed for certiorari with the SC.
Issue: Whether the HRET erred in dismissing the petitions for Quo Warranto
Held: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the HRET committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding
that Limkaichong is not disqualified to sit as Member of the House of Representatives.
Vilandos argument, that the quo warranto petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the
citizenship of Limkaichongs father as the certificate of naturalization is null and void from the
beginning, is devoid of merit.
The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichongs father should be in accordance with
Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.
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Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by
statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the
appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private
persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizens descendant.
True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challengingineligibility on the ground of lack of citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET
the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
its Members.
Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority
to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong.
To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father, which is not
permissible.
Rule 66 Case No. 4
HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, Commissioner, National Police Commission
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO, in his capacity as the new appointee vice herein petitioner HON. LUIS
MARIO M. GENERAL, National Police Commission
G.R. No. 191560
March 29, 2011
BRION, J.
DOCTRINE:
We stress that the person instituting the quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must show that
he is entitled to the office in dispute; otherwise, the action may be dismissed at any stage.
FACTS:
1. PGMA reappointed Roces as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner.
2. When Roces died, PGMA appointed the petitioner as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and
designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman.
3. Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro (Urro) in place of the petitioner as permanent
NAPOLCOM Commissioners. Urros appointment paper is dated March 5, 2010.
4. DILG Head Executive Assistant/Chief-of-Staff Pascual V. Veron Cruz, Jr. issued separate
congratulatory letters to the respondents.
5. After being furnished a copy of the congratulatory letters on March 22, 2010, the petitioner filed
the present petition questioning the validity of the respondents appointments mainly on the ground
that it violates the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments.
6. On July 30, 2010, the newly elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, His Excellency
Benigno S. Aquino III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) "Recalling, Withdrawing, and
Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of the Constitutional Ban
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on Midnight Appointments."
7. The petitioner claims that Roces was supposed to serve a full term of six years counted from the
date of her appointment in October (should be September) 2004.
8. The petitioner alternatively submits that even if his appointment were temporary, a temporary
appointment does not give the President the license to abuse a public official simply because he
lacks security of tenure.
PRAYER -- The petitioner asks that respondent Urro be ousted as NAPOLCOM Commissioner and
he be allowed to continue in office.
ISSUE:
Does the petitioner have the clear right to be reinstated to his former position and to oust respondent
Urro as NAPOLCOM Commissioner?
HELD:
No. Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearlydoes not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting
appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing
authority. The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the
ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to
succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail.
From this perspective, the petitioner must first clearly establish his own right to the disputed office as
a condition precedent to the consideration of the unconstitutionality of the respondents
appointments.
Rule 66
Case number 5/6
Munder vs. Comelec and Atty. Sarip
SERENO, J.:
Doctrine: If a petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy failed to comply with
the prescriptive period, his remedy after a candidate has been proclaimed is to file a quo warranto
action with the Regional Trial Court to prove that such candidate lacks the eligibility required by law.
Facts: Munder ran as mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and filed his CoC on Nov. 26, 2009. The last
day for filig the certificate of candidacy was on Nov. 30, 2009. Under Sec. 4 (A) (1) of the Comelec
Resolution 8689, a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy must be filed
within 5 days from the last day of filing of the COC but not later than 25 days from filing thereof.
Respondent Atty. Sarip likewise filed a COC vied for the same position in the same municipality.
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On April 13, 2010 Sarip filed a petition for disqualification with the comelec on the ground that
Munder was not a registered voted of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that the latters application for
candidacy was not accomplished in full.
Sarip argued that the candidate Munder was different from the registered voter Munder since they
had different birth years. Consequently, according to Sarip, Munder did not posses the Qualification
to run as elective official and should be disqualified. Sarip filed his petition for Disqualification
pursuant to Resolution No. 8696 Sec. 4 (b) (1) and argued that he had timely filed the petition.
In the May 2010 elections, Munder won overwhelmingly. The Municipal board of canvassers of
Bubong, Lanao Del Sur, thus proclaimed Munde as Mayor.
Munder filed his answer and argued that false representations, dishonesty and mockery of justice
were not grounds for disqualification of a candidate under Comelece resolution no. 8696. In effect he
argued that Sarip availed himself of the wrong remedy and that the latters petition should be treated
as a Petition to Deny Due Cours or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, at the time Sarip filed his
petition, the said petition had already lapsed.
Issue: whether or not the petition for Disqualification is the proper remedy.
Held: No. Sarips remedy is not a petition for Disqualification, but a petition to Deny Due Course or to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy which must comply with the prescriptive period. Otherwise, his
remedy, after Munder has been proclaimed is to file a quo warranto action with the RTC to prove that
Munder lacks eligibility required by law.
Rule 67
NPC vs SamarGR No. 17327 September 8, 201Del /a#tillo, J.
Doctrine: 9iolation o" te proce&$ral re4$irement# $n&er r$le 6 !ai%e& te $#$al proce&$re
pre#cribe&, incl$&in- te appointment o" commi##ioner# to a#certain '$#t compen#ation
Facts:
Civil Case No. IR!!"#
Sometime in 1770, petitioner National Po!er /orporation NP/; !it te RT/, #eein- to
epropriate re#pon&ent Samar# 1,020
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rea#onable %al$e o" te lan&. NP/ &i& not appeal nor &i& commence te epropriation
procee&in-.
Civil Case No. IR!$%&
(n December 5, 177, re#pon&ent# "ile& !it te #ame trial co$rt a /omplaint,
"or compen#ationan& &ama-e# a-ain#t NP/ relati%e to te #$b'ect lot !ic NP/ too o%er b$t "or !ic it "aile&
to pa+ '$#t compen#ation on acco$nt o" te &i#mi##al o" /i%il /a#e No. Ro!e%er, i" te -o%ernment tae# po##e##ion be"ore
te in#tit$tion o" epropriation procee&in-#, te %al$e #o$l& be "ie& a# o" te time o" te tain-
o" #ai& po##e##ion, not o" te "ilin- o" te complaint. Te %al$e at te time o" te "ilin- o" te
complaint #o$l& be te ba#i# "or te &etermination o" te %al$e !en te tain- o" te propert+
in%ol%e& coinci&e# !it or i# #$b#e4$ent to te commencement o" te procee&in-#.
Te proce&$re "or &eterminin- '$#t compen#ation i# #et "ort in R$le 6 o" te 177 R$le# o"
/i%il Proce&$re. Section 5 o" R$le 6 partl+ #tate# tat B$pon te ren&ition o" te or&er o"
epropriation, te co$rt #all appoint not more tan tree 3; competent an& &i#intere#te& per#on#
a# commi##ioner# to a#certain an& report to te co$rt te '$#t compen#ation "or te propert+
#o$-t to be taen.
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Recor #o! tat #ometime in 1770, NP/ "ile& an epropriation ca#e &ocete& a# /i%il /a#e
No. Ro!e%er, in an (r&er &ate& J$l+ 12, 177, te epropriation ca#e !a# &i#mi##e&
b+ te RT/ "or "ail$re o" NP/ to pro#ec$te. S$b#e4$entl+, or on December 5, 177, re#pon&ent#
"ile& /i%il /a#e No. Rence, p$r#$ant to te abo%e
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'o assist the courts in this tas2, (ection 9, 4ule @ of the 4ules of Court requires the appointment of # competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the propert& sought to be ta2en.< Although the appointment of commissioners is mandator&, the
4ules do not impose an& qualifications or restrictions on the appointment, other than that the commissioners should
not number more than three and that the& should be co-"t"!t a!) )%!t"r"%t")parties.
Court finds that the appointment of the %AC as commissioners substantiall& complies with (ection 9, 4ule @ of the
4OC. It is immaterial that the 4'C appointed a committee instead of three persons to act as commissioners, since
the %AC is composed of three members B the ro7!ca( A%%"%%or, th" ro7!ca( E!/!""r, a!) th" ro7!ca(
Tr"a%&r"r. Considering their positions, we find each member of the %AC competent to perform the dut& required of
them, i.e., to appraise the valuation of the affected lots. 'he mere fact that the& are government officials does not
disqualif& them as disinterested persons, as the provincial government has no significant interest in the case. Instead,
what we find material is that the %AC was tas2ed to perform precisel& the same dut& that the commissioners, under
(ection 9, 4ule @ of the 4ules of Court, are required to discharge. If 1apocor found the appointment of the %AC to
be objectionable, it should have filed its objections earl& on and not belatedl& raise them in its appeal with the CA.
Instead, 1apocor belatedl& raised its objections onl& in its appeal with the CA.
A( 'O ' CO0%1(A'IO1
8e find untenable 1apocor7s claim that the amount of just compensation was without factual and legal basis. 'hat
the properties were valued at %/-@.@ per square meter in *++, then at %-,-. in *++@ does not necessaril&
indicate that the assessment b& the %AC was manipulated. 1apocor itself ac2nowledge an increase in the value of
the properties when it modified its offered settlement from %/-@.@ to %*,+.. Also, the )6% Appraisal 4eport,
which 1apocor itself commissioned, has pegged the fair mar2et value of the properties at %-,-. per square
meter. 'he report considered important improvements in the vicinit&, among them, the construction of a school, a
church and several public buildings. If 1apocor had an& objections on the amount of just compensation fi3ed in the
commissioners7 report, its remed& was to file its objections within ten !*# da&s from receipt of the notice of the report.
A( 'O ' CO0%4O0I( AG401'
8e note that not onl& did it belatedl& file its objections to the appointment of the %AC and to the commissioners7
report it also failed to submit copies of the compromise agreement with the CA despite the numerous e3tensions it
requested. (ignificantl&, the e3ecution of the compromise agreement, b& itself, did not enjoin the CA from resolving
the appeal. 6& its terms and as found out b& the CA, the compromise agreement required the approval of the CA for it
to ta2e effect. 'hus, 1apocor can no longer assail the CA7s authorit& to resolve the appeal after it consistentl& failed to
furnish the CA a cop& of the agreement.
'he questions of Att&. %edro %rincipeEs representation and his entitlement to attorne&Es fees, insofar as the
respondents are concerned, are 40A1DD to the 4egional 'rial Court of 0alolos, 6ulacan, 6ranch *9, for
resolution. 'he trial court is hereb& ordered to resolve these matters with due haste.
Rule 67 Case Number 3
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS (DPWH)
vs.HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon
City, and SPOUSES WILLIAM AND REBECCA GENATO,
G.R. No. 187677 April 17, 2013
Sereno, CJ.:
Doctrine: The court that hears the expropriation case has jurisdiction to determine, in the same
proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned.
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Facts: On July 5, 2001, DPWH filed a complaint to expropriate the parcels of land of the Spouses
Genato affected by the construction of the EDSA-QUEZON AVENUE Flyover. Shortly thereafter, it
was alleged by the DPWH-NCR that the parcels of land of Spouses Genato were government land
and of dubious title. However, the petitioner was barred by the RTC from presenting evidence that
the parcels of land were of dubious title.
It is the contention of private respondents that by allowing petitioner to present
adversarial evidence, the court is in effect allowing respondents
Torrens title to be collaterally attacked, which is prohibited by Sec. 48 of PD 1529:
SECTION 48. Certificate Not Subject to Collateral Attack.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
The RTC ruled that the issue of validity can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that
purpose and barred plaintiff from presenting evidence. Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order which was denied, hence
this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue: Whether petitioner may be barred from presenting evidence to assail the validity of
respondents title
Held: NO. The SC ruled that petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert its ownership
over the subject property, but for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to just
compensation.
Expropriation, or the exercise of the States right to eminent domain, is proscribed by the restraints of
public use and just compensation. It is governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which presents
procedural guidelines for the court to ensure that due process is observed and just compensation
rightly paid to the private owners.That the court is empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned or
sought to be condemned property and adjudge the rightful owner thereof, in the same expropriation
case, is evident from Section 9 of the Revised Rule 69, which provides:
SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership. Conflicting claims. If the ownership of the property taken is
uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums
awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the clerk of court for the benefit of the
persons adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the
payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the clerk before the plaintiff can
enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made.
This situation is akin to ejectment cases in which a court is temporarily authorized to determine
ownership, if only to determine who is entitled to possession. This is not conclusive, and it remains
open to challenge through proper actions.
The attempt of petitioner to present evidence cannot be characterized as an "attack." It must be
emphasized that the objective of the case is to appropriate private property, and the contest on
private respondents' title arose only as an incident to the issue of whom should be rightly
compensated.
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Rule 67 Case No. 4
CITY OF MANILA
vs.
MELBA TAN TE
G.R. No. 169263
September 21, 2011
PERALTA, J.
DOCTRINE:
Thus, with said amendments, the present state of Rule 67 dispenses with the filing of an
extraordinary motion to dismiss such as that required before in response to a complaint for
expropriation. The present rule requires the filing of an answer as responsive pleading to the
complaint.
FACTS:1. Manila City Mayor Joselito L. Atienza approved Ordinance No. 7951 authorizing him to acquire by
negotiation or expropriation certain pieces of real property along Maria Clara and Governor Forbes
Streets where low-cost housing units could be built and then awarded to bona fide residents therein.
2. In the aggregate, the covered property measures 1,425 square meters, and includes the 475-
square-meter lot owned by respondent Melba Tan Te.
3. Respondent had sought before the MeTC the ejectment of these occupants from the premises.
The favorable ruling in that case evaded execution; hence, the court, despite opposition of the City of
Manila, issued a Writ of Demolition at respondents instance.
4. It appears that in the interim between the issuance of the writ of execution and the order of
demolition, the City of Manila had instituted an expropriation case affecting the same property.5. Petitioner filed 2 complaints for expropriation.
6. Respondent submitted a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Ordinance No. 7951 was an
invalid expropriation measure because it violated the rule against taking private property without just
compensation; that petitioner did not comply with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No.
7279; and that she qualified as a small property owner and, hence, exempt from the operation of
R.A. No. 7279, the subject lot being the only piece of realty that she owned.
7. This was granted by the RTC and was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Did the CA erred in its decision?
HELD:
Yes. The he trial court in this case should have denied respondents motion to dismiss and required
her to submit in its stead an answer within the reglementary period. This, because whether petitioner
has observed the provisions of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279 before resorting to expropriation,
and whether respondent owns other properties than the one sought to be expropriated, and whether
she is actually a small property owner beyond the reach of petitioners eminent domain powers, are
indeed issues in the nature of affirmative defenses which require the presentation of evidence
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aliunde. Besides, Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not consider these matters grounds
for a motion to dismiss, and an action can be dismissed only on the grounds authorized by this
provision.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. Respondent is DIRECTED
to file her Answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from the finality of this Decision.
Rule 67 Case number 5
Edna Delicano, Eduardo Lopez, Mario Cruz, Howard Meneses and Corazon Meneses vs. Pechaten
Corporation
GR. No. 191251 Sept. 7, 2011
CARPIO, J,:
Doctrine: Considering that the Decision of the Court of Appeals-Special Sixth Division reversing the
judgment of expropriation already became final and executory, it is only proper that respondent
should be restored to its rightful possession of the property in accordance with Sec. 11 of Rule 67.
Facts: in June 1993, Pechaten Corporation and Teodoro Alberto, Honorata Salmorin, Aquilina Hizon,
and Dalmacia Meneses entered into a two-year contract involving the property. The parties agreed
that the monthly rental for the first year would be Php 864 to be increased to Php 1,037 per month
during the second year of the contract. Subsequently, the lessees executed a waiver of their rights or
interest in the lease contract in favor of Virgilio Meneses, the son of Dalmacia Meneses. When the
lease expired on June 1995, respondent offered Virgilio Meneses to renew the lease agreement or
purchase the property. Virgilio Meneses ignored the offer and failed to pay monthly rentals for the
property starting July 1995. Respondent sent a demand letter to Meneses to vacate the property and
pay accrued rent. When Meneses refused, respondent filed with the MeTC a case for unlawful
detainer with damages against Meneses.
Meanwhile the City of Manila filed on August 2004 a complaint for exporopriation against respondent
involving the property. RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of the City of Manila. On March 2008
RTC issued an order of expropriation in favor of the City of Manila.
Upon death of Meneses, he was substituted by his heirs, who are petitioners in this case. In view of
the orders of Manila RTC involving the property in the expropriation case, petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration for the unlawful detainer case alleging that it was moot by virtue of the Writ of
Possession issued by the Manila RTC in expropriation case involving the property. Respondent
opposed the motion, alleging that the order of the RTC, declaring that he city of Manila has the lawful
right to take the property for public use, is the subject of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the respondent that the dismissal of the expropriation case was asupervening event which warrants the reconsideration of its decision.
Issue: whether or not the petitioners are still entitled to retain possession over the subject property
despite the dismissal of the expropriation case.
Held: No. Section 11 Rule 67 states that but if the appellate court determines that plaintiff has no
right of expropriation, judgment shall be rendered ordering the RTC to forthwith enforce the
restoration to the defendant of the possession of the property
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In this case, the Court of Appeals-Special Sixth Division, in the related expropriation case entitled
City of Manila v. Pechaten Corporation held that the expropriation of the property was not for public
use. Thus, the Court of Appeals Special Sixth division dismissed the complaint for eminent domain.
The City of Manila did not appeal the decision, which became final and executor.
Considering that the Decision of the Court of Appeals Special Sixth Division reversing the judgment
of expropriation already became final and executory, it is only proper that respondent should be
restored to its rightful possession of the property.
NPC vs 'CLA Sugar (evelo)ment Cor).
GR No. 173736 December 11, 2013Re+e#, J.
Doctrine:Te trial co$rt, in epropriation ca#e#, ma+ accept or re'ect, !eter in !ole or in part, tereport #$bmitte& b+ te =oar& o" /ommi##ioner#, !ic i# merel+ a&%i#or+ an& recommen&ator+ in
caracter
Facts:/? S$-ar De%elopment /orporation /?; i# te re-i#tere& o!ner o" tree parcel# o" lanit$ate& in P$erto Galera, Oriental Mindoro.
Petitioner National Po!er /orporation NP/; in or&er to complete it# Gri& Pro'ect in P$erto
Galera, (riental Ein&oro, NP/ a& to con#tr$ct tran#mi##ion line# tat !o$l& tra%er#e #e%eral
pri%ate propertie#, incl$&in- te #ai& parcel# o" lan& o!ne& b+ /?.
NP/ "ile& a /omplaint "or epropriation !it te RT/ a-ain#t /? an& #e%eral oter
in&i%i&$al#. Te NP/ #o$-t te epropriation o" a portion o" te parcel# o" lan& o!ne& b+ te
#ai& &e"en&ant# "or te ac4$i#ition o" an ea#ement o" ri-t
"ail$re to alle-e te p$blic $#e "or te inten&e& epropriation o" it# propertie#.
Te partie# mo%e&, inter alia, "or te con#tit$tion o" a =oar& o" /ommi##ioner# to be appointe&
b+ te RT/ to &etermine te rea#onable amo$nt o" '$#t compen#ation to be pai& b+ te NP/.
=oar& o" /ommi##ioner# #$bmitte& it# Report,
!ic "ie& te amo$nt o" '$#t compen#ation o"te #$b'ect propertie# at P500.00 per #4 m. /? ob'ecte& to te amo$nt recommen&e& b+ te
=oar& o" /ommi##ioner#, claimin- tat te amo$nt o" '$#t compen#ation #o$l& be "ie&
at P700.00 per #4 m con#i&erin- te impro%ement# in teir propertie#.
/? "ile& a motion a#in- te RT/ to &irect te =oar& o" /ommi##ioner# to con&$ct an oc$lar
in#pection o%er te #$b'ect propertie# (n September 15, 2003, te =oar& o" /ommi##ioner#
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#$bmitte& it# #econ& Report, !ic "ie& te '$#t compen#ation o" te #$b'ect propertie#
at P1,000.00 per #4 m. '$#ti"ie& b+ it# location on #trate-ic place an& te con#e4$ential &ama-e#
to te !ole propertie# o" te &e"en&ant# beca$#e te plainti"" occ$pie& te "ront portion alon-
te i-!a+.
##$e:
*eter or not te RT/ an& te / a& #$""icient ba#i# in arri%in- at te 4$e#tione& amo$nt o"
'$#t compen#ation o" te #$b'ect propertie#.
R$lin-:
No. t i# #ettle& tat te amo$nt o" '$#t compen#ation i# to be a#certaine& a# o" te time o" te tain-,!ic $#$all+ coinci&e# !it te commencement o" te epropriation procee&in-#. *ere te in#tit$tion
o" te action prece&e# entr+ into te propert+, te amo$nt o" '$#t compen#ation i# to be a#certaine& a# o"
te time o" te "ilin- o" te complaint.
Te trial co$rt, in epropriation ca#e#, ma+ accept or re'ect, !eter in !ole or in part, tereport #$bmitte& b+ te =oar& o" /ommi##ioner#, !ic i# merel+ a&%i#or+ an& recommen&ator+
in caracter. t ma+ al#o recommit te report or #et a#i&e te #ame an& appoint ne!
commi##ioner#. n ti# ca#e, te lo!er co$rt# -a%e "$ll "ait an& cre&ence to te =oar& o"
/ommi##ioner#F Report &ate& September 15, 2003 not!it#tan&in- tat it !a# not #$pporte& b+
an+ &oc$mentar+ e%i&ence.
/on#i&erin- tat te le-al ba#i# "or te &etermination o" '$#t compen#ation "or te #$b'ect
propertie# i# in#$""icient, te re#pecti%e Deci#ion# o" te RT/ an& te / #o$l& be #et a#i&e.
/a#e be reman&e& to te trial co$rt "or proper &etermination o" te '$#t compen#ation.
MASIIvs.T'E CIT O$ ASIG
G.R. No. 135349 Ja!&ar+ 23, 2005
SANDOAL GTIERRE, J.#
Doctr!"#
'he ver& foundation of the right to e3ercise eminent domain is a genuine necessit& and that necessit& must be of a public character.
$act%#
%etitioner 0asi2ip is the owner of a parcel of land located at Caniogan, %asig Cit&.
'he 0unicipalit& of %asig, now Cit& of %asig, notified petitioner of its intention to e3propriate a *,9 square meter portion of her
propert& to be used for the :%-ort% )"7"(o-"!t a!) r"cr"ato!a( act7t"%:of the residents of 6aranga& Caniogan. 4espondent
wrote another letter, but this time the purpose was allegedl&
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I%)AI1'I$$ A( 1O CA( O$ AC'IO1 $O4 ' H4CI( O$ ' %O84 O$ 0I11' DO0AI1, CO1(ID4I1G 'A'F
!A# 1O G1I1 1C((I' $O4 ' 'AJI1G O$ ' %4O%4'
!6# A46I'4A4I) A1D CA%4ICIO() CO(1 ' %4O%4' (OG' 'O 6 H%4O%4IA'D.
!C# K1 A((0I1G 'A' D$1DA1'7( %4O%4' 0A 6 H%4O%4IA'D 6 %)AI1'I$$, ' $0K O$ '
%4O%4' 'O 6 H%4O%4IA'D $A4 HCD( %@?,.
'C issued an Order den&ing the 0'D on the ground that th"r" % a /"!&!" !"c"%%t+ to ";-ro-rat" th" -ro-"rt+ or th" %-ort%
a!) r"cr"ato!a( act7t"% o th" r"%)"!t% o a%/. As to the just compensation, the 'C held that the same is to be determinedin accordance with the 4OC. %etitioner filed a 04 but it was denied. It appointed the Cit& Assessor and Cit& 'reasurer of %asig Cit&
as commissioners to ascertain the just compensation. 'his prompted petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a special civil action
for certiorari,
I%%&"#
*. 8O1 CA erred in holding that the motion to dismiss filed b& petitioner h&potheticall& admitted the truth of the facts alleged
in the complaint, specificall& that there is a genuine necessit& to e3propriate petitioner7s propert& for public use.
!%rocedural issue#-. 8O1 there is genuine necessit& to e3propriate petitioner7s propert&. !substantive#
'"()#
*. es. %etitioner filed her 0'D the complaint for e3propriation in *++9. It was denied b& the trial court in *++. At that time, the rule
on e3propriation was governed b& (ection >, 4ule @ of the 4evised 4ules of Court which providesF
. Defenses and objections. B 8ithin the time specified in the summons, each defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present in a single oto!
to )%%%or for other appropriate relief, all his objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to ta2e his propert& for the use or purpose specified
in the complaint. All such objections and defenses not so presented are waived. A cop& of the motion shall be served on the plaintiff7s attorne& of record
and filed with the court with proof of service.