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Copyright 2009, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies(IPCS)

The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies is notresponsible for the facts, views or opinion expressedby the author.

The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS),established in August 1996, is an independent thinktank devoted to research on peace and security from aSouth Asian perspective.Its aim is to develop a comprehensive andalternative framework for peace and security in the

region catering to the changing demands ofnational, regional and global security.

Address:B 7/3 Lower Ground FloorSafdarjung EnclaveNew Delhi 110029INDIA

Tel: 91-11-4100 1900, 4165 2556, 4165 2557,4165 2558, 4165 2559

Fax: (91-11) 4165 2560Email: [email protected]

Web: www.ipcs.org


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CONTENTS

I. Politics, Religion and Extremism.................................................................................... 2

II. Extremism in Pakistan: A Brief History ........................................................................ 5

III. Exploring the Causes of Extremism............................................................................. 8

IV. Politico-Religious Mobilization: Towards an Understanding.....................................13

V. Politics of Religious Extremism ....................................................................................18

VI. Bibliography .................................................................................................................22


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I. Politics, Religion and Extremism

In the last thirty years, scholars of neo-Marxist, feminist and social historians havechallenged the older Marxist andfunctionalist views of religion as a falseconsciousness repressing class struggle or aforce for social stability. These newsociologists of religion have portrayedreligious institutions and theological

worldviews as expressive of class and powerstruggles, rather than of monolithicideological hegemony; the interests of the

less powerful have been found to beexpressed through and in religion.For many, religion, spirituality and beliefcontribute to enhancing the inherent dignityand worth of every human being. Religion,however, is sometimes used and abused tofuel hatred, superiority and dominance. Thepoliticization of culture and religion createsan intolerable environment and the rise ofreligious intolerance is a cause for seriousconcern.

Much of the literature on the role of religionin politics and religious extremism falls intothree major groups. One school of thoughtbelieves that religion is always violent, suchas Hent de Vries (2002) and Mark

Juergenmeyers (2001). De Vries argues thatthere is no religion without violence ofsome sort, and no violence without religionof some sort. But De Vries theory cannotexplain why religious conflict is sometimes

violent and sometimes does not lead toviolence. Does violence inevitably shadowour ethical-political engagements anddecisions, including our understandings ofidentity, whether collective or individual?he asks.1 Juergenmeyer argues that religious

violence is a result of peoples tendency tosee their lives as a struggle between goodand evil. He asks: why do religious peoplecommit violent acts in the name of theirgod, taking the lives of innocent victims and

1 Vries, Hent De. 2002.Religion and Violence.

Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.

terrorizing entire populations? He arguesthat this is because people believe they arepart of a cosmic struggle between thepowers of good and evil - a battle to bringorder and peace out of chaos and darkness.

The clash between the forces of darknessand light can be understood not as a sacredstruggle, but as a real fight which ofteninvolves political manoeuvring. He claimsthat when there is an identity crisis, orproblem of legitimacy, threat of defeat; a

real world struggle can be conceived as asacred war where enemies are demonized.2

Another school of thought, that includesDaniel Pipes, Samuel Huntington, BernardLewis and Jessica Stern, view only Islam andnot other religions as inevitably violent.Daniel Pipes, for instance, claims thatradical Islam is an ideology incompatible

with secular society. Muslims want to forcethe secular world to submit to their

principles. They are thus, a radical networkof terrorists, terrorists in this world whocan't stand the thought of peace,terrorism with a global reach, evildoers,a dangerous group of people, a bunch ofcold-blooded killers, and even people

without a country. 3 However, there surelyare better explanations of why religion hasbecome an essential tool in politics and itsextremist manifestation. For instance, TedGurrs model of relative deprivation,

mobilization and grievances is extremelyrelevant to understand the intrusion ofreligion in politics and the phenomenon ofextremism.

It is often said that religious extremists arenot the poorest of the poor. However, those

2 Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2001. Terror in the Mind

of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence.

Berkeley (California): University of California

Press.3 Daniel Pipes. 7 October 2002. The war against

Islamic militants,Human Events, Vol.58(37): 10


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who are most deprived, oppressed, most inneed, are not those who usually violentlyrebel. In fact, all the big names in the list ofthe culprits in recent history have turned outto be those who were educated and

relatively well off. While there have beenfood riots and peasant uprisings, most often,revolutions and violence have occurred

when conditions are better or have beenimproving, and by those who are not themost deprived. Explanations vary, butgenerally focus on two propositions. First,deprivation is subjective and a function of aperson's perception, needs, and knowledge.

To nail deprivation to an objective orabsolute lack of something such as freedom,

equality, or sustenance, is to ignore the factthat the definition of these shifts accordingto historical periods, culture, society,position, and person.

The second proposition, deals with thesenorms. It asserts that we take our presentlyperceived or expected position,achievements, gratifications, or capabilitiesas a base of comparison against our wantsor needs, or what we feel we ought to have.

The gap between wants or ought andgratifications or capabilities is then ourdeprivation, or relativedeprivation, in thesense that it depends on our basis ofcomparison.

The literature on these two principles andon relative deprivation is well organized in

Ted Gurr's Why Men Rebel4, which meritsdiscussion. The idea of relative deprivationhas been used either to measure fairness,

inequality, and social justice, or to explaingrievance, social hostility, or aggression.Gurr's concern is relative deprivation as acause for aggression. Ted Gurr articulatedmodels, suggesting that the gap betweenexpectations and achievement wouldcontribute to the willingness of the peopleto rebel. In particular, he observed, rebellion

was most likely to be fueled by movementson the basis of perceived deprivation. In our

4 Gurr, Ted. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press.

discussion here on religious extremism, theaggressive, violent phenomenon ofextremism attests to Ted Gurrs theory thatit is actually the gap between theexpectations of a regime based on true

faith and the reality of an adulteratedregime that lead these self-proclaimedcustodians to use violence in the name ofreligion.5

The basic thesis of this paper is based ontwo theories; one that grievance born ofdeprivation (either economic or political) isan individual concern that manifests itselfcollectively. Quite often material andpolitical deprivation is aggregated within

specific groups with a homogenous culturalidentity. For example, a religious orlinguistic minority might sufferdisproportionately in a given society, andthis form of grievance can lead to unrestacross the social lines that distinguish theminority group.6 In most regions of the

world with ethnic and religious movements,which sometimes are of a violent nature, areminorities rebelling against the system.South Asia, however, is unique in the sense

that the religious revivalism in extreme

5 Gurr, for example, explains: In summary, the

primary source of the human capacity for violence

appears to be the frustration-aggression

mechanism. Frustration does not necessarily lead to

violence, and violence for some men is motivated

by expectations of gain. The anger induced by

frustration, however, is a motivating force that

disposes men to aggression, irrespective of its

instrumentalities. If frustrations are sufficiently

prolonged or sharply felt, aggression is quite likely,if not certain, to occur. To conclude that the

relationship is not relevant to individual or

collective violence is akin to the assertion that the

law of gravitation is irrelevant to the theory offlight because not everything that goes up falls

back to earth in accord with the basic gravitationalprinciple. The frustration-aggression mechanism is

in this sense analogous to the law of gravity: men

who are frustrated have an innate disposition to do

violence to its source in proportion to the intensity

of their frustrations....

Ibid. Pp.36-376

Gurr.Ted. 2000. People versus States: Minoritiesat Risk in the New Century. Washington DC:

United States Institute of Peace Press.


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forms in all of its troubled areas wasinitiated by religious majorities.

This brings to the second part of the thesis,which argues that to understand the

intrusion of religion in politics and thephenomenon of religious extremism inPakistan, one needs to understand theelement of Fear. One wonders if WinstonChurchill realized the sweeping politicalaccuracy of his assertion that we havenothing to fear, but fear itself.

The common thread that weaves violentpolitical movements together is fear. This istrue in the case of violent religiousmovements. The fear of being deprived of

something drives one to act aggressively,while the fear of being left out drivemovements against prevalent forces.

Although it is neither the only motivatingfactor for the political manifestation ofreligious violence, nor necessarily the mostobvious, it is conspicuously present at alltimes. Whenever we ask why peopleharbour hatred, or why they are willing tokill or die for a cause, the answer invariablyis Fear.

Religious radicals are united by fear.Whether they are Christian, Muslim, Jew,Hindu or Buddhist, the fear of beingdeprived the role and status that they expectand desire to achieve, is the commondenominator. Some groups fear change,modernization and loss of influence, othersfear that the young will abandon thechurches, temples, mosques and synagogues

for physical and material gratification. Theyare especially fearful of education, especiallyif it undermines the teachings of theirreligion. They fear a future they will havelittle control over and one they cannot even

comprehend.

Therefore, if relative deprivation can explainthe phenomenon of religious extremismamong religious minorities, the fear of beingdeprived the expected status and theinability to achieve a desirable society canexplain the rising religious extremism andmilitancy among the religious majority.South Asian religious majorities suffer fromsuch fear that have often led to extreme and

unfortunate occurrences like the pogrom inGujarat unleashed by the Hindu majority,

jihadwaged by Islamic militants against theinfidels in Pakistan, or the SinhaleseBuddhist engaging in violence against TamilHindus and Christians in Sri Lanka.

The study attempts to investigate whether itis relative deprivation as Ted Gurr suggestsor the element of fear that pushed theMuslim majority Pakistan into a cycle of

religious violence due to the intrusion ofreligion in politics. The political, military andreligious forces feared losing the identityon the basis of which the state was carvedout, in addition to the vast majority ofpeople who live on the margins of societyand feel deprived of political and economicpower, leading to the politicization ofreligion and its extreme manifestation in theform of violence.


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II. Extremism in Pakistan: A Brief History

Part IX, Article 227 of the 1973Constitution of Pakistan provides that allexisting laws shall be brought in conformity

with the injunctions of Islam as laid down inthe Holy Quran and Sunnah. Further,

Article 242 provides that in the applicationof this clause to the personal law of anyMuslim sect, the expression Quran andSunnah shall mean the Quran and Sunnahas interpreted by that sect.7 The constitutionalso provides that nothing in the Part

outlined above, shall affect the personal lawsof non-Muslim citizens or their status ascitizens.

The institutional provisions vis--vis religionin the Constitution of Pakistan has madereligion a politically potent force. Politicalleaders and military rulers in Pakistan haveused religion for political legitimacy andnational integration. Besides, religiousidentities, slogans and symbols have often

been used by political parties for politicalmobilization. The political use of religionhas heightened religious antagonism andacrimony, besides creating space forreligious militancy and extremism. Moreimportantly, recent years have witnessed aresurgence of religious militancy in Pakistan,

with militant fundamentalism emergingunder religious extremism.

As in the past, in Pakistan, change and

continuity still characterize the developmentof religious traditions. Pakistan hasexperimented (to different degrees) with theintegration of Islamic legal structures intothe running of the nation-state, but inneither, nation has conservative Islamexerted a definitive influence ongovernance. In todays increasinglyshrinking world, religious traditions aretransformed and influenced by economic

7

Interpreting the holy Quran according to theirindividual sects has created several problems for

people belonging to minority sects.

and political change, new media, andaltering social expectations. Core religiousbeliefs and practices will continue to changeeven in the future, as all living cultures do.

Despite being an Islamic Republicconstitutionally, there was a clear divisionbetween politics and religion, as well as adistinction between private and publicIslam, at least in the formidable years afterthe creation of Pakistan. Mohammad Ali

Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, in hisinaugural address to the PakistanConstituent Assembly on 11 August 1947,clearly stated that religion was a privateaffair of the individual and highlighted theequality of religions.

However, the strength of religious groups,who put all their efforts into declaringPakistan an Islamic state, had beenunderestimated or perhaps the intentions of

the leaders who would take on the reins ofPakistan, were not that obvious because inless than two years after the speech, theConstituent Assembly moved the ObjectiveResolution8 on 7 March 1949, pledging todraft an Islamic Constitution. With thesecession of East Pakistan, the religio-political parties sought to strengthen theideological basis for Pakistan andincorporated Islamic injunctions into the1973 Constitution.

The roots of this crisis of Muslim identitygo back to the pre-partition era. The issue ofsocial purity emerged after the decline ofMuslim power, when Shah Waliullah andother Muslim revivalists in the sub-continent attempted to preserve the distinctidentity of the Muslim community throughstrict adherence to pure Islam. These

8 The Objective Resolution stated: The Muslims

shall be enabled to order their lives in accordancewith the teachings and requirements of Islam as set

out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah


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individuals felt that the Indian Muslims hadbecome socially and culturally pollutedowing to their close association withHindus. This thinking translated into theneed for distancing themselves from the

Hindus through the creation of a separatehomeland and pursuing their religion

without any extraneous influences.9 Thepotentiality of an alliance between ulamaand fundamentalist leaders wasdemonstrated in 1953 when serious riotingbroke out in Lahore over the question of

whether the members of the Ahmadi sectshould officially be regarded as a non-Islamic minority. The issue was of particularimportance because of the presence of

Ahmadis in senior government positions.10

Later, in the 1950s, the leadership ofPakistan's most organized, urban religiousgroup, the Jamaat-e-Islami, and other like-minded parties began to use Islam to fosterexclusionary politics and instigate publicriots by politicizing the identity question,that is, Who is a Muslim?

The Jamaat led a successful movement to

have the small Ahmediyya sect (which isdoctrinally anathematic to the Jamaat)declared non-Muslim by the state. With theouster of the Ahmedis from the fold, thetone was set for progressively moreintolerant politics. Hasan Abbas defines theIslamization process in the late 70s and 80sunder Zia, as the hijacking of the Islamicslogan of the anti-Bhutto agitation andmaking it his own. He seemed totallycommitted to the formal and visual

performance of all religious rites, whilesimultaneously being quite flexible on thedeeper issue of morality.11 The religious

9 Chengappa, B.M. Pakistan: The Role of Religion

in Political Evolution. Strategic AnalysisVol.XXIV(12), IDSA, March 2001. Available at

http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_mar01chbO1.html10 Taylor, David. 1983. The Politics of Islam and

Islamization in Pakistan in James P. Piscatori (ed.)

Islam in the Political Process. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press. P.19111

Abbas, Hassan. 2005. Pakistans Drift intoExtremism: Allah, the Army and Americans War

on Terror. New York: East Gate. P.97

parties wholeheartedly supported Zia in thisproject of moral purification of thesociety, which would, in their opinion, leadto a political society based on Islamicprinciples. The Jamat-e-Islami was of critical

importance to Zia. It was the only partywith a committed cadre of loyalists thatstood in readiness to counter and blunt anyanti-Zia agitation launched by any politicalforce.

Interestingly, the armys redefined role wasalso an important factor in the Islamizationprocess. They were no longer merely thedefenders of the borders, but also defendersof Pakistans ideological frontiers.

Religious knowledge and commitmentbecame the determinants for the selectionprocess of officers.12

With the Islamization of the military,Pakistan increasingly became an ideologicalstate. However, there was no singledefinition available to explain whatIslamization was. With a number of sectsand varied types of Islam, the Deobandischool of thought became the official school

to look up to for theoretical explanations.With its close resemblance to SaudiWahabism, Saudi Arabia became thepatronizing factor, even though a majorityof Pakistanis was and still adhere to theBrelvi/Sufi tradition of Islam.

The educational system was the first casualtyunder the Islamization process, when on thepretext of providing free education to thepoor, madrassas were established all overthe country. The degrees that these

institutions awarded, qualified young men topreside over Qazi courts or work as Ulemain various departments of the government.

The recognition of the madrassas by thegovernment, led to the emergence ofIslamic constituencies, always ready to votefor Islam, as they did when a referendum

was held for Zia, where the choice waslargely construed as one where the peoplecould either vote for the Quran or not.

12 Ibid.P.101


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Interestingly, despite the United Statescontribution to help Pakistan establish itsreligious credentials during the Cold War,the US, in the initial years of its engagement

with Pakistan, had already recognized the

troubling potential of Islamist politics.

Hussain Haqqani, Pakistans Ambassador tothe US wrote in the Washington Quarterly, Ina policy statement issued on July 1, 1951,the U.S. Department of State declared that,[a]part from Communism, the other mainthreat to American interests in Pakistan wasfrom reactionary groups of landholders anduneducated religious leaders who wereopposed to the present Western-minded

government and favor a return to primitiveIslamic principles.13 However, the US didlittle to prevent Pakistan from using Islam asstate ideology, encouraging religious leadersand tying the Islamists to Pakistansmilitary-civil bureaucracy and intelligenceapparatus.14 Thanks to state patronage,religious parties from being mere pressuregroups, evolved into well-armed and well-financed forces. They operate outside theframework of the rule of law; and the

Islamists have contributed to the disruptionof the conduct of foreign policy, especiallyin India and Afghanistan.

13 Haqqani, Hussain. The Role of Islam in

Pakistan's Future. The Washington Quarterly,Winter 2004-05, Vol.28(1): 9314 Ibid.


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III. Extremism in Pakistan: Exploring the Causes

Though the recognition of faith of aparticular community as a countrys officialreligion is permitted under internationalstandards for freedom of religion or belief,and thus, is not, in and of itself,problematic. It is the implementation of thisright that unfortunately provides onecommunity an edge over the others andhence leads to exploitation and even

violence in the name of religion. Suchrecognition, conferred upon a particular

religion establishes an inevitable formalinequality with its concomitant risk ofdiscrimination, irrespective of its degree orseverity; and in turn, undercuts nationalunity, which is necessarily based onperceptions of common heritage andaspirations, to the extent that those outsidethe religion feel themselves excluded fromor at the periphery of the definingcharacteristic of national identity.

FEAR OF LOSING STATUSACQUIREDOVER THEYEARS

The birth of radical Islamic groups was aresult of the patronage provided by religiouspolitical parties, pampered by the state forboth domestic and external reasons. Theseextremists groups enjoyed a special statusdue to two important factors. First, theIslamists claim that they are the protectorsof Pakistans nuclear deterrent capability

(which has also provided the Americans thejustification to press Pakistan periodicallyabout its nuclear command and controlmechanism) and second, they claim to bethe champions of the national cause ofsecuring Kashmir for Pakistan.

These monstrous claims by the Islamists arebased on the fact that particularly in the lasttwo decades, they were given theimportance that they were not really ready

to digest. The secular ruling elite, politicalparties and bureaucracy assumed that these

groups were too weak and too dependenton the state to confront the powerstructure.15 The civil-military oligarchycontinued to assume self righteousness inprojecting itself as the defender of thestates identity through religious andmilitaristic nationalism. In the process, thealliance between the mosque and themilitary, as Haqqani puts it, becamepowerful, discarding the notion that thesegroups would only serve the states nation-

building function without destabilizingPakistan or western countries.

In the post-9/11 scenario, both domesticand external dynamics of the state changeddue to change in policy at the highest level.

The crackdown on religious groups, andwithdrawal of state patronage to religiousleaders, their parties, and madrassas, led tofrustration and anger within the Islamistgroups, which has since placed the very

existence of the state in doubt. Neither thereligious parties, nor their radical offshootsare ready to give up the command andcontrol they have enjoyed for two decades.

Years of religious rhetoric have influencedthe young within the military, bureaucracy,intelligentsia and the society in general,

which is their hard earned asset. The fear oflosing that status is primary, when related toany other concern or goal that these

groups might have had in the past. Theprevailing situation poses a dilemma forthem since they feel that their existence is atstake and in order to ensure their survival,they are willing to go to any length, even if itmeans drifting away from the ideologicalboundaries of Pakistan because for them,Pakistan matters only till its establishmentsupports the idea of an Islamic state.Pakistan without an Islamic ideology, tothem, is as evil as any other un-Islamic

country.15 Ibid. P.89


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The Pakistani state which has become animportant ideological centre of the globalIslamist movement, thanks to the al-Qaedaand Tehrik Taliban Pakistan, who have

attained their current status, believing in thesuccess of Jihad against the Soviets. Themilitary-religious alliance believed in theemergence of such a centre. To theirsurprise, as Haqqani points out, the politicalleadership in Pakistan always looked atPakistans interests in the Islamists as apolitico-military strategic doctrine. Thisled to the tussle between themilitary/Islamists and political parties. Theconfrontation of ideas contributed

significantly to preventing Pakistan fromevolving as a modern and moderate Muslimstate as envisaged by the Quaid, Mr. Jinnah.

The rising extremism, contrary to popularbelief, is not a part of state policy, but moreof a reactionary strategy on the part of theall-powerful Islamic groups who are notready to give up the privileged status theyonce enjoyed and who, by engaging inextremist, militant activities, wishes to

display the scope of their power andinfluence. As long as the confrontationbetween the state and these groupscontinues, Pakistan will continue to witnessacts of extremism against its own people.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMICDEPRIVATION

The deteriorating economic conditions,unemployment and lack of freedom of

expression within society are all pertinentfactors responsible for the growing numberof radicals despite the withdrawal of statepatronage. Additionally, these religiousgroups have become independent andfinancially powerful, especially since they areno longer dependent on the state forproviding them financial assistance as it didpreviously. Therefore, unless the statecomes up with some financial incentives forthe youth who are frustrated with the

present state of things, they will continue tofill up the ranks of the jihadi organizations.

Political deprivation is yet another factorresponsible for causing severe unrest withinthe country. Of the four provinces,Baluchistan has been struggling for politicalrights and against economic discontentment.

Similarly, a lack of political infrastructure inTribal areas has paved the way for differentreligious groups to establish their Emirates.

These Emirates are well-resourced andequipped with modern weapons. Hence,there is no dearth of people joining them tochallenge the state.

LONG PERIOD OF UNDEMOCRATIC ANDUNACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENTS

In order to understand the very complicatedissue of religious violence and its politicalmanifestation, one needs to analyze therelationship between the type of regime andreligious violence, in the light of historicalevidence and events that have taken placeover the years. Also, it is important toexamine whether in the absence of ademocratic form of government,authoritative regimes tend to use religion forpolitical purposes?

In Pakistan, there has always beencollaboration between the militarydictatorship and religious parties with theexception of Gen. Ayub Khan. Jamat-e-Islami forged an alliance with Zia and theMMA with Musharraf in the initial phase ofhis regime. In Pakistans brief democratichistory, democratic political parties andreligious political parties have always beenantagonistic to each other. Whether it is

religious politics that prevents them fromsupporting democratic forces or thatreligion itself needs an authoritative regimefor its complete implementation, bothsocially and politically, forms the core of theargument on Islam and politics.Pakistani society has undergone a similarprocess. For long it was under militarydictatorship, which tried to suppress allother identities, except either theoverarching Pakistani identity or Islamic

identity. However, a plethora of ethnicidentities exploded in the public arena,


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especially with the first general elections,held in 1969. The Bengali identity which hadfelt suffocated, found an opportunity tobreak away from the overarching Pakistaniidentity in the first election itself. Pakistan

went through a period of great crisis duringthe seventies when proto democraticstructures began surfacing in the country. It

was a period of semi-democratic rule inPakistan.General Zia-ul-Haq benefited greatly due tothe very obvious opposition of Islamicparties to Bhutto. Interestingly, it was notmerely an Islamic government that thereligious parties were after. From the verybeginning of the Bhutto era in 1971, the

landlords, military bureaucracy, as well asreligious parties realized that they would notbenefit under the Bhutto regime. It wasthe rhetoric of the Bhutto government

which emphasized economic issues, (eventhough these remained unfulfilled) thatacted as a catalyst of change in Pakistanspolitical culture by pushing obscurantistreligious issues to the background and byhighlighting problems of economicredistribution and social justice. Not only

did this alarm the capitalists, but also hurtthe interests of strong sections of Pakistanipolitical leadership ranging from the MuslimLeague to the Jamat-i-Islami that hadthrived upon obscurantist Islamic slogans

which had been used largely to obscure thereal social and economic problems.

It has been a fact throughout the checkeredhistory of Pakistani politics, that Islamicparties have never received enough votes to

claim a majority in the parliament, not evenenough to form a government by alliances.

The success of the MMA in Sindh andBaluchistan in 2002 elections was mainly areaction against the US attack on

Afghanistan and its preparation for war withIraq. The religious parties were well awareof their weakness and saw in the military theonly opportunity to achieve their goal.

These parties, particularly the Jamat-i-Islamiwelcomed the military takeover

wholeheartedly and it was this mobilizationby the Jamat-i-Islami that created the

momentum in General Zias Islamizationprocess. None of the two sides had a purelyreligious goal - it was more a matter ofgaining legitimacy among the public thananything else. The escalation of the Sunni-

Shiite conflict helped General Zia keep thepopulation busy in the debate on the rightand wrong interpretation of Islam. Itresulted in the absence of any organizedmobilization of the people against themilitary regime, except a few protests by thepolitical parties soon after the military coupof 1977. Religion came out of peopleshomes onto the streets and became thesource of much violent conflict. It helpedZia, but created a permanent dent in the

inner fabric of the society. Pakistan underZia is a perfect example of the politicizationof religion and its violent expression.

It is interesting to note that the use of Islamnot only suited the military, but also thesecular landlords and capitalists becausesuch deliberations transformed the politicaldebate in Pakistan. The issue of landreforms remained incomplete and the feudalaristocracy secured its future within the

military regime. One can say that it wasdouble jeopardy, because it was not only themilitary dictatorship under Zia, but also theauthoritative rule of landed aristocracy insmall villages and towns that created a land

with very little outlet to the free world.

JIHAD AS ASTATE POLICY IN PAKISTAN

Jihad as a state policy in Pakistan gainedlegitimacy when religious parties were co-

opted into the jihadi arm of Pakistans Armyin Afghanistan. It sent out a clear signal that

waging jihad was a legitimate politicalactivity. Flushed with Arab oil money,public zakat(charity)collections diverted tothem and private donations, the New-Islamistsconsolidated their power byglorifying jihad from public platforms,running an extensive network of madrasasand military training centers to raise cadrescomprised of youth, and mounting threats

to Pakistans ruling establishment tosurrender to their Islamic dictates. The arena


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of Jihad thus, expanded to the twin goals offreeing Kashmir from Indian control, andPakistan from the rule of secular politicians.

CHALLENGES OF OLD AND NEW

ISLAMISTS IN PAKISTAN

The inherent danger posed by the Islamicgroups is that there has been a fundamentalshift in their agenda. Simply, there is now adistinction between what can be termedold and new Islamists in Pakistan. NewIslamists (Pakistani Taliban, Jihadiorganizations, Islamists), who were initiallyinspired by Maududis Islamic liberationtheology and later developed their own

interpretations, are generally protagonists ofpolitical Islam, that is, they seek totransform politics through religion andreligion through politics. They are unlike theold Islamists (traditional Islamicmadaris/ulemas/Pirs/Sufis and mainlyBralevi religous parties) who wereaccommodated by the secular elites, andthus, avoided political confrontation.Islamist organizations are based mainly inthe economically marginalized and socially

traditional regions of Pakistan. The newIslamists were not willing to exercise suchan option. The political strategy pursued bythe new Islamists in Pakistan was to attemptto capture civil society institutions with a

view to eventually capture the state.

The politics of Islam underwent a majorchange as a result of Zias decision in 1980to involve Pakistan actively in Afghanistansanti-Soviet jihad. As this involvement

became deeper, the Inter-ServicesIntelligence Directorate took over fullcontrol of implementing state policy on thisfront. Initially, the ISI acquired the servicesof Jamat-e-Islami to funnel CIA-procuredarms and money to Afghan warlords or asthey were popularly called the Mujahideen(holy warriors). This explains the politicalpower and the creation and involvement ofthe New Islamists in Pakistani politics.

THE ISLAMIST CAPTURE OF CIVILSOCIETYINSTITUTIONS

It is, to say the least, not in the interest ofPakistani civil society to have the Islamists

dominate every aspect of the life of thesociety. It amounts to spreading a cult of

violence in Pakistan. The ruling classes,both, military and political, have used these'mujahideen' to suppress ethnic unrest andto maintain their political hegemony. InBaluchistan, state oppression with or

without the support of the feudalists in theprovince, depending on the nature of thealliance the Centre had with them, madesure that no genuine, nationalist, grassroots

political movement could emerge. Thepolitical vacuum paved the way for theemergence of religious fanatics who in thename of religion convinced the Centre andfeudalists in the area that religion alonecould counter the ethno-nationalisttendencies in the area.

Whether Bhutto, Gen. Zia or Gen.Musharraf; religious thugs were alwaysavailable to counter the any ethnic

movement in Baluchistan. In addition,South Punjab (faced with the Seraiki ethnicproblem), the Hazara Shiite minority inNWFP and northern areas were suppressedby these so-called new Islamists under theprotection of the center. The cult of

violence is spreading fast within Pakistanscivil society without any sign of anabatement of ethnic unrest. Ethnic groupshave their own legitimate aspirations whichno amount of jihadist mindset (being

promoted by powerful vested interests) cansuppress.

Ethnic groups, particularly the Sindhis,Baluchis and Muhajirs, have a heightenedpolitical consciousness and will not barteraway their legitimate aspirations for anillusionary Islamic identity. However, thisdoes not mean that they are not goodMuslims. In fact, they are much betterMuslims that those selling the 'Islamic'

identity to them. Womens rightsmovements against the HudoodOrdinance in


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the dark days of Zias martial law and thelawyers movement for the restoration ofthe Judiciary depict yet another facet ofPakistani society which has unfortunatelybeen hijacked by a few obscurantists.

LACK OF AUNIFIEDAPPROACHTOWARDSIJTEHADWITHIN THE CLERGY

Intrusion of religion in politics is also due toa lack of the Islamic tradition of Ijtihad

whereby religious clerics render anindependent interpretation of the Quran

with a view to apply Quranic laws tochanging circumstances. Todays Pakistanhas several of these so-called ulema and

religious leaders, but the political power ofthese leaders does not permit the realreligious scholars to articulate a definitiveinterpretation of the holy text. Moreover,scholars who dare to label the killing ofinnocent civilians in the name of religion asun-Islamic, face threats and harsh criticismfrom religious political parties whose most-favoured tool for public mobilization isoften a call for jihad against the infidels.It is also to be noted that the word 'jihad' is

being utterly misused by Pakistani religiousfanatics.

It is interesting to note that one does notfind in the Qur'an the word 'jihad' in thesense in which it is being popularly used,that is, 'holy war'. The word in the Qur'anfor war is 'qitaal' and not jihad. The word'jihad' is used in its literal sense, which is tostrive, assert or make efforts. Thus, jihad inthe Qur'anic terminology means to assert

oneself or to make efforts to promote whatis right and to prohibit what is evil.

A simplistic and overzealous attempt tointroduce the laws of a totally differentsocial formation into the socio-politicalfabric of a post-colonial, urbanizing,pluralistic society with an increasingbreakdown of primary group ties, canneither serve to maintain peace nor meet the

ends of justice. On the contrary it breedsviolence and contempt for the existing legalsystem and rule of law.


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13

IV. Politico-Religious Mobilization: Towards anUnderstanding

In an age denounced by some religiousleaders as secular, there is irony in theincreasing interaction, interplay andconvergence between religious and politicalextremism. In analyzing religious extremism,it is important to understand that religiousextremism does not have a single definition.In particular, contrary to what Mark

Juergensmeyer and others have suggested,not all religious extremism is a species ofreaction to liberal modernity or

globalization. It is wrong to assume thatreligious extremism is a new phenomenonor a late reaction to the processes ofglobalization (reaction against theliberalizing forces of Benjamin BarbersMcWorld).

The history of religious extremism predatesthe latest phase of globalization. Pakistandid not experience a sudden opening upafter the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was

already going through an Islamicglobalization in the form of a brotherhood

with Islamic states, particularly Saudi Arabiaon the one hand and Iran on the other, withthe US acting as a facilitator, at leastbetween Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Unlikethe rest of the world, Pakistan got a taste ofreligious extremism not long after itscreation. Though Pakistan had yet to

witness its violent manifestation, theinduction of Islamic principles into the

objective resolution of 1949, gave an edge tothe Mullahs in the Assembly. Later, in the1970s, with a liberal like Bhutto succumbingto the demands of religious parties todeclare Ahmedis non-Muslim, the groundfor religious extremism had been laid. The

Jihad against communism and Ziasaccommodation of the religious right,transformed the society from a tolerantMuslim society to one hijacked by theDeobandi/Wahabi mindset, led by the

Taliban.

Francis Fukuyama however, conceded inone of his most famous and articulatearguments that One is inclined to say thatthe revival of religion in some way attests toa broad unhappiness with the impersonalityand spiritual vacuity of liberal consumeristsocieties.16 This unhappiness was to find itsexpression, not only in the recourse toreligion, but in recourse to religiousterrorism. However, while this can beapplied to western/developed societies,

Pakistan is a different case.

Before the state embraced religion as a toolto legitimize its rule, religion was alreadydeeply embedded in society the differencelay in its violent manifestation. It was thetolerant, Sufi version of Islam that was mostaccommodative and has been practicedthroughout the sub-continent for centuries.

There was no spiritual vacuum that onecould identify which was filled by religion

and later developed into religiousextremism. It was the forced imposition ofthe philosophy on young minds and peoplein general that erased any memory oftolerance towards other faiths or even othersects within Islam. Hence Fukuyamasanalysis does not fit here.

The question that arises therefore, is that ifmilitant theology is more often aconsequence than a cause for militant

orientation, then what leads religious groupstowards militancy in the first place? Why didreligious groups choose violence to improvethe lot of their institutions and constituents,resisting repression and gaining politicalpower? One reason could be that religioussocieties, which favour one group overanother, suppressing all other competingsects, encourage furious and fanatical

16

Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History? TheNational Interest, No.16, Summer 1989: 14


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violence. Deobandi patronage by Zia forinstance, led to the rift with the Bralvis. Helater realized that the Deobandis were not ina majority (unlike today) and thus, had toaccommodate the Brelvis till such time as

various Deobandi sects had established firmroots in society, thanks to the moneypouring in from Saudi Arabia and the stateprotection extended to groups engaged inestablishing madrassas across the country.Sectarian violence between Shia-Sunniincreased many times and led to the creationof Shia groups to counter the Sunnis.

The politico-religious nationalisms havebeen greatly challenged by extremist

variants. Unlike their forbearers, thesevariants have several distinguishingcharacteristics in the Pakistani context.First, they assume the religious identity ofthe majority as not merely one importantaspect of the nations identity, but as centraland overriding, and hence the monopoly ofthe Sunni/Deobandis claiming a highlyquestionable majority, achieved throughcoercion and terror. Second, they considerethnic or religious identities to be different

from those of the majority, presumptivelyalien and disloyal, which led to the creationof a tiered conception of citizenship. Third,extremist religious movements are oftenpropagated by movements that believe thatcommunal and even terrorist violence arenormal and legitimate means ofpromoting their vision and of keepingreligious and ethnic minorities in their(subordinate) position. The politicalphilosophy of the Sipah-e-Sahaba in the

1990s, and in present times, the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) and

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), is basedon the idea of the survival of the fittest,

with the fittest being the followers of theirown group. Finally and perhaps mostdangerously, religious extremism fostersintense rivalries with other nations that donot share their religious identity. Though

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan is keen on havingthe sharia implemented only within Pakistan

for the moment, al-Qaeda-inspired groups

have no problem in extending their visionto other areas through force and terror.

As compared to many Islamic countries,Pakistan has been far more 'secular' and'modern'. Religious orthodoxy did not have

a place here. The military dictators, after all,were not religious fanatics (with theexception of Zia). In fact, Ayub resisted theinfluence of the orthodox 'ulema andintroduced many modern laws. Yahya Khantoo, by and large, refrained from invokingreligious orthodoxy for legitimizing his rule.Starting from Bhutto until Gen. Musharrafand the present government of Asif Zardarihowever, have been more accommodativeof religious orthodoxy.

The Taliban phenomenon was a naturaloutcome of the policies of the past. And themadrasas then set up in the North WestProvince are churning out large numbers of'Taliban' every year. Though they do notbecome ready-to-kill fanatics immediately,they have no exposure to the tolerant side ofIslam either. Thus, the emphasis is more oncultivating a jihadist mindset than providingtruly religious orientation. Most of these

madrasas have vested interests as they areunder the protection and supervision ofreligious parties; very few of them areindependent, and receive funds from varioussources, including some Islamic countries,most importantly, Saudi Arabia.

Whats Behind the Mobilization? An analysisof Pakistani politics raises the followingquestions:

Despite low electoral performance, what hasenabled religious parties to monopolizepolitics or make the mainstream politicalparties dependent on them? Is it the fear oflosing status that forces them to become apart of every political setup in the country,especially with military dictators, as historytells us? Or, is it because of the gap betweenexpectations and achievement of the youth,as Ted Gurr has argued, that they are willingto initiate and engage in all kinds of

protests?


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15

As in the case in Pakistan, it is religion thatprovides the valve for the release of peoplespent up anger and frustration againsteconomic and political problems.

DESIRE TO PROMOTE SPECIFICPOLITICAL GOALS

The root causes of identity mobilization arerelated to the underlying characteristics ofpolitics in a weak state and its susceptibilityto the intrusion of outside forces into itsbody politic. Sectarianism in Pakistandemonstrates that the imperatives of politicsin such a state combine with the interests ofinternational actors to entrench identity

cleavages in the political process.Instrumentalist and primordial explanationsof identity mobilization are insufficient. Thebehavior of international and state actors, inthe context of the structure of state-societyrelations, is also a causal factor.

Pakistans suffering because of religiousextremism is no secret. In Pakistan, theproblem is not simply antagonism towardsother religious communities, for instance,

violence against the Ahmadis or Christians,but even cleavages within the Muslimcommunity. Hardened religious Muslimgroups differ with each other oninterpretation which alters according to

various sects and often leads to acute formsof sectarian violence. Religion is politicizedand used for instigating terrorist acts by twodistinct sets of actors in Pakistan, whicheven though somewhat inter-related, showcertain differences with respect to their

objectives, areas of operation, and targets ofviolence.

First, there are sectarian groups belonging tothe Sunni and Shia sects of Islam that havebeen active in terrorist activities which aremostly, but not exclusively directed againstthe people from the opposite sect. Thiscommunal schism on sectarian lines was thedirect outcome of the process ofIslamization of laws in Pakistan, introduced

by President Zia ul-Haq in 197788;sectarian violence was very rare before this

period. The Shias, feeling empowered afterthe 1979 Iranian revolution and embitteredby Zias Islamization programme, created anorganization called the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-Fiqah-e-Jaffria17 (Movement for the

Imposition of Shia Law) and protestedagainst the presidents policies. They weresuccessful in securing escape clauses in thenew Islamized laws for themselves and inhaving the Shias, in general, exempted fromcertain aspects of those laws.

Not only did President Zia growapprehensive about Shia power in Pakistan,but the Sunnis were also agitated at the time.

They feared that people might seek

conversion from Sunni faith to Shiism inorder to seek exemption from zakat (theannual tax of 2.5 per cent on the savings ofMuslims to be distributed among the poor)or from other, more rigid Sunni family laws.

The vigilante Sunnis therefore, createdSipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan18 (Army of theCompanions of the Prophet).

The other set of religious extremists believein a grand agenda, and the movement or

network of the residue of the Afghan war.Concerned with a lot more than the ShiaSunni conflict, this group believes in aconstant war between the forces of evil(which includes the US, the West and allthose who support these states, includingMuslim states friendly with the US and the

West) and the forces of virtue, such as theal-Qaeda under Osama Bin Laden. Theresidue of the Afghan Jihad movement leadsthis group. With assured financial supply,

the group vows to bring an ideal Islamicsystem into the country. Thoughmainstream Islamic political parties inPakistan, deny any link to the violent agendaof the al-Qaeda, are nonetheless,sympathetic to its objective of establishing apuritanical Islamic system in the country and

17 See the official site of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-

Fiqah-e-Jafaria, http://www.tnfj.org/default.html18 For detailed information on Jehadi organizations,

see Amir Rana. 2007.A to Z of JehadiOrganizations in Pakistan. Translated by Saba

Ansari. Lahore: Mashal Books.


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any violence that takes place is sanctioned asan effort to please God. This behaviorexplains Ted Gurrs theory of relativedeprivation - despite being citizens of anIslamic state, these groups are still not

satisfied and content with the level ofIslamization of society. They compare theirstate with the ideal Islamic state whereSharia or Islamic laws are fully implemented.

FINANCIAL,SPIRITUAL AND EMOTIONALINCENTIVES BYLOCALS AND OUTSIDERS

Saudi Arabia erected a number of largeglobal charities in the 1960s and 1970s

whose original purpose may have been to

spread Wahhabi Islam, but which becamepenetrated by prominent individuals fromal-Qaedas globaljihadinetwork. Of these,the three most prominent charities were theInternational Islamic Relief Organization(IIRO; an offshoot of the Muslim WorldLeague), the World Assembly of Muslim

Youth, and the Charitable Foundations ofal-Haramain. All three are suspected by

various global intelligence organizations ofterrorist funding.19 From the CIAs

interrogation of an al-Qaeda operative, itwas learned that al-Haramain, for example,was used as a conduit for funding the al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. It would beincorrect to regard these charities as purelynon-governmental or private, as they aremistakenly called. At the apex of eachorganizations board is a top Saudi official.

In case of Pakistan, Saudi money andreligious ideology have made their presence

felt. The proliferation of religious seminariesfunded by quasi-Saudi governmentalorganizations, coupled with Zia'sIslamization drive, established Wahabi Islamas the official/high Islam. Under Zia-ul-Haq, a series of rigid and gender-biased'Islamic' laws were instituted including theZina Ordinance, a part of the HudoodOrdinance, Qisas and Diyat Laws, which

19 See the official website of the United States

Department of the Treasuryhttp://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1895.htm

(Accessed on 2 April 2008)

eroded women's legal rights, curtailed theirfreedom of movement, and banished themfrom the public space by making it difficultfor them to participate in activities outsidetheir house.

The International Center for Religion andDiplomacy describes the rise of politico-religious fundamentalism in Pakistan asfollows:

(Gen) Zia allowed the GovernmentDepartments and the Armed Forces torecruit madrasa graduates to lower posts.

This tremendously expanded the careeropportunities available to the products of

the madrasas. Secondly, Zia, a devoutDeobandi, was attracted by Wahhabism. Hepermitted a large flow of money from Saudi

Arabia for starting madrasas to spread theDeoband-Wahhabi ideology. Thirdly, Zia'smilitary regime saw a decline in publicinvestments in the social sector, particularlyin education. As a result, in many ruralareas, the only affordable schools availableto the poor people were the madrasas.Fourthly, helped by the Saudi money, the

madrasas started providing free boardingand lodging to their students. Many poorparents chose to send their children to themadrasas. This spared them theresponsibility of finding money for theirupbringing. The radicalization of themadrasas was a post-1980 phenomenon.20

It is unfortunate that that due to Zias tilttowards wahabism, wahabiclerics wereallowed to exercise tremendous influence

within the country, especially with theauthorization and support of the Pakistanigovernment and Saudi monarchy to spreadtheir hard-line brand of Islam. Young mindsalready suffering due to unemployment andpoverty, embraced the spiritual guidanceof the clerics for solace, not knowing that

20 See the website of the International Center for

Religion and Diplomacy, Washington DC.

http://www.icrd.org/index.php?

option=com_content&task=view&id=105&Itemid=104


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17

the relief they were being handed out wouldpush them instead, on the road to radicalismand religious extremism.

INDIVIDUALS FEELING HUMILIATED FOR

VARIETY OF REASONS TO JOINRobert Pape, a political scientist at theUniversity of Chicago, conducted a study ofsuicide bombers titled Dying to Win21 whichisbased on what Aristotle stated long ago,believing that ambition was a more powerfulincentive to sedition and revolution thandeprivation. He said: Men do not becometyrants in order to avoid exposure to cold.

The central role of communal humiliation ininspiring terrorism is the key finding of

Papes study. According to him, two factorslink Tamil, Palestinian, Chechen, and al-Qaeda suicide bombers. First, they aremembers of communities which feelhumiliated by genuine or perceivedoccupation (like the perceived occupation ofthe sacred territory of Saudi Arabia by virtueof the presence of US bases, in the eyes ofbin Laden and his allies). Second, suicidebombers seek to change the policies ofdemocratic occupying powers like Israel and

the United States by influencing their publicopinion in a sense making the occupyingpower suffer the same level of humiliationthey have felt.

It would be a mistake to treat prosperity as auniversal solvent that can deprive jihadistslike bin Laden of allies and sympathizers

within populations that feel humiliated byforeign domination or by being frozen outof politics. Ultimately, both foreign

occupation and domestic autocracy arepolitical problems that must find political,not economic, solutions. The campaignsagainst jihadism and global poverty are bothjustified. But they are not the same war.22

In case of Pakistan, the mobilization of thecommon people has been due to the fact

21 Bergen, Peter and Michael Lind., A Matter of

Pride: Why we can't buy off the next Osama bin

Laden.Democracy Journal, IssueNo.3, Winter2007: 13-1422 Ibid.

that the pre-partition religious parties couldnot prevent Pakistan from becoming areality despite their resistance. Thefundamentalist clerics opposed the conceptof Muslim nationalism, which they found

contradictory to the concept of MuslimUmmah which does not need a modernnation-state. After Pakistan came into being,these fundamentalist religious partiessuffered from a sense of marginalization,

which led to the feeling of humiliation.Therefore, in order to get even with theanti-Islamic forces, they argued that sincethe state was achieved on the basis of Islam,the state should be transformed into anIslamic one.23 Political mobilization thus

started and subsequently, led to theObjective Resolution in 1949, passed bythe Assembly in favour of Islamicorientation in the affairs of the state.

23 Bahadur, Kalim. 1995. Islam, Sharia, Ulama,

in Verinder Grover and Ranjanna Arora (eds.)

Political System in Pakistan (Vol. 4): The IslamicState of Pakistan; The Role of Religion in Politics.

New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications. Pp. 127-8


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V. Politics of Religious Extremism

Haqqani believes that gradually the politicalcommitment to an ideological state evolvedinto a strategic commitment to the jihadistideology, both, for regional influence andfor domestic reasons. For example, thePakistani military used Islamist idioms andtook the help of Islamist groups to keep outof power the elected secular leaders,supported by the majority Bengali-speakingpopulation. The Bengali rebellion and brutalsuppression of the Bengalis by the military

followed.

24

Religions role in Pakistani politics and itsmilitant manifestation increased severaltimes over after the anti-Soviet Afghan War.

The way the Kashmir struggle became moreof a religious struggle than apolitical/territorial dispute, says a lot aboutthe impact of religious extremism.

Of crucial importance for understanding the

impact of Pakistani religious extremism onthe states politics is to understand therelationship between religious extremismand violence committed by non-state actors.In particular, religious extremism tends toinspire religious violence and terrorism andalso, because of its persistence and

virulence, provokes reactive religiousviolence, terrorism, and even terroristmovements.

Most of the literature typically focuses onreligious extremism as a phenomenonoutside the government, ( practicalimplementation of the religious ideology,most of the things the proponents ofreligion in politics talk about can not beimplemented in modern state, religiousparties lack proper skills or mindset thatguarantees good governance in modern statesystem, hence they use either emotionalslogans or force to make people accept their

24 Haqqani, Hussain. Pakistan and the Islamists.

Current History, April 2007, Vol.106(699): 150

world view and manage to get seats inelections ) what happens when thephilosophy becomes a reality and tastepower, religious extremist parties whenthey come to power, use violence as a semi-official instrument of governance andpolitical self-preservation the MMA usedthe emotive phrase Islam in danger in the2002 elections in the backdrop of the USattack on Afghanistan in 2002 and approvedthe actions taken by militants and the

Taliban in the Tribal areas of Pakistanagainst the infidels.25

This shows that it is equally important toevaluate the impact of religious extremismon democracy. We have witnessed howreligious extremism has promotedmajoritarian and illiberal conceptions ofdemocracy that weaken the political rightsand civil liberties of religious minorities. Inother words, it is crucial to grasp the

important political role that religion and itsextremist variant play in Pakistan,particularly in democratic politics, how theseattract political support and exert politicalinfluence beyond core supporters andsucceed in shaping national politics.

The study demonstrates that the element offear exists in the religious groups in theMuslim majority state of Pakistan the fearof losing their identity and status. In order

to prevent this from happening, religiousgroups offered themselves to successiveregimes, whether military or civilian, inexchange for their support to the regime.

The social purity syndrome led them to laterget involved in making the state completelyclean of worldly vices.

The project of converting Pakistan into atheocratic c state, initiated by religious

25

Abbas, Hasan. 2005. Pakistans Drift intoExtremism: Allah, the Army and Americas War on

Terror. M.E Sharp Publisher. P.228


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19

parties that opposed the very creation of thenew state, has come a long way. But thebasic question still remains to be addressed.Having gone through half a century ofpursuing the celebrated objective at the cost

of fracturing the civil society with violentreligious, sectarian and ethnic conflicts, whatkind of an Islamic state do they have in the

works for Pakistan?

Realistically speaking, there is no idealmodel of an Islamic state to go by that canbe derived from the political history of theMuslim world. What is sometimes referredto as the original pristine Islamic State,ending with the assassination in 661 AD of

Hazrat Ali, the fourth rightly guided Caliph,is a misnomer because the seventh centuryHijaz was a tribal society in transition whichhad not yet evolved into a nation-state.

There is no consensus among the Muslimseven on the basic question of whether theIslamic state is going to be a hereditarymonarchy, a dictatorship or a democraticrepublic. The founder of Jamat-e-Islami andthe chief theoretician of the Islamic state,late Maulana Maududi, maintained that the

Islamic state would be a Caliphate(Khilafat), ruled by a caliph as the vicegerentof God, whose duty would be to enforce theLaws of God.26 While the Maulana explicitlyrepudiates Western democracy, he remainsnoncommittal on the method by which thecaliph of the Islamic state will be appointedto his exalted office.

In the context of Pakistan, it is of utmostimportance to understand that religious

philosophy and political violence may notnecessarily have a link in theory. In practice,however, there seems to be a strongconnection between the doctrine and thepolitics in the contemporary religio-politicalsituation in Pakistan. For example, Islam,

which calls for peaceful coexistence wouldnever appear to be the source of militancyand extremism. But the reality on ground

26 See the official website of the Jamaat-e-Islami

Pakistan, http://www.jamaat.org

tells us the story of violence and extremismin the name of Islam in the Muslim world.

It is often said in the West that due to lackof a true democratic system, religious

extremism flourishes. One can argue thatreligious extremism undermines democracy.Ironically, we have seen that at least in oneinstance in Pakistan, democracy facilitatedreligious extremism in the form of MMAsrule in the NWFP and Baluchistan througha legitimate electoral process in 2002.27 It isanother issue however, of how the membersof the MMA carried out their electioncampaign asking the voters whether they

wanted to vote for the Quran or America.28

The recent episode when theNizam-e-Adlregulation in Swat in the NWFP province

was passed by the parliament despiteprogressive, liberal political regimescontrolling the center(Peoples Party) andthe province (Awami National Party), is yetanother example that democracy is not apanacea to all ills, even though manyproblems can be attributed to authoritarianregimes.

It is true that successive militarygovernments depended on religious partiesfor legitimacy in Pakistan. In the initialperiod after independence, religious partiescould not play any significant political roleand the state tended to be most secular

when it had been most elitist and restrictive.Later, however, long periods ofauthoritarian rule, helped these scatteredreligious groups to claim political powerunder the shadow of the military

dictatorship. Therefore, what has exclusivelybeen a conservative group of Islamicfundamentalists, entered the arena of mass-based politics (for example the 1985 party-less elections) as a consequence ofdemocratic openings, even if short-term andpolitically weak. Unfortunately, thetransition to democracy in Pakistan afterlong periods of military rule, brought into

27 Abbas, Hasan.Op.Cit. P.2328 Ibid. p.228


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power, religious parties with aconfrontational agenda against the West.

Finally, there are a number of far reachingpolitical consequences of the intrusion of

religion in Pakistans politics. For instance,religious extremism fosters religiously-defined conceptions of national identity thatpolitically unify and mobilize peoples andserve as a benchmark of governmentallegitimacy. Religious extremism hasundermined democracy by promoting amajoritarian theory and in the words ofFareed Zakaria29 the practice of illiberaldemocracy that marginalizes anddisenfranchises religious and ethnic

minorities.

Unfortunately, religious extremism is oftenconsidered as merely periodic interruptionof the normal course of politics and nationalpolitical development, rather than a deep-rooted feature of the national politicalcultures. Religious extremism by its verynature is assumed to operate at the marginsof society rather than at the center-stage ofnational political life, but this leads to a

politically crucial and growing alliancebetween religious extremism and politicalnationalism.

Except for the relative isolation of sometribal communities in NWFP andBaluchistan, Pakistani society is exposed tothe cultural influences of a global urbanindustrial civilization. Any possibility of theimplementation of the Sharia laws seemsremote despite the various Islamic pressure

groups and religious parties, since thesociety is more at home with the South

Asian version of Islam that they haveexperienced for generations and are notready to replace it with anything foreign,be it Saudi Arabias version of puritanicalIslam or Irans version of the Islamic state.

Aaccording to the NWFP provincialgovernment, the recently signed Swatagreement with the Taliban was to control

29

See Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of IlliberalDemocracy, Foreign Affairs. November 1997,

Vol.76(6). Pp. 22-43

the law and order situation. On the otherhand, if the Taliban resort to violence andgo beyond what is agreed upon, PresidentZardari would have to reconsider theagreement.

Sufism which attracted large numbers ofSouth Asians to embrace Islam, does notbelieve in extremism of any sort. PakistaniMuslims are desperately looking for miraclethat can help them break the cycle offoreign-funded, highly-politicized Islam thatis still foreign to the 170 million people inthis part of the world.

The enforcement of sharia was never a

tradition in any part of the country untilGen. Zia-ul-Haq issued his controversialHudoodordinance because of itsanachronisms.

The orthodoxy of the Islamist politicalestablishment in Pakistan, particularly theWahabi-DeobandiIslam, does not have itsroots in the soil. This brand of Islam isdoctrinaire, virulently intolerant of diversity,misogynist and obsessed with jihad as

opposed to the faith and spirituality ofordinary people of Pakistan which issyncretic, tolerant, devotional and blendedin the mystical spirituality of the Indus

Valley and its languages. Song, music anddance are very much a part of this folkspiritual tradition.

However, it would be nave to think thatreligion in Pakistan will cease to exist as apolitical force; it will be the other way

round. It is therefore, important to pursuecooperation rather than confrontation,especially on the part of the policy-makers,to ensure the possibility of a happy synthesisin which ``essential elements of democracy

will be conveyed in the vessels of newreligious states.'' It is essential to know thedistinction between the religious orthodoxythat we need to fight and the finer moral

values of Islam that flourished in thespiritual land of the Indus valley that need to

be assimilated. To quote Haqqani, IfPakistan does not transcend the national


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21

ideologues and a dominant military, it willremain a perilous entity: a dysfunctionalstate with nuclear power.

In order to uphold the ideal of a modern

progressive state, and to tackle the politicsof medieval religiosity in a post-colonialMuslim majority state like Pakistan, adeliberate social engineering initiative isneeded. Despite severe limitations in

understanding, analyzing and definingmodernity and progressiveness, there is ahuge percentage of moderate, urban civilians

within Pakistans civil society, who have theintellectual quality, organizational ability and

experience of social activism and are theonly visible social force that can fight thereligious orthodoxy and play an effectiverole in establishing a modern state.

.

.


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VI. Bibliography

BOOKS

Abbas, Hassan. 2005. Pakistans Drift intoExtremism: Allah, the Army and Americans

War on Terror. New York: e.M.E.Sharpe

Bahadur, Kalim. 1995. Islam, Sharia,Ulama, in Verinder Grover and RanjannaArora (eds.) Political System in Pakistan(Vol. 4): The Islamic State of Pakistan: TheRole of Religion in Politics. New Delhi: Deepand Deep Publications.

Gurr, Ted. 1970. Why Men Rebel.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2001. Terror in theMind of God: The Global Rise of Religious

Violence. Berkeley (California): Universityof California Press

Jeuguersmyer, Mark. 2002. New ColdWar: Religious Nationalism Confronts

Secular State. USA: University of California

Press

Rana, Amir. 2007. A to Z of JehadiOrganizations in Pakistan. Translated bySaba Ansari. Lahore: Mashal Books

Taylor, David. 1983. The Politics of Islamand Islamization in Pakistan in James P.Piscatori (ed.) Islam in the Political Process.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vries, Hent De. 2002. Religion andViolence. Maryland: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press

ARTICLES

Chengappa, B.M. Pakistan: The Role ofReligion in Political Evolution. StrategicAnalysis Vol.XXIV(12), IDSA, March 2001.Available at http://

www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_mar01chbO1.html

Pipes, Daniel. 7 October 2002. The Waragainst Islamic militants. Human Events,Vol.58 (37)

Zakaria, Fareed. The Rise of IlliberalDemocracy. Foreign Affairs,November1997, Vol.76(6): 22-43

Haqqani, Hussain. The Role of Islam in

Pakistan's Future. The WashingtonQuarterly, Winter 2004-05, Vol.28(1)

Haqqani, Hussain. Pakistan and theIslamists. Current History, April 2007,Vol.106(699)

Bergen, Peter and Michael Lind. A Matterof Pride: Why we can't buy off the nextOsama bin Laden. Democracy Journal,Issue No.3, Winter 2007.

WEBSITES

Official website of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jafaria,http://www.tnfj.org/default.html

Official website of the Jamaat-e-IslamiPakistan, http://www.jamaat.org

Official website of the United StatesDepartment of the Treasury,http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1895.htm


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About the AuthorMs. Arshi is a Senior Research Analyst at the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, and

visiting faculty at the National Institute of Pakistan Studies (NIPS) and Department of Defenseand Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. She has worked as a researcher atthe United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life in

Washington DC.

Ms. Arshi specializes in Religion and Politics of Violent Conflicts with special reference to SouthAsia. She is a Graduate in International Peace and Conflict Resolution, from the School ofInternational Service (SIS), American University, Washington DC and is currently pursuing aPhD in International Relations at the Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad..

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