Review Dorion

7/30/2019 Review Dorion

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Review of Louis-Andr Dorion, Socrate (Que sais-je?), Paris: Presses Universitaires deFrance, 2004

Jan Szaif (University of California at Davis)

Louis-Andr Dorion has contributed a brief but instructive volume on Socrates to the series

Que sais-je?, and I cannot resist mentioning that a series with this title can hardly include

a more fitting contribution than a book on Socrates, for whom the question What do I

know? was so central a concern. Thanks to Dorions clear and unpretentious style, this

book will, I believe, serve the needs of the intended larger audience very well. Yet it also

provides interesting reading for scholars.

As is well known, Socrates did not write himself but inspired a whole generation of

followers to recreate Socratic dialogues which represent Socrates in philosophical

conversation with others. The Socratic dialogues by Plato and Xenophon, together with

their two Apologies (defense speeches) of Socrates, provide the main basis for attempts at

reconstructing the philosophy of Socrates, since the works of other Socratics have been lost

except for some scant fragments and testimonies. The respective value of Platos and

Xenophons Socratic writings as a historical source for the philosophy of Socrates has been

much disputed over the last two centuries. Other potential sources too, especially

Aristophanes representation of Socrates in the Clouds and Aristotles doxographical

remarks, have been critically examined. This task ofquellenkritikis known as the Socratic

question, its aim being the reconstruction of the philosophy of the historical Socrates from

our sources.

There is a trend in current scholarship that rejects this whole enterprise, claiming that

we do not have any reliable sources for the philosophy of the historical Socrates. This

radically skeptical approach, which seems to be gaining more and more ground, originated

from the discovery that the Socratic dialogues (Sokratikoi logoi) are a genre of

philosophical literature and that the literary conventions of this genre do not include a

commitment to historical veracity, apart from some degree of faithfulness to the character

orthos of Socrates. It turns out that these artificially recreated conversations are in reality avehicle of the authors own philosophical thinking, personally inspired by, but not

doctrinally committed to Socrates. This explains not only why Plato could use Socrates as

his mouth-piece for the exposition of philosophical ideas that were certainly not Socrates

own (as in thePhaedo or in theRepublic). It also explains the blatant differences of

philosophical doctrine between the Socratic dialogues of different Socratic authors.

Moreover, there are also strong arguments that cast reasonable doubt on the value of the two

Apologies as historical documents. Since the other potential sources, especially

Aristophanes and Aristotle, can also be shown, for different reasons, not to be reliable or not


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to be first-hand, the case of the skeptics who dismiss the Socratic question altogether

seems to be quite strong.1

In recent scholarship, the most important alternatives to this skepticism are, on the one

hand, Gregory Vlastos reconstruction of the philosophy of Socrates based upon the group

of so-called early Platonic dialogues, which Vlastos took to be faithful to the historical

Socrates in spirit and philosophical content, and, on the other hand, a minimalist approach

that acknowledges the fictional character of the dialogues but grants greater historical value

to the portrayal in PlatosApology and also includes, to some extent, the results of

comparative studies between the different Socratic authors (Klaus Dring, Charles Kahn).2

Dorion, however, is a champion of radical skepticism regarding the Socratic question.

(Chapter II of this book contains a succinct justification of his position.) Now, this

skepticism should make it, in a way, difficult for him to write a book on Socrates: If theSocratic question is to be dismissed, then the subject of a book on Socrates seems to evade

the author. Of course, one could choose to write on some closely related topic, e.g. on the

Socratic dialogues as a genre of philosophical literature, or on the history of the attempts to

reconstruct Socrates thinking. But thisbook is meant to be about a philosopher, Socrates,

not about a literary genre or a piece of history of scholarship.

To be sure, there is a common strategy for circumventing this problem: If we cannot

retrieve the historical Socrates behind the veil of philosophical portraits created by his

followers, the most reasonable procedure may be to select the philosophically most

important among these portraits, which undoubtedly is the one given by Plato. Accordingly,

we encounter books on the philosophy of Socrates whose authors invest their resources of

erudition not in reconstructing the philosophy of the historical Socrates but in describing

and analyzing the philosophy of what they call Platos Socrates. And Platos Socrates

turns out to be the philosophy suggested by the whole body of dialogues that are commonly

called Platos early dialogues (e.g. C.C.W. Taylor, Th. C. Brickhouse/ N. D. Smith).

Now, it is not Dorions strategy to limit the scope of his Socrates-book to Platos

Socratesand we would not expect that from him anyway since he is one of the leading

experts on Xenophons Socratic writings. Instead, he juxtaposes four chapters on the

1 Gigons Socrates-book was arguably the first contribution by a major scholar to defend the

complete rejection of the Socratic question (O. Gigon, Sokrates: Sein Bild in Dichtung undGeschichte, Bern 1947).2 G. Vlastos, Socrates. Ironist and Moral Philosopher, Cambridge UP, 1991; K. Dring,Sokrates, die Sokratiker und die von ihnen begrndeten Traditionen, in Grundriss derGeschichte der Philosophie: Die Philosophie der Antike, vol. 2.1, ed. by H. Flashar, Basel1998, pp. 139-364; Ch. Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, Cambridge UP, 1996.

Against the historical value of PlatosApology, see D. Morrison, On the alleged historicalreliability of Plato's Apology,Archiv fr Geschichte der Philosophie, 82 (2000), 23565.


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philosophical portrayals or assessments that we find in Aristophanes, Plato, Xenophon, and

Aristotle respectively. Yet in his chapter on Platos portrayal (which is by far the longest

chapter of this book) he commits himself to some of the problematic claims that underlie

the interpreters artifact of Platos Socrates, since he follows the conventional pattern of

identifying the philosophy of Platos Socrates with the corpus of Platos early dialogues.

There are problems with this approach: 1. Socrates is the leading interlocutor also in

Platos middle-period and later transitional dialogues, and in the very late dialogue

Philebus. So what justifies the exclusion of the Socratic dialogues that come after the early

phase? If one is a radical skeptic regarding the Socratic question as Dorion is, one cannot

consistently argue for the exclusion of the later Socratic dialogues from a premise about the

assumed greater proximity of the philosophical content of the early dialogues to the

historical Socrates. 2. The assumption that the early dialogues of Plato (including works liketheLysis, theMeno and theEuthydemus) yield a consistent picture of a Socratic philosophy,

though widely shared, can be questioned for some good reasons.3

This is, however, a

complicated and controversial issue, and Dorion seems to have, in that respect, the majority

of Plato-scholars on his side. I want to comment instead on Dorions arguments that answer

to the first problem just mentioned.

Dorion maintains (p. 38) that [c]e recours privilgi aux dialogues de jeunesse ne se

justifie pas par lhypothse quils exposeraient fidlement la pense du Socrate historique,

mais plutt par le constat que Socrate y joue un rle plus actif et plus dterminant que dans

la plupart des dialogues subsquents. This is a very questionable argument. If we compare

the group of dialogues that Dorion classifies as the dialogues de maturit (Cratylus,

Symposium,Phaedo,Republic,Phaedrus,Parmenides, Theaetetus), it is hard to see what he

means by saying that the Socrates of the earlier dialogues plays a more active and

determining role. With the only exception of theParmenides, the Socrates-personaplays a

most active and determining role in this whole later group of dialogues. So what justifies the

exclusion of these dialogues and of their metaphysics, epistemology, moral psychology etc.

3 One can make a case for a developmental thesis that approximates the aporetic dialogues

to the mature works of Platos middle period and thus dissociates them to some extent fromPlatos undoubtedly very early dialogues like the Ion or the Crito (cf. Kahn loc. cit.).Dorion follows rather common practice in grouping the Lysis, the Meno and the

Euthydemus together with the dialogues de jeunesse, the Symposium and thePhaedo withthe dialogues de maturit (cf. p. 38, fn. 1). It needs to be emphasized that this way of

drawing the border-line between the early and the middle-period dialogues cannot be based

on the results of stylometry but is a decision inspired by certain views about the

philosophical contents and the style of argumentation in these dialogues. Yet the

Euthydemus, for instance, contains some unmistakable reference to the Republicsconception of how mathematics relates to dialectic (Euthd. 290BC).


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from the scope of Platos Socrates? The traditional, non-skeptical answer would of course

be to say that these later dialogues contain philosophical theories that were certainly not

Socrates own, while the earlier dialogues are close to Socrates own way of thinking. But

this move is not open to the radical skeptic as Dorion himself acknowledges in the very

same sentence.

He adds a second argument though: En outre, les dialogues de jeunesse comprennent

un plus grand nombre de thmes socratiques, cest--dire de thmes qui taient galement

exposs et discuts par les autres auteurs de logoi sokratikoi, notamment Xnophon. This

seems to be an argument about Socratic themes as they can be defined by a rough

consensus among the Socratic authors (and, contra Dorion, no priority should be granted to

Xenophon in this respect.) Then Dorion goes on to say: Par example, sil est vrai que

Socrate se proccupait essentiellement de questions thiques et politiques, plutt quedontologie, de mtaphysique, dpistmologie et de mathmatiques, ... ce sont les

dialogues de jeunesse qui illustrent le mieux cet intrt exclusif pour les affaires humaines.

Here he does seem to refer to the historical Socrates and to characterize the general

tendency of his philosophical activity. In view of other Socratic authors like Eucleides of

Megara and Antisthenes it is wrong to attribute an exclusive ethical interest to the Socratics

as a group. Therefore the restriction of the notion of Socratic themes can hardly be

justified otherwise than by recourse to the presumed character of the philosophical activity

of the historical Socrateswhich is an illegitimate move for someone who thinks that the

Socratic question should be relgue aux oubliettes (p.26).

In view of Dorions pluralist approach, one would expect this book to include

discussion of some of the interesting bits of information we have about the Socratic

dialogues by authors other than Plato and Xenophon. I take it that Dorion had to comply

with a very strict limitation of space. Yet there should have been room for at least a brief

comparison with some of the other Socratics, and also some more detailed comments on

mutual influence and competition among them.

Dorions chapter on Platos Socrates contains a quite representative survey of major

themes in Platos early work. He does not limit himself to merely outlining these themes but

also provides some interesting critical discussion of the various interpretative suggestions

and comes up with his own well-argued suggestions. I mention his fine discussion of the

Socratic eros and his thoughtful comments on lpineux problme of the autonomous

character of morality as conceived by Platos Socrates. Yet as a reviewer, I want to focus

on two themes where I think he didnt get it right.

1. The famous Socratic disavowal of knowledge and the meaning of Socratic

eirneia: Dorion suggests that Socrates disavowal is ironic by way of being insincere and

serving a strategic purpose: Socrates wants to force his interlocutors into the role of the


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person who has to provide an answer to a question posed by Socrates, respond to further

questionsand will eventually prove unable to maintain a consistent position and thus

suffer refutation. The justification for this insincere strategy (or ruse pdagogique, p. 53)

would be Socrates aim of instigating self-examination in his interlocutors, based on his

conviction that only the self-examined life is worth living. Now, if his disavowal of

knowledge is insincere, Socrates does believe that he knows. And that is indeed a

conclusion Dorion wants to defend. (He connects this with the claim that the aporetic

dialogues are only faussement aportiques, p. 54). He lists major ethical principles which

Socrates in theApology and the early dialogues claims to know or to be assured of. Dorion

also points out that we understand Socrates claim to virtue only if we assume that he

believes to have the relevant kind of knowledge since he identifies virtue with knowledge.

But Dorion also concedes that Socrates is sincere when he dissociates his own state of mindfrom perfect divine knowledge. If I understand Dorion correctly, he wants to explain this by

Socrates less than perfect grasp of the good (p. 55). Now, it should be uncontroversial that

if Socrates does in fact identify virtue with some kind of knowledge, this is the knowledge

of what is good and what is bad. If, on the other hand, true virtue is that kind of knowledge,

and Socrates does not yet have it, or possesses only an imperfect approximation to it, then,

on the basis of these assumptions, he cannot be unqualifiedly virtuous. I dont think that

Dorions reading can overcome this difficulty. He is right in claiming that Socrates exhibits

ethical convictions, and that he is certain of being on the right track with his convictions. So

the relevant point cannot be the lack of subjective certainty. But if the imperfection of his

cognitive state has some other reason (perhaps because he cannot yet give a full and

systematic account of the good), the difficulty still remains how to reconcile this with

Socrates claim to virtue.

2. The denial ofakrasia famously attributed to Socrates by Aristotle (on the basis of

Platos early dialogues, esp. theProtagoras): Dorions discussion of this topic suffers from

his failure to distinguish clearly two very different ways of understanding this denial. The

first and quite extreme position would hold that actions and inclinations are always fully

determined by ones beliefs about what is good and what is bad such that there is no room

for acting against these beliefs. The second, more moderate, position would only maintain

that genuine knowledge orunderstandingregarding what is good and what is bad cannot be

defeated by irrational desires. The first position would typically be founded on a theory that

reduces all desires and emotional impulses to beliefs about what is good or bad (as did the

Stoics). The latter one, on the contrary, does not have to deny the phenomenon of genuine

sub-rational drives and inclinations in the human soul that can defeat beliefs about what is


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good or bad. It only needs to maintain the supreme power of fully developed understanding

(epistm).4

The whole issue is connected with two different ways of understanding the character-

trait of self-control, enkrateia. The latter of the two positions just mentioned viewsenkrateia as an aspect ofperfectvirtue, since perfect virtue, according to this view, does not

eliminate irrational pleasures and desires (Rep. 430E7f.), but is able to control them. This

is how enkrateia is described as an aspect of perfectsophrosun in Rep. IV, 430E (a

passage also quoted by Dorion).Akrasia (orakrateia), on the other hand, would be seen as

an aspect of vice. The Aristotelian notion ofenkrateia and akrasia, which is the one

scholars usually have in mind when they refer to the topic ofakrasia, understands these

character traits as imperfect states of the soul intermediate between virtue and vice. The

enkratic person acts correctly but lacks the virtuous inner harmony between rationalpreferences and emotional or appetitive desires, while in case of the akratic person the

irrational desires not only oppose but also defeat the rational preferences. PlatosLaws, to

be sure, appears to acknowledge a similar distinction between akrasia and vice, but the

moral psychology of theRepublic seems not yet committed to it. And more importantly, it

seems that the moral psychology of the Gorgias accords with theRepublic in this respect,

since it treats enkrateia as an aspect of genuine virtue.

First, Dorion is wrong in claiming that the notion ofenkrateia does not occur in

Platos early work (p. 87). In a key-passage in the Gorgias (491DE), Socrates suggests that

the virtuous person has to be enkrats, and he explains that as control over the pleasures and

desires. In the same context, he suggests something like a bi-partite psychology that

opposes reason and irrational desire for pleasure (493A-D). Now, the psychology of the

Republic differs of course from a bi-partite conception in that it introduces a medium level

of emotions which are incited by beliefs about what is noble, honorable and the like, and

render the person willing to overcome the fear of pain. But apart from that, the function of

enkrateia seems to be conceived of in a similar manner in both dialogues, viz. as a

necessary element of virtue which relates to virtues control over irrational, pleasure-

directed desires.5 This conception is fully compatible with the famous Socratic claim that

one never chooses what is bad when one knows that it is bad, if this latter principle is

4 Compare D. T. Devereux, Socrates Kantian Conception of Virtue, Journal of theHistory of Philosophy, 33 (1995), pp. 381-408, and Kahn, op. cit., 247-257, for aninterpretation that would show how this more moderate version of the denial of akrasia iscompatible with the Socratic claim that no-one ever desires what is bad (harmful).5 Socrates himself is, indeed, the star-example in Plato of a person who does experience

passionate impulses (Charm. 157A-B) but is able to control them, as he has control in his

soul over other bodily influences as well, e.g. remains unaffected by alcohol and by a nightwithout sleep (Symp. 223D).


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interpreted as meaning that our knowledge of the good, when fully developed, is a

necessary and sufficient condition for virtue and for successful control over ones irrational

inclinations. Nothing in the Gorgias commits Platos Socrates to a stronger version of the

denial ofakrasia. Nothing in theRepublic suggests that Plato has given up the idea thatfully unfolded knowledge of the good cannot be defeated by irrational desires. (Indeed, the

philosophers prerogative of absolute rule presupposes the truth of this idea.)6 Regarding the

Protagoras, which does seem to introduce a stronger version of the denial ofakrasia, at

least in the formulations used in 358B-D, it needs to be emphasized that the argumentation

there is just hypothetical and that the crucial hypothesis of the identity of pleasure and the

good (cf. 358B6f.) was not accepted by Plato or Platos Socrates.

If Platos conception in the Gorgias is as I have described it, then there is also no

substantial opposition between Platos Socrates and Xenophons Socrates in that respect,contrary to what Dorion claims (pp. 102-4). To be sure, Xenophon lays much greater stress

on the significance ofenkrateia, while Platos Socrates seems to be more interested in the

constitutive role of knowledge for virtue. But there is no incompatibility, as far as that

goes.7

Dorion is a leading expert on Xenophons Socratic writings. His 250-page introduction to

Xenophon's SocraticMemorabilia8 is an impressive piece of scholarship. However, in the

book under review here, he has limited himself to a rather brief exposition of the main

characteristics of the Xenophontic Socrates. Perhaps his exposition here is too much

dominated by his concern with showing that Xenophons Socratic writings do not depend

on Plato. This question is not of primary interest for the intended audience.

The appreciation of Xenophon by modern scholars has varied a lot. One has two

distinguish two questions here: Does his representation of Socratic conversations have any

realphilosophicalworth? Does it have value as a historicalsource regarding Socrates? A

negative answer to the first question does not have to imply a negative answer to the second

one, and vice versa. Thus the strategy pursued by Schleiermacher, Zeller and others was to

use Xenophons writings as a sort of uninspired portrayal by a man with very limited

6 To be sure, the Republic emphasizes the importance of character-formation at the sub-rational level. But since this dialogue also seems to suggest that the understanding of what

is good can become complete only if assisted by the right kind of character-formation, this

claim about the importance of character-formation is compatible with the view that the

understanding of what is good is a necessary and sufficient condition of virtue.7 The aspect ofautarkeia, achieved through moderation of ones desires and needs, is also

present in Platos Socrates (cf. Gorg. 493C7 contra Dorion, p. 112).8

L.-A. Dorion,Introduction, inXnophon: Mmorables, vol. 1, dition Bud, 2000, pp. vii-cclii.


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philosophical understanding, a portrayal which can nevertheless provide a solid starting-

point for the reconstruction of Socrates own thinking, roughly because this very lack of

originality prevents Xenophon from adding too much of his own thought. The subsequent

interpretative step was then to ask what else Socrates must have been in order to be more

than the mediocre philosopher that appears in Xenophon, and in order to have been able to

inspire a Plato.9 On the other hand, scholars like Dorion or Don Morrison try to rehabilitate

Xenophons philosophical originality while at the same time dismissing the value of his

Socratic writings as a historical source.

One thing, at least, is certain: It wont do to dismiss Xenophon simply as a stupid

man (as did Russell, disapprovingly quoted by Vlastos10

). Yet, although the recent

attempts at rehabilitating Xenophon as a philosopher may be deservedat least to some

degree and as an instance of ancientpopularphilosophiethe supporters of Xenophon mayoverdo their case a bit, for instance when they emphasize the great influence he

supposedly had on the Stoics (p. 97). The two main pieces of evidence Dorion refers to are,

first, the anecdote, reported by Diogenes Laertius, that Zeno of Citium, the founder of

Stoicism, took to philosophy after he had read XenophonsMemorabilia. Such anecdotes,

of which Diogenes Laertius biographies are full, are in general totally unreliable. The

other, more trustworthy, piece of evidence relates to two theological chapters in the

Memorabilia which contain a version of the famous teleological argument for the existence

of God or gods (Mem. I.4, IV.3). I think its a fair guess that Xenophon gleaned this

argument from some other source. (Such borrowings were of course quite common among

ancient authors who did not have our concept of intellectual property.) These two chapters

alone cannot establish the claim that Xenophon (or Xenophons Socrates) was a major

original thinker. Moreover, when one looks at Dorions list of 17 points of difference

between Platos and Xenophons Socrates, one cant help noticing how far removed

Xenophons value-theory is from Stoicism, farther indeed than the Platonic version of

Socratism (witness for instance points 5 and 7: the importance of material wealth and social

reputation).

There are a number of points that make it seem that Xenophons Socrates is not

simply an alternative version of Socrates, but a less challenging, less inspiring, more

conventional and superficial one. I mention the fact that Xenophon subscribes to the

conventional idea that excellence of character shows in the readiness and capability of

9 Cf. Friedrich Schleiermacher, ber den Werth des Sokrates als Philosophen, 1818 (inDer

historische Sokrates, ed. by A. Patzer, Darmstadt 1987, pp. 41-58), pp. 49-50.10 Vlastos op. cit., p. 101.


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helping ones friends and harming ones enemies.11 Platos Socrates in the Crito (49A-E)

sharply opposes this principle, and Vlastos and others have rightly emphasized how central

this move is for the ethical challenge of Socratism as conceived by Plato. Xenophons

uncritical compliance with the conventional attitude (likewise his wholly conventional

understanding of the virtues of piety and justice/law-abidingness) do not lend support to a

reading that views him as a major contributor to the development of ancient philosophical

ethics.

But what, then, explains the appreciation that Xenophons philosophical writings

seem to have enjoyed in antiquity? Werent his writings mere instances of

popularphilosophie? Characterizing someones writings this way is usually understood as a

reproach, not just as a classification. But why should it be objectionable to write

popularphilosophie, i.e. to write philosophical texts that are accessible to a larger audienceof educated but non-specialist readers and address issues likely to appear relevant for such

readers? The assessment of the merits or demerits ofpopularphilosophie depends on what

one takes to be the over-arching purpose of philosophy. The appreciation of a man like

Cicero for Xenophon12 may have resulted from the different cultural significance of

philosophy in antiquity. After all, if philosophy is to form the attitudes of the educated at

large, it has to achieve, apart from its substantial technical research, some kind of less

technical, more accessible representation as well. And this was certainly a concern of

ancient Greek and Roman philosophy from the Socratics down to late Stoicism. Also

authors like Plato or Aristotle committed themselves to writing protreptic texts that could

reach out.

So far, so good. Yet, it also needs to be mentioned that the problem many of us have

with Xenophons philosophical writings does not relate primarily to their non-technical

character, but to the rather dull and conventional content of his ethics. Dorion shows how

central the concepts ofenkrateia (self-control) and karteria (endurance, toughness) are in

Xenophons conception of virtue and how he connects these character traits with the idea of

autarkeia (self-sufficiency). These terms are familiar from other, more elaborate and more

provocative ancient ethical theories. Yet the way Xenophon spells out the life of the

virtuous person, with his great emphasis on social and economic success, seems to amount

to a quite conventional bourgeois existence (or rather the ancient equivalent to it).But I

grant that a defender of Xenophon could reply that this is actually a good feature of

Xenophons Socrates, since his ethics and moral psychology are more realistic, more easily

applicable, if perhaps intellectually less interesting, for that very reason.

11 Dorion quotes (p. 101) Mem. II.1, 28; 2, 2; 3, 14; 6, 35; IV.2, 15-17. The last two

passages are particularly telling.12 Cf. Dring op. cit., p. 199.


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Lets turn to Dorions chapter on Aristophanes representation of Socrates. Aristophanes

Clouds shows a Socrates who is both a natural philosopher and a sophist teaching

techniques of manipulative argumentation and getting paid for it, while the Socratics

unanimously dissociate Socrates from natural philosophy and emphasize that he never

taught for money. Dorion discusses two alternative explanations. The one takes

Aristophanes to have used thepersona of Socrates for a representation of all the

characteristics that the common Athenian associated with intellectuals. The other suggests

that the historical Socrates underwent a development and that he began with an interest in

natural philosophy but later turned away from it. Dorion favors the first interpretation,

pointing out that the developmental approach (which he discusses in the version proposed

by Vander Waerdt13

) cannot explain why he is also represented as a professional teacher ofdebating techniques. A consequence from this observation is that the Clouds does not

provide reliable historical evidence for the philosophy of Socrates, even though they were

published during Socrates life-time.

How does Aristotles assessment of Socrates fare in Dorions book? Dorion dismisses

Aristotles value as a historical source regarding Socrates on the basis of the following

familiar observations (pp. 24-25): Aristotles doxographical remarks on Socrates, apart from

having many gaps, also seem to depend entirely on Platos early dialogues. Moreover,

Aristotle is not interested in history of philosophy for its own sake but pursues his own

philosophical agenda in his reconstruction of the history of philosophical ideas. But Dorion

also emphasizes that Aristotle is the first to try an objective, critical assessment of what he

takes to be the basic philosophical achievements of Socrates, while the earlier Socratics

used the figure of Socrates as a vehicle of their own philosophizing.Well, I am not so sure

that Plato uses thepersona of Socrates simply as a vehicle. It seems to me that he also tried

to assess the philosophical merits of what he took to be the upshot of Socrates

philosophizing and that his Socratic dialogues reflect to some extent the way he grappled

with the problems which he took to be inherent in the Socratic approach. (Witness for

instance how several of his dialogues point out difficulties with the specification of the

object of virtue-knowledge.) But that is an issue I cannot expand on here.

My review has highlighted points on which I disagree with Dorion. But there should be no

doubt: This little book is a good piece of scholarship, and it is stimulating to read.

13

P. A. Vander Waerdt, Socrates in the Clouds, in The Socratic Movement, ed. by P. A.Vander Waerdt, Ithaca 1994, pp. 48-86.

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