Restoration and Improvement of Fish Landing Centres with ...€¦ · GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report 4 Table of contents List of Acronyms 5 Executive Summary 6 1 Introduction

October 2011 Final

Final evaluation report

Restoration and Improvement of Fish Landing Centres with Stakeholder Participation in Management - GCP/SRL/057/CAN

Office of Evaluation

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United

Nations

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GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report

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Acknowledgements

The evaluator would like to express his gratitude to everyone in Sri Lanka who assisted him

in his work. Particular thanks is due to the project staff who, despite the demands being made

on them in the last days of the project, were always helpful and willing to assist and made the

task both interesting and informative.

Composition of the Evaluation team

Evaluation team

Prof. Roderick L. Stirrat, social development and small scale fisheries expert


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Table of contents

List of Acronyms 5 Executive Summary 6

1 Introduction 10 1.1 Background and purpose of the evaluation 10 1.2 Methodology of the evaluation 10 2 Context of the project 11 3 Project concept and relevance 12

3.1 Project Design 12 3.2 Relevance 15 4 Project Implementation 16 4.1 Key events in the project‟s life 16

4.2 Budget and expenditure 17 4.3 Project management 18 4.4 Technical backstopping 19

4.5 Government support 19 5 Results and contributions to stated objectives 21

5.1 Outputs and outcomes 21 5.1.1 Output 1: Capacity of CFHC strengthened to coordinate landing site

rehabilitation and management 21 5.1.2 Output 2: Fisheries landing centres rehabilitated in 15 districts 23 5.1.3 Output 3: Institutional frameworks for community participation in harbour

management developed and implemented (and livelihoods improved) 26 5.1.4 Project Outcome: Rehabilitated landing centres functioning well and self-

sustaining as a result of stakeholder participation in management. 27 5.2 Gender issues 28

5.3 Impact and sustainability 29 5.3.1 Infrastructure 29

5.3.2 Frameworks for community participation 29 6 Conclusions 30 7 Recommendations 32

8 Lessons Learned 33 Annex 1. Terms of reference 34

Annex 2. Brief profile of the evaluation team 39 Annex 3. Documents consulted 39 Annex 4. Itinerary and list of persons met 41

Annex 5. Original Project Logical Framework 43 Annex 6. Revised Project Logical Framework 46


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List of Acronyms

AD Assistant Director (DFAR)

ADB Asian Development Bank

CBO Community Based Organization

CCD Coast Conservation Department

CFHC Ceylon Fisheries Harbours Corporation

DFAR Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources

CIDA Canadian International Development Agency

CTA Chief Technical Advisor

FCICSL Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Sri Lanka

FCS Fisheries Cooperative Society

FI Fisheries Inspector

FLC Fish Landing Centres/Sites

GoSL Government of Sri Lanka

ICEIDA Icelandic International Development Cooperation Agency

IFAD International Fund for Agriculture

LTO FAO Lead Technical Officer

MFARD Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resource Development

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

NARA National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency

NSC National Steering Committee

OED FAO Office of Evaluation

PMU Project Management Unit

RFLP Regional Fisheries Livelihood Project

RTE Real Time Evaluation

SANDS Shoreline and Near Shore Data Systems


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Executive Summary

Information about the evaluation

ES1. The project, „Restoration and Improvement of Fish Landing Centres with

Stakeholder Participation‟ (GCP/SRL/057/CAN) was a post-Tsunami project in Sri Lanka

funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) with a total amount of

USD 4.9 million. It started in April 2008 and was completed on 30 September 2011.

ES2. The Project Document included provisions for a final evaluation and the parties

involved – the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), CIDA, FAO Sri Lanka, the FAO Lead

Technical Officer (LTO) and the FAO Office of Evaluation (OED) agreed that a final

evaluation would be useful „to assess project achievements and identify lessons that may be

useful for future projects‟.

ES3. The Evaluation was carried out in late August-early September 2011 and included a

presentation of preliminary findings and conclusions at the final project workshop. It

followed the methodological guidance provided in the ToR: this included a review of a range

of available documents and interviews with project staff, with staff of government

departments with which the project interacted, and with relevant others. In addition, field

visits were made to 15 project sites. During these visits the physical results of project

activities were viewed, meetings between project staff and members of the fishing

communities observed, and a range of individuals interviewed.

ES4. Owing to unforeseen problems, the evaluation team was reduced to one member, the

identified national consultant, a fishery expert, withdrawing at the last moment from the

assignment. This seriously restricted the overall expertise of the team, especially in the

context of assessing the economic and financial aspects of the project. In addition, this

evaluation lacks the insights which are developed by a multi-disciplinary team.

Key findings and conclusions

ES5. The project was formulated in 2007 as part of the broader FAO‟s support to the

Government in the aftermath of the December 2004 Tsunami that caused widespread

destruction along much of the coast of Sri Lanka affecting not only fishing craft and gear but

also fisheries-related infrastructure such as buildings and roads.

ES6. Project design was finalised in 2007 and focused on three key areas of activity:

i. Strengthening the capacity of the Ceylon Fishery Harbours Corporation (CFHC)

to manage and coordinate the rehabilitation of fish landing sites,

ii. Carry out the rehabilitation of fish landing sites in 15 (later reduced to 13)

districts,

iii. Develop and implement frameworks for community participation in fish landing

site management.

ES7. Through these activities it was argued that the „livelihoods of fishers and fishing

communities in tsunami affected areas [will] be improved.


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ES8. In the context of building capacity in the CFHC, the project envisaged an ambitious

training scheme for CFHC staff, the establishment of a unit in the CFHC to design and

manage harbours and fish landing sites, and major improvements in data and information

management systems. As far as fish landing sites were concerned, the project planned to

carry out infrastructure activities in 80 sites whilst establishing forms of „community

management‟ to ensure the sustainability of these infrastructural developments.

ES9. The Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (MFAR) was designated as the

implementing agency but the project was situated in the CFHC where a Project Management

Unit (PMU) and a Design Unit were to be established. The Department of Fisheries and

Aquatic Resources (DFAR) was to be involved in the establishment and management of fish

landing sites with the help of NGOs.

ES10. In terms of relevance, the project‟s strategy and objectives were broadly in line with

GoSL policies. In terms of FAO‟s current strategic objectives, the project does relate to two

of the organisational results in the 2010-2011 Plan of Work. However, design in terms of the

logical relationship between capacity building in the CFHC, building infrastructure and

establishing community management of assets on the one hand, and improvements in the

livelihoods of fishing families and communities on the other is not made clear. Whilst the

objective was couched in terms of livelihoods, project activities focused on physical assets

and their management, not livelihoods.

ES11. Overall, general project management was good given the shortcomings in project

design and the difficulties of the institutional environment in which the project was operating.

Project management took decisions quickly, and adopted a flexible attitude to changing

situations.

ES12. There were, however, problems. Delays in starting the project coupled with delays in

implementing construction works (partly due to bad weather) made it difficult for the project

to achieve its outputs within the project timeframe. It quickly became apparent that the CFHC

had only a marginal interest in fish landing sites and the project found itself taking on roles

which had been seen as those of the CFHC. During project implementation the role of the

DFAR became increasingly important.

ES13. As far as training was concerned, 856 people attended courses supported by the

project, almost 50% from the DFAR and the balance from CFHC (around 30%) and the

MFARD. Around 33% of all staff in MFARD, DFAR and CFHC received some sort of

training supported by the project. Topics covered included planning, monitoring and

evaluation, Harbour engineering and contract management and management of community

organisations. In addition, there were courses on livelihoods and on social mobilisation and

study tours to India and the Philippines were organised by the project. The CFHC, the DFAR,

the MFARD and the National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency

(NARA) also received assistance in terms of equipment and software. Overall, the training

and other assistance supplied by the project did enhance the knowledge of members of these

organisations. However, the lack of an integrated and inclusive approach to capacity building

and problematic relations between the project and GoSL affected the full potential of the

project in terms of training and capacity building were not realised and the long term

sustainability of project outputs was jeopardised.


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ES14. The original target of working in 80 fish landing sites was always over-optimistic

given logistical and financial constraints. The project was active in 42 sites of which 23 were

open and in use by the end of the project. The infrastructure rehabilitated or constructed

ranged from road construction through to small complexes of buildings and in one case an

office for the Fisheries Assistant Director. There were delays in the construction process but

the CTA estimated that 95% of construction work was completed by the end of the project. In

some cases there were issues as to the siting of infrastructure, for instance fish sales points.

ES15. One of the central issues the project was how to address the long term maintenance

and management of the infrastructure established by the project at the FLCs. The project

sought to realise this output through local level CBOs, in most cases cooperative societies,

and through establishing business plans which would ensure long term sustainable

management of the sites. The project worked closely with DFAR staff to establish these

management groups and agree business plans with them. In some cases this initiative

promises well. In others there are issues as to how far the business plans are fully understood

and there are questions as to whether sufficient training in their use has been given.

ES16. Gender was not a central issue in this project and although the needs assessment paid

attention to the numbers of women involved in various activities, there was no gender

analysis. However, given the major role that women play in post-harvest activities in much of

Sri Lanka, women were involved in the organisations which it is planned will manage the fish

landing sites and were involved in meetings convened by the project. The project itself

estimates that „more than 10%‟ of project beneficiaries were women.

ES17. The project received good support from the Lead Technical Officer (LTO) although

it would have benefitted from inputs on participatory management and capacity building. The

Chief Technical Advisor would also have benefitted from greater training in FAO

procurement procedures. As far as FAOR is concerned, a more proactive stance especially in

encouraging and nurturing contacts between the various FAO fisheries projects active in Sri

Lanka would have been helpful to all whilst delays in the payment of invoices created

problems for the project.

ES18. Given that the project came to an end at the time of this evaluation, the following

recommendations are all addressed to FAO at corporate level.

ES19. It emerged in the analysis of this project that failures in planning were key to many

of the problems the project faced. Hence, Recommendation 1 focuses on project formulation

aspects.

Recommendation 1 To FAO on project formulation

FAO should ensure that in future projects:

a) More attention is paid to the logical relations between activities, outputs and

objectives,

b) When FAO and other agencies have worked in the same sector, a systematic

review of their experience should be made to guide planning,

c) Livelihoods projects must involve effective stakeholder and gender analysis at the

planning stage,

d) Realistic targets and time frames must be set.


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ES20. In project implementation FAO must address three issues arising from the

experience of this project, related to i) the fact that in the project, relations with the GoSL

were often strained; ii) training was a major component but there are doubts as to its

effectiveness in increasing capacity; and iii) project staff experienced problems in handling

FAO regulations and processes.

Recommendation 2 To FAO on project implementation


a) At project inception (or earlier) a clear division of labour should be agreed between

FAO and partner organisations, there must be regular meetings of coordinating

bodies, and the FAOR must take a proactive role in facilitating good relations;

b) FAO should ensure that training only takes place in terms of a wider training

strategy;

c) Staff should receive adequate training in FAO procedures. This is especially

important in projects which involve infrastructural components.

ES21. This project highlights some of the issues concerning the ways in which future

sustainability might be strengthened.

Recommendation 3 To FAO on sustainability

It is recommended that FAO ensures that problems concerning sustainability are identified at

an early stage in project implementation and that the time frame of projects is such that the

results of interventions can be assessed and issues addressed.


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1 Introduction

1.1 Background and purpose of the evaluation

1. The project Restoration and Improvement of Fish Landing Centres with Stakeholder

Participation in Management (GCP/SRL/057/CAN) was funded as a post-tsunami project in

Sri Lanka, by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) with a total budget of

USD 4.9 million. It started in April 2008 and was completed on 30 September 2011.

2. The Project Document included provisions for a final evaluation, and parties

involved – the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), CIDA, FAO Sri Lanka, the FAO Lead

Technical Officer (LTO) and FAO Office of Evaluation (OED) – agreed that a final

evaluation would be useful 'to assess project achievements and identify lessons that may be

useful for future projects'. In particular, the Terms of Reference of the Evaluation1 identified

three focal questions:

i. What have been the project's achievements in comparison to expected outputs and

outcomes?

ii. What are the potential and/or actual impacts of the project – positive, negative,

intended, unintended?

iii. What lessons can be drawn that may inform approaches to small scale fisheries

infrastructure development?

3. The Evaluation was carried out in late August-early September 2011, and included a

restitution of preliminary findings and conclusions at the final project workshop. This draft is

circulated to FAO stakeholders for their comments and suggestions, before finalization by the

Team Leader.2

1.2 Methodology of the evaluation

4. The evaluation followed the methodological guidance provided in the ToR. It was

based on a review of a range of available documents,3 and interviews with project staff and

with staff from government institutions with which the project interacted.4

5. In addition, field visits were made to 15 project sites in the following districts:

Colombo, Kalutara, Galle, Matara, Hambantota, Chilaw, Mannar and Mullaitivu. During

these visits the physical results of project activities were viewed, meetings between project

staff and members of the fishing communities were observed, and a range of individuals was

interviewed.

6. Owing to unforeseen problems at the moment of starting the field work, the

evaluation team consisted of only one member, as the identified national consultant, a fishery

_________________ 1 See Annex 1, Terms of Reference

2 See Annex 2, Profile of team members

3 See Annex 3, List of documents reviewed

4 See Annex 4, List of institutions and stakeholders met during the evaluation process


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expert, withdrew at the last minute from the assignment. This seriously restricted the overall

expertise of the team, especially in the context of assessing the economic and financial

aspects of the project. In addition, this evaluation lacks the insights which come from a multi-

disciplinary team.

2 Context of the project

7. On December 26th 2004 a tsunami hit the eastern, southern and south-western coasts

of Sri Lanka causing major loss of live as well as widespread damage to physical structures

and fishing craft. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami a major international relief effort

was mounted by a range of agencies from Sri Lanka and the international community. These

included FAO.

8. Despite the official aim of 'building back better', in many cases the resources

supplied by the various relief agencies were sub-standard or inappropriate to local conditions.

In part as a response to this situation, the GoSL began to take a greater role in coordinating

relief and rehabilitation activities. In the context of the fisheries sector, various arms of the

Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (MFAR, later MFARD – the Ministry of

Fisheries and Aquatic Resource Development)5 including the Ceylon Fisheries Harbours

Corporation (CFHC) and the Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (DFAR)

became the channel through which rehabilitation activities were directed.

9. FAO was actively involved in assisting the GoSL in managing and coordinating the

process of relief and rehabilitation in the fisheries sector. This included FAO assistance to the

Sri Lankan Government in the production of a long term strategy for the marine fisheries

sector in November 2005, and an analysis of fisheries institutions and capacity assessment in

2007. FAO also assisted in the production of a 'Master Plan' for the reconstruction and

development of anchorages and fish landing sites. In addition, FAO also supported a number

of other projects in the fisheries sector.

10. Much of the immediate relief focused on the replacement or rehabilitation of fishing

boats and gears but longer term issues concerning land-based infrastructure were also

addressed by the various agencies active immediately after the tsunami. This included the

restoration of harbours and anchorages as well as assets associated with smaller-scale landing

sites spread along the affected coasts. The situation was in part intensified by the removal in

some cases of fishing households and other buildings from the immediate vicinity of the

beach. This was seen by some as putting fishing gear at risk of being stolen.

11. Whilst most post-tsunami efforts went into boats, gear and supporting income-

generating activities, a smaller fraction went (and is still going) into the rehabilitation and

construction of fishing harbours. There has also been work which focuses more directly on

Fish Landing Centres (FLCs).6 Indeed, the project document refers to 220 previous

interventions in landing sites and anchorages in the post-tsunami period. Perhaps the most

relevant are the Icelandic International Development Cooperation Agency (ICEIDA)

supported project to develop infrastructure at 25 FLCs in seven districts between 2006 and

_________________ 5 The name of the Ministry changed in 2010. Throughout this report it will be referred to as the MFARD. 6 The literature seems to use 'fish landing sites' and 'fish landing centres' interchangeably. So will this report.


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2008, and the IFAD supported rehabilitation of FLCs at 18 sites on the south and east coasts.

In addition, various NGOs, both Sri Lankan and international, carried out a range of activities

as did international donor agencies such as GTZ, ADB and JICA.7

12. According to the Tripartite Review Report,8 “The development and/or improvement

of facilities at landing sites became quite an attractive activity for the actors in the tsunami

rehabilitation programme. As a result, FLCs proliferated. However... these facilities have

generally fallen into rack and ruin as a result of mismanagement or the absence of any

management.”

13. As the Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) noted in 2010, there is no certainty as to how

many fish landing sites there are in Sri Lanka, the figure of 700 frequently being quoted.

What constitutes a landing site is often unclear, many being temporary or only being used by

four or five craft. There is also uncertainty as to which ones have received assistance since

the tsunami, and what is the state of the assets established at these sites.

14. Leaving aside this major gap in the available knowledge on FLCs, by the time this

project was planned FAO had already gained considerable experience and knowledge of Sri

Lankan conditions. FAO had been involved in a series of projects in the fisheries sector and

had given general assistance to the GoSL, benefitted from the presence of an active FAO

Representative. By the time the project was being planned, the 'Real Time Evaluation of the

FAO Emergency and Rehabilitation Operations in Response to the Indian Ocean Earthquake

and Tsunami'9 was also available. In addition the Fisheries Institutional Analysis and

Capacity Development was available by November 2007.10 As far as FLCs were concerned, it

was also in a position to gain from the experience of IFAD and ICEIDA as well as other

agencies.

3 Project concept and relevance

3.1 Project Design

15. Project design was finalised in 2007 and focused on three key areas of activity:

a. Strengthening the capacity of the CFHC to manage and coordinate the rehabilitation

of fish landing sites,

b. Carry out the rehabilitation of fish landing sites in 15 (later 13) districts, and

c. Develop and implement frameworks for community participation in fish landing site

management.

_________________ 7 GTZ: Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit; ADB: Asian Development Bank; JICA:

Japan International Cooperation Agency. 8 The Tripartite Review of the project took place in September 2010, primarily at the behest of CIDA

9 The RTE was launched in 2005 and completed, after three international missions, in the second half of 2006.

The report was issued in 2007 and is available at http://www.fao.org/evaluation/oed-documents-and-

reports/en/ 10

This report is available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/ai532e/ai523e00.htm


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16. Through these activities it was argued that the 'livelihoods of fishers and fishing

communities in tsunami affected areas [will] be improved'.11

17. As far as capacity was concerned, the initial design focused on an ambitious training

scheme for CFHC staff, major improvements in data and information management systems,

and the establishment of a unit within the CFHC capable of designing harbours and managing

FLCs. By strengthening its capacity it was envisaged that the CFHC would be able to have

inputs into the other two areas of project activity.

18. The project envisaged adopting a participatory approach to the rehabilitation and

reconstruction of FLCs. Here, it was proposed that 80 sites from a list of 100 prepared by the

MFARD would be the foci of activity and that project and CFHC staff would be involved in

selecting sites, identifying needs, and reviewing the capacities of relevant construction

companies and local NGOs.

19. The final component, the management of the rehabilitated or newly built FLCs, was

seen as a form of 'community empowerment'. Thus not only were local communities to be

fully involved in the selection, design and construction of the new facilities: they were also to

be involved in the management of these FLCs. Here, the plans for the project envisaged

DFAR staff playing a key role, with assistance from the MFARD and from NGOs.

20. In the project design, the MFAR was designated as the implementation agency, but

the project was to be situated in the CFHC where a Project Management Unit (PMU) and a

design unit were to be established. The project was to be managed by an FAO international

Chief Technical Advisor working alongside a National Project Coordinator, both of whom

would be overseen by a steering committee which would include representatives from the

MFAR, the CFHC and FAO. It was originally proposed that there should also be two other

international experts to work on community participation and engineering aspects of the

project. However, these posts were rejected by GoSL.

21. An Inception Mission was mounted in 2008 and culminated in a National Inception

Workshop in November 2008. The complexity of the project in terms of the number and scale

of activities involved was considered to necessitate a workshop on training in monitoring and

evaluation. This was held in December 2009, after the CTA had been in post for 8 months,

and a monitoring and evaluation manual was produced in March 2010. The workshop led to a

complex and comprehensive monitoring system as well as a critical analysis of the existing

logframe and the formulation of a revised logframe for the project. However, the project

objective remained unchanged.

22. These changes focused more on detail than on overall strategy. Changes in wording

removed some of the ambiguities in the earlier project document particularly by affirming the

distinction between FLCs on the one hand, and harbours and anchorages on the other.

Decisions were taken as to which sites should be focused on and these became the basis for

Phase 1 of the project which concentrated its efforts in 11 districts. The original logframe

(2007) and the revised logframe (2009) are attached in Annex 5 and Annex 6.

_________________ 11

Project Document, p. 10


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23. One of the points made in the 2010 critical analysis of the original logframe and

associated project document was a lack of clarity in what the project would be doing and the

relationship between activities, outputs and objectives. Even after revision this lack of clarity

remained, especially in terms of how the project's objective – “the livelihoods of fishers and

fishing communities in tsunami affected areas improved” – is logically related to the three

activities and outputs strands in the project. Thus capacity building in the CFHC, the

construction or rehabilitation of FLCs and the encouragement of local Community Based

Organizations (CBOs) to manage these landing sites are all laudable in themselves, but how

they relate to the income or income security of fishing households is not immediately clear.

24. Arguably some components (e.g. the provision of lockable storage facilities for

engines and other gear) may reduce the dangers of theft but no evidence was presented in the

planning documents that theft was a problem. Similarly, the establishment of ice storage

facilities could have an effect on fish prices and thus fisher incomes. Other structures, for

instance the provision of meeting halls, of offices for cooperative society officers and at times

Fisheries Inspectors may well be laudable but again do not directly relate to income

generation. Also, there was some mention of training in post-harvest techniques which could

be related to improved livelihoods but this was envisaged as a minor component of the

project.

25. What was lacking was a clear theory of change which linked outputs (improved

landing sites and training) to outcomes (self-managed landing sites) which would contribute

directly or indirectly to project objectives (improved livelihoods).12 It could be argued that

this project was in effect a sub-component of the wider set of projects supported by FAO in

the Sri Lankan fisheries sector, and thus contributed to wider objectives. But this is not

supported by the low level of coordination FAO activities in the sector.

26. More generally, it appears that the project was primarily driven by a perceived need

for physical infrastructure at fish landing sites. As the Internal Evaluation puts it, 'The project

was not based on a livelihood need assessment but on a tsunami damage assessment'.13

Whether or not there was such a need is difficult to ascertain, but what is clear is that in small

landing sites (as distinct from larger harbours and anchorages which were outside the purlieu

of the project) there was little in the way of infrastructure prior to the tsunami and thus little

to rehabilitate.

27. Thus the project was to a certain extent working in a situation where it was not clear

that there was a need for infrastructure development at FLCs and had to work to create a

demand for what the project had to offer. Put crudely, local communities appear to have been

presented with a shopping list of inputs from which they chose. The purported link between

various constructions at these sites and the livelihoods of fishing households was simply a

means of justifying a project where the primary objective was completed infrastructure and

the means to manage it.

28. To a certain extent the lack of linkages between the activities and outputs of the

project with its objectives was recognised during the lifetime of the project. Thus as will be

discussed later, there were attempts to move beyond a simple focus on the management of

_________________ 12

The nature of log frame planning is made clear in the Project Cycle Management Guide produced by

SEAGA available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/ak211e/ak211e00.pdf 13

Internal Evaluation, p. 13

http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/ak211e/ak211e00.pdf


15

FLC infrastructure to a consideration of wider ways in which the CBOs involved in

management could be involved in a wider range of activities which might have a more direct

relationship to livelihoods.

29. If the underlying logic of the project was flawed, there are also questions to be asked

as to how the project was seen as fitting into government structures. The project was designed

to work with the CFHC with a secondary linkage to the DFAR. Yet it was always

problematic as to how involved the CFHC was in small scale fish landing sites rather than

fishery harbours and major anchorages. As will be elaborated on later in this report, the

CFHC lacked both the capacity and the will to take an active role in developing FLCs.

Failure to appreciate these factors at the planning stage led to problems in project

implementation.

30. What is perhaps surprising is that more note of FAO's experience in Sri Lanka was

not taken into account in the project planning process. No mention is made of, for instance

the problems reported in the tsunami evaluation concerning procurement. Although

representatives from other FLC-orientated projects participated in the Inception workshop

this seems to have had little impact on the design of the project. This, coupled with the lack

of any livelihoods analysis and the absence of any detailed consideration of the interest in and

commitment of the CFHC to FLCs were to cause major problems in project implementation.

3.2 Relevance

31. The project's strategy and objectives were broadly in line with GoSL strategies

concerning the revitalisation of the fishing industry in tsunami affected parts of the country.

Part of this strategy was the 'Masterplan for Reconstruction and Development of Anchorages

and Fishing Centres' (2006), which FAO had been involved in preparing and which consisted

of a list of fishing centres which the MFARD used to identify suitable sites for project

activities. The project was also in line with the 'Building Back Better' principle which

underlay post-tsunami recovery. And finally, it was said to be in line with the President's

'Mahinda Chintana' vision of the future of Sri Lanka (his manifesto for the 2010 presidential

election) and the 'Ten Year Development Policy Framework of the Fisheries and Aquatic

Resources Sector' announced in 2007, although the linkages between the project and

government policy are not direct. MFARD has also published an extremely ambitious set of

objectives for the sector envisaging almost doubling fish landings between 2009 and 2012.

This project has only a marginal relationship with these objectives.

32. As far as FAO is concerned, the project document claimed that the project related to

four of the MDGs: MDG 1 (Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger); MDG 2 (Achieve

universal primary education); MDG 3 (Promote gender equality and empower women) and

MDG 7 (Ensure environmental stability).

33. It is difficult to sustain these claims. The sorts of activities the project engaged in

and supported did not address extreme poverty or hunger nor were they designed to do so.

There was no component in the project concerned with education. Although the project did

involve women it was not designed to enhance the capabilities of women or enhance their

economic and social standing. And finally the project was not concerned with environmental

issues except in passing.


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34. The project was formulated within the context of the first FAO Strategic

Framework,14 wherein the project appears as correctly contributing to a programme titled

“2JA03: Capacity Building for Aquaculture and Small-scale Fisheries Development.” In the

current framework, links were made to both food security and sustainable management of

fisheries resources. More importantly, however, for the work of the Fisheries and

Aquaculture Department, this project is relevant to Article 8.9 of the Code of Conduct for

Responsible Fisheries on Harbours and landing places for fishing vessels.

4 Project Implementation

4.1 Key events in the project’s life

35. Given the complexities and delays in project implementation, it appears useful to

outline some key dates and events in the life of the project. These are listed in Box 1 below.

Box 1. Project milestones

Date Event, step

December 2004 The Asian tsunami

2006 Masterplan for Reconstruction and Development of Anchorages prepared by FAO

for GoSL

August 2007 Project document completed

October 2007 Fisheries Institutional Analysis and Capacity Assessment to the MFAR, Sri Lanka

March 2008 Agreement signed between FAO and CIDA

15 April 2008 Official start of project

August 2008 Inception mission visits Sri Lanka; Needs assessment of proposed sites started

September 2008 Official agreement signed between FAO and GoSL

February 2009 Draft Profile and Needs Assessment completed

March 2009 Chief Technical Advisor appointed

CIDA and FAO agree a six month extension to project

April 2009 Inception Phase Report and Project Implementation Plan

First Budget revision

May 2009 Violent conflict in north and east ends

July 2009 PMU fully staffed

August 2009 Project becomes fully operational

Six month extension to project agreed

September 2009 Training needs assessment completed

First needs assessment in ex-conflict areas

November 2009 M&E Training and Implementation Workshop

Revision of log-frame

Training component becomes active

March 2010 First construction contracts signed

Mid-2010 Presidential and National elections in Sri Lanka

June 2010 Second needs assessment in ex-conflict areas

August 2010 Phase 2 (work in Mannar and Mullaitivu districts) approved

September 2010 Tripartite Mission reviews project

November 2010 Second budget revision

August 2011 Internal evaluation (review) of project

August-September 2011 Independent evaluation

September 2011 End of project operations Source: Evaluation team

_________________ 14 FAO first Strategic Framework 2000-2015 was replaced by the current SF 2010-2019.


17

36. The project got under way in August 2008 with the visit of the Inception Mission.

At that point it was under the management the FAO office and, from late January 2009, of a

temporary CTA. Under him a two person team carried out an ambitious Needs Assessment

using a list of possible sites supplied by the CFHC.

37. The CTA finally arrived in March 2009 and an Inception Phase Report and Project

Implementation Plan were produced in April 2009. Project staff was then hired and included

the two consultants who had produced the Needs Assessment (a Community Participation in

Fisheries Expert and an Expert in Fish landing Site/Harbour Management and Institution

Building), a Human Resources Management and Training Specialist and a Monitoring and

Evaluation/IT Officer. In addition there was a Project Assistant, a Finance and Administrative

Assistant, a Project Secretary, an Office Assistant and three drivers.

38. Thus in all project staff consisted of five professional specialists which, given the

geographical scale and ambition of the project necessarily implied the use of consultancies,

23 Sri Lankan and 12 International.

4.2 Budget and expenditure

39. The costs of infrastructure totalled more than 50% of the overall budget. However,

as a result of delays in project implementation and the over-optimistic view of what could be

achieved in the three year life of the project, much of the construction work was still in

progress in the last weeks of the project and final payments would not be due until some

months after structures will be handed over by the contractors.

40. This resulted in a situation where still major items of expenditure were to be paid by

the time of the official closing date of the project, on 30 September 2011. At the date of

finalizing this report (14 October 2011) FAO financial statement indicated a positive balance

of 25% of the budget, after deducting expenditures and hard commitments. Thus it was

difficult to come to any general conclusion about the financial performance of the project and

this report wishes to flag this as an important issue for FAO to tackle adequately.

41. Project management made strenuous and generally successful efforts to control and

monitor its budget in a difficult situation. The process of producing bills of quantities and

cost estimates for construction work involved a series of checks and balances with three

levels of accountability: the supervising consultants, the project harbours specialist, and the

CTA all reviewing costs on a regular basis. Systems to impose penalties for late or sub-

standard delivery were also in place and were enforced. All the contractors involved in

construction work were major Sri Lankan companies, although in some cases their

performance was less efficient and the quality of their work lower than might have been

expected. The decision to group the works in to a series of packages rather than deal with

individual contractors at each site was almost certainly cost-effective.

42. It is difficult to compare the costs of infrastructure works at project-supported sites

with the costs incurred in other FLC-oriented projects. The package of inputs supplied by the

project varied from site to site which makes it difficult to compare the operations of this

project with – say – the operations of the ICEIDA project. It was claimed that where

comparisons could be made the costs of buildings supplied by this project, by IFAD and by


18

ICEIDA in parallel FLC projects were comparable and the Internal Evaluation concluded that

FLCs constructed by UNOPS were more expensive than those established by the project.

43. Most training was sourced from Sri Lankan organisations. In most cases these bids

went through a tendering process and appear to have been managed in an efficient fashion.

44. There were two revisions to the project budget. The first in April 2009 followed on

from the Inception Mission. The main thrust of the revision was to reallocate expenditure

from consultancy fees to salaries of project staff and to make allowance for the purchase of

project vehicles (unaccountably missing from the original budget). The second in November

2010 made some minor revisions in line with the non-involvement of NGOs in project

activities. Both these revisions appear to be sensible and practical and overall involved very

little change to the original budget. But as was noted, given that the project has still to meet

many of its bills, whether the project runs over budget, is on budget or under-spends was not

clear at the time of closing the evaluation mission.

4.3 Project management

45. Overall, general project management was good given the shortcomings in project

design and the difficulties of the institutional environment in which the project was operating.

Project management took decisions quickly, there was a degree of flexibility, for instance

adjusting its operational base to fit the institutional structure in Sri Lanka and reacting

speedily to the opening up of two northern districts to project activities (Phase 2 of the

project). The project was also notable for its use of relatively innovative approaches, for

instance the 'traffic lights' system of identifying the suitability and readiness of proposed sites

for project interventions, the 'business plans' approach to FLC management, and the

involvement of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Sri Lanka

(FCCISL). There was also close monitoring of project activities in line with the strong lead

set by the M&E Training workshop in November 2009.

46. Where there was much less success was in adjusting the original focus on site

construction and management to the more livelihoods focus hinted at in the project document.

Thus although the needs assessment and subsequent activities did mention social factors this

was in terms of the management of FLCs, not on livelihoods of fishermen or fishing families.

Nor did it include any social analysis. There were also delays in project implementation. The

work of the project started 6 months later than planned (which led to a six month project

extension) and there were also delays in the implementation of construction works, partly due

to adverse weather conditions but also due to issues concerning permissions from the Coast

Conservation Department (CCD), the need to comply with FAO procurement rules and the

decision of the National Steering Committee (NSC) not to involve UNOPS. Even if there had

not been these delays, it would have been difficult for the project to achieve its outputs within

the overall time frame. The project also lost focus. There was a shift away from FLC-

associated capacity building in the CFHC to a more general focus on training in the fisheries

sector.

47. An original objective of the project was to enhance the capacity of the CFHC to

design and manage FLCs. This was to be achieved through the creation of a FLC unit within

the CFHC and training of CFHC personnel. It quickly became apparent that there was little

interest in this line of activity from the Sri Lankan side, despite continuing attempts


19

throughout the life of the project to get the CFHC more involved in FLCs. This appears to be

the result of a number of factors. First, CFHC has traditionally focused on harbours and, to a

lesser extent, anchorages. FLCs were simply outside its ambit. Secondly, as harbours are the

main source of income for the CFHC, there was an unwillingness to use scarce resources by a

corporation which had already suffered from a major reduction in central government

subventions. Thirdly, as a government sector organisation, the CFHC was unable to meet the

costs of suitably qualified engineers which an effective FLC unit would require.

48. What this meant in practice was that the PMU took on the functions which had been

envisaged as the responsibility of the FLC unit in the CFHC. As far as the project's work on

FLCs was concerned, the DFAR with its network or ADs and FIs, the importance of which

had to a certain extent been recognised in the original plans for the project, became

increasingly significant. How far they were involved in needs assessment and site selection is

unclear.

4.4 Technical backstopping

49. The project received five visits from the Rome based Lead Technical Officer (LTO).

These were supportive to the project, especially in its dealings with the Sri Lankan

authorities. The LTO was also instrumental in arranging the study tours to General Santos

Fish Port Complex in the Philippines. There is no evidence that more technical support on the

physical aspects of harbours and FLCs was required given the nature of the project and the

competence of project management. However, the project would have benefited from more

technical inputs and support on participatory management and capacity building.

50. One area where the project did face difficulties was in dealing with procurement

issues. As a new member of FAO staff, the CTA (and project staff) would have benefitted

greatly from procurement training at the beginning of (rather than half way through) the

project Delays in decision making within FAO also led to problems, for instance delays

caused by the slow response to the proposal that UNOPS should handle the infrastructural

aspects of the project.

51. The project might also have benefited from greater involvement from the FAO

Representative especially in advising on the nuances of the Sri Lankan context and mediating

in a timely fashion at those points where minor issues threatened relations between the

project and GoSL. The FAO Representative might also have been more proactive in creating

a forum where the various FAO projects at work in the fisheries sector could exchange

information and experience. This is particularly significant in that in some quarters at least

this project was seen as part of a wider programme of activities in the Sri Lankan fisheries

sector. But given time pressures on the FAOR this is perhaps unrealistic. Finally, there were

continuing problems over the timely payment of project invoices, a situation which worsened

towards the end of the project.

4.5 Government support

52. Although this project was requested by the GoSL, several problems affected the

relationship between the project and various governmental institutions. Some of these have


20

been alluded to above, including the new regulations introduced by the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs that led to a protracted period of negotiations and to the late arrival of the CTA.

53. The original concept of the project envisaged a major role for Sri Lankan NGOs,

many of whom have had extensive experience in social mobilisation, in participatory

management and in training. Indeed, some had previous experience in establishing FLCs.

However, the changing political climate in Sri Lanka led to NGOs being less and less

acceptable to Government. In particular, MFARD refused to countenance the involvement of

NGOs (Sri Lankan or otherwise) in the project and thus the project was forced to have

recourse to consultants. This probably led to less effective social mobilisation and a weaker

understanding of the dynamics of village life.

54. Almost from its inception, the project was put under great pressure by MFARD to

construct a harbour at Kalametiya on the southern coast of Sri Lanka. This would have been a

major construction event, outside the focus of the project which was on small scale beach

landing sites, and would have required a considerable proportion of the overall budget of the

project. The project supported a consultancy to produce an investment plan but refused

further involvement in this site owing to the cost of the works which was estimated at USD

3.1 million.

55. Overall, the project received relatively little support from either the MFARD or the

CFHC. The main thrust of the project was not of direct interest to the CFHC whilst the

MFARD did little to support it or take an interest in its activities. Minor issues could lead to

problems, for instance when Sri Lankan civil service regulations and FAO regulations failed

to match up. One example of the lack of a close involvement of government in the project

was the failure of the Steering Committee to meet between November 2009 and August 2010.

Another was the failure of the CFHC to comment on any of the reports prepared by the

project.

56. The DFAR had the closest relationship with the project and received the most

benefits from the project in terms of training. In effect the project moved its focus of

activities from the CFHC to the DFAR and perhaps this should have been recognised in the

formal arrangements for the project. The MFARD and the CFHC did receive some benefits

but much less than was originally envisaged, and most of it only tangentially related to the

project's primary interest in fish landing sites.

57. Overall, poor relations with some national stakeholders led to the project becoming

something of an enclave. Many of the activities carried out by the project in the FLCs should

have involved either the CFHC or the DFAR or both but became the sole responsibility of the

project. This threatened both the capacity building aspects of the project and also its long

term sustainability.


21

5 Results and contributions to stated objectives

5.1 Outputs and outcomes

58. Ideally, it would be useful to be able to compare the actual outputs and outcomes of

this project with those listed in the revised logframe. In this case this is not possible for a

number of reasons. First, the change in focus from the CFHC to the DFAR meant that many

of the indicators listed in the logframe became irrelevant. Second, many activities were still

in progress at the time of project closing date and had not yet led to identifiable outcomes.

Thirdly, in many cases the information did not as yet exist.. Thus the approach adopted here

follows the broad framework of the logframe but is not as comprehensive as one would like.

5.1.1 Output 1: Capacity of CFHC strengthened to coordinate landing site rehabilitation

and management

59. The original remit of the project had been to help increase capacity in the CFHC to

manage and coordinate rehabilitation of fish landing sites. Given the lack of interest in

CFHC, the project shifted its focus to the broader task of increasing the general capacity

across the fisheries sector as a whole. Key to this was training.

60. A Training Needs Assessment was carried out in September 2009 covering 345

responders not only in the CFHC but also in the MFARD and the DFAR. The result was an

ambitious training programme with five main components:

i. Planning, monitoring and evaluation. This group of courses was primarily aimed at

staff from the MFARD and covered such topics as co-management, M&E systems

and data analysis.

ii. Management of community organisations. This group of courses covered such topics

as participatory management, social mobilisation and livelihoods issues, and was

primarily aimed at staff from the DFAR

iii. Harbour engineering and contract management. Primarily aimed at CFHC

management staff

iv. General courses. These included courses in English, Tamil, basic IT and financial

management, and were aimed at a broad cross-section of staff in the fisheries sector.

v. Special courses. These were aimed at senior staff and included specialist software

training and overseas study tours.

61. In total 856 people attended these courses, DFAR (413) and CHFC (272) making up

the bulk of attendees. Strikingly, 94 people attended four or more courses. Around 33% of all

staff in MFARD, DFAR and CFHC received some form of training supported by the project.

The training was delivered by a mix of Sri Lankan and international consultants.

62. One important element in the training programme consisted of two courses on the

Sustainable Livelihoods approach and one on Sustainable Livelihoods Enhancement and

Diversification, all held in mid 2010. The existence of these courses, oriented towards DFAR

staff, indicate that the project was trying to make an effort to put more emphasis on

livelihoods issues, an emphasis lacking in the project design. The project also mounted three

social mobilisation courses in the first half of 2010.


22

63. The training programme was broadly dependent on the profile of demands elicited

by the questionnaire. Despite the efforts of the project, attempts to establish a Training

Working Group to coordinate training needs across the fisheries sector were unsuccessful and

there does not seem to have been a training strategy.

64. As has been outlined previously, the lack of interest in FLCs on the part of the

CFHC led to the project developing its relationship with the DFAR. Plans to develop a FLC

unit in the CFHC came to nothing as did the attempt to prepare a corporate plan for the

CFHC. Even so, as also mentioned previously, there was a considerable amount of training

made available to CFHC staff including study tours to the Philippines and to India, plus some

computer equipment and courses in using software.

65. Clearly these inputs into the CFHC did not strengthen its capacity to 'coordinate

landing site rehabilitation and management', but they perhaps had some impact on the long

term capacity of the CFHC to manage fisheries harbours. Thus the visit to the General Santos

Fish Port Complex was seen as showing what is possible for a middle income country such as

Sri Lanka and has opened up the discussion of new ways (for Sri Lanka) of managing such

harbours and increasing standards of operation. In terms of knowledge, individual members

of staff in the CFHC have clearly benefited, but there is no overall structure within which

these individual benefits can be fully utilised to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of

the organisation as a whole. As many evaluations and studies have made clear, training by

itself does not lead to capacity building.

66. In DFAR, out of the 413 attendees, again over 50% attended three or more courses.

Most of these courses were more directly attuned to the direct interests of the project in FLC

management, all were very well received by the participants, and again it is clear that

individuals gained a considerable amount of knowledge through their exposure to new ideas

and ways of approaching the management of fishery assets. But again the major issue is the

degree to which training in itself can increase capacity.

67. Other inputs in support of capacity building in the sector consisted of the

rehabilitation of an auditorium for the CFHC (which proved useful as a venue for project

training activities) and the supply of motorbikes and computers to the DFAR for use by ADs

and FIs. The project also supported three students taking MSc courses. Mention should also

be made of the project's support to a new office for the AD in Mullaitivu. The project did

attempt to support the preparation of a corporate plan for the CFHC but this was terminated at

the request of the MFARD.

68. The study tours to the Philippines and to India appear to have had an impact on

decision makers and may well lead to positive results in terms of new thinking and

innovations in fisheries harbour management. Similarly, the training supplied in project

management and general training may also have longer running effects. But the impact and

sustainability of the training supplied depends on the wider institutional setting in which

trainees are situated, and here there are serious doubts. The most obvious is the training in the

use of MIKE21 – in the absence of the software itself in CFHC. In contrast, SANDS software


23

which had been offered to the CFHC, found a home in NARA and it is planned that it will be

used to collate data from across the fisheries sector.15

69. The lack of overall training strategies and capacity building strategies in general

means that the potential of the individual gains cannot be realised at the broader institutional

level. The project did begin work on a corporate plan for the CFHC but was prevented by the

MFARD from completing the work. The project did succeed in preparing detailed job

descriptions including training aspects or junior and middle management in the CFHC.

70. The lack of suitable institutional frameworks also threatens the long term

sustainability of certain aspects of capacity building in other ways. For long term benefits to

derive from the support given for the use of the SANDS programme by the project depends

upon continuing cooperation between relevant bodies, not just within the overview of the

MFARD. There is no guarantee that this will be forthcoming. Nor are there plans for support

to trainees in the future, and it would not be surprising if lessons learnt or skills gained will

soon be forgotten. Further, the project could not achieve many of its training objectives as it

ran out of time.

71. As far as equipment is concerned, the MFARD has been advised that it will be

responsible for supporting the maintenance of equipment supplied by the project. As far as

the materials made available to the FLCs are concerned, it is hoped that the business planning

approach to FLC management will enable this equipment to be maintained.

72. In sum, the project has had a definite impact in terms of knowledge within the

organisations with which it has worked, but it is not clear that this has increased the

organisations' capacity in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. This would have required a

much more integrated and inclusive approach to capacity building with probably less

emphasis on training large numbers of participants and more emphasis on both developing

corporate plans and ensuring that project staff work in conjunction with counterparts in the

host organisations.16

5.1.2 Output 2: Fisheries landing centres rehabilitated in 15 districts

73. Between August 2008 and February 2009 an ambitious 'Profile and Needs

Assessment' of 50 fish landing sites was carried out based on the list of sites identified by the

Masterplan. This generated a wealth of data which finally appeared in report form in June

2009, although the document was in use from February 2009. The report identified the types

of intervention needed at the various sites and the issues which would have to be addressed

such as availability of land. In certain cases it deemed sites to be unsuitable for project

intervention.

74. One feature of this needs assessment was its insistence that the needs of different

communities were different, and that a 'one size fits all' approach was unworkable. Here there

was an attempt to involve the local community in a dialogue as to what was needed and what

_________________ 15

MIKE 21 is an extremely expensive set of programmes of use in harbour planning and management.

SANDS is a relatively cheap programme much more useful to the needs of managing small scale landing

sites. 16

It should also be mentioned that the project also supplied training to 55 members of MFARD, and that in

addition to training the project supplied computer equipment and some vehicles to the DFAR.


24

was possible. This was in part the result of the experience of two other projects which had

worked on FLCs in Sri Lanka funded by ICEIDA and IFAD. The former had adopted a

system using a small number of standard models which was judged as less successful than the

IFAD approach which stressed the different needs of different sites.

75. Thus, the project supported a range of interventions – for instance net mending halls,

engine store rooms, fish auction sheds – each particular activity depending on negotiations

between local fishers and project staff. These negotiations were facilitated by DFAR staff

members. Not all requests were granted, partly because many were for infrastructure outwith

the remit of the project (e.g. major marine works) or were difficult or challenging for local

communities to manage. So for instance the frequent requests for fuel storage facilities were

generally ruled out as requiring management skills which were unlikely to be realised. The

needs assessment also addressed a range of social and economic issues, but primarily in terms

of what the likely impact of these factors would be on the management of landing site assets.

76. The Needs Assessment was followed up by further consultations in potential project

sites between project staff and local residents, a very demanding process for project staff.

The project developed what it called a 'traffic light' system to indicate the degree to which

sites were suitable for interventions. This was based on data being generated by the project's

M&E system and provided a simple visual means of indicating potential for the project.

Factors which would give rise to an amber or red status included the existence of FLC inputs

by another agency, problems in obtaining the requisite permissions from CCD and a lack of

local commitment.

77. Given the size of the PMU and the geographical spread of the project, it would have

been difficult if not impossible for the PMU to manage the physical activities in the project

sites spread around the coast of Sri Lanka. The project proposed that the design and

management of infrastructural works should be handled by UNOPS but this was rejected by

the NSC in July 2009, the NSC agreeing to follow a tender process to select suitable service

providers.

78. Thus in October 2009 the design and supervision contract was awarded to a Sri

Lankan consultancy company, PROTEK, which worked in close collaboration with the

project engineer. As for the construction work, the project followed the route outlined in the

project document and grouped the various sites into four geographical clusters, awarding

contracts to contractors following FAO and GoSL guidelines.

79. One of the points made in the evaluation of FAO post-tsunami activities was that

FAO should avoid becoming involved in construction activities and concentrate its activities

in areas in which it had a clear comparative advantage. Unsurprisingly the project faced

major problems in managing the activities associated with infrastructure renovation and

improvement. In part these derived from a mismatch between FAO procurement rules and the

local situation. Thus FAO insistence on accepting the lowest tender led to the project being

forced to appoint a contract despite misgivings over whether or not the contractor could

deliver on time. In Sri Lanka the normal procedure is for contractors to receive an advance

payment (20% of costs), a practice not accepted by FAO.

80. The original target of working in 80 FLCs in all 15 coastal districts of Sri Lanka was

always over-optimistic. At the time the project started certain districts were out of bounds

owing to the armed conflict in northern Sri Lanka. Furthermore, in cost terms (not to mention


25

the administrative and logistical issues involved and inflationary pressures), working in 80

sites was unrealistic. And finally, it might be worth noting that not all districts had been

affected by the tsunami. This issue had arisen at the Inception Workshop where there was a

strong recommendation from participants that the project should work in all districts and not

only those affected by the tsunami.

81. The project succeeded in working in 13 coastal districts (Jaffna and Killinochchi

were excluded), eleven in Phase 1; two in Phase 2. Rather than attempt to renovate existing

infrastructure or construct new infrastructure in 80 sites the project succeeded in being active

in 42 sites, although at one site no construction work took place but only support to the local

FCS, and another consisted of the construction of a new office for the DFAR AD in

Mullaitivu. Of the balance, it was claimed during the evaluation mission that 23 out of 40

FLCs were open and in use. At four of these project inputs consisted of roads, at one a new

toilet block was constructed, at another an existing building was refurbished, and new

buildings were constructed at seventeen sites.

82. Thus almost all the physical work done by the project involved the construction of

new buildings in addition to the upgrading of public facilities such as roads, and it is probably

incorrect to see this project as concerned with rehabilitation of existing assets but rather with

the introduction of a new range of facilities for the fishing population in selected villages.17

The range of facilities provided is impressive including net mending halls, engine store

rooms, ice storage facilities and meeting halls.

83. Yet whilst the overall figures are impressive, there are problems. None of the

contracts have been completed on time. The result is that 'liquidated damages' have had to be

imposed on three of the four contracts. At the time of this evaluation, construction work in

cluster 3 (South Coast) where the contract was awarded in May 2010 and which should have

been completed in April 2011 was still in progress – with little indication that it would be

completed before the end of the project in September 2011. In one case the works were

estimated to be only 25% complete at the end of August 2011. The supervising consultants

were aware of these issues. In Phase 2 sites, handled by a different contractor, it was clear

that a major effort was being made to complete work before the end of the project. Despite

these delays, the CTA reports that 95% of construction works were completed by the end of

the project.

84. In a few cases it was not clear that the completed facilities were correctly sited

despite the efforts that had gone into involving local people in decisions over infrastructure.

Thus at Taldekka (in Chilaw district) a recently completed fish sales point was not being

used, fish sellers continuing to congregate along the road 25 meters away where fish buyers

were found. At Kadawatha South (also in Chilaw district), the same problem may arise. More

generally, during the evaluation it appeared that many of the structures were not being used,

the exception being covered areas which, no matter what their design objective, were being

used for net mending. However, it should be remembered that only around 50% of sites had

been officially opened at the time of the evaluation.

_________________ 17

This raises the interesting question as to why there was so little rehabilitation. One possible answer is that

other factors, particularly the absence of an effective FCS, ruled these sites out of the project. Another is

that sites suitable for rehabilitation had already been dealt with by other agencies. A third is that perhaps

there was nothing to be rehabilitated.


26

5.1.3 Output 3: Institutional frameworks for community participation in harbour

management developed and implemented (and livelihoods improved)

85. One of the central issues the project was attempting to address was the long term

maintenance and management of the infrastructure established by the project at the FLCs. It

is only too evident that this has been one of the major failings in past interventions in this

area, the coast of Sri Lanka being littered with abandoned or dilapidated buildings and

equipment, by no means all post-tsunami assets. The solution to this problem was seen as

'asset co-management‟, management being shared between the DFAR (which retained the

ultimate ownership of the assets) and local organisations. The Project Document envisaged

that a wide range of stakeholders would be involved in managing the FLCs. However, the

project decided that this was unworkable and focused its activities on pre-existing Fisheries

Cooperative Societies (FCS).18 Indeed, the existence of a functioning FCS was one of the

major factors in determining whether a site should be classed as 'green, 'amber' or 'red'.

86. A major component of the project's approach to the co-management of FLC

infrastructure was the concept of the 'business plan'. At each FLC it was envisaged that a

CBO (an FCS or a combination of two or more FCS) would manage the FLC in accordance

with a business plan agreed to by the CBO and the DFAR. Again, the scale of the enterprise

(over 10,000 households in phase 1) was such that the PMU had to seek outside assistance.

Originally the Project Document had envisaged NGOs as playing a key role in group

formation and drawing up business plans but the involvement of NGOs was blocked by

MFARD. A team of four consultants was appointed in April 2010 to assist in drawing up

business plans in collaboration with CBOs in project sites. In June 2010 the FCCISL

(Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Sri Lanka) was brought in to support

the work of the CBO business plan consultants.

87. The objective of these business plans was to ensure that the FLCs became viable

sources of income sufficient to support the management and maintenance of the infrastructure

and use this as the basis for more ambitious income generating activities in the future. To this

end various income streams and costs were identified. The existence of these business plans

would, it was hoped, enhance the capacity of CBOs to raise loans from commercial banks to

expand their activities.

88. This approach to the management of the FLCs and the involvement of the FCCISL

in their establishment were certainly innovative ideas and an imaginative approach to avoid

the problems of asset management in the past. The first two of these plans were finalised in

September 2010 and in an attempt to speed up the process it was hoped that the CBOs could

produce their own plans. This proved over-ambitious and greater involvement of the

consultants and the FCCISL proved essential. In all, 33 business plans were either completed

or nearing completion by the time of the evaluation. Business plans were not produced where

the interventions took the form of highly „public‟ goods (e.g. roads) and in one case a

business plan was produced to assist an FCS in a situation where no infrastructure was

provided.

_________________ 18

An added complication was the establishment of 'Rural Fisheries Organizations (RFOs) by MFARD in mid

2010. The potential implications of this will be addressed below.


27

89. Many business plans were still being discussed during the Evaluator's visit. They are

drafted in English and many CBOs who are to manage the FLCs had still not seen a Sinhala

(or Tamil) version of the business plan. There were also reportedly problems in some of the

translations, the translators failing to spot differences between the plans produced for

different sites.

90. How far the business plans are understood by the CBOs managing the FLCs is not

clear, although it must be said that in at least three cases CBO officers had a very clear idea

of what was involved and the utility of them in managing the FLC assets. What appears to be

the case is that these were already very well run societies before the intervention of the

project and in these cases the office holders in the societies had a basic understanding of the

business plan concept. As yet there has been little training to the CBOs charged with

managing the FLCs. Whether this training is sufficient or effective in inculcating the

necessary ways of approaching asset management is an open question.

91. As stated earlier, ownership of the infrastructure at the FLCs is vested in the DFAR

and the relationship between the CBO managing the FLC and the DFAR is governed by a

Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which delineates the rights and duties of the two

parties. As yet these do not have legal status although this is expected. These MoUs are

drawn up in such a way that the DFAR has ultimate control over the use of the assets. They

also make fairly heavy demands on the CBO managing the resource, e.g. an attendance of

60% of members at monthly meetings before any decisions can be taken.

92. Officers of the DFAR including FIs and ADs have received training in participatory

approaches to asset management and a livelihoods approach to rural development. But they

have little if any experience in facilitating group formation or encouraging participatory

approaches to asset management although they were reportedly involved in facilitating

discussions over the business plans. During the evaluation, staff of the DFAR appeared as

spectators rather than as participants in discussion involving the local CBO and project staff.

93. Finally mention should be made of cross-visits between members of CBOs where

members of weaker organisations could benefit from the experience of more experienced

organisations. One interesting aspect of this programme were visits to the water supply sector

where there are a number of successful community asset management schemes.

5.1.4 Project Outcome: Rehabilitated landing centres functioning well and self-sustaining

as a result of stakeholder participation in management.

94. It is too early to make any comments on the outcome of the project. As indicated

above, one of the criteria used to determine whether or not a site was suitable for a project

intervention was 'the strength of community organisations' which counted for 30% of the

ranking score. This would appear to imply that the sample of communities in which the

project worked was somewhat atypical of Sri Lankan fishing villages in general and that one

might expect a relatively high degree of success. But this is to speculate, an activity better left

to a discussion of 'sustainability'.


28

5.2 Gender issues

95. Gender was not a central issue in this project. However, the ProDoc does make the

claim that, “The project will prioritise working with women” and that, “Women will benefit

directly through participation in management. They will also benefit considerably by being

able to organise activities such as fish processing using the new facilities which will become

available at the centre and improved access to other markets.”

96. In practice, however, there was no attempt at any gender analysis (nor indeed, a real

attempt at stakeholder analysis). This is not to say that women were ignored. The 'Needs

Assessment' makes mention of women's groups and the gender composition of FSCs. But this

does not constitute a gender analysis and there was no discussion of the nature of the gender

division of labour, how this related to economic and power differentials, nor what the

potential differential impact of the project would be on men and women.

97. The Needs Assessment noted that in some cases women made up the majority of

members of FSCs. During project implementation, women were often the most vocal group.

It was reported that in some cases women made up 90% of the attendees at meetings

concerning business plans, and some of the more influential office holders in the FSCs are

women. This is not surprising given the central role that women play in small scale fish

marketing in Sri Lanka. During the evaluation the central role of women in some FSCs was

witnessed by the evaluator, but what was also striking was the absence of women in other

FSCs.

98. One of the reasons given for the predominance of women in some of the meetings

was that the men were asleep after a night's fishing – which raises the issue of whether the

timing of meetings was such that both men and women could attend. There are also other

indicators which would seem to imply that women were perhaps not as centrally involved in

the process of deciding on inputs from the project as might appear to be the case. Thus the

poor positioning of sales points at two sites visited in Chilaw district may indicate the lack of

involvement of women who in this area dominate fish selling. Similarly, the reported requests

that FSC facilities be used as venues for Montessori schools has come after they have been

erected, perhaps indicating again that women's needs were marginal during the site selection

process. On the other hand, the project did attempt to ensure that the buildings constructed

were suitable for a range of uses and in one case (not visited by the evaluator) it is reported

that a building was redesigned to accommodate a school.

99. Turning to the training elements of the project, overall figures indicate that 133 out

of the 856 trainees were women – about 15%. In CFHC the proportion of women was

relatively high – 34%, but in the DFAR it is only 11%. Admittedly, we do not have figures

for the gender composition of staff as a whole, but it is rather worrying that only 11% of

DFAR trainees, the department which will have the most contact with the organisations

managing the FLCs, consists of women. Presumably the courses on Sustainable Livelihoods

did contain components on gender, but there is no evidence of a wider interest in gender in

the range of training offered by the project.

100. In a sense this is not surprising for although the project was billed as being

concerned with livelihoods it was orientated around an interest in infrastructure and

infrastructure management. Thus gender became invisible and was only of any real interest to

the project when gender issues impinged on the infrastructure rather than vice versa. Perhaps


29

the approach to gender adopted by this project is summed up by the formulation of one of the

indicators for output 3 – the output concerning community participation - which refers to

'women, poor and marginalised groups', not the most illuminating categorisation.

101. The project itself claims that there are around 20,000 beneficiaries of the project. Of

these, it estimates that 'more than 10% 'are women.. How many beneficiaries are 'poor' or

from 'marginalised groups' is unknown.

5.3 Impact and sustainability

102. Given that the project is only just finishing and that few of its outputs are completed,

it has been decided to deal with impact and sustainability together as both involve predictions

based on limited evidence.

5.3.1 Infrastructure

103. There is no evidence that the supply of net mending halls, meeting rooms or other

infrastructural items has had any impact on livelihoods. This is not to say that they are not

being used but rather that their impact on peoples' lives is marginal and that there is no

evidence that they are contributing to higher incomes or more sustainable incomes. This is

not surprising given that the original planning of the project asserted rather than demonstrated

a relationship between these investments and livelihoods and that there was no real evidence

of need.

104. However, there are possibilities that the work of the Regional Fisheries Livelihood

programme (RFLP) in some parts of Sri Lanka may have a positive effect on how the

infrastructure is used. One element of the RFLP is to improve fish handling at the landing

sites, and this in conjunction with some elements of this project (ice stores; fish selling

points; fish auction halls) may have a beneficial impact.

105. In the long run however, the viability of the infrastructure depends on whether the

organisations charged with managing the structures supplied by the project are viable. If they

are, and if there proves to be positive benefits accruing to these organisations, then there is a

sustainable future for the infrastructure supplied by the project.

5.3.2 Frameworks for community participation

106. As has already been mentioned, there was no analysis in project documents of why

so many local-level organisations in the fishery sector in Sri Lanka have been seen as

failures, and thus no identification of what factors are crucial in underlying the long term

viability or not of such organisations. The inception report did propose a study to examine

some aspects of these issues but this was not supported by the MFARD. Clearly there are

some organisations which thrive and appear to be viable in the long term but these are

relatively few and the project is perhaps lucky that the selection process favoured sites with

such organisations. Thus in terms of community participation and supporting local

management of assets, the project appears to have had an impact in sites such as

Kurusgahapaduwa and Godawaya. Similarly, at Pullimunai the long established and well run

FCS will probably benefit greatly from the infrastructure and assistance in business planning

supplied by the project.


30

107. These however are exceptions, and in most places there is not a history of long

running well run organisations which can manage assets and can benefit from the business

plan approach adopted by the project. There are already indications in some sites of disputes

as to who should control the assets and how they should be run. The situation is complicated

by the establishment in 2010 by the MFARD of a 'National Fisheries Federation (NFF) which

will have village-level units known as 'Rural Fisheries Organisations' (RFO), although they

are also referred to as 'Village Level Fisheries Organisations‟ or „Fisheries Community

Organisations'. The precise role of these new RFOs is unclear, and how they will relate to

pre-existing FCSs is also not clear. But this has raised worries at the village level as to what

structures will be responsible for managing the infrastructure supplied by the project or the

implementation of associated business plans. It also raises the obvious issue of how these

organisations will relate to political structures. The situation is thus very fragile – and very

unpredictable.

108. The sustainability of the management structures created for the infrastructure is very

reliant on two factors: the continuing involvement of the FCCISL and the abilities and

commitment of staff from the DFAR. Members of the FCCISL have been involved in

assisting in the formulation of business plans and in assisting in their implementation. There

are no arrangements for them to have a continuing involvement in the future. FIs and ADs

from the DFAR have been involved in assisting in the management of groups and have had

some training in participatory approaches to management. However, this training is

incomplete and as yet they have little experience of what in practice their role as mentors of

the management groups will be. Furthermore, given their existing workloads and their other

obligations as government servants, including enforcement, it is questionable whether they

will have the time to carry out this role, and there may be conflicts of interests between this

and their other duties.

109. In sum, the results of this project appear unlikely to be sustainable. Because the issue

was presented in physical terms, i.e. the need for infrastructure, insufficient attention was

paid to another, perhaps more crucial issue: why have forms of collective management both

of resources and assets, tended to fail in fishing communities in Sri Lanka.

6 Conclusions

110. This was a poorly formulated project, and many of the problems which project

management had to deal with were the result of failures at the planning and inception stages

of the project cycle:

a. The project was unclear as to its objectives. Whilst notionally concerned with

improving livelihoods, it was focused on the establishment of infrastructure at fish

landing sites and the means to manage this infrastructure in a sustainable fashion.

This is clear in the logframe which fails to develop a clear set of causal relationships

between activities, outputs and objectives;

b. The project was established over two and a half years after the tsunami. By this stage

much remedial work had been done in coastal areas of Sri Lanka and the project was

simply too late to have much impact. In addition, project formulation did not take

advantage of the experience of FAO and others in the post-tsunami fisheries sector;

c. At the planning stage, there was no social or gender analysis, and thus no

understanding of the dynamics of fishing communities in Sri Lanka. The failure to


31

address these issues led to a failure to understand the conditions under which

participatory forms of management might flourish or fail. It was also unclear as to

who the beneficiaries were likely to be and why, and issues such as gender were

ignored;

d. There was a failure to understand the context in which the project would work.

There was no analysis of the institutional setting of organisations such as the CFHC,

the MFARD or the MFAR, their capacities or interests. It was also not clear

whether or not there was a need for the sorts of interventions being proposed by the

project;

e. The time frame set for the project was too short given the scale of its aims and

ambitions. The project should have been more focused both in terms of geographical

area covered and in terms of capacity building.

111. As far as implementation is concerned, the picture is mixed. Some aspects of the

implementation process are to be admired and learnt from; others were less successful:

f. Given the constraints of project design and the context which the project found itself

in, project management was relatively good in terms of timely decision making,

introduction of novel ideas and controlling expenditure. Sensibly the project revised

down the number of FLCs at which it could operate;

g. Project staff were hard working and given the scale of the project remarkably

successful in producing the outputs required;

h. The project successfully repositioned itself by shifting its major links with Sri

Lankan organisations from the CFHC to the DFAR. However, this was at the cost of

spreading itself too thinly across a number of state bodies;

i. The FAOR could have been more proactive in facilitating good relations between

the project and GoSL institutions;

j. The project introduced novel ideas into the management of FLCs. At the level of

particular FLCs this involved the establishment of business plans as a means of

directing future participatory management of FLCs. In terms of the project's direct

work it introduced a 'traffic lights' system to provide an easily understood

visualisation of project activities;

k. The project was run efficiently in terms of its use of resources. It established an

ambitious monitoring system which allowed it to track activities, expenditures and

outputs in a timely way;

l. However, a series of factors (delays in mobilising the project; weather conditions;

bureaucratic delays) coupled with the ambition of the project led to a failure to

complete project activities within the allotted time-scale;

m. In terms of outputs, the project was successful both in terms of physical

infrastructure created and numbers of people trained;

n. There were continuing problems throughout the project concerning its relations with

Sri Lankan organisations. These were in part due to a mismatch between FAO

operating rules and those of the Sri Lankan agencies, coupled with a similar

mismatch between Sri Lankan expectations and FAO regulations;

o. The project also had problems in dealing with FAO over such issues as procurement;

p. During implementation there was no attempt at any rigorous social or gender

analysis. And relatively few inputs into training and capacity building amongst the

local organisations charged with managing the FLCs.

112. Given that the project's activities have not ended and that none of them have been

established for any period of time, comments on impact and sustainability are few.


32

q. The project successfully ran a number of well received training courses. But whether

this will have any lasting impact on the CFHC, the DFAR or the MFARD is

doubtful. There was little success in creating the wider structures within which the

benefits of training can be realised at an organisational level;

r. A considerable number of roads, buildings and covered areas have been constructed

by the project. In the short run some at least are being used, although not always for

the purpose they were designed for. And some of the structures are poorly sited;

s. Key to the sustainability of the infrastructure supplied by the project are the FLC

management units. Some will survive and probably make good use of the project's

legacy. The majority are likely to fail because of the lack of any clear understanding

of social context of the FLCs or the organisations charged with their management,

and limitations on the capacity of the DFAR to support these organisations.

7 Recommendations

113. Given that the project is now at an end, the following recommendations are all

addressed to FAO at corporate level.

114. It emerged in the analysis of this project that failures in planning were key to many

of the problems the project faced. Hence, Recommendation 1 focuses on project formulation

aspects.

Recommendation 1. To FAO on project formulation


e) More attention is paid to the logical relations between activities, outputs and

objectives,

f) When FAO and other agencies have worked in the same sector, a systematic

review of their experience should be made to guide planning,

g) Livelihoods projects must involve effective stakeholder and gender analysis at the

planning stage,

h) Realistic targets and time frames must be set.

115. In Project implementation FAO must address three issues arising from the

experience of this project, related to i) the fact that in the project, relations with the GoSL

were often strained; ii) training was a major component but there are doubts as to its

effectiveness in increasing capacity; and iii) project staff experienced problems in handling

FAO regulations and processes.

Recommendation 2. To FAO on project implementation


i) At project inception (or earlier) a clear division of labour should be agreed

between FAO and partner organisations, there must be regular meetings of

coordinating bodies, and the FAOR must take a proactive role in facilitating good

relations;

j) FAO should ensure that training only takes place in terms of a wider training

strategy;

k) Staff should receive adequate training in FAO procedures. This is especially

important in projects which involve infrastructural components.


33

116. This project highlights some of the issues concerning the ways in which future

sustainability might be strengthened.

Recommendation 3. To FAO on sustainability

It is recommended that FAO ensures that problems concerning sustainability are identified at

an early stage in project implementation and that the time frame of projects is such that the

results of interventions can be assessed and issues addressed.

8 Lessons Learned

Lesson Learned 1. On project planning

Although good planning may not guarantee success, bad planning ensures a problematic

project. No matter how energetic and committed the project team, it is difficult if not

impossible to work with a poor and unrealistic planning document.

Lesson Learned 2. On project planning

Planning involves an appreciation of a range of factors including the social and the political.

It is unrealistic to expect livelihoods objectives to be achieved without good social and

political analysis.

Lesson Learned 3. On ownership

It is essential for partner organisations to feel a sense of ownership of a project. The lack of

this leads to problems in implementation and a tendency towards an 'enclave' project.

Lesson Learned 4. On roles and responsibilities

For a project to run smoothly there must be long term agreement between the project

management and the host government on the ground rules concerning the running of the

project (e.g. use of NGOs; use of foreign staff; division of labour and responsibilities).

GCP/SRL/057/CAN, final evaluation report, Annexes

Annex 1. Terms of reference

1. Background

1.1 Background and purposes of the evaluation

1. This is a post-tsunami project in Sri Lanka funded by the Canadian International

Development Agency (CIDA) with a total amount of USD 4.9 million. The project

started in April 2008 and will be completed on 30 September 2011. The project directly

supports priorities as set out in the “Mahinda Chintana – A Ten Year Horizon

Development Framework 2006 –2016” as well as the fisheries Master Plan. The

expected impact of the project is: livelihoods of fishers and fishing communities in

tsunami-affected areas improved. The expected project outcome is: rehabilitated

landing sites functioning and managed self-sustaining through active stakeholder

participation.

2. The specific outputs of the project are:

Capacity of Ceylon Fishery Harbours Corporation (CFHC) strengthened to

coordinate landing site rehabilitation and management;

Fisheries landing sites rehabilitated in 15 districts; and

Institutional frameworks for community participation in fisheries landing site

management developed and implemented.

3. A project office has been set up within the premises of CFHC. The project is being

managed by an international chief technical adviser supported by a team of local staff

that includes a harbour engineer and a community participation and fisheries

management specialist. The project implementation is guided by a National Steering

Committee chaired by the Secretary of Fisheries and comprised of representatives from

FAO, CIDA, and government agencies such as the Ceylon Fishery Harbours

Corporation, Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Development, and Coast

Conservation Department.

4. There are a total of 41 project sites grouped into four clusters: northwestern area (12),

eastern area (9), Colombo and southern area (11), and northern area (9). Some sites

were recommended by CFHC based on a master plan for the reconstruction and

development of anchorages and fish landing centres prepared with the assistance of

FAO. Other sites have since been identified by the project and/or Ministry. The

infrastructure for each site varies and is based on the needs expressed by the fisheries

cooperative society (FCS). The Assistant Directors, fisheries inspectors and district

fisheries officers took an active role during the needs identification process. Capacity

building was undertaken for CFHC harbour managers, assistant directors of fisheries,

and district fisheries inspectors. Training needs assessment was carried out during the

first year which became the basis for a training plan. Organizational strengthening of

the FCS is an important component and was carried out through the participatory

formulation of business plans for each fish landing site and cross-visits between FCS.

5. The project has a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system in place. In August

2010, a project review was conducted and facilitated by a national consultant to assess

the project progress, ascertain what was/what was not achievable within the remaining

project timeframe and to assess if any changes needed to be effected to the project

outputs. A timeline of major activities was presented during the review to ensure that

the project outputs could be completed by NTE September 30, 2011. In April 2011, an


35

internal stock-taking exercise was started with the assistance of local consultants to

consolidate experiences and lessons from the project, the findings of which will be used

for the preparation of the terminal report and a fisheries technical paper.

2. Purpose of the Evaluation

6. A final evaluation of the project will be carried out before the completion date of 30

September 2011 to assess project achievements and identify lessons that may be useful

for future projects. The evaluation will focus on the following questions:

i. What have been the project‟s achievements in comparison to expected outputs and

outcomes?

ii. What are the potential and/or actual impacts of the project – positive, negative,

intended, unintended?

iii. What lessons can be drawn that may inform approaches to small-scale fisheries

infrastructure development?

3. Scope of the Evaluation

7. The evaluation will build on the recommendations of the project review and the

findings of the internal stock-taking exercise. It will assess the project against the

standard international criteria of evaluation:

relevance;

efficiency;

effectiveness;

sustainability;

impact; and

gender mainstreaming as a means to achieve gender equality.

8. The evaluation will assess the project as follows:

a. Its relevance to: national development priorities, needs and programmes; FAO

Global Goals and Strategic Objectives/Core Functions; other aid programmes in the

sector;

b. Robustness and realism of the theory of change underpinning the

project/programme, including logic of causal relationship between inputs, activities,

expected outputs, outcomes and impacts (specific and development objectives) and

validity of indicators, assumptions and risks;

c. Quality and realism of the project/programme design, including:

Project duration;

Stakeholder and beneficiary identification.

Institutional set-up and management arrangements;

Approach and methodology;

Process and adequacy of consultation with the Government of Sri Lanka

authorities;

d. Financial resources management, including:

Adequacy of budget allocations to achieve outputs;

Coherence and soundness of Budget Revisions- if any - in matching necessary

adjustments to requirements of project implementation;


36

Rate of delivery and budget balance at the time of the evaluation.

e. Management and implementation, including:

Effectiveness of strategic management, including quality and realism of Work

Plans;

Efficiency and effectiveness of operations management;

Implementation gaps and delays if any between planned and achieved outputs,

the causes and consequences of delays and assessment of any remedial

measures taken;

Implementation, efficiency and effectiveness of internal monitoring and

review processes;

Efficiency and effectiveness of coordination and steering bodies (if any);

Quality and quantity of administrative and technical support by FAO; and

Timeliness, quality and quantity of inputs and support by the Government and

resource partner.

f. Extent to which the expected outputs have been produced, their quality and

timeliness.19

g. Extent to which the expected outcomes have been achieved. In particular, the

Evaluation will assess:

How adequately the project addressed stakeholder participation and how such

participation could make a difference in achieving the expected outcome;

Catalytic role of the project interventions in potentially increasing livelihoods

opportunities;

Potential contribution of training activities to institutional strengthening

h. Use made by the initiative of FAO‟s normative products and actual and potential

contribution of the initiative to the normative work of the Organization.

i. Assessment of gender mainstreaming in the initiative. This will cover:

Analysis of how gender issues were reflected in project objectives, design,

identification of beneficiaries and implementation;

Analysis of how gender relations, gender equality and processes of women‟s

inclusion were and are likely to be affected by the initiative, including in

relation to access to resources and benefits and to empowerment aspects;

Extent to which gender issues were taken into account in project management.

j. The prospects for sustaining and up-scaling the initiative's results by the

beneficiaries and the host institutions after the termination of the initiative. The

assessment of sustainability will include, as appropriate:

Institutional, technical, economic and social sustainability of proposed

technologies, innovations and/or processes;

Environmental sustainability: the initiative‟s contribution to sustainable natural

resource management, in terms of maintenance and/or regeneration of the

natural resource base.

_________________ 19

The Project Manager should list the key outputs that he/she suggests for the evaluation team to assess

directly. The evaluation team may add to the list as appropriate.


37

k. Overall performance of the project/programme: extent to which the initiative has

attained, or is expected to attain, its intermediate/specific objectives and FAO

Organizational Result/s (impact), and hence, to the relevant Strategic Objectives and

Core Functions; this will also include the identification of actual and potential

positive and negative impacts produced by the initiative, directly or indirectly,

intended or unintended. Further, in the project sites in the north that were formerly

under conflict, the Evaluation will assess the potential impact of the project

interventions on promoting social stability.

9. Based on the above analysis, the evaluation will draw specific conclusions and

formulate recommendations for any necessary further action by Government, FAO

and/or other parties to ensure sustainable development, including any need for follow-

up action.

10. The evaluation will draw attention to specific lessons of interest to other similar

activities. Any proposal for further assistance should include specification of major

objectives and outputs and indicative inputs required.

4. Evaluation methodology

11. The evaluation will adopt a participatory approach and involve the widest possible

representation of stakeholders from each of the three project outputs and geographical

clusters (northwestern area, eastern area, Colombo and southern area, and northern

area).

12. It will start with a desk review of project documents, reports and monitoring and

evaluation system, among others. The evaluation team will decide on the selection of

the project sites to visit in consultation with the project management. The evaluation

team will use a combination of methods as appropriate, such as semi-structured

interviews, focus group discussions, and observation. It will triangulate the findings

from these methods.

13. The evaluation team will interview representatives from the following:

FAO Representation;

Donor agency;

Project management and staff;

Ceylon Fishery Harbours Corporation including those who participated in the study

tour to the General Santos Fish Port Complex in the Philippines;

Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Development;

Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources including district fisheries

inspectors and assistant directors who participated in the training courses;

National steering committee;

Fisheries cooperative societies and rural fisheries organizations, including a

selection of those who participated in the cross-visits.

14. In so far as possible, interaction will also take place with non-participants to canvass

their opinions. Particular attention will be devoted to ensure that women and other

under-privileged groups will be consulted in adequate manner. The Sustainable


38

Livelihoods Framework20 will be used as the reference for assessing contributions to

poverty alleviation, gender mainstreaming, social, economic and environmental

sustainability, etc. The Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT)

framework will be one major analytical tool for assessment of the projects‟ results.21

5. Evaluation report

15. The evaluation report will illustrate the evidence found that responds to the evaluation

issues, questions and criteria listed in the ToR. The report will be as clear and concise

as possible and will be a self-standing document. Adequate balance will be given to its

different parts, with focus on findings, conclusions and recommendations. It will

include an executive summary. Supporting data and analysis should be annexed to the

report when considered important to complement the main report and for future

reference.

16. The structure of the report should facilitate in so far as possible the links between body

of evidence, analysis and formulation of recommendations. These will be addressed to

the different stakeholders: they may be strategic and/or operational and will have to be

evidence-based, relevant, focused, clearly formulated and actionable.

17. The evaluation team will agree on the outline of the report early in the evaluation

process. The report will be prepared in English with numbered paragraphs.

18. The preliminary findings of the evaluation mission will be presented during the end-of-

the-project workshop on 8-9 September 2011 in Colombo. The evaluation team will

consider the comments, clarifications and suggestions from the workshop for

integration into the final draft report. The team leader bears responsibility for

submitting the final draft report to FAO and in finalizing the report based on the

comments received.

6. Composition of the evaluation team

19. The evaluation team will be comprised of an international community development

expert and a national fisheries expert with an institutional and policy perspective. The

team members will have had no previous direct involvement in the formulation,

implementation or backstopping of the project. The international expert must have an

in-depth knowledge and experience of community and capacity development in the

fisheries sector with direct knowledge of the Sri Lankan context. The national fisheries

expert would provide insights on the relevance of the work done, coherence with

national processes and perspectives of sustainability and uptake of the lessons learned.

_________________ 20

The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework identifies five different capitals (human, social, natural, financial,

and physical), each including different assets. It helps in improving understanding of livelihoods, in

particular of the poor. For more information, among others:

http://www.livelihoods.org/info/guidance_sheets_pdfs/section2.pdf 21

SWOT is a widely used strategic planning tool, useful also in the assessment of development interventions,

to canvass their strengths and weaknesses, as well as future perspectives. It is particularly used in focus

groups, but it can be adapted to individual interviews as well


39

7. Evaluation timetable

20. The evaluation will be organized following this timetable:

August 22 Briefing by OED and FI of the evaluation team

through tele-conference

August 23 or 24 Fielding of the mission

August 25 Latest arrival by the mission in Sri Lanka

August 26 – 8 September Desk review, interviews, field visits

9 September Presentation of preliminary findings to the end-of-the

project workshop

10 September International consultant departs Sri Lanka

17 September Submission of final draft report to FAO and CIDA

24 September Comments received from FAO and CIDA

30 September Final report submitted

Annex 2. Brief profile of the evaluation team

Professor Roderick Stirrat, UK national, is a Professor of Anthropology at the University

of Sussex and a social development consultant with over 30 years experience in the

developing world. Much of his work has been concerned with the natural resources sector,

and particularly with forestry and fisheries management issues in South and Southeast Asia.

Annex 3. Documents consulted

Project Documents

1. September 2007. Project Document.

2. April 2009. Inception Phase Report and Project Implementation Plan

3. June 2009. Profile and Needs Assessment, Vols 1 and 2

4. November 2009. Training Needs Assessment and Training Plan

5. March 2010. Monitoring and Evaluation Manual

6. August 2011. Draft Terminal Report

7. 2009-2011. Project Strategy Papers Nos. 1-11

Business Plans

8. Kurusagahapaduwa Fisheries Cooperative Society Limited, Chilaw

9. Annai Wellakkani Fisheries Cooperative Society, St, Antony Rural Fisheries

Organization and St. Joseph Vas Rural Fisheries Organisation, Ambakandawila,

Chilaw.

Project Progress Reports

10. December 2008-May 2009

11. May2009-April 2009;

12. June 2009 –December 2009

13. December 2009-May 10;


40

14. May 2010-October 2010

15. November 2010-April 2011

Consultants’ Reports

16. September 2010. Report of the Tripartite Review Mission. Claude Fernando.

17. August 2011. Green Tech Consultants . Restoration and Improvement of Fish

Landing Centers with Stakeholder Participation in Management Project.: Internal

Evaluation.

Back to Office Reports (LTO)

18. November 2008

19. September 2009

20. August 2010

Other FAO papers

21. 2001. Project Cycle Management Technical Guide, SEAGA. Available at

http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/ak211e/ak211e00.pdf

22. 2005. Fisheries Sector Damage and Needs Assessment and Programme for

Recovery and Rehabilitation. Available at

ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/DOCUMENT/tsunamis_05/sri_lanka/needs_assessments/SriLank

a_needs_assess_20-01-05.pdf

23. 2005. Master Plan for the Reconstruction and Development of Anchorages and Fish

Landing Centres along the Coast of Sri Lanka. Available at

ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/DOCUMENT/tsunamis_05/sri_lanka/cons_miss_rep/Sigurdarson

_FinalDec05.pdf

24. 2007. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Livelihoods in the Fisheries and

Aquaculture Sector in Countries Affected by the Tsunami in 2004. Available at

ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/011/j8998e.pdf

25. 2007. Fisheries Institutional Analysis and Capacity Development . Available at

http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/ai532e/ai532e00.htm

26. 2007. The FAO Emergency and Rehabilitation Operations in Response to the Indian

Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami. Evaluation Report. Available at

http://typo3.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/oed/docs/Indian%20Ocean%20Earthquak

e%20and%20Tsunami_2007_ER.pdf

27. 2008. Integrated programme for the rehabilitation of the fishery sector in the

tsunami affected districts of Hambantota, Ampara and Batticaloa. Final Report.


41

Annex 4. Itinerary and list of persons met

Date Location Main activity People met

Monday 22nd

August

Leave UK at 14:35 Travel

Tuesday 23rd

Arrive SL 0900 Review documents

Wednesday 24th

Project office Meeting project

staff

Mr Simon Diffey, Chief Technical

Advisor, Fisheries;

Mr Kumarasinghe Bandara;

Mr Kusal Dharmartne, Monitoring and

Evaluation/IT Officer

Mr Palitha Muthukade, Community

Participation in Fisheries expert

Mr Lalith Wijeratne

Thursday 25th

FAO

Representation

Meeting FAO staff Mr Patrick Evans FAO Rep;

DFAR Workshop on

sustainable

management of FLC

facilities

Mr Nimal Hettiarachchi, DG DFAR

Friday 26th

MFARD Interviews Dr Dhamita de Zoysa, Secretary;

Dr S Subasinghe, Advisor to the

Minister

CIDA Interviews Dr Nihal Atapattu, Senior

Development Officer

Saturday 27th

Reviewing

documents

Sunday 28th

Reviewing

documents

Monday 29th

Fairline Road,

Telwatta,

Kottawanagala,

Pelana, Idiwara

Field trip to project

sites

Project participants

Tuesday 30th

Unakuruwa Field trip to project

sites


Wednesday 31st Taldekka,

Kadawatha South,

Ambakandawila


sites

Mr Nihal Padukka, AD, Chilaw

Thursday 1st

September

MFARD Interviews Mr Indra Ranasinghe, DG (Technical)

CFHC Interviews Mr Amal Senalankadhikara, Chairman

Friday 2nd

September

NARA Interviews Ms Manusha Wijesundera;

Ms Amali Wijedeva

Project premises Interviews Mr Michael Stickley, Halcrows;

Mr Steve Creech, Independent

Consultant

FCCISL Interviews Mr Krisantha Wisenthige

Saturday 3rd

September

Documents

reviewed and notes

collated

Sunday 4th

September

Mannar, Venkalai,

Pesalai and

Pullimunai


sites


Monday 5th

September

Mullaitivu town,

Seealwathai and

Kalapadpadu North


sites


Tuesday 6th

CFHC Interviews Mr Percy Samarasinghe, Manager,


42

September Harbours Operations

Wednesday 7th

September

Preparing

preliminary

presentation

Thursday 8th

September

Terminal workshop

Friday 9th

September

Terminal workshop

Saturday 10th

September

Leave Sri Lanka, h

10:00 am


Design Summary

Indicators / Targets (by End of Project unless otherwise

stated)

Data Sources

Assumptions

Impact: The livelihoods of fishers

and fishing communities

in tsunami affected areas

improved

1. Fishers and community attribute

livelihood improvement to

restored landing centres

2. Increased income for fishers

3. Reduced livelihood vulnerability

for fishers

• District level

household surveys

• Fisher surveys-

landing centres

• no deterioration of

macro-economic

conditions

• abatement of

conflict/improvemen

ts in security

• resources managed

sustainably Outcome: Rehabilitated landing

centres functioning well

and self-sustaining as a

result of stakeholder

participation in

management

1. 80 landing centres rehabilitated

2. Management groups established

for 80 landing site

3. Community participation in

management of 80 landing centres

4. Improved capacity of government

to rehabilitate and support

management of landing centres

5. Reduction on post harvest losses

and improvement in fish quality

6. Increased income for fishers(over

baseline

• technical surveys

of completed

landing centres

• management committee

•

meeting reports

project

stakeholders/ben eficiaries

evaluations of

project activity

• no further

environmental

disaster

• abatement of

conflict/improvemen

ts in security (at

landing sites)

• community cohesion

allows consensus

and participation of

key stakeholders

Outputs: 1. Capacity of CFHC

strengthened to

coordinate landing site

rehabilitation and

management

1.1 National masterplan for harbour

rehabilitation updated and

National database for FLC

construction/rehabilitation

created

1.2 Harbour rehabilitation design

unit in CFHC operational and

staffed

1.3 Priority landing centres for

project rehabilitation identified

and clustered for implementation

1.4 Training in participatory landing

site management and landing site

design provided to CFHC staff

1.5 Cross visits completed

1.6 Government guidelines, design

standards and best practices for

landing site rehabilitation and

management agreed and

harmonised

1.7 Project operating procedures in

15 districts established and

training provided to District

engineers and stakeholders

• government

and community

management

plans

• CFHC reports

• project reports

(including

inception/progr

ess)

• training and

capacity

building reports

• guidelines

published

• timely establishment

of CFHC unit

• timely

implementation of

project activities

• counterpart staff

resources made

available

2. Fisheries landing

centres rehabilitated in

15 districts.

2.1 Community based management

meetings and stakeholder

consultations completed.

2.2 Design and Bathymetric surveys

complete

• project and

CFHC reports

• community

meeting reports

• availability of state

land

• availability of

manpower and

materials;

Annex 5. Original Project Logical Framework


44

Design Summary

Indicators / Targets (by End of Project unless otherwise

stated)

Data Sources

Assumptions

2.3 Outline plans completed

2.4 Community discussions on outline

plans completed and revisions

made

2.5 Final design, detailed plans BOQ

and specifications completed

2.6 Tendering and national

procurement for construction

services.

2.7 Monitoring of quantities/quality

of constructions

2.8 Completion of construction and

handover to community

management groups

• standard of

construction quality;

and,

• post construction

maintenance of

facilities

3 Institutional

frameworks for

community participation

in harbour management

developed and

implemented (and

livelihoods improved)

3.1 Management groups operating in

participating landing centres by

NTE.

3.2 Participatory management plans

for participating landings sites

developed

3.3 Regular meetings of landing site

management groups and

implementation of decisions

3.4 Stakeholder identification process

completed and awareness of the

harbour management committees

raised in participating

communities

3.5 Stakeholder representation on

management groups includes

broad representation including

women, poor and marginalized

groups.

3.6 Capacity building of key

stakeholders in management

completed

3.7 Improved maintenance of all

rehabilitated harbour infrastructure

3.8 Capacity building for fishers

carried out

3.9 Increased market price for fish

from rehabilitated landing centres

3.10Increased income for fishers

landing fish at rehabilitated

landing centres

3.11Reduced waste by 20% for

commercially important species

(and discards) landed by fishermen

operating from rehabilitated

landing centres

3.12Improved quality of processed

fish and fish products from

communities around rehabilitated

landing centres

3.13Improved quality of environment

at rehabilitated landing centres

• government

and community

management

plans

• CFHC reports

• project reports

(including

inception/progr

ess)

• training and

capacity

building reports

• stakholder

analysis reports

• training

programmes

completed

• houselhold

surveys

• participation of

communities in

process

• supportive legal

frameworks exist

• training providers

can be identified


45

Indicative Activities:

Design Summary Indicators / Targets

(by End of Project unless otherwise

stated)

Data Sources

Assumptions

1.1 Update national

masterplan for

harbours and create

database

1.2 Establish and train

CFHC team within

ministry and

operational

procedures in

Districts

1.3 Identify priority

landing centres for

rehabilitation

1.4 Develop design

standards and best

practices

2.1 Complete design

surveys for landing

centres and prioritise

2.2 Prepare outline plans,

discuss and agree

final plans with

community groups

2.3 Tender for

construction

2.4 Rehabilitate all

prioritised landing

centres (under 3

phases)

2.5 Monitor construction

(quality)

2.6 Handover of landing

centres to community

management groups

3.1 Establish and build

capacity of

community

management groups

3.2 Establish landing site

maintenance regime

3.3 Train management

groups in financial

management

3.4 Carry out training

needs assessment of

fishers

3.5 Carry out training of

fishers and key

stakeholders in post

harvest activities

3.6 monitor quality of

landed fish

3.7 Establish project

steering committee

3.8 Conduct baseline

studies


Annex 6. Revised Project Logical Framework

Revised version by International M&E Consultant, December 2009

Design Summary Indicators Data Sources Assumptions22

Goal:

The livelihoods of fishers and fishing communities in tsunami affected areas improved

1. Number and percentage of fishers and communities that attribute, livelihood

improvement to project activities carried out in their communities23

2. Reduction on post harvest losses for commercially important species landed by fishermen operating from rehabilitated landing centres and improvement in fish quality.

3. Increased market price for fish from rehabilitated landing centres 4. Increased income for fishers landing fish at rehabilitated landing centres 5. Improved quality of environment at rehabilitated landing centres

Beneficiary assessment towards the end of the Project

Baseline and evaluation study covering Project sites where infrastructure, co-mgmt. regime and/or training will be (has been) (re-)built/ practiced/ conducted that can have an impact on fish quality, reduction of post-harvest losses and other positive effects

Positive effects caused by project interventions are relevant & meaningful for fish folks’ improvement of livelihoods

no deterioration of macro-economic conditions

abatement of conflict /improvements in security in conflict zone

sustainable mgmt. of resources

Outcome:

Rehabilitated landing centres functioning well and self-sustaining as a result of stakeholder participation in management

1. No of FLC where rehabilitated infrastructure is being used by targeted groups

2. Degree (expressed in percentages) to which new/ rehabilitated infrastructure is being used by the target group as expected.

3. No and % of rehabilitated/constructed FLCs where fees are collected by users as recommended by the Project

4. No of FLC management/user groups in each maturity category, and % distribution across categories

5. No of Project FLCs where post-construction maintenance of infra-structure is practiced according to recommendations made by DSC.

6. Degree to which government capacity to (i)organize rehabilitation and

(ii)support participatory management of landing centres, is applied24

7. Evidence that the DFAR and/or CFHC have/has considered the project’s recommendations related to participatory management regimes.

quarterly reports by FIs and/or co- management committee meeting reports

periodic surveys of project stakeholders/beneficiaries conducted by Project’s Community Participation Expert and M&E/IT Officer

tri-partite evaluation report

workplans by FLC development unit in CFHC

study by all prof. project staff (organized by CTA and M&E/IT Officer) on the application of newly

all barriers that could prevent the expected beneficiaries from using the new infrastructure have been anticipated and dealt with by the project

GoSL decision makers remain committed to transfer responsibilities related to infrastructure to user groups

community cohesion allows consensus and participation of key stakeholders

trainers trained by the Project conduct effective training for FLC co-mgmt.& user groups

25

_________________ 22

There are two additional assumptions related to this component not visible in our logframe which are critical to the success of the project: (“attempts to use project

funds for purposes other than those stated in the Prodoc will be resisted by each of the three parties” and “decisions taken by the NSC reflect strong commitment to the

Project’s goal”). 23

This will be based on several indicators specifically related to individual types of project intervention. 24

This would include indicators of showing application of different aspects of capacity 25

This is a critical assumption that needs monitoring if the training at field level, i.e. the training provided by trainers trained under the project, is not financed by the

Project


47


8. DFAR and/or CFHC have/has taken decisions based on the project recommendations on participatory management regimes.

9. Degree to which CFHC and DFAR district staff prepare reports covering Project related questions and issues

created capacities of CFHC, MFAR and DFAR staff (incl. results of post-training surveys) and decisions taken on Project recommendations

environment is conducive to the application of what has been imparted through training

Outputs:

1. Capacity of CFHC strengthened to coordinate landing site rehabilitation and management

1.1 FLC development unit in CFHC operational and staffed by people trained under the Project

1.2 Job descriptions of staff of the new FLC unit drafted and submitted to CFHC management for consideration and approval

1.3 CFHC staff has the capability to update and use the master-plan for harbour rehabilitation.

1.4 CFHC staff can use the National GIS-database as a management tool. 1.5 CFHC staff able to prioritise FLC rehabilitation according the established

criteria. 1.6 CFHC staff can design and manage FLCs in participatory way. 1.7 CFHC staff in a position to follow the guidelines, design standards and best

practices drafted by the project in collaboration with key stakeholders. 1.8 The degree to which district staff can follow project operating procedures.

CFHC capacity needs assessment (as baseline report)

(study) report by all professional project staff (organized by CTA, M&E/IT Officer and HRD Training Coordinator) on (proposed) institutional changes and the newly created capacities of CFHC, MFAR and DFAR staff

government and community management plans and reports

individual training reports

summary reports by training provider

timely establishment of CFHC unit responsible for FLC development

counterpart staff is made available by CFHC management and collaborates intensively with project experts

CFHC management encourages the development of ‘soft’ skills of CFHC staff related to the promo-tion of participatory co-mgmt. - regimes and staff is willing to become involved in such efforts

2. Fisheries landing centers rehabilitated in 15 districts.

2 % of completed infrastructure works of different types in each FLC/district/project phase as of total number planned (green traffic light).

3 No of different types of completed infrastructure in each FLC/district/project phase.

4 Total cost of each type of infrastructure per FLC/ District/project phase as compared to TCE and FTCE

5 % of (expected) users satisfied with the facilities/infrastructure provided (rehabilitated) by the project.

6 % of work completion certificates issued by the DS consultant according to schedule as of total no of certificates to be issued.

7 % of constructed infrastructure rated by the DFAR/CFHC district officers as satisfactory/ unsatisfactory.

Design and Supervision Consultant’s progress reports

entries in FLC profiles originating from DSC and BTO-reports by Harbour Engineering Specialist

(back-to-office) reports on beneficiary assessments organized by project staff

quarterly reports by FIs or co- mgmt.committee meeting reports

community meeting reports

reports by CFHC district staff

abatement of conflict / improvements in security (at landing sites) in all 15 districts

sufficient availability of state land for FLC infrastructure development

availability of manpower and materials for construction

project staff is in the position to crosscheck that standards of construction quality are kept and deficits are effectively dealt with

3 Institutional frameworks for community participation in harbour management developed and implemented (and livelihoods

3.1 No and type of different participatory co-management regimes developed for landings sites.

3.2 Guidelines, rules and regulations for FLC co-management regime(s) and CBOs’ participation drafted and submitted for approval

3.3 Type and no of project supported co-management groups/committees established in FLCs.

3.4 No of fish landing sites where required capacity building of key stakeholders (incl. user groups) in management has been completed

3.5 No of co-management groups/committees which include broad

Project’s strategy paper on participatory co-management regimes covering legal aspects

entries in FLC profiles originating BTO-reports

reports prepared by Project’s Community Participation Expert

quarterly reports by FIs and/or co-

1. willingness of users to participate in co-management regimes and take responsibility for adequate operation and maintenance

2. supportive legal frameworks exist

3. suitable training providers can be identified


48


improved26)

representation including women, poor and marginalized groups. 3.6 No of Project FLCs where co-management groups/committees have been

exposed to the infrastructure maintenance procedures (recommended in DSC Manual)

3.7 No of hand-overs of rehabilitated FLCs to co-management groups/committees

3.8 Recommendations submitted to GoSL on the promotion of successful and promising regimes identified through in-depth evaluation of different participatory co-management regimes implemented under the Project and by other projects (e.g. IFAD)

management committee meeting reports

government and community management plans and reports

individual training reports

summary reports by training provider

in-depth evaluation of different participatory co-mgmt. regimes

_________________ 26

The phrase in brackets should rather be eliminated as it is not a project output but a desired impact.