Risk and Hierarchy in International Society

Risk and Hierarchy in International SocietyLiberal Interventionism in the Post-Cold War EraWilliam ClaptonISBN: 9781137396372DOI: 10.1057/9781137396372Palgrave Macmillan

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10.1057/9781137396372 - Risk and Hierarchy in International Society, William Clapton

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Palgrave Studies in International Relations Series

General Editors:

Knud Erik Jørgensen, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark

Audie Klotz, Department of Political Science, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, USA

Palgrave Studies in International Relations, produced in association with the ECPR Standing Group for International Relations, will provide students and scholars with the best theoreti-cally-informed scholarship on the global issues of our time. Edited by Knud Erik Jørgensen and Audie Klotz, this new book series will comprise cutting-edge monographs and edited collections which bridge schools of thought and cross the boundaries of conventional fields of study.

Titles include:

Pami Aalto, Vilho Harle and Sami Moisio (editors)INTERNATIONAL STUDIESInterdisciplinary Approaches

Mathias Albert, Lars-Erik Cederman and Alexander Wendt (editors)NEW SYSTEMS THEORIES OF WORLD POLITICS

Robert AysonHEDLEY BULL AND THE ACCOMMODATION OF POWER

Gideon Baker (editor)HOSPITALITY AND WORLD POLITICS

Joshua BaronGREAT POWER PEACE AND AMERICAN PRIMACYThe Origins and Future of a New International Order

Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez (editors)INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE MIDDLE EASTEnglish School Theory at the Regional Level

William ClaptonRISK AND HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETYLiberal Interventionism in the Post-Cold War Era

Toni Erskine and Richard Ned Lebow (editors)TRAGEDY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Rebekka Friedman, Kevork Oskanian and Ramon Pachedo Pardo (editors)AFTER LIBERALISM?The Future of Liberalism in International Relations

Geir HønnelandBORDERLAND RUSSIANSIdentity, Narrative and International Relations

Beate JahnLIBERAL INTERNATIONALISMTheory, History, Practice

Oliver Kessler, Rodney Bruce Hall, Cecelia Lynch and Nicholas G. Onuf (editors)ON RULES, POLITICS AND KNOWLEDGEFriedrich Kratochwil, International Relations, and Domestic Affairs

Pierre P. LizeeA WHOLE NEW WORLDReinventing International Studies for the Post-Western World

(continued in page ii)


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Patrick MelloDEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION IN ARMED CONFLICTMilitary Involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq

Hans Morgenthau, Hartmut Behr and Felix RöschTHE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL

Max M. MutschlerARMS CONTROL IN SPACEExploring Conditions for Preventive Arms Control

Cornelia Navari (editor)ETHICAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRSArguments from the Middle Ground

Cornelia Navari (editor)THEORISING INTERNATIONAL SOCIETYEnglish School Methods

Dirk PetersCONSTRAINED BALANCING: THE EU’S SECURITY POLICY

Linda QuayleSOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE ENGLISH SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSA Region-Theory Dialogue

Simon F. ReichGLOBAL NORMS, AMERICAN SPONSORSHIP AND THE EMERGING PATTERNS OF WORLD POLITICS

Michael O. SharpePOSTCOLONIAL CITIZENS AND ETHIC MIGRATIONThe Netherlands and Japan in the Age of Globalization

Robbie ShilliamGERMAN THOUGHT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSThe Rise and Fall of a Liberal Project

Daniela TepeTHE MYTH ABOUT GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETYDomestic Politics to Ban Landmines

Daniel C. Thomas (editor)MAKING EU FOREIGN POLICYNational Preferences, European Norms and Common Policies

Rens van MunsterSECURITIZING IMMIGRATIONThe Politics of Risk in the EU

Darshan VigneswaranTERRITORY, MIGRATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Wolfgang Wagner, Wouter Werner and Michal Onderco (editors)DEVIANCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS‘Rogue States’ and International Security

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Risk and Hierarchy in International SocietyLiberal Interventionism in the Post-Cold War Era

William ClaptonLecturer in International Relations, The University of New South Wales, Australia


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© William Clapton 2014

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published 2014 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

E-ISBN: 978–1–137–39637–2


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Contents

Acknowledgements vii

List of Abbreviations ix

Introduction 1Structure and Case Studies 7

1 The Hierarchical Society 11Defining Hierarchy 13Hierarchy and the English School 16Anarchy, Hierarchy and Sovereignty in International Relations 19Conclusion 25

2 Risk and International Society 27Risk and the ‘World Risk Society’ 29Risk and the Normative Constitution of International Society 35Alternative Explanations of Hierarchy in International Relations 37Conclusion 41

3 The Management of Risk 43The Three ‘Ps’ of Risk Management: Proactive Anticipation, Prevention and Precaution 45Liberalism and Democracy as Risk Management 51Conclusion 56

4 Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery: The European Neighbourhood Policy 59European Security Risks in the Post-Cold War Era 61The ENP: Promoting Democracy and Hierarchy along the European Periphery 68Implications for International Society 73Conclusion 77


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vi Contents

5 Australia and the Management of Risk in the South Pacific 79Australian Foreign Policy Post-9/11: Increased Interventionism in the South Pacific 81Promoting Good Governance in Solomon Islands and PNG 89Implications for International Society 97Conclusion 100

6 Preventing Risks and Changing Regimes: The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 103Going to War in Iraq: Uncertainty, Precaution and the Prevention of Risk 105Preventing Risks in Iraq – Invasion and Regime Change 114Implications for International Society: Hierarchy or Domination in Iraq? 123Conclusion 127

Conclusion 129

Notes 139

Bibliography 169

Index 191


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vii

Acknowledgements

There are many people to whom I owe a great deal of appreciation and gratitude for their help in the writing of this book. First, my thanks go to Professors Kanishka Jayasuriya and Samuel Makinda, both of whom were instrumental in the initial design and development of this project. This book has taken me on a long journey, one that could not have begun if not for Kanishka and Sam’s critical feedback, guidance, support and inspiration. I would also like to express my thanks to David Mickler, Katie Attwell and Shahar Hameiri for providing support and feedback during the initial stages of this project.

Special thanks also go to the Criminology and Development and International Relations clusters in the School of Social Sciences at the University of New South Wales. I could not have hoped for a more wel-coming and supportive group of colleagues, many of whom I now count as close friends. I would especially like to thank Laura Shepherd for her feedback, insights and guidance on my work. The current shape of this book is due in large part to the excellent feedback that Laura provided on particular chapters. The book is much stronger for it, and I am very grateful to Laura for this.

Thanks must also go to my editorial team at Palgrave Macmillan, Eleanor Davey-Corrigan, Harriet Barker and Julia Willan, all of whom have provided constant support, advice and encouragement as I pre-pared this book. Thanks as well to the anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback and engagement with my work.

However, above all else I would like to thank three people. The first two are my parents, without whom this book would not have been pos-sible. They have supported and encouraged me in all of my endeavours and I simply could not have progressed to where I am today, in all facets of my life, without Mum and Dad. Lastly, thank you Sophie for all of your love and affection. Life is much brighter with you by my side, and me by yours.

Certain sections of Chapter 2 appeared in William Clapton and Shahar Hameiri (2012), ‘The Domestic Politics of International Hierarchy: Risk Management and the Reconstitution of International Society’, International Politics 49(1): pp. 59–77 and have been reprinted by permis-sion of Palgrave Macmillan. Certain sections of Chapter 3 have been


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viii Acknowledgements

reprinted by permission of Taylor and Francis (http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals) from William Clapton (2009), ‘Risk and Hierarchy in International Society’, Global Change, Peace and Security 21(1): pp. 19–35, Copyright Taylor and Francis. Certain sections of Chapter 5 have been reprinted by permission of Taylor and Francis (www.tandfonline.com) on behalf of the Australian Institute of International Affairs from William Clapton (2009), ‘Managing Risk within International Society: Hierarchical Governance in the Asia-Pacific’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 63(3): pp. 416–29, Copyright Australian Institute of International Affairs.


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ix

List of Abbreviations

AFP Australian Federal PoliceASPI Australian Strategic Policy InstituteAusAID Australian Agency for International DevelopmentCFSP Common Foreign and Security PolicyCPA Coalition Provisional Authority CW Chemical WeaponsDFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and TradeDIO Defence Intelligence AgencyECP Enhanced Cooperation PackageEEAS European External Action ServiceEMP Euro-Mediterranean PartnershipENP European Neighbourhood PolicyESS European Security StrategyEU European UnionFIAA Facilitation of International Assistance ActIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyIFI International Financial InstitutionIFM Isatabu Freedom Movement IMF International Monetary FundIR International RelationsJIC Joint Intelligence CommitteeMEF Malaitan Eagle ForceMT Metric Tonne NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNSS National Security StrategyNSVI National Strategy for Victory in IraqORHA Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian AssistanceONA Office of National AssessmentsPNG Papua New GuineaRAMSI Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon IslandsRPNGC Royal Papua New Guinea ConstabularyRSIP Royal Solomon Islands Police ForceRtoP Responsibility to ProtectTAL Transitional Administrative LawSAP Structural Adjustment Policy


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x List of Abbreviations

UK United KingdomUN United NationsUNSCOM United Nations Special Commission UNSCR United Nations Security Council ResolutionUS United StatesWEU Western European UnionWMD Weapons of Mass Destruction


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1

This book examines the social logics of hierarchy within post-Cold War international society. At first glance, this might seem like an odd state-ment to make. One of the foundational assumptions of the English School’s concept of an international society is that it is fundamen-tally anarchical in character in the sense that it is the members of this society, sovereign states, which collectively provide for social order in the absence of a higher authority. Anarchy, as neo-realists such as Waltz would tell us, is opposed to hierarchy.1 Hence, for Waltz, anarchical systems cannot exist where hierarchies prevail and vice-versa. In a similar vein, the English School has largely discounted the study of hierarchy within international society, a handful of relatively recent exceptions notwithstanding.2

It is the English School’s assumption of an anarchical international society, coupled with the insistence of key thinkers such as Hedley Bull that modern international society is explicitly anti-hegemonial or anti-hierarchical in character, that perhaps best explains why it has had rela-tively little to say about hierarchy within international society. As Bull put it, ‘International society is based on the rejection of a hierarchical ordering of states in favour of equality in the sense of the like applica-tion of basic rights and duties to like entities’.3 However, this statement would appear to sit in tension not only with key aspects of Bull’s own account of the core institutions of international society, but also with the actual historical practice of states in their relations with one another. In terms of Bull’s five institutions of international society (war, the balance of power, the great powers, international law and diplomacy), the great powers are most interesting in light of the question of hierarchy within international society.

Introduction


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2 Risk and Hierarchy in International Society

As Bull and other English School theorists have argued, the great powers essentially fulfil a managerial role within international society, based on a ‘special’ set of rights and prerogatives owing to their status as great powers. This necessarily entails a form of hierarchy within international society, one between the great powers providing for social order and the smaller states that benefit from this order and, as such, recognise and legitimate the exercise of authority by the great powers. Arguably, hierar-chy is implicit in the English School’s concept of an international society, but it is something that the English School literature has rarely addressed explicitly. This is problematic given that members of the English School have recognised that international hierarchies are not particularly novel phenomena, nor is hierarchy a new feature of the way in which members of international society have interacted with polities beyond its confines (for example, European colonialism). As Dunne argues, ‘Hierarchy is not something that is new in international politics . . .’4

The question, however, is not just whether international society can accommodate hierarchy, but also how much hierarchy it can accommo-date before disorder potentially begins to prevail. How much resistance to extant hierarchies can international society accommodate before its existence is threatened? In large part, this depends on how one defines hierarchy and how hierarchy is distinguished from related, yet distinct, concepts such as domination, coercion and control. If we simply equate hierarchy with domination or coercion, then we can see how hierarchy might be incompatible with, or even threaten the existence of, interna-tional society and order.5 However, others, such as Hobson and Sharman, have argued that hierarchies are fundamentally social relationships underpinned by ‘social logics’: norms and social ordering principles that are recognised as legitimate by both the superordinate and subordinate parties.6 These social logics provide for the formation, maintenance and reproduction of hierarchical relationships. Yet, Hobson and Sharman follow what might be termed the ‘mainstream’ literature, including the English School, in arguing that hierarchy is distinct from an anarchical order of sovereign states. The idea here is that a sovereign state that becomes a subordinate in a hierarchical relationship ceases to be sover-eign and the two states cease to interact within a condition of anarchy. Hierarchy is thus something that exists within states; it is not something that can prevail between them.

This book offers an alternative conception of hierarchy within inter-national relations. It argues that we should conceive of hierarchy as a type of legitimated social relationship based upon social logics, one that states have practiced between themselves in both a historical and


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Introduction 3

contemporary sense. It further argues that hierarchy is compatible with the concept of an ostensibly anarchical international society of sover-eign states and that hierarchies are in fact a significant feature of post-Cold War international society. They are most evident in a series of interventions conducted largely by Western states (which include the states of Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand) that are designed to promote liberal democratic institutions and forms of governance. These interventions are significant not only in that they violate key norms within international society, such as non-intervention and sovereign equality, but also in that they signify a hier-archical relationship between the intervening Western countries and the states subjected to intervention.

The key question here is why have these interventions occurred – what has compelled Western states to intervene in particular territories in order to promote liberalism and democracy? Through an understand-ing of the factors that underpin these interventions, we can also identify the particular social logics that underpin the hierarchical relationships of which these interventions are representative. This is something that recent work within the English School has generally not focused on in significant detail. Members of the English School, such as Ian Clark, have identified an increasing invocation of liberalism and democracy by Western societies as the new ‘membership standard’ that states are expected to achieve in order to qualify for full membership within inter-national society. However, the English School has paid relatively less attention to what has prompted the emergence of these new standards or new forms of international hierarchy.7

There are several different responses from other theoretical approaches that could be provided to the related questions of why these interven-tions have occurred and what social logics underpin hierarchical relations between Western and non-Western states. For example, some scholars adopting a post-colonial perspective have argued that contemporary hierarchies within international society are rooted in imperial relations between Western powers and their former colonies, which persist despite the process of decolonisation in the middle of the twentieth century. Barkawi and Laffey, for example, have argued that a truly holistic depic-tion of the international would include not only the traditional image of a Westphalian order of formally equal sovereign states, but also the imperial relations that continue to prevail between Western and non-Western countries.8

The significant point here is that Barkawi and Laffey identify imperial relations as inherently hierarchical, suggesting that imperialism and its


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attendant relations of hierarchy are a prominent feature of international relations, one that is revealed through a focus on the ‘peripheral and subaltern’.9 However, they do not explicitly outline what ‘hierarchy’ means. Despite several assertions that international relations take place within a context of ‘imperial hierarchy’, it is not clear precisely what these hierarchies entail, aside from the obvious respective position of Western and non-Western states as superordinate and subordinate par-ties to the hierarchical relationship.10 Owing to the lack of any explicit definition of imperial hierarchy or the rationale underpinning it, one can only assume that the motives that have traditionally been associ-ated with imperialism – resource extraction, territorial conquest and imperial rivalries – continue to inform the logic underpinning imperial hierarchies today.

Similarly, Anghie, in highlighting the imperial foundations of inter-national law, suggests that imperial hierarchies continue to prevail today.11 Refuting the suggestion that the process of decolonisation eradi-cated these hierarchies, he contends that hierarchical relationships between the imperial powers and former colonies continue, albeit in a different guise. Tickner suggests that framing International Relations (IR) in terms of an ‘anarchical outside’ (together with a ‘hierarchical inside’ within the state) ignores the fact that the relations of the weak former colonies with the rest of the world take place under ‘markedly hierarchical conditions’, although again, the precise normative content of these hierarchies is not outlined.12 Once more, the common theme of much of the post-colonial scholarship is the enduring legacy of imperi-alism and the hierarchical relations that continue to exist between Western and non-Western states.

Scholars adopting a Marxist perspective have also highlighted the inherently unequal and hierarchical relations between the developed capitalist countries of the North and the relatively underdeveloped and poorer countries of the South. Dependency theory and Wallerstein’s ‘World Systems Theory’ are well-known examples of this. Wallerstein posited that the world capitalist system produced and maintained gross political and economic inequalities between different ‘classes’ of states, which he termed the Core, Semi-Periphery and Periphery.13 Galtung’s ‘structural theory of imperialism’ is another example within Marxist scholarship of the identification of the pervasive inter- and intrastate hierarchies that are a structural feature of the global capitalist system.14 It should be noted, however, that generally ‘hierarchy’ is understood and used differently in both the Marxist and post-colonial literatures than the conception of hierarchy offered here. Generally, both literatures


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Introduction 5

equate hierarchy with dominance or coercion, not as a social relationship recognised as legitimate by all parties to the relationship.

There is also an unhelpful determinism that marks both post-colonial and Marxist depictions of international hierarchies. Whether it is argued that these hierarchies are an indelible feature of continuing imperial relations, or that they are the consequence of a hegemonic global capitalist system that divides the Core from the Periphery, both offer accounts of hierarchy that are inherently deterministic and, most problematically, static. Take European colonialism for example. The desire for resource extraction through territorial conquest and rivalries between the impe-rial powers fuelled the hierarchies that resulted from colonialism. To suggest that this same logic applies to contemporary hierarchical rela-tions between Western and non-Western states misses significant social, political and economic shifts that have occurred not only since the colo-nial era, but also since the onset of decolonisation.

To suggest that these hierarchies are ‘imperial’ or ‘colonial’, we would have to adopt a very different understanding of what these concepts mean and what many have generally understood imperialism and colo-nialism to entail. In some respects, we see why post-colonial theorists, for example, would make the claim that contemporary interstate hierar-chies are a continuance of imperial hierarchies. Both involve the invoca-tion of a particular standard of ‘civilisation’, both involve a diminution of the sovereign rights of non-Western countries (in the case of colonialism, the complete denial of these rights) that states in Europe and later the West have long enjoyed, and both involve significant interference in the domestic affairs of non-Western states. However, despite these similar features, the logic underpinning contemporary hierarchies is fundamen-tally different from that which underpinned European imperialism and its attendant relations of hierarchy. Contemporary forms of hierarchy are at least qualitatively different from imperial hierarchies in that they ‘are justified in large part by the need of Western interveners to protect their own security’.15 As Ignatieff suggests, ‘. . . the new empire is not like that of times past, built on colonies and conquest. It is an empire lite, hegemony without colonies, a global sphere of influence without the burden of direct administration and the risks of daily policing’.16

Several recent interventions by Western states that have involved an attempt to promote liberalism and democracy have not been justified by resource extraction. They are also not informed by a desire to engage in capacity building, although this remains a central feature of these inter-ventions, nor are they simply a result of an altruistic desire to spread liberalism and democracy. The conspicuous selectivity of these ‘liberal


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interventions’ would indicate that this is not the case. Rather, security concerns have formed a crucial part of the justification of these inter-ventions. This emphasis on the maintenance and protection of security is therefore crucial to understanding the formation and reproduction of contemporary hierarchies within international society. Yet, the security issues that Western societies face in the post-Cold War era have arguably shifted, especially compared to the major security issues of the Cold War. This is most readily demonstrated in the recent focus of Western governments on the adverse implications of so-called ‘failed’ or ‘weak’ states in the context of the emergence of non-traditional security risks such as terrorism. As Heng and Rasmussen have argued, the emergence of new forms of transnational security risks has resulted in a much more uncertain and unpredictable international strategic environment.17

Sociologist Ulrich Beck’s ‘risk society’ thesis best captures the nature of these new security issues.18 The idea of the risk society, as well as the concepts of risk and risk management, provides a way of not only under-standing contemporary security issues, but also the formation and reproduction of contemporary hierarchical relationships within interna-tional society. Beck’s risk society thesis is primarily an account of macro-social change – his primary argument is that macro-social transitions are taking place in Western societies, instigated by the emergence and iden-tification of new forms of temporally and spatially de-bounded risks that escape established mechanisms of control.19 Applied to the English School, the risk society thesis provides a useful set of conceptual and theoretical tools for understanding the emergence and reproduction of interstate hierarchies within contemporary international society.

Initially, Beck’s focus was on environmental risks such as global climate change, but recently he has also focused on security risks such as terror-ism.20 Terrorism, for instance, can occur in any location, at any time and often with minimal warning. The de-bounded nature of contemporary security risks makes them difficult to identify and manage. It is because of this that focus has fallen on states or territories that Western govern-ments deem to be ‘risky’. Such states typically do not pose a traditional military threat. Rather, as Clapton and Hameiri argue, their ‘riskiness’ ‘is seen to flow indirectly from the potential emergence and proliferation of “non-traditional” security concerns, such as terrorism, transnational crime or illegal migration from within their borders’.21 Importantly, understandings of risk and riskiness have largely been framed in terms of the fragility or even outright absence of functioning liberal demo-cratic institutions.22

It is because of this link between risk and state capacity that interven-ers have sought to promote and establish functioning liberal democratic


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Introduction 7

institutions in target states. Hence, the main argument advanced in this book is that a new ‘social logic of risk’, which seeks to impose liberal values and institutions as a mechanism of risk management, underpins the existence of a particular set of contemporary hierarchies within international society. Not only is this significant in that it challenges the traditional conception of international society as fundamentally anar-chical, but it also has significant implications for the normative under-pinnings of international society itself. This is particularly so with regard to the notion that the norms of sovereign equality and non-intervention, traditionally associated with the pluralist conception of international society within the English School, continue to prevail as key norms of international society.23 Recent attempts at promoting liberalism as a means of managing security risks suggests that the pluralist idea that all states have a right to constitute their domestic institutions according to their own societal values has been challenged by the notion that states lacking functioning liberal democratic institutions are potentially danger-ous sites of instability and disorder.

Structure and Case Studies

This book consists of two main parts. The first part investigates the core concepts and ideas that are employed and establishes the theoretical framework to be advanced. Within this, Chapter 1 first explores the concept of hierarchy and outlines a definition that draws attention to the fundamentally social nature of hierarchical relationships. This chapter then goes on to explore the notion of hierarchy within interna-tional society. It is argued that as a form of social relationship that the relevant parties legitimate, one involving the relational exercise of authority, hierarchies are compatible with international society. Indeed, interstate hierarchies are fundamental to the English School’s own understanding of international society and its core institutions, despite the concept not having traditionally received a great deal of attention from English School writers.

Chapter 2 addresses the concepts of risk and risk management. It introduces Beck’s risk society thesis in an attempt to understand why Western governments have felt compelled to intervene in non-Western territories in order to promote liberalism and democracy in the post-Cold War era. It is argued that by applying Beck’s risk society thesis, we can identify and understand significant aspects of the underlying ratio-nale for these interventions, and hence the social logics of the hierarchies that they represent. The chapter also examines the effects of a social logic of risk for the normative constitution of international society.


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Chapter 3 then examines the management of risk, focusing in particular on the rationale behind promoting liberalism and democracy as a form of risk management. It also looks at related concepts of risk manage-ment, such as prevention and precaution, which are generally associ-ated with a risk management approach to addressing particular issues or problems.

The second part is comprised of three case studies in Chapters 4–6 to which the theoretical framework developed in the first part of the book will be applied and evaluated through the analysis of case evidence. A common structure is employed in each of the case studies to allow for comparison and to highlight areas of congruity and incongruity. Broadly, each chapter is broken into three components. Each chapter begins with an analysis of the security policies and doctrines of the Western govern-ment under examination and the justifications provided by government officials for the intervention undertaken. The point here is to identify perceptions of risk as the impetus for intervention and demonstrate that the concepts of risk and risk management are useful for explaining and understanding the underlying motive and rationale of the interventions conducted. Hence, these sections of the case studies explore the stated justifications for the interventions and examine whether security issues were significant to the justifications provided and whether Western interveners conceptualised these issues in terms of risk and related con-cepts such as prevention and precaution.

The second part of each chapter examines the conduct of the inter-ventions and looks at whether Western interveners attempted to impose liberalism and democracy in the target state. It also explores the methods that interveners employed to compel the target state to adopt liberal values and institutions, with a particular focus on the perceived legiti-macy of the intervention by the superordinate and subordinate states. The final part of each case study considers the implications for interna-tional society. These sections explore the reaction of international society to the interventions. The reaction of the wider international society, par-ticularly with regard to whether or not the intervention was viewed as legitimate, is crucial to understanding the broader implications of these interventions for international society. Specifically, the final sections of the case studies are intended to underscore the claim that hierarchies can occur within international society without necessarily providing for disorder or threatening the existence of the society of states.

The three cases selected include the European Union’s (EU) European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Australia’s recent interventions in the South Pacific and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Three basic criteria were


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Introduction 9

used to select the cases. First, each case had to involve an intervention by a Western government or grouping of governments in a non-Western territory. The focus is explicitly limited to the conduct of Western states, the assumption being that as the generally predominant members of international society these states are most likely to be involved as the superordinate parties in hierarchical relations with other countries. Second, the intervention had to involve the imposition of liberal insti-tutions and/or notions of good governance. In terms of promoting liberal good governance, this can include a range of liberal values such as the accountability of government to the people, respect for the rule of law or individual civil and political rights.

Each case study also had to focus on an intervention by a different Western government in a different geographical region in order to high-light not only that the interventions have taken place in diverse geo-graphical locations, but also that they have been prosecuted by several different Western governments, not only leading Western states such as the United States (US). Further, the cases have been deliberately chosen based on these disparities in order to allow for comparison so as to iden-tify common trends across dissimilar cases. This is intended to validate the main argument that perceptions of risk and attempts at risk manage-ment are common features of contemporary interventions conducted by Western governments, despite other disparities that may exist between these different instances of intervention.

Finally, the number of cases selected and the criteria that each inter-vention must have occurred in a different geographical region is intended to strengthen the claim that these interventions do not simply represent isolated cases or aberrations with only localised or regional effects. Rather, the selection of cases of intervention in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Northern Africa and the South Pacific is intended to demonstrate that new forms of hierarchy underpinned by a social logic of risk are relatively widespread and have been particularly so over the last 15 to 20 years. Much of the English School literature has not ade-quately recognised that international society, as it exists today, is at least in part a hierarchical society. By focusing on the existence and preva-lence of hierarchical relations between states, we can provide a more holistic account, and hopefully a greater understanding, of both the different types of social relations that occur within the society of states and different patterns of international order.24


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11

The concept of an international society is arguably the English School’s most distinctive contribution to the field of IR. Containing elements of realism, liberalism and constructivism, the concept of an international society and the English School in general provide a unique perspective on how states interact with one another and how these relationships are structured and ordered. As Bull famously commented:

A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.1

As per the title of the book in which this quote appeared, one of Bull’s key assumptions regarding international society is its fundamentally anarchical nature.

The reason for this assumption, of course, is the fact that all states are sovereign entities. Despite being one of the more heavily debated concepts within the discipline of IR, states are generally sovereign to the extent to which they answer to no higher authority. Sovereignty in this sense has traditionally been defined as an indivisible and absolute attribute – a political community is either sovereign or it is not.2 This view has long been established in the mainstream of the discipline, drawing from the works of renowned jurists such as Bodin, Grotius and Austin.3 Generally then, as an anarchical society of sovereign states, the English School has regarded hierarchy not just as an insignificant feature of international society, but also something that is potentially threatening or damaging to the society of states.

1The Hierarchical Society


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This is quite distinct from a number of different theoretical approaches that explicitly recognise the existence and salience of international hier-archies. Generally, this literature on hierarchy has been critical in its orientation, comprised of works employing post-colonialism, Marxism or Critical Theory. However, there has also been a recent emergence of a substantial body of more ‘mainstream’ works that have considered hier-archy within IR more generally and within international society more specifically. For example, Simpson has identified the enduring impor-tance of hierarchy and inequality as key historical features of interna-tional society,4 Hobson and Sharman have identified the continuing importance of hierarchy within international relations,5 while Lake, Goh and Donnelly have all identified various forms of hierarchy among states in the post-Cold War era.6 Despite this relative lack of focus on hierarchy, some within the English School, such as Clark, have suggested that ‘hier-archy within anarchy’ is indeed possible in the form of hegemony.7

The purpose of this chapter is to continue these considerations of hierarchy within international society and question some of the key claims made within the English School and the discipline of IR more generally, especially those surrounding the nature of sovereignty and the supposedly anarchical nature of international society. This chapter argues that the conception of an anarchical international society pro-vided by Bull and many other IR scholars does not fully capture the character of social and political relationships between states. Rather, we must also account for the fact that international hierarchies are a marked, and in some cases predominant, feature of interstate relationships. This is not to contend that international society is not anarchical – it is, in the sense that there is no centralised political authority to which all states submit – but rather to suggest that both hierarchy and anarchy are significant features of international politics.

This contention relies both on a conceptualisation of hierarchy as a compatible feature of international society and of sovereignty as some-thing other than an indivisible or absolute attribute. Indeed, an impor-tant question that arises from the contention that hierarchy is prevalent within international society is how does this impact prevailing notions of sovereignty and statehood? In particular, we must account for what Simpson and Donnelly have termed ‘sovereign inequalities’ in the post-Cold War era and the way in which the identification of hierarchical relationships between states has challenged traditional conceptions of sovereignty and statehood within international society.8 One weakness of parts of the existing literature on hierarchy is that the analyses pro-vided have largely been divorced from such considerations.9 Generally,


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The Hierarchical Society 13

scholars have considered hierarchy as a fundamentally different ordering principle compared to an anarchical order of sovereign states and, there-fore, have not systematically considered its implications for prevailing understandings of sovereignty and statehood.10

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The first part pro-vides an outline of the concept of hierarchy and defines what hierarchy entails in an international context. It suggests that we should conceive of hierarchies as fundamentally social relationships, underpinned by particular norms, or social logics, and legitimated by all parties to the relationship. This depiction of hierarchies as social relationships involving the exercise of relational authority by the superordinate party is central to the contention that hierarchy is compatible with international society. The second part of the chapter considers the treatment of hierarchy within the English School, especially in what might be termed the ‘clas-sical’ English School works of scholars such as Bull. It highlights the problematic lack of attention afforded to the concept of hierarchy given its centrality to the key definitions and depictions of international society and its institutions that these scholars have provided.

The third and final part of the chapter attempts to bring hierarchy into the English School. It does so through three conceptual moves. First, it conceives of international society as a dynamic and historically contingent assemblage of norms and institutions, one that is flexible and adaptable enough to accommodate a variety of different forms of social relationships between states. Second, it advances a conception of sovereignty that draws attention to its divisible and historically contin-gent nature in order to contend that sovereign states can (at least con-ceptually) be subordinate parties within relations of hierarchy. Finally, it reconsiders the dichotomous relationship between anarchy and hierar-chy that has prevailed within the mainstream literature and suggests that the two are in fact compatible. Through these three conceptual moves, this chapter demonstrates that hierarchies can exist within inter-national society.

Defining Hierarchy

In order to demonstrate the compatibility of hierarchy with interna-tional society, we must first explore the definition of the concept of hier-archy itself. While several recent works have sought to draw attention to the concept of hierarchy and its enduring role within international politics,11 Waltz provided what has perhaps become the ‘standard’ defi-nition of hierarchy within the mainstream IR literature. Waltz suggests


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that anarchy and hierarchy are distinct ordering principles, where anarchy refers to the lack of centralised authority, whereas hierarchy entails ‘rela-tions of super- and subordination’ in which ‘actors are formally differen-tiated according to the degrees of their authority, and their distinct functions are specified’.12 Importantly, this definition of hierarchy draws attention to the authoritative nature of hierarchical relationships.

Other scholars who have explored the concept of hierarchy have followed Waltz in their emphasis on the authoritative nature of hierar-chical relationships.13 Hobson and Sharman contend that hierarchical relationships are fundamentally authoritative, as opposed to purely coercive,14 entailing a social relationship between the superordinate and subordinate parties that both recognise as legitimate.15 As they suggest, ‘Hierarchical authority means . . . that some are entitled to command and some are required to obey, and that both sides recognize as legitimate the social logic of this unequal situation’.16 Hence Hobson and Sharman define hierarchy ‘as a relationship between two (or more) actors whereby one is entitled to command and the other is obligated to obey, and this relationship is recognized as right and legitimate by each’.17

Lake also focuses on hierarchy as a type of relationship based on con-sensual relational authority, arguing that external restrictions on states constitute hierarchical authority relationships when one state can com-pel another to behave in a particular manner and the subordinate state voluntarily complies.18 Importantly, the concept of relational authority offered by Lake as well as Hobson and Sharman differs from traditional formal-legal conceptions of authority that have pervaded the discipline of IR and led scholars to dismiss the possibility of hierarchy in an osten-sibly anarchical international environment.19 Indeed, if we were to con-ceive of authority in formal-legal terms, with authority and authoritative acts sanctioned by law, then by definition such authority, and hence hierarchies, cannot exist in an anarchical international environment. Conceiving of authority in relational or social terms allows us to move past this problem.

Another important facet of the concepts of hierarchy and authority is the relationship of both to the concept of coercion. Lake, like Hobson and Sharman, argues that external restrictions on a state’s actions that rely entirely on coercion are not authoritative and do not denote a truly hierarchical relationship.20 A relationship based entirely on the coercion of one state by another is thus something other than hierarchy – it involves outright domination. Hence, in keeping a party subordinated, the superordinate party must rely not only on the real or perceived threat of coercion, but also on the perceived legitimacy of their authority


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by both parties in the hierarchical relationship. We must be careful, however, not to entirely discount the role of coercion, which partially underpins any form of hierarchy.

While coercion and material capacity might not be the only or even the most important factors in a hierarchical relationship, hierarchies cannot function in the absence of the superordinate state’s demon-strated or perceived capacity to punish non-compliance on the part of the subordinate state.21 In other words, though hierarchies may not simply be reducible to inequality and coercion both are nevertheless an inherent feature of any hierarchical relationship. Authority and coer-cion are intimately tied together and while a hierarchical authority rela-tionship entails the obligation to obey on the part of the subordinate party, this obligation creates only an expectation of obedience.22 Subordinates can flout the rules and commands of superordinates while still recognising the legitimate right of the superordinate party to issue and enforce commands.23 A perceived or demonstrated capacity for coercion and enforcement is therefore necessary to keep the subordinate party in line.

Equally, however, while the coercive capacity of the superordinate party is an important component of hierarchy, Hobson and Sharman, Lake and Goh are all persuasive in arguing that hierarchy is not simply reducible to coercion or control.24 Social, rather than purely material, factors are crucial to hierarchy formation and reproduction. As Clark argues, hierarchy is ‘a social arrangement characterised by stratification in which, like the angels, there are orders of power and glory and the society is classified in successively subordinate grades’.25 At its core, hier-archy is a social relationship, one in which both the authority to com-mand and the obligation to obey are shaped and informed by the ideas and norms that underpin the hierarchical relationship. As Goh argues, ‘hierarchical social compacts cannot be understood without analysis of the collective norms and beliefs that underpin the legitimacy of such relations’.26

These ideas and norms are what Hobson and Sharman refer to as ‘social logics’: social ordering principles that shape hierarchy formation, fall and reproduction.27 These norms shape and construct the identity of the parties involved in the hierarchical relationship, particularly the identity of states as either superordinate or subordinate parties. The idea of European colonialism as a ‘civilising mission’, for example, underpinned the perceived legitimacy of Europe’s hierarchical relation-ships with the colonies and protectorates, simultaneously constructing the Europeans as ‘civilisers’ and the various colonies as ‘uncivilised’ or


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‘barbaric’.28 Crucially, all parties to the hierarchical relationship recognise these social logics, which underpin and legitimise the authority exercised by the superordinate party.

In sum, we can define hierarchy as a type of social relationship under-pinned and informed by social logics, one that involves the exercise of relational authority by a superordinate party that is consented to and recognised as legitimate by all parties to the relationship. The upshot of this definition of hierarchy as a social relationship underpinned by social logics is that hierarchy is possible within international society. The next section explores the treatment of hierarchy within the English School before outlining in more detail the argument that hierarchy can and does exist within the supposedly anarchical society.

Hierarchy and the English School

Like much of the mainstream IR literature, the English School has accepted and perpetuated the notion that anarchy is a unique and endur-ing feature of international relations. We can trace this as far back as Thomas Hobbes’ account of the attempt of individuals to form a sovereign state in the hope that it would allow them to escape the anarchy that defined the state of nature.29 The consequence has been that when real-ists, liberals, constructivists or those from the English School discuss anarchy, the differences and debates between them are usually confined to the consequences of anarchy and not the conception of anarchy itself.30 As Ashley suggests, the study of IR, insofar as one equates it with the mainstream theoretical disciplines, essentially revolves around the organising principle of anarchy; hence his description of the discipline as the ‘anarchy problematique’.31

This assumption of anarchy, along with Waltz’s claim that anarchy and hierarchy are distinct ordering principles, pervades the English School’s traditional conception of an international society, as does its historical accounts of the emergence and evolution of this society. Particularly in relation to the latter, the English School has largely ignored the role of hierarchy, something that is problematic, for example, given the inher-ently unequal and hierarchical relations between Europe and its colonies that presaged their eventual admittance into international society. Key thinkers in the School, such as Bull, explicitly reject the existence of hier-archies within international society. As Dunne suggests, ‘The only form of hierarchy envisaged by Bull was an international state, an end point that required the reproduction of the social contract among states’.32 For Clark, part of the English School’s traditional unease with hierarchy is


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that it is seen as something potentially inconsistent with anarchy, and therefore corrosive of ‘legitimacy and anarchy as traditionally con-ceived within international society’.33 The English School therefore conceives hierarchy as something that potentially endangers interna-tional society.

The work of Dunne readily demonstrates this, questioning the extent to which international society is compatible with hierarchy. Writing in the aftermath of the US’ invasion of Iraq in 2003, Dunne questioned, ‘How far is an international society composed of a plurality of sovereign states compatible with hierarchy?’34 In Dunne’s conceptualisation, though, the US had effectively placed itself outside of international soci-ety through its violation of international law and key norms when it invaded Iraq. In this, the US was attempting to externally impose hier-archy from outside international society. However, as Clark has pointed out, this is quite different from the endogenous emergence of hierar-chical relationships within international society.35 We might also note that Dunne’s concern was not simply the threat that hierarchy posed to international society per se, but rather the concentration of material power in the hands of a single actor or, in other words, hegemony.

The relative neglect and unease with the concept of hierarchy within the English School is also reflective of the School’s relatively uncritical acceptance of the canon in the IR literature regarding the emergence of the state in Europe after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.36 Following the traditional story of the Peace of Westphalia in the mainstream IR litera-ture, English School theorists such as Jackson have argued that contem-porary international society – conceived as a universal, anarchical and horizontal ordering of formally equal sovereign states – can trace its his-torical evolution to the Peace of Westphalia. At this point, sovereignty and anarchy trumped the loose hierarchies of the previous feudal social order in Europe.37 For Jackson, ‘The language of societas is the language of political freedom as opposed to that of universitas, which is the language of political hierarchy. . . .’38 Hence, Jackson argues that contemporary international society is a fundamentally pluralist, anti-hierarchical asso-ciation. Hierarchy can have no place in a society based on sovereignty, non-intervention and, ultimately, political freedom.

Despite this, some in the English School have addressed the issue of international hierarchy, even if they have not done so in a systematic fashion. Watson, for example, has considered the issue of hierarchy and hegemony within international society. Unlike Bull or Jackson, Watson explicitly incorporates hegemony into his depiction of international society. His study of international systems and societies dating back to


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ancient Greece examines the way in which they have shifted along a spectrum between hegemony and independence. Watson argues that the point of greatest legitimacy for all political communities that are members of a given system or society plays a central role in determin-ing what point on the spectrum is most stable for a given international society at a given time.39 Historically, international systems and societies have swung on a pendulum between hegemony and independence. Importantly, Watson concludes that, in practice, there has always been a ‘hegemonial pull’ within international society and hegemony has always been ubiquitous. Therefore, for Watson, the leading powers of the day have historically always exercised a level of hierarchical authority.

Indeed, speaking of contemporary international society, Watson argued in a later work that the current trend of international scrutiny of how states conduct themselves domestically is subverting the ‘anarcho-phile’ and ‘anti-hegemonial’ principles that are supposedly fundamental to contemporary international society.40 Others, such as Keene, have drawn attention to the existence of two different orders and the ways they have affected one another in international society’s history. One is comprised of sovereign European states in the ‘anarchical society’, the other is characterised by relations of hierarchy and comprised of the European empires and their colonies.41 Clark has also provided similar arguments regarding hierarchy and hegemony, suggesting not only that both are possible within international society, but that we should conceive of hegemony in particular as a socially recognised and legitimated insti-tution of international society.42

Clark goes on to suggest that international society is ‘effective pre-cisely because it offers the prospect of the successful institutionalisation of power’, presumably through socially legitimated institutions such as the great powers.43 As Hurrell likewise argues, ‘institutionalized forms of hierarchy were central to pluralist understandings of how international order might be nurtured and sustained . . .’44 This is a key point, as it exposes a tension and potential contradiction in the assertion of an ostensibly anti-hierarchical international society that in fact depends on socially recognised hierarchies for the maintenance of international order. Bull argues that the great powers fulfil a type of managerial func-tion, serving to maintain a level of order within international society through the management of their relations with each other and through their collective management of international society.45 They do so not only because of their preponderance in terms of material capabilities and political influence, but also because other states within international society recognise and legitimate their position as great powers.46


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In this sense, Bull explicitly recognised that states are in some cases grossly unequal in terms of their material capabilities and level of power, which is recognised by other states in terms of the conferral of ‘special rights and responsibilities’ to the great powers.47 However, this would presuppose the bestowal of a level of authority upon the great powers, the exercise of which other states would recognise as legitimate. This seems remarkably similar to the definition of hierarchy provided above. Indeed, this would appear to be a classic case of a hierarchical social relationship – the great powers exercise authority as the superordinate party and the subordinates recognise this exercise of authority and legit-imate it as well as the hierarchical relationship itself. If hierarchy does indeed sit at the heart of international society through its embodiment in one of its five key institutions, then on what basis can it be argued that hierarchy is incompatible with international society?

The problem here is that when hierarchy has been addressed within the English School it has either been conceived as something that is exogenous to international society (Dunne), has not been defined or con-ceptualised very clearly or has been largely ignored. This is highlighted by the fact that Bull simultaneously argued that international society is fundamentally anti-hierarchical, and that the exercise of hierarchical authority by the great powers is a central aspect of international order. The question remains then as to precisely what sort of hierarchical authority the great powers exercised in Bull’s thought, and why this was compatible with international society when Bull perceived hierarchy in general not to be. Given the English School’s general lack of focus on hierarchy, and the insistence of key thinkers such as Bull that interna-tional society is not hierarchical, the task remains to attempt to bring hierarchy into the English School.

Anarchy, Hierarchy and Sovereignty in International Relations

This final section of the chapter outlines a set of conceptual moves that will allow us, it is argued, to conceive of hierarchy within international society. More specifically, this section will explore three issues. The first is the ability of international society to accommodate different types of social relationships between states other than those involving the formal equality of all states. Second, it will explore the nature of sovereignty and the way in which the concept has been traditionally defined as indivisible and involving the exercise of an absolute form of authority. Finally, it will examine the supposed incompatibility of anarchy, hierarchy


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and sovereignty. As will be demonstrated, hierarchy is not incompatible with international society nor does a state subordinated within relations of hierarchy lose its identity as a sovereign entity.

The argument that hierarchy is incompatible with international society – or, as Dunne has suggested, potentially threatens international society – assumes that international society is both static and inflexible and that hierarchical relationships can potentially threaten interna-tional legitimacy. But as Clark argues, if we accept hierarchy as some-thing that proceeds fundamentally from consensual relational authority, as outlined above, then we can conceive of hierarchy within interna-tional society as an expression of a legitimate social relationship between two or more states.48 Taking a further step back, we might also question what scholars such as Bull mean when they talk of an ‘international society’. Particularly, how is such a society constituted? While Bull and other English School thinkers have provided fine definitions of what an international society is, what might be termed the ‘classical’ English School literature has generally not offered a systematic outline of how such a society is constituted.49

More recently, scholars such as Philpott, Reus-Smit and Jackson have directly tackled the question of how international society is constituted. Jackson, for instance, identifies international society as a historical arrangement of norms and institutions that is periodically reconstituted in response to changing ideas and circumstances.50 Like Jackson, both Reus-Smit and Philpott also emphasise both the role of ideas in the constitutional structuring of international society and the historically variable nature of the norms and institutions that sit at its heart.51 The point here is that if we conceive of international society as a dynamic and historically contingent set of norms and institutions, then there is no reason per se why international society cannot accommodate hier-archical relations between states. The mere fact of hierarchy in and of itself does not threaten international society, nor are hierarchy and international society automatically incompatible. Rather, what is impor-tant are the social practices through which states either legitimate or resist hierarchical relationships within international society.

The upshot of the argument that we should conceive of international society as historically dynamic is that we should also understand sover-eignty and statehood as two concepts that are historically variable and shift over time. Given that it is a society of sovereign states, shifts in international society’s norms and institutions will likely not occur in a vacuum – they will affect or be affected by broader shifts in prevailing understandings of sovereignty and statehood. This is a particularly


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important issue – it is one thing to suggest that international society itself might be able to accommodate different forms of social relation-ships between states, including hierarchy, but it is quite another to make the claim that sovereign states can be subordinated in hierarchical rela-tionships and still retain a form of sovereignty. Clearly, this contradicts traditional depictions of the concept in which sovereignty is taken as an absolute condition. However, if, like international society, sovereignty is to be understood as historically contingent and informed by prevailing ideas and intersubjective understandings between states, as constructivists have been arguing for some time now, then it is possible to conceive of different understandings of sovereignty emerging over time.52

Sovereignty can and does shift over time, something that creates prob-lems regarding the traditional depiction of sovereignty and its emer-gence as a result of the Peace of Westphalia. In particular, we might question the traditional story of the Peace of Westphalia giving rise to anarchy and the modern conception of sovereignty, one that is under-stood as absolute and indivisible. This story is a notable assumption of the English School. As de Carvalho et al. argue, the assumption of sover-eignty and international anarchy arising immediately after Westphalia is problematic. As they suggest:

The typical Eurocentric conflation of Europe and the world leads to the problematic assumption that sovereignty soon became a univer-sal feature of world politics once the big bang of political modernity had exploded at Westphalia . . . such an emphasis necessarily obscures the existence of various hierarchical international political forma-tions . . . not just in the pre-1648 era, but above all within the post-1648 ‘anarchic’ era.53

Further, it has also given rise to a relatively static conception of sover-eignty that continues to be understood within a ‘Westphalian’ context.

The continued use of terms such as ‘Westphalian sovereignty’ in the discipline is indicative of this.54 To accept that we can trace modern con-ceptions of sovereignty back to 1648 is to accept that the Peace of Westphalia did in fact give rise to this concept (which revisionists have heavily contested) and that sovereignty has remained relatively unchanged and static since this time.55 Again, the problem with tradi-tional accounts is not only the dubious historical accuracy of claims that Westphalia is central to the emergence of modern sovereignty. It is also the implication that a static form of sovereignty based on formal equality, non-intervention, indivisibility and absolute authority over a particular


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territory to the exclusion of all other actors emerged in 1648 and has informed international relations ever since. As Lake and others have argued, there is little evidence in the Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck, which comprise the Peace of Westphalia, to suggest that this is in fact the case.56

Yet, the ‘myth of Westphalia’ continues to prevail, including the idea of sovereignty as absolute and indivisible. Even some of the works that have sought to focus attention on the existence and importance of international hierarchies have propagated this idea. For example, Hobson and Sharman note, ‘Under sovereignty, political authority . . . is bundled together in a unitary and absolute fashion rather than shared out’.57 The consequence of such a view is that Hobson and Sharman remain wedded to the idea that hierarchy cannot occur between sover-eign states – states either enjoy absolute or exclusive authority over a given territory and population or they do not.58 If sovereignty is concep-tualised in these terms, by definition a state cannot be a subordinate party in a hierarchical relationship with another state. To do so, a state would have to cede at least some of its authority to the superordinate state and therefore would cede its sovereignty.

This again implies that anarchy, hierarchy and sovereignty are incom-patible. If two states engage in a hierarchical relationship, then their relationship ceases to be anarchical because the subordinate state ceases to enjoy absolute or indivisible authority over its territory and equal sovereign rights with the superordinate state. Indeed, this is precisely what Hobson and Sharman argue. They conceptualise hierarchy and sovereignty/anarchy as dichotomous ordering principles.59 Hence, while they conceive of international society as a mixed anarchic/hierarchic system, sovereign states only exist in the realm of anarchy, with hierar-chies existing as a complement to the anarchical states system.60 Political units that exist within hierarchies are not sovereign, according to an argument offered by Hobson and Sharman that is a consequence of their employment of a traditional definition of indivisible sovereignty that involves the exercise of formal-legal authority.61

This is a remarkably static reading of sovereignty that relates to what Hobson and Sharman term the ‘Westphalian frame of reference’, particu-larly given that in their conclusion they suggest that sovereignty, like hierarchy, could be defined in social rather than materialist terms, as is argued here. Hence, they effectively admit the possibility, but essentially do not appropriately acknowledge, that sovereignty is a social, histori-cally contingent and malleable concept. Rather than conceive of sover-eignty through such a static framework, we should instead focus on the


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ways in which sovereignty’s meaning has substantially shifted and altered over time.62 In doing so, we can account for the fact that sover-eign states that are subordinated in relations of hierarchy can continue to be recognised as sovereign states. The status of a political community as a sovereign state does not depend simply on its authority over a given territory; it is a product of social practices of recognition, shaped by pre-vailing ideas of what constitutes legitimate statehood and what criteria states must meet in order to obtain sovereign status.63

It is not self-evident that a state subject to the authority of another in a hierarchical relationship automatically loses its identity as a sovereign state. Even states that have little to no domestic authority at all – of which Somalia is the prime example – can continue to be recognised as sovereign entities despite the lack of exclusive authority over a given territory and population.64 Indeed, it is precisely because sovereignty is not static, indivisible or absolute that it makes sense to speak of Somalia as a sovereign state – international society can and has continued to recognise the sovereignty of Somalia, despite it lacking most of the attri-butes of a sovereign state. Because of such discrepancies in authority between states, it is important to consider the extent to which the formal or juridical equality of states does not always translate neatly into politi-cal or social equality between them. While all states are equal under international law, this legal status may not always be afforded social or political recognition in the context of states’ dealings with one another. Rather, we must account for the fact that states are often politically and socially unequal in the sense that some states wield greater authority than others within international society, the exercise of which is recog-nised as legitimate. In other words, and to paraphrase Orwell, all states may be sovereign, but ‘some states are more sovereign than others’.65

Both Donnelly and Simpson draw attention to what they term ‘sover-eign inequalities’ within international society: unequal statuses between states which in some instances provide ‘higher ranked’ states with greater authority over ‘lower ranked’ states, which nevertheless retain their sovereign status.66 Further, if we accept the traditional definition of sovereignty, like hierarchy, as denoting an authority relationship then it becomes unclear as to why sovereign authority must necessarily be abso-lute or indivisible. As Lake argues, one of the general characteristics of authoritative relationships is that authority is rarely, if ever, absolute.67 Sovereign authority therefore can be conceptualised as partial or divisible, which has been recognised within both IR and international law.68 As Oppenheim argues, ‘as there can be no doubt about the fact that there are semi-independent States in existence, it may well be maintained that


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sovereignty is divisible’.69 More recently, Brownlie has suggested that ‘Sovereignty is divisible both as a matter of principle and as a matter of experience’.70 This means that it is possible to conceive of gradations of sovereignty based on the level of authority that a state or a political community claiming sovereign status enjoys.71

Sovereignty therefore need not be an ‘all or nothing’ attribute. A state can be a subordinate party in a hierarchical relationship but still be rec-ognisable as a sovereign state, albeit one of ‘lesser standing’. Thus, we can conceive of an international society of sovereign states in which some states are subject to important limitations on their sovereign authority and rights but nevertheless retain their identity as a sovereign entity. This is precisely what has occurred recently, with certain states becoming the subordinate parties in new relations of hierarchy with Western countries. As will be demonstrated, these subordinated states do not cease to be sovereign, nor is their independence completely forfeited or subsumed under Western domination and control. Western interven-ers have been at pains to describe their interventions as ‘partnerships’ and reaffirm the sovereignty of their ‘partners’, and have generally sought quick progress in their attempts to effect liberal reform. In sum-mary, the identity of a state as sovereign does not necessarily depend on its exclusive or indivisible authority over a given territory or population. Social practices of recognition shape what constitutes a sovereign state.

Finally, if a form of ‘sovereignty under hierarchy’ can be conceived of, then so too can a form of ‘hierarchy under anarchy’. As Donnelly argues, part of the conceptual confusion when it comes to anarchy, hierarchy and sovereignty within world politics is that much of the literature equates anarchy with sovereign equality and therefore defines anarchy in opposition to hierarchy.72 However, as Goh and Donnelly argue, anar-chical orders need not involve equality between states.73 An anarchical order can exist, in the sense of the absence of a centralised authority or government, but still contain substantive inequalities and hierarchies. Further, it does not automatically follow that just because the interna-tional system is anarchic, in terms of the lack of overarching authority, that all interstate relationships within that system are anarchic as well.74 The conceptual problem here is that anarchy is opposed not to hierarchy, but to ‘archy’: centralised rule or government.75

Hierarchy, however, refers not to rule or government, but superordi-nation and differentiation.76 A domestic example illustrates this point: police officers exist in a hierarchical relationship with ‘ordinary’ citizens. They have the legitimate authority to issue commands which citizens are obliged to follow. However, they do not rule or govern and their


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authority cannot be equated with that of a centralised government. Within contemporary international society, superordinate states (like police officers) claim the authority to issue commands to subordinates, but this authority does not mitigate international anarchy because it does not constitute a form of centralised authority or rule.77 If we conceptualise hierarchy and anarchy as merely different, rather than opposed, order-ing principles, then it becomes possible to highlight the various hierar-chical relationships that prevail within international society despite the continued existence of international anarchy. It is, in part, a hierarchical society, one in which states can and do engage in legitimate hierarchical relations with one another.

Conclusion

Hierarchies are social relationships involving the exercise of consensual relational authority that both the superordinate and subordinate parties recognise as legitimate. Certain norms and principles, or social logics, underpin hierarchical relationships and facilitate their creation, repro-duction and fall. This definition of hierarchy is compatible with the con-cept of an ostensibly anarchical society of sovereign states for four main reasons. First, the argument that hierarchical relationships entail the retreat or contraction of international society is based on a rigid and static conception of how international society is constituted, one that ignores its constitutionally dynamic and historically variable nature. Second, the identity of a state as a sovereign entity is predicated upon social practices of recognition, meaning that what constitutes sover-eignty and statehood shifts over time. Third, the notion that sovereignty entails indivisible or absolute authority is incorrect – sovereignty is a divisible package of rights and authority. Finally, hierarchy and anarchy are not mutually exclusive concepts.

As has been argued, the traditional depiction of the incompatibility of the sovereignty/anarchy couplet with hierarchy does not capture the full picture of the way in which states interact with one another within international society. This is particularly true of the post-Cold War era in which Western and non-Western states have entered into several hierar-chical relationships, signified by a series of interventions designed to achieve the promotion and consolidation of liberal democratic norms and institutions. The next chapter explores the impetus for these inter-ventions and the social logics underpinning certain hierarchies in contem-porary international society.


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27

Over the last 25 years, international intervention has become an increasingly significant topic – during this period, humanitarian intervention, for example, has become an important issue in light of interventions in territories such as Kosovo and Libya and the lack of intervention in places such as Rwanda and Darfur. Other issues such as state failure and the appropriate response to mobile terrorist groups that may be located in a particular country also raise questions concerning the circumstances in which intervention in another state is legitimate. Added to this are debates over whether particular actors have the authority to conduct such interventions. Recent experience has shown that individual coun-tries or groups of states have been willing to undertake interventions both with and without official authorisation from the United Nations Security Council.1 This poses further questions regarding the contempo-rary applicability of supposedly key norms of international society, such as sovereign equality or non-intervention.

Such questions become especially pressing when we consider that several interventions conducted over the last 20 years have involved wide-scale and extensive interference in the domestic affairs of the target state. In the case of Iraq, for example, the US forcibly removed the exist-ing regime and replaced it with an entirely new system of government. The Western governments that have undertaken these interventions have effectively claimed the authority to conduct such wide-ranging reforms in other countries. Central to the justifications provided for these interventions, and the claims of authority that Western govern-ments have made in prosecuting them, is the notion that the absence of functioning liberal democratic institutions in the target state presents unacceptable security risks.

2Risk and International Society


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Utilising elements of Beck’s notions of risk and the ‘risk society’, this chapter argues that an increasing preoccupation with globalised security risks within international society compels Western states to intervene in territories identified as ‘risky’ in order to promote liberal values as a mechanism of risk management.2 Beck’s notion of the risk society was initially a sociological investigation of Western societies in a condi-tion of late modernity. Beck argued that Western societies were in the throes of a transformation into risk societies, in which the emergence of ‘de-bounded risks’ instigated an increasing social preoccupation with the management and distribution of these risks.3 This concept of de-bounded risk is a crucial element of Beck’s thesis. As Beck argues, these risks transcend geographic boundaries and calculable timeframes – they are ‘de-bounded’ in the sense that they cannot be limited in terms of time or space. De-bounded risks entail possible consequences and effects that are both potentially catastrophic and unlimited in the spatial and temporal locations at which they might materialise (e.g. climate change, terrorism, etc.).

Processes of globalisation have facilitated, in large part, the advent of these de-bounded risks.4 Globalisation has been perceived as contribut-ing to a shrunken world, one in which risks cannot be localised either in terms of time or space. It is this concept of de-bounded risk, and the social preoccupation with such risks, that is useful for understanding and explaining the social logics of contemporary hierarchies within international society. Confronted with de-bounded, global security risks such as terrorism, Western states have focused on identifying and reshaping so-called ‘zones of risk’ – states that exhibit domestic charac-teristics that provide an environment conducive to the production of risk. Western governments have primarily defined these risky environ-ments in terms of a lack of liberal democratic political institutions or state failure. Crucially, they are also more readily locatable in time and space and therefore more amenable to manipulation and regulation than de-bounded security risks themselves.

The justification of managing security risks is crucial to the underly-ing rationale of several recent interventions conducted in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Risk is also central to the underlying normative context of the hierarchies of which these interventions are representative – subjective constructions of risk and riskiness are central to the operationalisation of these hierarchies. Therefore, the primary argument advanced in this chapter is that a new ‘social logic of risk’ underpins contemporary hierarchical relationships within international society. This social logic of risk simultaneously constructs Western societies


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Risk and International Society 29

as superordinate ‘risk managers’ with the authority to reshape the domestic socio-political institutions of other states and illiberal or failed states as potentially dangerous sites of instability and disorder in which security risks might originate. These states become the subordinate parties in new relations of hierarchy with Western interveners.

The upshot of this is that the tolerance of diversity that is supposedly inherent in the English School notion of a pluralist international society becomes a risk in itself. This is because it is precisely this tolerance of diversity that sustains the existence of failed and illiberal states that potentially act as originators of global risks. The ‘pluralist compact’ that all states should be free to construct their own ideas of the good life and conceptions of justice has been directly challenged by the explicit attempt by Western governments to limit the range of acceptable values and regimes that states may reasonably adopt. Managing risks through the promotion of liberalism and democracy is therefore significant not only because of the hierarchical relationships that have formed between the interveners and target states, but also because it raises serious doubts about the continued efficacy and applicability of the norms associated with a pluralist international society.

Risk and the ‘World Risk Society’

Since the early 1990s, the concepts of risk and ‘risk society’ have become increasingly popular and influential within sociological discourse. Pioneered by sociologists such as Beck and Giddens, the basic premise of these theories of risk is that contemporary society is undergoing a period of radical transformation.5 Beck characterises this social transformation, particularly predominant in Western societies, as one between what he terms ‘industrial society’ or the ‘first modernity’ and (world) risk society or the ‘second modernity’. Put simply, the argument is that modernisa-tion has simultaneously (and paradoxically) brought about great tech-nological and scientific progress as well as more abstract and disembodied risks.6 As technological capacity increases, so too does the incalculability of the consequences of the use of such technologies.

Before considering Beck’s arguments in more detail, we first need to be clear as to what the term ‘risk’ means. One of the problems of much of the work on risk within both sociology and IR is that risk is rarely ever clearly defined. However, Heng has usefully provided a clear and system-atic definition of risk. On the one hand, actors can invoke risk as a descrip-tive term describing a particular danger, hazard or dangerous scenario. On the other hand, they can use risk as a normative term that refers to


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a desire to engage in proactive, anticipatory risk management activities.7 Further, it is important to distinguish between risk and threat, rather than conflate the two concepts. As Heng suggests, we can think of threats in terms of capabilities and intentions.8 It was this notion of threat that characterised the perception of the dangers that the Soviet Union posed to the West during the Cold War.

Strategists on both sides of the Iron Curtain were primarily concerned with the military capabilities and intentions of the other side. Thus, during the Cold War, a clearly defined enemy with clearly defined capabilities confronted the West. For instance, Western governments had a rough estimate of the number of Soviet nuclear warheads, they knew where the Soviet Union had targeted its missiles and they knew that they had the capability to strike back in the event of war. Western strategists could thus express the dangers posed by the Soviet Union quantitatively: num-ber of warheads, tanks, troops, official Soviet policies and actions, etc. Threats constitute an action-reaction relationship, implying that threats should normally be relatively well defined. In order to react to some-thing, we need to know what it is that we are reacting to.

Contrast this with risk, which Heng defines in terms of probabilities and consequences.9 Unlike threats, risks are not clearly defined or delineated – they are imprecise and uncertain. Thus today, in contrast to the per-ceived threat posed by the Soviet Union, Western governments know there are dangers ‘out there’ such as terrorism or the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), but the location of these dangers and the consequences of their realisation are often unknown. These dangers thus represent less of a quantitative threat than a qualitative risk. They are qualitative in the sense that we cannot know for a fact if a risk is ‘out there’. This is because risk refers to the possibility that a postu-lated scenario or event will materialise at some future point, meaning risk assessment relies upon our own subjective assessments of what the future might bring.10

Risk is therefore a concept that marries the present with the future.11 We can only understand risks in the context of futuristic scenarios that may or may not occur. This is another way of distinguishing between risk and threat: a risk refers to a future threat that has not yet materi-alised and may never do so. When a risk is realised, when the conse-quences of any given risk become real, then the risk becomes a threat properly so-called. In the risk society, people look to the future rather than the past to guide their present actions. As Beck argues, the relation-ship between past, present and future has been substantially altered – future events become the object of current action.12


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However, perhaps the key point concerning the nature of the new risks faced by Western societies is their uncontrollability and tendency to exceed the limits of calculability. This uncontrollability and incalcu-lability is a result of the temporal and spatial de-bounding of risks in contemporary international society.13 As Beck argues, the concept of risk society is not about the increase of risks, but of their de-bounding.14 Whereas in the past risks were generally localised in terms of time and space and thus predictable, controllable and insurable to a certain extent, today’s risks are characterised by uncertainty, unpredictability and diffusiveness.15 As Jarvis argues:

With magnitudes of risk so great, with technological hazards and mis-haps so extensive that they transcend both place and time by becom-ing international or global in scope and inter-generational in space, the prospects for the orderly control and distribution of risk across and within populations becomes both impossible and meaningless.16

Thus, one of the defining characteristics of the new risks faced by Western societies is their tendency towards globalisation.17

One of the key associations in Beck’s work is the relationship between globalisation and risk: he heavily implicates globalisation in the de-bounding of contemporary risk.18 Globalisation ostensibly provides the context within which the emergence of new forms of de-bounded risk becomes possible. The technological innovations associated with globali-sation and their social, economic and political effects are key elements in the modern de-bounding of risk. As Rasmussen suggests, ‘A global infrastructure allows for the extension of social spaces beyond their tra-ditional geographical confines’.19 One of the results of this is that ‘the notion of “local conflict” has been drained of much of its meaning; and seeing that much of what was once local is now unavoidably global, and often dangerously so, distant islands of anarchy are now ignored only at the risk of great peril’.20

Processes of globalisation, particularly technological innovation in transport and communications, give rise to two interrelated conse-quences: one, they leave Western states more exposed and therefore vulnerable to pockets of instability within the wider international soci-ety; two, they provide the means by which forces within these pockets of instability can potentially strike out at the West.21 As Coker argues, ‘Risk became central in our thinking and behaviour once we entered a global society. For globalisation has drawn us out of our self-contained national or local communities into a larger world which offers none of


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the old protections’.22 Globalisation, once viewed as a force for economic integration, development and the spread of liberalism and democracy, is now viewed as containing a ‘dark side’. For instance, the Australian Department of Defence’s 2007 Defence Update suggests that

. . . the negative side of globalisation is that this connectedness brings potential security threats closer to us. Globalisation speeds up the impact and significance of existing and new threats, shortening response times, and increasing uncertainty . . . While globalisation offers significant opportunities, it also can help the spread of extremist terrorism and diseases such as avian influenza.23

The emphasis on potential security threats in the above statement is important as it underscores the claim that risk and its management have become important aspects of the strategic outlook of Western states. In turn, they have also become important aspects of contemporary international society. This statement also highlights the uncertainty that is a feature of attempting to deal with globalised risks. Western societies now lack what Giddens terms ‘ontological security’ or the firm knowl-edge of what to expect.24 Instead, as Coker argues, Western societies now share a new ‘risk management ethos which has emerged in response to the greater insecurity that seems to stem from globalisation’.25 In the risk society, there are far too many ‘unknown unknowns’ for so-called experts to be able to give authoritative answers on the risks we face.26 The most that we can expect are definitional struggles over the scale, degree and urgency of risks.27 The risk society thesis therefore challenges the ‘modern’ notion that risks can be subject to classification, quantifi-cation and elimination through rational behaviour.28

The above would tend to suggest that risks are, at least in part, a socially constructed phenomenon. Beck himself appears to adhere to both a realist and a constructivist approach to risk, seeing it as both objectively real and socially constructed.29 Indeed, Beck has claimed that he is both a constructivist and a realist, suggesting that ‘risks are at the same time both real and constituted by social perception and construc-tion’.30 More specifically, we can suggest that Beck adopts a realist ontology and a constructivist epistemology; as he argues, risks are objectively real in that risks and their impacts are materially rooted in ongoing routines of industrial production and scientific research.31 However, the knowl-edge of these risks as held by social actors, and the way they respond to them, is historically, culturally and socially contingent.32 As Beck suggests, this is how we can understand why social actors comprehend and address objectively extant risks in very different ways.33


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Therefore, Beck is essentially what might be termed a ‘thin construc-tivist’: he sees risks themselves as objective and material in nature, but also as socially mediated in the context of the response to these risks by social actors.34 This is a view that others employing Beck’s risk society thesis have also adopted.35 However, some others have suggested that Beck is not ‘constructivist enough’. Aradau and Van Munster, for example, argue that Beck’s realist-constructivist approach is problematic in that it reduces cultural and social (and political) factors to intervening vari-ables between objective material risks and social and policy responses to them.36 This downplays and underemphasises the socially constructed and political nature of risk, including both the definition of what consti-tutes a risk and the selection of appropriate responses to them. Indeed, the extent to which risks are in fact rooted in material conditions is highly questionable. Risks are essentially anticipations of events or out-comes that might occur in the future. By definition, they cannot be objectively real ‘things’ because they do not actually exist yet in the world ‘out there’.

Rather, risks exist in the imaginations and perceptions of social actors who ascribe risk to other actors or particular objects or scenarios – risks cannot exist independently of the actors that identify, define and respond to them. It is precisely the act of identifying or defining some-thing as a risk that renders it risky, not any pre-given material attributes or qualities. Identifying something as a risk is therefore normatively and discursively mediated, based on subjective interpretations and represen-tations of potentially dangerous things. A significant departure from Beck’s framework, one that is adopted here, has therefore been pro-moted by scholars such as Aradau and Van Munster with their claim that both risk and the selected responses to them are socially predi-cated.37 As argued elsewhere, ‘what is considered risky in one context is not necessarily a risk in another’, something that reflects the socially constructed and variable nature of both risk and risk management.38

For example, in his later work, Beck identifies terrorism as another form of de-bounded risk that has come to the attention of Western risk societies. Beck suggests that 9/11 highlighted the fact that contempo-rary terrorist groups no longer operate within fixed geographical bound-aries, something that produces broad social anxiety in Western risk societies.39 The problem, though, is that Beck regards this feature of recent terrorist groups as something that is objectively inherent in these groups themselves.40 What Beck overlooks is the extent to which the attribution of risk to these terrorist groups, and the social anxiety and preoccupation with terrorism that has resulted from this in Western countries, are themselves constructions. Terrorism is not a risk in its own


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right – it can only become a risk when social actors define and represent it as such, meaning that we must explore how the issue of terrorism has recently been portrayed and represented as both potentially catastrophic and novel by Western governments despite the low probability that an attack will actually occur.41

What actors, including Western governments, will consider a risk will be shaped by their values and norms. This is particularly important, as Beck’s thin constructivist approach to risk masks the role of Western liberal values in both the definition of and response to contemporary globalised security risks. Again, risks do not and cannot exist indepen-dent of actor’s perceptions of them.42 Likewise, Handmer and James sug-gest that one of the features of complex de-bounded risks is that values are central to definitions of risk and the selection of responses to them.43 The concept of the risk society is therefore useful in highlighting a social preoccupation with de-bounded risks and their management in Western societies, which Beck and others argue has ‘spilled over’ into the inter-national relations of these societies. It is also useful in highlighting the role of globalisation in this de-bounding of risk, and can help to explain why Western governments have recently scrutinised the strategic effects and consequences of globalisation. Together, these two features are a key part of the social logic of risk that underpins hierarchies between Western and non-Western states, providing the impetus for intervention and the production of hierarchies between the former and the latter.

However, the concept of the risk society, especially Beck’s objective conceptualisation of risk, does not tell us how Western governments per-ceive and identify security risks; nor does it explain why they have sought to manage them through intervention in ‘risky zones’ and domestic reform in targeted states. It is not objectively identifiable scenarios, actors or objects that underscore recent interventions. Rather, it is the idea that states that lack functional liberal democratic regimes are poten-tially risky because they might facilitate the production of de-bounded risks that is important. It is this idea that is a key component of the social logic of risk that underpins recent Western interventionism and its associated hierarchies. Beck’s realist-constructivist approach to risk creates an unnecessary and problematic division between risk (objec-tive) and its management (subjective). Actors do not experience risks in any objective sense; they construct them, and based on that construc-tion they then decide how to respond to them. Hence the link between the ideas that a lack of liberal democratic government is risky and that promoting liberal democracy is therefore an appropriate tool of risk management.


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The social logic of risk underpinning contemporary hierarchies is essentially a package of norms and ideas that provides a cognitive frame-work for ascribing risk and determining appropriate responses to them. It is precisely according to subjective perceptions of ‘riskiness’ that it constructs illiberal or weak states as risky subordinates and Western lib-eral democracies as risk managing superordinates. Chapter 3 explores the rationale for promoting liberal democracy as a preventive risk man-agement technique in more detail, but here it is important to note that the construction of hierarchies based upon a social logic of risk does not simply provide for the exercise of authority by Western states over non-Western states. It also challenges the applicability of key international norms due to the extensive interference it mandates in the domestic affairs of ‘risky’ states. The next section explores the impacts of risk and its management for international society’s normative constitution.

Risk and the Normative Constitution of International Society

The social logic of risk that constructs Western democracies as superordi-nate ‘risk managers’ and illiberal, undemocratic or weak states as subordi-nates potentially has significant normative implications for international society. These subordinates are essentially subject to a ‘lesser’ form of sovereignty that permits extensive interference in their domestic affairs. One of the main consequences of this social logic of risk, and the inter-ventions and hierarchies that it underpins, is the violation of key norms of the English School’s notion of a pluralist international society. These include sovereign equality, non-intervention and territorial integrity. It is precisely the idea that de-bounded risk can be managed by pursuing liberal reform in targeted states that is at odds with existing interna-tional norms.

The reason for this is that these norms sustain the existence of failed, illiberal and undemocratic states, states that Western governments have perceived as constituting risky environments. Ian Clark captures this well with his argument that there is an ongoing ‘double movement’ within international society. As international society evolved into a pluralist society of states during the twentieth century, the West, reflect-ing on the vagaries, inconveniences and consequences of the open ‘political market’, has sought to forge a more overtly normative and ‘thicker’ version of international society based on liberal values. Clark argues that this process is inseparable from the evolution and eventual emergence of the pluralist international society during the twentieth


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century. In essence, Clark’s argument is that Western governments have sought to promote liberal values as a way of addressing the risks inherent in a pluralist international society. Further, this process has intensified in the post-Cold War era.44

That this process has intensified in recent years is perhaps no surprise given the perceived consequences of a pluralist international society in an age of globalisation for Western states, one in which disorder and instability can potentially no longer be fully localised and contained. Hence, Western governments have ‘fought back’, attempting to secure themselves and their interests by forging an overtly thicker set of norms based on liberal values within international society. As Clark argues:

However, in the second stage [of the ‘double movement’], the wider West – incorporating most of Europe but led by the United States – has struck back at the very pluralism that the global state system had generated . . . It has sought to reassert a greater central control of the international system. Its chosen instrument has been the forging of a new international society – adhering to a thicker set of legitimating principles embracing democracy, liberal values and capitalism – that has been progressively formed from within the original.45

The extension of key norms of a pluralist international society to the colonial territories after the Second World War underpinned decolonisa-tion and the granting of independence to the former colonies, finally universalising international society in the process. However, the provi-sion of independence was no guarantee that all of the former colonies would successfully transition to stable and prosperous states; indeed many did not. One of the consequences of this has been that ‘the world’s most destitute states, and the patterns of violence to which they give rise, are sustained in a rather perverse way by the constitutive norms of international society’.46 The central value of a pluralist international society is that all states should have the space and freedom to determine their society’s particular version of the good life and construct their domestic institutions as they see fit. However, in an age of perceived risk – risks that are de-bounded and globalised – the tolerance of diversity, which was a hallmark of pluralist international society, has been signifi-cantly mitigated.

An acceptance of heterogeneity among states is increasingly giving way to a greater desire for homogeneity as Western governments seek to secure liberal democratic reform in other countries. There are certainly limits to this process, and there remain large states, such as China, that do not have a liberal or democratic political system and which remain


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generally opposed to interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. However, such limits have not totally prevented Western governments from acting against perceived risks to their security via intervention in other territories, nor has it prevented smaller states that have come to be deemed as risky from becoming subordinate parties in relations of hier-archy with Western states and, in the process, having important limita-tions placed upon their sovereignty. While it is too early to suggest that norms such as non-intervention and sovereign equality have had their day, international practice demonstrates that in recent times these norms have been only selectively applied.

Today’s international society is both hierarchical and anarchical, comprised of unequal sovereigns and featuring the uneven application of key constitutive norms in different regions. Indeed, one of the conse-quences of a social logic of risk is the construction and encouragement of a division between risky and non-risky zones in different regions of the world. Such thinking has been prevalent in the work of Western academics, particularly since the end of the Cold War. It is evident in Fukuyama’s notion of ‘historical’ and ‘post-historical’ zones within international society, or Cooper’s division of the world into a ‘postmodern’ zone and a ‘zone of chaos’.47 Again, those states or regions consigned to the ‘zone of risk’ do not necessarily pose any extant security threats to Western states. Rather, their perceived riskiness flows from the potential security challenges that they may one day pose.

A social logic of risk is therefore not only important for understanding the particular character and nature of contemporary hierarchies within international society, but also for the impacts it has more broadly on international society’s constitutive norms. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile norms such as sovereign equality and non-intervention with the notion that intervening in other states to promote liberal democracy, forcibly in the most extreme cases (including the 2003 invasion of Iraq), is an acceptable method of risk management. Again, though, the extent to which the key constitutive norms of international society will be dis-placed remains to be seen, and will depend heavily on the willingness of non-Western states to continue to recognise and legitimate the particular hierarchies that are underpinned by a social logic of risk.

Alternative Explanations of Hierarchy in International Relations

Despite a relatively long history of discussing international hierarchies in the post-colonial and Marxist literatures, for example, it is only recently that hierarchy has received sustained attention in more mainstream IR


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literatures. However, while these alternative conceptions of hierarchy may be useful or explanatory in certain contexts, they remain unable to account fully for the social logic of risk that informs particular hierar-chies between Western and non-Western states within contemporary international society. In some cases, this is due to a lack of focus on the normative context that underpins these hierarchies. In others, the prob-lem lies in a focus on different issues and concepts that may not be completely conducive for explaining the character of contemporary hierarchies informed by a social logic of risk.

There are several examples of work on hierarchy in the post-Cold War era that identify the emergence of hierarchical relationships between states, but do not fully account for the normative underpinnings of these hierarchies. For example, Lake’s conceptualisation of hierarchy rests largely on the instrumental concerns of rational, utility-maximising actors – states enter into a sort of social contract in developing a hierar-chical relationship with the subordinate deriving tangible benefits (such as political order) in return for recognising the authority of the superor-dinate state. It is this social contract, and the instrumental benefits that accrue from it, that lies at the root of the legitimation afforded to the hierarchical relationship by the relevant parties.48 However, it is doubtful that we can explain the legitimacy of a hierarchical relationship only with reference to the instrumental benefits that it provides.

What sort of benefits does a superordinate need to offer for a hierar-chical relationship to be stable? Is this the same across different hierar-chies, or does it shift from one hierarchical relationship to the next? Even if instrumental concerns are important, the way in which actors understand such benefits and the threshold beyond which a particular benefit or set of benefits is sufficient to entice a subordinate state to legitimate a hierarchical relationship is likely to be normatively condi-tioned. How the parties understand both will be constructed socially through their interactions with one another and the norms and ideas that are developed and applied to the hierarchical relationship. Indeed, despite stressing the relational and social aspects of hierarchical authority, Lake does not fully consider the broader normative underpinnings of hierarchical relationships.49

Similarly, Gerry Simpson argues that international society essentially has two faces, one pluralist and the other hierarchical and anti-pluralist.50 For Simpson, international society reflects each to varying degrees in different historical epochs. However, Simpson does not fully consider the precise normative context of the different shifts between pluralism


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and anti-pluralism that he identifies. For example, although Simpson focuses on the contemporary re-emergence of what he calls ‘liberal anti-pluralism’, which essentially establishes a hierarchy of states predicated on whether a state is a liberal democracy or not, he does not fully out-line the normative context that has underpinned the emergence and reproduction of these hierarchies. Simpson tells us only part of the story – liberal democratic values are central to contemporary interstate hierar-chies, but crucially what is missing here is an explanation of why these hierarchies have emerged at this particular historical juncture and why they are based on a distinction between liberal democracies and states with different forms of government.51

In other literatures, such as the post-colonial literature, the treatment of hierarchy has been problematic for different reasons. For example, Anghie’s study of the significance of colonialism for international law makes the argument that the old colonial hierarchies thought to have died with decolonisation in the early 1960s have in fact endured and still structure Western relations with the former colonies to this day.52 However, such an argument tends to mask both the different features of colonial hierarchies as compared to contemporary hierarchies and the very different ways in which these different forms of hierarchy have been operationalised within international society. Colonialism featured the conquest of territory by predominantly European powers for the primary purpose of resource extraction. Inter-European rivalries also provided an impetus for the acquisition of further colonies as the major European powers sought to strengthen their relative positions vis-à-vis one another.

This is a very different logic from that which underpins contemporary hierarchies within international society. Several recent interventions have been justified by Western governments with reference neither to resource extraction nor to territorial conquest, but the preservation of their own security in the face of a range of de-bounded risks. Indeed, unlike colonialism, the territories subjected to intervention remain states, albeit states of a ‘lesser standing’. To argue then that contemporary hier-archies are in essence a continuation of those that prevailed under colo-nialism, we would have to ignore broad social, political and strategic changes that have occurred since decolonisation, and indeed more particularly over the last 25 years. To an extent, Anghie recognises these changes in his work, arguing in relation to recent Western interventions that ‘the transformation of the offending society into a democracy is the most effective way of ensuring that it will pose no future threat’.53


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Therefore, the questions that Anghie’s discussion of the enduring role of colonialism in informing contemporary hierarchies raises are that if contemporary Western interventions do represent the continu-ance of colonial hierarchies, how do we account for the fact that the previous European/Western depiction of colonial peoples and territo-ries as inherently inferior and thus ripe for conquest and exploitation has transformed? What has prompted the emergence of the new depic-tion of these territories as representing potential risks that Western societies must secure themselves against? When, and why, did exploita-tion and paternalism transform into fear and anxiety? How, for example, can we explain the Bush administration’s identification of state failure in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) as a security issue of grave concern?54 Again, the only way to explain this is to recog-nise that the social logics underpinning particular hierarchies within international society today are fundamentally different from those that informed the formation and reproduction of the colonial hierarchies of the past.

A significant issue with the post-colonial literature then is the relatively static and deterministic manner in which hierarchy is conceptualised and understood. In part, this stems from a relatively uncritical employ-ment of the term ‘hierarchy’ without consideration of the normative context that conditions hierarchical relationships and, most impor-tantly, how this context shifts over time. The same is true of the Marxist literature on international hierarchies that suggests that they are an enduring consequence of the hegemony of global capitalism. Again, there is a determinism in the Marxist literature on international hierar-chies, most of which supposedly share a common logic of capitalist exploitation that has remained relatively constant for a considerable period. Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory, for example, attempts to provide a macro-social account of the dynamics of the global capitalist system, one divided between the Core and Peripheral states who exist in a hierarchical relationship.55 In Wallerstein’s account, the enduring logic of capitalist exploitation and the extraction of surplus capital by the Core from the Periphery is central to the hierarchical relationships that exist between states in these two zones. However, the weakness of this argument is that it blinds us to different logics that might inform particular hierarchical relations, some of which may not be informed by a ‘capitalist logic’ at all.

An understanding of the social logics of recent hierarchies within inter-national society must be able to explain the identification of de-bounded security risks as a justification for the intervention. The approaches discussed above cannot fully explain this. Beck’s risk society thesis allows


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us to do so. It provides a conceptual framework that allows us to explain the importance of the identification of security issues, conceptualised as de-bounded risks, and the role of globalisation in enhancing prevailing perceptions of risk as a major impetus for the interventions that Western states have conducted. While it is less useful in explaining how these risks are constructed, and consequently why Western states have identified the promotion of liberalism and democracy as a method of managing them, it does allow us to conceptualise the promotion of liberalism and democracy as a tool aimed at preventing risks, rather than addressing extant threats.

Conclusion

A social logic of risk underpins particular hierarchies within contem-porary international society, constructing illiberal, undemocratic or otherwise dysfunctional states as sites conducive to the production of various de-bounded security risks. In contrast, this social logic constructs Western states as risk managers, promoting liberal values and demo-cratic institutions as a way of preventing the materialisation of security risks. Crucial to understanding recent hierarchies is Beck’s risk society thesis, one that provides a useful explanation of key features relating to recent Western interventions and their attendant hierarchies. This includes the characterisation of the risks that such interventions are intended to address as amorphous, difficult to identify or as ‘unknown unknowns’. It also highlights the role of globalisation in facilitating the emergence of de-bounded risk, allowing us to understand the recent attention that strategists in Western societies have paid to its impacts and consequences.

Both risk and its management have significant implications for inter-national society beyond their role in informing hierarchical relations between Western and non-Western states. The tolerance of diversity and the space states have to constitute themselves politically, economically and socially, free from external interference, have essentially become risks in themselves. This is because in a globalised world, the perception of several Western governments is that it is no longer possible to easily contain potential problems and risks that may originate in illiberal states or those suffering from state weakness or failure. In the face of de-bounded security risks such as terrorism, several Western governments have come to regard managing risks through intervention abroad as an appropriate way of maintaining Western security. The next chapter explores in more depth the rationale behind the promotion of liberalism and democracy as key tools of risk management.


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43

Risk is a concept that focuses attention on future possibilities, on the probabilities and potentialities of hazards, dangers or threats that do not yet exist and may or may not materialise. Because of this, the manage-ment of risk is generally oriented towards activities and modes of behav-iour such as prevention, precaution and proactivity. Risk management is essentially about anticipating negative scenarios with adverse conse-quences before they occur and, thereafter, ensuring that they either do not occur at all or that their impacts are mitigated and controlled. Essentially, this is what Western governments have attempted to do through several interventions in ostensibly risky states. The point has been to prevent globalised or transnational risks to Western security from materialising rather than responding to threats or emergencies as they arise. In effect, Western governments have explicitly taken up the mantle of risk managers, seeking to govern risk and prevent negative future occurrences.

This is generally unsurprising. The management of risk has become a core part of the business of Western governments in the late-modern age.1 Across areas as diverse as health, immigration, the environment, crime and national security, risk management has become an increas-ingly important function of governments. In the area of national secu-rity and defence, risk and its management or prevention have recently become key characteristics of the policies and strategic doctrines that Western governments have employed. The governments of several Western countries, particularly the US, UK and Australia, have focused explicitly on risks and have attempted to employ policies aimed at pre-venting their occurrence or materialisation. More specifically, as argued in Chapter 2, these governments have identified the promotion of liber-alism and democracy as a key tool for managing de-bounded, globalised

3The Management of Risk


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security risks, with significant consequences for international society’s normative constitution. The question though is what are the ideas informing this feature of the social logic of risk that underpins contem-porary hierarchies between Western and non-Western states? Why, and how, has the promotion of liberalism and democracy come to be utilised as a tool of risk management?

This chapter suggests that there are two core reasons for this. The first is the longstanding ideological commitment to the promotion of liberal democratic government by many Western societies, especially the US. This includes the belief that the promotion and spread of democracy and liberalism facilitates international peace and security. This idea dates back to the end of the First World War and the ideological views of US President Woodrow Wilson.2 Wilson was one of the first political leaders to articulate the ideas that liberal democracy was the apogee of political development, and that the spread of the liberal democratic model would ensure domestic stability and prosperity within states and further peace internationally.3 Since this time, the idea of promoting liberal values has retained a central place within US foreign policy. With the end of the Cold War, this ideological commitment to the global spread of liberalism has enjoyed renewed vigour among the US and other Western states. However, while this ideological commitment to promoting liberal democracy is nothing new, promoting democracy as a preventive security measure is.

Second, by their very nature, globalised risks are difficult to locate in time and space. Given that security risks like terrorism can often materi-alise at diverse times and locations with minimal warning, attention has fallen on areas or zones that are conducive to the production of risk. Such ‘risky zones’ may include weak, failed or simply illiberal states that present environments perceived to be conducive to the production of risks. These environments are more readily locatable and more suscep-tible to manipulation and regulation than the globalised risks that they might potentially produce. The promotion of liberalism and democracy thus becomes a tool of risk management based on the prevention of risks through the reform and regulation of risky environments. This is similar to so-called ‘situational’ risk management techniques that attempt to manage risks by strengthening environmental resilience to diminish the possibility that risks will actually materialise.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section explores the general characteristics and features of risk management, namely its focus on the three ‘Ps’ – proactive anticipation, prevention and precaution. While there are several different types of techniques and approaches to risk


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The Management of Risk 45

management, these three concepts are significant features of any type of risk management. The second section of the chapter examines more closely the idea of the promotion of liberal values as a form of risk management, particularly the idea of situational risk management. It is argued here that Western attempts at promoting liberalism and democ-racy in particular states is best understood as a form of situational risk management. The promotion of liberal democracy by Western govern-ments does not simply represent an altruistic desire to bring ‘freedom’ and representative government to oppressed peoples, but is rather an instrumental and utilitarian exercise in managing de-bounded risks.

The Three ‘Ps’ of Risk Management: Proactive Anticipation, Prevention and Precaution

As Caplan argues, scholars such as Beck, Giddens and Douglas have high-lighted how attempting to manage risks is really an attempt to ‘colonise the future’ by identifying potential dangers and assessing their probabil-ities and consequences.4 In contemporary Western societies, a significant number of activities, mechanisms and controls have emerged through which risk can be managed. Risk management also takes place across a diverse array of areas, from business and finance to health, each with its own risks and approaches to risk management.5 Risk management itself is therefore a diverse and varied enterprise, based upon several different approaches and principles.6 However, regardless of the methods or prin-ciples adopted, all forms of risk management are centred upon reducing the likelihood and mitigating the consequences of negative future events.7 Risk management is thus primarily concerned with prevention – when people seek to manage risk, they ultimately seek to prevent par-ticular future scenarios from occurring. Risk management’s focus on the likelihood of future events and the consequences of their materialisation means that it is characterised by features such as proactive anticipation, prevention and the precautionary principle.

Before preventive processes can be implemented, there must first be a risk to prevent – adverse future scenarios or events need to be predicted. When risks are anticipated, they are also essentially defined. Again, the processes of anticipation and definition are socially mediated exercises – risks do not just exist out there; risk anticipation and definition depend in large part upon subjective perception, including the values that people bring to bear when defining risk.8 The sorts of anticipated scenarios that are defined as risks will be shaped by subjective understandings of what people deem potentially dangerous or threatening.9 As risk is defined in


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terms of probabilities and consequences, a large part of risk anticipation and definition must be concerned with attempting to understand both the likelihood and consequences of occurrence.10

The assessments made about the probability of a risk materialising and the consequences if it does so can have a significant impact on the way in which risks are perceived and managed. A risk that would have highly catastophic consequences, but that is extremely unlikely to occur (for example, an asteroid hitting Earth), may not be regarded as urgently as a risk with serious, but less catastrophic, consequences that is more likely to occur (for example, a relatively small-scale terrorist attack such as the recent Boston bombings). The interplay between assessments of probability and consequences can result in extremely complicated pro-cesses of risk anticipation and definition.11 Different types of risk man-agement approaches may also privilege the reduction of likelihoods over mitigating the consequences of risks (which might occur, for example, through activities such as ‘target hardening’ and strengthening resil-ience) or vice-versa. Whatever the approach, or mix of approaches, risk managers must still first be able to identify and assess risks. Surveillance, monitoring and ‘horizon scanning’ are therefore key tools for risk man-agers in anticipating and defining risks.

Indeed, surveillance and horizon scanning are key features of risk soci-eties. Several scholars have commented recently on the significance attached to government surveillance and information gathering as a means of anticipating and monitoring for risks, particularly in relation to crime and the ‘War on Terror’.12 The importance attached to surveil-lance and monitoring is also readily demonstrated in the recent advent of various types of ‘early warning systems’ such as military satellite tech-nologies, improved tsunami warning systems in Australia or multitudes of medical scans and ‘check-ups’.13 In effect, early warning systems and processes allow us to ‘peer into the future’ through constant surveillance and vigilance. The idea is to mitigate uncertainty and surprise by providing constant information on potential areas of risk and early notification of any emergent ‘dangers on the horizon’. The anticipation, definition and assessment of risk thus depends in large part upon constant flows of information.

Once a potential risk has been anticipated and defined, it must then be prevented from occurring. As Van Munster states, ‘Because risk man-agement is not focused upon an existing existential threat, the logic of risk management is by definition preventive’.14 However, it is important to be clear about what we mean by prevention as opposed to similar, yet distinct, concepts such as pre-emption. Despite Rasmussen’s claim that


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prevention and pre-emption are not analytically distinct, prevention is not to be confused with the term pre-emption – they are not synonymous concepts.15 For example, much was made of the controversial ‘Bush Doctrine’ of ‘pre-emption’ that was outlined in the 2002 NSS as a way of managing the risks of terrorism and rogue states attempting to acquire WMD.16 However, it is questionable whether pre-emption is the best characterisation of the Bush Doctrine.17 As Yost suggests, ‘pre-emptive attack consists of prompt action on the basis of evidence that an enemy is about to strike, while – in contrast – preventive war involves military operations undertaken to avert a plausible but hypothetical future risk’.18 Pre-emption therefore involves reacting to a threat defined in terms of capabilities and intentions, whereas prevention refers to proactively addressing future scenarios that may or may not occur.

The right of pre-emptive self-defence has been recognised for some time within customary international law.19 The criteria employed in assessing whether a state has a right to pre-emption has generally been restrictive, concerned almost exclusively with the imminence of an attack that a particular state seeks to pre-empt.20 In 1841, US Secretary of State Daniel Webster articulated a legal doctrine of pre-emption when he argued that the need to act pre-emptively must be ‘instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’.21 This focus on imminence and minimal time for deliberating options suggests that pre-emption is an activity carried out in response to a threat that is extant and can clearly be located. Pre-emption is geared towards addressing present threats in the here and now, not ill-defined risks that may be realised sometime in the future, as is prevention.

This is an important distinction, as it goes to the core of the contro-versy surrounding the Bush Doctrine and the subsequent invasion of Iraq. The invasion was, in large part, informed by this doctrine and the idea that it would not be possible to deter rogue states inclined to sup-port terrorists and seeking to arm themselves with WMD – the US had to prevent these states from striking first against the US and its interests.22 Two passages from the NSS are of note. First, the document suggests that: ‘Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past’.23 Rather than reacting to threats as it did before, the US now seeks to act proactively and prevent these threats, or risks, from occurring at all. Second, the NSS goes on to state that:

The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend


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ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver-saries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.24

It is the assertion that the US will act, even without firm knowledge of the time and place of the enemy’s attack, which underscores the conten-tion that the 2002 NSS did not outline a pre-emptive doctrine so much as it did a preventive one. As Van Munster suggests, ‘Whereas anticipatory self-defence as it is understood in international law still operated with an image of reactive violence, the war on terrorism replaces this picture with that of proactive intervention’.25 This is precisely the cause of the controversy surrounding the doctrine – it is one thing to suggest that the US will act to pre-empt imminent and certain threats to its security, it is quite another to suggest that the US has the right to prevent future events from materialising by acting against risks before they can occur.

The broader point here is that risk management cannot adequately be conceptualised as an activity in pre-emption. It does not deal with imminence, certainty and clarity. Risk management is concerned with possibilities, probabilities, imperfect knowledge and uncertainty – it is an activity in prevention. Particularly when it comes to globalised and de-bounded risks, uncertainty and a lack of knowledge will be key con-straints within which risk managers must operate – the questions of where and when simply cannot be firmly answered. When risk managers perceive that risks might have potentially catastrophic consequences, as de-bounded security risks like terrorism and WMD proliferation might, then the imperative to prevent these risks from occurring can become particularly urgent. In such situations, the probability of something bad happening can become less important than the potential outcomes if it actually did.

Uncertainty and concern for the possibly catastrophic consequences of risks leads to an emphasis on the third main characteristic of risk management: the precautionary principle, or ‘better safe than sorry’ doctrine. Faced with possibily devastating consequences, it is deemed better to act on the basis of uncertainty and attempt to prevent the risk rather than wait for confirmation that the risk is real, when it could be too late to act preventively.26 As Heng claims, precautionary principles only come into play when there is conflict over the certainty of a risk occurring and the potential for catastrophic damage is high.27 The pre-cautionary principle first arose in response to global environmental risks and was enshrined in Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. This document states that: ‘Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty


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shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’.28

Originally, the idea of the precautionary principle was designed to speed up environmental decision-making if scientific uncertainty and a lack of knowledge were delaying this from happening.29 The effect of this is that the precautionary principle provides a way of overcoming the need for proving that a risk is real or imminent, legitimating preven-tive action in the face of uncertainty.30 It compels decision-makers to address more false negatives (risks that were thought non-existent or relatively small in likelihood and consequence but were actually real and serious) and be less concerned with false positives (risks thought real and serious which later turned out to be small or non-existent).31 Crucially, this emphasis on prevention and precaution also legitimates the management of risk within those dangerous environments in which possible dangers might originate. It defeats the purpose of anticipating and preventing risks for risk managers to wait for the risk to arrive at their doorstep. From a precautionary perspective, waiting for the risk to arrive would be irresponsible – it is better to act cautiously and manage the risk well away from vulnerable areas and avoid any possible disas-ters. The European Security Strategy (ESS) follows such a logic, suggesting that in adopting a preventive and precautionary stance the first line of defence will often be abroad.32

Several Western leaders and officials have also recently employed a pre-cautionary logic quite clearly. For example, key members of the Bush administration explicitly employed the precautionary principle as a jus-tification for various policies and practices that comprised the War on Terror. Former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, for example, spoke in precautionary terms after 9/11, suggesting at a NATO Defence Ministers Meeting that absolute proof cannot be a precondition for action.33 Former US President George W. Bush, in outlining his case for invading Iraq, spoke repeatedly of then President Saddam Hussein’s desire for and attempt to acquire WMD, but never provided firm evidence that Iraq did have them or specify exactly when it would have WMD capability.34 Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair was also distinctly precaution-ary in his justifications for British involvement in the invasion of Iraq, effectively suggesting that in the face of the risks of global terrorism and WMD proliferation by rogue states, it was ‘better to be safe than sorry’.35

Finally, it is important to note that risk management’s emphasis on prevention and precaution also means that when assessing the effec-tiveness of risk management activities, performance is evaluated in neg-ative terms of non-events rather than positive outcomes. If a possibly adverse future scenario never occurs, actors can take this as an indicator


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of the success of the risk management processes and practices that were implemented to manage the risk and prevent its future realisation. Risk management is an activity or process that we evaluate in terms of what did not happen rather than what did. Because of its focus on prevention, we can only ever conclusively evaluate the failure of a risk management activity – if risk managers do not prevent the risk and it actually occurs then it is obvious that risk management has failed. However, if the pos-sible future scenario never happens, how do we determine whether this was a result of implemented risk management practices or whether the anticipated risk was never actually going to occur?

Without straying too deeply into this topic, it is important to be aware that as the process of risk definition is subjective and socially mediated it is also inherently political. This means that the implementation of risk management activities can potentially be useful in serving narrow political interests rather than highlighting a dangerous object or situation that those using the label of ‘risk’ genuinely find to be potentially threatening. Therefore, there is an inherent riskiness to the management of risk itself. This is particularly so in an age where Western governments have dem-onstrated their preparedness to intervene in certain situations in response to perceived global security risks. The upshot is that if a risk does not occur it is difficult to establish whether this was a result of risk manage-ment practices, incorrect anticipations of risk (false positives) or a delib-erate invocation of risk designed to serve ulterior political motives.36 Preventing future possibilities means that it is almost impossible to evaluate the legitimacy of ascriptions of risk and the efficacy of risk management in the present.

Thus, paradoxically, while risk perception and definition are inherently political exercises that rely on subjective interpretation, the very defini-tion of an object or scenario as ‘risky’ can serve to mask the social and political context within which such risks are constructed. As Jayasuriya argues:

By conceiving of these threats as various types of risk, these theories of reflexive modernization work to dislodge the social and political context that produces these threats, and end up naturalizing these risks and failing to understand the way in which these risks are both naturalized and politicized.37

Especially within the context of contemporary interventions designed to manage risk, one must be wary of preventive and precautionary doctrines that mandate interventionist actions based on ifs, maybes and probabil-ities. As Rasmussen notes, ‘It is fortunate that people should remain


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critical about strategic precautionary principles, because the doctrine of managing the flows of insecurity by occasional pre-emption makes it impossible to hold policymakers accountable for their policies’.38

Proactive anticipation, prevention and precaution are active elements of risk management. These three ‘Ps’ are the general features of most forms or types of risk management, including Western attempts to pro-mote liberalism and democracy as a way of managing risks in the post-Cold War era. Risk management, like risks themselves, is also a subjective exercise – values and norms can play a large role in whether actors label something as risky or not and in the selection of specific risk manage-ment approaches.39 The questions here are: Why have Western govern-ments pursued the promotion of liberal democracy as a technique of risk management? What is the specific rationale for doing so?

Liberalism and Democracy as Risk Management

One of the key aspects of the social logic of risk underpinning recent international hierarchies is the role of liberalism and democracy in the construction of the relevant parties as either superordinates or subordi-nates, and the attempted promotion of liberalism and democracy by the superordinate parties. Promoting liberalism and democracy is nothing new – the foreign policies of most Western governments have long fea-tured democracy promotion as a key objective. What is unique, how-ever, is the rationale and motivation behind recent attempts to spread liberal values. Interventions to promote liberal values have not been undertaken simply for the sake of these values themselves, nor have they been entirely motivated (though they may have been in part) by an altruistic desire to bring freedom and prosperity to oppressed peoples. Rather, Western attempts to promote liberalism and democracy in the post-Cold War era constitute a self-interested and utilitarian mechanism of risk management. Promoting liberalism and democracy in selected territories is essentially an exercise in prevention and precaution.

As Rasmussen suggests, ‘Even the promise of democracy as a recipe for peace and human freedom is today rather a way to manage risk than to realise a liberal utopia’.40 Security at home for Western countries increas-ingly depends upon liberalism and democracy abroad.41 The statements and rhetoric of several recent and current Western leaders have readily reflected this. For example, Blair overtly spoke of the centrality of Western liberal values, outlining the intertwining of values and inter-ests, and asserted that ‘The spread of our values makes us safer’.42 Speaking on Iraq in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion by the US-led ‘Coalition of the Willing’, Blair suggested that the fight against rogue


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states and terrorism was one defined precisely in terms of the defence of Western values against the extremist ideology of the terrorists.43 Former US Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have also spoken in similar terms concerning the spread of Western values of liberty and democracy. Clinton’s 1998 NSS, for example, asserts that: ‘Underpinning our interna-tional leadership is the power of our democratic ideals and values. In designing our strategy, we recognize that the spread of democracy sup-ports American values and enhances both our security and prosperity’.44

The subsequent 1999 NSS likewise suggests that: ‘Our security depends upon the protection and expansion of democracy worldwide, without which repression, corruption and instability could engulf a number of countries. . .’45 Bush too has spoken in such terms, the 2006 NSS suggest-ing that:

In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them. The goal of our state-craft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves respon-sibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.46

Finally, the most recent NSS, the 2010 document that the Obama admin-istration published, suggests that democratic countries are more ‘just, peaceful and legitimate’ and that promoting democracy overseas ‘fosters an environment that supports America’s national interests’.47

In highlighting the security benefits of liberalism and democracy, Western leaders have essentially drawn on the idea of the democratic peace. There is a large literature on the democratic or liberal peace, much of which advances the normative claim that the greater the number of liberal democracies within international society, the more stable and peaceful it will be. However, some scholars have gone further, arguing that because liberal democracies are more stable and peaceful, interna-tional society should afford them special rights or privileges not afforded to other states. In some cases, scholars have argued that illiberal or undemocratic states should lose their rights to sovereign equality and non-intervention, effectively becoming outlaws within international society.48 As Gerry Simpson contends, we might label these arguments as representative of a form of ‘anti-pluralist’ liberalism, particularly those that explicitly attempt to draw distinctions between liberal democratic states and the rest in order to underscore the superiority and/or the desirability of the former.


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Indeed, Simpson has identified both pluralist and anti-pluralist versions of liberalism within international society, each providing a competing image of international order.49 Sorensen has likewise identi-fied a ‘Liberalism of Restraint’ broadly based upon Berlin’s notion of negative liberty, and a ‘Liberalism of Imposition’ based upon positive conceptions of liberty.50 The arguments and ideas put forth by scholars subscribing to ‘liberal anti-pluralism’ are well summarised by Reus-Smit, who suggests that:

Informed by a mixture of Kantian liberalism and democratic peace theory, cosmopolitan sensibilities and activism, neoliberal institu-tionalism and new liberal legal theory . . . these scholars question the equalitarian regime’s version of international liberalism, advancing a markedly different formulation. They advocate the formal rehierar-chisation of international society, whereby democratic states would gain special governance rights – particularly with regard to the legiti-mate use of force – and other states would have their categorical rights to self-determination and non-intervention qualified.51

There are several ideas that are common to these different liberal theories, including their belief in the superiority of liberalism, for various reasons; the idea that the domestic regime of a state is determinative of its interna-tional behaviour; and their advocacy for the establishment of hierarchical relationships between liberal and non-liberal states. This is particularly reflected in the arguments of some scholars that liberal states should enjoy special authority and rights within international society that non-liberal states do not. As Jahn has suggested, ‘The political systems of the established democracies are taken to display a “clear moral and practical superiority”, thus, occupying the highest level of development and providing the model all other states are expected to follow’.52 A good example of this type of argument is Fukuyama’s thesis on the ‘end of history’. This thesis suggests that with the end of the Cold War and the defeat of communism at the hands of liberalism/capitalism, the world had reached the end of history: the end of human ideological evolution and the establishment of liberal democracy as the final form of human government.53

For Fukuyama, and others who subscribe to the notion that liberal democracy represents a superior form of government, only liberal demo-cratic states are capable of providing international public goods such as collective security or economic prosperity. Fukuyama believes that interna-tional institutions which have been established to maintain international


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peace and security and promote effective liberal international governance, such as the United Nations (UN), were flawed from the very beginning by allowing for a mixed membership of liberal and non-liberal states and sovereign equality between all states.54 If we wanted a ‘true’ league of nations founded and organised according to Kantian precepts, Fukuyama suggests that it would need to look more like NATO than the UN.55 Others, such as Buchanan and Keohane, have similarly argued for a type of ‘Democratic House of Review’ that would have the authority to authorise humanitarian interventions if the Security Council failed to do so.56 The point of these arguments is to supplant the norm of sover-eign equality within international society with formal gradations of rights and authority based on the domestic constitution of states.

While Western governments have not gone so far as to advocate the sorts of formal hierarchies envisaged by Fukuyama and others, they have certainly engaged in informal hierarchical relationships with non-Western states. Perceptions of risk and the idea that as a ‘superior’ form of government and governance liberal democracy represents the best way to manage these risks and achieve security for Western societies informs these hierarchies. However, whereas the democratic peace theory suggests that promoting democracy can achieve peace and security by negating the propensity for interstate warfare (as democracies suppos-edly will not fight one another), Western governments have not used the promotion of liberalism and democracy as a way of achieving secu-rity from any extant threats. Rather, they have used it as a situational form of risk management, geared towards the prevention of de-bounded security risks that might emanate from risky zones characterised by a lack of stable, liberal democratic government.

This ‘situational approach’ to risk management is one that comes from criminology. In their respective works on risk, war and strategic studies in the contemporary age, both Heng and Rasmussen make refer-ence to the importance of criminology in the study of risk and risk management practices.57 In the 1970s, new criminologies emerged that focused on crime not as an abberration or abnormality to be controlled, but as a risk to be managed via a range of different policing techniques and methods.58 Prior to this, the focus of crime control and prevention was on rehabilitating individual offenders and attempting to address the underlying causes of criminal behaviour.59 The emphasis on rehabilita-tion was largely reactionary – once a criminal had already committed an offence and had been caught, they could then be punished and reha-bilitated. Obviously, this focus on rehabilitation remains but, as Heng


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suggests, by the 1970s the overarching theme of criminology had shifted.60 There was widespread dissatisfaction with rehabilitation as a method of crime control and prevention.61 Faced with rising crime rates in the face of attempts to rehabilitate offenders, criminologists and Western govern-ments admitted that crime could not be wholly eliminated. Instead, it would have to be accepted as a social risk to be managed.

The modern focus of controlling crime via the punishment and reha-bilitation of criminals has given way to a more managerial focus con-cerned with the prevention of criminal risk.62 The focus of policing has therefore shifted from the individual offender to the wider society of potential victims who must be protected.63 Managing crime involves managing the environment in which criminals operate rather than managing and controlling individual offenders.64 In other words, the previous emphasis on the criminal disposition of the individual has given way to an empahsis on the environmental situation within which crime occurs.65 This focus on the management of the risk of crime has given rise to policing approaches that emphasise the prevention of crime by reducing environmental factors that are conducive to criminal activity. In other words, by reshaping risky environments, authorities can remove opportunities to engage in criminal activity and hence mitigate the risk of criminal conduct and the damage that it may entail.66 This policing tactic is known as ‘situational crime prevention’, which Clarke defines as ‘a pre-emptive approach that relies, not on improving society or its institutions, but simply on reducing the oppor-tunities for crime’.67

In other words, as Rose argues, the aim of situational crime prevention is to ‘act pre-emptively upon potentially problematic zones, to structure them in such a way as to reduce the likelihood of undesirable events or conduct occurring’.68 There are numerous examples of situational crime prevention measures, such as Closed Circuit TV cameras on street corners in major cities and home alarm systems. These measures make it more difficult for individuals to engage in criminal activity without getting caught and, in so doing, hopefully reduce the incentives for crime. This of course serves to reduce the likelihood that crime will occur, mitigat-ing the risk of criminal activity. This model of situational crime pre-vention represents a new penology, one which focuses on probabilistic calcualtions of risk.69

Similar to this domestic policing model, Western interventionism is a form of situational prevention: those territories that are potentially conducive to the production of de-bounded security risks can be subject


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to ‘environmental manipulation’ through the promotion of the values and institutions of liberal democracy. As Coker argues:

In this world of uncertainties and risks, the only option open to governments is to police the world. And in a globalised age we see the emergence of a new concept of policing which takes its cue from the domestic model, where people have moved from ‘community policing’ to ‘policing communities of risk’.70

The idea is to ‘disrupt the socio-economic and political conditions’ of risky environments that can potentially produce and support radicalism and terrorism, transnational criminal networks and other security risks.71 Again, unlike particular strains of democratic peace theory, the motiva-tion behind the interventions that Western governments have conducted is not to achieve positive ideological outcomes. Rather, these interven-tions are negative activities aimed at preventing particular risks and outcomes.

Finally, it is important to highlight that one of the central paradoxes of recent interventions aimed at promoting liberalism and democracy is their potentially illiberal implications. At face value, there is seemingly a tension between the values of liberalism and democracy, supposedly a force for emancipation and freedom, and the means by which Western governments have promoted them. This has often involved the subjec-tion of local populations in the target territories to foreign authority and interference in their domestic affairs. The ends might be liberal, but in some respects, the means are not. As Hobson notes, the centrality of democ-racy to ‘new global structures of hierarchy, domination and violence’ curtails its emancipatory and progressive elements.72 Liberalism and democracy, because of their perceived potential as a means to managing risk, have become part of the discourse of national security in several Western societies, with potentially illiberal implications for the risky territories that are targeted for intervention.73

Conclusion

Risk management within international society is an activity that we cannot fully understand without first examining the centrality of Western values of liberty and democracy to the process of anticipating and defining risks and the selection of appropriate responses to them. Not only have Western leaders identified risky environments primarily according to the absence of liberal democratic government, they have


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also explicitly suggested that liberal democracy is the key to maintaining Western security and the management of global security risks. Faced with uncertain, unpredictable and de-bounded risks, Western states have attempted to manage them by employing situational risk management techniques that aim to reshape environments. The result is the emer-gence of a hierarchical ‘international risk society’, one in which some states lose their unqualified right to sovereign equality, non-intervention and self-determination should Western governments deem them to pose unacceptable risks to their security.

The hallmarks of this international risk society have been the continual emphasis of Western governments on strategic uncertainty and unpre-dictability in the face of de-bounded risks, and the formulation and operationalisation of preventive and precautionary strategic doctrines designed to manage perceived risks and their potential consequences. Liberal democracy has therefore become a new, informal standard of statehood within international society, precisely because Western governments perceive liberalism and democracy as capable of reducing the opportunities for the emergence of globalised security risks. Whether the assumption by Western governments that promoting liberal values is the best way to prevent de-bounded risks from materialising is correct is highly debatable; however, what is important is that Western govern-ments perceive it to be so. As demonstrated above, Western leaders have been explicit in their support for liberalism and democracy as the solu-tion to managing globalised security risks.

The remaining chapters explore different cases of Western attempts at risk management within international society. These case studies pri-marily examine the extent to which Western interventions have: i) been prompted by perceived security risks and the desire to manage them; ii) demonstrated the key risk management elements of proactive anticipa-tion, prevention and precaution and iii) focused on the promotion of liberal democracy as a way of reshaping environments identified as potentially risky. Examining cases such as the invasion of Iraq, the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy and Australia’s state-building activities in the South Pacific, these chapters demonstrate that in the post-Cold War era the West has become preoccupied with global security risks, attempting to manage them via different (in some instances coercive) methods of state building and the promotion of liberal democracy.


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59

The 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU were highly significant events for the Union, in a number of respects. Not only did these enlargements provide membership to many of the post-communist states of Eastern Europe, but they also posed the question of how an enlarged EU would deal with non-EU states in its immediate vicinity. The expansion of the EU through the accession process brought it much closer to identified zones of instability and risk within international society and created a new hierarchy of states both within the EU and between the EU and its new neighbours.1 As Dannreuther notes, enlarge-ment meant that states on the periphery of Europe in Northern Africa, the Middle East and the former Soviet republics could no longer be ignored.2 The EU perceives many of the potential globalised security risks that it faces, such as terrorism, transnational crime or illegal immi-gration, to originate in the areas that now sit immediately alongside the external borders of the Union.

The 2003 ESS clearly recognised the EU’s concern with its immediate neighbours, highlighting the necessity of ensuring stability and prosperity in the regions bordering Europe.3 Even before the release of this document, the EU had begun to develop the ENP, which was designed to promote European values of liberalism and democracy and bring non-EU members in the region closer to the EU’s governance and regulatory standards. The point of the ENP is therefore to create the EU’s definition of a ‘good neighbour’: states with liberal democratic political institutions, func-tioning market economies and governance standards in line with those of the EU. The EU expects that those states that enter into partnership agreements with it will meet a range of benchmarks concerning their domestic institutions; in return, they are offered the promise of significant

4Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery: The European Neighbourhood Policy


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political and economic benefits, although the EU does not offer these states the prize of EU membership.4

While the EU itself has stressed the importance of the political and economic reforms that sit at the heart of the ENP, others have suggested that what is really at stake for the EU are security concerns and the per-ceived need to accomplish domestic reform in the risky states that strad-dle the enlarged EU’s borders.5 Indeed, several scholars have noted the tension between the two narratives prevalent within discussions of the ENP – the first involves the long-term reform of EU neighbours and the creation of a broader Euro-Mediterranean community; the second involves European security concerns.6 As is argued in this chapter, how-ever, these two goals of promoting democracy and achieving security are actually aligned: the ENP constitutes an exercise in risk management by the EU. The promotion of long-term economic and political reforms in ENP partner states is a key method employed by the EU in order to mitigate the risks posed by the partner states in identified risky zones, especially to the Union’s south.

Faced with multifaceted and multidirectional risks to its security, partic-ularly terrorism and potentially heavy, unregulated migration flows, the EU has responded by attempting to manage these possible dangers by entering into agreements with several states in identified zones of risk in an attempt to induce liberal political and economic reform. Like the Australian government in the South Pacific, the enlarged EU views itself as sitting on the doorstep of several risky zones, creating an imperative to engage with states in these zones in an attempt to promote liberal values and standards of governance. As Smith states, ‘The process of growing closer to the EU by “approximating” its values and standards is expected to help increase prosperity and security in the neighbourhood . . .’7

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section examines the EU’s strategic outlook with particular reference to the ESS. The focus here is on the main security issues, such as the strategic effects of globalisation, that the EU seeks to deal with and the way in which such issues are defined and characterised. This section will also explore the EU’s justifi-cations for the ENP. As will be demonstrated, the EU is predominantly concerned with temporally and spatially de-bounded risks, rather than threats, to its security. The second section examines the ENP itself. Of special interest here are the EU’s ‘Country Reports’ and ‘Action Plans’ for each state involved in the ENP which outline the reforms that need to be carried out in partner countries and which are used to evaluate progress. This section also explores the EU’s use of conditionalities as a way of inducing compliance with its desired reforms.


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Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery: The European Neighbourhood Policy 61

The third and final section examines the implications for international society. As is argued, the ENP represents a manifestation of the EU’s claim to have the authority to determine the socio-political and economic make-up of its neighbours, resulting in new hierarchical relationships between the EU and ENP partners. In large part, the agreement of the ENP partners to subject themselves to EU regulation and oversight, along with the relatively muted response of other countries within inter-national society to the ENP, legitimates these hierarchies. Indeed, the prevailing consensus within international society seems to be that the ENP is a positive programme aimed at facilitating economic and political reform in partner states, with obvious benefits for the partners themselves but also for the EU and other actors that have an interest in promoting stability in North Africa and the Middle East.

European Security Risks in the Post-Cold War Era

The ending of the Cold War represented the emergence of a fundamentally altered strategic environment in Europe. However, while the overarching threat of the Soviet Union was gone a more unstable and uncertain secu-rity environment emerged in its place, something that Western states recognised rather quickly after the end of the Cold War. NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept clearly suggested that a range of new, non-traditional security issues were of growing concern: ‘In contrast with the predomi-nant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess . . .’8 By the time of the publication of the ESS in 2003, issues such as terrorism, human rights violations, uncontrolled refugee flows and transnational criminal activity would be at the forefront of the EU’s strategic outlook.

With the establishment of the EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar as part of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, one could begin to discuss common European security strategies and policies outside of NATO or the former Western European Union.9 To date, the high point of the evolution of the CFSP since 1992 has been the publica-tion of the ESS, formulated by Javier Solana who formerly served as both the High Representative for the CFSP and Secretary General of the Council of the European Union.10 This document is particularly impor-tant not only because it represented the EU’s first adoption of an over-arching strategic framework,11 but also because it clearly outlined Europe’s focus on the effects of globalisation and particular risks to its security in the post-Cold War era.12


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The ESS provides a clear characterisation of the new security risks that Europe faces, stating that: ‘Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable’.13 Further, similar to its Australian and US counterparts, the EU is highly cognisant of the secu-rity implications of globalisation. The first section of the ESS, which deals with the key risks and global challenges that Europe now faces, begins by discussing the effects of globalisation and what these mean for European security, emphasising both its positive and negative aspects. While processes of globalisation have brought freedom and prosperity to peoples around the world, they have also led to increased European vulnerability and dependence on the global infrastructure erected by these processes.14 As Javier Solana argues:

The world we live in has been dramatically changed in little more than a decade. The geo-strategic scene has been transformed. The process we describe as ‘globalisation’ has facilitated the easy move-ment of people, goods and ideas, but also of grievances, criminality and weapons.15

More pointedly, globalisation has increased European vulnerability to instability and security risks arising in locations far from Europe. As the ESS suggests, ‘In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand’.16 Solana also highlighted Europe’s vulnerability in a speech to the Institute for European Politics in Berlin in 2003:

Globalisation brings more freedom and wealth, but if not properly managed it can also generate new frustrations. We must be alive to the prospect of new combinations of threats: terrorism capitalising on the persistence of regional conflicts; criminal organisations acquiring weap-ons of mass destruction, whether through theft, collaboration with rogue States or the collapse of State structures; collusion between funda-mentalists, cyber-terrorists and international criminal organisations.17

Indeed, in an address to the European Parliament, Solana explicitly sug-gested that a globalised world is one that presents Europe with new risks: ‘The globalised world we now live in offers new opportunities for increased freedom and prosperity. It has also made some familiar prob-lems worse and brought about a new range of risks’.18 The theme here is that of a Western society or collective of societies faced with new forms


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of multifaceted and multidirectional risks. The security implications of globalisation revolve predominantly around the way in which its pro-cesses can provide a global operational scope for non-state actors such as terrorists or transnational criminal networks that can be difficult to locate and identify. The statements of Solana’s successor as the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (a post created in the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon), Catherine Ashton, have also repeated this theme. As Ashton has suggested:

If there is one dominant trend now, I would argue it is globalisation. It is not just an economic phenomena, it is also a political one. These days security threats, technology breakthroughs, the redistribution of political power, are all global – both in their nature and in their consequences.19

As the Belgian foreign policy think-tank, the Royal Institute for International Relations, suggests, ‘Today, nobody can insulate its security from the rest of the world, since the ramifications of globalisation are borne in upon all’.20 This concern with the ‘dark side’ of globalisation is one that the security policies and strategies of several EU members have unsurprisingly also reflected. For example, the UK’s 2008 National Security Strategy argues that:

The Cold War threat has been replaced by a diverse but intercon-nected set of threats and risks . . . These and other threats and risks are driven by a diverse and interconnected set of underlying factors, including climate change, competition for energy, poverty and poor governance, demographic changes and globalisation.21

The ways that the EU seeks to address such challenges, namely through global engagement and intervention in identified zones of risk, also reflects the globalised, de-bounded nature of contemporary security issues. Risk opens up new zones or spaces of governance that require constant monitoring and management. Identified zones of risk (or com-munities of risk as Coker terms it) within international society are sub-jected to interventionist modes of regulation.22 Accordingly, rather than focusing solely on securing and defending the EU’s external borders against identified threats, securing the EU now depends upon global engagement with those states or territories deemed to belong to zones of risk. As the ESS states, ‘Our traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With


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the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad’.23 The Council of the European Union has similarly suggested that globalisa-tion means that European defence may begin in other countries rather than on the EU’s borders.24

Increasingly, European security becomes predicated not only on bor-der control or the EU’s ability to secure its own geographical space, but rather on the EU’s active engagement with the outside world. As Browning and Joenniemi suggest, ‘Notably, however, instead of simply drawing a line of ultimate exclusion . . . external threats are to be coun-tered by EU attempts to order the space beyond its borders through the export of EU norms and practices’.25 Again, the only way to achieve security against risks in today’s world, particularly those with poten-tially catastrophic consequences, is to act upon those regions where risks may originate, to neutralise the possibility of their materialisation before they actually occur. It is for this reason that Western powers have placed such a heavy emphasis on the security benefits of democracy promotion, a theme that senior EU officials such as Ashton have discussed and promoted extensively (see below).

Another significant feature of the ESS (and European foreign policy in general) is its generally anticipatory and proactive nature. The ESS emphasises the importance of preventive activities in its effort to manage new security risks.26 As Solana suggests:

Making a stand first requires being more active. The threats are today dynamic. Left alone, they will become more dangerous. The EU must actively counter these threats. It must be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.27

The ESS itself urges European states to ‘develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and where necessary, robust intervention’.28 This emphasis on proactive anticipation and prevention is indicative of a pre-cautionary desire to prevent the materialisation of potential catastrophes. The EU’s preventative approach places emphasis on horizon scanning, early warning and continual vigilance precisely because it is unclear at what point in time a risk might materialise or a crisis will occur.

The EU’s conceptualisation of its contemporary strategic context has also displayed a significant precautionary trend. With regard to post-Cold War security issues, the ESS states that: ‘The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous’.29 The ESS assumes that a failure to act


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against possible risks will only increase the dangers confronting Europe; as it argues, prevention now will mitigate the potential materialisation of catastrophic risks later.30 Further, the suggestion by Solana that threat (or rather risk) prevention cannot start too early is distinctly indicative of the precautionary principle, which likewise suggests that prevention against anticipated risks can never occur too early, regardless of the exis-tence (or not) of conclusive evidence that corroborates the risk assess-ments being made.31

European foreign and security policies have therefore demonstrated a focus on new forms of risk and, subsequently, an emphasis on precau-tionary and preventive methods of risk management. Importantly, how-ever, they have also explicitly identified the promotion of European values of democracy and liberalism as a central aspect of EU risk man-agement efforts. The EU’s identification of enlargement and the ENP, both centred on the promotion of EU values and standards of governance, as providing key security benefits clearly demonstrates this. The EU’s desire to spread liberalism and democracy is, however, not a new one. The promotion of democracy and liberal values has been a consistent and continual feature of EU foreign policy and practice since its incep-tion in 1992.

The EU’s desire to be a force for democracy promotion is readily demonstrated in the ESS. It suggests that the promotion of European values is a key element of not only strengthening and improving the quality of international society, but also achieving security for Europe:

The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.32

The upshot of this statement is that the EU very clearly defines the ‘best’ or ‘safest’ forms of domestic governance and government in terms of liberalism and democracy. Presumably, liberal democratic states stand in distinction to illiberal or undemocratic states characterised as inferior or unstable, and thus potentially risky.

It is precisely this construction of liberal democracy as safe and pro-gressive, coupled with the notion that any deviance from the EU’s liberal democratic standards represents backwardness and potentially dangerous


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instability, which informs the EU’s desire to promote liberal values as a means to managing risk. The thinking on the part of the EU seems to be that exporting its values of liberalism and democracy will draw other states into the Western zone of peace and prosperity, thus preventing the potential danger that the previously illiberal and unstable socio-political conditions of these territories will present risks to European security. As Ashton has suggested, promoting democracy is key to Europe’s security and prosperity.33 Ashton has spoken regularly of the need to promote ‘deep democracy’ in other countries, involving not simply government elections but also broader political reforms, institu-tion building, support for civil society groups and other measures.34 Again, this is deemed crucial not only for the sake of the countries attempting to transition to democracy, but also for European security.

Primarily, the diffusion of liberal values and democracy promotion has occurred through EU enlargement and the ENP. As Hill argues, enlargement constitutes the EU’s long-term preventive measure against conflict and instability.35 Bringing states into the EU by requiring them to undergo extensive socio-political and economic reforms is the best way for the EU to manage security risks. The EU enlargement process saw ten new members join the Union in 2004, with Romania and Bulgaria joining in 2007 and Croatia joining on 1 July 2013.36 The former Yugoslav republics of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey and Iceland are currently in accession negotiations.37 The so-called ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ adopted at the 1993 Copenhagen Council were relatively clear in the conditions prospective members had to fulfil: liberal democratic political institutions, a functioning market economy and acceptance of the EU acquis communitaire (the body of EU law to date), along with an ability to take on the obligations of membership.38

However, enlargement has also entailed some negative consequences, particularly in relation to the fact that it has brought the enlarged EU closer to states residing in zones of risk on the periphery of Europe and beyond. The enlarged EU has perceived and defined its new neigh-bours primarily in terms of the potential dangers they pose for Europe.39 As Smith argues, ‘The 2004 enlargement, however, brought the EU closer to them, and thus created an immediate need to ensure that the wider neighbourhood was stable, to avoid the risk of instability spilling over into the larger EU’.40 These security considerations have constituted a large part of the justifications provided by the EU for the establishment and implementation of the ENP after its 2004 enlargement.

The perceived instability and potential risks posed by the EU’s new neighbours have been central to the process of developing the ENP from


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the very beginning. In 2002, the development of the ENP began with a letter from Jack Straw, the then British Foreign Minister, to his Spanish counterpart, Josep Piqué, outlining the need to address the instability present in many of the EU’s future neighbours.41 A year later, the ESS noted that one of the key tasks for the EU in terms of security policy was to build stability and prosperity in its immediate neighbourhood:

The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.42

The European Commission itself has suggested that the ENP is a response to the hopes and fears of its citizens about the challenges of today’s world (globalisation, terrorism, organised crime, etc.), derived from instability and insecurity in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood.43

The EU has thus identified the need for engagement with its neigh-bouring states as a means of mitigating any potential risks that they may pose. The European Commission suggests that: ‘As enlargement brings the EU into direct contact with neighbours marked by political and social instability, its response is to share with them its prosperity and stability, thus consolidating its own security’.44 The importance of this statement is that it highlights the instrumental security considerations that underpin the ENP and the EU’s role in its neighbourhood. These considerations are also reflected in another statement from the European Commission:

In order to realise the vision of building an increasingly closer rela-tionship with our neighbours, and a zone of stability, security and prosperity for all, the EU and each ENP partner reach agreement on reform objectives across a wide range of fields within certain ‘com-mon’ areas such as cooperation on political and security issues. . .45

These statements neatly summarise the security considerations that, at least in part, inform the EU’s objective of facilitating economic and socio-political reform within ENP partner states. As Del Sarto and Schumacher contend, ‘Seeking to establish a cushion of new neighbours, some of whom will enjoy a virtual EU membership, may be read as an attempt of preventing the emergence of new fault lines and zones of instability – at least in the EU’s immediate periphery’.46 The ENP functions as a risk


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management mechanism designed to export EU values of liberalism and democracy to states within identified zones of risk.

The ENP: Promoting Democracy and Hierarchy along the European Periphery

Prior to, and since its 2004 expansion, one of the EU’s central problems in relation to its new neighbourhood was how to provide suitable incentives for its neighbours to adopt EU values and regulations without offering them the prize of membership. As Former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi argued in 2002, the EU needed to offer these states ‘more than partnership and less than membership, without precluding the latter’.47 In March 2003, the European Commission proposed the ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood’ initiative that would eventually evolve into the ENP.48 This initiative was initially confined to the former Soviet republics in Eastern Europe. However, pressure from the southern EU members to include Mediterranean countries ultimately led to the expansion of the ENP into North Africa and the Middle East.49 The European Commission formulated the ENP in May 2004 with the publication of the ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper’.50 In 2011, the European Commission reviewed the ENP in the context of major social and political upheaval in North Africa and the Middle East (the so-called Arab Spring). The outcome of this review was an enhanced focus on promoting deep democracy and the creation of the ‘more for more’ principle, under which the EU ‘will develop stronger partnerships with those neighbours that make more progress towards democratic reform’.51

The ENP builds on earlier European initiatives designed to achieve political and economic reform in Europe’s near neighbours, especially in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) that was launched in 1995.52 The basic method of the ENP is to offer partners the opportunity to move beyond cooperation alone and instead engage in considerable political and economic inte-gration with the EU, including enhanced access to the EU common market, in return for adopting the required reforms.53 The core objective of the ENP is to ‘share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neigh-bouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned. It is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours’.54 In order to fulfil these objectives, the strategy paper proposes that the EU define, in con-sultation with partners, priority areas for reform, the fulfilment of which will bring them closer to the EU.


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At the outset of the process, the European Commission prepares ‘Country Reports’ detailing the situation in each country that has agreed to subject itself to the ENP. The identified priority areas of reform in ENP partner states are then detailed in ‘Action Plans’ that outline the neces-sary reforms that must be carried out. The EU then provides financial and technical assistance to ensure that the desired reforms are successfully implemented, while also conducting periodic assessments and reviews of the progress that each ENP partner makes in meeting its reform objectives.55 As the Commission envisages, the end result of the ENP

involves a ring of countries, sharing the EU’s fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an increasingly close relationship, going beyond co-operation to involve a significant measure of economic and political integration. This will bring enormous gains to all involved in terms of increased stability, security and well-being.56

One crucial feature of this statement is the identification of the security benefits that the EU will obtain as a result of the ENP. These security ben-efits are twofold. First, by promoting liberal values in neighbouring states, the EU can reshape potentially risky socio-political environments on its borders and prevent the emergence of security risks. Promoting democ-racy is not the goal of the ENP; it is the means to achieving the goal of stability and security.57 Second, the idea of a ‘ring of friends’ surrounding the EU is suggestive of the formulation of a buffer zone, one intended to keep security risks from penetrating the EU’s core (Western Europe). Notably, security considerations are also a feature of most of the Action Plans, particularly in relation to counter-terrorism. ENP countries are required to continue to work on developing cooperation with the EU on terrorism and other security issues. This includes the implementation of specific policies and programmes such as UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, which deals with the non-proliferation of WMD.58

Another important feature of the Commission’s statement is the cen-trality of the EU’s ‘fundamental values and objectives’ to the ENP and its anticipated outcomes. There is no mention of the values or objectives of partner states. As Del Sarto and Schumacher argue, ‘The Commission does not leave any doubts that the “commitment to shared values” – such as democracy, liberty, rule of law, respect for human rights and human dignity – refers to the values of the EU and its Member States’.59

The point of the ENP is not to engage in negotiation or compromise over the disparate values or standards of governance held by the EU and the ENP partners. Rather, the EU has designed the ENP solely as a means for the transmission of EU standards and values.60


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Both the official statements and rhetoric from various EU bodies and agencies and the general character of various features of the ENP itself, such as the Country Reports and Action Plans, demonstrate this. The EU has explicitly stated that the reforms that it is attempting to facilitate are based on its own norms and values, not those of its partners. As the European Commission’s 2012 report on delivering a ‘new’ ENP states, ‘The EU is also engaged in intense co-operation with partners on a broad range of sectoral issues, based on EU norms and standards’.61 The Country Reports and Action Plans readily support this statement. As Smith argues, one of the key features of these plans is the ‘prominence within them of political objectives, including – most notably – respect for specific human rights and democratic principles’.62 However, the scope of the Country Reports and the reforms mandated in the Action Plans go much further than simply adopting, for example, institutions of representative government or public sector reforms in line with liberal notions of good governance.

The Action Plans and Country Reports also involve more specific mea-sures in a variety of policy areas that the EU’s neighbouring states are required to adopt. These more specific measures potentially involve an extensive reform of the relationship between state and society in the ENP partner states. They also involve extensive legislative and regulatory reform and are essentially aimed at bringing ENP states into line with the EU’s acquis communitaire.63 The Country Reports clearly demonstrate the wide scope of the areas that come under the regulatory purview of the ENP. The Country Report for Armenia, for example, deals with the following areas: political issues, democracy and the rule of law, human rights, foreign affairs, economic and social situation, state involvement in the economy, regulatory frameworks, transport, energy, environment and research and innovation, to name a few.64 Other Country Reports are of similar breadth, covering a large range of areas and issues. The wide scope of the Country Reports is repeated in the Action Plans, which again outline the large number of reforms that ENP partners must undertake.

Despite this focus on promoting a common set of values and stan-dards, the EU has also emphasised differentiation in its relationships with ENP partners by arguing that each relationship will be varied and unique.65 Yet this differentiation really only refers to the variations that occur between ENP partner states in their progress towards assimilating the common values that the EU is seeking to export. As President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso has argued:

It will be clear that there is a very different relationship between the EU and each of its neighbours, reflecting how close we are to each other


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in implementing the common values we share, the specific nature of each partner’s economy, and the desires and aspirations you have for your relationship with the EU.66

The adoption of the ‘more for more’ principle reinforces these senti-ments, strengthening the focus on linking the progress of ENP partners in achieving the mandated reforms to the closeness of their relationship with the EU.

The implementation of the more for more principle is interesting not only because it reinforces the EU’s desire to promote its own values and standards, but also because it underscores the inherently conditional nature of the ENP. Conditionality has been a key feature of the ENP since its inception, and is the EU’s primary method for compelling ENP part-ners to accept its mandated reforms. As the 2003 European Commission ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood’ communication stated:

In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including in aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU.67

In short, the EU dangles the carrot of enhanced access to the EU internal market and greater political cooperation in order to compel partners to comply with its mandated reforms.

As the European Commission states:

Increased EU support to its neighbours is conditional. It will depend on progress in building and consolidating democracy and respect for the rule of law. The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will get from the EU.68

Importantly, the more for more principle also serves to reinforce the bilateral nature of the ENP. Unlike the multilateral focus of the EMP, for example, the ENP is based upon bilateral relationships between the EU and individual partner states.69 This bilateralism serves to accentuate the political and economic inequalities between the EU and ENP partners, providing the EU with even greater leverage.70 This leverage is only enhanced by the more for more principle, which places an even greater focus on bilateral relationships by distinguishing between ENP partners depending on how far they have progressed in implementing the reforms required of them. This allows the EU to set the terms and conditions of its


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relations with its neighbours with very little input from the neighbours themselves.71

The use of conditionality to compel member states to conform to liberal democratic standards and values highlights the point that ENP partners have little real ownership over these values and standards. The EU has depicted its relationship with ENP partners as a horizontal one between equals negotiating over mutually beneficial reforms. Further, the implementation of these reforms is portrayed by the EU as very much bottom-up in nature. ENP partners themselves implement such reforms, in their own time and according to the unique socio-political and economic context of their country, with a helping hand from the EU.72 However, despite the rhetoric of the European Commission, the relationship is very much a vertical, rather than horizontal, one between fundamentally unequal ‘partners’. As Browning and Joenniemi suggest

. . . hierarchical elements in the ENP stem directly from the emphasis on conditionality, which means notions of ‘joint ownership’ ulti-mately are widely seen to add up to little. Thus, it is the EU that is setting the goals of the specific ENP Action Plans and that will decide if they have been implemented or not.73

While the ENP partners have freely agreed to enter into such an arrange-ment with the EU, it is the EU that wields and exercises authority in its relationships with the ENP partner states. Indeed, it wields a significant level of authority – the EU has effectively attempted to tell its neighbours what types of states they should be (liberal democracies) and stipulated that they comply in return for particular political and economic benefits. By agreeing to participate in the ENP, partner countries have effectively legitimised the EU’s exercise of authority and agreed to submit themselves to a programme of fairly intrusive oversight and regulation of their inter-nal affairs. This is a fine example of a hierarchical relationship in practice, with a clear distinction between the EU and its ENP partners as the superordinate and subordinate actors in the relationship. Crucially though, this differentiation between superordinate and subordinate is constructed according to the EU’s perceptions of risk, perceptions which are framed within the context of values of liberalism and democracy.

Finally, the wide scope of the ENP’s desired reforms are coupled with mechanisms of monitoring and assessment that provide for regular EU oversight of partner states’ progress in achieving reforms. Since 2005, the European Commission – and more recently the European External Action Service (EEAS) – has published annual progress reports for each


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ENP partner state that effectively serve as audits on the effectiveness of the implementation of the ENP’s mandated liberal reforms in partner countries.74 The progress reports are the EU’s primary oversight and accountability mechanism, but other initiatives such as increased for-mal and informal contacts between the EU and ENP partners and the establishment of taskforces for individual countries attempting to tran-sition to functional democracies have also been used in this capacity. Again, this underscores the claim that the EU is currently busy promot-ing both democracy and hierarchy along its periphery, providing finan-cial, technical and political benefits to ENP partners in return for significant EU oversight and regulation of their internal affairs as they progress towards the ‘common’ values of liberalism and democracy.

Implications for International Society

The ENP is now, as of writing, a nine-year-old programme that the EU has recently renewed, revised and refreshed. Certainly, the EU has shown no sign that it is about to abandon or wind down the ENP, and it remains one of the fundamental aspects of the EU’s foreign policy towards its near neighbours in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. Despite representing a clear case of an interstate hierarchi-cal relationship in practice, the ENP has both survived for a relatively lengthy period and elicited relatively little controversy within interna-tional society, notwithstanding some criticisms from academics and ENP partners.75 A key reason for this may be that, aside from the unique social logic of risk underpinning the ENP and its attendant hierarchies, there is not a great deal that is especially novel about the ENP or the way that the EU has sought to deal with its largely undemocratic and poten-tially unstable near neighbours.

Indeed, one might suggest that the ENP is really just indicative of a great power exercising authority and power over its sphere of influence, something that has been done by several different great powers, from the US in the Americas to the Soviet Union (during the Cold War) in Eastern Europe. Likewise, there is nothing particularly innovative or novel about the EU’s use of conditionality to compel ENP partners to comply with mandated reforms. Both states and international institu-tions (such as the IMF with its Structural Adjustment Programs) have used conditionality frequently in order to entice states to implement policy reforms. And this is the point: it is the very fact that these two features of the ENP are not particularly novel or unique that emphasises one of the main contentions advanced in this book – hierarchies are not


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incompatible with international society and indeed are a longstanding and key feature of the society of states.

The concepts of a sphere of influence and conditionality both imply gradations of authority, whether it is between the great power and smaller states within its sphere of influence or between the state or organisation offering conditional incentives and the smaller powers that are compelled to accept these conditions. In this sense, both are reflec-tive of a vertical hierarchical relationship between the superordinate and subordinate parties to the relationship. Both are also reflected in the ENP and the EU’s interactions with ENP partner states – to suggest that the EU is exercising authority within its sphere of influence or that the ENP is based on thoroughly conditional agreements between the EU and ENP partners is to acknowledge the fundamentally hierarchical relation-ship between these actors. Again, the hierarchical quality of the ENP is not unique – what is unique is the social logic of risk that informs this particular example of interstate hierarchy, based on the EU’s perceptions of risk in its neighbourhood and its attempts to promote liberalism and democracy in response.

The fact that the ENP has been relatively uncontroversial also sup-ports the argument that hierarchy is a significant feature of international society. Perhaps the key feature of international society’s response to the ENP has been the general lack of a substantial reaction by external actors. The fact remains that the ENP’s goal of promoting democracy and liberalism along its periphery meshes well with the foreign policies of other great powers within international society, most notably the US, which itself has a direct interest in promoting democracy and stability in the Middle East and North Africa in particular.76 This interest has only strengthened in the wake of the Arab Spring revolutions and the need of major actors with strategic interests in the region to promote a successful transition to democracy for several Arab states while avoiding large-scale disorder and instability.77

Other powers such as Russia and China have also been largely silent, likely because the ENP does not represent something unpalatable like the promotion of democracy via military intervention (for example, Iraq). Rather, the ENP’s legitimacy stems from the fact that partner states willingly sign up to the programme, even if they have very little say or influence over the sorts of reforms required of them once they are part of the ENP. There is no ostensible violation of sovereignty, even though the EU currently exercises a high degree of authority and influence over the domestic affairs of ENP partners to the extent that it has effectively


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told partner states what type of government they should have and how they should achieve it. Indeed, we must recognise that while ENP partners remain sovereign states, they do not wield sovereignty in the traditional sense of absolute or exclusive authority over their domestic affairs. To suggest that they do would be to ignore the significant authority that ENP partners have allowed an external actor to wield over their societies.

However, like any subordinate party in a hierarchical relationship, the ENP partners do have room to resist the reforms that the EU seeks to achieve. Indeed, the record of the ENP in actually promoting and con-solidating ‘deep democracy’ in ENP partner states is patchy at best, in contrast to the success the EU has enjoyed at using conditionality and other forms of incentive in promoting democracy and political stability in EU candidate countries through the accession process.78 A substantial section of the academic literature on the ENP has been critical of the EU’s democracy promotion efforts in North Africa and the Middle East in particular, attributing the EU’s poor record to a number of factors including the design of the ENP and the deliberate resistance and non-compliance of partner states.79 The more for more principle itself was an acknowledgement that the progress of ENP partners in achieving the required reforms was uneven and inconsistent, necessitating a tighten-ing of the conditionalities associated with the ENP and a reinforcement of the incentives on offer to secure compliance.

Yet resistance and non-compliance are not fatal to a hierarchical rela-tionship. Again, the authority wielded by a superordinate party creates only an expectation of obedience – non-compliance is not necessarily an indication that the authority of the superordinate party has been broken or is non-existent. It should also be noted that the EU is attempt-ing to promote a highly ambitious package of political, economic, legal and regulatory reforms in 16 separate countries. That the EU has not secured its desired reforms in partner states is reflective not only of deliberate non-compliance but also the very real challenges associated with attempting to promote such a wide-ranging package of reforms in a number of highly diverse states, states that often have a long history of underdevelopment and instability. This does not change the fact, however, that the EU has effectively asserted that it has the authority to attempt to do so, an assertion recognised and legitimated by the ENP partner states.

The other interesting facet of the ENP is what it tells us about the pluralist norms of international society. Ostensibly, the ENP does not involve any significant violation of key international norms such as


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sovereign equality or non-intervention, as ENP partners have willingly signed up to the programme. Yet, it is clear that the ENP involves significant external interference in the domestic affairs of ENP partners and that these partners and the EU participate in a fundamentally unequal rela-tionship – while it might not directly violate these norms, the ENP does at least qualify and place important limits on them. Perhaps more importantly, the ENP questions the very ethical or moral basis of pluralist international society – that states have a right to construct their own political and social institutions in accordance with their own values and goals. The ENP is essentially an explicit attempt to limit this right, to enforce a greater level of homogeneity along the European periphery.

The language used by the EU is instructive in this regard. In a 2011 document outlining the revamped ENP, the EU suggests explicitly that: ‘The EU does not seek to impose a model or a ready-made recipe for political reform, but it will insist that each partner country’s reform pro-cess reflect a clear commitment to universal values’.80 Indeed, several other EU documents relating to the ENP stress that the liberal demo-cratic reforms that they seek to promote are universal values – ENP part-ners just need assistance in achieving compliance with values that they surely agree with and support. On this basis, some may contend that what we are witnessing is the emergence of a solidarist form of interna-tional society, based on a greater normative commitment by all states within international society to a deeper set of (liberal) values and norms. However, if this is in fact the case, then the question remains as to why the EU feels it necessary to use conditional agreements to entice its ENP partners to adopt its desired reforms. Such enticements should not be necessary if there is a genuine consensus that liberalism and democracy are truly desirable among all states within international society.

The practice of the ENP does not necessarily match the rhetoric of universalism; nor does the EU’s relative lack of success in promoting democracy within its neighbourhood. While the EU may talk about uni-versal values, what it is actually attempting to do is promote its own particular values for specific strategic benefits. It is engaged in a process of homogenisation precisely as a means of managing the risks presented by its relatively underdeveloped and unstable neighbours. Again, the ENP is a significant case not only because it demonstrates the ability of international society to accommodate hierarchical relations between states without threatening wider international stability or order, but also because the social logic of risk underpinning the hierarchies between Europe and ENP partners challenges the fundamental moral basis of a pluralist international society.


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Conclusion

Like other Western societies in the post-Cold War era, the EU and its members have become increasingly preoccupied with the negative aspects of globalisation and the emergence of a range of de-bounded risks to its security. The 2004 enlargement of the Union exacerbated these concerns by bringing the EU closer to identified zones of risk within international society. The EU has identified these zones as risky and unstable primarily due to the lack of liberal democratic institutions and governance in many of the countries situated within them. Aware that these territories could act as originators of de-bounded risks, the EU has moved to export its liberal values as part of a mechanism of risk management aimed at reshaping the socio-political and economic envi-ronments of its neighbours.

The primary means for doing so has thus far been the ENP, a pro-gramme designed to assist the EU’s near neighbours in drawing closer to the EU via standardisation and homogenisation.81 Its aim is to construct a new zone of peace, prosperity and stability stretching from the EU into its wider neighbourhood. Despite its pretensions towards coopera-tion, partnership and mutual ownership, ultimately the ENP involves a one-way transmission of EU values in return for the benefits associated with closer political and economic integration with the EU. Partner states have agreed to extensive EU interference and oversight over their domestic affairs, providing the EU with a considerable level of authority to reshape and reform the domestic institutions of these countries. In this sense, hierarchical interstate relationships prevail along the European periphery as the EU continues to seek the export of its values for strategic gain.


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79

Since attaining independence, most Pacific island states have relied on Australia as a major source of foreign aid and development assistance. Pacific island nations such as Papua New Guinea (PNG), a former trust territory of Australia until 1975 and, more recently, East Timor and Solomon Islands have relied heavily upon Australia for aid funding and support. In turn, Australia has focused heavily on liberal notions of good governance as the pre-requisite for economic development and social and political stability in the Pacific island states.1 Despite this, until recently Australia’s policy position on development aid was largely centred on a ‘hands-off’ approach – provide aid funding to Pacific island states and allow their respective governments to formulate and adopt their own development agendas.2 The point was to avoid any suggestion that Australia was interfering in the internal affairs of these states or was seeking to establish itself as a neo-imperialist regional power.3

However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and 2002 Bali bombings, this approach has been cast aside in favour of a new interventionist approach that supports substantially increased Australian involvement in the internal affairs of these states in order to facilitate governance reforms and build institutional capacity.4 Recent interventions in PNG and Solomon Islands have demonstrated Australia’s newfound willingness to promote good governance in the Pacific islands by intervening directly in their domestic affairs. It is a preoccupation with spatially and temporally de-bounded security risks that has provided much of the impetus for Australia’s interventionist approach to promoting good governance in the South Pacific. Since 9/11 and the October 2002 Bali bombings, the Australian government has become increasingly preoc-cupied with globalised, transnational risks to its security. Further, it has determined that the primary method for managing such risks in its

5Australia and the Management of Risk in the South Pacific


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immediate region is to prevent state failure in several Pacific island states by reshaping their socio-political and economic environments via the promotion of liberal standards of good governance.

Australia has come to view itself as positioned on the doorstep of an ‘arc of instability’ or ‘South Pacific zone of risk’.5 This zone is character-ised by the presence of several small, fragile states beset by political and social instability and economic underdevelopment, states that Australia perceives to be at significant risk of failure. It is these conditions of state weakness and potential failure, conceived in terms of poor governance and weak state institutions, which pose an environment conducive to the origination of globalised security risks. Terrorists or other transna-tional criminals, such as drug smugglers, might potentially exploit weak South Pacific states, increasing the risk that they will use these territories as a launching pad for operations within, or attacks against, Australia.6 As the Australian government has concluded, instability in the immedi-ate region makes it more difficult for Australia to secure itself against globalised risks.7

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section outlines Australia’s broad foreign policy approach since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, arguing that Australian foreign policy has become increasingly preoccupied with de-bounded security risks. Following this, the section examines how this broader emphasis on security risks has affected the Australian govern-ment’s policies regarding its neighbouring island states, with a particular focus on PNG and Solomon Islands. Here it suggests that the Australian government’s perception that weak or failing states leave Australia more exposed to de-bounded risks informs a new interventionist approach designed to promote good governance throughout the South Pacific. The next section explores this approach in further detail, looking at the Australian government’s interventions in Solomon Islands and PNG and its aim of strengthening state institutions perceived to be weak or fragile through the promotion of liberal good governance. Despite the consen-sual nature of Australia’s state-building endeavours (both PNG and Solomon Islands acceded to Australian involvement in their internal affairs) and their description as ‘cooperative interventions’ or partner-ships, what these interventions have essentially sought to do is subject Pacific island states to Australian-led socio-political regulation as a way of managing risk.8

The third and concluding section considers the implications of Australia’s attempts at state-building in PNG and Solomon Islands for international society. Australian attempts at risk management within the South Pacific have led to the emergence of new relations of hierarchy in the region.


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Australia and the Management of Risk in the South Pacific 81

Like the hierarchies that result from the EU’s ENP, underpinning new hierarchical relationships in the South Pacific is a social logic of risk that constitutes illiberal or fragile states as potentially dangerous sites of risk fomentation and origination. The cooperative nature of the interventions has legitimated the Australian government’s claim to have the authority to intervene in these ‘risky’ states in order to protect Australia’s security. Like the ENP, international society has recognised this authority – the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands (RAMSI), the most significant and wide-ranging of Australia’s recent interventions in the region, has elicited little controversy within the society of states.

Australian Foreign Policy Post-9/11: Increased Interventionism in the South Pacific

In Australia, 9/11, along with the October 2002 Bali bombings in which 88 Australians lost their lives, represented a fundamental shift in Australian views of both its immediate region and the wider interna-tional society. As Wesley argues, 9/11 produced a shock within the Australian government that led to the emergence of what he terms a new ‘foreign policy logic’.9 Former Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer likewise suggested that the world changed fundamentally after 9/11 and the Bali bombings.10 An important component of Australia’s foreign policy shift in the wake of the 9/11 attacks has involved the Australian government’s increasing awareness of, and concern with, a range of temporally and spatially de-bounded security risks and the uncertain strategic environment to which they give rise.

The risks associated with global terrorism and WMD proliferation (and their prevention) became a defining feature of Australian foreign policy after 2001.11 As Downer argued, ‘Australia’s security is at risk from the threat of international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction’.12 Downer later contended during a speech to the UN General Assembly that: ‘Where once it was possible to view terrorism as the lamentable legacy of a few unsafe regions, today almost no country has been left untouched’.13 Such shifts in strategic outlook have not been unique to Australia. Following 9/11, most Western societies, par-ticularly the US and the UK, have focused heavily on the dangers posed to their security interests by spatially and temporally de-bounded risks.

The 2003 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (DFAT) White Paper clearly articulated Australia’s new foreign policy outlook. This doc-ument describes Australia as part of an uncertain and dangerous world, one in which globalisation has increased the vulnerability of Australia


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and other states to transnational risks.14 Downer has also highlighted the uncertainty and unpredictability inherent in the contemporary international environment that Australia must navigate.15 Indeed, it is Australia’s increased concern with this uncertainty and unpredictability that is one of the more important features of its post-9/11 foreign policy approach, as it has given rise to a more cautious and apprehensive international outlook. This increased apprehensiveness is particularly evident in the Australian government’s views on globalisation. Prior to 9/11, the Australian government’s views of globalisation were quite pos-itive; Downer continually extolled the virtues of open markets, free trade and technological advances in communications, transport and production.16

The 2000 Department of Defence White Paper also regarded globali-sation in largely positive terms. Globalisation was seen as bringing a number of security benefits to Australia, predominantly because it increased the stake that governments had in a stable international order.17 Yet this largely positive view had all but dissipated only three years later, to be replaced with a more cautious and negative view of globalisation and its effects. The 2003 DFAT White Paper regards globalisation as providing several benefits, but also as posing a range of challenges to state institutions and governance.18 The 2005 Defence Update, one of three supplements to the 2000 Defence White Paper, likewise considers the negative security implications of globalisation, arguing that:

While the international system is never static, globalisation is accel-erating the movement of ideas and technologies. It has increased the interdependency between countries and made borders more porous. It has increased the potency of the terrorist threat, and the potential danger of WMD proliferation. Failing states are a significant concern because the insecurity they face can easily move beyond their borders.19

It is precisely due to its potential to give rise to spatially de-bounded risks such as terrorism that the Australian government has come to view globalisation in a more uneasy manner. One of the crucial points that Australian government officials have made regarding globalisa-tion’s security implications is the inability of states to insulate them-selves from globalisation’s effects, both good and bad. As Alexander Downer commented, ‘In a globalised world, Australia’s security inter-ests are increasingly affected by lawlessness and disorder in other


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states’.20 Internal disorder in states across the globe can have negative consequences for Australia’s security. DFAT’s 2003 White Paper expresses such a view:

Changes in the international security environment, too, have added to the blurring between domestic and international issues. The faster and freer movement of people and goods has increased the vulnera-bility of Australia and other countries to non-traditional security threats, including terrorism, organised crime, environmental degra-dation and disease.21

The point that Downer and the White Paper allude to in these state-ments is that geographical location no longer offers Australia the protec-tion it once did. The 2003 Defence Update also explicitly articulates a similar view, noting that:

Paradoxically however, in some other important ways, certainty and predictability have decreased because the strategic advantage offered by our geography does not protect Australia against rogue states armed with WMD and long-range ballistic missiles. Nor does it protect Australia from the scourge of terrorism.22

An important point made in the above comment is that the advent of spatially de-bounded risks associated with globalisation produces higher levels of uncertainty and unpredictability that the Australian govern-ment must deal with in its contemporary strategic environment. As a result of the uncertain and unpredictable nature of new global risks, attention has fallen on more readily identifiable regions of disorder, or zones of risk, where dangers can potentially grow.

Particular attention in this regard has been paid to the issue of state fragility and failure. As the 2003 DFAT White Paper suggests, ‘Some regions of disorder have become more volatile, more of a threat to global order and thus more relevant to Australia’s security interests’.23 The 2005 and 2007 Defence Updates reiterated such a view. For example, the 2005 Update suggests that:

Globalisation can add to the potential fallout from failing states in those situations where economic development, governance and the rule of law break down. Failing states may provide the opportunity for recruiting, training and deploying terrorists. A vacuum of gover-nance and law and order creates an environment within which these


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groups can flourish. Due to the easy movement of people and goods, the consequences arising from failing states are often transported beyond their borders.24

The point here is that zones of risk within international society cannot be ignored – to do so would only allow potential dangers to develop. Hence, the problems that characterise these zones become global prob-lems that can adversely affect Australian, and Western, security.

The Australian government has placed emphasis, particularly within its immediate region, on managing these risks by reshaping the socio-political and economic environments of weak states in an attempt to prevent state failure.25 A central part of this focus on reshaping risky environments has been the importance that the Australian government has attached to promoting liberal good governance.26 Roberts et al. make a significant point in this regard:

Post 9/11, war on terror geopolitical constructions of regions as potential sites for fomenting terrorism become part of the reason why the governance agenda in the Pacific receives support from foreign policy interests in relatively powerful countries such as the US and Australia . . . We could say that in the present geopolitical era there is an intensification in the application of the security–governance nexus in certain regions or zones, including the Pacific.27

This focus on good governance is not new – good governance is a concept that has been a key part of development policy since the late 1980s.28 Indeed, there has been a strong focus on governance as a panacea to development problems in the Pacific since the early 1990s.29

However, good governance is a concept that is generally ill-defined and open to competing interpretations and definitions.30 As both Roberts et al. and Weiss note, governance is a slippery and malleable concept that can be subject to definitional adjustment.31 The result is that ‘good governance’, as it has come to be defined in the post-9/11 era, is increasingly enmeshed with Western security concerns.32 So while the focus on governance as the solution to development prob-lems in non-Western territories is not new, the emphasis on governance as a means to achieving security for the West against globalised risks is. In short, promoting good governance has become recast in the post-9/11 period as a particular mode of risk management. Good governance is simultaneously the means for achieving sustainable development and managing de-bounded risks.33


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Concomitantly, Western states have cast state weakness or fragility precisely in terms of weak institutions lacking sufficient capacity and good governance, necessitating the strengthening of state institutions through the promotion of good governance. As the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), Australia’s former aid agency (before the current government led by Prime Minister Tony Abbott inte-grated it with DFAT in 2013), suggests, it is the lack of sustainable insti-tutions or good governance that creates state weakness and hence the risky environment.34 However, it is important to note that what the Australian Government considers ‘good’ governance, as opposed to ‘poor’ governance, is not merely an apolitical and technical affair, but rather is distinctly informed by Australia’s liberal democratic values. Downer captures Australia’s support for the global promotion of liberal values well:

We believe that the liberal democratic model provides the best mech-anism for addressing political, economic and social problems – globally, as well as locally. We believe that governments and societies which tend towards liberal democracy are better at creating wealth, alleviating poverty, respecting human rights, fostering creativity and bringing stability to the world . . . Liberal democracy is the soundest basis for peace and prosperity. It’s the basis for dynamism and inno-vation. It’s in Australia’s national interest for democracy to spread. And so it’s a core value of our foreign policy.35

Australia’s explicit support for liberal values and democratic forms of government defines the particular conception of good governance that it seeks to promote. As AusAID suggests, political principles associated with good governance include a representative and accountable govern-ment, a pluralistic society with freedom of expression and the primacy of the rule of law.36 Such principles represent the distinctive values that are associated with liberal political ideology and a liberal democratic form of government. As Fukuyama argues, good governance and liberal democracy are functionally linked as the very definition of what consti-tutes ‘good’ governance or ‘good’ state institutions draws heavily on notions of accountability, transparency and individual freedoms.37 However, this is not to say that the mere existence of these liberal institu-tions is sufficient in itself. Rather, these institutions must have the capac-ity to operate effectively and according to sound processes. As Downer argues, ‘Of course, creating and sustaining free societies requires more than just a tradition of regular elections and economic liberalisation.


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Good governance and effective institutions are essential building-blocks of free societies’.38

Again, while this emphasis on good governance predates the 9/11 attacks and Bali bombings, it is an emphasis that has been employed more forcefully by the Australian government (and Western societies in general) since 2001.39 Through the promotion of good governance in zones of risk, dangerous environments can be reshaped and Australia’s security and prosperity enhanced. As the 2003 DFAT White Paper argues

Good governance – which includes the rule of law, respect for human rights and development of sustainable policies and institutions – is a basic condition for security and prosperity in all countries. The improve-ment of governance around the world can help create an environment that contributes to the security and prosperity of Australia . . .40

Unsurprisingly, this is a view that Downer has echoed, and one that he consistently stuck to during his tenure as Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs. In 2007, he suggested that:

Because when we face threats like transnational crime and terrorism, strong nation states are more important than ever. Only effective and robust states – I would argue democratic and free liberal states – are equipped to meet the range of challenges we face, and survive and thrive . . . To deal with global problems, we need strong states. We need states that are effectively run. We need states with institutions that are accountable to their citizens.41

As a result of Australia’s increased concern with fostering good gover-nance as a mechanism through which to manage perceived risks to its security, and the perceived urgency in doing so to address weakness and fragility among the Pacific Island states, the methods through which the Australian government has sought to promote good governance in the South Pacific have changed.

The broad shift in Australia’s foreign policy outlook has had signifi-cant implications for Australian policy regarding fragile neighbouring states in the immediate region. Until 9/11 and the Bali bombings, the popular view in Australia regarding development in the Pacific island states was, as Downer suggests, that these new states should be left alone to enjoy their independence.42 Australia’s role was to provide external aid and support, not to involve itself in the internal affairs of these states. This view has changed markedly as Australia transitioned from a


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‘hands-off’ to a ‘hands-on’ approach to development assistance in the South Pacific.43 As Fry and Kabutaulaka argue, what is distinctive about this new approach is the linking of security objectives to the develop-ment agenda and Australia’s increased readiness to intervene in the affairs of its neighbours.44

This hands-on approach has involved a newly assertive Australia that has undertaken ‘an ambitious attempt at region-wide social engineering . . .’45 State weakness in the Pacific has acquired a new strategic significance and has thus come to the fore in Australian policy relating to the South Pacific. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s (ASPI) report on Solomon Islands summarises the Australian government’s thinking well:

In today’s globalised world, the failure of Solomon Islands as a mod-ern nation state would not simply mean that its people would revert to the Pacific Island idyll of subsistence prosperity among the palm trees . . . Without an effective government upholding the rule of law and controlling its borders, Solomon Islands risks becoming – and has to some extent already become – a petri dish in which transna-tional and non-state security threats can develop and breed.46

The issue here is that fragile or failing island states such as Solomon Islands or PNG constitute environments within which de-bounded risks can develop and foment. As Dinnen et al. argue, ‘Post 9/11, the focus was on the security risks presented to Australia by the region’s “weak” and “failing” states. These, in turn, were viewed as potential havens for transnational crime and terrorism’.47 Hameiri likewise makes an argu-ment similar to that presented above, suggesting that Australia’s aid approach in the Pacific has been securitised and that the nature of this securitisation is reflective of a risk management approach that seeks to prevent the spillover of transnational risks by building institutional capacity in weak Pacific states.48 Thus, the Australian government views it as no longer viable to simply sit back and provide aid to weak states in the Pacific in the hope that they will use it wisely to undertake appropri-ate reforms and develop capable institutions. The new dangers faced by Australia provide a mandate for a more proactive, preventive approach to promoting good governance, one in which Australia becomes the ‘regional sheriff’ policing and regulating Pacific island states as a form of risk management.49

The Australian government’s backflip on the issue of intervening in Solomon Islands neatly captures these changes to the Australian approach towards promoting good governance in the region. Despite


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the conflict and instability that began in Solomon Islands in 1998, the Australian government, prior to 2003, consistently rejected pleas from the Solomon Islands government asking for assistance to curb the violence and halt the conflict. The Australian government persistently stuck to its hands-off, non-interventionist approach to development assistance in the South Pacific, even in the face of the kidnapping of Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu by militants in 2000.50 However, by 2003 this had all changed. By this stage, the Solomon Islands state had all but collapsed, to the increasing concern of the Australian government and think-tanks such as ASPI. In June 2003, the Howard government com-pleted a backflip on Solomon Islands, agreeing to directly intervene after previously repeatedly declining to do so.

The then Prime Minister, John Howard, justified the decision to inter-vene in a ministerial statement to Parliament, which was instructive regarding the risk management rationale underlying the intervention:

A failed state would not only devastate the lives of the peoples of the Solomons but could also pose a significant security risk for the whole region. Failed states can all too easily become safe-havens for transna-tional criminals and even terrorists. Poor governance and endemic corruption provide the conditions that support criminal activities. If Australia wants security, we need to do all that we can to ensure that our region, our neighbourhood, is stable – that governance is strong and the rule of law is just.51

Two significant elements of Australia’s international outlook since 9/11, a preoccupation with de-bounded risks and a focus on the promotion of good governance as a way of managing them, are evident in this state-ment. As Howard suggests, failed states provide the conditions within which security risks can flourish.

Importantly, the above also clearly suggests that the primary motive or rationale for the intervention was not simply to improve the lives of Solomon Islanders. If it was, the intervention would have occurred earlier than 2003. Rather, the intervention occurred in 2003 because, after 9/11 and the Bali bombings, the Australian government became increasingly anxious over the possible risks to its national security posed by failed states in the region. However, at the time of the intervention, there was no substantial evidence of a direct threat to Australian security by terrorists or criminals operating out of Solomon Islands, nor was there any credi-ble evidence to suggest that the presence of terrorists or transnational criminal groups within Solomon Islands was an imminent possibility.52


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As Nick Warner, former Special Coordinator of RAMSI, suggested, ‘And while there was no evidence that transnational criminals were targeting Solomon Islands, there was no point waiting for this to happen’.53

Rather, the security concerns of the Australian government were defined with reference to the future possibility that, if left unchecked, state failure in Solomon Islands could leave Australia vulnerable to tem-porally and spatially de-bounded risks at some future point in time. There was thus a distinctive element of precaution in Australia’s deci-sion to intervene in Solomon Islands, and later in PNG through the Enhanced Cooperation Package (ECP). Despite the lack of any firm evidence that terrorists, transnational criminals or any other form of de-bounded security risk might arise out of the situation in either of these countries, the Australian government still justified its interven-tions with reference to Australian security interests and the need to manage globalised risks.

Promoting Good Governance in Solomon Islands and PNG

Since independence, both Solomon Islands and PNG have suffered from state weakness and developmental problems. The problems in Solomon Islands began in 1998 when Guadalcanalese militants, members of the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM), began launching low-level skir-mishes against settlers from the neighbouring island of Malaita on Guadalcanal.54 The militants were aggrieved over the presence of these settlers, who had arrived on Guadalcanal in the preceding decades. However, despite the appearance of the conflict as a product of ethnic tensions between the two groups, Hameiri and Dinnen et al. have noted that underpinning these tensions were fundamental economic and developmental issues associated with the changes brought about by globalisation (particularly uneven levels of development throughout Solomon Islands), state corruption and demographic factors.55

The Malaitans retaliated against the Guadalcanalese militants, form-ing the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF). MEF members were responsible for the kidnapping of Prime Minister Ulufa’alu in 2000. Following this coup, lawlessness and disorder prevailed in Solomon Islands. In response, Australia and New Zealand brokered the Townsville Peace Agreement, which was signed in October 2000 and provided for the disarmament and dissolution of the militias.56 While the agreement significantly reduced open conflict between the militant groups, it failed to stop high levels of criminal activity – violence, looting and extortion were all common between 2000 and the beginning of RAMSI in 2003. Further,


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the economy plummeted as a result of the conflict and disorder (GDP declined by 14 per cent in 1999 and 9 per cent in 2000), and Solomon Islands faced a continuously deteriorating security environment cou-pled with economic collapse.57 It became clear by 2003 that the Solomon Islands government did not possess the capacity to halt the decline. This led to a formal request from the Solomon Islands government for a regional intervention in the country.58

Despite Alexander Downer’s dismissal of intervening in Solomon Islands as late as January 2003, the Howard government took the deci-sion in June 2003 to lead a regional intervention in Solomon Islands.59 Soon thereafter, on 30 June, a meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum in Sydney ratified Australia’s proposal for the intervention.60 RAMSI was, in effect, a preventive action aimed at ensuring that Solomon Islands did not eventually descend into complete state collapse and failure.61 As Barbara notes:

The Australian Government justified intervention on the grounds that a failed state in the region would become a haven for transnational security threats (such as terrorism and organized crime) and that action was required to prevent Solomon Islands from collapsing.62

This meant that the decision to intervene was commensurate with the anticipatory outlook that one would normally associate with risk manage-ment activities.

The Australian government was careful to ensure that the interven-tion was ‘regional’ in nature, which it ostensibly was. The Pacific Islands Forum endorsed the intervention and it included every Pacific Island state with the exception of Solomon Islands, although RAMSI was not officially authorised by the UN Security Council. Downer explicitly rejected this, suggesting that a regional intervention would have greater legitimacy and would operate more effectively without UN involve-ment.63 Despite this, Australia was by far the largest contributor to RAMSI, providing 1500 of the 1800 soldiers initially deployed and a substantial number of the police and civilian personnel contingents.64 Hence, while RAMSI was cloaked in the legitimacy of being a regional intervention that was consented to by the Solomon Islands govern-ment (an important factor in determining whether or not the relation-ship between Solomon Islands and Australia constituted a hierarchy), it was essentially an Australian-led and largely an Australian-directed mission.65


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RAMSI was deployed on 24 July 2003 and was successful in quickly halting violence and disorder in Solomon Islands. Once RAMSI had achieved its immediate objective of stabilising the security situation, its officials quickly set to work on the main task of reforming state institu-tions and improving governance. A large part of RAMSI’s state-building focus has been capacity building, with institutions targeted for capacity-building programmes across three key pillars: Security, Law and Justice; Economic Governance and the Machinery of Government.66 As this suggests, RAMSI is a complex and multifaceted operation, responsible for reforming several key institutions of the Solomon Islands state. In the Security, Law and Justice pillar, RAMSI’s contingent of police offi-cers, known as the Participating Police Force (PPF), has undertaken a comprehensive rebuilding of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIP). This has involved the dismissal of a sizeable number of officers (including 160 former officers who have been arrested for various offences) and the formation of the Solomon Islands Police Force Capacity Development Management Team, designed to assess and man-age capability gaps in the RSIP.67

Economic governance reforms have included stabilisation of the government budget and improvement of government revenue collection, building the capacity of the Treasury and Ministry of Finance and a pro-gramme of taxation reform, among other initiatives. RAMSI’s Machinery of Government pillar is involved in strengthening many parts of the Solomon Islands government and bureaucracy. This has involved signifi-cant work conducted to strengthen the capabilities of key accountability institutions such as the Ombudsman and the office of the Auditor-General.68 Perhaps the most notable aspect of RAMSI’s work is the wide scope and comprehensiveness of its mandate – RAMSI is involved in regu-lating most areas of the Solomon Islands state, reforming legal, economic, political and social institutions. Its mandate, and indeed its practice since deployment, has been to regulate and reshape the socio-political envi-ronment of Solomon Islands by subjecting key areas of the Solomon Islands government to its capacity-building programmes.

Part of RAMSI’s approach to capacity building has been to embed per-sonnel in ‘line positions’ within key areas of the Solomon Islands gov-ernment alongside technical advisors and other personnel. This has involved RAMSI personnel conducting much of the work within these areas, even to the extent of an Australian Federal Police (AFP) Officer being named as the Commissioner of the RSIP.69 Other notable RAMSI appointments within the Solomon Islands government have included the


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Solicitor-General, Deputy Legal Draftsperson and Acting Auditor-General. The effect of this has been to subject control of particular institutions of the Solomon Islands government to RAMSI officials, enabling them to exercise direct control over the governance reforms and institu-tional capacity building that are supposedly taking place in ‘partnership’ with the Solomon Islands government. For example, in the Ministry of Finance RAMSI officials have been extensively involved in improving government finances, financial transactions, corporate governance and the structure of the Ministry.70 This work has included challenging and amending appropriation bills passed by the Solomon Islands parliament.71 This is a highly significant exercise of authority by foreign officials in an ostensibly sovereign state.

This exercise of authority, and the fact that it is consented to and recog-nised by the Solomon Islands government, is strongly indicative of a hierarchical relationship between Australia, as the leading contributor to RAMSI, and Solomon Islands. This hierarchy, and the different rights and prerogatives that Australia and Solomon Islands enjoy as the respec-tive superordinate and subordinate parties, is further underscored by the immunity provisions of the Facilitation of International Assistance Act (FIAA), passed by the Solomon Islands parliament in 2003. This Act legalises RAMSI’s presence in Solomon Islands and protects its personnel from any form of legal proceeding in the country.72 This means that despite RAMSI’s significant influence and, in some cases, direct control of key government institutions in Solomon Islands, the Solomon Islands government and therefore its people are unable to hold RAMSI personnel to account for their actions.

While the Solomon Islands government ostensibly retains its sover-eignty and its responsibilities for governing its territory, in effect RAMSI has exercised extensive influence and control over several key institu-tions for the last ten years without any established mechanism of accountability between RAMSI and the Solomon Islands people. Rather, RAMSI personnel are predominantly accountable to interdepartmental committees within the Australian government (involving key depart-ments and agencies such as the AFP, Treasury and DFAT) who make deci-sions and formulate policy with little to no involvement from Solomon Islands.73 Such control is therefore troubling from a democratic stand-point as it means that RAMSI officials can undertake significant action without the possibility of the Solomon Islands people being able to hold them to account. This is particularly important given that RAMSI is effec-tively attempting to promote rather particular (liberal democratic) ideas of what a strong and effective state should look like in Solomon Islands.


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As Morgan and McLeod suggest, ‘. . . idealised concepts of state structure and functioning, including assumptions about ideal relation-ships between individuals, civil society and particular state institutions, are central to state-building practices’.74 In the case of RAMSI, good governance and institutional capacity have been defined in largely liberal terms. The insistence on applying external notions of liberal good governance is of course reflective of the ideological prescriptions and ideas that Western notions of liberalism, democracy and good governance are universally applicable and represent a suite of values, institutions and processes that can be applied anywhere.75 Despite the tendency of RAMSI to view its work in Solomon Islands in terms of technocratic and apolitical notions of ‘capacity building’, the very insti-tutional capabilities and processes that it seeks to build are reflective of its broader commitment to ensuring a well-functioning, liberal democratic Solomon Islands government.

Morgan and McLeod suggest that through RAMSI’s activities in Solomon Islands ‘Australia is attempting to build a modern nation-state through state-building activities aimed at replacing local modes of poli-ticking with political stability based on liberal democratic values and practices’.76 Therefore, while RAMSI may be predominantly concerned with ‘technical’ issues in Solomon Islands, political and ideological prescriptions of what constitutes a strong and effective state inform its solutions to these issues. To suggest then that RAMSI’s mission in Solomon Islands, or state-building in general, is merely a case of techno-cratic, administrative reform divorced from political or ideological considerations is dubious at best.77 Such considerations are integral to RAMSI’s state-building project – the point of RAMSI’s mission is to reshape the social and political structures that caused state fragility in Solomon Islands, transforming the country into a stable liberal democ-racy as a means to managing risk.78 Whether this is congruent with existing political and social practices in Solomon Islands is generally not considered. Rather, what is important is that RAMSI’s programmes attempt to build sustainable institutions practicing Western notions of liberal good governance.

It is notable that while the Australian government and RAMSI offi-cials continually speak of improving the lives of Solomon Islanders in partnership with the local population, the prescriptions for such improvements are based entirely on Australia’s liberal notions of good governance and the good life.79 Rarely are we told how the reforms undertaken in Solomon Islands relate to, and affect, existing social and political relationships. Importantly, these features of RAMSI’s


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intervention in Solomon Islands belie the oft-used description of RAMSI as a ‘cooperative intervention’. Rather, the talk of ‘cooperation’ or of a ‘partnership’ between Solomon Islands and RAMSI serves to legitimate the relations of hierarchy between Solomon Islands and Australia that RAMSI’s mission is representative of. Again, the Solomon Islands may consent to the intervention and annually recognise and legitimate the presence of RAMSI by the passing of the FIAA through the Solomon Islands parliament, but it does so from a fundamentally unequal and subordinate position.

The wide-ranging scope of RAMSI’s mandate, the immunity provi-sions of the FIAA and the general lack of local participation in important aspects of RAMSI’s state-building efforts are all demonstrative of this. However, none of these features are particularly novel – they have been seen before in other state-building missions, even in the call of some scholars who have argued for ‘institutionalisation before liberalisation’ and the curtailment of popular accountability and local participation in state-building missions in order to allow them to achieve their man-dates.80 This is because, in many cases, the participation of local officials or the local population is deemed risky in itself, potentially leading to unwelcome interference in attempts to promote liberal good gover-nance. Rather, power is concentrated in the hands of ‘capacity builders’ who are not politically accountable to those over whom they exercise this power. This is precisely the point: capacity building is not a true partnership, for those who are deemed to lack the capacity to effectively govern their state lack real agency and power; capacity builders will only return this agency to them when they have met the criteria established by capacity builders themselves.81 We therefore might characterise RAMSI as practicing a ‘top-down’ form of state-building, legitimated by the perceived urgency of building a stable liberal democratic state in Solomon Islands as a way of enhancing and protecting Australia’s national security.82

The perceived dangers inherent in any deviance from RAMSI’s pre-scribed notions of institutional capacity and good governance militate against any true partnership between RAMSI and the government and people of Solomon Islands. This underscores the contradiction that exists between attempting to promote liberal values and good gover-nance via interventionist and regulatory mechanisms of risk manage-ment that often involve distinctly illiberal trends and practices. Hence, we should not view RAMSI as a ‘true’ partnership between Australian state-builders who consult and collaborate with local officials and the local populace in an attempt to promote particular conceptions of good


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governance and institutional capacity that are modified in light of existing socio-political structures and relationships. Placing officials in line posi-tions, for example, does little to build the capacity of the local public servants who are eventually supposed to assume these roles for them-selves. This is suggestive of a hierarchical relationship between the external intervener who ‘knows best’ (Australia) taking control of the poorly functioning institutions of the affected state in need of regula-tion and reform. In short, RAMSI’s capacity-building programmes denote a power or authority relationship, not a partnership.83

RAMSI has been the largest intervention undertaken by Australia in the South Pacific over the last ten years. However, it is not the only situ-ation in which Australia has sought to exercise the authority to intervene in a Pacific island state to promote liberal good governance. Australia has also attempted to do so in PNG through the ECP. Australian devel-opment assistance in PNG has been ongoing since the country achieved its independence from Australia in 1975. However, despite the influx of Australian aid, which Australia provided with little to no conditions after independence, PNG has continued to suffer from underdevelop-ment and state weakness. This has resulted in a deteriorating law and order situation, economic stagnation and poor delivery of government services.84 The poor situation in PNG in the early 2000s prompted the Australian government to consider options for a ‘circuit breaker’, some-thing that could achieve better results than regular development assis-tance.85 Like Solomon Islands, Australia has focused on poor standards of governance and weak institutional capacity as the main issues inform-ing these problems in PNG. As an ASPI report on PNG stated, ‘Underlying all these problems, however, are pervasive and systemic weaknesses in the capacity of the PNG state to provide effective government’.86

The ECP encapsulated Australia’s new interventionist approach to development assistance and state-building in the South Pacific, designed to reshape PNG’s risky socio-political environment by re-establishing law and order in several regions of the country and building the capac-ity of key state institutions.87 The Australian and PNG governments had negotiated the final terms of the assistance package at the 2003 Australia–Papua New Guinea Ministerial Forum, although the final agreement was not signed until July 2004 due to PNG concerns with the Australian government’s insistence on immunity provisions for its offi-cials, particularly police officers.88 The ECP involved the deployment of Australian police and other officials in line positions within the PNG government and Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC), including an Australian appointment to the position of Solicitor


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General along with other appointments in the Prosecutor’s office and correctional services.89

While the bulk of Australian personnel committed to this mission were 230 police officers, it also included 18 personnel working in non-policing law and justice areas, 36 personnel assigned to economic and finance institutions and 10 officials assigned to immigration services, border security and aviation safety.90 The ECP thus provided for signifi-cant Australian involvement in several state institutions – like RAMSI in Solomon Islands, it provided for Australian personnel assuming direct responsibility for key areas within the PNG government. Despite the fact that the ECP was described as a ‘cooperative partnership’ between PNG and Australia, similar to Australia’s relationship with Solomon Islands, partnership or collaboration extended only as far as the formal consent of the affected state to the deployment of Australian officials within its territory. The necessary governance and institutional reforms that Australia perceived to be required were selected with reference to its own standards of liberal good governance and institutional capacity.

Similar to the FIAA that provides the legal authority for RAMSI’s pres-ence in Solomon Islands, a key provision of the agreement between Australia and PNG that established the ECP was that of immunity for Australian personnel working in PNG. Australian officials enjoyed immunity from civil and disciplinary proceedings in PNG, although Australia and PNG concurrently exercised criminal jurisdiction.91 Despite this, Australia retained jurisdiction over any criminal offences commit-ted by Australian personnel in the course of discharging their duties.92 This meant that Australian officials would be able to exercise significant control and influence within state institutions in PNG without the PNG government or its people being able to hold them to account. Like their RAMSI counterparts, Australian personnel in PNG were effectively insu-lated from oversight and interference by the PNG government. The immunity provisions reflected Australian concerns regarding its person-nel being subject to oversight by the very institutions that they sought to reform. The fact that the Australian government would not agree to implement the ECP until PNG acquiesced to its demands for immunity for Australian officials highlighted the importance attached to these immunity provisions.

Again, the immunity provisions of the ECP underscored the unequal and hierarchical relationship that Australia’s intervention in PNG repre-sented. However, PNG objections to the immunity provisions of the ECP agreement did not end with the deployment of the mission. There were several outspoken critics of the ECP in PNG, including the Governor of


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Morobe Province, Luther Wenge, who eventually challenged the PNG legislation enabling the ECP on constitutional grounds.93 The Supreme Court of PNG upheld this challenge in May 2005, which ruled that the immunity provisions were unconstitutional because, among other issues, they violated the rights of PNG citizens and the authority of PNG’s police and prosecutors.94 This led to the immediate withdrawal of the majority of the Australian police contingent, and those officials working in line positions within the PNG government assumed advisory roles.95 As Downer commented, Australia would not allow its personnel to be subject to vexatious litigation and would no longer allow its aid money to be wasted in countries like PNG suffering from poor gover-nance and weak institutional capacity.96

Therefore, many of the features of Australia’s involvement in Solomon Islands through RAMSI are also present in its intervention in PNG, despite the brevity of the ECP. First, the Australian government defined potential state failure in terms of poor governance and weak capacity, and hence the ECP was an intervention designed to reshape PNG’s socio-political and economic environment by promoting liberal good governance and building institutional capacity. Second, the intervention involved the appointment of Australian experts in line positions within key government institutions who, because of immunity provisions, were unaccountable to the PNG government or its people. These provisions ensured that Australian officials were insulated from potential interfer-ence in their work. Finally, despite the description by the Australian government of the intervention as a cooperative or collaborative part-nership, collaboration really only extended to the consent of the PNG government to Australia’s intervention. Again, this is unsurprising given that it was PNG’s existing social and political institutions that the Australia government perceived as lacking capacity and contributing to state weakness.

Implications for International Society

The question of the normative and political implications of state-building interventions for interstate relations has become a topic of importance for both scholars and practitioners. Regardless of whether or not the target state consents to the intervention, as was the case in both Solomon Islands and PNG, state-building interventions invariably involve extensive interference in the domestic affairs of the target state and are also based upon a very particular model of what a strong and capable state should look like.97 Western governments, indeed even the


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United Nations, have been clear and consistent in attempting to build strong, liberal democratic institutions and promote liberal notions of good governance across several different state-building interventions, including East Timor, Kosovo, Afghanistan and the cases explored in this chapter. Significantly, many of these interventions, although not all, have received relatively widespread international support and legitimacy.

In Solomon Islands and, for a limited time, PNG, Australian officials have been able to exercise extensive influence and control over several key areas of the governments of both states, including the direct assump-tion of key appointments in the bureaucracy. In the case of Solomon Islands RAMSI is still ongoing, despite the final Australian military con-tingent withdrawing in early August 2013. However, as RAMSI itself admits, while the security situation has stabilised to the extent that troops are no longer required, much work remains to be done to build the capacity of the RSIP and state institutions in Solomon Islands.98 RAMSI has therefore been involved in extensive state-building efforts in Solomon Islands for over ten years. This is an extended period of sub-stantial interference in an ostensibly sovereign state’s domestic affairs. Regardless of the fact that Solomon Islands requested the intervention, it is difficult to reconcile existing international norms such as non-intervention and sovereign equality with the fact of wide-ranging inter-ventions designed to rebuild states ‘from the ground up’.

Like the EU’s ENP, Australia’s state-building interventions are also designed to limit the possible range of values and regimes that states can adopt – deviance from the prescribed standards of liberal good gover-nance and democratic government becomes a problem of a ‘lack of capacity’ or ‘poor governance’. This is not to suggest that there are not serious problems in Solomon Islands and other Pacific Island states. However, it is interesting that two key features of Australia’s interven-tions in the South Pacific have included immunity provisions that pre-vent local populations from holding Australian personnel accountable for their actions and the general lack of consideration that Australia and RAMSI have afforded to local customs and institutions, both formal and informal. It is also telling that RAMSI depicts its mission as a largely technical exercise in capacity building, suggesting that it operates in partnership with the Solomon Islands government and people to build a strong and viable Solomon Islands state according to ‘commonly accepted’ principles and values. However, the supposed partnership between Australia and Solomon Islands is mitigated not only by RAMSI’s lack of accountability to the Solomon Islands people, but also by the


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appropriation of direct control over positions within state institutions by RAMSI personnel.

The Australian government has claimed the authority to reshape the internal institutions of its island neighbours according to its own liberal notions of good governance and institutional capacity, which it contin-ues to exercise in Solomon Islands. RAMSI is not so much a partnership or an example of a ‘cooperative intervention’ as it is a top-down exercise in state-building in which the Australian government determines the scope and character of the Solomon Islands state. Importantly though, despite their subordinated status, both Solomon Islands and PNG have retained their formal legal identity as sovereign states and continue to enjoy recognition of this sovereignty by other members of international society. However, it is a lesser form of sovereignty that they retain, one in which their right to non-intervention and sovereign equality are mitigated by the notion that state fragility or failure could lead to unac-ceptable security risks for Australia. Again, the expectation that weak states must conform to imposed standards of liberal good governance and institutional capacity effectively removes their right to determine their socio-political institutions according to their own societal values.

As Chandler argues, ‘The pluralist post-World War II framework of the United Nations Charter has been replaced, overnight, by a new hierarchy of Western power. Yet this hierarchy has not been formalised in the way that empire was in the past’.99 Indeed, hierarchies in the South Pacific are novel in that they are based upon a social logic of risk, as demon-strated by Australia’s justifications for leading and participating in RAMSI. Crucially though in the context of the broader claim advanced in this book that international society is compatible with hierarchies, Australia’s interventions in the South Pacific have barely raised any debate or controversy at all outside of the countries directly involved. In particular instances then, it appears legitimate not only for Western states to engage in state-building interventions and hierarchical rela-tions with weak or fragile states, but also for the norms of sovereign equality and non-intervention to be circumscribed, if not violated, in doing so.

The fact that PNG and Solomon Islands either agreed to an interven-tion or initially requested one legitimates both of these South Pacific interventions. The regional nature of RAMSI has further legitimated its intervention. Although Australia provides the bulk of the personnel to RAMSI and exercises significantly more influence over its mandate and operations than any other contributing nation (demonstrated, among other examples, by the fact the commander of the PPF has always been


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an officer of the AFP), it is still represented as a ‘regional intervention’.100 RAMSI was not the result of unilateral action by Australia, but rather resulted from a request for assistance by the Solomon Islands govern-ment, which the Pacific Islands Forum, not just Australia, ostensibly responded to. RAMSI has therefore enjoyed international legitimacy from its inception. For example, shortly after RAMSI’s initial deployment in 2003, the then President of the Security Council, Fayssal Mekdad, issued a press statement warmly welcoming the collective action of the countries of the Pacific Island Forum in responding to Solomon Islands’ precarious situation.101

In a further sign of the UN’s support for RAMSI, Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon visited Solomon Islands and was briefed on RAMSI and its achievements in September 2011. Despite its achievements and the generally broad international legitimacy that it enjoys, RAMSI has not been without controversy. The fractured relationship between RAMSI and the Sogavare government, which was in power between 2006 and 2007, was a notable instance of resistance within Solomon Islands to RAMSI and its package of capacity-building reforms.102 Again though, despite this relatively turbulent period in RAMSI’s relations with the Solomon Islands government, the mission itself has not generated sig-nificant ongoing controversy or unrest within Solomon Islands. Nor has it generated any significant controversy or resistance within interna-tional society. This again demonstrates the compatibility of hierarchy with international society. RAMSI in particular provides a good example of a clearly hierarchical relationship between a superordinate and subor-dinate state, albeit one cloaked in the legitimacy of a regional interven-tion, being recognised and accepted by the wider society of states.

Conclusion

The 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and subsequent bombings in Bali in 2002 prompted a distinctive shift within Australia’s foreign policy outlook. Since these terrorist incidents, the Australian government has become increasingly concerned with anticipating and managing temporally and spatially de-bounded security risks. The recent 2013 NSS, for example, outlines key risks to Australian security, including malicious cyber activity, instability in fragile states and terrorism.103 This focus on spatially de-bounded, globalised risks has been particu-larly evident in Australia’s shifting views on globalisation. In 2000, the Australian government viewed globalisation as a largely positive phenomenon, helping to increase integration between states. However,


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by 2003, it viewed globalisation in a more negative light, seeing it as facilitating transnational risks to Australian security.

One of the more immediate effects of this shifting foreign policy out-look was the formulation of a more assertive and interventionist approach to weak states in the South Pacific, Australia’s ‘geographical backyard’. Compelled by the idea that failed states constitute environ-ments conducive to the origination of globalised risks, the Australian government has embarked on more far-reaching and interventionist state-building exercises, particularly in Solomon Islands and PNG. Gone is the old hands-off approach to overseas development assistance; in its place is a new hands-on approach informed by the need to effect an environmental reshaping of failing states by imposing liberal standards of good governance in order to protect Australia’s security interests. The resulting interventions in Solomon Islands and PNG have involved extensive Australian involvement and control within key areas of the governments of both states.

The effect has been that Solomon Islands and PNG have been subject to a form of socio-political regulation. Despite the consensual nature of the interventions and their description as partnerships, the point has been to impose external standards of good governance in both states. This has entailed the emergence of new relations of hierarchy between Australia and weak states in its immediate neighbourhood. These new hierarchical relationships posit a distinction between Australia as the superordinate party and state-builder that is at risk from fragile states and is able to manage these potential dangers via intervention; and weak states in the region who pose unacceptable security risks and lose their unqualified right to non-intervention and sovereign equality. These fragile states become the subordinate partners in new relations of international hierarchy.


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103

The 2003 invasion of Iraq is an important case study in the examination of risk and hierarchy in international society in the post-Cold War era. First, spatially and temporally de-bounded risks and the perceived need to prevent them were central to the justifications and rationale provided by proponents of the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. Second, in response to these risks, the US and its ‘Coalition of the Willing’ sought to reshape the environment from which the risks associated with WMD proliferation and terrorism were perceived to originate by deposing Saddam Hussein’s regime and promoting liberal democracy in Iraq. Indeed, the former Bush administration was explicit that ‘victory’ in Iraq and the management of risk would primarily involve a stable and democratic Iraq.1

However, because of the questionable legality and contentious nature of the so-called Bush Doctrine of ‘preventive self-defence’ and the lack of any firm evidence that Iraq possessed or was attempting to attain WMD, the invasion of Iraq aroused a great deal of controversy within international society.2 Many, including prominent US allies, questioned the necessity and legitimacy of the use of armed force against Iraq in the absence of a Security Council mandate.3 The subsequent inability of coalition forces to find any WMD, links to terrorists or to generate sus-tained domestic stability within Iraq after the overthrow of Hussein has only served to heighten the controversy and debate surrounding the invasion. Debate continues to this day regarding the necessity of the invasion and the ‘real’ motivations behind the Bush administration’s decision to use force against Iraq. Part of the argument put forth by those who opposed the invasion in the lead-up to March 2003 was that there was no clear evidence of any overt threat posed by Hussein’s regime to the security of the US or any other Western country.

6Preventing Risks and Changing Regimes: The 2003 Invasion of Iraq


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This chapter argues that there was indeed a conspicuous lack of clear evidence at the time that Iraq either had or was attempting to acquire WMD, or that it had links with terrorist organisations. These perceived risks were not extant in the period leading up to the 2003 invasion. Several critics have suggested that this lack of evidence means that the invasion was little more than a grab for oil or was motivated in part by George W. Bush’s desire for personal revenge against Hussein (in response to the assassination attempt on his father, George Bush, in 1993).4 The argument that the US and its allies went into Iraq to secure oil supplies assumes that the subsequent failure to find substantial stockpiles of WMD provides evidence that the original justification for the war, disarming Iraq, was little more than a smokescreen to cover the real motives behind the war.5 This argument also effectively dismisses the goal of promoting liberalism and democracy in Iraq, suggesting that this was never a serious aspiration of the US or its allies in the first place.

Such an argument overlooks the fact that, in the years after the end of the initial military campaign, the US and its allies worked to construct a stable security environment and an effective democratic government in Iraq (with questionable levels of success). Notwithstanding the consider-able lack of evidence to suggest that oil or revenge were the prime moti-vators of the invasion, in sum, those who have advocated such notions fail to properly and seriously consider the perceived risks associated with WMD and the promotion of democracy as the actual reasons behind the decision to engage in military conflict.6 In particular, advocates of the ‘oil thesis’ have paid insufficient attention to the language and rhetoric employed by Bush, his senior administration officials and other leaders such as former Prime Ministers Tony Blair and John Howard. During the lead-up to the war, Bush in particular conceptualised and framed the dangers posed by Hussein’s regime in terms of future eventualities and possibilities.7

Advocates for war couched their justifications in terms of ‘what ifs’ and ‘maybes’, despite confident assertions that Iraq did in fact pose an ‘immi-nent’ threat. In large part, notwithstanding the argument that ulterior political goals motivated the invasion, much of the initial debate during the lead-up to the Iraq War arose as a result of differing judgements regarding the risks posed by Hussein’s regime. As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, given that actors define and select their responses to risks accord-ing to subjective and probabilistic calculations of anticipated future scenarios and their likely consequences, risk definition and anticipation is an inherently political exercise. Varying risk definitions were evident in the Security Council in the adoption of UNSCR 1441 in November


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Preventing Risks and Changing Regimes: The 2003 Invasion of Iraq 105

2002 and subsequent American and British attempts to garner support for a further UNSCR explicitly authorising the use of force.8 They were also evident in exchanges between those Western nations that advo-cated war (US, UK, Australia and Spain) and those that did not (France and Germany, among others).

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The first section examines the period leading up to the 2003 war. As will be demonstrated in this section, the arguments made by the Bush administration and its allies in favour of military action against Iraq were largely defined in terms of the need to prevent a set of possible future dangers. Further, while Bush and Blair in particular advanced the promotion of liberal democracy as a reason for engaging in military action, this justification was secondary to the primary objective of preventing Iraq from obtaining WMD and providing them to terrorists. Promoting liberal democracy was not the end itself – it was a means to ensuring that Iraq would not give rise to the aforementioned security risks. The second section examines US state-building in Iraq and the bid to replace Hussein’s regime with a new liberal democracy.

The final section examines the effects of the invasion of Iraq on inter-national society and considers the extent to which the relationship between the US and Iraq after the invasion can be characterised as hier-archical. If hierarchies are social relationships relying on the perceived legitimacy of the relationship by both superordinate and subordinate parties, then it is problematic, at face value, to describe the relationship between the US and Iraq immediately after the invasion as a hierarchy.9 The invasion not only involved the use of force to overthrow the gov-ernment of an ostensibly sovereign state, but a substantial section of international society also deemed it to be illegitimate, if not illegal. However, while the initial invasion and occupation of Iraq represented a case of coercive domination, a hierarchical relationship did eventually emerge between the US and the government of Nouri al-Maliki after the US had ‘transferred’ sovereignty back to Iraq in 2004.

Going to War in Iraq: Uncertainty, Precaution and the Prevention of Risk

This section examines the justifications for the war, concentrating on the period beginning 29 January 2002 (the date of Bush’s State of the Union address) until the end of 2004, with a particular focus on the way in which Bush, Blair and other advocates for war framed and represented the issue of Iraq’s alleged possession of WMD. As will be shown, the dangers


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posed by Iraq’s possession of WMD were characterised as temporally and spatially de-bounded risks with potentially catastrophic consequences.10 It is important to note that the intent here is not to evaluate whether Blair and Bush were telling the ‘truth’ in their claims of WMD, nor is it to seek to evaluate evidence determining the extent to which Iraq actually did possess prohibited WMD or missile systems.11

Rather, the focus here is limited to an examination of the way in which particular Western leaders conceptualised the perceived dangers posed by Hussein, and the language they employed in making the case for military action in Iraq. Before doing so, however, it is useful to briefly outline the historical context that informed the lead-up to war. The ces-sation of hostilities following Iraq’s defeat in the 1991 Gulf War was conditioned upon Iraq’s agreement to voluntarily eliminate its stock-piles of WMD and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilo-metres, pay the appropriate reparations to Kuwait for damage and suffering inflicted and cease its support for terrorism.12 To ensure that Iraq complied with its disarmament obligations, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established to conduct, along with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), inspections of Iraqi WMD facilities. UNSCOM was also tasked with verifying Iraq’s compliance with the provisions of Resolution 687, which outlined the conditions of the cessation of hostilities with Iraq.13

In October 1998, Iraq declared that it would no longer cooperate with UNSCOM after several years of allegedly attempting to obstruct its work.14 Despite British and American airstrikes during ‘Operation Desert Fox’,15 weapons inspectors did not return to Iraq until the passing of UNSCR 1441 in November 2002.16 After a relative lull in political inter-est concerning Iraqi WMD after Desert Fox, the issue came to the fore again in 2002 after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Importantly, by the time of Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, which clearly indicated that the US government was considering military action to disarm Iraq, a great deal of uncertainty surrounded the issue of Iraqi WMD due to a lack of inspections over the preceding three and half years.17 There were high levels of uncertainty regarding the location of Iraq’s alleged WMD stock-piles and the timeframes involved regarding possible efforts by Iraq to reconstitute its WMD development programmes and stockpiles.18

Despite this uncertainty, during his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush infamously included Iraq as one of the three countries (along with Iran and North Korea) that constituted an ‘Axis of Evil’. Bush declared that Iraq was a country with a history of abusing and murdering its own citizens and that Hussein’s regime had ‘something to hide’ from the


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‘civilised world’.19 By mid-2002, Bush, along with Blair and Howard, was pushing for action over the alleged risks posed by Iraq’s desire to acquire WMD. One of the defining aspects of the lead-up to the intervention was the explicit invocation of the concepts of globalised or de-bounded risk, prevention and precaution in conceptualising the dangers posed by Hussein’s regime and in justifying military action. Not only was the spatial location of Iraqi WMD uncertain, but action against Iraq was also explicitly defined with regard to possible future events. Iraq’s alleged WMD was not limited to clear evidence of presently extant threats; it was also inclusive of the possible acquisition of WMD by Iraq in the future.

Bush clearly highlighted the globalised nature of contemporary secu-rity risks as a justification for preventive action in Iraq. On several occa-sions, he referred to the idea that the US used to be able to rely on its geographical location, situated between two oceans, to protect it from harm. However, with the globalised nature of contemporary risk, geography no longer offers the US any protection:

But September the 11th brought home a new reality, and it’s impor-tant for all our citizens to understand that reality . . . We all believed that two oceans would forever separate us from harm’s way, and that if there was a threat gathering overseas, we could pick and choose whether or not we wanted to be involved in dealing with that threat. September the 11th delivered a chilling message to our country, and that is oceans no longer protect us. And therefore, it is my obligation to make sure that we address gathering threats overseas before they could do harm to the American people.20

Blair also alluded to the qualitatively different dangers faced by contem-porary Western societies compared with those faced during the Cold War:

So these are new and different dangers. It’s not like the old Soviet bloc versus NATO. There, defensive alliances were formed; crises occurred, often serious; but in a funny way, the world knew where it was. The year 2002 is different. These dangers can strike at any time, across any national boundary and in pursuit of a cause with which there can be little or no rational negotiation.21

Perhaps the key point in this statement is that even though the West faced complete destruction during the Cold War, at least during this period Western societies knew exactly what they faced – they possessed


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Gidden’s ontological security.22 The problem in 2002 (and today) is essentially one of vulnerability – while no overwhelming or existential threats exist, Western states perceive themselves to be vulnerable to de-bounded risks in an uncertain strategic environment.

This emphasis on globalised, spatially de-bounded risks was matched with a consistent framing of the dangers posed by Iraqi WMD in terms of futuristic, temporally de-bounded scenarios. Bush and Blair continu-ally invoked images of possible future risks that could materialise at any given time – the dangers posed by Iraqi WMD were not limited to any specific timeframe. Bush was explicit throughout 2002 and early 2003 that he sought to protect the US against future threats. In March 2002, Bush stated that ‘one thing I will not allow is a nation such as Iraq to threaten our very future by developing weapons of mass destruction’.23 Bush’s pessimistic anticipations of a future in which the US had not removed Hussein from power or disarmed Iraq were further evident in his discussions with US congressional leaders:

The dangers we face will only worsen from month to month and from year to year. To ignore these threats is to encourage them. And when they have fully materialized it may be too late to protect our-selves and our friends and our allies. By then the Iraqi dictator would have the means to terrorize and dominate the region. Each passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX – nerve gas – or some day a nuclear weapon to a terrorist ally. We refuse to live in this future of fear.24

In this statement, Bush centres on future scenarios and the consequences of their realisation. Of most importance is that Bush never clearly sug-gests in this statement precisely when such risks will come to pass. While he does warn that it could be ‘too late’ to act by the time such risks materialise, he does not (and cannot) specify at what point in time they will do so. Most of Bush’s statements regarding Iraq during 2002 and 2003 therefore employed terms such as ‘could’, ‘might’ or ‘imagine’ – he continually referred to possibilities and probabilities rather than imme-diate or imminent dangers. Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address was instructive in this regard:

With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weap-ons, Saddam Hussein could resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in that region . . . Imagine those


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19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans – this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. We will do everything in our power to make sure that that day never comes.25

Absent from this statement is any evidence that Iraq presently has WMD. Also of importance is the notion that a failure to prevent such possibili-ties could lead to catastrophic consequences. The two main components of defining risk, probabilities and consequences, are at play in this state-ment. We are asked to anticipate a possible future and imagine what it would be like if WMD were deployed on American soil. What was at stake here was not a currently WMD-armed Iraq posing a direct threat to the security of the US. Rather, the issue was that if Iraq attempted to develop WMD, the consequences for American security could be disas-trous. Throughout 2002 and into 2003, Bush maintained his focus on future events and continually invoked future possibilities as the principal rationale for military action in Iraq. In February 2003 he stated that:

There are people who worry about the future. I understand that. And I worry about the future. I worry about a future in which Saddam Hussein gets to blackmail and/or attack. I worry about a future in which terrorist organizations are fuelled and funded by a Saddam Hussein. And that’s why we’re bringing this issue to a head.26

Blair shared Bush’s emphasis on future possibilities in his discussions regarding the ‘threat’ that Hussein ostensibly posed. At a speech in Blackpool in September 2002, Blair argued that:

. . . if we do not deal with the threat from this international outlaw and his barbaric regime, it may not erupt and engulf us this month or next; perhaps not even this year or the next. But it will at some point. And I do not want it on my conscience that we knew the threat, saw it coming and did nothing.27

Like Bush, Blair does not point to a specific timeframe when he discusses the risks of Iraq and WMD. The argument for action against Iraq made above rests on little more than Blair’s subjective analysis of possibly adverse future scenarios emanating from Hussein and his ostensible reserve of WMD.28


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Blair again established this emphasis on future scenarios at a press conference in January 2003 when he stated that:

. . . my fear is that we wake up one day and we find either that one of these dictatorial states has used weapons of mass destruction . . . or alternatively these weapons, which are being traded right round the world at the moment, fall into the hands of these terrorist groups . . . And I understand of course why people think it is a very remote threat and it is far away and why does it bother us. Now, I simply say to you, it is a matter of time unless we act and take a stand before terrorism and weapons of mass destruction come together . . .29

Despite the sense of urgency with which Blair and Bush attempted to portray the dangers posed by Hussein, they did not make the case that Hussein, WMD and possible linkages with terrorists constituted an imminent threat. Blair confirmed that the British government did not consider Iraq to be an imminent threat to the UK in 2004: ‘Had we believed Iraq was an imminent direct threat to Britain, we would have taken action in September 2002; we would not have gone to the UN’.30

The then Australian Prime Minister John Howard also spoke in futur-istic terms regarding Hussein’s regime. In a Ministerial Statement to the Australian House of Representatives, he suggested that: ‘Saddam Hussein will not abandon his chemical and biological weapons programs. He will keep striving to build a nuclear capacity. And he will almost certainly, at some time in the future, use these weapons to fulfil his ambition to dominate his region’.31 Howard, like Bush and Blair, points to posited speculations of future scenarios – there is no temporal limitation placed on the risks posed by Hussein’s pursuit of WMD. Instead, action against Iraq is justified in order to prevent Hussein from acquiring and using WMD ‘at some point in the future’.

The framing of the threat posed by Hussein in terms of future, tempo-rally ill-defined possibilities was especially evident in the discussions regarding Iraq’s possible development or acquisition of nuclear weapons. Shortly after his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2002, Bush argued in a radio address that: ‘Today this regime likely maintains stockpiles of chemical and biological agents . . . Should his regime acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year’.32 Bush further added that:

If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could


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have a nuclear weapon in less than a year. And if we allow that to happen, a terrible line would be crossed. Saddam Hussein would be in a position to blackmail anyone who opposes his aggression . . . He would be in a position to threaten America. And Saddam Hussein would be in a position to pass nuclear technology to terrorists.33

It is important to note that during 2002 and early 2003, there was virtu-ally no evidence that Iraq even had the required material or capabilities to produce a nuclear weapon. The IAEA, reporting on its inspections conducted between November 2002 and March 2003, concluded that it had found no significant evidence of a revival of any nuclear programmes or attempts to acquire uranium. Further, it found that there had been a substantial degradation of the facilities and finances required to support a nuclear programme.34 This report was released five months after the invasion of Iraq – it is notable that Bush repeatedly spoke about Iraq’s possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, even though the IAEA’s verifi-cation mission had yet to be completed. Indeed, there was a broad level of uncertainty regarding Iraq’s actual WMD capabilities. In a November 2002 press conference, Bush suggested that:

And they – no one likes war, but they also don’t like the idea of Saddam Hussein having a nuclear weapon. Imagine what would happen. And by the way, we don’t know how close he is to a nuclear weapon right now. We know he wants one. But we don’t know. We know he was close to one at one point in time; we have no idea today.35

Significantly, such uncertainty was evident not only in statements made by Bush and others, but also in the intelligence assessments of various US, UK and Australian agencies regarding Iraq and WMD. An October 2002 Australian Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) report on Iraq and WMD suggested that: ‘What is not known about Iraq’s WMD programmes is as worrying as what is known’.36 Leading up to war in 2002 and early 2003, it was precisely such uncertainty and ‘unknowing’ that provided a major impetus for taking action. Commenting in relation to intelligence gathered by Australia’s Office of National Assessments (ONA), a Parliamentary Committee tasked with assessing the quality and presentation of the intelligence relating to Iraq in the lead-up to the war suggested that: ‘The early assessments, in 2000 and 2001, suggest the possibility of a revival of the WMD pro-grammes in Iraq. However, there are as many qualifications as there are certainties’.37


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More specifically, one of the problems faced by intelligence agencies, aside from actually proving the existence of Iraqi WMD, was that they could provide little intelligence regarding the location of any WMD that did in fact exist. An ONA assessment in September 2002 concluded that the intelligence on Iraq was ‘slight on the scope and location of Iraq’s WMD activities’.38 British intelligence on Iraq, like that of the Australians, demonstrated a high degree of tentativeness and uncertainty. In May 2001, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) reported that intelligence on Iraq regarding WMD was ‘patchy’.39 Even though British intelligence assessed that Hussein had indeed used the lull in weapons inspections between 1998 and 2002 to resume production of chemical and bio-logical weapons, it could not determine what had been produced or in what quantities.40 Further, British intelligence did not know where Iraq’s supposed WMD capabilities were located, nor did they know where these weapons could be deployed.41

In sum, like their Australian counterparts, British intelligence reports indicated a firm belief that Iraq did in fact have WMD. However, they could not point to the specific location of these weapons, what weap-ons Iraq already possessed or when more weapons would be produced. Although the American intelligence agencies were far more assertive than their British and Australian counterparts, their assessments also demonstrated a great deal of uncertainty regarding Iraq’s WMD capa-bilities and development programmes. In July 2003, the White House released declassified excerpts from the October 2002 ‘National Intelligence Estimate’, which stated that: ‘We lack specific information on many key aspects of Iraq’s WMD programs’.42 This lack of knowledge was reiterated in the assessment of Iraq’s chemical weapons: ‘Although we have little specific information on Iraq’s CW [chemical weapons] stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents – much of it added in the last year’.43

Importantly, this uncertainty or ‘unknowing’ manifested in an overt tendency on the part of several Western leaders (and their governments) to assume the worst when it came to Iraq and WMD. This informed the sense of urgency that was apparent in the statements made by Bush, Blair and others convinced of the need for preventive military action in Iraq. By assuming that Hussein was in fact developing or did have WMD, or that his regime had contacts with terrorist organisations, the dangers posed by Hussein became characterised as a potentially existential threat warranting urgent and immediate action. In other words, ‘worst-case analysis was rampant on the subject of Iraq . . .’44 Bush himself


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frequently outlined worst-case scenarios, suggesting that: ‘Understanding the threats of our time, knowing the designs and deceptions of the Iraqi regime, we have every reason to assume the worst, and we have an urgent duty to prevent the worst from occurring’.45

Bush, Blair and Howard all tended to frame the issue of Iraq and WMD as a dire risk that the world simply could not afford to take.46 Consequently, their tendency to assume the worst led to a strong emphasis on precaution and the need for action before it was too late. Adopting a wary or guarded approach to taking action against Iraq could lead, so the argument went, to devastation for Western societies. As Blair argued at length, in the face of uncertainty, Western societies could not afford to sit back and hope that the risk would disappear:

Here is the crux. It is possible that even with all of this, nothing would have happened. Possible that Saddam would change his ambi-tions; possible he would develop the WMD but never use it; possible that the terrorists would never get their hands on WMD, whether from Iraq or elsewhere. We cannot be certain. Perhaps we would have found different ways of reducing it. Perhaps this Islamic terrorism would ebb of its own accord. But do we want to take the risk? That is the judgement. And my judgement then and now is that the risk of this new global terrorism and its interaction with states or organisa-tions or individuals proliferating WMD, is one I simply am not pre-pared to run.47

In its authorisation to use military force against Iraq, the US Congress also spoke in precautionary terms:

. . . the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend itself.48

This emphasis on precaution included not waiting for conclusive evidence that Iraq did in fact possess WMD capabilities or was attempt-ing to produce or acquire them before committing to military action. Conclusive evidence or the demonstration of a clear causal relation-ship as the basis for action is precisely what the precautionary principle rejects.49 Bush commented that: ‘Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot


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wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud’.50

Therefore, risk and its associated concepts clearly informed the ratio-nale and justifications for war provided by Bush, Blair and other support-ers of intervention in Iraq. In particular, it has been shown that the dangers posed by Iraq were framed in terms of temporally and spatially de-bounded risks, high levels of uncertainty and an emphasis on precau-tion and prevention. That Bush, Blair and Howard consistently spoke of in terms of risks rather than imminent, clearly defined threats is lent further credence by the ambiguous and inconclusive evidence that they used to support their arguments for military action. In attempting to deal with de-bounded risks mired in uncertainty Bush and Blair in par-ticular responded as archetypal risk managers, demonstrating a willing-ness and desire to engage in preventive action even in the face of imperfect knowledge and incomplete evidence. This ‘action’ involved the invasion of Iraq and the removal of its government. It was not enough for the Coalition of the Willing to simply forcibly compel Hussein to give up his alleged WMD programmes; rather, the perceived risks posed could only be effectively mitigated by removing Hussein and supplanting his regime with a new liberal democracy.

Preventing Risks in Iraq – Invasion and Regime Change

It was clear before the commencement of military operations in March 2003 that the Coalition would supplant Hussein’s regime with a liberal democracy.51 However, many critics dismissed the stated intent of the Coalition to replace Hussein’s regime with a liberal democracy, suggest-ing that it was little more than an attempt to provide a moral gloss to an intervention inspired by separate motives and goals.52 However, the fact is that once the initial combat phase ended, Coalition forces immedi-ately began working towards the formation of a liberal democratic gov-ernment in Iraq.53 Therefore, the argument that the Americans and their allies went to Iraq to promote liberalism and democracy cannot be dis-missed outright. Yet, the scepticism displayed by many over this issue is not entirely misplaced. To suggest that the promotion of liberal demo-cratic governance was the primary goal of the Coalition ignores the fact that bringing liberty to Iraq was very much a secondary issue in the lead-up to the war. The focus was firmly on the risks associated with terrorism and WMD production and proliferation.

It was these risks that advocates for the invasion advanced as the primary justification for the war – Western governments were far more


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concerned with their own security than they were with bringing freedom to Iraqi citizens. Blair intimated as much when he argued that despite the foul nature of Hussein’s regime, regime change and the forging of a liberal Iraq were not the UK’s primary motivation for taking military action in 2003. Rather, the primary motivation was to enforce Iraq’s WMD disarmament obligations.54 The promotion of liberal democracy in Iraq was not the end goal of the Coalition. Rather, it was a means to the end of securing themselves against globalised, de-bounded security risks. As Hobson suggests, democracy (and a range of liberal values) was pursued in Iraq and the wider Middle East predominantly for strategic reasons, not because of some altruistic mission to bring freedom to the populations of this region.55

Despite the focus on WMD and terrorism in the lead-up to the war, bringing liberty and democracy to the Iraqi people was discussed before the onset of military action in March 2003. Indeed, during this period, the solution offered by US officials to the risks posed by Hussein’s regime and its alleged pursuit of WMD was the removal of Hussein and the reshap-ing of Iraq into a liberal democracy. The 2002 NSS had already clearly outlined not only America’s new preventive strategy, but also the central role that American values of liberty and democracy were to play in addressing the security risks that the US faced.56 By February 2003, Bush was speaking much more explicitly of promoting liberal values in Iraq:

The Iraqi people today are not allowed to speak out for freedom, but they have a right to live in freedom. We don’t believe freedom and liberty are America’s gift to the world; we believe they are the Almighty’s gift to mankind. And for the oppressed people of Iraq, people whose lives we care about, the day of freedom is drawing near.57

While this statement clearly illustrates Bush’s desire to spread liberty in Iraq, it does not clearly outline the security benefits that would accrue to Western societies as a result. Bush articulated these benefits, however, in a press briefing at the end of February 2003:

A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. America’s interests in security, and America’s belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq.58

The intertwining of liberal values and security interests is highlighted here – a free and democratic Iraq is congruent both with American values


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and with Bush’s interest in securing America against perceived risks. Bush reiterated the idea that reshaping Iraq into a liberal democracy would benefit Western security interests when he claimed that:

The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life . . . A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region.59

Not only would a liberal and democratic Iraq reduce the opportunities for the emergence of security risks such as terrorism, but it could also lead to a broader social and political reshaping of the Middle East. This region is one that many Western governments and organisations have identified as a risky zone within international society, one in which state governments are predominantly autocratic and from which several contemporary secu-rity risks emanate.60 The assumption on the part of Bush and other members of the administration was that long-term peace and stability for both Western societies and the Middle East depended on liberal reform throughout the region.61 Again, the point here is that liberal values are conceived of in mostly instrumental terms – promoting liberal democracy is merely one way of managing the ‘Middle Eastern zone of risk’.

After the end of the initial combat phase and the collapse of Hussein’s regime in April 2003, this theme of the need to successfully reshape the political and social environment in Iraq was one that Bush and the leaders of other contributing nations to the Coalition repeated often. The political focus in Coalition countries shifted from attempting to sell the war to justifying the continued presence of Coalition forces in Iraq. This justi-fication was couched primarily in terms of staying in Iraq ‘until the job was done’ – the ‘job’ being to ensure that Iraq made a successful transi-tion to a liberal democracy.62 After the war, those that favoured military action repeatedly argued that failure to achieve this outcome would lead to Iraq becoming a haven for terrorists and other forms of security risk.63

For example, in each successive State of the Union address between 2004 and 2008, Bush repeatedly argued that American security depended on success in ensuring that liberal values were promoted and stable democratic institutions were constructed in Iraq. During the 2005 State of the Union address, Bush argued that:

the victory of freedom in Iraq will . . . bring more hope and progress to a troubled region, and thereby lift a terrible threat from the lives of


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our children and grandchildren . . . We are standing for the freedom of our Iraqi friends, and freedom in Iraq will make America safer for generations to come.64

Such sentiments were restated by Bush in his 2006 State of the Union address:

Abroad, our nation is committed to an historic, long-term goal – we seek the end of tyranny in our world. Some dismiss that goal as misguided idealism. In reality, the future security of America depends on it . . . Every step toward freedom in the world makes our country safer so we will act boldly in freedom’s cause.65

The main argument was clear and consistent during Bush’s tenure: America must succeed in building a liberal democratic Iraq for the sake of its future security.66

The 2005 US National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) consolidated the strategy of effecting liberal reform in Iraq as a means of managing risk. This document outlined the conditions for an American victory in Iraq (following the initial invasion and removal of Hussein) and the strategic framework that the US would employ to achieve it. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the document was the way in which it defined victory in Iraq. One might expect that complete victory would result once all insurgents and terrorists in the country had been captured or eliminated. Yet, this is not the primary condition for victory outlined in the NSVI. Instead, the document states that the strategy to be employed in Iraq involves helping ‘the Iraqi people build a new Iraq with a consti-tutional, representative government that respects civil rights and has security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven for terrorists’.67

Reshaping Iraq into a liberal society with a democratic government was the ultimate strategy of the Bush administration. The document appears to contain the explicit assumption that a liberal and democratic Iraq in itself would mitigate the dangers posed by the terrorists and insurgents operating in the country. Not only would a stable democratic government have the capacity to eliminate or capture any remaining terrorists or insurgents, but it would also provide the conditions neces-sary to reduce the possibility of individuals adopting extremist ide-ologies and engaging in terrorist activity in the first place.68 The Bush administration’s belief in reshaping Iraq into a liberal democracy reflects an optimistic view of the ability of American power, coupled with


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American ideals, to reshape the world into a better place.69 This would be a better world not only for the oppressed peoples that America would liberate, but also for America and its allies.

This of course reflects a set of assumptions concerning the inherently ‘good’ nature of liberal democratic states and the power of liberal values to curb the political, social and economic conditions that give rise to security risks such as terrorism or rogue states seeking to acquire WMD. However, Bush was not alone in his views regarding the nexus between liberal values and security. Blair appeared to share Bush’s sentiments regarding the importance of liberal values in Iraq for Western security, although he was not as explicit or consistent in making the argument that Western security depends upon liberty in Iraq. Blair argued that:

. . . it is in a free, democratic and stable Iraq that not just the violence, but the wretched and backward philosophy of these terrorists will be defeated and destroyed . . . if you’ve got freedom and democracy, and the rule of law, you can raise your family, you can earn a decent stan-dard of living, you can go about your daily business without fear of the secret police or terrorism. And in those types of societies, the terrorists who thrive on hatred and fanaticism, they get no breathing ground, they get no breathing space.70

In a speech to the US Congress in 2003, Blair again argued that Western security depended on spreading liberal values: ‘The spread of freedom is the best security for the free. It is our last line of defence and our first line of attack’.71

Importantly, these statements did not merely constitute empty rhetoric – once the Coalition had control of Iraq, it moved quickly to begin the work of establishing a new liberal democratic polity. Once Coalition forces had attained control of Baghdad, control over post-war recon-struction and rehabilitation in Iraq was initially exercised by the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), created by Bush under National Security Presidential Directive 24 of 20 January 2003.72 However, ORHA activities did not last long, and shortly after combat operations had been (prematurely) declared over by President Bush in May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) assumed control over the ORHA’s humanitarian assistance and reconstruction missions. It also assumed responsibility for the broader project of build-ing representative political institutions and improving governance within Iraq.73 Although nominally an international body, the CPA was created by the American government and was headed by US Presidential Envoy Paul Bremer.74


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The CPA’s mission was to help the Iraqis build what was deemed to be the four foundational pillars of their sovereignty: Security, Governance (emphasising liberal notions of good governance), Essential Services and Economy (again emphasising a liberal notion of good gover-nance).75 The CPA’s main strategic objective was a stable peace for a unified and democratic Iraq.76 As outlined in its first Regulation, the CPA vested itself with full governmental authority, assuming all execu-tive, legislative and judicial authority needed to meet its objectives.77 The assumption of this authority was justified on the basis of the laws of war (the US and UK having designated themselves as occupying powers) and UNSCR 1483. This Resolution called upon the US and UK to effectively administer Iraq so as to provide the conditions in which the Iraqi people would be able to assume the responsibilities of self-government.78

Interestingly, this meant that despite the talk of democracy and liber-alism, during the period of CPA control over Iraq, Bremer essentially ruled by decree, issuing promulgations in the form of regulations, orders or memoranda.79 Such promulgations involved significant mea-sures aimed at reshaping the political and social environment in Iraq. While not all of these reforms were directly related to building repre-sentative institutions or formulating an adherence to liberal forms of good governance, most of these promulgations were generally informed by the CPA’s main objective of formulating a stable and democratic Iraq. One of the more notable, and controversial, promulgations in this regard was Bremer’s order to undertake the so-called ‘de-Ba’athification’ of Iraqi Society, involving the elimination of Hussein’s Ba’ath Party. The CPA announced its intention to pursue de-Ba’athification in April 2003, formalising this announcement a month later with Order One of the CPA.80

Not only was the Ba’ath Party disbanded, but all senior members of the Party were fired from government positions and prohibited from future employment in the public service.81 Further, all individuals hold-ing a position in the ‘top three layers’ of management in every govern-ment ministry, institution or affiliated corporation were also screened for Ba’ath Party affiliation – individuals found to be full members, regardless of rank, lost their position.82 Ostensibly, this was to ensure that the Ba’ath Party could not threaten Iraq’s future democracy or pose a security risk to the Coalition.83 This measure was coupled with the disbanding of the Iraqi military, intelligence agencies and organisations charged with guarding Hussein.84 This was similarly designed to reshape the political and security environment in Iraq. Akin to the disbanding of the Ba’ath Party, the aim of the CPA was to remove all influences of


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Hussein’s previous regime that could destabilise Iraq and pose a risk to Coalition efforts to politically and socially reform the country.85

The intention of the Coalition, particularly the Americans, in Iraq was not simply to supplant Hussein’s regime with a liberal democracy, but to completely eradicate all elements of this regime from the Iraqi political landscape. This evidenced a far-ranging reshaping of the Iraqi social and political environment. These measures also highlighted distinctly illiberal trends in relation to the way in which the CPA governed Iraq. Not only was Bremer unaccountable to the Iraqi people, but promulgated mea-sures such as de-Ba’athification often involved arbitrary discrimination against individuals who may have been part of the Ba’ath party but had not necessarily committed any offence. Even if someone had been a high-ranking Ba’ath Party official, there was the question of whether an individual’s Ba’ath Party membership itself, rather than their actual con-duct, should be used in such a crude and indiscriminate manner to rid Iraq of any Ba’ath influence.86 More practically, the termination of Ba’ath Party members from their positions and the rapid disbanding of the military and other government agencies bred resentment among those affected and resulted in severe staff shortages across government ministries and agencies, impacting on the delivery of services.87

Another notable feature of the CPA’s governing of Iraq was the speed with which it moved to begin the process of reforming Iraq into a stable liberal democracy. This reflected the importance placed upon securing liberal democratic reforms in Iraq as a means of controlling risks. In July 2003, Bremer promulgated the establishment of the Governing Council of Iraq as part of the Iraqi interim administration.88 This organisation did not supersede the CPA, although it did have its own set of responsi-bilities. Notably, the Governing Council was not an elected body, but rather consisted of 25 members that the US itself handpicked.89 Ostensibly, the CPA established the Governing Council to give the Iraqis some representation in the interim administration of Iraq before the formation of a transitional government in 2005. In November 2003, the CPA, in consultation with the Governing Council, agreed to a plan out-lining the process by which the CPA would relinquish control and hand sovereignty back to Iraq.90

The plan involved the formulation and signing of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and the selection of an interim National Assembly and government, to which sovereignty would be ‘handed’ by mid-2004.91 In March 2004, the CPA issued the TAL, which outlined the process to be followed in Iraq’s transition to full representative governance. Importantly, this document dictated that Iraq’s future


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government ‘shall be republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic . . .’92 This clause in the TAL reflected not the expressed preferences of the Iraqi people, but rather that of the Coalition, which dictated the form of Iraq’s new government. Again, neither the TAL nor the interim govern-ment were acceded to by the Iraqi people – they were issued or appointed by the CPA in consultation with the Governing Council.

In short, the Iraqi people did not choose liberal democratic govern-ment and could not do so given the fact that they were never offered a choice. Instead, the US and its Coalition imposed liberal institutions and government in Iraq, reflecting Coalition preferences for a liberal reshaping of the political and social environment in a bid to manage globalised security risks. Given the thinking that liberalism and democ-racy in Iraq are the answer to perceived security risks, it is unsurprising that the Coalition did not leave the Iraqis much room to manoeuvre as they worked towards self-government. It was further unsurprising that the Coalition was careful to decide for itself who would be appointed to the Governing Council and also played a substantial role in deciding who, along with the Governing Council and UN Special Representative to Iraq, Lakdhar Brahimi, would be a part of the interim government and the interim National Assembly.93

The actual handover of sovereignty to the Iraqi interim government occurred on 28 June 2004, at which time the CPA was dissolved and ceased to exist.94 Bremer left Iraq immediately after the formal handover of sovereignty was complete.95 Perhaps one of the most notable features of the CPA then is its relative brevity, governing Iraq for a period of only 14 months. The quick transferral of sovereignty was unsurprising given that Coalition countries viewed it as a crucial first step on the road towards an Iraqi democracy.96 However, even after the CPA had nomi-nally returned sovereignty to the Iraqis and had been dissolved, the TAL and Bremer’s edicts continued to constrain the authority and the actions of the interim government. Indeed, several of Bremer’s edicts continued to remain in force after the dissolution of the CPA.97

While Coalition forces continued to exercise control over security in Iraq after the handover of sovereignty, political control was now nomi-nally in the hands of the Iraqi people. On 30 January 2005, elections were held to establish a transitional National Assembly and government that would draft a permanent constitution for Iraq. This constitution was ratified in October 2005, allowing for the holding of another general election to elect a permanent National Assembly and government.98 This election was held in December 2005, achieving a turnout of over 70 per cent of the voting population and resulting in a permanent government


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of Iraq, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, taking office in May 2006.99 Thus, in just over three years, the Coalition had built institu-tions of representative governance in Iraq that had resulted in a freely elected Iraqi government. In the immediate period after the election, however, the security situation deteriorated markedly as insurgent attacks increased and sectarian violence between the Shiite majority and Sunni minority (which had held a privileged position in Iraq under Hussein, himself a Sunni) worsened.

Much of the tension between the Shiites and Sunnis stemmed from Sunni resentment at their diminished position in the Iraqi government and society.100 The year 2006 was particularly bad as sectarian and com-munal violence – marked by numerous attacks, both between Shiites and Sunnis and internally within these groups – intensified.101 This prompted the Bush Administration to authorise a surge of about 30,000 troops to stabilise the situation and provide order in early 2007. It also moved to enhance its reconciliation efforts in Iraq, including tying some aid to Iraq to the achievement of reconciliation benchmarks agreed to by the Iraqi government.102 Despite the widespread instability and disorder, the Iraqi government has remained in place and has survived both elec-tions in 2010 and the withdrawal of American troops in 2011.103 However, especially during the period 2006–2011, the Iraqi government was almost entirely dependent on the US for the provision of security in Iraq.

Overall, the invasion of Iraq and US involvement in the country after-wards demonstrates that faced with perceivably urgent security risks Western governments are prepared to manage them in particular instances through the promotion and imposition of liberal democratic institutions in the ‘risky’ state. As US involvement in Iraq has also demonstrated, this can occur in a distinctly illiberal fashion – the CPA’s 14-month tenure as the governing authority of Iraq is instructive in this regard. On the surface, one could say that the political and social reshaping of Iraq was a success – the US eliminated Hussein’s regime and replaced his dictatorship with a liberal democratic government. This should mean enhanced security for Western societies against the per-ceived risks posed by Iraq under Hussein’s regime. Yet the democratic government in Iraq is not a stable one, continually beset by instability caused by sectarian violence and insurgency.

Still, the US exercised significant authority within Iraq from 2003 until 2011, when it completed its troop withdrawal. The question though is how much of this period can be characterised as signifying a hierarchical relationship between the US and Iraq. A social logic of risk was a signifi-cant feature of the justifications for the invasion and the actions taken


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by the US and its Coalition of the Willing in the aftermath. Not only were risk, prevention and precaution central to the justifications pro-vided for the invasion, but liberal values were crucial to defining the appropriate responses to the perceived risks posed by Hussein’s regime. However, whether there ever was a hierarchical relationship between the US and Iraq, one legitimated by both parties to the relationship, remains debatable.

Implications for International Society: Hierarchy or Domination in Iraq?

The 2003 invasion of Iraq undoubtedly aroused a great deal of contro-versy within international society regarding the necessity, legitimacy and legality of the invasion. The political fallout of the intervention was significant to say the least. Not only had the efficacy and credibility of the UN been called into question in the face of a superpower which possessed the capability to bypass the organisation altogether if it wished (and ultimately did), but some even went so far as to question the con-tinued viability of the post-1945 international order or the existence of international society itself.104 The high level of dissent within interna-tional society means that the initial invasion of Iraq lacked widespread legitimacy. While the leaders of the states involved in the Coalition con-tinually asserted the legality, legitimacy and necessity of invading Iraq, they did so in the face of significant political resistance from other states within international society.

Indeed, several facets of the US invasion of Iraq do not sit well with the norms of pluralist international society. The US thoroughly violated the norms of sovereign equality and non-intervention. A coercive homogeneity appeared to replace the heterogeneity normally associated with a pluralist international society in 2003, in which the US and its allies dictate liberal democratic governance to illiberal states deemed to be particularly risky. As Dunne argues, the point of the norms underpin-ning pluralist international society was to prevent the more powerful members of international society from overrunning diverse political communities.105 Yet clearly, this is exactly what happened in Iraq – international norms had little effect in preventing the US and its coali-tion from overrunning Iraq.

However, was the invasion in 2003 indicative of a hierarchical rela-tionship between the US and Iraq? This is an important question in determining whether international society can accommodate hierarchy. For Dunne, it cannot, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US signified


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that hierarchy threatens international society’s existence and that the US had effectively placed itself beyond international society by so blatantly and thoroughly violating international norms.106 However, Dunne, writing in 2003, conflates the coercive domination that the invasion represented with hierarchy. As argued in Chapter 1, coercion and hierarchy are in fact distinct concepts. The resistance within inter-national society to the invasion, including the obvious resistance of Hussein’s regime to the US’ demand that it relinquish power or face an invasion, means that when we look at the relationship between the US and Iraq in the period 2003–2004, it is difficult to argue that a hierarchi-cal relationship existed between these two countries. There was no point before or during the invasion at which both Iraq and the US recognised the legitimacy of the US’ authority to pursue regime change.

After the invasion, it also makes little sense to speak of a hierarchical relationship while the CPA was the governing authority in Iraq, as there was no subordinate party in Iraq that the US could enter into a hierarchical relationship with. While there is therefore evidence to suggest that a social logic of risk informed both the justifications for the invasion and the risk management methods that the US employed in Iraq, it did not immediately underpin a hierarchical relationship – the invasion itself was a case of coercive domination. Hence, it is not hierarchy that poten-tially threatens the existence of international society or is the cause of the controversy elicited by the invasion of Iraq, but the rather distinct issue of the US deciding to invade Iraq without Security Council authori-sation based on what turned out to be an incorrect anticipation of risks.

It is also important to note that the fact that the invasion itself did not represent a hierarchical relationship between the US and Iraq does not automatically preclude the possibility that one did eventually emerge between the two countries. The invasion allowed the US to establish its authority over Iraq. While this was initially contested, both interna-tional society and the new Iraqi government eventually recognised and legitimated US authority, at least partly.107 In the case of Iraq, therefore, a social logic of risk underpinned both an instance of coercion and also the subsequent hierarchy that resulted from this. From the moment the CPA was dissolved and the US ‘handed’ sovereignty back to Iraq in 2004, it does make sense to speak of a hierarchical relationship between the Iraqi government and the US, which still maintained a significant level of authority (and a large number of troops) within Iraq until its with-drawal in 2011.

During this period the Iraqi government was dependent on the US for the provision of security to a significant extent, much as the Solomon


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Islands government was dependent on Australia for the provision of security from 2003–2013. The interim, transitional and permanent Iraqi governments all had an interest in maintaining a US presence in the country, and an interest in recognising and legitimating the US’ authority to take action to stabilise the security situation in Iraq and continue to strengthen the nascent democratic institutions that it had built. Like Australia in Solomon Islands, American forces in Iraq operated with legal immunity under the 2008 ‘Status of Forces’ agreement between the US and Iraq (between 2004 and 2008, Coalition forces were nominally subject to Iraqi laws, although in practice it would have been extremely difficult for Iraq to attempt to prosecute Coalition personnel for alleged crimes).108 This meant that the US was able to exercise substantial authority in Iraq, particularly relating to security matters, with little to no accountability to the Iraqi people.109 Again, this is indicative of a hierarchical relationship, with the superordinate and subordinate par-ties enjoying different rights and prerogatives.

In terms of the legitimacy bestowed by international society upon the US’ exercise of authority in Iraq as it sought to build a viable democratic state, UNSCRs 1483 and 1511, both passed in 2003, are important. Both resolutions recognised, and therefore provided a legal basis for, the CPA’s control over Iraq (although the resolutions also stressed the temporary nature of the CPA’s tenure).110 Crucially, Resolution 1483 also recognised the US’ claim to hold the authority to promote liberalism and democ-racy and reshape Iraqi socio-political institutions. It states that the UN seeks to work with the CPA ‘to advance efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance, including by working together to facilitate a process leading to an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq’.111

This added legitimacy to the US’ efforts to develop a functioning and stable democratic government in Iraq and underscored the authority of the US to actually do so. Further, the Coalition’s military presence in Iraq was also formally authorised and legitimated in UNSCR 1511, which called for the creation of a multinational force under a unified (US) com-mand.112 Critics might counter that these Resolutions show only that the Security Council was acting pragmatically, and in accordance with established international law, in recognising the CPA as the governing authority in Iraq and authorising the presence of a multinational mili-tary force to provide security. This argument is certainly plausible, but, regardless of the Security Council’s motives in passing these and other Resolutions that continually authorised the US’ presence and authority in Iraq from 2003 onwards, the fact remains that it did provide legal


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recognition, and a measure of legitimacy, to US activities in Iraq after the invasion.113

What the invasion of Iraq therefore demonstrates is that there are very real limits to the manner in which Western governments can intervene in other states in order to promote liberalism and democracy. It is nota-ble that the ENP and RAMSI elicited little to no debate within interna-tional society because in both cases the target states consented to the intervention prior to its commencement. This is why these first two cases are relatively more straightforward examples of hierarchical rela-tionships underpinned by a social logic of risk. In the case of Iraq, we must recognise the lack of legitimacy, and therefore the lack of a hierar-chical relationship between the US and Iraq, that characterised the inva-sion and the immediate aftermath during which the US was an occupying power in the country. However, after this time, the Iraqi interim admin-istration, transitional government and al-Maliki’s permanent government all recognised and legitimated the US’ exercise of authority and presence in Iraq until US forces withdrew in 2011.

On this basis, it is therefore incorrect to suggest that hierarchy per se threatens or challenges the existence of international society, even in the case of Iraq. Claims that hierarchy does so conflate hierarchy with domination and also ignore important features of the way in which the US conducted its intervention. Iraq was never removed from interna-tional society – it did not cease to be a state or separate political com-munity, despite the curtailing of the rights of sovereign equality and non-intervention normally afforded to states within international society. The invasion did demonstrate, however, the propensity of the US and other Western governments to refuse to fully recognise the sovereignty of particular states that do not meet liberal democratic standards of domestic constitution and governance. As Mazzar argues, Western states can dispense with state sovereignty, at least temporarily, when they attempt to enforce their rules on non-Western, peripheral states.114 Still, it is notable that the Americans were quick to transfer sovereignty back to Iraq and, despite its subordination, see to the establishment of a (at least nominally) democratic and independent Iraqi state.

What the management of risk, and the hierarchical relationships that it has underpinned across the three cases surveyed, means then for international society is not a contraction of its membership or its end, but rather a shift in the way key norms are applied and understood. The invasion and subsequent practice of regime change in Iraq in particular raises serious questions about the supposedly universal purchase of key norms of pluralist international society. Along with the interventions


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conducted by Australia and the EU, the three cases point to important discrepancies in the way in which norms such as sovereign equality and non-intervention are applied. They point to the emergence of an inter-national society that is not only both hierarchical and anarchical, but also is not solely defined in terms of the maximisation of the range of potential values and regimes that a state can adopt. Instead, risk has encouraged the promotion of liberal democracy as the necessary stan-dard of government and governance within international society by particular Western governments – failure to conform to this model of good governance has resulted in varying modes of intervention aimed at managing risk, depending on the perceived severity of the potential dangers involved.

Conclusion

The perception that Hussein’s regime posed a number of unacceptable and potentially catastrophic risks that the US had to prevent was the primary motivation for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The justifications pro-vided by Bush, Blair and other Western leaders and officials for going to war in Iraq explicitly pointed to globalised risks as the basis upon which action needed to be taken. At no stage did Bush, Blair or any other Western officials supportive of the war point to a specific ‘thing’, one that was spatially and temporally locatable, and say ‘this is the threat’. While Bush and Blair both often used the term ‘threat’, this ‘threat’ was ill-defined and surrounded by high levels of uncertainty. Despite the talk of ‘threats’ what was really being referred to were risks. Risk manage-ment is thus a suitable characterisation of the Iraq War. In order to manage the risks posed by WMD and terrorism, the Coalition sought to politi-cally and socially reshape Iraq into a liberal democracy as a means of ensuring that it would no longer act as a source of global security risks. By transforming Iraq into a liberal democracy, the US could create an environment hostile to the production of such risks, rather than condu-cive to them.

There is little doubt that the intervention raised serious questions concerning the applicability of key norms of international society. In the previous cases surveyed, the interventions undertaken by Western societies were far more consensual. The invasion of Iraq, however, rep-resented the subjugation and domination of one sovereign state by another, regardless of the fact that the Americans were seeking to replace a dictatorship with a democracy. Yet international society itself was not necessarily threatened by the invasion, nor were the relations of


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hierarchy that emerged between the US and Iraq in the years after the invasion particularly problematic for international society to accom-modate. The Security Council eventually legitimated and endorsed the promotion of democracy in Iraq by the US, and the Iraqi government was content, for a while, to recognise the authority of the US to stabilise the security situation and continue to strengthen Iraq’s new demo-cratic institutions. Iraq therefore provides another example of the way in which a social logic of risk underpins the emergence of a more hierar-chical form of international society.


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129

The concepts of hierarchy and international society are compatible, and hierarchies are a key feature of the ways in which sovereign states organ-ise their social and political relationships with one another. This is the foundational claim that this book has advanced. From this basis, it has proceeded to make the case for conceiving of international society as perfectly capable of accommodating hierarchical relationships between states and has explored three separate instances of hierarchy in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, hierarchy is fundamental to international society. It is central to the English School’s five institutions of international society, particularly the institution of the great powers. Despite the disciplinary convention that international relations occurs in an anarchical envi-ronment, in practice states have wielded, and ceded, differing levels of authority over each other. As Lake suggests, international relations are not uniform, but a rich tapestry of differing shades and hues.1 International society is both hierarchical and anarchical.

Advancing a claim such as this requires a rethinking not only of key concepts such as anarchy, hierarchy and international society, but also of sovereignty. The notion of an anarchical international society is the logical corollary of the traditional conception of sovereignty as indivis-ible or absolute – sovereign states can answer to no higher authority, therefore they cannot be subordinate parties in hierarchical relation-ships. In practice, however, it is highly doubtful whether any states, even the most powerful, have wielded an indivisible or absolute form of sovereignty. Rather, sovereignty is a divisible package of rights and authority that states ‘hold in different degrees in different issue areas at different times’.2 International anarchy simply refers to the absence of a central, formal type of authority above states. This means that anarchy and hierarchy do not preclude one another; conceiving of authority in

Conclusion


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relational, rather than formal-legal, terms allows for the identification of informal hierarchical relationships between sovereign states that involve some states exercising relational authority over others within an osten-sibly anarchical international environment.

The exercise of this authority depends heavily on legitimacy, which is crucial to the production and reproduction of hierarchies; indeed, it is crucial to the constitution and reproduction of international society. Conventional accounts of an anarchical international society assume that hierarchies cannot exist within international society because inter-state hierarchies are illegitimate – a violation of the norm of sovereign equality and potentially damaging to international society if smaller states resist attempts by larger states to exert authority over them. In this formulation, though, hierarchy tends to be equated with coercion or domination, not something accepted and legitimated by superordinate and subordinate states. This is why scholars have pointed to the inva-sion of Iraq and suggested that hierarchy potentially endangers interna-tional society. As the US invasion of Iraq demonstrated, international society will resist authority claims or actions that it views as grossly violating international norms or rules. However, it is precisely the lack of legitimacy and the fact that international society did resist the inva-sion, along with the fact that the US had to resort to coercion to initially establish its authority over Iraq, which precludes a definition of the initial invasion as a ‘hierarchy’. Domination and coercion might threaten international society, not hierarchy and the legitimated exercise of authority by states over one another.

As Clark argues, the sense of being bound by a common set of norms and rules produces international society’s own internal sense of obliga-tion, something that states themselves create through their social and political relations.3 Inequality and hierarchy do not threaten this, so long as dominant states do not overstep the boundaries of what interna-tional society considers acceptable conduct. Indeed, especially since decolonisation and international society’s expansion, gross inequalities between states across a range of criteria have been a key feature of inter-national society. Conceiving of international society as both anarchical and hierarchical brings this key feature into sharper relief. It challenges the assumption that despite such inequalities, dominant states cannot exercise authority over weaker states because weaker states will not and cannot recognise any external authority above their own. The post-Cold War era has shown that fragile states have been willing to recognise and accept extensive foreign interference and authority over their domestic affairs, even if they have had relatively little choice in the matter. In several of these cases, international society has proven capable of


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Conclusion 131

accommodating hierarchical relations that do, in effect, place important limits on the rights normally afforded to sovereign states.

Importantly though, the hierarchical relationships informed by a social logic of risk that have been the focus of this book are but one example of international hierarchy. Interstate hierarchies can take many shapes and forms and can result in varying discrepancies in authority between superordinate and subordinate states. Although hierarchy is central to the institution of the great powers, superordinate status is not the sole province of the great powers. Smaller states, such as Australia, can and do exercise superordinate authority in hierarchical relation-ships with other states. Australia in particular is an interesting case as an argument could be made that Australia is a superordinate party in some hierarchies, but very clearly a subordinate party in others (for example, in its relationship with the US). The point here is that social interaction between states and the authority that they can exercise over one another is much more variegated and dynamic than conventional accounts of international society would have us believe. Conceiving of international society solely as an anarchical association of states elides important fea-tures of interstate interaction and the actual relationships that states maintain with one another.

We can provide a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of international society by incorporating both hierarchy and anarchy into the lens through which we view international relations. This is especially important when attempting to understand international society and its ongoing evolution today. As mentioned above, interven-tions conducted by Western countries have demonstrated the willing-ness not only of Western governments to intervene, but also of fragile or weak states to acquiesce to significant limitations on their sovereignty. It is one thing to suggest that international society is both anarchical and hierarchical, but we are also potentially witnessing a shift in its nor-mative constitution and prevailing understandings of sovereignty and statehood. By itself, hierarchy does not necessarily pose any ostensible threat to the existing international norms of sovereign equality and non-intervention. However, hierarchies based on interventions that are designed to promote liberal democratic institutions and governance do raise questions about the continued efficacy of key international norms. Traditional depictions of international society and its key norms no longer seem to neatly match up with international practice and inter-state conduct.

However, this does not mean that these norms or international society itself have become totally defunct. Rather, the meaning of sovereignty or of norms such as sovereign equality and non-intervention appear to


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have changed substantially since the end of the Cold War. Further, the application of these norms has also become more varied and inconsis-tent. While the norms of sovereign equality and non-intervention have never been perfectly applied and rigidly observed by every state within international society, they have enjoyed widespread recognition and legitimacy for a considerable period, particularly since decolonisation. However, it remains to be seen how states, especially the most powerful, will continue to recognise, observe and apply them within international society in the years ahead. Certainly, the trend of the last 20 years has been the watering down of these norms as international society places greater scrutiny on the domestic circumstances and conditions of its members.

Indeed, the liberal interventions that this book has focused on are sig-nificant for international society in that they demonstrate the willing-ness and capability of Western states to ignore these norms in particular instances. However, this trend is not only limited to these interventions, but has also been reflected in the conduct of international institutions such as the UN, World Bank and IMF. This also applies to shifting under-standings of sovereignty within international society. The most obvious example of such shifts is the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) and the idea that states forfeit their right to non-intervention should they perpetrate or fail to prevent gross human rights violations within their territory. RtoP and the concomitant idea that sovereign authority must be exercised within a broader framework of rights, duties and responsibilities has been heavily promoted by non-state actors and major international institutions, not only Western societies who never-theless generally remain RtoP’s most enthusiastic supporters.

The consequence of these trends has been to place significant limita-tions on extant international norms amid a broader attempt to redefine traditional understandings of sovereignty and statehood. These attempts at redefining sovereignty largely involve the imposition of more strin-gent criteria for its recognition. Within pluralist international society, the recognition of sovereignty and full membership is largely detached from the internal characteristics of the state. However, the period fol-lowing the end of the Cold War has seen the application of particular criteria applied to the recognition of sovereignty and membership within international society in certain cases.4 As Hurrell suggests, this is a consequence of the increasing complexity of contemporary global governance in an age of globalisation. The effective management of risks such as human rights violations, terrorism or environmental protection increasingly necessitates closer scrutiny of how states organise themselves


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Conclusion 133

domestically, an ever deeper engagement between states, international institutions and non-state actors and, ultimately, more frequent interventions.5

This presents a significant challenge to pluralist international society. Along with the norm of self-determination, the norms of sovereign equality and non-intervention are the embodiment of the broader moral basis of international society, namely that it ought to preserve the inde-pendence of its members and their freedom to constitute themselves and ‘promote their diverse ends with the minimal of outside interfer-ence’.6 Even though the subordinate states in the cases surveyed have accepted and legitimated their subordinate status (belatedly, in the case of Iraq), the attempt by Western governments to limit the range of acceptable values and institutions that these states may adopt and the heavy interference in the domestic affairs of subordinate states suggests at least a qualification of pluralist norms. An interesting issue here is the role of liberalism and democracy in the hierarchical relationships that this book has identified and the consequences for international society of attempts at democracy promotion by Western states. The question here is do these interventions represent a shift towards a ‘liberal’ inter-national society, and is this compatible with the core norms of pluralist international society?

Certainly, a large literature has emerged in the post-Cold War era regarding democracy promotion and its impacts on the general evolution of international society and international order. However, within this literature the answers to the above questions vary markedly, and depend in large part on what one means by a ‘liberal international society’ – as Simpson has highlighted, there are different visions of a liberal interna-tional society that offer competing moral perspectives on what such a society would or should look like.7 Does it refer to a society comprised of liberal democratic states, a society in which liberal principles underpin the normative constitution of that society and regulate interstate con-duct, or both? While the two options presented here, a society of liberal democratic states or a society underpinned by liberal norms, might seem compatible, in practice they are not necessarily so.

It is questionable whether Western states can seek to increase the number of stable liberal democracies in international society through intervention in weak or illiberal states without some sort of qualification of the norms of pluralist international society, which some have described as ‘liberal’.8 Indeed, the result of particularistic values coming ‘to dominate the conception of an appropriate form of international society’ is the curtailment of the sovereign rights of some of those states


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that fail to adhere to these liberal values – stable, well-functioning liberal institutions have recently become the guarantors of the enjoyment of full sovereign rights within international society.9 Again, by itself, hier-archy does not necessarily threaten or challenge existing international norms. It is not the simple fact of the exercise of authority by one state over another that is of importance here, but rather the ways in which Western states have sought to exert their authority over subordinated non-Western states in order to achieve significant and far-reaching domestic reforms in the latter.

Of course, the significant issue at stake for international society is not just whether or not the norms of pluralist international society are being challenged, but also whether they should be challenged. Is the qualifica-tion of states’ rights to constitute themselves domestically in whatever way they see fit an acceptable outcome for international society in an age of globalisation and de-bounded risks? Should states be required to maintain minimum (liberal) standards of domestic constitution and order to qualify for full recognition of sovereignty and membership of international society? Certainly, international society should expect its members to observe minimum standards of international and domestic conduct, and it should have the capacity to act when states violate these standards. However, this is very different from decreeing that states should politically and economically constitute themselves in specific ways. It is one thing for international society to regulate a state’s conduct, quite another for its dominant members to attempt to regulate what type of state a political community should have.

Morally, the former is far more compatible with the norms of a pluralist international society. The notion that the sovereign state remains the best form of social and political organisation for providing domestic order and allowing individuals and communities to realise their own conceptions of the good life underpins the moral value afforded to ensuring the existence of a politically and culturally diverse assemblage of sovereign states. Generally then, requiring states to ensure that they fulfil this function and acting to regulate their conduct should they fail to do so would ostensibly seem to be compatible with the moral purpose of pluralist international society. Of course, significant difficulties lie in determining the threshold of failure beyond which international society should act and what actions it can and should take without destabilising international order. These are difficult issues that are unfortunately beyond the scope of the present discussion.

However, the point remains that maintaining minimum and recog-nised standards of conduct is different from intervening to achieve deep


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Conclusion 135

institutional and governance reforms in states, in effect changing the type of government that a state has. It is difficult to argue that doing so is acceptable, especially when promoting liberalism and democracy is undertaken by Western states as a means of managing perceived risks to their security that may or may not materialise. Violating key interna-tional norms, limiting the target state’s sovereignty and ultimately restricting the acceptable range of domestic values and institutions that states and their peoples may adopt, based on ‘ifs’ and ‘maybes’, is prob-lematic to say the least. This is not an argument against intervention or shifting understandings of key norms and sovereignty per se; it is an argument against the particular interventions surveyed in this book. It seems distinctly and ironically illiberal to attempt to promote liberalism and democracy as a means of risk management in the manner that some Western states recently have, especially the US in Iraq.

Aside from the above issues, responding to whether it is morally and ethically acceptable to engage in liberal interventionism should states not meet expected standards must surely also include a consideration of the outcomes that international society can reasonably expect to achieve. A key question to ask is, ‘Do liberal interventions actually work?’ A very generous response to this question would be an extremely ambivalent ‘maybe’. The cases surveyed in this book do not suggest that intervening to promote liberalism and democracy is a quick and easy task or that it is something that has a high chance of ultimately being successful. Now heading into its eleventh year, RAMSI’s state-building mission in Solomon Islands remains incomplete, despite the withdrawal of a significant component of the mission in 2013. The EU continues to face resistance from ENP partners to its mandated reforms, and its record of promoting deep and substantial reforms along its periphery has been mixed at best. In Iraq, a democratic government is in place, but it pre-sides over a highly unstable country, with insurgents continuing to pose a severe risk to national security and social and political order.10

However, we are not far enough removed from these interventions to be able to fully judge whether they will result in the desired outcomes. It seems naïve and unfair to expect societies with little to no experience of Western notions of liberal democratic government to quickly and easily transition to stable democratic states. This ignores not only the very real and challenging social, economic and political difficulties that the societies in question face, but also the long evolution of Western societies themselves into modern liberal democracies. We will need to trace the evolution and development of states subjected to intervention over a longer period to determine the efficacy of the interventions that


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Western states have conducted. Again though, the short-term outlook for many of the states subjected to intervention over the last 15–20 years is not encouraging.

In examining these interventions and their effects for international society, we must also recognise that Western democracy promotion has been anything but a uniform and consistent affair – for every interven-tion that has occurred in the post-Cold War era, there are numerous examples of potential interventions that have not, such as in Darfur, Syria and elsewhere. In part, this is because there are very real and practical limits as to how far this process can go, as the controversy surrounding the invasion of Iraq demonstrated. Even the most powerful states cannot grossly violate existing international norms without engendering con-testation and resistance. While this book has argued that one consequence of these interventions has been the mitigation of particular international norms and the rights afforded to sovereign states, any current retreat from a pluralist international society is not necessarily one that will continue in the longer-term. The rise of China, India and other large developing states will likely have significant effects for international society and its normative constitution as the balance of power shifts. The ongoing chal-lenge to the key norms of pluralist international society and the push to promote liberalism and democracy as universal standards for states to meet will not necessarily last.

In the short term, however, it is important to note that Western govern-ments continue to be preoccupied with de-bounded risks and their man-agement. Of the three case studies, only the intervention in Iraq is no longer ongoing. While the Obama administration has attempted to rebuild the international authority and legitimacy that was arguably lost after the invasion of Iraq and the generally ‘unilateral’ foreign policy stance of the Bush administration, it is notable that a concern for de-bounded risks and democracy promotion remain a part of its national security strategies.11 This preoccupation with risk is not confined to the three cases, but rather is representative of a broader shift to a ‘risk-based strategic logic’ in the EU, Australia and the US. Indeed, more recent security strategies and defence policies published by several Western governments continue to demonstrate a preoccupation with temporally and spatially de-bounded risks and their prevention. For example, the 2013 Australian NSS out-lines a set of key strategic risks to Australia’s national security and the necessary actions for their mitigation and prevention.12

The 2010 UK NSS goes even further – not only does it list a set of key strategic risks, but also organises them into tiers based on likelihood and


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Conclusion 137

impact. The document also outlines a risk management methodology that explains how each risk was analysed and ranked and emphasises anticipation, horizon scanning, prevention and mitigation as key activi-ties that need to be undertaken to manage the strategic risks identified.13 The paradox here of these types of strategic outlook is that Western soci-eties are simultaneously more secure from major threats such as wide-spread interstate conflict but also perceive themselves to be more vulnerable to de-bounded risks and the strategic effects of globalisation. The 2010 UK NSS explicitly suggests that:

Britain today is both more secure and more vulnerable than in most of her long history. More secure, in the sense that we do not currently face, as we have so often in our past, a conventional threat of attack on our territory by a hostile power. But more vulnerable, because we are one of the most open societies, in a world that is more networked than ever before.14

It is not only the increasingly dense connections with the outside world and a concomitant sense of ‘openness’ that feeds such perceptions of vulnerability, but also the multifaceted and complex nature of the risks that Western societies face. In a word, uncertainty remains the defining feature of the contemporary international strategic environment, as the UK NSS notes.15 Coupled with the perception that some security risks could have catastrophic consequences, this uncertainty breeds anxiety and an emphasis on the prevention of risk. If a preoccupation with de-bounded risks remains a key feature of the strategic doctrines of Western govern-ments, so too does a focus on the strategic effects of failed states or ‘poorly governed spaces’ and the desire to promote liberalism and democracy in response.16 Western governments continue to cite the risks inherent in state failure, fragility or weakness as a major strategic issue. They have also been consistent in highlighting the need for promoting liberal values and good governance.

This means that, at least in the immediate period ahead, the identified trends of a more restrictive set of liberal democratic criteria for the full recognition of sovereignty and statehood, and the variable application of norms of sovereign equality and non-intervention as a result, are likely to continue. So too will hierarchies between Western and non-Western states based on a social logic of risk. Importantly though, neither hierar-chy nor normative transition necessarily threatens the existence of the society of states. The notion of the ‘hierarchical society’ does not forfeit


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the two prerequisites of any form of international society: recognition of an obligation to observe and abide by common rules and norms and, flowing from this, legitimacy. While its core constitutive norms may shift and change over time, so long as recognition, obligation and legiti-macy remain central to the relationships of states and other actors, international society – whether anarchical, hierarchical or a mixture of both – will continue to endure.


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139

Introduction

1 See Kenneth Waltz (1979), Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House).

2 See Ian Clark (2011), Hegemony in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Ian Clark (2009), ‘How Hierarchical Can International Society Be?’, International Relations 23(3): pp. 464–80; Ian Clark (2009), ‘Towards an English School Theory of Hegemony’, European Journal of International Relations 15(2): pp. 203–28; Edward Keene (2002), Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

3 Hedley Bull (1977), The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan): p. 228.

4 Tim Dunne (2005), ‘The New Agenda’, in Alex J. Bellamy (ed.) International Society and its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press): p. 76.

5 Dunne argued that hierarchy could threaten the existence of international society in the context of the US’ invasion of Iraq in 2003. See Tim Dunne (2003), ‘Society and Hierarchy in International Relations’, International Relations 17(3): pp. 303–20.

6 James M. Hobson and J. C. Sharman (2005), ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics: Tracing the Social Logics of Hierarchy and Political Change’, European Journal of International Relations 11(1): p. 68.

7 See Ian Clark (2005), Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

8 Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey (2002), ‘Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International Relations’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies 31(1): pp. 109–27.

9 Barkawi and Laffey, ‘Retrieving the Imperial’, p. 114.10 Barkawi and Laffey, ‘Retrieving the Imperial’, p. 111.11 As Anghie argues, colonialism is an enduring feature of international law,

having shaped many of the doctrines of international law, particularly sover-eignty. See Antony Anghie (2005), Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): pp. 3–4.

12 Arlene Tickner (2003), ‘Seeing IR Differently – Notes from the Third World’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies 32(2): p. 309.

13 See Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1980 and 1989), The Modern World-System (vols 1 to 3) (San Diego, CA: Academy Press) and Immanuel Wallerstein (1996), ‘The Inter-State Structure of the Modern World System’, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).

14 Johan Galtung (1971), ‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism’, Journal of Peace Research 8(1): pp. 81–117.

Notes


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140 Notes

15 William Clapton and Shahar Hameiri (2012), ‘The Domestic Politics of International Hierarchy: Risk Management and the Reconstitution of International Society’, International Politics 49(1): p. 61.

16 Michael Ignatieff (2003), Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London: Vintage): pp. 1–2.

17 Yee-Kuang Heng (2006), ‘The “Transformation of War” Debate: Through the Looking Glass of Ulrich Beck’s World Risk Society’, International Relations 20(1): 69–91; Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen (2004), ‘“It Sounds Like a Riddle”: Security Studies, the War on Terror and Risk’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies 33(2): pp. 381–95.

18 See Ulrich Beck (1992), Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage) and Ulrich Beck (1999), World Risk Society (Malden: Polity).

19 See Beck, Risk Society and Beck, World Risk Society.20 Ulrich Beck (2002), ‘The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited’,

Theory, Culture and Society 19(4): pp. 39–55.21 Clapton and Hameiri, ‘The Domestic Politics of International Hierarchy’,

p. 61 (italics in original).22 Clapton and Hameiri, ‘The Domestic Politics of International Hierarchy’,

p. 61.23 Alex J. Bellamy (2005), ‘Introduction: International Society and the English

School’, in Alex J. Bellamy (ed.), International Society and its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press): p. 10.

24 David A. Lake (2009), Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press): p. x.

1 The Hierarchical Society

1 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 13 (italics in original).2 Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, p. 47 and Keene, Beyond the

Anarchical Society, p. 44.3 See Jean Bodin (1992), On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from the Six Books of the

Commonwealth, Julian H. Franklin (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Hugo Grotius (1925), De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, Francis Kelsey (trans.) (Oxford: Clarendon) and John Austin (1879), Letters of Jurisprudence, or the Philosophy of Positive Law (London: John Murray).

4 Gerry Simpson (2004), Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

5 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’.6 Evelyn Goh (2008), ‘Hierarchy and the Role of the United States in the East

Asian Security Order’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8(3): pp. 353–77; Jack Donnelly (2006), ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International Society’, European Journal of International Relations 12(2): pp. 139–70; Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations.

7 Clark, Hegemony in International Society; Clark, ‘How Hierarchical Can International Society Be?’; Clark, ‘Towards an English School Theory of Hegemony’.

8 See Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States and Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy’.

9 The works of Simpson and Donnelly being notable exceptions.


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Notes 141

10 The work of Lake is also distinct in this regard. Lake’s work on hierarchy begins with a consideration of both authority and sovereignty. See Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, p. 3.

11 Notable examples of the latter include Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’; David A. Lake (2003), ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations’, International Studies Review 5(3): pp. 303–23; Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations; Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy’; Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim (1996), ‘Hierarchy Under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State’, in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds), State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): pp. 240–77 and Daniel Deudney (1996), ‘Binding Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in Philadelphian Systems’, in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds), State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): pp. 190–239.

12 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 81.13 See Goh, ‘Hierarchy and the Role of the United States’; Hobson and Sharman,

‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’; Lake, ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations’ and David A. Lake (2007), ‘Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics’, International Security 32(1): pp. 47–79.

14 Lake has previously made this distinction between coercion and authority, arguing that coercive commands are not authoritative, as authority rela-tionships must contain some measure of legitimacy. See Lake, ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations’, p. 304.

15 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, p. 68.

16 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, p. 69 (italics in original).

17 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, pp. 69–70.

18 Lake, ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations’, p. 311.19 Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, pp. 24–8.20 Lake, ‘Escape from the State of Nature’, p. 52.21 Such a ‘coercive’ capacity need not rely only on military force; it could well

include other forms of sanction such as the conditionalities included in the EU’s agreements with ENP partner states. See Chapter 4 for more details.

22 Lake, ‘Escape from the State of Nature’, p. 52.23 Lake, ‘Escape from the State of Nature’, p. 52.24 See Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World

Politics’; Lake, ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations’; Lake, ‘Escape From the State of Nature’ and Goh, ‘Hierarchy and the Role of the United States’.

25 Ian Clark (1989), The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): p. 2.

26 Goh, ‘Hierarchy and the Role of the United States’, p. 357.27 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’,

p. 68.28 Gerrit W. Gong (1984), The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society

(Oxford: Clarendon): pp. 4–5.


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142 Notes

29 Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, p. 1.30 Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, p. 2.31 See Richard K. Ashley (1988), ‘Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading

of the Anarchy Problematique’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies 17(2): pp. 227–62 and Richard K. Ashley (1989), ‘Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War’, in James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (eds), International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics (Lexington: Lexington Books): pp. 259–321.

32 Dunne, ‘Society and Hierarchy’, p. 304.33 Clark, ‘How Hierarchical Can International Society Be?’, p. 465.34 Dunne, ‘Society and Hierarchy’, p. 304.35 Clark, ‘How Hierarchical Can International Society Be?’, p. 467.36 There are exceptions to this. See Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society and

Andrew Hurrell (2007), On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press): p. 54.

37 Robert Jackson (2000), The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press): p. v.

38 Jackson, The Global Covenant, p. 16839 Adam Watson (1992), The Evolution of International Society (Oxon: Routledge):

p. 131.40 Adam Watson (2007), Hegemony and History (Oxon: Routledge): p. 72.41 See Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society.42 Clark, Hegemony in International Society, p. 47.43 Clark, Hegemony in International Society, p. 48.44 Hurrell, On Global Order, p. 34.45 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 200. Also see Chris Brown (2003), ‘Do Great

Powers Have Great Responsibilities? Great Powers and Moral Agency’, Global Society 18(1): pp. 5–19.

46 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 201.47 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 199.48 Clark, ‘How Hierarchical Can International Society Be?’, pp. 468–9.49 Christian Reus-Smit (1999), The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social

Identity and Institutional Rationality in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press): p. xi.

50 Jackson, The Global Covenant, p. viii.51 See Daniel Philpott (2001), Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped the

Modern World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) and Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State.

52 See Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds) (1996), State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) and Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State.

53 Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira and John M. Hobson (2011), ‘The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You About 1648 and 1919’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies 39(3): p. 741.

54 For example, see Stephen Krasner (1999), Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

55 For example, see Andreas Osiander (2001), ‘Sovereignty, International Relations and the Westphalian Myth’, International Organization 55(2): pp. 251–87.

56 Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, p. 47.


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Notes 143

57 Hobson and Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics’, p. 72. The authors also note that sovereignty entails the exercise of supreme and exclusive authority over a given territory (p. 65). Also see Robert Jackson (1999), ‘Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape’, Political Studies 47(3): pp. 431–56.

58 As Lake suggests, many in the discipline remain wedded to the idea that sov-ereignty is indivisible and that hierarchy therefore cannot occur between states. See Lake, ‘Escape from the State of Nature’, p. 57. Also see Oyvind Osterud (1994), ‘Sovereign Statehood and National Self-Determination: A World Order Dilemma’, in Marianne Heiberg (ed.), Subduing Sovereignty: Sovereignty and the Right to Intervene (London: Pinter): pp. 18–32.





63 Wouter G. Werner (2004), ‘State Sovereignty and International Legal Discourse’, in Ige F. Dekker and Wouter G. Werner (eds), Governance and International Legal Theory (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff): p. 134; Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (1996), ‘The Social Construction of State Sovereignty’, in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds), State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): pp. 1–21; Samuel M. Makinda (1998), ‘Sovereignty and Global Security’, Security Dialogue 29(3): pp. 282–3.

64 As Robert Jackson contends, post-colonial international society’s ‘negative sovereignty’ regime provides for the recognition of a state’s sovereignty with-out regard to that state’s authority over its territory or population. See Robert Jackson (1990), Quasi States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): p. 1.

65 George Orwell (1945), Animal Farm (Orlando: Harcourt Brace).66 Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy’, pp. 144–52;

Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States.67 Lake, ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations’, p. 305.68 Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy’, p. 145.69 Lassa Oppenheim (1920), International Law: A Treatise (3rd edn, 2 vols)

(London: Longmans, Green): sect. 70.70 Ian Brownlie (2003), Principles of International Law (6th edn) (Oxford: Oxford

University Press): p. 113.71 Robert O. Keohane has similarly argued that we can conceive of gradations

of sovereignty rather than treating it as an all or nothing concept predicated upon exclusive or absolute forms of authority. See Robert O. Keohane (2003), ‘Political Authority After Intervention: Gradations in Sovereignty’, in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): p. 277. Similarly, Hameiri notes that recent state-building interventions are predicated on gradations of sovereignty between the intervening capacity builders and the states that lack capacity. See Shahar Hameiri (2010),


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144 Notes

Regulating Statehood: State Building and the Transformation of the Global Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan): p. 160. Also see Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, p. 3.

72 Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy’, p. 144.73 Goh, ‘Hierarchy and the Role of the United States’, p. 356; Donnelly,

‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy’, p. 144.74 David A. Lake (2009), ‘Regional Hierarchy: Authority and Local International

Order’, Review of International Studies 35(S1): p. 37.75 Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy’, p. 141.76 Goh, ‘Hierarchy and the Role of the United States’, p. 356.77 The difference being, of course, that police authority is derived from a gov-

ernment; no higher power bestows the authority of a superordinate state.

2 Risk and International Society

1 For example, Kosovo in 1999 (NATO intervention without Security Council authorisation) and Libya in 2011 (NATO intervention with authorisation).

2 Beck, Risk Society; Beck, World Risk Society.3 Beck, Risk Society.4 Yee-Kuang Heng (2006), War as Risk Management: Strategy and Conflict in an

Age of Globalised Risks (New York: Routledge): p. 26.5 Beck, World Risk Society, p. 1. Also see Anthony Giddens (1990), The

Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press) and Anthony Giddens (1991), Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late-Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity).

6 John Handmer and Paul James (2007), ‘Trust Us and Be Scared: The Changing Nature of Contemporary Risk’, Global Society 21(1): p. 120.

7 Heng, ‘The “Transformation of War” Debate’, p. 71.8 Heng, ‘The “Transformation of War” Debate’, p. 71.9 Heng, ‘The “Transformation of War” Debate’, p. 71.

10 Risk anticipation and assessment is discussed further in Chapter 3.11 Claudia Aradau, Luis Lobo-Guerrero and Rens Van Munster (2008), ‘Security,

Technologies of Risk, and the Political: Guest Editors’ Introduction’, Security Dialogue 39(2–3): pp. 147–54.

12 Beck, World Risk Society, p. 137.13 Beck, Risk Society, p. 22; Richard V. Ericson and Aaron Doyle (2004),

‘Catastrophe Risk, Insurance and Terrorism’, Economy and Society 33(2): p. 136.

14 Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’, p. 41.15 Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate (2008), ‘Terrorism, Risk and International

Security: The Perils of Asking “What If?”’, Security Dialogue 39(2–3): p. 223.16 Darryl S. L. Jarvis (2007), ‘Risk, Globalisation and the State: A Critical

Appraisal of Ulrich Beck and the World Risk Society Thesis’, Global Society 21(1): p. 30.

17 Beck, Risk Society, p. 13.18 Heng, War as Risk Management, p. 26.19 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen (2002), ‘“9–11”: Globalisation, Security and World

Order’, Working Paper 2002/2 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs): p. 6.


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Notes 145

20 William Bain (2003), Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press): p. 5.

21 James Gow (2005), Defending the West (Cambridge: Polity): p. 59.22 Christopher Coker (2002), ‘Security, Independence and Liberty After

September 11: Balancing Competing Claims’, introductory paper presented to the 21st Century Trust, Klingenthal Castle, near Strasbourg, France (12–18 May 2002), http://www.21stcenturytrust.org/post911.htm (accessed 27 February 2007). Also see Christopher Coker (2009), War in an Age of Risk (Cambridge: Polity).

23 Australian Department of Defence (2007), Australia’s National Security: Defence Update 2007 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia): p. 14.

24 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, pp. 35–69.25 Christopher Coker (19 April 2002), ‘Risk Management Goes Global’, Spiked

Online, http://www.spiked-online.com/Printable/00000006D8BB.htm (accessed 20 March 2013).

26 This phrase is from former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s infa-mous reply to a question posed at a NATO Press Conference in June 2002, in which he argued that there are ‘no knowns. There are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there are things that we now know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don’t know we don’t know . . . each year, we discover a few more of those unknown unknowns’. See Donald Rumsfeld (6–7 June 2002), ‘Press Conference by US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld’, NATO Defence Minister’s Meeting, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020606.htm (accessed 10 May 2007).

27 Rasmussen, ‘“It Sounds Like a Riddle”’.28 CASE Collective (2006), ‘Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A

Networked Manifesto’, Security Dialogue 37(4): p. 468. Luhmann argues that risk is traditionally conceptualised as ‘a controlled extension of rational action’, meaning that rational action can aid in the estimation and manage-ment of risk. This conceptualisation is shared by Power in his work on risk management. See Niklas Luhmann (1998), Risk: A Sociological Theory (New York: Walter de Gruyter): p. 13 and Michael Power (2004), The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty (London: Demos).

29 Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster (2007), ‘Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future’, European Journal of International Relations 13(1): p. 96.

30 Ulrich Beck (2000), ‘Risk Society Revisited: Theory, Politics and Research Programmes’, in Barbara Adam, Ulrich Beck and Joost Van Loon (eds), The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory (London: Sage): p. 219. In more recent work, Beck seems to have shifted further towards a construc-tivist understanding of risk, introducing the concept of ‘staging’ – the imag-ining and identification of risk. As he suggests ‘For only by imagining and staging world risk does the future catastrophe become present . . .’ See Ulrich Beck (2009), World at Risk (Cambridge: Polity): p. 10.

31 Beck, ‘Risk Society Revisited’, p. 219; Aradau and Van Munster, ‘Governing Terrorism Through Risk’, p. 96.

32 Beck, ‘Risk Society Revisited’, p. 219.33 Beck, ‘Risk Society Revisited’, p. 219.


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146 Notes

34 Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’, p. 44.35 Heng, War as Risk Management, pp. 41–2.36 Aradau and Van Munster, ‘Governing Terrorism Through Risk’, p. 96.37 Aradau and Van Munster, ‘Governing Terrorism Through Risk’, p. 96.38 William Clapton (2011), ‘Risk in International Relations’, International

Relations 25(3): p. 287.39 See Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’.40 Clapton, ‘Risk in International Relations’, p. 287.41 Clapton, ‘Risk in International Relations’, p. 287.42 Coker, ‘Risk Management Goes Global’.43 Handmer and James, ‘Trust Us and Be Scared’, p. 129.44 Ian Clark (2001), ‘Another “Double Movement”: The Great Transformation

After the Cold War?’, Review of International Studies 27(5): pp. 237–55.45 Clark, ‘Another “Double Movement”’, pp. 254–5.46 Bain, Between Anarchy and Society, p. 143.47 Francis Fukuyama (1992), The End of History and the Last Man (New York:

Avon Books); Robert Cooper (2004), The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London: Atlantic Books).

48 Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, p. 9.49 For a further critique of contractual or rationalist conceptions of hierarchy,

see J. C. Sharman (2013), ‘International Hierarchies and Contemporary Imperial Governance: A Tale of Three Kingdoms’, European Journal of International Relations 19(2): pp. 189–207.

50 Gerry Simpson (2001), ‘Two Liberalisms’, European Journal of International Law 12(3): pp. 537–71.

51 This is particularly evident when Simpson considers the war in Afghanistan. Here, Simpson essentially argues that US intervention in Afghanistan (and Kosovo) is representative of a form of anti-pluralism and hierarchy within international society. What is missing from Simpson’s account is an analysis of precisely why such anti-pluralist and hierarchical trends have re-emerged. See Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States, pp. 319–51.

52 See Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law.53 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, p. 278

(italics added).54 The White House (September 2002), The National Security Strategy of the United

States of America (Washington D.C.): p. 1.55 See Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vols 1–3.

3 The Management of Risk

1 United Kingdom Cabinet Office Strategy Unit (November 2002), Risk: Improving Government’s Capability to Handle Risk and Uncertainty (London: Cabinet Office Strategy Unit).

2 Wilson’s address to a Joint Session of Congress in 1918 encapsulated these views. See Woodrow Wilson (8 January 1918), ‘Program for World’s Peace’, speech delivered to a Joint Session of the United States Congress.

3 Roland Paris (2004), At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): p. 40.


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4 Pat Caplan (2000), ‘Introduction: Risk Revisited’, in Pat Caplan (ed.), Risk Revisited (London: Pluto Press): p. 22.

5 Heng, War as Risk Management, p. 52.6 Heng, War as Risk Management, p. 52.7 Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer and David Gordon (2008), ‘Introduction’, in Paul

Bracken, Ian Bremmer and David Gordon (eds), Managing Strategic Surprise: Lessons From Risk Management and Risk Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): p. 4.

8 The centrality of values to the anticipation and definition of risk is crucial to understanding the West’s invocation of liberal values not only in defining what constitutes a risk (lack of liberalism) but also in its response to security risks (promoting liberal values).

9 As Bracken et al. note, we should expect strong differences between individu-als and societies when it comes to the management of risk. See Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer and David Gordon (2008), ‘Conclusion: Managing Strategic Surprise’, in Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer and David Gordon (eds), Managing Strategic Surprise: Lessons From Risk Management and Risk Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): p. 304.

10 Heng, ‘The “Transformation of War” Debate’, p. 71.11 See Bracken et al., ‘Introduction’, p. 4.12 For example, see Jude McCulloch and Sharon Pickering (2009), ‘Pre-Crime

and Counter-Terrorism: Imagining Future Crime in the War on Terror’, British Journal of Criminology 49(5): pp. 628–45; Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster (2009), ‘Exceptionalism and the War on Terror: Criminology Meets International Relations’, British Journal of Criminology 49(5): pp. 686–701; Mythen and Walklate, ‘Terrorism, Risk and International Security’; Heng, War as Risk Management.

13 Paul Bracken (2008), ‘How to Build a Warning System’, in Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer and David Gordon (eds), Managing Strategic Surprise: Lessons From Risk Management and Risk Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): p. 16.

14 Rens Van Munster (2005), ‘Logics of Security: The Copenhagen School, Risk Management and the War on Terror’, Political Science Publications 10/2005 (Department of Political Science and Public Management: University of Southern Denmark): p. 8.

15 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen (2006), The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): p. 94.

16 The White House, National Security Strategy (2002), p. 6.17 Jeffrey Record (2003), ‘The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq’, The US Army

War College Quarterly Parameters, Spring 2003: p. 7.18 David S. Yost (2007), ‘NATO and the Anticipatory Use of Force’, International

Affairs 83(1): p. 41 (italics in original). Also see Robert Jervis (2003), ‘Understanding the Bush Doctrine’, Political Science Quarterly 118(3): pp. 365–88.

19 Abraham D. Sofaer (2003), ‘On the Necessity of Pre-emption’, European Journal of International Law 14(2): p. 214.

20 Sofaer, ‘On the Necessity of Pre-emption’, p. 214.21 Letter from Secretary of State Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton of 6 August

1842, cited in David M. Ackerman (11 April 2003), ‘International Law and


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the Preemptive Use of Force Against Iraq’, Congressional Research Service Report (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service): p. 2.

22 The White House, National Security Strategy (2002), p. 15.23 The White House, National Security Strategy (2002), p. 15.24 The White House, National Security Strategy (2002), p. 15.25 Van Munster, ‘Logics of Security’, p. 9.26 Jessica Stern and Jonathan B. Wiener (2008), ‘Precaution Against Terrorism’,

in Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer and David Gordon (eds), Managing Strategic Surprise: Lessons From Risk Management and Risk Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): p. 111.

27 Heng, War as Risk Management, p. 57.28 United Nations Environment Programme (1992), Rio Declaration on

Environment and Development, http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&ar ticleid=1163 (accessed 15 December 2013). Despite the divergent discourses, the politics of the environment and national security have both employed the same concepts and ideas – those of risk, prevention and precaution.

29 Hans Sanderson and Soren Petersen (2002), ‘Power Analysis as a Reflexive Scientific Tool for Interpretation and Implementation of the Precautionary Principle in the European Union’, Environmental Science and Pollution Research 9(4): p. 221.

30 Stern and Wiener, ‘Precaution Against Terrorism’, p. 115.31 Stern and Wiener, ‘Precaution Against Terrorism’, p. 115; Heng, War as Risk

Management, p. 57.32 Council of the European Union (2003), A Secure Europe in a Better World:

European Security Strategy (Brussels: Council of the European Union): p. 11.33 Donald Rumsfeld (6 June 2002), ‘Remarks by US Secretary of Defense, Donald

Rumsfeld at the Defence Ministers Meeting of the North Atlantic Council’, http://www.nato.int/docu/sp eech/2002/s020606d.htm (accessed 15 December 2013).

34 Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, p. 125.35 Tony Blair (5 March 2004), ‘Prime Minister Warns of Continuing Global

Terror Threat’ (London: Office of the Prime Minister).36 For example, one might argue that the justifications for the 2003 invasion of

Iraq (the risk of WMD proliferation) were merely a cover for the real motive behind the invasion, namely the Bush administration’s desire to secure Iraqi oil reserves. For more on this, see Chapter 6.

37 Kanishka Jayasuriya (2005), Reconstituting the Global Liberal Order: Legitimacy and Regulation (Oxon: Routledge): p. 43.

38 Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, p. 137.39 Clapton, ‘Risk in International Relations’, pp. 286–8.40 Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, p. 206.41 Hehir argues that the contemporary advocacy for democracy promotion is

due precisely to the perception that it is a useful counter-terrorism tool. See Aidan Hehir (2007), ‘The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1(3): p. 322.

42 Tony Blair (22 April 1999), ‘The Blair Doctrine’, PBS Newshour, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-june99/blair_doctrine4-23.html (accessed 20 March 2013).


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43 Blair, ‘Prime Minister Warns of Continuing Global Terror Threat’.44 The White House (October 1998), A National Security Strategy for a New Century

(Washington D.C.): p. 2.45 The White House (December 1999), A National Security Strategy for a New

Century (Washington D.C.): p. 25.46 The White House (March 2006), The National Security Strategy of the United

States of America (Washington D.C.): p. 1.47 The White House (May 2010), National Security Strategy (Washington D.C.):

p. 37.48 See Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States and Fernando Teson (1992), ‘The

Kantian Theory of International Law’, Columbia Law Review 92(1): p. 89.49 See Simpson, ‘Two Liberalisms’.50 See Georg Sorensen (2006), ‘Liberalism of Restraint and Liberalism of

Imposition: Liberal Values and World Order in the New Millennium’, International Relations 20(3): pp. 251–72 and Georg Sorensen (2007), ‘After the Security Dilemma: The Challenges of Insecurity in Weak States and the Dilemma of Liberal Values’, Security Dialogue 38(3): pp. 357–78.

51 Christian Reus-Smit (2005), ‘Liberal Hierarchy and the Licence to Use Force’, Review of International Studies 31(S1): p. 72.

52 Beate Jahn (2007), ‘The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, Intervention, Statebuilding (Part Two)’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1(2): p. 213.

53 Fukuyama, The End of History, p. xi.54 Fukuyama, The End of History, p. 282.55 Fukuyama, The End of History, pp. 282–3.56 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane (2004), ‘The Preventive use of Force:

A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal’, Ethics and International Affairs 18(1): pp. 1–22.

57 Heng, War as Risk Management, pp. 35–8; Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, pp. 106–8.

58 David Garland (1996), ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society’, British Journal of Criminology 36(4): pp. 445–71.

59 Nancy Reichman (1986), ‘Managing Crime Risks: Toward an Insurance Based Model of Social Control’, in Andrew T. Scull and Stephen Spitzer (eds), Research in Law, Deviance and Social Control 8 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press): p. 164.

60 Heng, War as Risk Management, p. 37.61 Gordon Hughes (1998), Understanding Crime Prevention: Social Control, Risk

and Late Modernity (Buckingham: Open University Press): p. 59.62 Alan Wright (2002), Policing: An Introduction to Concepts and Practice (Devon:

Willan): pp. 40–2.63 Coker, ‘Risk Management Goes Global’.64 Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, p. 108.65 Hughes, Understanding Crime Prevention, p. 59.66 Reichman, ‘Managing Crime Risks’, p. 158.67 Ronald Clarke (1992), Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies

(New York: Harrow and Heston): p. 4.68 Nikolas Rose (1999), Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press): p. 237.


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150 Notes

69 Hughes, Understanding Crime Prevention, p. 141.70 Coker, ‘Risk Management Goes Global’.71 For example, see The White House (September 2006), National Strategy for

Combating Terrorism (Washington D.C.) and The White House ( June 2011), National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington D.C.).

72 Christopher Hobson (2008), ‘Democracy as Civilisation’, Global Change, Peace and Security 22(1): p. 76.

73 See Sorensen, ‘Liberalism of Restraint and Liberalism of Imposition’ and Sorensen, ‘After the Security Dilemma’.

4 Managing Risks in Europe’s Periphery: The European Neighbourhood Policy

1 Although not a focus of this chapter, an interesting aspect of the 2004 enlargement is the unequal membership conditions that the EU placed on the acceding states. For example, before the enlargement, all 15 member states placed restrictions on the movement of migrants from the Central European states, despite their status as full EU members. See Jon Kvist (2004), ‘Does EU Enlargement Start a Race to the Bottom? Strategic Interaction Among EU Member States in Social Policy’, Journal of European Social Policy 14(3): pp. 301–18.

2 Roland Dannreuther (2008), ‘The European Security Strategy’s Regional Objective: The Neighbourhood Policy’, in Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson (eds), The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe (Oxon: Routledge): p. 63.

3 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World, pp. 12–14.4 See Romano Prodi (5–6 December 2002), ‘A Wider Europe – A Proximity

Policy as the Key to Stability’, SPEECH/02/619, speech delivered at Sixth ECSA-World Conference, Jean Monnet Project (Brussels).

5 Christian Kaunert and Sarah Léonard (2011), ‘EU Counterterrorism and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An Appraisal of the Southern Dimension’, Terrorism and Political Violence 23(2): pp. 286–309.

6 As Jeandesboz argues, the European Neighbourhood Policy is structured through two main discursive structures or narratives, the ‘duty narrative’ and the ‘threat narrative’, which represent the EU’s neighbourhood as posing a range of risks that need to be managed. See Julien Jeandesboz (2007), ‘Labelling the “Neighbourhood”: Towards a Genesis of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, Journal of International Relations and Development 10(4): pp. 387–416.

7 Karen E. Smith (2005), ‘The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy’, International Affairs 81(4): p. 763.

8 NATO (8 November 1991), The Alliance’s Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Rome).

9 The WEU is a separate organisation established in 1948 to provide collective self-defence for its members. It was disbanded in 2011.

10 For more on the evolution of the CFSP and EU foreign relations in general see Council of the European Union (n.d.), ‘The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)’, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/foreign-policy (accessed


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28 March 2013) and European External Action Service (n.d.), ‘What We Do’, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/what_we_do/ (accessed 31 March 2013).

11 It is important to note the context within which the ESS was written, which occurred in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq and can therefore be read as a response to both an increasingly unilateral American foreign policy and the deep schisms that emerged within the EU over the invasion.

12 Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson (2008), ‘Introduction’, in Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson (eds), The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe (Oxon: Routledge): p. 1.

13 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World, p. 6.14 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World, p. 5.15 Javier Solana (26 November 2003), ‘The Voice of Europe on Security Matters’,

S0242/03 (Brussels), http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/78071.pdf (accessed 21 March 2013).

16 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World, p. 11.17 Javier Solana (12 November 2003), ‘The EU Security Strategy: Implications

for Europe’s Role in a Changing World’, S0230/03 (Berlin), http://www. consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/77889.pdf (accessed 15 March 2013).

18 Javier Solana (18 November 2003), ‘Summary of the Address by Mr Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy to the European Parliament’, S0137/03 (Brussels), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/76240.pdf (accessed 19 March 2013).

19 Catherine Ashton (8 July 2010), ‘Europe and the World’, Speech/10/3748 (Athens), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-378_en.htm (accessed 1 April 2013).

20 Royal Institute for International Relations (April 2004), A European Security Concept for the 21st Century, Egmont Paper 1 (Gent: Academia Press): p. 5.

21 United Kingdom (2008), The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World (London: Cabinet Office): p. 3. The UK’s 2010 security strategy likewise emphasises the strategic consequences of globalisation and increasing global interconnectedness. See United Kingdom (2010), A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (London: Cabinet Office).

22 Coker, ‘Risk Management Goes Global’.23 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World, p. 11.24 Council of the European Union (2005), Working for Peace, Stability and

Security: European Union in the World (Brussels: Council of the European Union): p. 6.

25 Christopher S. Browning and Pertti Joenniemi (2008), ‘Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, European Journal of International Relations 14(3): p. 531.

26 This emphasis on preventative activities as a response to contemporary secu-rity issues is one that continues to be a central aspect of EU security policy. See Council of the European Union (11 December 2008), ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World’, S407/08 (Brussels: Council of the European Union).

27 Solana, ‘The EU Security Strategy: Implications for Europe’s Role in a Changing World’.


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28 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World, p. 17.29 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World, p. 11.30 The report on the implementation of the ESS seemingly confirms the idea

that failing to act or acting inadequately will increase the dangers facing Europe. It also suggests that certain risks, such as WMD proliferation, have increased since the adoption of the ESS, while all risks have become more unpredictable and complex. See Council of the European Union, ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy’, p. 3.

31 This precautionary trend is also evident in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy’s emphasis on protection from terrorist attacks. The Strategy focuses on enhanced border controls and ‘target-hardening’ as a precaution against possible terrorist attacks. See Council of the European Union (30 November 2005), The European Union Counter-Terrorist Strategy (Brussels: Council of the European Union): pp. 10–11.

32 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World, p. 16.33 Catherine Ashton (27 September 2011), ‘Statement by EU HR Ashton Ahead

of the Eastern Partnership Summit’, SP11-072EN, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_11439_fr.htm (accessed 30 March 2013).

34 Catherine Ashton (23 February 2011), ‘Remarks by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at the Senior Officials’ Meeting on Egypt and Tunisia’, A 069/11, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119459.pdf (accessed 30 March 2013).

35 Christopher Hill (n.d.), ‘Britain and the European Security Strategy’, FORNET CFSP Forum Working Paper no. 6, http://www.fornet.info/documents/Working%20Paper%20no%206.pdf (accessed 17 November 2012): p. 1.

36 Dan Bilefsky (2 July 2013), ‘Croatia Joins the EU amid Crisis’, The Sydney Morning Herald, http://www.smh.com.au/world/croatia-joins-the-eu-amid-crisis-20130702-2p8p4.html (accessed 30 December 2013).

37 European Commission (n.d.), ‘Enlargement’, http://ec.europa.eu/enlarge-ment/countries/check-current-status/index_en.htm (accessed 28 March 2013).

38 European Commission (n.d.), ‘Conditions for Membership’, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm (accessed 28 March 2013).

39 Browning and Joenniemi, ‘Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, p. 531.

40 Smith, ‘The Outsiders’, p. 758.41 Letter from Jack Straw to Josep Piqué (London: Foreign and Commonwealth

Office, 28 January 2002).42 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World, pp. 12–13.

Albioni makes a similar point, arguing that the EU is faced with neighbours that play a crucial role in ‘soft’ security issues such as terrorism, illegal traf-ficking and organised crime. See Roberto Albioni (2005), ‘The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, European Foreign Affairs Review 10(1): pp. 1–16.

43 European Commission (2007), Working Together: The European Neighbourhood Policy (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities): p. 6.

44 European Commission (2004), A World Player: The European Union’s External Relations (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities): p. 18.


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45 Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine and Belarus (n.d.), ‘The Policy: How does the European Neighbourhood Policy Work’, http://delukr.sdv.com.ua/page45137.html?SESSID=25d9dd1b3ab9efea2943a5ba75aeeda1&template=print (accessed 2 April 2013).

46 Raffaella A. Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher (2005), ‘From EMP to ENP: What’s at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy Towards the Southern Mediterranean?’, European Foreign Affairs Review 10(1): p. 28.

47 Romano Prodi, ‘A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability’.48 See European Commission (11 March 2003), ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood:

A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2003) 104 final (Brussels: European Commission).

49 Current ENP partner countries include Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.

50 European Commission (12 May 2004), ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper’, Communication from the Commission, COM(2004) 373 final (Brussels: European Commission).

51 European External Action Service (n.d.), ‘What is the European Neighbourhood Policy?’, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm (accessed 15 March 2014).

52 European External Action Service (n.d.), ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED)’, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/index_en.htm (accessed 23 March 2013).

53 Danuta Hubner (21 September 2006), ‘Enlargement, Neighbourhood Policy and Globalisation: The Need for an Open Europe’, SPEECH/06/534 (Edinburgh University).

54 European Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper’, p. 3.

55 European Union External Action Service (n.d.), ‘How does itWork?’ http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/how-it-works/index_en.htm (accessed 30 April 2013).

56 European Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper’, p. 5.57 Michelle Pace (2009), ‘Paradoxes and Contradictions in EU Democracy

Promotion in the Mediterranean: The Limits of EU Normative Power’, Democratization 16(1): p. 42.

58 For example, the Action Plans for Armenia, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia all require compliance with UNSCR 1540.

59 Del Sarto and Schumacher, ‘From EMP to ENP’, pp. 23–4.60 The Commission’s communication on a new Wider Europe Framework

explicitly states that ‘shared values’ means ‘Notably democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, as set out within the EU in the Charter of Fundamental Rights’. See European Commission, ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood’, fn 2, p. 4.

61 European Commission (15 February 2012), ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Delivering on a New European Neighbourhood Policy’, JOIN(2012) 14 final, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/delivering_new_enp_en.pdf (accessed 30 April 2012) (italics mine).

62 Smith, ‘The Outsiders’, p. 765.


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63 Gabriella Meloni (Summer 2007), ‘Who’s My Neighbour?’, European Political Economy Review 7, pp. 24–37.

64 European Commission (2 March 2008), ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Country Report: Armenia’, Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2005) 285/3 (Brussels: European Commission).

65 See European Commission, ‘European Neighbourhood Strategy Paper’.66 Jose Manuel Barroso (3 September 2007), ‘Shared Challenges, Shared Futures:

Taking the Neighbourhood Policy Forward’, SPEECH/07/502, speech given at the European Neighbourhood Policy Conference (Brussels) (italics mine).

67 European Commission, ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood’, p. 4.68 European Commission (25 May 2011), ‘A New Response to a Changing

Neighbourhood: A Review of European Neighbourhood Policy’, Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission, COM(2011) 303 (Brussels: European Commission): p. 3.

69 It should be noted that the EU has recently supplemented this bilateralism with a more regional approach in the form of the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership. The latter combines new multilateral initia-tives with enhanced bilateral relations between the EU and its Eastern part-ners. See European Commission (20 May 2008), ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2008) 319 (final) (Brussels: European Commission) and European Commission (3 December 2008), ‘Eastern Partnership’, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2008) 823 final (Brussels: European Commission).

70 Smith, ‘The Outsiders’, pp. 762–3.71 As Tassinari argues, the bilateral partnership approach of the ENP is thus a

veiled form of unilateralism – the EU acts individually in setting the stan-dards and values that it wishes to promote. See Fabrizio Tassinari (1 July 2005), ‘Security and Integration in the EU Neighbourhood: The Case for Regionalism’, CEPS Working Document No. 226 (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies): p. 5.

72 Most of the main documents and information sources on the ENP published by the European Commission and cited in this chapter speak of the ENP in these terms. The emphasis in these documents is of course on notions of ‘partnership’ and ‘mutual ownership’.

73 Browning and Joenniemi, ‘Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, p. 533.

74 European External Action Service, ‘How Does it Work’?75 For example, see Smith, ‘The Outsiders’; Browning and Joenniemi,

‘Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy’ and Hiski Haukkala (2008), ‘The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy’, Europe-Asia Studies 60(9): pp. 1601–22.

76 See United Kingdom, National Security Strategy, p. 24.77 As Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton stressed the need for the international

community, including the US, to provide support for Arab states transition-ing to democracy. For example see Hillary Rodham Clinton (12 March 2012), ‘Remarks at the United Nations Security Council’, http://www.state.gov/ secretary/rm/2012/03/185623.htm (accessed 10 May 2013).


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78 Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff (2012), ‘Much Ado about Nothing? The European Neighbourhood Policy in Context’, in Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff (eds), The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context, Implementation and Practice (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

79 Peter Seeberg (2009), ‘The EU as a Realist Actor in Normative Clothes: EU Democracy Promotion in Lebanon and the European Neighbourhood Policy’, Democratization 16(1): p. 82. Also see Pace, ‘Paradoxes and Contradictions in EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean’.

80 European Commission, ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood’, pp. 2–3.

81 Benita Ferrero-Waldner (17 October 2006), ‘The European Union and Central Asia – Building a 21st Century Partnership’, SPEECH/06/615 (L.N. Gumilyev Eurasian National University, Astana).

5 Australia and the Management of Risk in the South Pacific

1 This emphasis on liberal good governance was apparent in the regional development policies of the former Keating government in the mid-1990s and continues to this day. See Greg Fry and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (2008), ‘Political Legitimacy and State-Building Intervention in the Pacific’, in Greg Fry and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (eds), Intervention and State-building in the Pacific: The Legitimacy of Co-operative Intervention (Manchester: Manchester University Press): p. 14 and William Sutherland (2000), ‘Global Imperatives and Economic Reform in the Pacific Island States’, Development and Change 31(2): pp. 459–80.

2 Elisa Wainwright (2003), Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon Islands (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute): p. 8. However, the Keating government did attempt to condition aid funding on compliance with Australian notions of good governance. See Greg Fry (1994), ‘Climbing Back Unto the Map? The South Pacific Forum and the New Development Orthodoxy’, Journal of Pacific History 29(3): pp. 64–72.

3 Wainwright, Our Failing Neighbour, p. 8.4 This view is part of a broader international concern with state failure and

the dangers posed by weak or failed states to Western security interests that emerged after 9/11. See David Chandler (2005), ‘Introduction: Peace Without Politics’, International Peacekeeping 12(3): pp. 307–21 and Robert I. Rotberg (2002), ‘Failed States in a World of Terror’, Foreign Affairs 81(4): pp. 127–40.

5 The term ‘arc of instability’ is one that has been popularised by the Australian government and the media. For more on the concept and Australia’s interac-tions with the region see Dennis Rumley, Vivian Louis Forbes and Christopher Griffin (eds) (2006), Australia’s Arc of Instability: The Political and Cultural Dynamics of Regional Security (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer).

6 The idea that terrorists could use weak or failing states as bases is one that first gained prominence in the US after the September 11 terrorist attacks. See Commission on Weak States and US National Security (2004), On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security (Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development): p. 1.


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7 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2003), Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy Whitepaper (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia): p. 93.

8 Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (2005), ‘Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI Intervention in Solomon Islands’, The Contemporary Pacific 17(2): p. 299.

9 Michael Wesley (2002), ‘Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 2001’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 56(1): pp. 47–63.

10 Alexander Downer (26 June 2003), ‘Security in an Unstable World’ (Canberra: National Press Club), http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2003/ 030626_unstableworld.html (accessed 30 November 2013).

11 This includes the risk that terrorists might acquire WMD. See Australian Department of Defence, Defence Update 2007, p. 9.

12 Downer, ‘Security in an Unstable World’.13 Alexander Downer (24 September 2003), ‘Speech to the United Nations

General Assembly’ (New York: United Nations General Assembly), http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2003/030924_general_assembly_ny.html (accessed 30 November 2013).

14 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest, p. ix.15 Alexander Downer (7 May 2002), ‘Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s

Foreign Policy Challenge’ (Canberra: National Press Club), http://foreign-minister.gov.au/speeches/2002/020507_fa_whitepaper.html (accessed 30 November 2013).

16 See Alexander Downer (1 March 2001), ‘Australia – Meeting our International Challenges’ (Canberra: National Press Club), http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2001/010301_fa_npc.html (accessed 30 November 2013).

17 Australian Department of Defence (2000), Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia): p. 15.

18 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest, p. ix.19 Australian Department of Defence (2005), Australia’s National Security: A

Defence Update 2005 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia): p. 3.20 Alexander Downer (22 August 2007), ‘Australian Foreign Policy Today and

Tomorrow’ (Melbourne: Monash University), http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2007/070822_monash.html (accessed 30 November 2013).

21 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest, p. 124.

22 Australian Department of Defence (2003), Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia): p. 9.

23 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest, p. 18.24 Department of Defence, Defence Update 2005, p. 4. Also see Department of

Defence, Defence Update 2007, p. 9.25 As Hameiri notes, the post-Cold War era has generally witnessed high levels

of growth in the interest of policy makers and scholars with the issue of state failure. See Shahar Hameiri (2007), ‘Failed States or a Failed Paradigm? State Capacity and the Limits of Institutionalism’, Journal of International Relations and Development 10(2): p. 122.

26 The idea of re-organising and re-configuring state institutions and processes of governance bears some similarity to Power’s arguments regarding contem-porary organisational responses to risk, a key element of which has been the rise of internal control systems that involve organisation or system-wide


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regulatory mechanisms and processes designed to manage risk. It is possible to view good governance as a form of internal control system of the state, providing regulatory frameworks and processes that manage a range of pos-sible social, political, economic and security risks. See Power, The Risk Management of Everything, pp. 24–8 and Michael Power (2007), Organized Uncertainty: Designing a World of Risk Management (Oxford: Oxford University Press): pp. 34–65.

27 Susan M. Roberts, Sarah Wright and Phillip O’Neill (2007), ‘Good Governance in the Pacific? Ambivalence and Possibility’, Geoforum 38(5): p. 971 (italics in original).

28 Thomas G. Weiss (2000), ‘Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges’, Third World Quarterly 21(5): p. 795.

29 Elise Huffer (2005), ‘Governance, Corruption and Ethics in the Pacific’, The Contemporary Pacific 17(1): p. 118.

30 See Martin Doornbos (2001), ‘“Good Governance”: The Rise and Decline of a Policy Metaphor?’, Journal of Development Studies 37(6): pp. 93–108.

31 See Roberts et al, ‘Good Governance in the Pacific?’ and Weiss, ‘Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance’.

32 Roberts, et al, ‘Good Governance in the Pacific?’, p. 971; Weiss, ‘Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance’, pp. 795–8.

33 The broader nexus between the discourses of security and development is one that has recently received increasing scholarly attention. See Mark Duffield (2001), Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (London: Zed Books).

34 AusAID (n.d.), ‘Fragile States and Australia’s Aid Program’, http://www. ausaid.gov.au/keyaid/fragile_states.cfm (accessed 10 September 2009).

35 Alexander Downer (11 July 2006), ‘40 Years of Australian Foreign Policy – Democracy, Liberalism and Australia’s National Interests’ (Adelaide: Flinders University), http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2006/060711_40years.html (accessed 30 November 2013).

36 AusAID (2000), Good Governance: Guiding Principles for Implementation (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia): p. 3.

37 Francis Fukuyama (2004), State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press): pp. 26–7.

38 Downer, ‘40 Years of Australian Foreign Policy’.39 Shahar Hameiri (2007), ‘The Trouble with RAMSI: Reexamining the Roots of

Conflict in Solomon Islands’, The Contemporary Pacific 19(2): p. 410.40 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest,

p. xviii (italics mine).41 Downer, ‘Australian Foreign Policy Today and Tomorrow’.42 Alexander Downer, quoted in Yaroslav Trofimov (28 July 2007), ‘Australia Takes

Policeman’s Role in Strife-Ridden Island Nations’, Wall Street Journal Online, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121720516864888693.html?mod=todays_us_page_one#articleTabs%3D article (accessed 31 July 2009).

43 Fry and Kabutaulaka, ‘Political Legitimacy and State-Building Intervention in the Pacific’, p. 15.



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46 Wainwright, Our Failing Neighbour, p. 13.47 Sinclair Dinnen, Abby McLeod and Gordon Peake (2006), ‘Police-Building in

Weak States: Australian Approaches in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands’, Civil Wars 8(2): pp. 87–108.

48 Shahar Hameiri (2008), ‘Risk Management, Neo-liberalism and the Securitisation of the Australian Aid Program’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 62(3): pp. 57–71.

49 Mark Beeson (2007), ‘The Declining Theoretical and Practical Utility of “Bandwagoning”: American Hegemony in the Age of Terror’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 9(4): p. 627; Trofimov, ‘Australia Takes Policeman’s Role in Strife-Ridden Island Nations’.

50 Debra McDougall (2006), ‘New Interventions, Old Asymmetries: Australia and the Solomon Islands’, The New Critic 3, http://www.ias.uwa.edu.au/ newcritic/three/newinterventions (accessed 30 November 2013).

51 John Howard (12 August 2003), Ministerial Statement to Parliament on the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia), http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/10052/ 20030821-0000/www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech422.html (accessed 1 December 2013).

52 See Beth K. Greener-Barcham and Manuhuia Barcham (2006), ‘Terrorism in the South Pacific? Thinking Critically about Approaches to Security in the Region’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 60(1): pp. 67–82.

53 Nick Warner (23 March 2004), ‘Operation Helpem Fren: Rebuilding the Nation of Solomon Islands’, speech to National Security Conference (Sydney), http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/department/040323_nsc_ramsi.html (accessed 1 December 2013).

54 Hameiri, ‘The Trouble with RAMSI’, p. 410.55 See Hameiri, ‘The Trouble with RAMSI’, p. 425; Dinnen et al, ‘Police-building

in Weak States’, p. 96. Also see Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (2001), ‘Beyond Ethnicity: The Political Economy of the Guadalcanal Crisis in Solomon Islands’, State Society and Governance in Melanesia Project Discussion Paper 1/2001 (Canberra: Australian National University).

56 See ‘Townsville Peace Agreement: An Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities Between the Malaita Eagle Force and the Isatabu Freedom Movement and for the Restoration of Peace and Ethnic Harmony in Solomon Islands’ (15 October 2000), http://www.commerce.gov.sb//Gov/Peace_Agreement.htm (accessed 30 November 2013).

57 Hameiri, ‘The Trouble with RAMSI’, p. 410.58 Sinclair Dinnen (2004), ‘Lending a Fist? Australia’s New Interventionism in

the Southwest Pacific’, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project Discussion Paper 2004/5 (Canberra: Australia National University): p. 4.

59 Alexander Downer (8 January 2003), ‘Neighbours Cannot be Recolonised’, The Australian: p. 11.

60 Shahar Hameiri (2009), ‘State Building or Crisis Management? The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands and the Limits of State Transformation’, Third World Quarterly 30(1): pp. 35–52.


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61 Michael Fullilove (March 2006), ‘The Testament of Solomons: RAMSI and International State-Building’ (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy): p. 1.

62 Julien Barbara (2008), ‘Antipodean Statebuilding: The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands and Australian Intervention in the South Pacific’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2(2): p. 141.

63 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (2005), ‘Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations’, International Security 29(4): p. 186.

64 Bellamy and Williams, ‘Who’s Keeping the Peace?’, p. 186.65 An agreement between Solomon Islands and each contributor to RAMSI pro-

vided the initial consent for the intervention. See ‘Agreement between the Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Tonga Concerning the Operations and Status of the Police and Armed Forces and Other Personnel Deployed to the Solomon Islands to Assist in the Restoration of Law and Order and Security’ (9 September 2003), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2003/17.html (accessed 2 December 2013).

66 Tim George (November 2007), ‘Message From the Special Coordinator’, RAMSI Brief, http://www.ramsi.org/files/ramsi_brief_final_v2.pdf (accessed 20 September 2008): p. 7.

67 RAMSI (November 2007), RAMSI Brief, http://www.ramsi.org/files/ramsi_brief_final_v2.pdf (accessed 20 September 2009): p. 11.

68 RAMSI, RAMSI Brief, p. 22.69 AFP officer Shane Castles was sworn in as the Commissioner of the RSIP in

2005 before the Sogavare government declared him an ‘undesirable immi-grant’ in 2006. See ABC News (27 December 2006), ‘Solomons Shuts out Police Chief’, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2006/12/27/1818671.htm (accessed 2 December 2013). The Commander of the PPF also serves as the Deputy Commissioner of the RSIP.

70 RAMSI (2013), ‘Ministry of Finance and Treasury Organisational Development’, http://www.ramsi.org/our-work/economic-governance/ministry-of-finance-organisational-development.html (accessed 2 December 2013).

71 Michael G. Morgan and Abby McLeod (2006), ‘Have We Failed Our Neighbour?’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 60(3): p. 420.

72 The Facilitation of International Assistance Act, passed unanimously in the Solomon Islands parliament on 17 July 2003, provides for this immunity. This Act is ratified each year to provide the legal basis for RAMSI’s presence in Solomon Islands. See Solomon Islands National Parliament (17 July 2003), Facilitation of International Assistance Act, No. 1 of 2003 (Honiara), www.paclii.org/sb/legis/num_act/foiaa2003386/ (accessed 2 December 2013): s23(1).

73 Allan Patience (2005), ‘The ECP and Australia’s Middle Power Ambitions’, State Society and Governance in Melanesia Project Discussion Paper 2005/4 (Canberra: Australian National University): p. 8.

74 Morgan and McLeod, ‘Have We Failed Our Neighbour?’, p. 413.75 It should be noted, however, that several commentators have discussed issues

relating to the appropriateness of external institutions and liberal forms of governance in weak states on state building. See Sinclair Dinnen (2008), ‘Dilemmas of Intervention and the Building of State and Nation’, in Sinclair


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Dinnen and Stewart Firth (eds) Politics and State Building in Solomon Islands (Canberra: ANU E Press/Asia Pacific Press): p. 9.

76 Morgan and McLeod, ‘Have We Failed Our Neighbour?’, p. 417.77 As Huffer argues, one of the problems with the governance agenda in the

Pacific and elsewhere is its heavy reliance on Western thought and its accom-panying principles of economic and political liberalism. See Huffer, ‘Governance, Corruption and Ethics in the Pacific’, p. 119.

78 Hameiri similarly contends that reconstituting state-society relations in Solomon Islands is precisely the point of RAMSI’s capacity-building pro-grammes. See Hameiri, ‘State Building or Crisis Management?’, p. 42.

79 For example, see RAMSI’s website, http://www.ramsi.org/.80 See Paris, At War’s End.81 Hameiri, Regulating Statehood, p. 160.82 This bears some similarity to Chesterman’s notion of state building through

‘benevolent autocracy’. See Simon Chesterman (2004), ‘Building Democracy Through Benevolent Autocracy: Consultation and Accountability in UN Transitional Administrations’, in Edward Newman and Roland Rich (eds), The UN Role in Promoting Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality (Tokyo: United Nations University Press): pp. 86–112 and Simon Chesterman (2004), You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building (Oxford: Oxford University Press): pp. 126–53.

83 Hameiri, ‘State Building or Crisis Management?’, p. 43.84 Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2004), Strengthening Our Neighbour:

Australia and the Future of Papua New Guinea (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute): p. 8.

85 Geoff Dixon, Michael Gene and Neil Walter (March 2008), ‘Joint Review of the Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP)’, http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Documents/ecp_final_report2008.pdf (accessed 3 December 2013): p. 15.

86 Dixon et al., ‘Joint Review of the Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP)’, p. 15.

87 Patience, ‘The ECP and Australia’s Middle Power Ambitions’, p. 5.88 Patricia Karvelas (16 March 2004), ‘Downer, PNG at Odds Over PNG

Immunity’, The Australian.89 Dinnen, ‘Lending a Fist?’, p. 8.90 Alexander Downer (11 December 2003), ‘New Era of Cooperation With PNG’

(Canberra), http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2003/fa158_03.html (accessed 3 December 2013).

91 ‘Joint Agreement on Enhanced Cooperation between Australia and Papua New Guinea’ (30 June 2004), Australasian Legal Information Institute (Port Moresby), http://138.25.65.50/au/other/dfat/treaties/2004/24.html (accessed 24 September 2008): articles 3(6) and 8(1).

92 ‘Joint Agreement on Enhanced Cooperation’: article 8(3).93 Stewart Firth (2008), ‘The New Regionalism and its Contradictions’, in Greg

Fry and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (eds), Intervention and State-Building in the Pacific: The Legitimacy of ‘Cooperative Intervention’ (Manchester: Manchester University Press): p. 208.

94 Rosita McDonald (2008), ‘Safety, Security and Accessible Justice: Participatory Approaches to Law and Justice Reform in Papua New Guinea’, Pacific Islands Policy 3 (Honolulu: East-West Center): p. 5.


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95 Thaddeus Lin (2007), ‘Institutional Capacity and Cooperation for Policing Operations: The Australian Experience’, International Peacekeeping 14(5): p. 578.

96 Alexander Downer (24 August 2005), ‘Speech at the Australia-Papua New Guinea Business Council Breakfast’ (Port Moresby), www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2005/050824_png.html (accessed 18 December 2013).

97 Downer, ‘40 Years of Australian Foreign Policy’.98 See RAMSI Office of the Special Coordinator (July 2013), ‘RAMSI’s Achievements,

2003–2013’, http://www.ramsi.org/Media/docs/Background-Briefing-for-Pacific- Islands-Forum-bd5f3eb9-163e-4b3b-848f-65ad589360a3-0.pdf (accessed 19 December 2013).

99 David Chandler (2006), Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building (London: Pluto): p. 9.

100 As of writing, there have been 7 PPF Commanders: Ben McDevitt, Sandi Peisley, Will Jamieson, Denis McDermott, Wayne Buchhorn, Paul Osbourne and Greg Harrigan. All were serving or retired members of the AFP upon assuming the position of PPF Commander.

101 Fayssal Mekdad (26 August 2008), ‘Press Statement on Solomon Islands by Security Council President’, SC/7853, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 2003/sc7853.doc.htm (accessed 4 December 2013).

102 Sogavare accused RAMSI of running a parallel administration and of attempt-ing to undermine Solomon Islands’ sovereignty. See Campbell Cooney (16 October 2007), ‘RAMSI Undermining Solomons’ Sovereignty: Sogavare’, ABC News, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2007-10-15/ramsi-undermining-solomons-sovereignty-sogavare/699998 (accessed 4 December 2013).

103 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (2013), Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia): pp. 10–11.

6 Preventing Risks and Changing Regimes: The 2003 Invasion of Iraq

1 See United States National Security Council (November 2005), National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (Washington D.C.: National Security Council).

2 Christine Gray (2008), International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn) (Oxford: Oxford University Press): p. 2.

3 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, p. 3. The invasion caused a sig-nificant rift between the US and several of its allies, particularly France and Germany.

4 For example, Michael Ignatieff advocates a more sophisticated version of the ‘oil thesis’, arguing that the invasion of Iraq was motivated by America’s desire to consolidate its position as a guarantor of oil supplies for the Western economy. While Ignatieff does suggest that we also need to take account of Bush’s moralism and his desire to spread freedom to the Iraqis, he effectively dismisses the rhetoric employed by Bush in the lead-up to the war, rhetoric that continually affirmed the need to act against the risks posed by Hussein’s regime. See Michael Ignatieff (7 September 2003), ‘Why are We in Iraq? (And Liberia? And Afghanistan?)’, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/07/magazine/why-are-we-in-iraq-and-liberia-and-afghanistan.html (accessed 29 June 2008).


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5 See David Teather (2003), ‘American to Oversee Iraqi Oil Industry’, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/apr/26/iraq.oil (accessed 21 December 2013).

6 For example, Clark argues that the US invasion of Iraq was not simply moti-vated by control of Iraqi oil, but also for control of the means by which oil is globally traded. Scott and Ambler also suggest that the ‘grab for oil’ was an obvious political motivation for the invasion in the US that threatened to undermine the Bush administration’s claim that it was consistent with inter-national law. See William R. Clark (2005), Petrodollar Warfare (Gabriola Island, Canada: New Society) and Shirley V. Scott and Olivia Ambler (2007), ‘Does Legality Really Matter? Accounting for the Decline in US Foreign Policy Legitimacy Following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq’, European Journal of International Relations 13(1): pp. 67–87.

7 Of course, while perceptions of risk were central to the justifications provided for war, it is extremely difficult to conclusively say that these risks were in fact the primary motivation for military action. However, it will be demonstrated below that perceptions of risk were the primary justification provided for the war by Bush, Blair and Howard in particular.

8 United Nations Security Council (11 November 2002), Resolution 1441: The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, UN Doc SC/Res 1441 (2002).


10 Indeed, the dangers posed by Iraq were often explicitly described as ‘risks’ rather than ‘threats’.

11 For a thorough overview of the reasons and motivations behind the invasion of Iraq, see George Packer (2005), The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux).

12 United Nations Security Council (3 April 1991), Resolution 687: Iraq-Kuwait, UN Doc SC/Res 687 (1991).

13 The IAEA was charged with overseeing Iraq’s nuclear disarmament. See David M. Malone (2006), The International Struggle Over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council 1980–2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press): p. 153.

14 Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (2002), ‘UNSCOM: Between Iraq and a Hard Place’, European Journal of International Law 13(1): p. 144.

15 See Christine Gray (2002), ‘From Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of Force against Iraq’, European Journal of International Law 13(1): p. 11.

16 Christoph Bluth (2004), ‘The British Road to War: Blair, Bush and the Decision to Invade Iraq’, International Affairs 80(5): pp. 871–92.

17 George W. Bush (29 January 2002), ‘2002 State of the Union Address’ (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary).

18 A UN report regarding disarmament in Iraq concluded that UNSCOM and IAEA inspections had eliminated the bulk of Iraq’s proscribed weapons. Questions did remain, however, regarding certain elements of Iraq’s WMD programmes, and the report concluded that a level of uncertainty would remain regarding the complete verification of Iraq’s WMD. See Letter dated 27 March 1999, from the Chairman of the Panels established pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council of 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100) addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/1999/356.

19 Bush, ‘2002 State of the Union Address’.


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20 George W. Bush (3 December 2002), ‘Excerpts from Remarks in Louisiana Welcome’ (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary). Also see George W. Bush (7 September 2002), ‘President Bush, Prime Minister Blair Discuss Keeping the Peace’ (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary).

21 Tony Blair (11 November 2002), ‘PM Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet’ (London: Office of the Prime Minister).

22 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, pp. 35–69.23 George W. Bush (13 March 2002), ‘President Bush Holds Press Conference’

(Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary).24 George W. Bush (26 September 2002), ‘President Bush Discusses Iraq with

Congressional Leaders’ (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary).25 George W. Bush (28 January 2003), ‘2003 State of the Union Address’

(Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary) (italics mine).26 George W. Bush (25 February 2003), ‘President Meets with National Economic

Council’ (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary).27 Tony Blair (10 September 2002), ‘Prime Minister’s Speech to TUC Conference

in Blackpool’ (London: Office of the Prime Minister).28 Bluth, ‘The British Road to War’, p. 879.29 Tony Blair (13 January 2003), ‘PM: “Saddam Should Take the Peaceful Route

and Disarm”’, http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page3005.asp (accessed 9 July 2007).

30 Blair, ‘Prime Minister Warns of Continuing Global Terror Threat’.31 John Howard (4 February 2003), Ministerial Statement to Parliament on Iraq

(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia), http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/ 10052/20030821-0000/www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech69.html (accessed 15 November 2013).

32 George W. Bush (14 September 2002), ‘President Discusses Growing Danger posed by Saddam Hussein’s Regime’ (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary) (italics mine).

33 George W. Bush (7 October 2002), ‘President Outlines Iraqi Threat’ (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary).

34 International Atomic Energy Agency (8 August 2003), Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to Iraq, IAEA Report GOV/2003/50-GC(47)/10: p. 4.

35 George W. Bush (7 November 2002), ‘President Outlines Priorities’ (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary). Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee from 2001–2003, similarly suggested that ‘the whole question of removing him [Hussein] involves a balancing of risks in the face of uncertainty’. See Richard Perle (1 August 2002), ‘Why the West Must Strike First’, On the Issues (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute), http://www.aei.org/issue/14187 (accessed 16 July 2008).

36 DIO Assessment (10 October 2002), cited in Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD (2004), Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia): p. 36.

37 Parliamentary Joint Committee, Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 29.

38 ONA Assessment (6 September 2002), cited in Parliamentary Joint Committee, Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 29.


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164 Notes

39 Intelligence and Security Committee (September 2003), Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments (London: Intelligence and Security Committee): p. 20.

40 Intelligence and Security Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 20.41 Intelligence and Security Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 19.42 National Intelligence Council (2002), ‘Iraq’s Continuing Program for

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Key Judgments (from October 2002 NIE)’, https://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd.html (accessed 20 December 2013).

43 National Intelligence Council, ‘Iraq’s Continuing Program for Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (italics mine).

44 Lawrence Freedman (2004), ‘War in Iraq: Selling the Threat’, Survival 46(2): p. 34.45 Bush, ‘President Outlines Iraqi Threat’.46 Bush, ‘President Discusses Growing Danger’.47 Blair, ‘Prime Minister Warns of Continuing Global Terror Threat’.48 United States Congress (2 October 2002), Joint Resolution to Authorise the

Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq (Washington D.C.), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-2.html (accessed 18 November 2013).

49 Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, p. 126.50 Bush, ‘President Outlines Iraqi Threat’.51 Bush, ‘President Bush, Prime Minister Blair Discuss Keeping the Peace’.52 Nevertheless, promoting liberal values or democracy was indeed a part of the

justifications provided for the invasion. See Katerina Dalacoura (2005), ‘US Democracy Promotion in the Arab Middle East since 11 September 2001: A Critique’, International Affairs 81(5): p. 965.

53 The initial combat phase commenced on 20 March 2003 and ended on 1 May 2003 when Bush infamously landed on the flight deck of the US Navy aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and declared that major combat operations were over in front of a banner that read ‘Mission Accomplished’.

54 Blair, ‘PM Warns of Continuing Terror Threat’.55 Christopher Hobson (2005), ‘A Forward Strategy of Freedom in the Middle

East: US Democracy Promotion and the “War on Terror”’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 59(1): pp. 39–53.

56 The White House, National Security Strategy (2002), pp. iv–vi.57 George W. Bush (20 February 2003), ‘President Meets with Small Business

Owners in Georgia’ (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary).58 George W. Bush (26 February 2003), ‘President Discusses the Future of Iraq’

(Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary).59 Bush, ‘President Discusses the Future of Iraq’.60 Omar G. Encarnacion (2005), ‘The Follies of Democratic Imperialism’, World

Policy Journal 22(1): p. 47.61 Philip Gordon (2003), ‘Bush’s Middle East Vision’, Survival 45(1): pp. 155–65.62 For example, the Howard Government repeatedly made the claim that

Australian forces had to stay in Iraq until the job was done while it was in power. See Richard Woolcott (10 September 2002), ‘Why We Are a Bigger Target’, The Age, http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/09/09/1094530764777.html (accessed 13 November 2013).



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Notes 165

64 George W. Bush (2 February 2005), ‘2005 State of the Union Address’ (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary).


66 See George W. Bush (20 January 2004), ‘2004 State of the Union Address’ (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary); George W. Bush (23 January 2007), ‘2007 State of the Union Address’ (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary).

67 National Security Council, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.68 This notion was part of a broader neo-conservative outlook on the Middle

East and US foreign policy that had been articulated in a 1998 letter to then President Clinton prior to Bush’s 2000 election victory. This letter, sent by the neo-conservative group Project for a New American Century and con-taining several future Bush administration officials, such as Donald Rumsfeld, urged Clinton to consider replacing Hussein’s regime with a democratic government to prevent him from acquiring WMD. See Project for a New American Century (26 January 1998), ‘Letter to President Bill Clinton’, http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm (accessed 20 June 2008).

69 See Christian Reus-Smit (2004), American Power and World Order (Cambridge: Polity).

70 Tony Blair (8 April 2003), ‘Press Conference: Prime Minister Tony Blair and President George W. Bush’ (London: Office of the Prime Minister).

71 Jim Garamone (17 July 2003), ‘Blair Says Freedom, Liberty Best Weapons Against Terrorism’, US Department of Defence, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=28710 (accessed 18 November 2013).

72 L. Elaine Halchin (29 April 2005), ‘The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities’, Congressional Research Service Report (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service): pp. 1–2.

73 Halchin, ‘The Coalition Provisional Authority’, pp. 2–3.74 Larry Diamond (2005), Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the

Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (New York: Owl Books): p. 36.75 Coalition Provisional Authority (n.d.), ‘A Historic Review of CPA

Accomplishments’, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB654.pdf (accessed 19 November 2013): pp. 2–3.

76 Coalition Provisional Authority, ‘A Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments’, p. 4.

77 Coalition Provisional Authority (16 May 2003), ‘Regulation One: The Coalition Provisional Authority’, CPA/REG/16 May 2003/01.

78 United Nations Security Council (22 May 2003), Resolution 1483: The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, UN Doc S/RES 1483 (2003).

79 A list of CPA orders, regulations and memoranda is available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/ (accessed 19 November 2013).

80 Coalition Provisional Authority (16 May 2003), ‘Order Number One: De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society’, CPA/ORD/16 May 2003/01.

81 Coalition Provisional Authority, ‘Order Number One’. ‘Senior Party Members’ includes any full member with the rank of Regional Command Member, Branch Member, Section Member or Group Member.

82 Coalition Provisional Authority, ‘Order Number One’.83 Coalition Provisional Authority, ‘Order Number One’.


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166 Notes

84 Coalition Provisional Authority (23 May 2003), ‘Order Number Two: Dissolution of Entities’, CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02.

85 Bremer later conceded that prior to departing for Iraq he had been shown a memo specifying that the Coalition would eliminate all remnants of Hussein’s regime. See L. Paul Bremer (6 September 2007), ‘How I Didn’t Dismantle Iraq’s Army’, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2007/09/06/opinion/06bremer.html?_r=0 (accessed 28 December 2013).

86 Miranda Sissons and Abdulrazzaq Al-Saiedi (12 March 2013), ‘Iraq’s de-Baathification Still Haunts the Country’, Al-Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/03/201331055338463426.html (accessed 18 November 2013). As Sissons and Al-Saiedi note, the net result of de-Ba’athification was the intensification and deepening of sectarian, political and social divisions in Iraq.

87 Sissons and Al-Saiedi, ‘Iraq’s de-Baathification’.88 Coalition Provisional Authority (13 July 2003), ‘Regulation Number Six:

Governing Council of Iraq’, CPA/REG/13 July 2003/06.89 BBC News (14 July 2003), ‘Iraqi Governing Council Members’, http://news.

bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3062897.stm (accessed 19 November 2013).90 Kenneth Katzman (21 July 2004), ‘Iraq: Transition to Sovereignty’,

Congressional Research Service Report (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service): p. 1.

91 Katzman, ‘Iraq: Transition to Sovereignty’, p. 1.92 Coalition Provisional Authority (8 March 2004), ‘Law of Administration for

the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period’, http://www.law.case.edu/ saddamtrial/documents/TAL.pdf/TAL.html (accessed 19 November 2013).

93 Katzman, ‘Iraq: Transition to Sovereignty’, p. 3.94 BBC News (28 June 2004), ‘US hands back power in Iraq’, http://news.bbc.

co.uk/2/hi/europe/3845517.stm (accessed 19 November 2013).95 Rory McCarthy (29 June 2003), ‘Confident Bremer Hurries Away From

Baghdad via the Back Door’, The Guardian, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jun/29/iraq.usa (accessed 19 November 2013).

96 George W. Bush (24 May 2004), ‘President Outlines Steps to Help Iraq Achieve Freedom and Democracy’ (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary).

97 Chandler, Empire in Denial, p. 167; Encarnacion, ‘The Follies of Democratic Imperialism’, p. 57.

98 Samantha L. Quigley (24 October 2005), ‘Iraqi Referendum Seen as a Security Success’, US Department of Defense, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=17979 (accessed 21 November 2013).

99 International Mission for Iraqi Elections (12 April 2006), ‘Final Report on the December 15, 2005 Iraqi Council of Representatives Elections’, http://www.elections.ca/imie/pdf/final_report.pdf (accessed 18 November 2013).

100 Kenneth Katzman (2013), ‘Iraq: Politics, Governance and Human Rights’, Congressional Research Service Report (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service): p. 4.

101 Michael J. Boyle (2009), ‘Bargaining, Fear, and Denial: Explaining Violence Against Civilians in Iraq 2004–2007’, Terrorism and Political Violence 21(2): p. 261.

102 Katzman, ‘Iraq: Politics, Governance and Human Rights’, p. 5.


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Notes 167

103 President Obama announced that American troops would withdrawal from Iraq before the end of 2011 on 21 October 2011. See Mark Landler (21 October 2011), ‘U.S. Troops to Leave Iraq by Year’s End, Obama Says’, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/world/middleeast/ president-obama-announces-end-of-war-in-iraq.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 20 December 2013).

104 Ramesh Thakur (2006), The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): p. 241 and Dunne, ‘Society and Hierarchy’.

105 Dunne, ‘Society and Hierarchy’, p. 306.106 Dunne, ‘Society and Hierarchy’, p. 306.107 Wheatley notes that while the invasion itself was subject to extensive con-

troversy and debate, the subsequent efforts to establish a democratic regime in Iraq were not. See Steven Wheatley (2006), ‘The Security Council, Democratic Legitimacy and Regime Change in Iraq’, European Journal of International Law 17(3): p. 532.

108 See United States Department of State (2008), ‘Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq’, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122074.pdf (accessed 21 November 2013). This agreement provided for the withdrawal of all US troops by 31 December 2011. Despite this, the Obama administration later negotiated with the Iraqi government to keep some US forces in Iraq after this time. These negotiations were not successful, however, due to the failure of Iraq and the US to sign a new agreement providing immunity for US military personnel. All US forces withdrew from Iraq on 16 December 2011.

109 This lack of accountability, and the numerous incidents of civilian deaths arising either directly or indirectly from US military actions, made it politi-cally very difficult for al-Maliki’s government to sign an agreement extend-ing immunity provisions for US military personnel.

110 Security Council, Resolution 1483, p. 2.111 Security Council, Resolution 1483, p. 3 (italics mine); Wheatley, ‘The Security

Council’: pp. 534–5.112 United Nations Security Council (16 October 2003), Resolution 1511: The

Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, UN Doc S/Res/1511 (2003): p. 3.113 For example, see United Nations Security Council (8 June 2004), Resolution

1546 – Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, UN Doc S/Res/1546 (2004) and United Nations Security Council (28 November 2006), Resolution 1723 – Iraq, UN Doc S/Res/1723 (2006).

114 Michael J. Mazzar (2003), ‘George W. Bush, Idealist’, International Affairs 79(3): pp. 503–22.

Conclusion

1 Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, p. 175.2 Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, p. 175.3 Ian Clark (2013), The Vulnerable in International Society (Oxford: Oxford

University Press): p. 158.


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168 Notes

4 Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, p. 27.5 Hurrell, On Global Order, p. 292.6 Andrew Linklater (1998), The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical

Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity Press): p. 59.7 See Simpson, ‘Two Liberalisms’ and Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States.8 See Reus-Smit, ‘Liberal Hierarchy and the Licence to Use Force’.9 Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, p. 41.

10 ABC News (05 January 2014), ‘Residents Flee Fallujah as Iraq Government Tries to Retake City from Al Qaeda-Linked ISIS Militants’, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-01-05/iraq-prepares-to-retake-fallujah/5185612 (accessed 25 January 2014).

11 See The White House, National Security Strategy (2010).12 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Strong and Secure, pp. 10–11.13 United Kingdom, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, pp. 25–37.14 United Kingdom, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, p. 3.15 United Kingdom, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, p. 3.16 United Kingdom, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, p. 28.


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191

Index

Abbott, Tony, 85al-Maliki, Nouri, 105, 122anarchy

hierarchy’s compatibility with, 12, 13, 24–5, 129–30

international society, 1, 16lack of centralised authority, 12, 14

Anghie, Antony, 4, 39–40Arab Spring, 68, 74Aradau, Claudia, 33Armenia, 70Ashley, Richard K, 16Ashton, Catherine, 63, 64, 66Australia

foreign policy: fragile states, 83–4, 86–7, 88; impact of 9/11 and Bali bombings, 100; preoccupation with de-bounded risk, 80, 81–3, 100; promotion of good governance, 84–6

globalisation, security implications of, 82–3, 100–1

intervention in Pacific island states, 79–81: change to hands-on approach, 86–7, 101; cooperative nature of, 80, 81; hierarchical relationships, 80–1, 94–5, 101; implications for international society, 97–100; as risk management, 79–80, 87, 88

National Security Strategy (2013), 136

Papua New Guinea, 95–7: Enhanced Cooperation Package, 89, 95–7; hierarchical relationship, 96, 97

promotion of liberal good governance, 79–80, 84–6: implications for international society, 97–100; Papua New Guinea, 95–6, 97; Solomon Islands, 91–2, 93–4, 98–9

risk perceptions, South Pacific zone of risk, 80

Solomon Islands, 87–8, 90–5: dangers of state failure in, 87; governance and economic reforms, 91–2, 93–4; hierarchical relationship, 92, 94–5, 98–9; security motives for intervention, 88–9

as superordinate/subordinate party, 131

see also Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands

Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), 85

Australian Department of DefenceDefence 2000: Our Future Defence

Force, 82Defence Update (2003), 83Defence Update (2005): failing states,

83–4; globalisation, 82Defence Update (2007), 32

Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), 81–2

impact of globalisation, 83promotion of good governance, 86

Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 87

authoritycoercion, relationship with, 14–15,

141ngreat powers’ exercise of, 19hierarchical relationships, 14, 24–5,

129–30legitimacy of, 130sovereign inequalities, 23

Ba’ath Party, 119Bali bombings (2002), 81, 100Ban Ki Moon, 100Barbara, Julien, 90Barkawi, Tarak, 3–4


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192 Index

Barroso, Jose Manuel, 70–1Beck, Ulrich

realist-constructivist approach to risk, 32–3, 34

risk society, 6, 28, 40–1: de-bounded risk, 31; relationship of past, present and future, 30

terrorism, 33Blair, Tony, 104

justifications for Iraq invasion, 114, 127: assuming worst-case, 113; globalised nature of risk, 107; potential risks, 109–10; precautionary principle, 49, 113; risk of WMD proliferation, 105–6, 107

promotion of liberal democracy, 51–2: security motivations, 118

Brahimi, Lakdhar, 121Bremer, Paul, 118, 119, 120, 121Browning, Christopher S, 64, 72Brownlie, Ian, 24Buchanan, Allen, 54Bulgaria, 66Bull, Hedley, 1, 11, 18, 19Bush Doctrine, 47–8

controversy over, 103Bush, George W, 104

justifications for Iraq invasion, 114, 127: assuming worst-case, 112–13; globalised nature of risk, 107; potential nuclear threat, 110–11; potential risks, 108–9, 110–11; precautionary principle, 49, 113–14; risk of WMD proliferation, 105–6, 107, 108; uncertainty over WMD, 111–12

motives for Iraq invasion, 104promotion of liberal democracy

in Iraq, security motivations, 52, 115–17

State of the Union addresses, 106–7, 108–9, 116–17

Caplan, Pat, 45Chandler, David, 99China, 36–7

Clapton, William, 6Clarke, Ronald, 55Clark, Ian, 3, 12, 130

double movement in international society, 35–6

English School’s unease with hierarchy, 16–17

hegemony, 18hierarchy as social relationship, 15

Clinton, Bill, 52Clinton, Hilary, 154nCoalition Provisional Authority

(CPA), 118–21coercion

distinction from authority, 141nhierarchy, relationship with, 2,

14–15Coker, Christopher, 31–2, 56Cold War, and threat perception, 30colonialism, 5, 39–40

social logics of, 15–16conditionality, and European

Neighbourhood Policy, 71, 72, 73, 74

Cooper, Robert, 37Council of the European Union, 64criminology, and situational risk

management, 54–5Croatia, 66

Dannreuther, Roland, 59Darfur, 27, 136de-bounded risk

globalisation, 28, 31–2, 34, 41, 137as justification of Western

interventions, 40–1nature of, 28risk society, 6, 28, 31social construction of risk, 32, 33–4uncertainty, 48Western preoccupation with, 136–7

De Carvalho, Benjamin, 21Defence Intelligence Organisation

(DIO, Australia), 111Del Sarto, Raffaella A, 67, 69democratic peace, 52, 54dependency theory, 4Desert Fox, Operation, 106


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Index 193

Dinnen, Sinclair, 87, 89diversity

reduced tolerance of, 36as risk, 29

domination, and distinction from hierarchy, 2

Donnelly, Jack, 12, 18, 23, 24Downer, Alexander, 82, 90, 97

globalisation, 82–3promotion of liberal

democracy, 85–6threat of terrorism, 81

Dunne, Timothy, 2, 16, 17, 123–4

East Timor, 79English School

anarchical nature of international society, 1, 16

international society, 11, 129: constitution of, 20

managerial role of great powers, 2, 18

neglect of hierarchy, 1, 2, 13treatment of hierarchy, 16–19

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), 68

European Commission, 67European Neighbourhood Policy,

69, 70: conditional nature of, 71; Country Reports, 69, 70; progress reports, 72–3

Wider Europe – Neighbourhood initiative, 68, 71

European External Action Service (EEAS), 72

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

addressing instability in neighbouring countries, 66–7

bilateral nature of, 71–2conditional nature of, 71, 72, 73, 74counter-terrorism cooperation, 69Country Reports, 69, 70creation of ‘good neighbours’, 59end result of, 69implications for international

society, 73–6international norms, 75–6

objective of, 68origins of, 68partnership development, 68political and economic reforms, 60,

67, 68: Action Plans, 69, 70; oversight of, 72–3; scope of, 70

promotion of European values, 59, 68–73, 76: poor record on, 75; universalistic claims of, 76

relationship with partner states, 70–1: hierarchical nature of, 72, 73–5, 77; more for more principle, 71, 75; unequal nature of, 72, 76

as risk management mechanism, 60, 67–8

security benefits of, 69security considerations

underpinning, 67security objectives, 60

European Security Strategy (ESS), 49addressing instability in

neighbouring countries, 67concern with Europe’s

neighbours, 59context of, 151nengagement with zones of risk, 63–4globalisation’s security

implications, 62–3importance of, 61precautionary principle, 64–5prevention, 64proactive anticipation, 64promotion of European values, 65security risks faced by Europe, 62

European Union (EU), 64anticipatory and proactive foreign

policy, 64Common Foreign and Security

Policy, 61Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 152nEastern Partnership, 154nengagement with zones of risk,

63–4, 67enlargement of, 59: accession

criteria, 66; diffusion of European values, 66; security consequences of, 66; unequal membership conditions, 150n


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194 Index

European Union (EU)—continuedpartnership states, 59–60post-Cold War security risks, 61, 77precautionary principle, 64–5promotion of European values, 59,

64, 65–6, 68–73proximity to zones of risk, 59, 60,

66, 77security risks faced by, 60, 61Union for the Mediterranean, 154nsee also European Neighbourhood

Policy (ENP); European Security Strategy (ESS)

Facilitation of International Assistance Act (Solomon Islands, 2003), 92

failed/weak statesacceptance of foreign interference,

130, 131Australian concerns over, 83–4,

86–7, 88interventions, 27Papua New Guinea, 89, 95perceptions of risk from, 34, 35, 44Solomon Islands, 89–90sustained by norms of international

society, 35, 36Western concern over, 6, 137, 155n

Fry, Greg, 87Fukuyama, Francis, 37, 53–4, 85

Galtung, Johan, 4Giddens, Anthony, 32, 107–8globalisation

de-bounded risk, 28, 31–2, 34, 41, 137

potential security threats, 32security implications of: Australian

views of, 82–3, 100–1; European Security Strategy, 62–3; Iraq invasion 107–8

Goh, Evelyn, 15, 24great powers

exercise of authority, 19, 129managerial role in international

society, 2, 18Guadalcanal, 89

Hameiri, Shahar, 6, 87, 89Handmer, John, 34hegemony, and international

society, 17–18Heng, Yee-Kuang, 6

criminology, 54–5precautionary principle, 48risk, 29–30

hierarchy in international society, 1–2, 11–13

anarchy, compatibility with, 12, 13, 24–5, 129–30

anti-pluralist liberalism, 52–3Australian interventions, 80–1, 101:

Papua New Guinea, 96, 97; Solomon Islands, 92, 94–5, 98–100

authoritative nature of relationships, 14, 24–5, 129–30

coercion, relationship with, 2, 14–15

colonialism, 5, 39–40compatibility with international

society, 3, 13, 16, 20, 24, 25, 73–4, 99, 100, 129, 130–1, 137–8

conceptions of, 2definition of, 13–16deterministic accounts of, 5, 40diverse forms of, 131enforcement capacity, 15English School: neglected by, 1, 2, 13;

treatment by, 16–19European Neighbourhood Policy,

72, 73–5, 77as feature of post-Cold War

period, 3imperialism, 3–4, 5incompatibility with international

society, 2, 19–20, 123–4instrumental benefits of, 38international norms, 134international risk society, 57legitimacy of, 130Marxist perspective on, 4–5, 40post-colonial theory, 3–4, 5,

39–40post-invasion USA-Iraqi relations,

124–5


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Index 195

risk society, 6social logic of risk, 7, 28–9, 34–5, 38,

41, 131, 137: de-bounded risk, 28; impact on international norms, 35–7

social logics of, 2, 15–16, 25as social relationship, 2–3, 13, 14,

15, 16, 19, 20, 25sovereignty: compatibility with,

23, 24; incompatibility with, 22

Hill, Christopher, 66Hobbes, Thomas, 16Hobson, Christopher, 115Hobson, John M, 2, 12, 56

authoritative nature of hierarchical relationships, 14

social logics, 15sovereignty, 22

horizon-scanning, and risk management, 46

Howard, Johnintervention in Solomon

Islands, 88, 90invasion of Iraq, 104, 107, 110,

113, 114humanitarian intervention, 27Hurrell, Andrew, 18, 132

Iceland, 66Ignatieff, Michael, 5, 161nimperialism, and hierarchy, 3–4, 5International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), 106, 111International Monetary Fund, 132international society

anarchical nature of, 1, 16anti-pluralist liberalism, 52–3Australian interventions,

implications of, 97–100changes in norms of, 131–4constitution of, 20definition of, 11English School’s concept of,

11, 129European Neighbourhood Policy,

implications of, 73–6hegemony, 17–18

hierarchy in, 1–2: compatibility of, 3, 13, 16, 20, 24, 25, 73–4, 99, 100, 129, 130–1, 137–8; incompatibility of, 2, 19–20, 123–4

historically dynamic nature of, 20implications of social logic of

risk, 35–7inequalities between states, 130institutions of, 1Iraq invasion, implications of,

123–7liberal international society, 133pluralist conception of, 7,

17, 18, 29, 35–6, 76, 123, 126, 132–4

solidarist form of, 76standards of conduct, 134

interventions, Western, 3acceptance of, 130, 131as challenge to pluralist

compact, 29effectiveness of, 135–6illiberal implications of, 56, 94,

120, 122, 135imperialism, 3–4motives for, 3, 5risk management, 7, 29, 34, 37, 41,

43–4, 51–6security justifications for, 6, 27–8,

40–1: social logic of risk, 28–9, 34–5

selectivity of, 5–6, 136as signifier of hierarchical

relationships, 3(un)authorised, 27violation of international

norms, 3, 132see also European Neighbourhood

Policy; Iraq, US invasion of; liberal democracy, Western promotion of; Papua New Guinea; Solomon Islands

Iraq, US invasion of (2003), 127–8as coercive domination, 124controversy over, 103, 123effects on international

society, 105historical context of, 106–7


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196 Index

Iraq, US invasion of (2003)—continuedimplications for international

society, 123–7intelligence assessments on

WMD, 111–12justifications for, 105–14, 127:

assuming worst-case, 112–13; Bush Doctrine, 47, 103; de-bounded risk, 103; globalised nature of risk, 107–8; potential nuclear threat, 110–11; potential risks, 108–11, 114–15; precautionary principle, 113–14; risk of WMD proliferation, 105–6, 107, 108, 111–12; risk prevention, 107

lack of evidence of terrorist links, 104

lack of evidence of WMD, 104lack of legitimacy, 123, 130legitimacy of post-invasion US

activities, 125–6motives for, 104, 161n, 162nNational Strategy for Victory in Iraq

(USA), 117post-invasion reconstruction:

Coalition Provisional Authority, 118–21; elections, 121–2; handover of sovereignty, 121; Transitional Administrative Law, 120–1

post-invasion sectarian violence, 122

post-invasion USA-Iraqi relations, 105, 122–3: coercive domination, 124; hierarchical relationship, 124–5

promotion of liberal democracy, 104, 114, 117–18: post-invasion reconstruction, 118–21; security motivations, 115–17, 118, 121; as victory condition, 117

regime change, 103, 114as risk management, 114, 124, 127risk perceptions, 104–5victory conditions, 117violation of international

norms, 123Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM), 89

Jackson, Robert, 17, 20Jahn, Beate, 53James, Paul, 34Jarvis, Darryl S L, 31Jayasuriya, Kanishka, 50Joenniemi, Pertti, 64, 72Joint Intelligence Committee

( JIC, UK), 112

Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius Tara, 87Keene, Edward, 18Keohane, Robert O, 54Kosovo, 27

Laffey, Mark, 3–4Lake, David A, 129

authoritative relationships, 14, 23coercion/authority distinction, 141ninstrumental benefits of

hierarchy, 38liberal democracy, Western promotion

of, 6–7, 34, 35–6, 39, 41anti-pluralist liberalism, 52–3Australian interventions, 79–80,

84–6: implications for international society, 97–100; Papua New Guinea, 95–6, 97; Solomon Islands, 91–2, 93

democratic peace, 52, 54effectiveness of, 135–6European Neighbourhood Policy,

68–73, 76: poor record of, 75; universalistic claims of, 76

European Union, 59, 64, 65–6ideological commitment to, 44illiberal implications of, 56, 94, 120,

122, 135impact on international society,

133–5inconsistent application of, 5–6, 136Iraq, 104, 114, 117–18: Coalition

Provisional Authority, 118–21; elections, 121–2; handover of sovereignty, 121; post-invasion reconstruction, 118–19; security motivations, 115–17, 118, 121; as victory condition, 117


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Index 197

limits to, 36–7, 136problematic nature of, 135qualification of international

norms, 133–4as risk management, 34, 36–7, 41,

43–4, 51–6, 57, 64, 65–6, 84–5situational risk prevention, 55–6superiority of liberalism, 53–4,

65, 118liberal interventionism, see

interventions, WesternLibya, 27Lisbon, Treaty of (2009), 63

Maastricht Treaty (1992), 61Macedonia, 66McLeod, Abby, 93Malaita, 89Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF), 89Marxism, and hierarchy in

international society, 4–5, 40Mazzar, Michael J, 126Mekdad, Fayssal, 100modernisation, and risk

society, 29Montenegro, 66Morgan, Michael G, 93

National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS), 40, 47–8, 52

National Security Strategy (USA), 115

NATO, and post-Cold War security risks, 61

9/11 terrorist attacks, impact on Australian foreign policy, 81, 100

non-intervention, 7, 37, 133changes in meaning of, 131–2forfeiting right to, 132supplanting norm of, 52

Obama, Barack, 52, 136Office for Reconstruction and

Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), 118

Office of National Assessments (ONA, Australia), 111, 112

Oppenheim, Lassa, 23–4

Pacific Islands Forum, 90, 100Pacific island states

Australian intervention in, 79–81: change to hands-on approach, 86–7, 101; cooperative nature of, 80, 81; hierarchical relationships, 80–1, 94–5; implications for international society, 97–100; promotion of liberal good governance, 79–80, 84–6

dangers of state failure, 87reliance on Australia, 79see also Papua New Guinea;

Solomon IslandsPapua New Guinea (PNG)

Australian intervention in, 80, 95–7: Enhanced Cooperation Package, 89, 95–7; hierarchical relationship, 96, 97

reliance on Australia, 79state weakness, 89, 95

Philpott, Daniel, 20Piqué, Josep, 67pluralist compact, challenge to, 29policing, and situational crime

prevention, 55post-colonial theory, and hierarchy in

international society, 3–4, 5, 39–40precautionary principle

European Security Strategy, 64–5invasion of Iraq, 113–14risk management, 48–9

pre-emption, 47–8Prodi, Romano, 68

Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedbyglobalisation, 31precautionary principle, 50–1prevention/pre-emption, 46–7promotion of liberal democracy, 51uncertain international

environment, 6


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198 Index

Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands (RAMSI), 81, 90, 98–100

as Australian-led mission, 90Facilitation of International

Assistance Act (2003), 92governance and economic reforms,

91–2, 93–4lack of local accountability, 92United Nation’s support of, 100

Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), 132Reus-Smit, Christian, 20, 53Rio Declaration of Environment and

Development (1992), and precautionary principle, 48–9

riskdefinition of, 29–30future-based orientation, 30incalculability of, 31normative constitution of

international society, 35–7politically constructed nature of, 50qualitative risks, 30realist-constructivist approach to,

32–3social logic of, 7, 28–9, 34–5, 38, 41:

consequences for norms of international society, 35–7

socially constructed nature of, 32, 33–4

state capacity, 6subjective nature of assessment

of, 30terrorism, 33–4threat, distinction from, 30uncertain and imprecise nature

of, 30uncontrollability of, 31

risk managementAustralian interventions, 79–80,

87, 88European Neighbourhood Policy,

60, 67–8evaluating effectiveness of, 49–50as government function, 43Iraq, invasion of, 114, 124, 127nature of, 43political uses of, 50precautionary principle, 48–9

prevention, 45, 46, 48, 49: distinction from pre-emption, 46–8

proactive anticipation, 45–6promotion of liberal democracy, 34,

36–7, 41, 43–4, 51–6, 57, 64, 65–6, 84–5

situational risk management, 44, 54: criminology, 54–5

as subjective exercise, 51surveillance and horizon-scanning, 46uncertainty, 46, 48Western interventions, 7, 29, 41Western strategic outlook, 32

risk society, 6, 28, 40–1basic premise of, 29de-bounded risk, 6, 28, 31globalisation, 28, 31–2modernisation, 29realist-constructivist approach to

risk, 32–3social construction of risk, 32, 33–4uncertainty, 32

Roberts, Susan M, 84Romania, 66Rose, Nikolas, 55Royal Institute for International

Relations (Belgium), 63Royal Papua New Guinea

Constabulary (RPNGC), 95Royal Solomon Islands Police Force

(RSIP), 91Rumsfeld, Donald, 49, 145nRwanda, 27

Schumacher, Tobias, 67, 69scientific progress, and risk society, 29security

de-bounded risk, 28, 31–2: Western preoccupation with, 136–7

emergence of new risks, 6as justification of Western

interventions, 6, 27–8, 40–1: social logic of risk, 28–9, 34–5

promotion of liberal democracy, 51–6, 57, 64

risk society, 6uncertainty, 32, 137zones of risk, 28, 44, 63


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Index 199

self-determination, 133Serbia, 66Sharman, J C, 2, 12, 14, 15, 22Simpson, Gerry, 12, 18, 23, 38–9,

52–3, 133Smith, Karen E, 60, 66, 70Solana, Javier

European Security Strategy, 61risk prevention, 64security implications of

globalisation, 62Solomon Islands

Australian intervention in, 80, 87–8, 90–5: hierarchical relationship, 92, 94–5, 98–100; security motives for, 88–9

consequences of state failure, 87Facilitation of International

Assistance Act (2003), 92Regional Assistance Mission in

Solomon Islands, 81, 90, 98–100: governance and economic reforms, 91–2, 93–4; lack of local accountability, 92

reliance on Australia, 79requests regional intervention, 90state weakness, 89–90Townsville Peace Agreement

(2000), 89Somalia, 23Sorensen, Georg, 53sovereign equality, 7, 37, 133

changes in meaning of, 131–2supplanting norm of, 52, 54

sovereignty, 11, 19changes in meaning of, 22–3, 131–3compatibility with hierarchy, 23, 24divisibility of, 23–4historically contingent nature of, 21incompatibility with hierarchy, 22sovereign inequalities, 18, 23traditional conception of, 21–2, 129

sphere of influence, 73, 74states

inequality of, 19, 23legal equality of, 23

Straw, Jack, 67surveillance, and risk management, 46Syria, 136

technological progress, and risk society, 29, 31

terrorism, 6interventions, 27perceptions of risk from, 33–4threat from, 81

threat, distinction from risk, 30Tickner, Arlene, 4Townsville Peace Agreement

(2000), 89Turkey, 66

Ulufa’alu, Bartholomew, 88, 89United Kingdom

National Security Strategy (2008), 63

National Security Strategy (2010), 136–7

security implications of globalisation, 63

United Nations Security Council, 27Iraq, 104–5, 125–6, 128

United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), 106

United Nations (UN), 54, 97–8, 132Iraq, invasion of, 123Regional Assistance Mission in

Solomon Islands, 100United States

Bush Doctrine, 47–8: controversy over, 103

precautionary principle, 49promotion of liberal democracy:

ideological commitment to, 44; security motivations, 52, 115–17

see also Bush, George W; Iraq, US invasion of (2003)

United States Congress, and invasion of Iraq, 113

Van Munster, Rens, 33, 46, 48

Wallerstein, Immanuel, 4, 40Waltz, Kenneth, 1, 13–14Warner, Nick, 89


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200 Index

War on Terror and precautionary principle, 49

Watson, Adam, 17–18Webster, Daniel, 47Wenge, Luther, 97Wesley, Michael, 81Western European Union, 61Westphalia, Peace of (1648), 17

traditional conception of sovereignty, 21–2

Wilson, Woodrow, 44World Bank, 132World Systems Theory, 4, 40

Yost, David S, 47


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