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ANNALS, AAPSS, 550, March 1997

NAFTAand Chiapas

By PAUL RICH

ABSTRACT:exico is now plagued by guerrilla uprisings in itspoorest states, the most theatrical and celebrated of which is that ofthe Zapatista National LiberationArmy in Chiapas under the lead-

ership of the enigmatic, pipe-smokingSubcomandanteMarcos. Therebels have made the North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA)a focus of their fury and have cleverlyused the Internet toair their complaints.While free trade certainly is contributingto the

economic problems of the Mexican underclass, the depopulating ofrural areas and growthofthe cities is an almost inevitable trend thateven the most dramatic gestures by Marcos and his followers are

unlikely to postpone.NAFTAhas become a scapegoatforthe modern-ization of Mexico.

Paul Rich is Titular Professor of International Relations and History, University ofthe Americas, Puebla, Mexico, and fellow, Hoover Institution on War,Revolution and

Peace,Stanford University.

For tenyears,

he was a senior adviser in the ArabianGulfsheikhdom of Qatar Active in Harvard alumni affairs, he is governor of Harris

Manchester College at Oxford University, a fellow of the Royal Historical Society, chair

of the endowment committee of theAmerican Culture Association, and fellow or trustee

of more than two dozen learned societies.

72

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NAFTAAND CHIAPAS 73

THEsigningof the NorthAmeri-can Free Trade Agreement

(NAFTA)has a close

relationshipto

the troubles in the southern Mexicanstate of Chiapas that began in Janu-

ary 1994 and that are remarkableforthe notoriety of the ZapatistaI guer-rillas' leader, the enigmatic Subco-mandante Marcos,and forhis cleveruse ofthe media.2Theuprisingbythe

Ej6rcitoZapatista de Liberaci6nNa-cional(ZapatistaNational Liberation

Army,or EZLN)has had a substan-tial effect on Mexico'spost-NAFTAambitions.3

However,Chiapasis a reaction notto one crisis in Mexicobut to layers ofcrises. Oneset ofproblemshas partlybeen created by NAFTA. The freemarket initiatives, privatizationschemes, andNAFTA-sponsoredow-

ering of trade barriers have meantthat the poorin Mexico,particularly

1. So called after EmilianoZapata,guer-rilla fighter during the Mexican Revolutionwho was assassinated in 1919.

2. The use of the Internet by Marcos is

especially notable. His press releases andthoseof his followerscan be foundonChiapas-L, which is an open, unmoderateddiscussionlist concerning he conflict n the state of Chia-

pas, Mexico,and its ongoingstatus. New pa-personthe subjectarewelcome.Press releasesare also covered.Chiapas-L s an activist list,including efforts to help Mexico's ndigenouscommunities, social service, activism, fund-

raising, and so on. The list focuses on the

ZapatistaNationalLiberationArmy, he peaceprocess,negotiations,Chiapas,humanrights,and the like. Tosubscribeto Chiapas-L,sendan E-mail to [email protected] no topic, but in the body of the mes-

sage, simply write "subscribe Chiapas"with yourname. "Chiapas-LDiscussionList,"[email protected],7 July 1996.

3. Deedee Halleck, "ZapatistasOn-line,"

Report on the Americas (North American Con-

gress on Latin America),28(2):30(Sept.-Oct.1994).

the campesinos (peasants), face di-rect competitionfrom Canadian andAmerican

industryand

agribusi-ness.4Any reply by Mexicanfarmersandbusinesspeople to the challengesof NAFTA nvolves the almost impos-sible task of finding the money tointroduce new equipment and tech-

nology, ncluding computers.Contrary o what manyAmericans

believed when NAFTAwas being de-bated-that Mexicans would steal

Americanjobs-there are signs that,thanks to lack of capital, Mexican

jobs are being lost to the better-trained and technologically empow-ered American and Canadian labormarket. The Chiapas uprising oc-curred partly because of the threatthat indigenous peoples and peas-ants perceive coming from NAFTA

and related changes.5

4. "Theprivatizationschemes of the Sali-nas government dismantled a large part ofMexico'seconomy and concentrated wealthand power n what the presidentconsidered obe big, competitive conglomerates for our

[Mexico's]ntry into the world scene. The los-ers were small- and medium-sizebusinesses,lackingcredit,andMexicansocietyas a whole,lacking the publicinvestments that had once

had repercussionsacross the whole economicboard,stimulating furtherpayments,employ-ment, production,and a healthier balance of

payments."Carlos Fuentes, A New ime forMexico(New York:Farrar,Straus & Giroux,1996),pp. 78-79.

5. "InChiapas, an entire campesinocul-ture felt threatened."Ibid., p. 92. The first

message to goout fromChiapaswas a stirringone:"January1, 1994.... We are the inheri-tors and the true builders of our nation. The

dispossessed,we are millions, and we therebycall uponour brothersand sisters to join this

struggle as the only path, so that we will notdie ofhungerdue to the insatiableambitionofa 70-yeardictatorship ed bya gangof traitorsthat represents the most reactionarygroups. ... To the people of Mexico: We the








74 THE ANNALSOF THEAMERICANACADEMY

Statements about this are easilyobtainable because the leader of the

Chiapas revolt,Subcomandante

Marcos, is a prolific writer.6 Once

written, the letters and essays areoften "on the Internet by the next

morning."'Indeed, he has been pur-sued electronically by the Mexicangovernment, troubled at being "a

helpless victim of the information

age"8and seeking to get its counter-

insurgency position out on the Net.9

men and women, full and free, are consciousthat the war that we have declared s our last

resort,but also a just one. ... JOINTHE IN-SURGENT FORCES OF THE ZAPATISTANATIONAL LIBERATIONARMY."Halleck,"ZapatistasOn-line,"p. 30.

6. "Cognoscenti peakofover 400 commu-

niques and letters in a year that, at this writ-

ing, still has 100 days left. My eyes have seena diskette."John Ross,"TheEZLN,a History:

Miracles, Coyunturas, Communiques," inShadowsofTender ury:TheLettersand Com-

muniques of SubcomandanteMarcos and the

ZapatistaArmyofNational Liberation, rans.Frank Bardackeet al. (NewYork:MonthlyRe-view Press, 1995),p. 13.

7. Ibid.8. Andres Oppenheimer, Bordering on

Chaos: Guerrillas, Stockbrokers,Politicians,and Mexico's Road to Prosperity (Boston:Little, Brown& Company,1996),p. 216.

9. The claim has beenmadethat "there Sa whole section of gobernaci6n[the depart-ment of the interior]that spendsall daymoni-

toring lists such as Mexico2000 and trying tointerferewith the freediscussion of Mexicoonthe Internet generally."R. C. Whalen, "Mex-ico2000 Discussion List," [email protected], 3 July 1996. Some Mexican discussionlists that had used Mexican servers were infact relocated out of fear of governmentmed-

dling.Ibid."Thereare 120centersoftelephone

espionage nstalledin theprincipalcities ofthecountry.Theespionagecenters areoperated na coordinatedeffortbytheAttorneyGeneralofthe Mexican Republic. . . . These espionagecenters are staffed and operated by dozensof

operators that call themselves 'gamas,' 'te-

colotes,'or 'gaviotas'.... Back in Monterrey,

The Internet attack by the rebelson the legitimacy of the Mexicangov-

ernmentand its free market

policiesis a reminder that Carlos Salinaswon or stole the 1988 presidentialelection after a supposed computerfailure attributed to overloaded cir-cuits and "atmospheric conditions,"1oand then claimed to have put Mexico

permanently on the high road eco-

nomically. Much of the Internetrhetoric is anti-NAFTA,directed at

the allegedlack ofcompassionshownby the free traders."1

The Chiapas uprising has neverbeen aboutultimate military success

by the insurgents since even the in-

ept Mexican army could overpowerthem in any sustained operations.Rather, it is, in respects, a massive

publicity campaign directed against

neoliberalism, with NAFTA as thebogeyman.12Withits use of E-mail, itis the first postmodern revolution-

postmodern accordingto no less an

authority than the celebrated Mexi-can historian LorenzoMeyer.13It is a

the listeningcenter is located in the Manches-ter Building and carries the nickname 'LaCueva' thecave).In room301 of that building,

the listening devices operate 24 hours a day.The Manchester Building is located at 2110

IgnacioMoronesPrietoAvenue n the centerofthe city.""Southof the BorderDown Mexico

Way,"Unclassified: QuarterlyPublication ofthe Associationof National SecurityAlumni,no. 34, p. 3 (Fall 1995).

10. DouglasW.Payne,"Salinastroika:Lessthan Meets the Eye,"National Interest,p. 47(Winter 1994-95).

11.Halleck,"ZapatistasOn-line,"p. 32.

12. Numerous World Wide Web sitesand lists have developed to plot the for-tunes of Chiapas. See the lanic gopher,lanic.utexas.edu,at the Universityof Texas.

13. Quoted n LucyConger,"Mexico:Zapa-tista Thunder,"CurrentHistory, 93(581):117(Mar.1994)."'Postmodern' s an idea that the










76 THEANNALS OF THEAMERICANACADEMY

write about a countrywhere one couldnotonlynot trust whatpeoplesaid,butwasn'teven surewhetherpeoplewerewho they were supposedto be?"21

Despite denials, however,there isa great deal of evidence that he isRafael Sebastian Guill6n, a onetime

university professor. ProfessorGuill6n's disappearance coincideswith Marcos'sappearanceandwould

help accountforwhy he is accused of

being in a time warp, a Marxist from

the 1960sin BananaRepublic-tailoredfatigues who is fighting not for de-

mocracy but against capitalism andfor a one-party proletarian state.22

Curiously, he rebel leaders have Ma-sonicconnections,'so apparently ome

guerrillasare Marxist Masons '

21. Ibid.,pp. 265-66.22. Ibid.,p. 44. Muchofwhat Marcossays

is reminiscent of the "guerrilla-intellectualwork"of the dependencistas supportingrevo-lution as an alternativetocapitalism,polemicsthat donot seem to take into accountwhat has

happened since the collapse of the SovietUnion. See Gabriel A. Almond,A DisciplineDivided: Schoolsand Sects in Political Science

(NewburyPark,CA:Sage, 1990),pp. 229-44.23. AboveMarcos s the even moremyste-

rious Commander-in-Chief German, pre-sumed to be FernandoYdnez.With the rise in

the popularityof Marcos,German has gonefurther into the shadows,but there are thosewho think that he remains the ultimate

authority.The son of a Monterreydoctor,hisfather and grandfatherwere Freemasonsand

according o his brother,"Eachofus, when weturned fourteen,joined the Hope and Frater-

nity Association, a Masonic lodge where welearned to speak in publicand get involved in

community affairs."Oppenheimer,Borderingon Chaos,p. 254.

24. The Masons tied to the Institutional

Revolutionary Party (PRI) are not radicals.The notoriousdinner of23 Feb. 1993,at whichPresidentCarlos Salinas solicitedgifts of $25million each from a groupofbusinessmen whowere benefiting from his economic policies,was describedas "aMasonicaffair"--which,at

Whoeverhe is, as an image-makerleader Marcos s miles ahead ofMexi-can President Zedillo, sometimescalled El Nerd or Agua al Tiempo(waterat roomtemperature,after hisfavorite drink).25Marcos has at-

tempted to fight fire with fire, in thesense that he providesan alternative

leadership that is perceived as more

exciting and more interesting thanZedillo's inept administration. ThatMarcos has tried to project a strong

image at this time in Mexico'shistoryconfirms that Mexico still suffersfrom a legacy of personalismo, thatthe perceptionof one's power and ofwhom one knows is more importantthan what one knows. Personalismowill be put ahead ofthe law,and from

personalismo comes caudillismo

least in attempted secrecy,if not in ritual, itwas. Ibid.,p. 107. The involvementofMasonryis not entirely implausible in an already im-

plausible scenario, as there is evidence thatMexican Freemasonry has been an educa-tional system in Mexico as well as a secretritualistic society and has played a part in

training young men for political leadership.See Paul Rich and Guillermo de los Reyes,"Freemasonry'sEducational Role in Mexico,"Hanna Papers in Education, Ed-94-2 (Stan-

ford,CA:StanfordUniversity,Hoover Institu-tion, 1994). See also idem, "EducatingtheMexican and American Presidents,"Hoover

PapersinInternationalStudies,1-95-12 Stan-ford,CA:StanfordUniversity,HooverInstitu-

tion, 1995).25. Zedillo,who is poker-facedand wooden

and about as lackingin charisma as it is pos-sible to be, comes froman extremelyhumble

background.Ironically,t may be that Marcoshas much more of a claim to be middle class

than Zedillo.At the present time (Aug. 1996),Zedillo s perceivedas waveringin his commit-ment to reform. He has gone to Tabasco to

appearapprovinglywith the governor,Robert

Madrazo, who was charged with criminalfraudbyZedillo'sattorneygeneral.All chargeshave been dropped.








NAFTAANDCHIAPAS 77

(authoritarianism).26 n rural statessuch as Chiapas, it is at its mostvirulent. This caudillismo

dependson the controlof information and the

suppressionofspeech,onbriberyandon patronage.Marcosthoroughlyun-derstands that image is crucial andthat the rebelswill win via the media,not by arms, and will win by havinga devil-neoliberalism and NAFTA.

To understand why Marcos hasbeen able to make NAFTAan issue in

his attempted revolution requiressome backgroundin Mexican politi-cal history. The country'sdominant

politicalforce,the Institutional Revo-

lutionary Party (PRI), is not a partyin the American sense but more of a

family firm and social insuranceschemethat has co-optedhundredsofthousands if not millions of support-

ers by handouts.27 Decaying, it pre-sides over a country where recollec-tions of President Salinas's boastsaboutthe fruits of NAFTAand Presi-dent Zedillo's1994 election promisesto provideforthe "well-being oryourfamily" and advertisements of him-self as a leader who "knowshow to do

it"producehollow laughter.28

ROSYFUTUREPOSTPONED

The Chiapasuprising is a demandfor enfranchisement by a groupthathas heretofore been voiceless and

26. See Juan E. M6ndez,"HumanRightsandChiapasRebellion," estimonybeforeU.S.,Congress,House,ForeignAffairsSubcommit-tee on Western HemisphereAffairs, Current

History,93(581):121(Mar.1994).27. Charles C. Cumberland,Mexico:The

StruggleforModernity NewYork:OxfordUni-

versity Press, 1968),p. 274.28. Paul B. CarrollandDianneSolis,"Mex-

ico'sZedilloStumbles in His New Job,"Wall

StreetJournal, 6 Feb. 1995.

that felt ignored during the NAFTA

negotiations. Therewas no debate inMexico about the

agreement,which

was imposed by Salinas as the cap-stone of his presidency.29 oignancyisadded to the present situation by re-

calling how upbeat Mexicans hadbeen just a couple years before the

fall, believing that, with the signingof NAFTA and with the boomingstock market, a rosy future beck-oned.30Actually, had anyone both-

29. To the contrary, "the debate as towhether Mexiconeeded or could even afford

peasantssharpenedafter 1982,as the interna-tional communityof bankers and neo-liberaleconomicplannersforcedMexico oacceptaus-

terity and economicrestructuring n the wakeof crisis over its $96 billion foreign debt."

GeorgeA. Collier,"The Rebellionin Chiapasandthe LegacyofEnergy Development,"Mexi-can Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 10(2):375

(Summer 1994).30. "Infact, no president in recent years

elevated the expectationsof the Mexicanpeo-ple so highly and so quickly.He [Salinas] leftthe presidency n 1994 with a 75 percent pub-lic-approvalrating. His fall into universal re-

jectioncannotbe separatedfrom the expecta-tionshe raised."Fuentes,New 7imeforMexico,p. 78.Comparisonsbetweenthe two stock mar-

kets, American and Mexican,are particularlyinteresting when studying the psychological

aspects of the Mexican crisis. In ways, theMexicanstock markethas had the excitementand has displayed the speculative fever thatthe American market did at the end of the1920s.There has been a lack ofconcernabout

developingprotectiveinstruments such as afuturesmarket.The results for individual in-vestors are rather similar, too. RegardingtheU.S. situation, "wroteSidney J. Weinberg,aseniorpartner n the famous nvestmenthouseof Goldman-SachsCompany: The public got

scaredandsold.Itwas a verytryingperiodforme. Ourinvestmentcompanywent up to two,three hundred,and then went downto practi-cally nothing .... I don't know anybody that

jumped out of the window.But I know manywho threatened to jump. They ended up in

nursing homes and in insane asylums and









ered to look deeper during the Sali-nas presidency, which enjoyed suchsuccess in proclaiming the virtues of

NAFTA,31 there were disturbingsigns during the euphoria associatedwith NAFTA that not everything was

well. There was enormous residual

poverty, there were titanic problemsassociated with technological impactand the dislocation of employmentthat technology brings, and therewas considerable unemployment. In

short, feelings of well-being were notmatched by realities. Mexico was cer-

tainly premature in announcing that,with NAFTA, it had become a FirstWorld country.32

Yet, as Marcos points out inces-

santly, Chiapas's and Mexico's pov-

things like that.'" Quoted in Lewis Lipsitz,American Democracy (New York: St. Martin's

Press, 1986), p. 438. The same sort of grouphysteria was aboutin Mexico n 1994.

31. "Salinashimselfhad achievedanimagecontrol with the press that nearly matchedthat enjoyed by American President Ronald

Reaganin his heyday.But suddenlyhis graspon eventshadslipped. Before,twas as thoughhe was a type of king, or God,who made nomistakes and all he touched ran marvelously,like a magician.Now we knowthat was a verypartialview.Wefocusedon the economic itu-

ation in general and lost sight of the socialquestion,' noted Salinas sympathizer SusanKaufmanPurcell,the vice presidentforLatinAmerican affairs at the Americas Society."Conger,"Mexico:ZapatistaThunder,"p. 115.

32. What can be learned from the U.S.

experienceandappliedto the currentMexicansituation? One conclusion could be that, insuch a severe downturn,the governmenthasto intervene, no matter how convinced the

leadershipis that the long-rangepolicyshouldbe one of less

government. In the UnitedStates, gross investment fell enormouslybe-tween 1929 and 1933.Thegrossnationalprod-uct plummeted.Constructionvirtually ceased,and unemploymentsoared. In such circum-

stances, psychological considerations over-

powereconomicconsiderations.

erty contrasts with their immensenatural resources. For example,

Chiapas produces nearly50

percentof Mexico's natural gas and 60 per-cent of its hydroelectric power, alongwith substantial amounts of lumber,coffee, and beef. Ironically, in someareas in Chiapas, 70 percent of thehomes do not have electricity.33 Not

surprisingly, this mix of obviouswealth and cutting poverty has con-tributed to the uprising:

It is precisely in regions with a high per-centage ofindigenouspeoplesthat canbefound a systematic political, juridical,economic violence that has led, in some

cases, to the outbreak of violent, armedconflicts. The EZLN, in Chiapas, wasborn amongst indigenous peoples who,most of all, demand dignified living con-ditions. They prefer,as they say, risking

their life in a dignified manner, ratherthan dying little by little from the dis-eases of poverty.34

American opponents of NAFTAmissed a point that the Chiapas guer-rillas appreciate, namely, that theworldwide trend is toward capital-in-tense development, a trend that re-

quires constant educational change

and continuing investment in tech-nology.35 "One of the ironies of thetwentieth century," remark Joseph

33. Oppenheimer, Bordering on Chaos, p. 20.34. Social Sciences Team,CentroAntonio

de Montesinos,"IndigenousPeoples, Povertyand Violence,"CentroAntoniode Montesinos,Analysis#82, [email protected],5July1996.

35. "Writingduring the agitated days of

Mexicanpoliticallife recorded n this volume,I have recalled the insistence with which Pe-droso repeated Rousseau'sfamous phrase 'Inthe end, it all comes back to politics.' Wecannot imagine Jean-Jacques saying, 'In theend,it all comesback to technology.'"Fuentes,New ~Tme or Mexico, p. 197.








NAFTAAND CHIAPAS 79

Nye and William Owens, "is thatMarxist theorists, as well as their

critics, such as George Orwell, cor-

rectly noted that technologicaldevel-opments can profoundlyshape socie-ties and governments, but both

groups misconstrued how. Techno-logical and economicchangehave forthe mostpart provedto bepluralizingforces conducive to the formation offree markets rather than repressiveforces enhancing centralized

power."36t is obvious to the guerril-las that Mexico cannot take full ad-

vantage of NAFTAwithoutenormousamountsofcapital.37 hey suspectthatthe majorityof the present working-class population can never realize

any advantage from the agreement.The indigenous in states such as

Chiapas see NAFTAas making their

pitiful situation even worse.Events since the initial January1994 uprising have only confirmedthat viewpoint. In December 1994,just after Zedillo was inaugurated,the Mexican financial system col-

lapsed. The peso was devaluated by50 percent and total chaos wasavoided only by a controversial $50billion bailout engineered by theClinton administration. Now thechief concernwas not how to face thenew world created by NAFTA buthow to survive at all. In the first six

36. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and William A.

Owens,"America'snformationEdge,"ForeignAffairs, 75(2):29(Mar.-Apr. 996).

37. What Mexiconeeds is something like

the Schoolto WorkOpportunitiesAct. It needsits own version of

TechPrep.But it had not

even had the advantageof the Smith-HughesAct of 1917. In other words, the countryhad

not come to terms with the fact that real suc-

cess in the post-NAFTAeradependedpartlyon

a radicalchangein attitude towardvocational

and technicaleducation.

months of 1995, more than 1 millionMexicans lost theirjobs. Inflationbe-came rampant:the price for gasolinewent up by 35 percent in one jumpand then began further monthly in-creases. Similar price rises involvedsuch staples as food and electricity.Since a similar situation had beenfacedin the 1980s, no one in Chiapasorelsewhere in Mexicoexpectedany-thing butyears ofprivation.38n 1996in Mexico the minimum day's wage

will buy 6 quarts of milk or 2.2pounds of beans, whereas in 1976 itwould buy 21 quarts of milk or 5.0

pounds of beans. It will now buy 2.5

pounds of sugar or 2 gallons of gaso-line, whereas in 1976 it would buy

38. In analyzingthe currentsituation,his-toricalcomparisonsarealwaysdangerous.Ob-

viously, no two events are exactly the same.

Nevertheless,as notedearlier,there are strik-ing similarities between the current Mexicaneconomic ituationandtheAmericansituationin the 1930s. TheAmericandepressionhad itsroots in the exuberanceand optimism of the

1920s,when, at least for the American middle

class, there was an apparentlyunprecedentedprosperity.The stock marketsoared,and therewas a general attitude that things were justgoingto get better and better:optimism, faithin economic ndividualism,and confidencein

the free marketwere prevailingbeliefs. In anelection campaign speech in 1928, HerbertHooverdenouncedthe DemocraticParty and

governmentinterventionin the economy:"In

effect, they abandonthe tenets of their own

partyandturnto State socialismas a solutionfor the difficulties..... It is a false liberalismthat inserts itself into the Governmentopera-tion ofcommercialbusiness. Every step ofbu-

reaucratizingof the business of our countrypoisons the very roots of liberalism-that is

political equalityof

opportunity."Herbert

Hoover, speech, New York, 22 Oct. 1928,

quotedin RichardHofstadterand BeatriceK.

Hofstadter, eds., Great Issues in American His-

tory: From Reconstruction to the Present Day,1864-1981 (New York:Random House, Vin-

tage, 1982),pp. 332-33.









16.0 pounds of sugar or 11gallons of

gasoline.39So the

Chiapas guerrillasare not

exaggerating when they claim thatNAFTA is associated with disasterfor the Mexican underclass. In es-

sence, their revolt asks just what

happens in a countryduringthe freemarket transition periodwhen social

programs are being dismantled.40 InMexico today, only 11.37 million ofthe economicallyactive populationof

24.89 million have regular paidjobs.The rest survive with part-time em-

ployment.41(Arguably, the United

States, too, has not been exemptfrom the downside of free marketeconomics42)

39. Mary Beth Sheridan, "State of theUnions: Mexican Labor,Like Its Leader,Is

Showing Signs ofAge,"LosAngeles7Imes,11

Mar. 1996, quoted in List Mexico2000,[email protected],3 July 1996.

40. There has been no clear answer as tohow an already poor underclass can be pro-tected from further shocks broughtabout bythe free market.The connectionbetween thosewho do benefit and the political Right seemswell established. A resurgenceof the Right'slatent political power is perhaps one of the

underlyingreasons why the income share ofthe very small percentageofAmericans n the

top brackets has bloated (the top fifth nowhave 44.6 percentof the total national incomewhile the lowest fifth have only 4.4 percent)and the number of poor in America has in-creased. Forstarters,in what was to becomea

long litany of special interest legislation, theRevenueAct of 1978 awarded 75 percentof allits tax reductions to the wealthiest 2 percentof the country.WorldAlmanac, 1995, p. 326.

41. Mexican Update #81, MEXPAZ_infor-mation [email protected],7 July

1996.42. In 1970,25.4 millionAmericans,or12.6

percent of the population,were living belowthe officialpovertylevel specified by the U.S.

Departmentof Commerce.By 1980 these fig-ures had increased to 29.3 million and 13.0

percent.By 1990 the figureswere 33.6 million

Since the signing of NAFTA,littlehas gone right (no pun intended).43For the

poorin a rural state such as

Chiapas, which is called "Mexico'sbasement," he situation continues todeteriorate." Mexicans are indeed

paying dearly for the long PRI rule,which has had an effect on the coun-

try's personalityas well as its pocket-book,andforplunginginto an experi-ment like NAFTA without publicdiscussion.

NAFTA s, of course, partly aboutthe upgrading of the Mexican infra-structure. The much-remarked-uponuse of computers by the insurgentsmight appear to bolster the claims

and 13.5 percent. At the beginning of 1993,there were "officially"6.9 million Americans

living in poverty,and that was 14.5 percentofthe population.WorldAlmanac,p. 383.

43. "Thedevaluation will surely result in amajorsurge of inflation,"propheticallywroteRobertBartley,the editor of the Wall Street

Journal,"whichwill offsetany imaginedtrade

advantagesto a lowerexchangerate. The com-binationof inflation and recession will throwthe government budget into chaos. The eco-nomic turmoil, especially the devastation ofthe nascent middleclass, will in turn producepolitical turmoil. Much of the hard-won

progress of the last 12years will be reversed."

RobertL. Bartley,"MexicoSufferingthe Con-ventionalWisdom,"WallStreetJournal,8 Feb.1995.

44. It needs to be emphasizedthat NAFTAis not goingto help Chiapas.In Mexico,whereat least 30 million people are outside of the

money economy altogether,the campesino or

farmer-peasantsees very little cash at all andhas no governmentsafety net staving off mal-nutrition and homelessness. Exports do not

help most Mexicans.Eighty percent of Mex-ico's

exportsare

by750 firms that

produceexports, that is, 2.8 percentof the companiesthat even try to exportare responsiblefor 80

percent of actual exports. Peter Rashkin,"Mexican Labor News and Analysis #13,"News, 1(3), 16 July 1996, List Mexico2000,[email protected];9 July 1996.








NAFTAAND CHIAPAS 81

that Mexico can quickly embrace

technology and be competitive. Butthe

guerrillas'use ofthe Internet has

symbolic dimensions that cut both

ways, and only on the surface does it

appear to contradictthe stereotypesof campesino illiteracy and back-wardness.45Marcos'suse of the In-ternet underlines the tragedy of the

peasants in a competitive NorthAmerican economy:they are not on-line.46 t is their white urbane leader

who is on-line.The Internet is widen-ing the gap between the haves and

have-nots.4Marcoshas been trying to enlarge

his support, taking advantage of theeconomic crisis and suspicions of

NAFTA. In July 1996, he staged aconference to protest free market

capitalism: "Using the Internet to

45. See John Charles Chasteen,"FightingWords:The Discourseof Insurgencyin Latin

American History," Latin American Research

Review,28(3):83-111,esp. pp. 102-3(1993).46. Rather, hey areincreasingly rrelevant

in a technologicallyengrossedsociety."Occa-

sional outburstsof rage and despairfromthe

inward-oriented ectorof Mexicansocietywill

inevitably erupt, but, as the Zapatistarebel-

lion in Chiapas demonstrated,these can be

containedandmanaged."

JorgeG.Castafieda,"Mexico'sCircle of Misery,"Foreign Affairs,75(4):100 (July-Aug. 1996). In Mexico there

areperhaps25,000computers hat areon-line.

"Mexicans Struggle to Get Online," List

Mexnet, [email protected],17 July 1996.

47. Lisa Guernsey,"TheElectronicSoap-box," Chronicle of Higher Education, 3 May

1996,p.A32.TheInternetencouragesbuildinginteractive electroniccommunities, but, in a

region like Chiapas where many do not even

have electricpower, he prospectsofbeing partof such communitiesare nil. Formoreon elec-

troniccommunities,seeArthurArmstrongand

John Hagel III, "TheReal Value of On-line

Communities," Harvard Business Review,

74(3):131-41(May-June1996).

summon supportersfrom around the

world, Zapatista rebels are staging amini-Woodstock of the information

age-a rally against big business inthe mountains of southern Mexico.

Swappinge-mail addresses and sing-ing revolutionary songs, leftists from41 countries on five continents

met."48The Zapatistas have signed a

pact with El Barz6n, which is thedebtor movementofthe middle class,farmers, and small businessmen. El

Barz6n repudiates the bank loansand mortgages that are now in de-fault. El Barz6n national presidentJuan Jos6 Quirino Salsas has

warned, "Wewill not permit that inthis battle for a new Mexico anyonelays hands on a single Zapatista. Wewill not permit that the worthy menwhofight in the Barz6nbeput injail."

El Barz6nclaims850,000 members.49The Chiapas rebellion also has

been followedby a guerrilla action inGuerreroknown as Ej6rcitoPopularRevolucionario EPR)and by still an-other uprising in Sierra Madre Ori-ental.Actionsin Guerrerohave taken

place only thirty miles from

Acapulco, directed by "Comandante

Antonio."so heprospectsforpeace inMexico have much to do with the

ruling hierarchy'sdealing with these

interests, which have been largelyignoredandwhichperceiveeconomicfreedom as only compoundingtheir

48. "Mexican Rebels Convene Interna-

tional Protest Forum," [email protected],31 July 1996.

49. "Mexico's Zapatistas, Barz6n DebtGroupSet Pact,"LaRealidad,21 July 1996,in

Mexico2000news, [email protected],22 July1996.

50.JohnRoss,"GuerreroReport,"Chiapas-

[email protected].








82 THE ANNALSOF THE AMERICANACADEMY

grievances.51Indeed, the future offree trade and of neoliberalism inLatin America in

general requiresdiscussion with minorities such asthe indigenous of Chiapas, peoplesthat have long embracedantistatismin the face ofdecadesof authoritariandomination.52At least that they arenow demanding such discussion ismorepromisingthan if they were un-

repentant anarchists.53

THECD-ROMREVOLUTION

The Internet may be a help to therebels in getting their story out andin promotingthe image of Marcos asa with-it person, but the Internet isnot a place where the indigenousagrarianculturesthat the Zapatistasclaim to defend against NAFTAare

cherished: "Such an environmentrapidly breaks down not merelyboundaries but cultures them-selves."54Furthermore, the use ofsuch technology casts doubt on therebellion as one led by peasant Indi-ans. Marcoshimself is an educated,white, technologically savvy media

51. Latin Americansubaltern studies are

nowin vogue,"subaltern"eferring o subordi-nated peoplesof popularculture.

52. However,discussions should avoid arenewal of the arguments of the 1920s and1930s that the treatment of minority historyas a digression from the great issues is notaccidentalbut partof a hiddenagenda.

53. Unfortunately,land reformis basic totheir demands-and that offerslittle prospectof actually raising them frompoverty.In the

longrun,"shortofbuildingdikesin the Pacific

Ocean," and reformis not going to solve thecampesinos'problems.See Mitchell A. Selig-son, "AgrarianInequality and the TheoryofPeasant Rebellion," Latin American Research

Review,31(2):140-57(1966).54. Clausen,"Welcomeo Post-Culturism,"

p. 380.

star,a ZorroizedZapata.He is English-speaking,55enabling him to give

pressinterviews to

gringo reporterswho know neither Spanish nor Ma-

yan.56Just how much a leader of the

indigenous against the new NorthAmerican community he can reallybe can be debated."5

The ultimate effect of the Chiapasrebellion on NAFTA and Mexican

politics is therefore uncertain. Atleast according to polls, far more

Mexicans are concerned about eco-nomic issues such as unemploymentthan they are about Chiapas itself.While 52 percent think creating new

jobs should be a first priority of gov-ernment,only3 percentthink solvingthe Chiapas conflict should take pri-ority.5WhenCuauht6mocCardenas,the presidential candidate of the op-

position Party of the DemocraticRevolution, met Marcos during the1994 election campaign, the effectseems to have been that voters werescared that his election might bringon civil war.59

On the other hand, Chiapas hasbeen the equivalent of a parliamen-tary vote of no confidence in recent

55. Pro-guerrilla graffiti in San Crist6baland otherChiapastowns hadappeared n Eng-lish for benefitof the cameras.Halleck,"Zapa-tistas On-line,"p. 32.

56. See Oppenheimer, Bordering on Chaos,

pp. 22-23.57. Forexample,when he called a conven-

tion of oppositiongroupsin Aug. 1994,he was

given Mexicangovernmentmoneyto host the

meeting The governmentprovided rucks, la-

trines, and speaker systems, and it helpedstring electric wires. The reason apparentlywas that President Salinas preferredto havethe meetings than to have a disruptionduringthe forthcoming lections. Ibid.,pp. 142-43.

58. Ibid.,pp. 153-54.59. Ibid.,pp. 150-51.










T H E A N N A L S O F T H E A M E R I C A N A C A D E M Y

Political reform in Mexico could

eventually mitigate the force of Mar-cos's accusations and rob him of the

crisis that has promoted his stand-ing. The 1997 Mexican congressionalelections may see the PRI lose its

majority in Congress for the firsttime since its founding in 1929. A

harbinger is the fact that in the 1994

presidential election, the PRI re-ceived only 50 percent of the vote,while the National Action Party, the

right-of-center party, received 27 per-cent and the Party of the Democratic

Revolution, which includes a numberof leftist movements, received 17 per-cent. Electoral reforms so far have

included independent registrationand polling booth officials, limits on

campaign expenditures, and equalaccess to the media. More such re-

forms are promised.64Meanwhile, in one of the contra-

dictions that make the whole situ-

ation so interesting, the subcoman-

dante, with his old-fashioned leftist

messages and suspicion of develop-ment policies, comes "whizzingthrough the electronic ether of cyber-space at thousands of information

fragments per second, a familiar

masked pipe-smoking visage." Mexi-can Foreign Minister Jose Angel Gur-ria with some irritation has called it"an Internet war." The RAND Corpo-

64. See Ulises Beltin and MarcosValdivia

"Accuracy nd Error in ElectoralPolls:Mexi-can Electoral Polls in ComparativePerspec-tive" PaperdeliveredatWaporRegionalSemi-nar "Quality Criteria in Survey Research,"

Villa La Collina, Cadenabbia, Italy, 27-29June, 1966),passim.

r a t i o n ' s D a v i d R o n f e l d t c a l l s n e t -

w a r . ) 6 5

M a r c o s , e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l d e s p i t eh i s a n t i c a p i t a l i s t r a m b l i n g s , h a s in

f o r m e d h i s E - m a i l a u d i e n c e t h a t

p l a n n i n g s e l l h i s f i r s t C D - R o m .

W e a r e g o i n g C D - R o m ,

s a y s , s p a c e l i k e t h e v i s i t t h e

L o u v r e m u s e u m , b u t t h a t w o u l d

v i s i t t h e L a c a n a d o n J u n g l e .

T h e n , a d d s w i t h e n t h u s i a s m ,

p e o p l e c a n v i s i t c a m p f r o m t h e i r

o f f i c e M o s c o w W a s h i n g t o n

w h a t e v e r , c o m e a n d g e t k n o w t h e

Z a p a t i s t a s . W e w a n t g e t [ t h e

C D - R o m ] d i s t r i b u t e d . T h i s w o u l d

s u p p l e m e n t M a r c o s ' s h o m e p a g e

t h e W o r l d W i d e W e b , h i s f l i r t a t i o n s

w i t h p r o p o s e d d e s i g n e r l i n e

s w e a t e r s p r o d u c e d b y t h e I t a l i a n

m a n u f a c tu r e r B e n e t t o n a n d h i s

C e n t a p p e a r a n c e on t h e m u s i c v i d e o

c h a n n e l M T V . 6 M e x i c o t h e s e d a y sr e v o l u t i o n a r i e s o p p o s e N A F T A b u t

n o t p r o f i t s .

65. Marcos is at http://www.peak.org/justin/ezln/ezln.html, and his enemies, theMexicangovernment,are at http://www.elec-triciti.com/mexinfo/mexagncy.htm. MartinLangfield,"Mexico's apatistaRebelsRide theInternet," [email protected].

unam.mx,13 Dec. 1995.66. "'Youhave to go to war. But what to

wear?'declared he captionbeside a compositephotographof the Zapatista commander inColors [magazine], 'Camouflage visual dy-namic:light, photogenic... ideal for the sol-dier whogoesfromwar to warand doesn'thavetime to change.'"MarkFineman,"Zapatistasin Transition from Fighting to Fashion,"LosAngeles71mes,21 Apr.1996.

67. "Marcos peaks ofWar,Politics ... and

CD-ROMS,"[email protected],6July 1996.

84 THEANNALS OFTHEAMERICANACADEMY

Political reform in Mexico could

eventually mitigate the force of Mar-cos's accusations and rob him of the

crisis that has promoted his stand-ing. The 1997 Mexicancongressionalelections may see the PRI lose its

majority in Congress for the firsttime since its founding in 1929. A

harbingeris the fact that in the 1994

presidential election, the PRI re-ceived only 50 percent of the vote,while the National Action Party,the

right-of-centerparty,received 27 per-cent and the Party of the Democratic

Revolution,which includes a numberofleftist movements, received 17per-cent. Electoral reforms so far haveincluded independent registrationand polling booth officials, limits on

campaign expenditures, and equalaccess to the media. More such re-

forms are promised."4Meanwhile, in one of the contra-dictions that make the whole situ-ation so interesting, the subcoman-

dante, with his old-fashioned leftist

messages and suspicion of develop-ment policies, comes "whizzingthrough the electronic ether ofcyber-space at thousands of information

fragments per second, a familiar

masked pipe-smoking visage."Mexi-canForeignMinisterJos6AngelGur-ria with some irritationhas called t"anInternet war."The RANDCorpo-

ration's David Ronfeldt calls it "net-war.,,65

Marcos, entrepreneurial despitehis anticapitalist ramblings, has in-formedhis E-mail audiencethat he is

planning to sell his first CD-Rom."We are going to do a CD-Rom,"hesays, "a space like the visit to theLouvremuseum, but that would be avisit to the Lacanadon Jungle.""Then,"he adds with enthusiasm,"peoplecan visit a camp from their

office in Moscow or Washington orwhatever, come and get to know theZapatistas .... We want to get [theCD-Rom] distributed." This would

supplement Marcos's home page onthe WorldWide Web, his flirtationswith a proposed designer line ofsweaters produced by the ItalianmanufacturerBenetton,66and his re-

cent appearance on the music videochannelMTV.67n Mexicothese days,revolutionaries oppose NAFTA-butnot profits.

64. See Ulises Beltainand MarcosValdivia

"Accuracy nd Error n ElectoralPolls:Mexi-can Electoral Polls in ComparativePerspec-tive" PaperdeliveredatWaporRegionalSemi-nar "Quality Criteria in Survey Research,"

Villa La Collina, Cadenabbia, Italy, 27-29June, 1966),passim.

65. Marcos is at http://www.peak.org/justin/ezln/ezln.html, and his enemies, theMexican government,are at http://www.elec-triciti.com/mexinfo/mexagncy.htm. Martin

Langfield,"Mexico's apatistaRebelsRide the

Internet," [email protected].

unam.mx,13 Dec. 1995.66. "'Youhave to go to war. But what to

wear?'declaredthe captionbeside a compositephotographof the Zapatista commander inColors [magazine], 'Camouflage visual dy-namic: light, photogenic... ideal for the sol-dier whogoesfromwar to warand doesn'thavetime to change.'"MarkFineman,"Zapatistasin Transition from Fighting to Fashion,"Los

Angeles 7Imes,21 Apr.1996.67. "Marcos peaksofWar,Politics ... and

CD-ROMS,"[email protected],6July 1996.

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