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Sadekar Enviro Engineers Pvt. Ltd Chapter 7- 1

Risk Assessment

Risk assessment is an essential part of the risk management process and is the overall term

covering the risk identification, analysis and risk evaluation part of the risk management process.

The Risk management process involves the following steps,

1. System Definition

2. Risk Identification

3. Risk Estimation

4. Risk Evaluation

5. Risk Control

6.Risk Monitoring

7. Risk Communication

As indicated in the earlier chapter the company currently manufactures oxime and in the

proposed expansion it will manufacture Isopropyl ethyl thionocarbamate & Oxime/ Polymer

solution ammonium & Potassium salt along with by-products.

In order to study the risks envisaged by the proposed expansion activities, the following

methodology was adopted.

Detailed study of all manufacturing activities

7.2.1 M.S.D.S.s

Brief M.S.D.S.s of all the above chemicals and other raw materials which would be used in the

manufacturing processes of products are used as reference for preparation of HAZOP study.

7.3 HAZOP Study

Introduction

The HAZOP Study for both the products has been prepared considering all the unit operations

and processes involved in the manufacturing of products.

Methodology

The documents pertaining to the processes such as rough P&I D made available by the client,

MSDS of the substances involved, etc. were studied. Detailed discussions were held with the

concerned officials of the factory.


Based on the above, HAZOP worksheets were prepared by applying standard procedures of

using guide words to generate deviations in the process parameters. Corrective actions wherever

necessary were indicated and presented below as HAZOP recommendations. The complete

HAZOP report is attached as annexure 7.1.

Table No.7.1: HAZOP Study Recommendations

Product name Recommendation

Number

Recommendations

Oxime 1 Nitrogen padding to be given on ST 301 2 confirm the size of RD on VR 201 3 1) Internal coil PI/PM programme to be prepare.

2) Grounding& Bonding to be done on R 400 3) Interlock to be provided So that Magnesium charging from H 400 do not allow for low level

of R400. 4 Tagging to be done on NRV & PA/PI

programme to be prepared. 5 Toluene Transfer line grounding & bonding to

be done. 6 Interlock to be provided for MTA addition in R

400 for low level & high level 7 PSV to be provide on HE 400 A/B 8 Separate MOV to be provided on P301 A, NP

charging line towards R 401/402. 9 Proper RD size to be provided on R 401 & R

402. 10 Proper size PSV to be provided on HE 401 A/B 11 Proper size PSV to be provided on HE 402 A/B 12 Proper RD size to be provided VR401 13 O2 monitoring system to be provided& use CP

403/404 during PF charging system. 14 RD to be evaluate& provided on R 403. 15 Proper size of RD to be installsS 403. 16 Proper size of PSV to be install HE 404 A/B 17 Confirm the size of RD & provided on VR 411 18 confirm the size of RD & provided on VT 402 19 confirm the size of RD & provided on R 405 20 50 NB pipeline size to be install on BP 403 to R

405 (D-80 & TXIB charging line) 21 High Alarm to be provided on T 413 with level

instrument. 22 High Alarmto be provided on T 414 with level


instrument. 23 Correct size of RD to be provide on ATFE 201 24 Correct size of RD to be provide on VR 214 A/B 25 Provide relief device on P 210 ( crude oxime

feed pump) 26 Correct size of RD to be provided on VR

217,218,219,220.221,222 27 PSV to be provided on HE 207 A/B

IPETC RD size to be reviewed through HEL

To avoid dust accumulation in working premises, Dust collector to be provided.

Continuous CS2 and O2 monitoring system to be provided and maintained.

Continuous Nitrogen monitoring to be done after defined interval.

Inerting of Hopper controlled by PCV and PSL meeting requirements of LNS2A to be provided

SIPX to be procured in antistatic jumbo bags. Hooter to be provided on level or agitator

interlock with level and charging hoper valve interlock

RD size to be reviewed through HEL. Temperature to be controlled by TCV on steam

supply interlocked with TIC on reactor. PVRV 40814 design at 25mbarg and it is to be

connected to the scrubber system SCR-402 S403 jacket hydro testing to be done.

Need to provide the hooter or alarm on DCS

SOP training to be provided to the operators SOP training to be given to all concerns and

recorded. Confirm check valve on MEA loading line to

VR201/VR400A will qualify as by insuring it is on the PI/PM list of safety critical Instruments. Also need tag nr on

P&ID Revalidation report on all vent sizes for all

vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for this scenario

Conservation vent of VR201 & VR400A to be connected to condenser and condenser vent to be


connected to scrubber SCR401.

Detonation arrestor to be provided between scrubber header and vent line of VR201 &

VR400A. RD size to be reviewed through HEL. PRV 41709 design at 25mbarg and it is to be

connected to the scrubber system SCR-402

Scrubber to be designed by considering extreme condition of increase in vapor load.

Revalidation report on all vent sizes for all vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing

for this scenario from process hazard lab. Possibility of providing cooling media during

decomposition to be checked

To be defined PM/PI program Pressure switch to be provided on CHWS &

CWS inlet line and indication with hooter to be provided.

Follow SOP and PPE matrix

High alarm indication and hooter to be installed

Insulation for safety to be provided over transferring line

Vent valve on VR-413 to be kept locked open

Conservation vent need to provide on VR-411

High level indication and hooter to be provided Conservation vent to be provided over STT-503

N2 blanketing arrangement to be done over STT-503


7.4 Aerial Location of Hazardous Atmosphere (ALOHA):

A Quantitative Risk Assessment based on the software ALOHA – Aerial Locations of Hazardous

Atmospheres was carried out. The criteria failure scenarios considered for ALOHA depend on

the type of storage whether above ground tank, drums in storage area or pressurized cylinders as

well as physical state of the chemical stored and chemical properties of the chemical.

ALOHA (Arial Locations of Hazards Atmosphere) is an atmospheric dispersion model

used for evaluating releases of hazardous chemical vapors. ALOHA is a part of software called

CAMEO (Computer Aided Management of Emergency Operation). CAMEO is one of the tools

developed by EPA’s Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPPO) and the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office of Response and Restoration (NOAA),

to assist front-line chemical emergency planners and responders. For the present calculation

version 5.4.4 is used.

CAMEO suite consists of three parts viz.

1. CAMEO: It is basically a chemical data base provided for calculations.

2. ALOHA: ALOHA allows the user to estimate the downwind dispersion of a chemical cloud

based on the toxicological/physical characteristics of the released chemical, atmospheric

conditions, and specific circumstances of the release.

3. MARPLOT (Mapping Applications for Response, Planning, and Local Operational Tasks):

Graphical outputs include a "cloud footprint" that can be plotted on maps with MARPLOT to

display the location of other facilities storing hazardous materials and vulnerable locations,

such as hospitals and schools. Specific information about these locations can be extracted

from CAMEO information modules to help make decisions about the degree of hazard posed.

Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGL):


Figure No. 7.1: Description of AEGL levels

THERMAL RADITION EFFECTS:

A Thermal Radiation Level of Concern (LOC) is a threshold level of thermal radiation, usually

the level above which a hazard may exist.

10 kW/(sq m) -- potentially lethal within 60 sec;

5 kW/(sq m) -- second-degree burns within 60 sec; and

2 kW/(sq m) -- pain within 60 sec.

Below are some effects at specific thermal radiation levels for which software was run.

37.5 kw / m2 (100% lethality),

12.5 kw/m2 (1% lethality),

1.6 kw/m2 (no discomfort)

The thermal radiation effects that people experience depend upon the length of time they are

exposed to a specific thermal radiation level. Longer exposure durations, even at a lower

thermal radiation level, can produce serious physiological effects.

OVERPRESSURE EFFECTS:

A major hazard associated with any explosion is overpressure. Overpressure, also called a blast

wave, refers to the sudden onset of a pressure wave after an explosion. This pressure wave is

caused by the energy released in the initial explosion—the bigger the initial explosion, the more

damaging the pressure wave. Blast waves can damage buildings or even knock them flat—often


injuring or killing the people inside them. The sudden change in pressure can also affect

pressure-sensitive organs like the ears and lungs. The damaging effects of the overpressure will

be greatest near the source of the explosion and lessen as you move farther from the source.

An Overpressure Level of Concern (LOC) is a threshold level of pressure from a blast wave,

usually the pressure above which a hazard may exist. In vapour cloud explosion scenario,

ALOHA will suggest three default LOC values. ALOHA uses three threshold values to create

the default threat zones:

• Red: 8.0 psi (destruction of buildings);

• Orange: 3.5 psi (serious injury likely); and

• Yellow: 1.0 psi (shatters glass).

ALOHA software is used to estimate the risk associated with release of pressurized gases. The

list of pressurized gases stored in the plant with respective quantity is listed in following table.

Table No 7.2: Tank Farm Storage Details (Day Tanks)

The summary of ALOHA for different scenarios for Mono Ethyl Amine are attached in

Annexure 7.2. ALOHA footprints for different hazard scenarios are presented in table 7.3.

Table No 7.3: ALOHA footprints

Substance Failure

Scenario No.

Effects considered

LOC Distance (m)

70% Mono Ethyl Amine

Direct Source

MEA / 01 Toxic area of vapor cloud

AEGL-3 270 ppm 1100

Sr. No.

Day Tank no.

Service MOC Diameter, mm

Length, mm

Capacity, kl

1 VR-201 70% Mono-Ethyl Amine

SS304L 1600 2600 6.15

2 VR-400A

70% Mono-Ethyl Amine

SS304L 1500 2200 4.33


AEGL-2 49 ppm 2000 AEGL-1 7.5 ppm 3700 MEA / 02 Flammable

area of vapor cloud

16200 ppm = 60% LEL

136

2700 ppm = 10% LEL

383

MEA / 03 Over pressure

(blast force) from vapor cloud explosion

8.0 psi --

3.5 psi 106 1.0 psi 154 Leak from

hole in vertical cylindrical tank Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning

MEA / 04 Toxic area of vapor cloud

AEGL-3 270 ppm 91

AEGL-2 49 ppm 226 AEGL-1 7.5 ppm 606

MEA/ 05 Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud

16200 ppm = 60% LEL

11

2700 ppm = 10% LEL

28

MEA/ 06 Overpressure

(blast force) from vapor cloud explosion

8.0 psi --

3.5 psi. 15 1.0 psi 13


Recommendations -

A) Mono Ethyl Amine. 1. A dyke is given to Mono ethyl amine tanks for collection of leakages and spilled

which are collected in basin or trench by providing appropriate slop, from where they

can be disposed off scientifically.

2. Protect tanks from physical damage.

3. Store in cool, dry, well-ventilated area of non combustible construction away from

heavily trafficked areas and emergency exits.

4. Post "No Smoking or Open Flames" signs in the storage or use area. There should be

no sources of ignition in the storage or use area.

5. Personal Protective Equipments - Butyl rubber, PVC or polyethylene gloves. Safety

goggles or safety glasses face shield. Safety shoes, safety showerand protective apron

should be used.

6. A copy of MSDS to be kept near the storage area which should be easily available.

7.5 DOW Fire and Explosion Index

The Dow index has been calculated for chemicals stored chemical storage area. Dow Index has

been calculated based on storages of chemicals. DOW Index have been separately calculated

area for PESO area, raw material godown area and Magnesium storage area.

For the chemicals stored in PESO area, the DOW Index has been calculated for all the raw

materials in storage considering Mono Ethyl amine as it has the lowest flash point and highest N

(F) rating as per NFPA Classification.

For the chemicals stored in raw material godown area, the DOW index has beencalculated for all

the raw materials in storage considering p-Formaldehydeas it has the lowest flash point and

highest N (F) rating as per NFPA Classification.

Table No. 7.4: List of hazardous chemicals and its respective DOW F& E Index


Sr. No

Chemical Quantity at any

given time,

Nh Nf Nr Material Factor

F&EI Degree of hazard

PESO Storage 1 Mono Ethyl Amine

( 24.39 Tones) 24.39 Tones

3 4 0 21 123.37 Intermediate

Raw Material Godown 2 p-Formaldehyde

(10 Tones) 10 Tones 3 1 0 4 6.8 Light

Magnesium Storage Godown 3 Magnesium metal 2 Tones 0 1 1 14 15.4 Light

The DOW Index work sheet and the respective storages and recommendations for all storages

are attached as Annexure - 7.3.

7.6 Toxicity (Monds) Index

Introduction

The principle and general approach used in the DOW method of hazard evaluation have been

further developed by ICI Mond Division, the revised Mond Fire, Explosive and Toxicity index is

a series of papers by Lewis (1979). The main developments made to the DOW Index in the

Mond Index are:

1. It covers a wider range of process and storage installation

2. It covers the processing of chemicals with explosive properties

3. A calculation procedure is included to allow for the off-setting effects of good design and

control and safety instrumentation

4. The procedure has been extended to cover plant layout

5. Separate indices are calculated to access the hazards of fire, internal explosion and aerial

explosion.

To estimate the Monds Index for raw materials in storage area following,


All the raw materials stored in the industry premisesare tabulated and data for their N (H) levels

and TLV levels are obtained. Based on their highest toxicity factor and lowest TLV level Mond’s

Index was calculated for Mono ethyl Amine, p-Formaldehyde for drum storages. Similarly

Sulphuric acid and Nonyl Phenol are stored in tank farms, Mond’s index was performed is

performed for both of them.Detailed methodology of Toxicity Index and the toxicity index

calculations are given in Annexure - 7.4.

Table 7.6 explains the toxicity index and degree of hazard associated with respective raw

material.


Table No. 7.5: Monds Toxicity index of toxic chemicals

Sr. No

Raw Materials Quantity Flash Point

UN Classification

Health Hazard

Threshold Limit Value

Flammability/ Reactivity

1 Toluene 6 Tones 4.40 Class 3 C 2 200 ppm Flammable/Toxic 2 Escaid - D80 1 Ton 750 Class 4 C 1 165 ppm Combustible/Toxic 3 Solvent- TXIB 10Tones 1360 Not regulated C -- NA -- 4 Methanol 1 Ton 110 Class 3 C 1 200 ppm Flammable 5 LDO 4.0 Tones 660 Class 4 C 0 N.A Combustible 6 HSD 1.0 Ton 320 Class 4 C 0 N.A Combustible 7 Mono Ethyl Amine 1.39 Tones < 17.90 Class 3 C 3 10 ppm Flammable / Toxic 8 Para Formaldehyde (96%) 10 Tones 710 Class 4.1 C 3 5 ppm Combustible/Toxic 9 Hydroxylamine Sulphate

(98%) 10 Tones N.A Class 8 3 Not Listed Corrosive/Toxic

10 Sodium Carbonate (98%) 5 Tones N.A Not regulated 2 Not Listed Toxic 11 Magnesium oxide (80%) 1 Ton N.A Not regulated 1 -- -- 12 Caustic Lye (20%) 1000 liters 1 IBC N.A. Class 8 2 -- Corrosive/Toxic 13 Sodium Isopropyl

Xanthate (SIPX) 2679 kg N.A Class 4.2 2 10 ppm Combustible/ Toxic

14 Nickel Sulfate Hexa-Hydrate

76 kg N.A. Not regulated 2 -- Toxic

15 Magnesium Metal 10 Tones N.A. Class 4.2 1 -- Combustible 16 Sulphuric acid (Tank

Storage) 13 KL N.A Class 8 3 0.25 ppm Corrosive

17 Nonyl Phenol (Tank Storage)

141 KL 1410 Class 8 C 3 5 ppm Corrosive


Table no. 7.6 : Calculated Mond’s Index and degree of Hazard for Hazardous chemicals.

Sr. No.

Raw Materials Th (Toxicity factor)

Ts ( Correction factor)

Mond’s Index Degree of hazard

1. p-Formaldehyde 250 125 7.12 Moderate 2. Mono Ethyl

Amine 250 75 6.535 Moderate

3. Sulphuric acid 250 125 7.25 Moderate 4. Nonyl Phenol 250 125 8.625 Moderate

Toxicity (Mond) Index recommendations:

1. Toxic material should be stored in cool place. It should be away from heat and temperature.

2. Toxic material can cause breathing difficulty therefore storage area should be well

ventilated.

3. Dyke or Spill kit should be provided for storage to limit the spill of materials. Suitable

Absorbent like sodium bi carbonate should be used to absorb the spill.

4. The storage area should not be congested and good housekeeping practice should be

implemented.

5. The chemicals should be stored considering their compatibility with each other.

6. PPE’s should be used wherever necessary.

7.7 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

Objectives of Disaster Management Plan [DMP]

The Disaster Management Plan (DMP) is aimed to ensure safety of life, protection of

environment, protection of installation, restoration of production and salvage operations in the

same order of priorities. For effective implementation of the DMP, it should be widely circulated

and personnel training through rehearsals/drills should be organized. Further, the management

should be able to demonstrate that its assessment of the consequences as good supporting

evidence. To tackle the consequences of a major emergency inside the factory or immediate

vicinity of the factory, a DMP has to be formulated and this planned emergency document is

called "Disaster Management Plan". The objective of the Industrial Disaster Management Plan is


to make use of the combined resources of the plant and the outside services to achieve the

following:

• Effect the rescue and medical treatment of causalities

• Safeguard other people

• Minimize damage to property and the environment

• Initially control and ultimately bring the incident under control

• Identify any casualties

• Provide authoritative information to the news media

• Secure the safe rehabilitation of affected area

• Preserve relevant records and equipment for the subsequent inquiry into the cause and

circumstances of the emergency. In effect, it is to optimize operational efficiency to

rescue rehabilitation and render medical help and to restore normalcy.

7.7.1 Onsite Emergency Plan

Salient Features of the Project and key personnel in formation and implementation of onsite

emergency plan is listed in table 7.7.

Table No. 7.7: Salient Features of Project

Name of Project M/s Cytec India Specialty Chemicals & Materials Pvt. Ltd. Address (Plant) Plot No – G-54, Butibori MIDC, Dist- Nagpur State –

Maharashtra. India. Nature of the Project Specialty Chemicals Capacity Products – 555 MT/M

By Products – 1323.5 MT/M Man Power 100 Nos Name of Vice President Mr. Arun Bharadi

Designation-Site Manager Key Persons in the Emergency Plan

Mr. Sachin Devadhe Designation - ( Health, Safety and Environment Manager)

Mr. Ajay Raut Designation- ( HSE Co-ordinator)

Hemant Kalbande Designation-( HSE Co-ordinator)

Sheetal Gotekar Designation- ( HSE Co-ordinator)


7.7.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE PLAN

On-Site emergency preparedness plan has the following objectives:

1. Safeguard lives and property at site and in its vicinity area.

2. Contain the incident and bring it under control;

3. Minimize damage to lives, property and environment;

4. Rescue and treat affected human beings;

5. To train the people to act efficiently and with confidence in an emergency.

6. Evacuate people to safe areas;

7. To minimize its occurrence.

7.7.2.1 Pre – Emergency Plans:

Pre – Emergency means the preparatory stage of the plan. It should be ensured that the prepared

plan contains all required provisions and details of facility to handle and to contain the

emergency situation successfully. The unit has to consider maximum and possible worst scenario

for emergency purpose while planning. The unit has to develop and maintain the essential

facilities, so that the emergency can be controlled and the damages are minimized in the shortest

period with proper use of all available resources.

The unit should be duly prepared and ready all the time to encounter any possible emergency,

while it may strike or not. Being a Specialty Chemicals Manufacturing unit various type of

chemicals are used possessing varied types of hazards and knowing the hazards of the chemical,

stored, handled or processed in the factory, the quick response action must be created within unit.

The structure of the plan may vary depending on the number of employees, materials, process,

and availability of recourses, location of site, size and complexity of the unit. It should ensure to

work out a plan with possibilities of various emergencies with likely to arise within unit. Further

the periodical rehearsal is also to be carried out to check and examine the effectiveness,

awareness and preparedness of the plan as well as services. The emergency planning is not a

substitute for good design, plant operating and maintenance practices. Therefore, the Onsite

Emergency Action Plan must be followed to avoid emergency.

7.7.2.2 Periodic Checking Schedule-


To check availability, work ability and take necessary actions for replacement and maintenance,

if required. Check resources of water. Keep all emergency and essential Telephone Nos. with

contact persons, suppliers for the same handy. Contact details may be displayed on the boards

installed at prominent locations in the plant and offices. Maintain the co- ordination with other

fire – services. Also the Firefighting system and PPE should be checked if they are in working

condition and proper maintenance should be done.

7.7.2.3Preventive Maintenance (To Avoid Emergency)

A scheduled periodical preventative maintenance and inspection of the plants, Reactors,

centrifuges, equipment’s, storage tanks, air compressors, D.G. Sets etc. are as per laid down

procedures and check that records are maintained properly. Check the test, examination and

certification have been carried out within reasonable period.

7.7.2.4Training

By imparting an effective training to the plant supervisors, inspectors, and education and training

of the workers from time to time, the awareness is to be kept alive all the time to ensure safety

awareness, preparedness for emergency situations, good housekeeping, discipline, etc. Display of

safety slogans, operative instructions and motivation for safety should be made part of the

company’s normal activities. All the persons earmarked for the emergency services are to be

trained to respond to the emergency. The company conducts internal & external training for

Environment Health & safety. The training should be conducted at a documented frequency. The

external training should be conducted six monthly and internal training is conducted every

month.

7.7.2.5 Monitoring the Environment

Continuous and periodic monitoring of environment is required for detection of a possible

damage or a risky situation arises.

7.7.2.6Mock Drill

Organize the periodical mock drill / rehearsal as per suggested format by creating an emergency

situation so as to verify preparedness and awareness as well as shortcomings on the part of the


person to overcome the same. Provide sufficient time prior to mock drill to the emergency

services and public for proper response to exercise and provide training also. Record the

deficiencies of the system during the trial and take appropriate actions to improve the efficiency

of the plan in terms of preparedness and response.

7.7.2.7 Maintenance of Records

Keep the records of the monitoring conditions, safety systems, storage levels, process condition,

etc. and maintain the log- books, registers etc. Keep the M.S.D.S. and onsite emergency plan

with required details in a place from where they are readily available.

7.7.2.8 Emergency Control Room

The equipped Emergency Control Room should be in working order. The plant layout maps,

drawing, storage details, Material safety Data Sheets (MSDS), emergency operations, manuals

etc. should be kept and should be updated continuously. List of essential telephone Nos. is also

maintained up to date. The senior and expert person should be posted as in charge of the control

room.

7.7.2.9 Command & Control

The organization chart, for the emergency plan has been given which explains the chart of

command, channel of information flow, and actions as required during the emergency. The

single organizational structure has been created on striking emergency and the same shall be

continued till the emergency over. The Shift Supervisor shall take the initial charge as incident

controller; he will be coordinating with various agencies effectively to combat the situation. The

security office room will be used as emergency control Room. The security gate will be used as

Assembly point. The Factory Manager will act as site main controller for the unit. On arrival, he

will supervise all activities with the help of asst. Plant incharge.

7.7.2.10Identification of Hazards

The type of hazards have been identified in the previous section accordingly and risk

quantification is also been done for all hazardous raw materials.


7.7.3 Fire controlling measures in case of emergency situation:

In the plant premise different control measures shall be applied to control and extinguish fire in

accidental situations. Following list details the availability of such measures available at different

plant locations.

List of fire extinguishers provided

1. No. of fire extinguishers – 138 no.

2. Type of extinguishers – DCP/CO2/Foam Type/D-Type/Water CO2

3. Location of Fire Extinguishers: As given below

Table No.7.8: Details of fire extinguishers with location

Sr. No. Type Location Warehouse Dept. 1 DCP (2no.) Old warehouse Store entrance 2 DCP (2no.) New warehouse Store entrance 3 DCP (2no.) Warehouse entrance East side 4 CO2 (2no.) Near Fire door 5 DCP (4no.) Emergency Exit 1 Front & back side 6 DCP (4no.) Emergency Exit 2 Front & back side Laboratory 7 DCP (1no.) Lab emergency exit 8 CO2 (1no.) Retention sample room 9 CO2 (2no.) Lab ( inside) Plant 10 CO2 (1no.) Plant entrance North side (C 10) 11 CO2 (1no.) At C8 (Ground Floor) 12 CO2 (1no.) At C6(Ground Floor) 13 CO2 (1no.) At C4(Ground Floor) 14 Foam (1no.) Near R-400 15 CO2 (1no.) At C2(Ground Floor) 16 DCP (8no.) At A10,8,5,3 &D 7,5,3,1(Ground Floor) 17 Foam (1no.) Near R-400 1st floor 18 CO2 (3no.) At B 3,7,9 ( Ist Floor) 19 DCP (6no.) At C5,7 & A7,10 & D5,8 ( 1st Floor) 20 CO2 (2no.) At A 9,6 (2nd Floor) 21 DCP (6no.) At A5,B2 &D 6,7,8 (2nd Floor)/Near T-413 Utility 22 Water CO2 (3no) Biomass area 23 DCP (1no.) Entrance cooling tower pump


24 CO2 (1no.) Nitrogen plant 25 CO2 (2no.) Compressor shed 26 DCP (1no.) Near old Tharmopac 27 CO2 (1no.) MCC entrance 28 CO2 (1no.) MCC inside 29 CO2 (1no.) MCC inside 30 CO2 (1no.) MCC back entrance 31 CO2 (1no.) Maintaince Workshop 32 DCP (1no.) Maintaince workshop 33 CO2 (4no.) 33 kv Substation inside 34 DCP (2no.) Near HT room 35 DCP (1no.) Near pilot plant 36 DCP (1no.) Site entry from canteen Admin block 37 CO2 (1no.) Office entrance 38 CO2 (1no.) Near FM 200 Panel 39 DCP (1no.) Ground floor passage 40 CO2 (1no.) 1st floor Entrance Conference room 41 CO2 (1no.) 1st near Electrical room Explosive Godown 42 Foam (1no.) Expl.godown area entry 43 DCP (4no.) Explosive godown entry 44 DCP (1no.) Changing room entrance Pump House 45 CO2 (1no.) Inside Pump house 46 CO2 (1no.) Inside Pump house 47 DCP (1no.) Entrance ECC room Rack room 48 CO2 (2no.) Both entrance Instrument room 49 CO2 (2no.) Both entrance 50 DCP (1no.) Security gate 1 Magnesium godown 51 DCP (2no.) At both entrance 52 D-Type (2 no.) At both entrance

Byproduct 53 DCP (2no.) Ground floor 54 CO2 (1no.) Ground floor 55 CO2 (1no.) 1st floor 56 DCP (2no.) 1st floor 57 DCP (2no.) 2nd floor Hazardous Waste storage shed 58 DCP (6no.) East & south side of HWSS


59 Foam (4no.) East & north side of HWSS

7.7.4 Fire Fighting Systems

Table No.7.9: Details of fire fighting system

Fire Fighting Tank Details Capacity of Fire Fighting tanks 300 KL Type of tank Overhead/ Below head Underground Material of Construction RCC Pump Capacity of fire fighting tank Main pump – 273 m3/hr and head

of 88 metres. No of assembly points 2 no. Gate – 2

Plant North west side No of exit points for emergency evacuation 3 no. of gates Fire Hydrant system Yes No of fire hydrant points in the premises 38 no.

7.7.4.1 Water requirement for Fire Fighting and Back – up Time Calculation.

The amount of water required for firefighting purpose can be estimated by the below formula:

Water required in liters per minutes = (A + B +C + D)/20

A) The total area in sq.mtr of all Floors including galleries in all building of the factory (Total Built up Area) = 8399.7 sq.m.

B) The total area in sq.mtr of all Floors and galleries including open spaces in which combustible materials (Total Area wherever raw material is stored + Tank farm yard area) = 12417.81 sq.m.

C) The total area in sq.mtr of all Floors over 15 mtr above ground level = NIL sq.m.

D) The total area in sq.mtr of all floors of buildings other than those of fire resisting construction of various floors is so certified by any fire association or fire insurance company = 148 sq.m.

Water required in liters per minutes = (8399.7 +12417.81 + NIL+ 148)/20

= 1048 lit/min = 1.048m3/min


The quantity of firefighting tank is 300 m3.

Time (min) = [Total water in fire fighting tank (m3)]/water required m3/min

= 300/ 1.048

= 286.26 min = 286/60 = 4 Hrs. 77 Minutes.

Therefore the capacity is justified. As the back-up water supply will last for 4.77 hours.

7.7.4.2 Justification considering pump capacity

The pump capacity in the plant is 273m3/hr, therefore according to the discharge capacity of the pump installed. The back-up time by which the tank will be empty is calculated below,

Time (min) = [Total water in fire fighting tank (m3)]/discharge capacity (m3

Sr. No.

/hr)

= 300/273

= 1.098 Hours i.e 66 mins.

Back-up time will be 66 mins.

Table No. 7.10: Location of fire hydrant points in the premises

Type Capacity Location 1 Canvas 45Mtrs Near Pump House Area 2 Canvas 45 Mtrs Near Gate No. 1 parking area 3 Canvas 45 Mtrs North side warehouse 4 Canvas 45 Mtrs North side fencing area 5 Canvas 45 Mtrs North side fencing area 6 Canvas 45 Mtrs North side fencing area 7 Canvas 45 Mtrs North side fencing area 8 Canvas 45 Mtrs Near explosive godown Westside charbhuja 9 Canvas 45 Mtrs South side explosive godown 10 Canvas 45 Mtrs In front of explosive godown 11 Canvas 45 Mtrs Backside NP tank 12 Canvas 45 Mtrs Back side Mg. Godown 13 Canvas 45 Mtrs South side of Mg. Godown 14 Canvas 45 Mtrs Near Gammon wall 15 Canvas 45 Mtrs West side Nitrogen plant 16 Canvas 45 Mtrs South side nitrogen plant 17 Canvas 45 Mtrs South side Thermo pack 18 Canvas 45 Mtrs South side MCC room


19 Canvas 45 Mtrs East side MCC room 20 Canvas 45 Mtrs South side warehouse 21 Canvas 45 Mtrs South side substation 22 Canvas 45 Mtrs East side new canteen 23 Canvas 45 Mtrs East side canteen toilet 24 Canvas 45 Mtrs Near gate No. 2 25 Canvas 45 Mtrs South side pump house 26 Canvas 45 Mtrs East side ware house 27 Canvas 45 Mtrs Back side Admin Building 28 Canvas 45 Mtrs North side MCC room 29 Canvas 45 Mtrs South side warehouse 30 Canvas 45 Mtrs South side warehouse 31 Canvas 45 Mtrs South side of 4.6 Mtr plant area 32 Canvas 45 Mtrs East side H2SO4 tank 33 Canvas 45 Mtrs North side air compressor 34 Canvas 45 Mtrs North side boiler area 35 Canvas 45 Mtrs Plant First floor East side 36 Canvas 45 Mtrs Plant Second floor North side 37 Canvas 45 Mtrs Plant First floor South side 38 Canvas 45 Mtrs Plant Second floor South side

7.7.5 Flow Diagram showing Key Persons involved in Emergency Situation and their

hierarchy.


Figure No. 7.2: Schematic Representation of organizational structure of environment management

7.7.6 Emergency Responsibilities

The responsibilities of the key personnel are appended below.

Safety assistant

• On knowing about emergency, rushes to ECC.

• Helps the Incident Controller in containment of the emergency.


• Ensures fire pumps in operating conditions and instructs pump house operator to be ready

for any emergency with standby arrangement.

• Guides the fire fighting crew i.e. firemen, trained plant personnel and security staff.

• Organizes shifting the fire fighting facilities to the emergency site, if required.

• Takes guidance of the Incident Controller for firefighting as well as assesses the

requirements of outside help.

• Arranges to control the traffic at the gate and the incident area.

• Directs the security staff to the incident site to take part in the emergency operations

under his guidance and supervision.

• Evacuates the people in the plant or in the nearby areas as advised by Site Controller.

• Searches for casualties and arranges proper aid for them.

• Assembles a search and evacuation team.

• Arranges for safety equipment for the members of this team.

• Decides which paths the evacuated workers should follow.

• Maintains law and order in the area and, if necessary, seeks the help of police.

7.7.7 Safety Supervisor

• In the event of failure of electric supply and thereby internal telephone, sets up

communication point and establishes contact with the Emergency Control Centre (ECC).

• Organizes medical treatment to the injured and, if necessary, arrange to shift the injured

to nearby hospitals.

• Mobilizes extra medical help from outside, if necessary.

• Keeps a list of qualified first aiders of the factory and seeks their assistance.

• Maintains first aid and medical emergency requirements.

• Makes sure that all safety equipment is made available to the emergency team.

• Assists Site Controller with necessary data and to coordinate the emergency activities.

• Assists Site Controller in updating the emergency plan, organizing mock drills,

verification of inventory of emergency facilities and furnishing report to Site Controller.

• Maintains liaison with Civil Administration.

• Ensures availability of canteen facilities and maintenance of rehabilitation centre.


• He will liaise with Site Controller/Incident Controller.

• Ensures transportation facility.

• Ensures availability of necessary cash for rescue/rehabilitation and emergency

expenditure.

• Controls rehabilitation of affected areas on discontinuation of emergency.

• Makes available diesel/petrol for transport vehicles engaged in emergency operation.

7.7.8 Safety Manager

• He would assist Site Controller and Incident Controller.

• Maintains essential services like Diesel Generator, Water, Fire Water, compressed

Air/Instrument Air and power supply for lighting.

• He would plan alternate facilities in the event of power failure, to maintain essential

services such as lighting, refrigeration plant etc.

• He would organize separate electrical connections for all utilities and emergency services

so that in the event of emergency or fires, essential services and utilities are not affected.

• Gives necessary instructions regarding emergency electrical supply, isolation of certain

sections etc. to shift in charge and electricians.

• Ensures availability of adequate quantities of protective equipment and other emergency

materials, spares etc.

7.7.9 General Responsibilities of Employees during an Emergency

During an emergency, it becomes more enhanced and pronounced when an emergency warning

is raised; the workers, if they are in charge of process equipment, should adopt safe and

emergency shut down and attend to any prescribed duty as essential employee. If no such

responsibility is assigned, he should adopt a safe course to assembly point and await instructions.

He should not resort to spread panic. On the other hand, he must assist emergency personnel

towards objectives of DMP.

7.7.10 Emergency Facilities

7.7.10.1 Emergency Control Centre (ECC)

M/s Cytec India Specialty Chemicals & Materials Pvt. Ltd.. has established an Emergency

Control Centre. It has external telephone, telefax and telex facility. All the Site Controller/


Incident Controller Officers, Senior Personnel would be located here. The following information

and equipment will be provided at the Emergency Control Centre (ECC):

• Intercom, telephone

• P and T telephone

• Safe contained breathing apparatus

• Fire suit/gas tight goggles/gloves/helmets

• Hand tools, wind direction/velocities indicators

• Public address megaphone, hand bell, telephone directories

• (Internal, P and T) factory layout, site plan

• Emergency lamps/torch lights/batteries

• Plan indicating locations of hazard inventories, plant control room, sources of safety

equipment, work road plan, assembly points, rescue location, vulnerable zones, and

escape routes

• Hazard chart

• Emergency shut-down procedures

• Nominal roll of employees

• List of key personnel, list of essential employees, list of Emergency Co-ordinators

• Duties of key personnel

• Addresses with telephone numbers of key personnel, emergency coordinator, and

essential employees.

• Important addresses and telephone numbers including Government agencies, neighboring

industries and sources of help, outside experts, chemical fact sheets, population details

around the factory.

7.7.10.2 Assembly Point

Number of assemblies depending upon the plant location would be identified wherein employees

who are not directly connected with the disaster management would be assembled for safety and

rescue. Emergency breathing apparatus, minimum facilities like water etc. would be organized.

In view of the size of plant, different locations are earmarked as assembly points. Depending

upon the location of hazard, the assembly points are to be used.


7.7.10.3 Emergency Power Supply

Plant facilities would be connected to Generator and would be placed in auto mode. Thus, water

pumps, plant’s lighting and emergency control centre, administrative building and other auxiliary

services are connected to emergency power supply. In all the blocks, flameproof type emergency

lamps would be provided.

7.7.10.4 Fire Fighting Facilities

First Aid and Firefighting equipment suitable for emergency are maintained well in each section

in the plant. This would be developed according to the statutory requirements. However, fire

hydrant line covering major areas has been laid. Fire alarms have been located in the bulk

storage areas.

7.7.10.5 Location of Wind Sock

Windsocks exist in the plant.

7.7.10.6 Emergency Medical Facilities

Stretchers, gas masks and general first aid materials for dealing with chemical burns, fire burns

etc. will be maintained in the medical centre as well as in the emergency control room. Private

medical practitioners’ help would be sought. Government hospital would be approached for

emergency help. Apart from plant first aid facilities, external facilities would be augmented.

Names of medical personnel and medical facilities in the area would be Prepared and updated.

Necessary specific medicines for emergency Treatment of burns patients and for those affected

by toxicity would be maintained. Breathing apparatus and other emergency medical equipment

would be provided and maintained. The help of nearby industrial managements in this regard

would be taken on mutual support basis.

Table No. 7.11: First Aid kit Facility

Sr. No

No of First Aid kits available

Locations where the first aid kit is Available

Components of First Aid Box

Person Responsible and designation.

1 Total 9 no. of First aid kits

Plant

1.Medium size sterilized Dressings

1.Sanjay Hejib ( Production Superintendent)


2.Sterilized Eye pad 3.Ointment for Burns 4.Diclot ointment 5.Sterilized Cotton wool 6.Cotton Bandage 2” 7.Cotton Bandage 4” 8.Triangular Bandage 9.Adhesive Plaster (2 cm X 1 meter) 10.Disposal gloves 11.Eye wash bottle 12.Breathing barrier 13.Safety Pins 14.Cold pack 15.Scissors 16.First Aid Leaflet 17.Antiseptic wipes 18.Gauge pads 19.Emergency blanket 20.Hansaplast

2. Vikas Mahajan ( Production Engineer) Laboratory

Vandana Deshbhratar & Alka Waghe ( QC Leader)

Warehouse

Uttam Biswas ( Warehouse Coordinator)

Utility area

Rambhau Matankar& Krishna Virkhare( Boiler operator)

Workshop

Devkumar Tambe ( Maintaince Supervisor)

Admin Building

Ashish Kale ( HR Coordinator)

Security gate no.1

Umashankar Singh &Jagdishkardate( Security Incharge)

ECC Room

Umashankar Singh &Jagdishkardate( Security Incharge)

OHC center VaishaliBhagat& Satish kewarti( OHC Nurse)

Table No. 7.12: No. of sprinklers

1. No. of sprinklers- 242 no

Sr. No. Location No. of sprinklers

1 Warehouse area 130

2 Explosive godown 112

Table No. 7.13: No. of smoke detectors

1. No. of smoke detectors- 99 no.

Sr No Location SD-4

Admin Building Ground Floor Reception area SD-5 SD-15 SD-16 SD-24 SD-32 Admin building ground floor Library room SD-6 Admin building ground floor Board Room SD-7


SD-8 SD-37 Admin building ground Electrical room SD-35 A.B ground floor pantry SD-13 A.B Ground floor Procurement Dept. record room SD-12

Procurement Dept. cubical cabin SD-13 SD-36 SD-38 SD-39 A.B ground floor Production Superintendent cabin SD-9 A.B ground floor Procurement Manager cabin SD-33 A.B ground floor passage SD-34 LAB Passage SD-1 QC manager cabin SD-2 Lab Leader(cabin) SD-3 R&D Manager (cabin) SD-25

LAB Room

SD-26 SD-27 SD-29 SD-30 SD-31 SD-23 LAB GC & HPLC room SD-28 SD-22 Lab passage SD-52 Admin Building 1st Floor Reception area SD-53 SD-54 A.B First floor pantry SD-59 A.B First floor round table room SD-62

A.B First floor Process/instrumentation/supply chain cubical

SD-63 SD-64 SD-65 SD-58 SD-69 SD-71 A.B First floor visitor cabin 1 SD-72 A.B First floor visitor cabin 2 SD-61 A.B First floor HR dept. cubical SD-66 SD-50 A.B First floor round conference room SD-45

A.B First floor Project/Finance /IT cubical SD-46 SD-47 SD-48


SD-57 A.B First floor Record room SD-81 Site manager cabin SD-40 HSE manager cabin SD-41 Instrument manager cabin SD-43 Project manager cabin SD-78 HR manager cabin SD-76 Maintaince Manager cabin SD-77 Finance manage cabin SD-75 Sr. Process Engineer cabin SD-68 Logistic Manager cabin SD-80 A.B. First floor Visitor cabin SD-79 A.B. First floor IT room SD-74 A.B. First floor Electrical room SD-51

Canteen

SD-52 SD-53 SD-54 SD-55 SD-56 SD-57 Canteen kitchen SD-58 Canteen store room SD-60

Maintenance office SD-61 SD-62 SD-2

Substation room ( HT & LT room)

SD-3 SD-4 SD-5 SD-6 SD-7 SD-14

MCC room

SD-15 SD-16 SD-17 SD-18 SD-19 SD-20 SD-21 SD-22 SD-23 SD-24 SD-25 SD-31 Rack room SD-32


SD-33 SD-42

Production/Safety/ Warehouse office SD-43 SD-44

Table No. 7.14: Type and no. of protective and rescue equipment on site

Sr No

Type No Location

1 SCBA 1 In front of warehouse 2 2 Ground floor plant North side 3 3 Ground floor plant South side 4 4 Boiler area 5 5 Explosive godown 6 SCBA cylinder trolley with

Bio-airline supply set 1 ECC Room

7 Tripod winch 1 ECC Room 8 Rope ladder 2 Warehouse 9 Public address system 2 ECC & Warehouse 10 Emergency Kit 1 ECC Room 11 MSDS/Evacuation

plan/Medical Emergency Response plan/OSEMP/Hydrant layout

Each 1 Copy

ECC Room

12 Fire proximity suit 5 Plant & warehouse 13 Alumina fire retardant suit 1 Warehouse 14 Pressure suit 7 ECC & Warehouse 15 Full face mask ( panorama) 10 no. ECC & Warehouse 16 Organic vapor cartridge

mask 15 no. ECC/Warehouse/plant

17 Flash light torch 2 no. ECC Room 18 Richet 10 ECC & Warehouse 19 PPE cupboard 8 no. Plant Ground floor Northside 20 Plant Ground floor Southside 21 Plant 4.6 Level Northside 22 Plant 4.6 level Southside 23 Plant 8.6 level Northside 24 Plant 8.6 level Southside 25 Boiler room 26 Explosive godown 27 Safety shower SS-01 G. Floor entrance south side of plant 28 SS-02 G. Floor entrance North side of plant


29 SS-03 At 4.8m level Entrance from south side of plant

30 SS-04 At 4.8m level Entrance from North side of plant

31 SS-05 At 8.6m level Entrance from south side of plant

32 SS-06 At 8.6m level Entrance from North side of plant

33 SS-07 G. Floor East side of plant Near T-413 34 SS-08 In front of new warehouse. 35 SS-09 In front of warehouse ( old safety shower) 36 SS-10 Near pilot plant ( old safety shower) 37 SS-11 Near Nonyl phenol (ST-301 Tank) old

safety shower 38 SS-12 Near H2so4 Tank farm area ( New safety

shower) 39 SS-13 Near H2so4 Tank farm area ( old safety

shower) 40 SS-14 Centre of the Utility shed on the north side 41 SS-15 North west corner of the utility shed near

the platform stairs 42 SS-16 At ground floor Byproduct 43 SS-17 North east corner of the old DG set 44 EW-01 G. floor plant near T-406, C-7 45 EW-02 First floor Main plant Near S-403 46 EW-03 North east corner of By product plant 47 EW-04 1st floor of by product plant 48 EW-05 Inside GC/HPLC Room 49 EW-06 Inside New lab 50 EW-07 Inside New lab 51 EW-08 Lab sample room 52 PEW-01 Hazardous Waste storage yard 53 PEW-02 Explosive godown 54 Sand Bucket SB-01 In Front of Warehouse area 55 SB-02 Near Cage Elevator G.F Plant 56 SB-03 Near HE-217 57 SB-04 Near C-201 1ST Floor 58 SB-05 Near R-404 59 SB-06 Near VR-411 2nd floor 60 SB-07 Near VR-221 2nd floor 61 SB-08 Entrance 33 KV Substation 62 SB-09 Emergency Exit of LAB 63 SB-10 Near H2SO4 Tank 64 SB-11 By product area


65 SB-12 Explosive godown 66 Water Monitor WM-01 North side explosive godown 67 WM-02 South side explosive godown 68 WM-03 West side of main plant 69 WM-04 East side main plant 70 WM-05 North side of boiler area 71 WM-06 Near H2SO4 tank 72 Hose Reel HR-01 North side entrance of plant 73 HR-02 South side entrance of plant 74 HR-03 First floor plant north side 75 HR-04 First floor plant south side 76 HR-05 Second floor plant north side 77 HR-06 Second floor plant south side 78 HR-07 Warehouse south side 79 HR-08 Warehouse north side 80 HR-09 Admin east south corner ground floor 81 HR-10 Admin first floor 82 HR-11 East side of canteen 83 HR-12 Utility section(near D.M.plant) 84 Hose boxes HB-01 Near Pump House Area 85 HB-02 Near Gate No. 1 parking area 86 HB-03 North side warehouse 87 HB-04 North side fencing area 88 HB-05 North side fencing area 89 HB-06 North side fencing area 90 HB-07 North side fencing area 91 HB-08 Near explosive godown Westside charbhuja 92 HB-09 South side explosive godown 93 HB-10 In front of explosive godown 94 HB-11 Backside NP tank 95 HB-12 Back side Mg. Godown 96 HB-13 South side of Mg. Godown 97 HB-14 Near Gammon wall 98 HB-15 West side Nitrogen plant 99 HB-16 South side nitrogen plant 100 HB-17 South side Thermo pack 101 HB-18 South side MCC room 102 HB-19 East side MCC room 103 HB-20 South side warehouse 104 HB-21 South side substation 105 HB-22 East side new canteen 106 HB-23 East side canteen toilet 107 HB-24 Near gate No. 2 108 HB-25 South side pump house


109 HB-26 East side ware house 110 HB-27 Back side Admin Building 111 HB-28 North side MCC room 112 HB-29 South side warehouse 113 HB-30 South side warehouse 114 HB-31 South side of 4.6 Mtr plant area 115 HB-32 East side H2SO4 tank 116 HB-33 North side air compressor 117 Hose boxes HB-34 North side boiler area 118 HB-35 Plant First floor East side 119 HB-36 Plant Second floor North side 120 HB-37 Plant First floor South side 121 HB-38 Plant Second floor South side 122 Spill KIT SK-P-01 Plant Ground floor near T-406 123 SK-P-02 Plant ground floor near VR-410 124 SK-P-03 Plant 1st floor near R-404 125 SK-P-04 Plant 1st floor near C-201 126 SK-W-01 Warehouse 127 SK-U-01 Utility area near Themopack 128 SK-U-02 Boiler area 129 SK-U-03 Workshop 130 SK-E-01 Explosive godown 131 SK-L-01 Lab 132 SK-RS-01 Retention sample room 133 Walki-talki 3 no. Production Dept. 134 2 no. HSE dept. 135 1 no. QC. Dept. 136 1 no. Instrument Dept. 137 3 no. Maintenance& utility 138 1 no. Site manager 139 2 no. Security Dept. 140 FM -200 SYSTEM 1 no. IT room 141 Fire alarm system 1 no. Near security gate no. 1 142 3% Aqueous film forming

foam Trolley 1 no. Plant ground floor

143 Manual call point (MCP) 1 Admin B. Entrance of Emergency Exit 144 2 Main Entrance of Admin B. 145 3 Inside Lab 146 4 Admin B.1st floor near Emergency Exit 147 5 1st floor entrance of Admin B. 148 6 Canteen Entrance 149 7 Inside canteen 150 8 Canteen kitchen area 151 9 Entrance of Maintenance room


152 10 Workshop area 153 11 Workshop area 154 12 Entrance of MCC Room 155 13 Near DM Water tank 156 14 Near themopack area 157 15 G.F south side entrance of Main plant 158 16 G.F North side entrance of Main plant 159 17 1st floor North side entrance of Main plant 160 18 1st floor South side entrance of Main plant 161 19 2nd floor South side entrance of Main plant 162 20 2nd floor North side entrance of Main plant 163 21 South side 1st gate main entrance of

warehouse area 164 22 South side 2nd gate main entrance of

warehouse area 165 23 Entrance of Pump house area 166 24 Mg godown 167 25 1st floor passage of Admin B 168 26 Inside substation area 169 27 Inside substation area 170 28 In warehouse 1st Emergency exit door 171 29 In warehouse 2nd Emergency exit door 172 Safety Harness P(SH)-01 Production 173 P(SH)-02 174 P(SH)-03 175 P(SH)-04 176 U(SH)-01 Maintaince& Utility 177 U(SH)-02 178 U(SH)-03 179 U(SH)-04 180 U(SH)-05 181 U(SH)-06 182 U(SH)-07 183 U(SH)-08 184 C(SH)-01 Civil 185 C(SH)-02 186 C(SH)-03 187 C(SH)-04 188 L(SH)-01 Lab 189 Safety Ladder P(A)-01 Production 190 P(A)-02 191 P(A)-03 192 P(A)-04 193 P(A)-05


194 P(A)-06 195 U(A)-01 Maintenance & Utility 196 U(A)-02 197 U(A)-03 198 U(A)-04 199 U(A)-05 200 U(A)-06 201 U(E)-01 202 U(E)-02 203 U(E)-03

7.7.11 Emergency Actions

7.7.11.1 Emergency Warning

Communication of emergency will be made familiar to the personnel inside the plant and people

outside. An emergency warning system has already been established in the plant.

7.7.11.2 Emergency Shutdown

There are a number of facilities which can be provided to help deal with hazardous conditions,

when a tank is on fire. The suggested arrangements are:

• Stop feed

• Dilute contents

• Remove heat

• Deluge with water

• Transfer contents. Whether a given method is appropriate depends on the particular case.

• Cessation of agitation may be the best action in some instances but not in others.

Stopping of the feed may require the provision of bypass arrangements.

Methods of removing additional heat include removal through the normal cooling arrangements

or use of an emergency cooling system. Cooling facilities, which use vaporizing liquid, may be

particularly effective, since a large increase in vaporization can be obtained by dropping

pressure.


7.7.11.3 Evacuation of Personnel

There could be more number of persons in the storage area and other areas in the vicinity. The

area would have adequate number of exits and staircases. In the event of an emergency,

unconnected personnel have to escape to assembly point. Operators have to take emergency

shutdown procedure and escape. Time Office maintains a copy of deployment of employees in

each shift. If necessary, persons can be evacuated by rescue teams.

7.7.11.4 All Clear Signal

Also, at the end of an emergency, after discussing with Incident Controllers and Emergency Co-

coordinators, the Site Controller orders an all clear signal. When it becomes essential, the Site

Controller communicates to the District Emergency Authority, Police, and Fire Service

personnel regarding help required or development of the situation into an Off-Site Emergency.

7.7.12 General parameters

7.7.12.1Employee Information

During an emergency, employees would be warned by raising siren in specific pattern.

Employees would be given training of escape routes, taking shelter, protecting from toxic effects.

Employees would be provided with information related to fire hazards, antidotes and first aid

measures. Those who would be designated as key personnel and essential employees should be

given training in emergency response.

7.7.12.2 Public Information and Warning

The industrial disaster effects related to this plant may mostly be confined to the plant area. The

detailed risk analysis has indicated that the pool fire effects would not be felt outside. However,

as an abundant precaution, the information related to chemicals in use would be furnished to

District Emergency Authority (normally the Collector) for necessary dissemination to general

public and for any use during an offsite emergency.

7.7.12.3 Co-ordination with Local Authorities

Keeping in view the nature of the emergency, two levels of co-ordination are proposed. In the

case of an On Site Emergency, resources within the organization would be mobilized and in the

event of an extreme emergency, local authorities’ help should be sought.


In the event of an emergency developing into an offsite emergency, local authority and District

Emergency Authority (normally the Collector) would be appraised and under his supervision, the

Off Site Disaster Management Plan would be exercised. For this purpose, the facilities that are

available locally, i.e. medical, transport, personnel, rescue accommodation, voluntary

organizations etc. would be mustered. Necessary rehearsals and training in the form of mock

drills should be organized.

7.8 Off-Site Emergency Preparedness Plan

The off-site plan will be prepared with the help of the local district authorities. The proposed

plan will be based on the following guidelines.

7.8.1 Introduction

Off-site emergency plan follows the on-site emergency plan. When the consequences of an

emergency situation go beyond the plant boundaries, it becomes an off-site emergency. Off-site

emergency is essentially the responsibility of the public administration. However, the factory

management will provide the public administration with the technical information relating to the

nature, quantum and probable consequences on the neighboring population. The off-site plan in

detail will be based on those events, which are most likely to occur, but other less likely events,

which have severe consequence, will also be considered. Incidents, which have very severe

consequences yet have a small probability of occurrence, should also be considered during the

preparation of the plan. However, the key feature of a good off-site emergency plan is flexibility

in its application to emergencies other than those specifically included in the formation of the

plan.

The roles of the various parties who will be involved in the implementation of an off-site plan

are described below. Depending on local arrangements, the responsibility for the off-site plan

should either rest with the works management or, with the local authority. Either way, the plan

should identify an emergency coordinating officer, who would take the overall command of the

off-site activities. As with the on-site plan, an emergency control centre should be set up within

which the emergency coordinating officer can operate. An early decision will be required in

many cases on the advice to be given to people living "within range" of the accident; in


particular, whether they should be evacuated or told to go indoor. In the latter case, the decision

can regularly be reviewed in the event of an escalation of the incident.

Consideration of evacuation may include the following factors:

• In the case of a major fire but without explosion risk (e.g. an oil storage tank), only

houses close to the fire are likely to need evacuation, although a severe smoke hazard

may require this to be reviewed periodically

• If a fire is escalating and in turn threatening a store of hazardous material, it might be

necessary to evacuate people nearby, but only if there is time; if insufficient time exists,

people should be advised to stay indoors and shield themselves from the fire For release

or potential release of toxic materials, limited evacuation may be appropriate downwind

if there is time. The decision would depend partly on the type of housing "at risk".

Conventional housing of solid construction with windows closed offers substantial

protection from the effects of a toxic cloud, while shanty house, which can exist close to

factories, offers little or no protection

7.8.2 Aspects Proposed to be considered in the Off-Site Emergency Plan

The main aspects, which should be included in the emergency plan, are:

7.8.2.1 Organization

Details of command structure, warning systems, implementation procedures, emergency control

centers. Names and appointments of incident controller, site main controller, their deputies and

other key personnel.

7.8.2.2 Communications

Identification of personnel involved, communication centre, call signs, network, lists of

telephone numbers.

7.8.2.3 Specialized knowledge

Details of specialist bodies, firms and people upon whom it may be necessary to call e.g. those

with specialized chemical knowledge, laboratories.

7.8.2.4 Voluntary organizations

Details of organizers, telephone numbers, resources etc.

7.8.2.5 Chemical information


Details of the hazardous substances stored or processed on each site and a summary of the risk

associated with them.

7.8.2.6 Meteorological information

Arrangements for obtaining details of weather conditions prevailing at the time and weather

forecasts.

7.8.2.7 Humanitarian arrangements

Transport, evacuation centers, emergency feeding treatment of injured, First aid, ambulances,

temporary mortuaries.

7.8.2.8 Public information

Arrangements for: (a) dealing with the media press office; (b) informingrelatives, etc.

7.8.2.9 Assessment

Arrangements for: (a) collecting information on the causes of the emergency; (b) reviewing the

efficiency and effectiveness of all aspects of the emergency plan.

7.8.2.10 Role of the Emergency Co-ordinating Officer

The various emergency services should be co-ordinated by an emergency co-ordinating officer

(ECO), who will be designated by the District Collector. The ECO should liaise closely with the

Site Controller. Again, depending on local arrangements, for very severe incidents with major or

prolonged off-site consequences, the external control should be passed on to a senior local

authority administrator or even an administrator appointed by the central or state government.

7.8.2.11 Role of the Local Authority

The duty to prepare the off-site plan lies with the local authorities. The emergency planning

officer (EPO) appointed should carry out his duty in preparing for a whole range of different

emergencies within the local authority area. The EPO should liase with the works, to obtain the

information to provide the basis for the plan. This liaison should ensure that the plan is

continually kept up to date.

It will be the responsibility of the EPO to ensure that all those organizations, which will be

involved off site in, handling the emergency, know of their role and are able to accept it by

having for example, sufficient staff and appropriate equipment to cover their particular

responsibilities. Rehearsals for off-site plans should be organized by the EPO.


7.8.2.12 Role of Police

Formal duties of the police during an emergency include protecting life and property and

controlling traffic movements. Their functions should include controlling bystanders, evacuating

the public, identifying the dead and dealing with casualties, and informing relatives of dead or

injured.

7.8.2.13 Role of Fire Authorities

The control of a fire should normally be the responsibility of the senior fire brigade officer who

would take over the handling of the fire from the site incident controller on arrival at the site.

The senior fire brigade officer should also have a similar responsibility for other events, such as

explosions and toxic release. Fire authorities in the region should be apprised about the location

of all stores of flammable materials, water and foam supply points, and fire-fighting equipment.

They should be involved in on-site emergency rehearsals both as participants and, on occasion,

as observers of exercises involving on-site personnel.

7.8.2.14 Role of Health Authorities

Health authorities, including doctors, surgeons, hospitals, ambulances, and similar other

persons/institutions should have a vital part to play following a major accident, and they should

form an integral part of the emergency plan. For major fires, injuries should be the result of the

effects of thermal radiation to a varying degree, and the knowledge and experience to handle this

in all but extreme cases may be generally available in most hospitals. For major toxic releases,

the effects vary according to the chemical in question, and the health authorities should be

apprised about the likely toxic releases from the plant, which will enable them to deal with the

aftermath of a toxic release with treatment appropriate to such casualties. Major off-site incidents

are likely to require medical equipment and facilities inadditional to those available locally, and

a medical "mutual aid" scheme shouldexist to enable the assistance of neighboring authorities to

be obtained in theevent of an emergency.

7.8.2.15 Role of Government Safety Authority

This will be the factory inspectorate available in the region. Inspectors are likely to want to

satisfy themselves that the organization responsible for producing the off-site plan has made

adequate arrangements for handling emergencies of all types including major emergencies. They


may wish to see well documented procedures and evidence of exercise undertaken to test the

plan. In the event of an accident, local arrangements regarding the role of the factory inspector

will apply. These may vary from keeping a watch to a close involvement in advising on

operations. While the industry will activate the DMP and take necessary alleviating measures

and arrange to extend all medical and security support, the factory inspectorate may be the only

external agency with equipment and resources to carry out appropriate tests to assess the impact.

7.8.3 External agencies contact details involved during emergency

Table No. 7.15: Details of external agencies to be involved during emergency

Details of Hospitals Sr. No.

Name of Hospital Address Telephone Distances

1 Rachana hospital P-26,MIDC Butibori Nagpur

07103-262160 6 km

2 Maya hospital P-78,MIDC Butibori Nagpur

07103-684885 6 km

3 Wokhard hospital 1643,north Ambazari road Nagpur 440033

91-712-6624289/4444 40 km

Details of Police Stations

Sr. No.

Name of Police Station

Address Telephone Distances

1 Butibori police station

Butibori main chowk 07103-262221 7 km

2 MIDC police station

Near Central bank Butibori MIDC

07104-265135 2 km

Details of Fire Stations Sr. No.

Name of Fire Station


1 Butibori MIDC Fire station

Plot no. P-33,Near BMA office

07104-265465/66 3 km

Details of MIDC Offices Sr. No.

Name of MIDC Address Telephone Distances

1 Butibori MIDC Five star zone area, Near central bank 07104-265252 2 km

Details of Municipal Corporations Sr. No.

Name of Municipality



1 Nagpur Municipal corporation ( NMC)

Civil line Nagpur 0712-2567035 35 km

Details of Pollution Control Department Sr. No.

Name of PCD Address Telephone Distances

1 Maharashtra pollution control board ( MPCB)

Udyog bhavan, 6th

0712-2565308

floor ,near sales tax office, civil line,nagpur-44001

40km



IPETC HAZOP STUDY

Hazop Study Worksheet -1

Node: (3) Preparation of 30% SIPX solution by addition of SIPX powder / Pellets in water in S-403 Notes: Fresh Water (5563 Kg) is added from common water header to S-403 is done from DM plant through pump P-10 having flow 15 M3 / Hr.

Equipment details: - S-403, MSGL, 10KL

P & ID reference no. – IPETC-01-01-0400-01 Rev. 01, A5FP-25-25-1400-52

Parameter: Flow

HAZOP STUDY REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM DESIGN INTENSION Process steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Temperature DESIGN

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION No

. Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequence Safeguards S P R

3 No 3.1 No Flow

3.1.1. No DM water available in tank 3.1.2. Inlet or outlet valve in close condition 3.1.3 Circulation valve in full open position

3.1.1.1 Overheating of motor or churning 3.1.2.1. Overheating of motor or churning 3.1.3.1 No consequences

3.1.1.1.1 Float type level indicator at tank 3.1.2.1.1. SOP is in place and followed. Trained manpower 3.1.2.1.2 Water batch flow meter is in place at production block





3 Less 3.2 less Flow

3.2.1. Basket Strainer Chock

3.2.1.1 No Safety consequences

3.2.1.1.1 Water batch flow meter is in place at Production block 3.2.1.1.2 Preventive maintenance schedule is in place and followed

Node: (4)Gradually charging of SIPX pellets (within 1 to 1.5 hours)under agitation using charging hopper to create SIPX solution. Notes: Required amount of SIPX gradually is charged in packaged additions (Jumbo bag) of 500 kg. Temperature is at 45-50 °C with complete dissolution of added SIPX. Charging system is open hopper feeding via valve into the reactor with N2 purge. S403is inerted via N2 blanketing system controlled by PCV41003. Hoppers are provided with N2 relief line (vent) to safe location. Liberated gas generated in S403 are condensed through overhead condensers and captured in Scrubber system (SCR402). Equipment details: - S-403, MSGL, 10KL, RPM

P & ID reference no. – IPETC-01-01-0400-01 Rev. 01

Parameter: Flow

HAZOP STUDY REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM DESIGN INTENSION Process steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Flow DESIGN

RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION No Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequence Safeguards S P R

4 More 4.1. More Flow

4.1.1. Operator adds SIPX bag too quickly

4.1.1.1. Entraining of SIPX powder into condenser, pressurization of system, emissions to atmosphere and fumes of SIPX, clogging of condenser and pressurization Of S403. 4.1.1.2. Rapid charging of next bag of SIPX with potential flash

4.1.1.1.1. Rupture disc RD41010 on S403 of DN40 rated at 3 barg / T 145°C (LRS3C) 4.1.1.2.1. Solid Charging Systems for SIPX

RD size to be reviewed through HEL. To avoid dust accumulation in working premises, Dust collector to be provided. Continuous CS2 and




4.1.2 Charging of extra water than required quantity 4.1.3. Charging of extra quantity of SIPX than required quantity

fire due to static discharge from solids or bags - the decomposition by hydrolysis of SIPX in water solutions with the evolution of carbon disulfide gas that requires level 2 inerting control per SHE802 (Ignition Source And Internal Deflagration Controls For Process Vessels) 4.1.2.1 Overflow of S403 4.1.3.1 No safety consequences

Hopper CP405 that limit introduction of air during addition and eliminates operator exposure (LNS2A) 4.1.1.2.2. Inerting of S403 controlled by PCV and PSL meeting requirements of LNS2A

4.1.2.1.1 Batch flow meter available on reactor

4.1.2.1.2 High level alarm available on S403

4.1.3.1.1SOP to be followed

O2 monitoring system to be provided and maintained. Continuous Nitrogen monitoring to be done after defined interval. Inerting of Hopper controlled by PCV and PSL meeting requirements of LNS2A to be provided SIPX to be procured in antistatic jumbo bags.

Other Than

4.2. Misdirected sequence

4.2.1. Operator adds SIPX first instead of Water

4.2.1.1. There may be chances of damage glass line reactor due to addition of SIPX pellets during agitation in absence of water.

Hooter to be provided on level or agitator interlock with level and charging hoper valve interlock

Parameter: Temperature

HAZOP STUDY REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM DESIGN INTENSION Process steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Temperature DESIGN RECOMMENDATONS

/ ACTION

No. Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequence Safeguards S P R


4 More 4.3. Higher Temperature

4.3.1. Operator error steam valve opened, mass temperature exceeds desired temp. 4.3.2 Due to external fire

4.3.1.1. Due to high temperaturedecomposition may raise the temperature to the auto-ignition point of the carbon disulfide decomposition product , causing spontaneous combustion. 4.3.2.1 Over pressurize system, fail vessel, injury to Employee.

4.3.1.1.1. PVRV 40814 design at 25mbarg 4.3.1.1.2Rupture disc RD41010 on S403 of DN40 rated at 3 barg / T 145°C (LRS3C)

4.3.1.1.3. Rupture disc RD41010 on S403 of DN40 rated at 3 barg / T 145°C (LRS3C)

RD size to be reviewed through HEL. Temperature to becontrolled by TCV on steam supply interlocked with TIC on reactor. RD size to be reviewed through HEL. PVRV 40814 design at 25mbarg and it is to be connected to the scrubber system SCR-402

Less 4.4. Lower Temperature

4.4.1. Operator error, No steam applied to S403

4.4.1.1. Batch delay due to longer time for the mixing

SOP to be followed

Parameter: Pressure

HAZOP STUDY REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM DESIGN INTENSION Process steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Pressure DESIGN RECOMMENDATONS

/ ACTION


4 More 4.5. Higher Pressure due to(nitrogen used for blanketing in S-403 not more than 10mbarg)

4.5.1.PCV failure

4.5.1.1. No SHE consequences

4.5.1.1.1.PSV134502 on nitrogen header set at 0.88 barg RD provided on S-403 set at 3 barg at 145 Deg C. 4.5.1.1.2. After failure of PCV N2 pressure will not go beyond 15mbarg. 4.5.1.1.3. PCV preventive maintenance schedule is in

RD size to be reviewed through HEL. Temperature to be controlled by TCV on



/ ACTION


Higher pressure due to decomposition of SIPX High pressure

4.5.2. High temperature of S-403 content 4.5.3. Failure ofPRV103703/PSV103704

4.5.1.2 No SHE consequences 4.5.1.3 High pressurization of S403 in jacket due to failure of PRV103703/PSV103704.

place and followed. 4.5.1.2.1 PVRV 40814 design at 25mbarg RD provided on S-403 will protect the vessel set at 3 barg at 145 Deg.C

4.5.1.3.1 PRV103703 set at 3.4 barg and incorporated in PM schedule and followed. 4.5.1.3.2 PSV103704 set at 3.5 barg and incorporated in PM schedule and followed.

steam supply interlocked with TIC on reactor. RD size to be reviewed through HEL. S403 jacket hydrotesting to be done.

Parameter :Agitation


/ ACTION


4 Agitation 4.6. No agitation

4.6.1 Power failure 4.6.2 Human error ; forgot to start the agitation

4.6.1.1No SHE consequences 4.6.2.2 Homogeneous mixture will not form

4.6.1.1.1 Back up DG set 750KVA provided SOP available

Need to provide the hooter or alarm on DCS SOP training to be



/ ACTION


provided to the operators

Node: (5) Transferring of 30% SIPX solution from S-403 to R-405 or R-406 via pump P-404 Notes: After preparation of 30% SIPX solution, transfer it to R-405 or R-406 via pump P-404 of capacity of 5 Cu.M/hr. at 15M head with DN40 pipe sizing at the velocity of 1 m/sec. Equipment details: - S-403, MSGL, 10KL,: R-405, 16KL, MSGL: R-406, 12.5KL, MSGL:

P & ID reference no. – IPETC-01-01-0400-01 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-03 Rev01, IPETC-01-01-0400-07 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-09 Rev. 01

Parameter: Flow


/ ACTION




/ ACTION


5 More Less or No

Higher flow Low flow Misdirected flow

5.1.1 Not credible 5.1.2 Pump strainer blocked 5.1.3 30% solution is not homogenous 5.1.4 Charge SIPX solution in R-405 instead of R-406 or vice versa

5.1.1.1 No SHE consequences 5.1.1.2 Operational issue; batch delay 5.1.1.3 Operational issue; batch delay 5.1.1.4 Overfilling of vessel of R-405 or R-406 No safety concern

5.1.1.2.1Pump & strainer periodic maintenance schedule prepared

5.1.1.3.1. Viewglass is installed in the pump suction of P-404

5.1.1.4.1Interlock of level with transfer line MOV

SOP training to be given to all operators.


/ ACTION




/ ACTION


5 High Low

Pressure Pressure

5.2.1 Receiving line MOV closed 5.2.2 Human error; forgot to open suction valve of pump P-404

5.2.1.1 No SHE consequences 5.2.1.2 No SHE consequences

5.2.1.1.1 Power monitor installed on the pump, hence pump will be tripped

5.2.1.1.2 Power monitor installed on the pump, hence pump will be tripped

Node: (6) Preparation of 10% Nickel Sulfate Hexa-Hydrate solution by addition of solid Nickel Sulfate Hexa- hydrate in water at ambient temperature Notes: Fresh Water (688 Kg) is added from common water header to SR-401is done from DM plant through pump P-10 having flow 15 M3 / Hr.

Equipment details: - SR-401, PP, 6KL

P & ID reference no. – IPETC-01-01-0400-04 Rev. 01, A5FP-25-25-1400-52

Parameter: Flow




6 No 6.1 No Flow

6.1.1. No DM water available in tank 6.1.2. Inlet or outlet valve in

6.1.1.1 Overheating of motor or churning 6.1.2.1. Overheating of motor or

6.1.1.1.1 Float type level indicator at tank 6.1.2.1.1. SOP is in place and





close condition 6.1.3 Circulation valve in full open position

churning 6.1.3.1 No consequences

followed. Trained manpower 6.1.2.1.2 Water batch flow meter is in place at production block




6 Less 6.2 less Flow

6.2.1. Basket Strainer Chock

6.2.1.1 No Safety consequences

6.2.1.1.1 Water batch flow meter is in place at Production block 6.2.1.1.2 Preventive maintenance schedule is in place and followed

Node: (7) Gradually charging of Nickelsulfate Hexa-Hydrate to prepare10% NiSO4.6H2Osolution.


Notes: Required amount of solid NiSO4.6H2O gradually is charged from25 kg bag. at ambient temperature and atmospheric pressure in SR-401 vessel through manhole. Equipment details: - SR-401, PP, 6KL,

P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-04 Rev. 01

Parameter: Flow




7.1.1. Operator adds NiSO4.6H20 bag too quickly 7.1.2 Charging of extra water than required quantity 7.1.3. Charging of extra quantity of NiSO4.6H2O than required quantity

7.1.1.1. No SHE consequences 7.1.1.2. No SHE consequences 7.1.1.3 No SHE consequences

Follow SOP

Other Than

7.2. Composition

7.2.1. Operator adds NiSO4.6H2O first instead of Water

7.2.1.1. No SHE consequences


HAZOP STUDY REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM DESIGN INTENSION Process steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Temperature DESIGN RECOMMENDATONS

/ ACTION No Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequence Safeguards S P R


.


7.3.1Not credible as preparation is under at ambient temp ; No heating facility

7.3.1.1.No SHE consequences

Less 7.3.2 Lower Temperature

7.3.2.1 Not credible

7.3.2.1 No SHE consequences

Parameter: Pressure


/ ACTION


7 More Less

7.4. Higher Pressure 7.4 Low pressure

7.4.1. Not credible 7.4.2. Not credible

7.4.1.1. No SHE consequences 7.4.2.1. No SHE consequences

Parameter : Agitation

HAZOP STUDY REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM


DESIGN INTENSION Process steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Pressure DESIGN RECOMMENDATONS/

ACTION No. Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequence Safeguards S P R

7 Agitation 7.5. No agitation

7.5.1 Power failure 7.5.2 Human error ; forgot to start the agitation

7.5.1.1 No SHE consequences 7.5.2.1Non credible

7.5.1.1.1 Back up DG set 750KVA provided Follow SOP

Node: (8) Transferring of 10% Nickel sulfatehexa hydrate solution from SR-401 to R-405 or R-406 via pump P-407 Notes: After preparation of 10% Nickel sulfate hexa hydrate solution, transfer it to R-405 or R-406 via pump P-407 of capacity of 5 Cu.M/hr. at 25M head with DN40 pipe sizing at the velocity of 1.1 m/sec. Equipment details: - SR-401, PP, 6KL,P-407:R-405, 16KL, MSGL: R-406, 12.5KL, MSGL:

P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-04 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-07 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0400-09 Rev.01

Parameter: Flow


/ ACTION


More Less or No

Higher flow Low flow Misdirected flow

8.1.1 Not credible 8.1.2 Pump strainer blocked 8.1.3 Charge 10% NiSO4.6H2O solution in R-405 instead of R-406 or vice

8.1.1.1 No SHE consequences 8.1.1.2 Operational issue; batch delay 8.1.1.3No SHE consequences

Pump & strainer periodic maintenance schedule prepared

Interlock of level with transfer line MOV

SOP training to be given to all concerns and recorded.



/ ACTION


versa


/ ACTION


High Low

Pressure Pressure

8.2.1 Receiving line MOV closed 8.2.2 Human error; forgot to open suction valve of pump P-407 or bottom valve of SR-401

8.2.1.1 No SHE consequences 8.2.2.1 No SHE consequences

Follow SOP

Node: (9),Charging of 70% MEA to VR-201 / VR-400A by barrel pump BP-401/402. Notes: 70% MEA ischarged with electric barrel pump (max capacity 2 m³/H) from drum to receiver VR201/VR400A after QC control of composition. Based on DN25 charging lines, velocity of transfer is 1.4 m/s. VR201& VR400A is provided with CHWS and not provided with heating. There is inerting on VR201& VR400A


(N2 blanketing controlled by PCV40113& PCV40108 on these vessel respectively). Drum is grounded and bonded, having visible earth monitoring device / clamp; fixed piping and dip tube into VR201& VR400A. Drum charging line to VR201 & VR400A is carving on recirculation line of VR201& VR400A pump. Equipment details: - VR-201, 6.1 Kl, SS304L (Jacketed), VR-400A, 4.33 Kl, SS304L (Jacketed), BP-401/402, 2M3

HAZOP STUDY

at 10Mtr head,

P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-05 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-06 Rev.01

Parameter: Flow

REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM DESIGN INTENSION Process steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Flow DESIGN




9.1.1. High flow 70% MEA from drum into VR201 or VR400A

9.1.1.1. Electrostatic sparking / solvent vapor ignition; internal fire, explosion; employee injury

9.1.1.1.1. Grounding/bonding + dip tube into VR201 & VR400A 9.1.1.1.2. Nitrogen blanketing onVR201 & VR400A 9.1.1.1.3 CHWS provided on VR201 & VR400A

5 2 7

Reverse 9.2. Reverse Flow

9.2.1. Reverse flow from VR201/VR400A into drum; wrongsequence of valve

9.2.1.1. backflow of MEA from VR201/VR400A to drum with spill /operator exposure; drum wouldhave to be full

9.2.1.1.1. Check valve to prevent backflow cannot take credit for checkvalve until confirm

3 3 6 Confirm check valve onMEA loading line to VR201/VR400A will qualify as by insuring it is onthe PI/PM list of safety criticalInstruments. Also need tag nr on P&ID







9.3.1. External fire on VR201 or VR400A caused by spill of nearby flammable mixture & ignition 9.3.2 Due to region environmental condition

9.3.1.1 Over pressurization of VR201 & VR400A 9.3.2.1 Over pressurization of VR201 & VR400A

9.3.1.1.1. RD40124 on VR201: DN80 rated at 1 barg and T=140°C - sized for external.

9.3.1.1.2. RD40103 VR400A: DN80 rated at 1 barg and T=85°C - sized for external.

9.3.2.1.1. Conservation vent PVRV40120 on VR201 & PVRV40109 on VR400A connected to scrubber SCR401

3

3

3

3

6

6

Revalidation report on all vent sizes for all vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for this scenario

Conservation vent ofVR201 & VR400A to be connected to condenser and condenser vent to be connected to scrubber SCR401. Detonation arrestor to be provided between scrubber header and vent line of VR201 & VR400A.

Parameter: Pressure

HAZOP STUDY REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM DESIGN INTENSION Process steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Pressure DESIGN



.

9 More 9.4. Higher Pressure

9.4.1. Nitrogen overpressure on VR201& VR400A

9.4.1.1. Over pressurization of VR201 & VR400A

9.4.1.1.1. RD40124 on VR201: DN80 rated at 1 barg and T=140°C - sized for external.

9.4.1.1.2. RD40103 VR400A: DN80 rated at 1 barg and T=85°C - sized for external.

9.4.1.1.3. Conservation vent PVRV40120 on VR201 & PVRV40109 on VR400A connected to scrubber SCR401

3 3 6 Revalidation report on all vent sizes for all vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for this scenario

Conservation vent of VR201 & VR400A to be connected to condenser and condenser vent to be connected to scrubber SCR401. Detonation arrestor to be provided between scrubber header and vent line of VR201 & VR400A.

Parameter: Composition

HAZOP STUDY REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM DESIGN INTENSION Process steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Composition DESIGN



9 Other Than Composition Not credible


Parameter: Level

HAZOP STUDY REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM DESIGN INTENSION Process steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Level DESIGN



9 More 9.6. Higher Level

9.6.1. Overfill VR201& VR400A, add toomany drums

9.6.1.1. Overfill VR201 & VR400A, releaseto the environment

9.6.1.1.1. Interlock on level highin VR201 will close MOV40119 via LIT40116 and Interlock on level high in VR400A will close MOV40104 via LIT40105

3 1 4

Node: (10) Mixing and heating of 30% SIPX solution & 10% Nickel Sulfate Hexa Hydrate solution. Notes: Apply steam to R405 jacket, heat content up to 79-80o

HAZOP STUDY

C.

P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-07 Rev. 01


REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM DESIGN INTENSION Process steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Temperature DESIGN




19.1.1. External fire on VR201& VR400A or R405 caused by spill of nearby flammable mixture &ignition. External fire scenario for R405 system 19.1.2. Apply too high heat

19.1.1.1 Over pressurize system, fail vessel, injury to Employee. 19.1.2.1 Due to high temperature decomposition may raise the temperature to the auto-ignition point of the carbon disulfide decomposition

19.1.1.1.1. Rupture disc RD41707 on R405 of DN150 rated at 3.4 barg / T 150°C (LRS3C)

19.1.2.1.1. Temperature controlled by TCV 41706 on steam supply interlocked with TIC41710 on reactor.

RD size to be reviewed through HEL. PRV 41709 design at 25mbarg and it is to be connected to the scrubber system SCR-402

RD size to be


19.1.3. External fire for heat exchangers HE-404A & B not credible; located one level above ground on checkered plate floor that cannot contain Liquids. 19.1.4. Loss of cooling & Chilling water on condenser

product , causing spontaneous combustion. 19.1.4.1 Vaporload increase on scrubber SCR402 or may direct vent out from scrubber system.

19.1.2.1.2. PRV 41709 design at 25mbarg 19.1.2.1.3. Rupture disc RD41707 on R405 of DN150 rated at 3.4 barg / T 150°C (LRS3C)

19.1.4.1.1 PSV 41221 & PSV41229 provided on HE 404A&B respectively.

reviewed through HEL. Scrubber to be designed by considering extreme condition of increase in vapor load.

Parameter: Agitation

HAZOP STUDY REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM DESIGN INTENSION Process steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Agitation DESIGN



10 No 19.2. No Agitation

19.2.1. Power failure, loss of agitation

19.2.1.1. No SHE consequence before adding MEA

Back up DG set 750KVA provided

Node: (11)Once the temperature reaches to 79-80oC, start adding specified qty1390 Kgof 70% MEA from 70% MEA Day tank VR-201 / VR-400A by pump P-203. Notes: Charging is done with centrifugal pump P203 that has max. capacity of 10 m³/H; there is a flow meter to control charging rate and recirculation line to VR201. Basedon this flow rate and DN40 of charging line connected to DN80, Charging line is without dip tube into R405. MEA charging done at 79 to 80°C; then maintained for 12 Hrsbetween 79 to 80°C by steam control valve. Note that boiling point of MEA is 38°C. During maintaining, operator uses log sheet every 30 minutes to record critical data. R405 is inerted via N2 sweep controlled by flow indicator.


Parameter: Flow






20.1.1. Operator error, charging of extra quantity of MEA or high flow MEA into R405, FQIC40122 failure by operator reset or else

20.1.1.1. No HSE consequences, material will loss

Other Than

20.2. Misdirected Flow

20.2.1. Misdirected flow to R406 because of wrong selection of MOV

20.2.2.1. No SHE consequence

20.2.2.1.1 High level interlock with MOV 47101 20.2.2.1.2 High temperature interlock with MOV 47101






20.3.1. Excess steam on R405

20.3.1.1. Reaction mass temperature exceeds more than 900

13.3.1.1.1. High temperature in R405 closes TV41706. 13.3.1.1.2. Scrubber SCR402 has been designed on the basis of gas liberation rate 13.3.1.1.3. High temperature alarm indication with hooter is in place. 13.3.1.1.4. RD of DN150 on

C, CS2 & H2S will liberate from the reaction mass and it will consider a minor decomposition. R405 rated at 3.4barg and T

5 3 8 Revalidation report on all vent sizes for all vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for this scenario from process hazard lab.

Possibility of providing cooling media during decomposition to be





20.3.2 Mislocation of temperature probe

20.3.2.1 Correct mass temperature may not show

=150°C. checked

To be defined PM/PI program

13.3.2. Loss of cooling (in condenser HE404A/B)

13.3.2.1. Vapor load increase on scrubber SCR402 or may direct vent out from scrubber system.

Pressure switch to be provided on CHWS & CWS inlet line and indication with hooter to be provided. Revalidation report on all vent sizes for all vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for this scenario from process hazard lab.







13.4.1. Operator error 13.4.1.1. No HSE consequences

Parameter : Pressure


RECOMMENDATONS/ ACTION

No. Guide

Word Deviation Causes Consequence Safeguards S P R

13 More 13.5 High pressure 13.5.1 Due to decomposition of SIPX

13.5.1.1 Reaction mass temperature exceeds more than 900

13.5.1.1.1. High temperature in R405 closes TV41706. 13.5.1.1.2 PIT 41708 indicate the pressure

C, CS2 & H2S will liberate from the reaction mass and it will consider a minor decomposition.

Revalidation report on all vent sizes for all vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for




No. Guide


13.5.1.1.3. Scrubber SCR402 has been designed on the basis of gas liberation rate 13.5.1.1.4. High temperature alarm indication with hooter is in place. 13.5.1.1.5. RD of DN150 on R405 rated at 3.4 barg and T =150°C.

this scenario from process hazard lab.

13 Less 13.6 Low pressure 13.6.1 Low N2 pressure during reaction

13.6.1.1 Oxidation of reaction mass ; No HSE consequences

13.6.1.1.1 PIT 41708 indicate and PCV 41701 controlled the N2 pressure

Node(14) :- Sampling of IPETC forchecking pH, IPETC strength, IPA, Free SIPX and MEA content.

Notes :Sample is drawn from R-405and sent to QC lab for checking pH, IPETC strength, IPA, Free SIPX and MEA content during maintaining. Another sample is drawn and sent to QC lab of MEA addition for checking pH, IPETC strength, IPA, Free SIPX and MEA content.

P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-07 Rev. 01


Parameter : Flow



No. Guide


14 More 14.1 High flow 14.1.1 Human error ; Sampling valve fully opened

14.1.1.1 Spill or splash on operator body


Parameter : Temperature



No. Guide


14 High 14.2 High temperature 14.2.1 Human error ; Sampling valve fully opened

14.2.1.1 Hot reaction mixture may splash on body; employee burn injury


Node (15): Allow to separate the reaction mixture in two phases Notes : After completion of 12 hrs in R-405 at 79-80oC under agitation, stop the agitator to allow for the two phases to separate for 1 hr. After phase separation, remove the solid precipitate containing Nickel sulfidefrom the bottom drain valve of R-405 in SS-Bucket or container and measure the qty of solid precipitate. The remaining suspended solids to be collected from the online filter system. All the collected solid precipitate will go to catalyst supplier for catalyst recycle or for disposal to external party.


The aqueous Mother Liquor layer is then decanted to vessels STT-503/STT-506 via pump P-418 under close supervision. The aqueous layer is passed through Filter F-405 for trapping of solids. As soon as organic layer is seen in the bottom pipeline view glass of R-405 close the bottom valve. R405 is glass-lined MS vessel of 16 m3, which is inerted with N2 controlled by PCV41701. Pressure rating of R405 is 6.8 barg at 268°C. Decantation by centrifugal pump P418 which has max capacity of 15 m³/Hr. at 15m head.


Parameter : Flow



No. Guide


15 Other than

15.1 Misdirected flow 15.1.1 Valve misalignment 14.1.1.1 Overfilling of vessel either STT-503/STT-506 and new vessel

14.1.1.1.1 LIT 56111 and LIT 56602 is in place on the vessel STT-503 and STT506 respectively


Follow SOP

Pararmeter : Pressure



No. Guide


15 More 15.2 High pressure 15.2.1 High pressure in STT-503 , STT-506 and new vessel

15.2.1.1 Not credible as vessels are open vented




No. Guide


15 Less 15.3 Low pressure 15.3.1 Pump suction or strainer or filter blocked

15.3.1.1 Not credible as transferring done at 80 Deg.C

15.3.1.1.1. Power monitor is provided on the pump P-418

Parameter :- Temperature



No. Guide


15 Less 15.4 Low temperature 15.4.1Reaction mass temperature too low

15.4.1.1 Not credible as liquid is not having properties of formation of crystal at lower temperature

15 More 15.5 High temperature

15.5.1 Reaction mass transferring temperature at 80 Deg.C

15.5.1.1.Chances of hot burn injury


PPE matrix to be followed

Parameter : Other than



DESIGN INTENSION Process steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Flow DESIGN RECOMMENDATONS/

ACTION No. Guide


15 Other than

15.6 Incorrect material 15.6.1. Overdecantation of R-405 liquid in STT-503, STT-506 & new vessel

15.6.1.1 Overfilling of STT-503, STT-506 and new vessels

High level alarm indication and hooter to be installed

Follow SOP

Node (16): Transfer of crude IPETC from R-405 to VR-411 and VR-413 via pump P-417 Notes: The top organic phase containing crude IPETC is decanted to VR-411/VR-413 via pump P417


Parameter : Flow



No. Guide


16 Other than

16.1 Misdirected flow 16.1.1 Pump P-418 used for organic transfer instead of P-417

16.1.1.1 No HSE consequences as multiple manual valve operation




DESIGN INTENSION Process steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Flow DESIGN RECOMMENDATONS/

ACTION No. Guide


16 More 16.2 High pressure 16.2.1 Vent valve closed over VR-413

16.2.2 Human error MOV41410 closed in between VR-411 & VR-413

16.2.1.1 Over pressurization of vessels, rupture of vessel; employee injury 16.2.2.1 Over pressurization of VR-411

16.2.1.1.1 RD41414 DN50 set at 4 barg will take care for high pressure

16.2.2.1.1 RD41404 DN40 set at 4 barg will take care foe high pressure






No. Guide





Insulation for safety to be provided over transferring line and VR-411 & VR-413





No. Guide





No. Guide


16 Other than

16.4 Incorrect material 16.4.1. Human error; forgot to decant aqueous layer

16.4.1.1 Overfilling of VR-411 & VR-413 16.4.1.1.1 High level interlock on VR-413 with MOV41410


Follow SOP

Node(17) : Removal of IPA and other volatile components from crude IPETC to form Finished IPETC Notes :- Transferof crude IPETC from VR-411/VR-413 to ATFE-201 via Pump P408 capacity of 1 Cu.M/hr. at 40m head for further treatment for removal of traces of water, IPA and other volatile impuritiesPumping crude IPETC from VR-413 to ATFE via pump P408 at max 1 m³/H (continuous feed). Piping is DN50 leading to velocity of 0.14 m/s. Drying of crude IPETC in ATFE (= agitated thin film evaporator ) which is heated with 2.0-3.4 barg steam (supply 3.5barg) Condensation of vapors in HE-208, then condensate sent to VR215 (SS, 1m³). Deep vacuum source is water ejector system using vacuum trap VR-216, water trap WT-202, water ejector E-202, Ejector tank ET-202. Transfer of dried and purified IPETC bottom of ATFE to VR214A/B (vacuum receivers) which are glass lined MS vessels of 1.6m³ capacity, cooling and collectionin either holdup tank VR-213 (PP vessel of 5 m³).Cleaning of operation with water if needed.

P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0200-12 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-11 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0200-13 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0200-15 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0200-14 Rev.01

Parameter: Flow

AZOP STUDY REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM DESIGN INTENSION Process steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Flow DESIGN




17.1.1 High flow from VR-413 to ATFE201 from P-408 17.1.2. High flow from VR-

17.1.1.1 No HSE consequences 17.1.2.1. No SHE

3 2 5





214A/B to VR213, resulting from feed to ATFE too high. 17.1.3. High flow to VR-215, condensate receiver due high feed to ATFE. 17.1.4. More flow to vacuum side of ATFE and bottom valve also closed

consequences 17.1.3.1. No SHE Consequences 17.1.4.1 No SHE consequences

17.1.4.1.1 Interlock on temperature high in ATFE will close steam supply (PV 22109) and IPETC feed by TI22101 at bottom of ATFE

Less 17.2. Low flow out of ATFE

17.2.1. Blocked discharge valve on ATFE 17.2.2. Low flow of cooling water to ATFE condenser

17.2.1.1. No HSE consequences

17.2.1.1.1. Interlock on temperature high in ATFE will close steam supply (PV 22109) and IPETC feed by TI22101 at bottom of ATFE 17.2.1.1.2. Interlock on level high in ATFE will close steam supply (PV22109) and oxime feed by PDT22102 at bottom of ATFE 17.2.1.1.3. RD22106 on ATFE of DN100 (set pressure still to be define) 17.2.2.1.1. PSV22104 rated at 5 barg on utility

3

3

2

2

5

5

.





17.2.3. Low flow lubricant to bottom bushing

17.2.3.1. Vibration, equipment damage, no SHE concern

side of HE-208 sized for blocked-in condensor scenario

Reverse 17.3. Reverse Flow

17.3.1. Power failure while system under vacuum


17.3.1.1.1 MOV22415 protect the system from ingress of air






17.4.1. Blocked discharge valve on ATFE , low flow, block in IPETC in ATFE 17.4.2. Operator error, IPETC at too high temperature in VR214A/B; due to cooling water on jacket closed/external fire

No HSE consequences

17.4.2.1.1. RD22206/RD22210 on resp VR214A/B. DN100 rated at 2.5 barg and T=150°C - sized for external fire as worst case scenario PSV installed on CWR side

:





17.4.1. High temperature in piping or in VR-213 caused by operator error in VR-214A or B (insufficient cooling time) 17.4.2. External fire on VR214A/B 17.4.3. External fire on VR213 17.4.4. External fire on R206 17.4.5. External fire on VR215 17.4.6. External fire on HE208 - actually non-credible

17.4.1.1. Damage to VR-213 (PP vessel), release to environment, potential for employee injury. Considered not credible as tank can withstand 100°C. 17.4.2.1 Rupture of equipment 17.4.3.1. Melting of VR213 17.4.4.1. Melting of R206 17.4.5.1. Rupture of equipment 17.4.6.1. Rupture of equipment

of VR-214A/B 17.4.1.1.1 High temp.(60 Deg .C) closes MOV22309 to prevent draining of IPETC in VR-213 17.4.2.1.1. RD22206/RD22210 on resp VR214A/B. DN100 rated at 2.5 barg and T=150°C - sized for external fire as worst case 17.4.3.1.1. None 17.4.4.1.1. None 17.4.5.1.1. RD22410 on VR215. DN40 rated at 2.5 barg and T=150°C - sized for external fire as worst case scenario 17.4.6.1.1. PSV22104 rated at 4 barg on utility

. .





because of location (> 25ft above grade) but scenario developed anyway.

`

side of HE-208 sized for blocked-in condenser Scenario 17.4.6.1.2. Process side protected by RD on VR214A/B rated for external fire


Parameter: Pressure





17.5.1. See high temperature and low flow scenarios 17.5.2. Pumping liquid from VR213 into R-206, open vent to atmosphere makes scenario non-credible 17.5.3. Discharge P-408, piston pump, run pump deadheaded 17.5.4. High nitrogen pressure due to supply regulator faiure to VR214A/B, VR216 (vacuum trap connected to ATFE-201) when breaking vacuum 17.5.5. High steam pressure on ATFE-201 .

17.5.3.1. High pressure in discharge piping, P-408 is a positive displacement pump, lead to piping failure or gasket failure, loss of containment 17.5.4.1. Overpressurization of VR214A/B, VR216, ATFE-201 17.5.5.1. Overpressure ATFE- 201, potential for vessel rupture, employee injury

17.5.3.1.1. No control on P-408 discharge pressure 17.5.4.1.1. RD on all equipment sized for worst case of external fire scenario - will cover this scenario as well 17.5.5.1.1. Relief device PSV103704 on steam header

. . .


Parameter: Level





17.6.1. High level in ATFE- 201, bottom valve closed - see no flow and high temperature scenarios 17.6.2. High level in VR- 214A/B, bottom valve closed with multiple batches fed to .these receivers 17.6.3. High level in VR-213, previous batch not removed 17.6.4. High level in VR-216 vacuum trap due to operator error, failure to drain system . 17.6.5. High level in VR-215 condensate receiver due to operator error, failure to drain system. 17.6.6. High level in ET-202 ejector water tank due to operator error, failure to drain system.

17.6.2.1. Overfill VR21A/B that will fill-up piping upto ATFE 17.6.2.2. See no flow/high temperature scenarios for consequence in ATFE 17.6.3.1. Overfilling of VR-213 with non-hazardous spill into workshop 17.6.4.1. Overfilling of VR-213 with non-hazardous spill into workshop 17.6.5.1. Overfilling of VR-213 with non-hazardous spill into workshop 17.6.6.1. Same Overfilling of VR-213 with non-hazardous spill into workshop; water tank open to

17.6.2.1.1. Level high interlock on VR214A/B will stop P408 on ATFE feed controlled by IT2202/22214 17.6.3.1.1. Weight alarm W22308 on VR213 with operator action





atmosphere, spill to containment

Less 17.7. Low Level 17.7.1. Low level in ATFE- 201 lubrication pot due to operator error, failure to monitor fluid level

17.7.1.1. Friction, potential damage to bushing; no SHE concerns







17.8.1. Loss of power, ATFE- 201 only impacted 17.8.2. Air ingress into system because vacuum system stops

17.8.1.1. Operational issue; no safety concern 17.8.2.1. No HSE consequences

17.8.2.1.1. Grounding and bouding of feed system and ATFE 17.8.2.1.2 Power back up through DG set 750KVA 17.8.2.1.2. loss of power will fail-close MOV22415 in the vacuum line from ET202 so vacuum in system will be broken by inerting lines on ATFE and VR216 before startup


Node: (18) Charging operations in R-206 from VR-213 through pump P212. Filling of IPETCin packaging. Notes: QC test for IPETC, packaging at ambient, and final QC

P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0200-14 Rev. 01

Parameter: Flow





18.1.1. Pumping from VR-213 to R-206 with valve fully open 18.1.2. More flow if the temperature is too high in VR- 213 due to operator error, not allowing enough time for cooling.

18.1.1.1. R-206 is polypro; No chance of static ignition as operating temperature at ambient and is below flashpoint. No SHE consequences. 18.1.2.1. R-206 is polypro; No chance of static ignition as operating temperature at ambient and is below flashpoint. No SHE consequences 18.1.2.2. Damage to VR-213 (PP vessel), release to environment, potential for employee injury. Considered not credible as tank can withstand 100°C.

18.1.2.2.1High temp.(60 Deg .C) closes MOV22309 to prevent draining of IPETC in VR-213







18.2.1. External fire caused by spill of nearby flammable mixture & ignition 18.2.2. insufficient cooling time in VR-214A/B - not credible to have impact on R206 since need to pass via VR213

18.2.1.1. Melting of R206 which is located on elevated section of 1st floor that normally could not contain pool fire.

18.2.1.1.1. Electrical Construction to proper classification NFPA or ATEX to prevent sources of ignition [LES2A] 18.2.1.1.2. Control of hot work

Parameter: Pressure





18.3.1. No credible scenarios with SHE consequence

18.2.1.1.1. Electrical Construction to proper classification NFPA or ATEX to prevent sources of ignition [LES2A] 18.2.1.1.2. Control of hot work


Parameter: Level





18.5.1. Operator error, discharge to R-206 from VR- 213 before first lot is Completed

18.5.1.1. No HSE consequences as two batches quantity does not exceed capacity of R-206(5Kl)

High level indication and hooter to be provided





18 More 18.6. More Agitation

18.6.1. No credible cause 18.6.1.1 No HSE concern

Less 18.7. No agitation

18.7.1. Loss of power 18.7.1.1. No SHE concern, quality issue


Node: (19) Mixing and heating of 30% SIPX solution & 10% Nickel Sulfate Hexa Hydrate solution. Notes: Apply steam to R406 jacket, heat content up to 79-80o

HAZOP STUDY

C.

P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-09 Rev. 01


REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM DESIGN INTENSION Process steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Temperature DESIGN




19.1.1. External fire on VR201& VR400A or R406 caused by spill of nearby flammable mixture & ignition. External fire scenario for R406 system 19.1.2. Apply too high heat 19.1.3. External fire for heat exchangers HE-400A & B not credible; located one level above ground on checkered plate floor that cannot contain Liquids. 19.1.4. Loss of cooling & Chilling water on condenser

19.1.1.1 Over pressurize system, fail vessel, injury to Employee. 19.1.2.1 Due to high temperature decomposition may raise the temperature to the auto-ignition point of the carbon disulfide decomposition product , causing spontaneous combustion. 19.1.4.1 Vapor load increase on scrubber SCR402 or may direct vent out from scrubber system.

19.1.1.1.1. Rupture disc RD47101 on R406 of DN100 rated at 3.0 barg / T 150°C (LRS3C)

19.1.2.1.1. Temperature controlled by TCV 47101 on steam supply interlocked with TIC47101 on reactor.

19.1.2.1.2. PRV 47102 design at 25mbarg 19.1.2.1.3. Rupture disc RD47101 on R406 of DN100 rated at 3.0 barg / T 150°C (LRS3C)

19.1.4.1.1 PSV 40302& PSV40305 provided on HE 400A&B respectively.

RD size to be reviewed through HEL. PRV 47102 design at 25mbarg and it is to be connected to the scrubber system SCR-402

RD size to be reviewed through HEL. Scrubber to be designed by considering extreme condition of increase in vapor load.







19.2.1. Power failure, loss of agitation

19.2.1.1. No SHE consequence before adding MEA

Back up DG set 750KVA provided

Node: (20) Once the temperature reaches to 79-80oC, start adding specified qty of 70% MEA from 70% MEA Day tank VR201/VR-400A by pump P203/P-401. Notes: Charging is done with centrifugal pump P203/P401 that has max. capacity of 10 m³/H/ 2 M3

HAZOP STUDY

/hr; there is a flow meter to control charging rate and recirculation line to VR201/VR-400A. Based on this flow rate and DN40/DN25 of charging line connected to DN80/DN50, Charging line is without dip tube into R406. MEA charging done at 79 to 80°C; then maintained for 12 Hrs between 79 to 80°C by steam control valve. Note that boiling point of MEA is 38°C. During maintaining, operator uses log sheet every 30 minutes to record critical data. R406 is inerted via N2 sweep controlled by flow indicator.


Parameter: Flow





20.1.1. Operator error, charging of extra quantity of MEA or high flow MEA into R406, FQIC40122/FQIC 40112 failure by operator reset or else

20.1.1.1. No HSE consequences, material will loss





Other Than

20.2. Misdirected Flow

20.2.1. Misdirected flow to R405 because of wrong selection of MOV

20.2.2.1. No SHE consequence

20.2.2.1.1 High level interlock with MOV 41714 20.2.2.1.2 High temperature interlock with MOV 41714






20.3.1. Excess steam on R406 20.3.2 Mislocation of temperature probe

20.3.1.1. Reaction mass temperature exceeds more than 900

13.3.1.1.1. High temperature in R406 closes TV47101. 13.3.1.1.2. Scrubber SCR402 has been designed on the basis of gas liberation rate 13.3.1.1.3. High temperature alarm indication with hooter is in place. 13.3.1.1.4. RD of DN100 on R406 rated at 3.0barg and T =150°C.

C, CS2 & H2S will liberate from the reaction mass and it will consider a minor decomposition. 20.3.2.1 Correct mass temperature may not show

5 3 8 Revalidation report on all vent sizes for all vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for this scenario from process hazard lab.

Possibility of providing cooling media during decomposition to be checked

To be defined PM/PI program





20.3.2. Loss of cooling (in condenser HE400A/B)

20.3.2.1. Vapor load increase on scrubber SCR402 or may direct vent out from scrubber system.

Pressure switch to be provided on CHWS & CWS inlet line and indication with hooter to be provided. Revalidation report on all vent sizes for all vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for this scenario from process hazard lab.



20.4.1. Operator error 20.4.1.1. No HSE consequences


Parameter : Pressure



No. Guide


20 More 20.5 High pressure 20.5.1 Due to decomposition of SIPX

20.5.1.1 Reaction mass temperature exceeds more than 900

20.5.1.1.1. High temperature in R406 closes TV47101. 20.5.1.1.2 PIT 47101 indicate the pressure 20.5.1.1.3. Scrubber SCR402 has been designed on the basis of gas liberation rate 20.5.1.1.4. High temperature alarm indication with hooter is in place. 20.5.1.1.5. RD of DN100 on R406 rated at 3.0barg and T =150°C.

C, CS2 & H2S will liberate from the reaction mass and it will consider a minor decomposition.

Revalidation report on all vent sizes for all vessels and ancillary equipment. Confirm sizing for this scenario from process hazard lab.

20 Less 20.6 Low pressure 20.6.1 Low N2 pressure during reaction

20.6.1.1 Oxidation of reaction mass ; No HSE consequences

20.6.1.1.1 PIT 47101 indicate and PCV 47101 controlled the N2 pressure

Node :-Sampling of IPETC forchecking pH, IPETC strength, IPA, Free SIPX and MEA content.

Notes :Refer sampling Node no. 14 of R-405 for R-406 sampling

P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-09 Rev. 01

Node: Allow to separate the reaction mixture in two phases


Notes : After completion of 12 hrs in R-406 at 79-80o

HAZOP STUDY

C under agitation, stop the agitator to allow for the two phases to separate for 1 hr. After phase separation, remove the solid precipitate containing Nickel sulfide from the bottom drain valve of R-406 in SS-Bucket or container and measure the qty of solid precipitate. The remaining suspended solids to be collected from the online filter system. All the collected solid precipitate will go to catalyst supplier for catalyst recycle or for disposal to external party. The aqueous Mother Liquor layer is then decanted to vessels STT-503/STT-506 via pump P-421 under close supervision. The aqueous layer is passed through Filter F-406 for trapping of solids. As soon as organic layer is seen in the bottom pipeline view glass of R-406 close the bottom valve. R406 is glass-lined MS vessel of 12.5 m3, which is inerted with N2 controlled by PCV47101. Pressure rating of R406 is 6.0barg at 220°C. Decantation by centrifugal pump P421 which has max capacity of 15 m³/Hr. at 30m head.


Parameter : Flow



No. Guide


21 Other than

21.1 Misdirected flow 21.1.1 Valve misalignment 21.1.1.1 Overfilling of vessel either STT-503/STT-506 and new vessel

21.1.1.1.1 LIT 56111 and LIT 56602 is in place on the vessel STT-503 and STT506 respectively


Follow SOP




No. Guide





No. Guide


21 More 21.2 High pressure 21.2.1 High pressure in STT-503 , STT-506 and new vessel

21.2.1.1 Not credible as vessels are open vented

Conservation vent to be provided over STT-503/506

N2 blanketing arrangement to be done over STT-503/506.

21 Less 21.3 Low pressure 21.3.1 Pump suction or strainer or filter blocked

21.3.1.1 Not credible as transferring done at 80 Deg.C

21.3.1.1.1. Power monitor is provided on the pump P-421




No. Guide


21 Less 21.4 Low temperature 21.4.1 Reaction mass temperature too low

21.4.1.1 Not credible as liquid is not having properties of formation of crystal at lower temperature










No. Guide


21 Other than

21.6 Incorrect material 21.6.1. Overdecantation of R-405 liquid in STT-503, STT-506 & new vessel

21.6.1.1 Overfilling of STT-503, STT-506 and new vessels


Follow SOP

Node(22): Transfer of crude IPETC from R-406to VR-411 and VR-413 via pump P-420 Notes: The top organic phase containing crude IPETC is decanted to VR-411/VR-413 via pump P420


Parameter : Flow



No. Guide





No. Guide


22 Other than

22.1 Misdirected flow 221.1 Pump P-421 used for organic transfer instead of P-420

22.1.1.1 No HSE consequences as multiple manual valve operation

Parameter: Pressure



No. Guide


22 More 22.2 High pressure 22.2.1 Vent valve closed over VR-413

22.2.2 Human error MOV41410 closed in between VR-411 & VR-413

22.2.1.1 Over pressurization of vessels, rupture of vessel; employee injury 22.2.2.1 Over pressurization of VR-411

22.2.1.1.1 RD41414 DN50 set at 4 barg will take care for high pressure

22.2.2.1.1 RD41404 DN40 set at 4 barg will take care foe high pressure




HAZOP STUDY REFERENCE P & I DIAGRAM DESIGN INTENSION Process steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Flow DESIGN RECOMMENDATONS/


No. Guide

Word Deviation Causes Consequence Safeguards S P R ACTION




Insulation for safety to be provided over transferring line and VR-411 & VR-413





No. Guide


22 Other than

22.4 Incorrect material 22.4.1. Human error; forgot to decant aqueous layer

22.4.1.1 Overfilling of VR-411 & VR-413 22.4.1.1.1 High level interlock on VR-413 with MOV41410


Follow SOP

Node: (23) Receiving of mother liquor in STT-503 and new tank from R-405/R-406 via pump P-418/P-421

P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0400-07 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0400-09 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0500-16 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0500-20 Rev.01


DESIGN INTERSION Process Steps as per Section 2.2 PARAMETER Flow DESIGN RECOMMENDATION/



ACTION

23 High Temp. High Level Low level

23.1. High temperature in STT-503 23.2. High level in STT - 503 23.3. Low level in STT- 503

23.1.1. External fire 23.2.1. Forgot to transfer previous batches liquid from STT-503 to feed to Calandria 501 23.3.1. Operator error; malfunction of level switch

23.1.1.1. Vessel failure; employee injury 23.2.1.1. Overfilling of vessel STT-503; spillage on the floor 23.3.1.1. No SHE consequences; operational issue

23.1.1.1.1. Open Vent Pipe to atmosphere on low pressure storage tank - Low fouling Potential

Conservation vent to be provided over STT-503 N2 blanketing arrangement to be done over STT-503 .

Node: (24) Mother liquor from STT-503 transfer to calendria CL-501 through the feed pump P-516 to circulation pump P-503 under vacuum & heat the solution in Calendria CL-501 . Water vapor from VS-501 is then cooled in the HE-501 & bottom liquid which is coming out from VS-501 is then recirculated back to CL-501 via pump P-503. STT-503 is SS-304 vessel of 8 m3,. Pressure rating of STT-503 is 2.0 barg at 150°C. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0500-16 Rev.01, IPETC-01-01-0500-17 Rev. 01




24

High Temp. Low

24.1. High temperature in evaporator CL-501 24.2. Low temperature

24.1.1. Circulation pump P-503 stopped 24.2.1. No Steam

24.1.1.1. Liquid overheated in CL- 501; Over pressurization of CL-501, vessel failure 24.2.1.1. No SHE

24.1.1.1.1. Rupture disc on VS-501 will protect the vessel 24.2.1.1.1. Rupture





24

Temp. High pressure Low pressure High Level Low level High pressure Low pressure

in evaporator CL-501 24.3. High pressure in CL-501 24.4. Low pressure in CL-501 24.5. High level in VS-501 24.6. Low level in VS- 501 24.7. High pressure in VS-501 24.8. Low pressure in VS-501

Supply 24.3.1. Circulation pump P-503 stopped 24.4.1. Operator error; vacuum increased in the system 24.5.1. Mother liquor slurry transfer pump P-504 flow stopped due to blockage at the outlet of VS-501 24.6.1. No cause identified 24.8.1. High vacuum in the system 24.9.1. External fire

Consequences 24.3.1.1. Liquid overheated in CL- 501; Overpressurisation of CL-501, vessel failure 24.4.1.1. No HSE consequences 24.5.1.1. Liquid flooding in the VS- 501, & finally goes in the vacuum pump 24.8.1.1. No SHE consequences; Max. vapors in the VS-501 will suck by the vacuum pump

disc on VS-501 will protect the vessel 24.5.1.1.1 FIT 56113 will control the flow and MOV 56115 closes on high level LIT 56213 flow to VS-501 24.9.1.1.1. RD will





High Temp. Low Temp.

24.9. High Temperature in VS-501 24.10. Low temp. in VS- 501

24.10.1. Liquid coming from CL-501 is not heated

24.9.1.1. Over pressurization of VS-501; rupture vessel 24.10.1.1. No SHE consequences; No vapor formation

protect the vessel VS-501 & CL-501 as both are interconnected

Node: (25) Overflow liquid from side nozzle of VS-501 is then transfer to STT-504 via pump P-504 & the overflow liquid from STT-

504 is then transfer to STT-503 by gravity and cooled upto ambient temperature.





25 Low Temp. High Temp.

25.1. Low temperature in tank STT-504 25.2. High temperature in tank STT-504 25.3. High level in STT-

25.1.1. Atmospheric temp. is too low 25.2.1. External fire 25.3.1. Too much

25.1.1.1. No SHE consequences; operational issue 25.2.1.1. No SHE consequences; Vessel is open top Head 25.3.1.1. Not credible as





High Level

504

liquid transfer from VS-501 to STT-504, overflow line blockage

liquid is free flowing

Node: (26) Water vapor from VS-501 is then cooled in condenser HE-501 under vacuum of water condensed in HE-501 is then

transfer to T-507 via pump P-505 through CP-501.





26 High Level

26.1. High level in T- 507

26.1.1. If water from T-507 not transferred for recycling

26.1.1.1. Overfilling of T-507; No HSE consequences

26.1.1.1.1. LI is provided on T-507 to avoid overfilling





High Temp.

26.2. High temperature in T507

26.2.1. Cooling water supply to condenser off 26.3.2. External fire

26.2.1.1. No SHE consequences; hot water from condenser will collected into T-507 & get cooled. 26.2.2.1. No SHE Consequences Rupture of vessel as it is HDPE; spillage of water

Node: (27)Packaging of concentrated aqueous Mother Liquor (ML) Product.

Notes:-Treated concentrated aqueous Mother Liquor (ML) product from STT-504 is packed to specified packaging media and sent to sale for external Customer or sent to Disposal agency.

P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0500-18 Rev. 01




27 High Temp.

27.1. High temperature in STT-504

27.1.1. Forgot to apply cooling to STT-504


27.1.1.1.1 Liquid collected in STT-504 through double pipe heat exchanger temp

Follow SOP





High flow

27.2 High flow of liquid draining from STT-504 to packaging

27.1.2. External fire 27.2.1. Human error; operator forgot to close the draining valve

27.1.2.1. No chances Of Over pressurization as tank STT-504, is open to atmosphere vessel 27.2.1.1. Spill or splash of liquid on operator body

does not goes beyond 60 Deg.C 27.2.1.1.1 PPE matrix and appropriate PPE available

Node: (28) Water collected in the tank T-507 is check for pH, TDS or any organic content, if it is cleared by QA/QC then it is recycled back in process via pump P-516.






28 High Level Low level High Temp.

28.1. High level in T- 507 28.2. Low level in T- 507 28.3. High temperature in T-507

28.1.1. Previous batches water is not recycled from T- 507 to S-403 28.2.1. Low level in the tank T-507 as full water transferred to S-403 28.3.1. External fire

28.1.1.1. No SHE consequences 28.2.1.1. No SHE Consequences . 28.3.1.1.1 HDPE tank get collapse& water get release surrounding area.

28.1.1.1.1. Tank capacity is 25Kl it will take the volume of 4 batches at a time

Node: (29) Receiving of mother liquor in STT-506 and new tank from R-405/R-406 via pump P-418/P-421






29 High Temp. High Level Low level

29.1. High temperature in STT-506 29.2. High level in STT - 506 29.3. Low level in STT- 506

29.1.1. External fire 29.2.1. Forgot to transfer previous batches liquid from STT-506 to feed to Calandria 502 29.3.1. Operator error; malfunction of level switch

29.1.1.1. Vessel failure; employee injury 29.2.1.1. Overfilling of vessel STT-506; spillage on the floor 29.3.1.1. No SHE consequences; operational issue

29.1.1.1.1. Open Vent Pipe to atmosphere on low pressure storage tank - Low fouling Potential

.Conservation vent to be provided over STT-506 N2 blanketing arrangement to be done over STT-506 .

Node: (30) Mother liquor from STT-506 transfer to calendria CL-502 through the feed pump P-519 to circulation pump P-508 under vacuum & heat the solution in Calendria CL-502 . Water vapor from VS-502 is then cooled in the HE-502 & bottom liquid which is coming out from VS-502 is then recirculated back to CL-502 via pump P-508. STT-506 is SS-304 vessel of 17 m3,. Pressure rating of STT-506 is 2.0 barg at 150°C. P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0500-20 Rev. 01, IPETC-01-01-0500-21 Rev.01





30 30

High Temp. Low Temp. High pressure Low pressure High Level Low level High pressure

30.1. High temperature in evaporator CL-502 30.2. Low temperature in evaporator CL-502 30.3. High pressure in CL-502 30.4. Low pressure in CL-502 30.5. High level in VS-502 30.6. Low level in VS- 502 30.7. High pressure in VS-502

30.1.1. Circulation pump P-508 stopped 30.2.1. No Steam Supply 30.3.1. Circulation pump P-509 stopped 30.4.1. Operator error; vacuum increased in the system 30.5.1. Mother liquor slurry transfer pump P-509 flow stopped due to blockage at the outlet of VS-502 30.6.1. No cause identified 30.8.1. High vacuum in

30.1.1.1. Liquid overheated in CL- 502; Over pressurization of CL-501, vessel failure 30.2.1.1. No SHE Consequences 30.3.1.1. Liquid overheated in CL- 502; Over pressurization of CL-502, vessel failure 30.4.1.1. No HSE consequences 30.5.1.1. Liquid flooding in the VS- 502, & finally goes in the vacuum pump

30.1.1.1.1. Rupture disc on VS-502 will protect the vessel 30.2.1.1.1. Rupture disc on VS-502 will protect the vessel 30.5.1.1.1 FIT 56603 will control the flow and MOV 56607 closes on high level LIT 56716 flow to VS-502





Low pressure High Temp. Low Temp.

30.8. Low pressure in VS-502 30.9. High Temperature in VS-502 30.10. Low temp. in VS- 502

the system 30.9.1. External fire 30.10.1. Liquid coming from CL-502 is not heated

30.8.1.1. No SHE consequences; Max. vapors in the VS-502 will suck by the vacuum pump 30.9.1.1. Over pressurization of VS-502; rupture vessel 30.10.1.1. No SHE consequences; No vapor formation

System is designed for low pressure 30.9.1.1.1. RD will protect the vessel VS-502 & CL-502 as both are interconnected

Node: (31) Overflow liquid from side nozzle of VS-502 is then transfer to STT-507 via pump P-509 & the overflow liquid from STT-

507 is then transfer to STT-506 by gravity and cooled upto ambient temperature.






ACTION

31 Low Temp. High Temp. High Level

31.1. Low temperature in tank STT-506 31.2. High temperature in tank STT-506 31.3. High level in STT- 506

31.1.1. Atmospheric temp. is too low 31.2.1. External fire 31.3.1. Too much liquid transfer from VS-502 to STT-507 overflow line blockage

31.1.1.1. No SHE consequences; 31.2.1.1. No SHE consequences; Vessel is open top Head 31.3.1.1. Not credible as liquid is free flowing


Node: (32) Water vapor from VS-502 is then cooled in condenser HE-502 under vacuum of water condensed in HE-502 is then transfer to T-507 via pump P-510 through CP-502.





32 High Level High Temp.

32.1. High level in T- 507 32.2. High temperature in T507

32.1.1. If water from T-507 not transferred for recycling 32.2.1. Cooling water supply to condenser off 32.2.2. External fire

32.1.1.1. Overfilling of T-507; No HSE consequences 32.2.1.1. No SHE consequences; hot water from condenser will collected into T-507 & get cooled. 32.2.2.1. No SHE Consequences Rupture of vessel as it is HDPE; spillage of water

32.1.1.1.1. LI is provided on T-507 to avoid overfilling


Node: (33)Packaging of concentrated aqueous Mother Liquor (ML) Product.

Notes:-Treated concentrated aqueous Mother Liquor (ML) product from STT-507 is packed to specified packaging media and sent to sale for external Customer or sent to Disposal agency.

P & ID No. – IPETC-01-01-0500-22 Rev. 01




33 High Temp. High flow

33.1. High temperature in STT-507 33.2 High flow of liquid draining from STT-507 to packaging

33.1.1. Forgot to apply cooling to STT-507 33.1.2. External fire 33.2.1. Human error; operator forgot to close the draining valve

33.1.1.1. No HSE consequences 33.1.2.1. No chances Of Over pressurization as tank STT-507, is open to atmosphere vessel 33.2.1.1. Spill or splash of liquid on operator body

33.1.1.1.1 Liquid collected in STT-507 through double pipe heat exchanger temp does not goes beyond 60 Deg.C 33.2.1.1.1 PPE matrix and appropriate PPE available

Follow SOP





Node: (34) Water collected in the tank T-507 is check for pH, TDS or any organic content, if it is cleared by QA/QC then it is recycled back in process via pump P-516 to S-403.





34 High Level Low level High Temp.

34.1. High level in T- 507 34.2. Low level in T- 507 34.3. High temperature in T-507

34.1.1. Previous batches water is not recycled from T- 507 to S-403 34.2.1. Low level in the tank T-507 as full water transferred to S-403 34.3.1. External fire

34.1.1.1. No SHE consequences 34.2.1.1. No SHE Consequences . 34.3.1.1.1 HDPE tank get collapse& water get release surrounding area.

34.1.1.1.1. Tank capacity is 25Kl it will take the volume of 4 batches at a time





Node: (35) Warm collected condensed water in the tank T-505 is then transferred through HE-503 chiller via pump P-512 for vacuum pump VP-513sealant cooling; hot sealant water is then collected in UGT-506 & transferred from there to T-505 via pump P-512. Vacuum is applied to thesystem via vacuum pump VP-513 through vacuum trap VT-513.

P & ID No. – A5FP-25-25-0500-65 Rev. 04




35 High flow Low level

35.1. High flow from P-512 35.2. High flow vapour from VT-512. 35.3. Low flow from P-512.

35.1.1. No SHE Consequence 35.2.1. High vapor flow from HE 501 (See 27.23.1 ) 35.2.2. Air ingress due to leak or vacuum pump failure. 35.3.1. Low level or no level in T-505 35.3.2. P-512 not working properly or

35.2.2.1. NO SHE consequence. 35.3.1.1. No SHE consequence but its Operational problem.





High Temp. Low Temp.

35.4. High Temperature in T-505. 35.5. Low Temperature in T-505.

cavitation. 35. 4.1. See 27.3. 35.5.1. No SHE consequence.


Annexure – 7.2

CHEMICAL DATA:

Chemical Name: ETHYLAMINE Molecular Weight: 45.08 g/mol

AEGL-1 (60 min): 7.5 ppm AEGL-2 (60 min): 49 ppm AEGL-3 (60 min): 270 ppm

IDLH: 600 ppm LEL: 27000 ppm UEL: 140000 ppm

Ambient Boiling Point: 14.5° C

Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm

Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%

ATMOSPHERIC DATA: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)

Wind: 1.8 meters/second from NE at 3 meters

Ground Roughness: open country Cloud Cover: 5 tenths

Air Temperature: 25° C Stability Class: B

No Inversion Height Relative Humidity: 55%

Scenario - 1

SOURCE STRENGTH:

Direct Source: 2150 liters Source Height: 0

Source State: Liquid

Source Temperature: equal to ambient

Release Duration: 1 minute

Release Rate: 24.2 kilograms/sec

Total Amount Released: 1,454 kilograms

Note: This chemical may flash boil and/or result in two phase flow.


THREAT ZONE:

Model Run: Heavy Gas

Red : 1.1 kilometers --- (270 ppm = AEGL-3 [60 min])

Orange: 2.0 kilometers --- (49 ppm = AEGL-2 [60 min])

Yellow: 3.7 kilometers --- (7.5 ppm = AEGL-1 [60 min])

2 0 2 4 63

1

0

1

3

kilometers

kilometers

greater than 270 ppm (AEGL-3 [60 min])

greater than 49 ppm (AEGL-2 [60 min])

greater than 7.5 ppm (AEGL-1 [60 min])

wind direction confidence lines

wind


Scenario - 2

SOURCE STRENGTH:








THREAT ZONE:

Threat Modeled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud


Red : 136 meters --- (16200 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets)

Yellow: 383 meters --- (2700 ppm = 10% LEL)


200 0 200 400 600300

100

0

100

300

meters

meters

greater than 16200 ppm (60% LEL = Flame Pockets)

greater than 2700 ppm (10% LEL)


wind


Scenario – 3

SOURCE STRENGTH:








THREAT ZONE:

Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion

Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame

Level of Congestion: congested


Red : LOC was never exceeded --- (8.0 psi = destruction of buildings)

Orange: 106 meters --- (3.5 psi = serious injury likely)

Yellow: 154 meters --- (1.0 psi = shatters glass)


100 0 100 200 300150

50

0

50

150

meters

meters

greater than 8.0 psi (destruction of buildings)

greater than 3.5 psi (serious injury likely)

greater than 1.0 psi (shatters glass)


wind


Scenario – 4

SOURCE STRENGTH:

Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank

Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning)

Tank Diameter: 1.7 meters Tank Length: 2.8 meters

Tank Volume: 6.36 cubic meters

Tank contains liquid Internal Temperature: 25° C

Chemical Mass in Tank: 4.48 tons Tank is 94% full

Circular Opening Diameter: 0.5 centimeters

Opening is 1 centimeters from tank bottom

Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour

Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 6.72 kilograms/min

(averaged over a minute or more)

Total Amount Released: 401 kilograms

Note: The chemical escaped as a mixture of gas and aerosol (two phase flow).

THREAT ZONE:


Red : 91 meters --- (270 ppm = AEGL-3 [60 min])

Orange: 226 meters --- (49 ppm = AEGL-2 [60 min])

Yellow: 606 meters --- (7.5 ppm = AEGL-1 [60 min])



Scenario – 5

SOURCE STRENGTH:














THREAT ZONE:

Threat Modeled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud


Red : 11 meters --- (16200 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets)

Note: Threat zone was not drawn because effects of near-field patchiness

make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances.

Yellow: 22 meters --- (2700 ppm = 10% LEL)

Note: Threat zone was not drawn because effects of near-field patchiness


make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances.

Scenario – 6

SOURCE STRENGTH:














THREAT ZONE:

Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion

Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame

Level of Congestion: congested


Red : LOC was never exceeded --- (8.0 psi = destruction of buildings)


Orange: 15 meters --- (3.5 psi = serious injury likely)

Yellow: 33 meters --- (1.0 psi = shatters glass)


Annexure: 7.3

DOW INDEX

Table No. 7.3.1 List of Raw Materials Stored in Drums in PESO Area -

The DOW Index is performed for all the raw materials augmenting to a total capacity of 24.39 Tones. Considering a worst case scenario all the raw materials the DOW Index is performed for Mono Ethyl Amine as the fire hazard i.e. Nf = 4 and it has the least flash point of < 17.90

Tank No.

C

1. Mono Ethyl Amine

-- Equipment Name Mono Ethyl Amine storage drums ( 24.39 Tones)

Basic Material for Material factor Mono Ethyl Amine Density, kg/l 0.79

Properties of material N h 3 N f 4 N r 0 M.F. 21 Boil. pt. 62 0F 16.66 0C Flash pt. -- 0F < 17.9 0C ∆HC = Heat of Comb. 16300 BTU / lb Quantity of the material 30873 l 24390 kg 53770 Lb

Sr. No.

Raw Materials Quantity No. Of Drums/Tanks

Flash Point

1 Toluene 6 Tones 30.0 Drums (200 Kg X20)

4.40C

2 Escaid - D80 1 Ton 5.0 Drum (200 Kg X 5)

750C

3 Solvent- TXIB 10Tones 50 Drums (200 Kg X50)

1360C

4 Methanol 1 Ton 40 Cans (200 Kg X 10)

110C

5 LDO 4.0 Tones 20 Drums (200 Kg X 20)

660C

6 HSD 1.0 Ton 5 Drums (200 Kg X 5)

320C

7 Mono Ethyl Amine 1.39 Tones 9 Drums (160 kg x 9 drums)

< 17.90C


Storage conditions Temp 25 0C Pressure 1.0 Bar Penalty factor

range Penalty factor used

1.General Process

Base Factor 1.00 1.00 Exothermic Chemical Reaction 0.30 to 1.25 0.00 Endothermic Processes 0.20 to 0.40 0.00 Material handling and transfer 0.25 to 1.05 0.85 Enclosed or Indoor Process Units 0.25 to 0.90 0.00 Access 0.20 to 0.35 0.00 Drainage and Spill Control 0.25 to 0.50 0.50 General Process Hazard Factor ( F1 ) 2.35 2.Special Process

Base Factor 1.00 1.00

Toxic material(s) 0.20 to 0.80 0.60 Sub atmospheric pressure (< 500 mm

0.50 0.00

Operation in or near flammable range

inerted noninerted

0.00 to 0.80

1. Tank farm storage flammable

0.50 0.00 2. Process upset or purge failure 0.30 0.00 3. Always in contact of Flame

0.80 0.00

Dust Explosion 0.25 to 2.00 0.00 Pressure Operating pressure psig

0.00

Low temperature 0.20 to 0.30 0.00 Quantity of flammable / unstable

1. Liquids or gases in process 0.00 8.7x10 2. Liquids or gases in storage 9 0.80 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, Dust

in Process 0.00

Corrosion & Erosion 0.10 to 0.75 0.10 Leakage - Joints & Packing 0.10 to 1.50 0.00 Use of Fired Equipment 0.00 Hot oil heat exchange system 0.15 to 1.15 0.00 Rotating Equipment 0.50 0.00 Special Process Hazard Factor ( F2 ) 2.50 Process Unit Hazard Factor ( F3 = F1 x F2) 5.875 Fire & Explosion Index (F.& E.I.= F3 x M.F. ) 123.375 Degree of Hazard Intermediate


Degree of Hazard for F & EI Degree of Hazard for F & EI F & EI Index Range Degree of Hazard 1-60 Light 61-96 Moderate 97-127 Intermediate 128-158 Heavy 159-up Severe RECOMMENDED MINIMUM FEATURES ACCORDING TO DOW FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX

Preventive & Protective Features Fire & Explosion Index Number Index for the present case 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-75 75-90 >90 123.375 Feature

optional Suggested Recomme

nded Feature required

1) Fireproofing 1 2 2 3 4 4 √ 2) Water spray a) directional 1 2 3 3 4 4 √ b) area 1 2 3 3 4 4 √ c) curtain 1 1 2 2 2 4 √ 3) Special instrumentation

a) temperature 1 2 3 3 4 4 √ b) pressure 1 2 3 3 3 4 √ c) flow control 1 2 3 4 4 4 √

4) Dust, blowdown, spill control 1 1 2 3 3 4 √ 5) Internal examination 1 2 3 3 4 4 √ 6) Combustible gas monitors

a) signal alarm 1 1 2 3 3 4 √ b) actuate equipment 1 1 2 2 3 4 √ 7) Remote operation 1 1 2 3 3 4 √


8) Diking, (Not Applicable as barrel storage)

1 4 4 4 4 4

9) Blast & barrier walls separation

1 1 2 3 4 4 √

Feature optional 2) Feature suggested 3) Feature recommended 4) Feature required

Table No. 7.3.2 List of Flammable Raw Materials Stored in ware house.

The DOW Index is performed for p-Formaldehyde augmenting to a total capacity of 10 Tones. Other chemicals are salts which are not flammable. Thus DOW Index is only performed Para Formaldehyde.

2. Para Formaldehyde

Sr. No.


Flash Point

1 Para Formaldehyde (96%)

10 Tones 400 Bags (25 kg X 400)

710C

2 Hydroxylamine Sulphate ( 98%)

10 Tones 400 Bags (25 kg X 400)

N.A

3 Sodium Carbonate (98%)

5 Tones 200 Bags (25 kg X 200)

N.A

4 Magnesium oxide (80%)

1 Ton 40 Bags (25 Kg X 40 bags)

N.A

5 Caustic Lye ( 20%) 1000 litres 1 IBC

1 IBC N.A.

6 Sodium Isopropyl Xanthate (SIPX)

2679 kg 6 bags ( 500 kgs x 6 nos.)

N.A

7 Nickel Sulfate Hexa-Hydrate

76 kg 3 bags ( 25 kgs x 3 nos)

N.A.

8 Polymer 1 30 MT 1200 bags ( 1200 x 25 kgs)

N.A

9 Polymer 2 60 MT 2400 bags ( 2400 x 25 kgs)

N.A

10 NaOH 5 MT 200 bags ( 200 x 25 kgs)

N.A

11 NH4OH 5 MT -- N.A


Tank No. -- Equipment Name Para Formaldehyde 400 Bags (25 kg X 400)

Basic Material for Material factor - Density, kg/l --

Properties of material N h 3 N f 1 N r 0 M.F. 4 Boil. pt. -- 0F -- 0C Flash pt. 159

0F 71 0C

∆HC = Heat of Comb. -- BTU / lb Quantity of the material l 1000 kg 2204 Lb Storage conditions Temp 25 0C Pressure 1.0 Bar Penalty factor


1.General Process




0.50 0.00


inerted noninerted

0.00 to 0.80


0.50 0.00 2. Process upset or purge failure 0.30 0.00 3. Always in contact of Flame

0.80 0.00


0.00


1. Liquids or gases in process 0.00 2. Liquids or gases in storage 0.00 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, Dust

in Process 0.00

Corrosion & Erosion 0.10 to 0.75 0.10 Leakage - Joints & Packing 0.10 to 1.50 0.00 Use of Fired Equipment 0.00 Hot oil heat exchange system 0.15 to 1.15 0.00 Rotating Equipment 0.50 0.00


Special Process Hazard Factor ( F2 ) 1.7 Process Unit Hazard Factor ( F3 = F1 x F2) 1.7 Fire & Explosion Index (F.& E.I.= F3 x M.F. ) 6.8 Degree of Hazard Light






a) temperature 1 2 3 3 4 4 √ b) pressure 1 2 3 3 3 4 √ c) flow control 1 2 3 4 4 4 √

4) Dust, blowdown, spill control 1 1 2 3 3 4 √ 5) Internal examination 1 2 3 3 4 4 √ 6) Combustible gas monitors

a) signal alarm 1 1 2 3 3 4 √ b) actuate equipment 1 1 2 2 3 4 √


7) Remote operation 1 1 2 3 3 4 √ 8) Diking, (Not Applicable as barrel storage)

1 4 4 4 4 4


1 1 2 3 4 4 √

1) Feature optional 2) Feature suggested 3) Feature recommended 4) Feature required

3. Magnesium Metal

Tank No. -- Equipment Name Magnesium Metal (2 T, 80 bags) Basic Material for Material factor 14 Density, kg/l -- Properties of material N h 0 N f 1 N r 1 M.F. 14 Boil. pt. 2025 0F 1107.2 0C Flash pt. -- 0F -- 0C ∆HC = Heat of Comb. 10600 BTU / lb Quantity of the material 2000 kg 4409.25 Lb Storage conditions Temp 25 0C Pressure 1.0 Bar Penalty factor


1.General Process



Toxic material(s) 0.20 to 0.80 0.00 Sub atmospheric pressure (< 500 mm Hg) 0.50 0.00 Operation in or near flammable range

inerted noninerted 0.00 to 0.80

1. Tank farm storage flammable liquids 0.50 0.00 2. Process upset or purge failure 0.30 0.00 3. Always in contact of Flame

process 0.80 0.00

Sr. No.


Flash Point

1 Magnesium Metal 2 Tones 80 Bags (25 kg X 400)

--



Relief setting ________ psig 0.00

Low temperature 0.20 to 0.30 0.00 Quantity of flammable / unstable material 1. Liquids or gases in process 0.00 2. Liquids or gases in storage 0.00 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, Dust in

Process 0.10

Corrosion & Erosion 0.10 to 0.75 0.00 Leakage - Joints & Packing 0.10 to 1.50 0.00 Use of Fired Equipment 0.00 Hot oil heat exchange system 0.15 to 1.15 0.00 Rotating Equipment 0.50 0.00 Special Process Hazard Factor ( F2 ) 1.1 Process Unit Hazard Factor ( F3 = F1 x F2) 1.1 Fire & Explosion Index (F.& E.I.= F3 x M.F. ) 15.4 Degree of Hazard Light






a) temperature 1 2 3 3 4 4 √ b) pressure 1 2 3 3 3 4 √


c) flow control 1 2 3 4 4 4 √ 4) Dust, blowdown, spill control 1 1 2 3 3 4 √ 5) Internal examination 1 2 3 3 4 4 √ 6) Combustible gas monitors

a) signal alarm 1 1 2 3 3 4 √ b) actuate equipment 1 1 2 2 3 4 √ 7) Remote operation 1 1 2 3 3 4 √ 8) Diking, (Not Applicable as barrel storage)

1 4 4 4 4 4


1 1 2 3 4 4

1)Feature optional 2) Feature suggested 3) Feature recommended 4) Feature required

Annexure: 7.4

TOXICITY INDEX (MONDS INDEX)

Methodology:

Toxicity Index : Th + Ts (1+GPH+SPH)

Ts (Correction Factor): For p-Formaldehyde will be 125 from the table no. 6.7 as the MAC is 5 ppm

100

Where, SPH = Special Process Hazard

GPH = General Process Hazard

Th = Toxicity factor based on the NFPA hazard index (0 – 4)

Ts = Correction factor (additional penalty) for toxicity based on Maximum

Allowable Concentration (MAC) value in ppm

Th (Toxicity Factor): For p- Formaldehyde will be 250 from the table no. 6.6 as the Nh factor for p-formaldehyde is 3


Table No.

NFPA Index Number

Toxicity factor Index

Toxicity Factor (Th)

0 0

1 50

2 125

3 250

4 325

Table :

MAC (in ppm)

Correction factor for Toxicity

Ts

5 and below 125

Between 5 and 50 75

50 and more 50

Table

The resulting TI values are ranked into three categories:

Toxicity Index

1-5 Light 6-9 Moderate 10-up High

1) Monds Index of p-Formaldehyde

General & Special Process Hazard

1.General Process

Base Factor 1.00 1.00 Exothermic Chemical Reaction 0.30 to 1.25 0.00 Endothermic Processes 0.20 to 0.40 0.00 Material handling and transfer 0.25 to 1.05 0.00 Enclosed or Indoor Process Units 0.25 to 0.90 0.00 Access 0.20 to 0.35 0.00 Drainage and Spill Control 0.25 to 0.50 0.00


General Process Hazard Factor ( F1 ) 1.00 2.Special Process



0.50 0.00


_____inerted ______noninerted

0.00 to 0.80


0.50 0.0 2. Process upset or purge failure 0.30 0.00 3. Always in Flammable range

0.80 0.00


0.00



in Process 0.00

Corrosion & Erosion 0.10 to 0.75 0.10 Leakage - Joints & Packing 0.10 to 1.50 0.10 Use of Fired Equipment 0.00 Hot oil heat exchange system 0.15 to 1.15 0.00 Rotating Equipment 0.50 0.00 Special Process Hazard Factor ( F2 ) 1.7

Therefore from the above table the GPH and SPH is coming to be around 1.00 and 1.9 respectively.

Calculation of Toxicity Index:


The Toxicity Index for p-Formaldehyde is calculated to be around 7.12 which indicate that the degree of hazard is moderate from table no. 7.23

100

Toxicity Index : [250 + 125 (1 + 1.00 + 1.7)]/100

Toxicity Index : 7.12


2) Monds Index of Mono Ethyl Amine.


1.General Process




0.50 0.00



0.00 to 0.80



0.80 0.00


0.00


1. Liquids or gases in process 0.00 0.63 x 10 2. Liquids or gases in storage 9 0.33 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, Dust

in Process 0.00






1.General Process

100

Toxicity Index : [250 + 75 (1 + 2.35 + 2.03)]/100


The Toxicity Index for Mono Ethyl Amine is calculated to be around 6.535 which indicate that the degree of hazard is moderate from table no. 7.23

3) Monds Index of Sulphuric acid





0.50 0.00



0.00 to 0.80



0.80 0.00


0.00



in Process 0.00

Corrosion & Erosion 0.10 to 0.75 0.10 Leakage - Joints & Packing 0.10 to 1.50 0.10


Use of Fired Equipment 0.00 Hot oil heat exchange system 0.15 to 1.15 0.00 Rotating Equipment 0.50 0.00 Special Process Hazard Factor ( F2 ) 1.8




1.General Process

100

Toxicity Index : [250 + 125 (1 + 1.00 + 1.8)]/100


The Toxicity Index for sulphuric acid is calculated to be around 7.25 which indicate that the degree of hazard is moderate from table no. 7.23

4) Monds Index of Nonyl Phenol





0.50 0.00



0.00 to 0.80


0.50 0.0 2. Process upset or purge failure 0.30 0.00


3. Always in Flammable range

0.80 0.00


0.00


1. Liquids or gases in process 0.00 51.13 x 10 2. Liquids or gases in storage 9 1.1 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, Dust

in Process 0.00





100

Toxicity Index : [250 + 125 (1 + 1 + 2.9)]/100


The Toxicity Index for Nonyl Phenol is calculated to be around 8.625 which indicate that the degree of hazard is moderate from table no. 7.23

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