Response To Show Cause Cause

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

____________________________________

Leisha Tringali, Civil Action No.: 1:14-cv-124-LM

Plaintiff

vs.

Hannah Attuso

Amy Pitter,

Laurie McGrath,

Doug Comfort,

Darrin Davis,

Mary Ellen Lembo

Rachel Kaprielian,

“Mr. Aniliton”,

Unknown Defendants 1-10

Defendants

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Pursuant to the Court's Order to Show Cause, the undersigned hereby responds to the Court's Order to Show Cause. In support of this response, plaintiff offers the following statement of facts and argument, with reference to applicable authorities.

Plaintiff's only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are her fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield her in times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold the plaintiff's basic due process rights or bow down to tyranny."

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Hannah Attuso

The defendant Hannah Attuso is an employee of the Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Agency.

On June 25, 2002 The plaintiff alleges the defendant, Hannah Attuso filed notice of appearance for DOR/CSE as counsel with the Middlesex Probate and Family Court ( Donnnelly, J. ).

The plaintiff alleges the defendant, Hannah Attuso further motioned the Middlesex Probate and Family Court to request for financial statement against Leisha Eshbach.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant, Hannah Attuso violated statutory requirements and standards designated under Chapter 119A of the General Laws pursuant to Title IV Part D of the Social Security Act.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant, Hannah Attuso failed to afford the plaintiff notice and a hearing before attempting to enforce a temporary child support order against her pursuant to M.G.L 119A s.3 (B) and in rule 4(d)(2) of the Massachusetts Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure.

Those "constitutionally adequate procedures" require notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S. Ct. 652, 656-57, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)

The jurisdictional rules are set out in Part A of Article 2 of UIFSA, Sections 201 and 202. Section 201 establishes UIFSA's bases for jurisdiction over a nonresident, i.e., long-arm jurisdiction, by providing that a state may exercise jurisdiction over an individual if the individual has been properly served in the state.

The Plaintiff brings this action seeking redress for the illegal acts of the defendant, which have resulted in a loss of plaintiff's property and denial of her liberties, and for declaratory and injunctive relief to end those practices and prevent further losses.

B. Amy Pitter

The defendant Amy Pitter is an employee of the Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Agency.

The defendant Amy Pitter serves as Commissioner of the Department of Revenue. She is responsible for overseeing DOR employees in offices across the state who work in child support enforcement.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant Amy Pitters failure by her own neglence to determine if the plaintiff had incurred bank or similar fees as a direct result of administrative error by the IV-D agency pursuant to M.G.L. 119A s. 10A (c ).

The plaintiff alleges the defendant Amy Pitter failure by her own neglence to determine if the IV-D agency had distributed a payment to an individual obligee that was not a child support collection on behalf of the obligee, or that the obligee was otherwise not entitled to the payment, pursuant to M.G.L. 119A s. 10A ( b ).

The plaintiff alleges the defendant Amy Pitter by her own neglence failed to issue a refund to the plaintiff of money collected through means of fraud pursuant to M.G.L. 119A s. 10A ( b ).

The plaintiff alleges by the defendant Amy Pitter's own negligence to make that determination has allowed harm to continue to the plaintiff and made no attempt to recover and refund the plaintiffs money in which was taken by means of fraud.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant Amy Pitter knowingly and willfully made use of all false documents knowing the same contained from a fraudulent documents pursuant to 18 USC 1001.

On June 21, 2013 the plaintiff alleges she sent a disclosure request to Attorney James Sweeny for the district Attorney's Office and carbon copied the defendant Amy Pitter of the the Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Division. Enclosed plaintiff inserted a signed release for records as provided by the Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Division's website.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant Amy Pitter conspired with others by failing to provide the plaintiff access to the record in which their Department had her listed as a client and in which she is entitled pursuant to Title IV Part D of the Social Security Act. Knowing the case file was based on fraud.

The defendant knowingly and willfully allowed others to make use of all false documents knowing the same contained from a fraudulent documents pursuant to 18 USC 1001.


C. Laurie McGrath

The defendant Laurie McGrath is associated with Massachusetts Department of Revenue with the role of Deputy Commissioner.

The plaintiff alleges on June 4, 2013 the defendant Laurie McGrath sent notice to the plaintiff, Leisha Tringali that her Department had issued a new Income Order / Notice of Support.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant Laurie McGrath intentionally retaliated against plaintiff by sending such notice knowing that Tringali I case was under review with the first circuit court of appeals and that the plaintiff was suing her department for Synthetic Identity Theft and knowing this would cause harm to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant, Laurie McGrath is a state actor acting under the “color of law” she should have known that issuing Income Order/ Notice of Support would cause the plaintiff loss of her property.

The plaintiff alleges by placing the plaintiff's name upon the Income Order / Notice of Support. the defendant Laurie McGrath by means of fraud knowingly transferred the plaintiff's name, Leisha Tringali in an effort to collect on a temporary child support order for Leisha Eshbach without lawful authority pursuant to 18 U.S. Code § 1028.

The defendant, Laurie McGrath knowingly and willfully falsified documents and or made use of all false documents knowing the same contained from a fraudulent documents pursuant to 18 USC 1001.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant Laurie McGrath engaged in unlawful acts through a pattern of collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain directly or indirectly an interest in the plaintiff's personal property and liberties pursuant to 18 USC 1951.


D. Doug Comfort

The defendant, Doug Comfort is an employee of the Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Agency.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant, Doug Comforts j ob description is Child Support Enforce Spec ( C ). His job duties include but not limited to as a first level supervisor, a preliminary function as a trainer, and doing expert level work beyond the general competencies of the job. Training Specialist, formulate policy, provide technical consultations on complex assignments, or perform work at an expert level. Child Support Enforcement Specialists evaluate and monitor child support cases to establish paternity and to establish, modify, and enforce child support orders; prepare cases for court action; ensure compliance with child support agreements and court orders; conduct research to locate non-custodial parents and identify asset/income available to meet child support obligations; research cases involving failure to pay court-ordered child support; ensure the accuracy of case information by performing reviews and adjusting case information when needed; and assist custodial and non-custodial parents by providing information to them regarding their child support cases through telephone calls, in face to face meetings, or in writing.

Around October 2006 the plaintiff alleges the defendant, Doug Comfort intercepted an insurance claim settlement payment from the plaintiff in the amount of $5,000.00.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant, Doug Comfort by his own negligence failed in his job duties to ensure the accuracy of case information by performing reviews and adjusting case information when needed.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant, Doug Comfort is a state actor acting under the “color of law” he should have known that intercepting an insurance claim settlement payment would cause the plaintiff loss of her property.

Furthermore the plaintiff alleges the defendant, Doug Comfort by his own negligence failed to provide the plaintiff notice of said interception of her money pursuant to Title IV, Part D of the Social Security Act, 42 , and M.G.L. c. 119A. In which deprived the plaintiff of due process.

Plaintiff is aggrieved by the defendant's actions taken in collecting child support without notice to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff claims that procedural due process demands that a party affected by government action be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of a property interest.

Around October 2006 the plaintiff alleges the defendant, Doug Comfort intercepted another insurance claim settlement payment from the plaintiff in the amount of $5,000.00.

The plaintiff alleges again the defendant, Doug Comfort is a state actor acting under the “color of law” he should have known that intercepting an insurance claim settlement payment would cause the plaintiff loss of her property.

Furthermore the plaintiff alleges the defendant, Doug Comfort failed by his own negligence to provide the plaintiff notice of said interception of her money pursuant to Title IV, Part D of the Social Security Act, 42 , and M.G.L. c. 119A.

The plaintiff claims when property is seized by a state and then remanded to the custody of the United States, the federal agency receiving the property must provide notice of the seizure to any interested parties within 90 days of the date of the initial seizure. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(iv).

Plaintiff is aggrieved by the defendant's actions taken in collecting child support without notice to the plaintiff. Procedural due process demands that a party affected by government action be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of a property interest.

Judge Barbadoro dismissed the plaintiff's claims against the defendant Doug Comfort on grounds that “she [had] not pleaded sufficient facts to show either Comfort proximatley caused the violations she alledge[d] or that he has the power to implement an order granting her relief she sought” Tringali I, 2012 WL 5683236, at 4.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant, Doug Comfort failed by his own negligence in his job duties ensure the accuracy of case information by performing reviews and adjusting case information when needed. Further failing to provide plaintiff notice.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant Doug Comfort had the ability to modify and to prepare cases for court action but the defendant by his own neglence failed to do so.

The plaintiff alleges within her complaint sufficient facts to show that the defendant, Doug Comfort caused due process violations and had the power to grant her relief.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant Doug Comfort engaged in unlawful acts through a pattern of collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain directly or indirectly an interest in the plaintiff's personal property and liberties pursuant to 18 USC 1951.

The Plaintiff bring this action seeking redress for the illegal acts of the defendant, which have resulted in a loss of her property and denial of her liberties, and for declaratory and injunctive relief to end those practices and prevent further losses.

E. Darrin Davis

Darrin Davis is an employee of the Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement

The plaintiff alleges the defendant Darrin Davis was assigned to the case in which she is named.

The defendant Darrin Davis job description is Child Support Enforce Spec ( A/B ). His job duties include but not limited to Child Support Enforcement Specialists evaluate and monitor child support cases to establish paternity and to establish, modify, and enforce child support orders; prepare cases for court action; ensure compliance with child support agreements and court orders; conduct research to locate non-custodial parents and identify asset/income available to meet child support obligations; research cases involving failure to pay court-ordered child support; ensure the accuracy of case information by performing reviews and adjusting case information when needed; and assist custodial and non-custodial parents by providing information to them regarding their child support cases through telephone calls, in face to face meetings, or in writing.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant Darrin Davis failed by his own negligence in his duties to ensure the accuracy of the case information by performing reviews and adjusting case information when needed and assist the plaintiff by providing information regarding the child support cases through telephone calls, in face to face meetings, or in writing.

F. Mary Ellen Lembo

The defendant Mary Ellen Lembo is an employee of the Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Agency.

The plaintiff alleges the Registration Statement was signed by the defendant Mary Ellen Lembo on June 19, 2013 under the penality of perjury that all information and facts concerning arrearage accrued under this order were true to the best of her knowledge and belief.

The plaintiff alleges a Registration Statement was enclosed. On this record the names of Leisha Tringali and Leisha Eshbach were named to identify the mother's information.

Attached with the Registration Statement was the temporary child support order in which Leisha Eshbach is named and not that of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff alleges the this statement was NOT sent pursuant to a request from the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Child Support but rather from Mary Ellen Lembo to New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Child Support.

The plaintiff alleges on October 4, 2013 Peggy Rossing, Esq Staff Attorney for the Division of Child Support Services ( New Hampshire ) filed a Motion to Withdraw Registration of Foreign Order as the plaintiff provided proof that she has challenged the validity of the Department ( Massachusetts DOR ) attempted to register. The New Hampshire Department did not wish to proceed until the issues were resolved in Massachusetts.

It is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential harm that the defendant's conduct would have caused to its intended victim if the wrongful plan had succeeded, as well as the possible harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior were not deterred - TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 US 443 – Supreme Court 1993

The plaintiff alleges by placing the plaintiff's name upon the Registration Statement the defendant Mary Ellen Lembo by means of fraud knowingly and willingly transferred the plaintiff's name without lawful authority pursuant to 18 U.S. Code § 1028.

The plaintiff alleges again the defendant, Mary Ellen Lembo is a state actor acting under the “color of law” he should have known that filing a Registration Statement would cause the plaintiff loss of her property and liberties.

G. FNU (first name unknown) Anilton

The plaintiff alleges the defendant, Anilton did not lift the suspension of the plaintiff’s license and quoted MGL 119 s. 16 (b) as his authority.

According to the DOR/CSE, M.G.L. C 119A, § 16, gives them the authority to suspended a individuals business, trade, professional, recreational or motor vehicle license or virtually any other license or registration that a person has legally obtained

The plaintiff alleges the defendant, Anilton stated “Once you have cleared your outstanding obligation, you must present the Registry of Motor Vehicles with an official notice from the

Child Support Enforcement Division of the Massachusetts Department of Revenue, stating that you are in compliance with the payment plan and are eligible or reinstatement”.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant, Anilton insinuated that plaintiff owed child-support with no proof from the DOR/CSE other then a computer generated letter.

Plaintiff alleges she was never afforded a hearing regarding the suspension of her driver’s license but rather told to present the Registry of Motor Vehicles with an official notice from the Child Support Enforcement Division of the Massachusetts Department of Revenue, stating that plaintiff was in compliance.

The plaintiff claims that for the defendant, Anilton to implicate and enforce M.G.L. c 119A, § 16, in the manner in which he chose to enforce against the plaintiff, would with no doubt have to violate her rights under the 5th, 7th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution.

The plaintiff alleges again the defendant, Aniliton is a state actor acting under the “color of law” he should have known that enforcing M.G.L. c 119A, § 16 would cause the plaintiff loss of her liberties.

H. Rachel Kaprielian

On June 23, 2011 the plaintiff alleges the defendant, Rachel Kaprielian, Registrar of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Execustive Office of Transportation Registry of Motor Vehicles sent Leisha Tringali a notice of suspension effective on July 3, 2010.

The plaintiff claims that for the defendant Rachel Kaprielian to implicate and enforce M.G.L. c 119A, § 16, in the manner in which she chose to enforce against the plaintiff, would with no

doubt have to violate her rights under the 5th, 7th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution

Although according to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts having a drivers license is a privilege, the suspending of a license without a valid court order or a hearing on an allegation is a clear violation of one’s due process.

The defendant, Rachel Kaprielian suspended the plaintiff’s driver license by a request from the DOR/CSE with no valid court order violated plaintiff’s due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United State Constitution.

The Fifth Amendment (part of the “Bill of Rights”) states;

“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private

property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”

While the Fourteenth Amendment under section one states;

“All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

The plaintiff alleges again the defendant, Rachel Kaprielian is a state actor acting under the “color of law” he should have known that enforcing M.G.L. c 119A, § 16 would cause the plaintiff loss of her liberties.

I. John Does 1 & 2

The plaintiff asserted that the DTA ( John Doe 1 ) created a synthetic identity of Leisha Eshbach and the DOR/CSE ( John Doe 2 ) without the express authorization of the plaintiff transferred her personal identifying information ( Social Security Number ) to obtain child support payments in which the plaintiff is not named.

The plaintiff alleges by John Doe 1 by means of fraud knowingly and willingly transferred the plaintiff's name to a synthetic identity they created without lawful authority pursuant to 18 U.S. Code § 1028.

The plaintiff alleges by John Doe 2 by means of fraud knowingly and willingly transferred the plaintiff's social security number to a sythentic identity without lawful authority pursuant to 18 U.S. Code § 1028.

J. John Doe 3

The plaintiff alleges while employed at CSE on March 24, 2003, John Doe 3 "levied $475.98" from plaintiff's bank account.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant, John Doe 3 is a state actor acting under the “color of law” and should have known that issuing a levy would cause the plaintiff loss of her property.

Furthermore the plaintiff alleges the defendant, John Doe 3 own negligence to provide the plaintiff notice of said levy of her money pursuant to Title IV, Part D of the Social Security Act, 42 , and M.G.L. c. 119A. In which deprived the plaintiff of due process.

When property is seized by a state and then remanded to the custody of the United States, the federal agency receiving the property must provide notice of the seizure to any interested parties within 90 days of the date of the initial seizure. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(iv).

Plaintiff is aggrieved by the defendant(s) actions taken in collecting child support without notice to the plaintiff.

Plaintiff claims procedural due process demands that a party affected by government action be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of a property interest.

The plaintiff alleges the defendant engaged in unlawful acts through a pattern of collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain directly or indirectly an interest in the plaintiff's personal property and liberties pursuant to 18 USC 1951.


K. John Doe 4

The plaintiff alleges while employed at CSE on April 26, 2003, John Doe 4 intercepted an insurace-claim payment directed to plaintiff in the amount of $1327.50.



Plaintiff claims when property is seized by a state and then remanded to the custody of the United States, the federal agency receiving the property must provide notice of the seizure to any interested parties within 90 days of the date of the initial seizure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(iv).

Plaintiff is aggrieved by the defendant's actions taken in collecting child support without notice to the plaintiff.

Plaintiff claims procedural due process demands that a party affected by government action be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of a property interest.



L. John Doe 5

The plaintiff alleges while employed at CSE on September 13, 2003, John Doe 5 "levied $1906.00" from plaintiff's bank account.



Plaintiff claims when property is seized by a state and then remanded to the custody of the United States, the federal agency receiving the property must provide notice of the seizure to any interested parties within 90 days of the date of the initial seizure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(iv).

Plaintiff is aggrieved by the defendant's actions taken in collecting child support without notice to the plaintiff. Procedural due process demands that a party affected by government action be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of a property interest.



M. John Doe 6

Plaintiff alleges she requested an "administrative review" of the seizures of her money from CSE, John Doe 6 never gave plaintiff "proper notice of the outcome . . ."

The plaintiff alleges the defendant John Doe 6 failed to provide the plaintiff notice of her request for an administrative review of the IV-D agency’s actions in collecting of child support pursuant to M.G.L 119A s. 17.

Plaintiff is aggrieved by the defendant's own negligence to provide notice of the outcome as plaintiff is prohibited from seeking judicial review without providing the court with the agencies final determination pursuant to M.G.L 119A s. 17.

ARGUMENT

A. Claims Barred by the Eleventh Amendment Immunity

I. Waiver of Immunity is Not Absolute

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, by virtue of Articles V and XI of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, has made itself accountable” for suit in Federal Court, precluding immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Article V. All power residing originally in the people, and being derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of government, vested with authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them.

Article XI. Every subject of the commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which she may receive in her person, property, or character. She ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws.

II. Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws of the United States.

Plaintiff claims that her rights under the due process clause were violated by defendants neglegance to give her notice or an opportunity to be heard.

Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to state a claim that without notice, the defendant(s) had deprived plaintiff of her liberty and property interest without due process.

“Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” See McKay v. Dallas Independent School District, (2009)

“Section 1983 provides a private right of action against any person who, acting under the color of state or territorial law, abridges "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States.” See Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun, 283 F. 3d 531- Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit, (2002)

"[T]he § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional rights."- See Brewer v. Cantrell, 622 F. Supp. 1320 - Dist. Court, WD Virginia, (1985).

" `We do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy' for the deprivation of a federally secured right. " See Doe By Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F. 3d 861 - Court of Appeals, Dist. Of Columbia Circuit, (1996)

In a § 1983 action, defendant has the burden of demonstrating "by express provision or other

specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement. `We do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy' for the deprivation of a federally secured right. "- See BH v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387 - Dist. Court, ND Illinois, (1989)

III. State officials may be sued for damages in their individual capacityfor violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights

committed in the course of official duties

The defendants are jointly and severally responsible and liable for disgorging all money that they wrongfully obtained through their illegal conduct, and for restoring such money to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff argues the defendant(s) and their agents should be compelled to make restitution for all private property illegally seized and taken in violation of constitutionally protected and guaranteed rights to due process of law and / or in violation of applicable standards and procedures imposed by statute and court rule.

The defendant(s) who maintain such information in the normal course of business have a legal duty to reasonably safeguard that information from being used for an illegitimate purpose.

This claim is analogous to a premises liability claim for negligent security resulting in criminal activity. The plaintiff claims, the defendant(s) are alleged to have failed to take reasonable precautions to protect the plaintiff from foreseeable injuries caused by the agency in which the defendant(s) work or by a third party.All persons have a duty to exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm. See Walls v. Oxford Management Co., 137 NH 653 - NH: Supreme Court 1993

Whether a defendant's conduct creates a risk of harm to others sufficiently foreseeable to charge the defendant with a duty to avoid such conduct is a question of law, 145 N.H. 190, 193 (2000), because "the existence of a duty does not arise solely from the relationship between the parties, but also from the need for protection against reasonably foreseeable harm."143 N.H. 208, 211 (1998) (quotation omitted). Thus, in some cases, a party's actions give rise to a duty. 137 N.H. at 656. Parties owe a duty to those third parties foreseeably endangered by their conduct with respect to those risks whose likelihood and magnitude make the conduct unreasonably dangerous. 143 N.H. at 211.


The defendant(s) acted under color of law but contrary to law, and intentionally and unreasonably deprived Leisha Tringali of rights , privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution, laws of the United States, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction to hear state law claims against state officials sued in their individual capacity if the federal claims arise from the same subject matter and provide the federal court with jurisdiction. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123.

Individual capacity suits against the defendant(s) arises out of official acts may be limited to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13013563882778406005&q=Boyer+vs.++Docusearch&hl=en&as_sdt=2,30






A. In ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress abrogated sovereign immunity in actions involving state violations of fundamental constitutional rights.

Fourteenth Amendment.

The first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

U.S . Const ., amend. VIX. And, the United States Supreme Court has specifically held that the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment limits state immunity:

But we think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of s 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that section Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce “by appropriate legislation” the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority. When Congress acts pursuant to s 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant , it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority. We think that Congress may, indetermining what is “appropriate legislation” for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509(2004)

In Fitzpatrick, supra., the U.S. Supreme Court dealt decided the issue of whether Congress had abrogated the Sovereign Immunity of the States as to Title VII claims. They ruled the Congress had done so pursuant to their power enumerated in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, the Court does not need to look for congressional action taken pursuant to Section 5. Instead, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, itself, explicitly contains the abrogation language.

‘[I]t is well - settled that '[t]here is no longer a need to bring official - capacity actions against local government officials, for under Monell [v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S. Ct. 2018,56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978)] . . . local government units can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief.' "

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91 And, the importance of including those government entities is underscored by the lack of remedies available to those wronged by the governmental entity:

Representative Bingham, for example, in discussing § 1 of the bill, explained that he had drafted § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment with the case of Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore,7 Pet. 243, 8 L.Ed. 672(1833), especially in mind. “In [that] case the city had taken private property for public use, without COMPENSATION . . . , AND THERE WAS NO REDRESS

FOR THE wrong.. . . . ..” globe App. 84 (emphasis added). Bingham's further remarks clearly indicate his view that such takings by cities, as had occurred in Barron, would be redressable under § 1 of the bill. See Globe App. 85.

More generally, and as Bingham's remarks confirm, § 1 of the bill would logically be the vehicle by which Congress provided redress for takings, since that section provided the only civil remedy for Fourteenth Amendment violations and that Amendment unequivocally prohibited uncompensated takings. Given this purpose, it beggars reason to suppose that Congress would have exempted municipalities from suit, insisting instead that compensation for a taking come from an officer in his individual capacity rather than from the government unit that had the benefit of the property taken.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 686-87 (emphasis added). Thus, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically drafted to provide a remedy where none other existed.

he reasons for ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment support plaintiff’s contention that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment permit this action to proceed against the defendant(s).

“the Due Process Clause fully incorporates particular rights contained in the first eight Amendments”. McDonald, 130 U.S. at 15. And, states must respect fundamental constitutional rights. See Duncan, 391 U. S., at 149, and n. 14 .

Following this view, the cases which have incorporated parts of the Bill of Rights essentially were court orders enjoining the state to follow the law as it always had been since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In the process of adoption, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified by both houses of Congress, by a two-thirds majority in each. See Article Five of the United States Constitution. Therefore, at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress abrogated the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of the states in regards to claims involving violations of fundamental constitutional rights (including Due Process) as those rights have always existed since the adoption of the bill of rights.

Accordingly, this Court is not deprived of jurisdiction to enforce tdue process violations via the Fourteenth Amendment as Congress intended.

B. State officials may be sued for damages in their individual capacity for violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights committed in the course of official duties

Defendant(s) are appropriate in this action for at least two reasons.

First, where injunctive relief is sought, a state official acting in his or her official capacity is a “person” for the purposes of Section 1983 actions. Will, 491U.S. At 71, n. 10 (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 473, n. 14); Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123. 159–160 (1908) (...official - capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.) (citations omitted). Plaintiff has plainly sought injunctive relief in her Complaint.

Second, Defendant(s) may not rely on sovereign immunity to bar this action. In Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), the United States Supreme Court created an exception to the general

principle that a State official, sued in their official capacity, is the same entity as the State. Specifically, where a Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a state official's action in enforcing state law, that official is not considered the State.

Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a state official's action in enforcing state law, that official is not considered the State. In Ex Parte Young, supra., the Defendant contended that he was merely acting for the state of Minnesota when he sought to enforce its laws. The Court specifically rejected that argument, holding that when a state official does something that is unconstitutional, the official is not acting in the name of the state. Id. At 159. This is because the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution operates to invalidate any unconstitutional state laws:

The answer to all this is the same as made in every case where an official claims to be acting under the authority of the State. The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and, if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of, and one which does not affect, the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a State official in attempting, by the use of the name of the State, to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer, in proceeding under such enactment, comesinto conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is, in that case, stripped of his official or representative character, and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. Id at 160

Thus, this suit, insofar as it names Defendant(s), is no against the State, but merely against the individual officer, who is not acting as the State when enforcing an unconstitutional law.

Therefore, Defendant(s) are both a representative of the state and an individual person who can have suit brought against them.

This conclusion is inevitable following “'straight forward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective."' Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002).

Unless the Fourteenth Amendment is to be ignored, it is clear that this complaint fulfills the ExParte Young standard and avoids the Eleventh Amendment bar to suit.

Plaintiff is entitled to have Defendant(s) enjoined from enforcing the unconstitutional laws at issue in this case.

IV. Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction and a declaratory judgment

Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction and a declaratory judgment against each defendant in his / her oficial capacity pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

Such a fraud suffices as a basis to set aside the temporary child support order under F.R.C.P.

60(b).

A permanent injunction and a declaratory judgment will serve the plaintiff's interest in putting an end to the defendant(s) fraudulent conduct, where they, knowingly, intentionally and willfully, fraudulently collected and continue to attempt to collect funds and suspension of any type of license from the plaintiff.

A permanent injunction and a declaratory judgment will serve that the plaintiff will not be subjected to the Defendants’ unlawful conduct and will not be deprived of her personal property or liberty.

The defendants’ unlawful conduct, if allowed to prevail, will cause the plaintiff permanent irreparable injury

B. Claims Barred by the Statue of Limitations

Plaintiff claims that her rights under the due process clause were violated by defendants neglegance to give her notice or an opportunity to be heard.

Plaintiff alleges the defendant(s) have and continue to violate statutory requirements and standards designated under Chapter 119A of the General Laws pursuant to Title IV Part D of the Social Security Act.

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants deprived her of the value of her personal property, raising claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 ("RICO")

Continuity is "both a closed- and open - ended concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition." in GINTOWT v. TL VENTURES, 2004

Plaintiff alleges the defendants, violated plaintiff’s protected due process rights by a pattern and practice of criminally editing, falsifying, and manipulating a temporary order child support order by creating a synthetic identity then denied plaintiff the ability to conduct an administrative review to deprive her of any meaningful remedy.

The so - called “continuity" requirement can be satisfied either by showing a "closed - ended" pattern -a series of related predicate acts extending over a substantial period of time - or by demonstrating an "open - ended" pattern of racketeering activity that poses a threat of continuing criminal conduct beyond the period during which the predicate acts were performed. in MIKHLIN v. HSBC, 2009

The plaintiff claims continued harm to the plaintiff still exsists and as to date there has been no remedy for relief afforded to her in which she has and will continue to seek.

Plaintiff alleges the defendants are jointly and severally responsible and liable for disgorging

all money that they wrongfully obtained through their illegal conduct, and for restoring such money to the Plaintiff

The defendant(s) who maintain such information in the normal course of business have a legal duty to reasonably safeguard that information from being used for an illegitimate purpose.

This claim is analogous to a premises liability claim for negligent security. The plaintiff claims, the defendant(s) are alleged to have failed to take reasonable precautions to protect the plaintiff from foreseeable injuries caused by the agency in which the defendant(s) work or by a third party.

In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley - Duff & Associates, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that a uniform statute of limitations, borrowed from the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(b), should be applied to civil actions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1964. The Court noted that a clear majority of the Court had rejected the notion that the most analogous state statute of limitations must "always" be applied when a federal statute is silent on the proper limitations period. 483 U.S. at 146, 107 S.Ct. at 2762. The Court stated:

that [g]iven our long standing practice of borrowing state law, and the congressional awareness of this practice, we can generally assume that Congress intends by its silence that we borrow state law. In some limited circumstances, however, our characterization of a federal claim has led the Court to conclude that "state statutes of limitations can be unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of federal law. In those instances, it may be inappropriate to conclude that Congress 357*357 would choose to adopt state rules at odds with the purpose or operation of federal substantive law." .... While the mere fact that state law fails to provide a perfect analogy to the federal cause of action is never itself sufficient to justify the use of a federal statute of limitations, in some circumstances the Court has found it more appropriate to borrow limitation periods found in other federal, rather than state, statutes:

"[A]s the courts have often discovered, there is not always an obvious state -law choice for application to a given federal cause of action; yet resort to state law remains the norm for borrowing of limitations periods. Nevertheless, when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking, we have not hesitated to turn away from state law."

Id. 483 U.S. at 154, 107 S.Ct. At 2766 (quoting Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law 392 (1985)).Most recently, in Reed v. United Transportation Union, the Court reiterated thatthe general rule [is] that statutes of limitation are to be borrowed from state law. We decline t o borrow a state statute of limitations only "when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking."

Among the themes to be distilled from the Supreme Court's recent borrowing discussions are that selection of a uniform federal limitations period may be warranted (1) where the statutory claim in question covers a multiplicity of types of actions, leading to the possible application

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of a number of different types of state statutes of limitations, (2) where the federal claim does not precisely match any state -law claim, (3) where the challenged action is multistate in nature, perhaps leading to forum shopping and inordinate litigation expense, and (4) where a federal statute provides a very close analogy.

The plaintiff further claims the discovery rule because of false documents and her inability to obtain records or notification.

When plaintiff became aware of harms she made attempts to rectify the harms and she continues to seek a remedy.

Furthermore the plaintiff argues the statue of limitations should be tolled as the harms are on going as the defendants continue to harm plaintiff as to the current date. Each action caused by the defendant's should toll the statutue of limitations.

C. Due Process Claims

The plaintiff asserts violation of rights specifically identified in the Bill of Rights or protected under substaintive componet of the Due Process Clause, the violation is complete at the time of the challenged conduct.

I. Standard of Review

A. Due Process: Substantive and Procedural

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process clause provides two different kinds of constitutional protection: procedural due process and substantive due process. Zinermon v. Burch,494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 983, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990);McKiney v. Paten,20 F.3d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc),cert. denied,___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 898, 130 L.Ed.2d 783 (1995). A violation of either of these kinds of protection may form the basis for a suit under Section 1983.

B. Substantive Due Process

The substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects those rights that are "fundamental," that is, rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. "Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937). The Supreme Court has deemed that most — but not all — of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights are fundamental; certain unenumerated rights also merit protection.. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992).

It is in this framework that fundamental rights are incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions against the states. A finding that a right merits substantive due process protection

means that the right is protected "against` certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them. '"Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664-65, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986)).

C. Procedural Due Process

The Supreme Court has made clear that, although the preliminary question of whether a property right exists may be one of state law, federal law governs the analysis of whether the procedures by which the property right or interest was deprived comport with the requirements of procedural due process. Loudermill, 470 U.S. At 541, 105 S. Ct. at 1492-93.

The right to due process is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in [public] employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541, 105 S. Ct. at 1493 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The Due Process Clause "is the source of three different kinds of constitutional protection. "Daniels 474 U.S. at 337, 106 S. Ct. at 677. First, it provides a "guarantee of fair procedure, ... referred to as `procedural due process,'" in connection with any deprivation of life, liberty or property by a state. This is "the most familiar office" of the Clause. Collins v. Harker Heights, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992).

Second, the Clause contains a substantive component "that protects individual liberty against `certain government actions regardless of the procedures used to implement them. '"(quoting Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331, 106 S. Ct. at 665). This substantive component is referred to as substantive due process.

Third, the Clause incorporates the specific protections of most of the Bill of Rights against the states. These, too, are referred to as "substantive" rights, and are comprised within the "liberty" provision of the Clause. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 3 37, 106 S. Ct. at 677; Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1546 (10th Cir. 1993); Miller v. Campbell County, 945 F.2d 348, 352 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1174, 117 L.Ed.2d 419 (1992).

D. Three factors are to be considered in determining whether a particular procedure satisfies due process:

"[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands, "Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (citation omitted).

Three factors are to be considered in determining whether a particular procedure satisfies due process:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative

burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

II. Due Process Clause Requires

Notice and an Opportunity to be Heard

The Due process Claus entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases. This requirement of neutrality in adjudicative proceedings safeguards the two central concerns of procedural due process, the prevention of unjustified or mistake deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individual in the decision making process.

The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law.

At the same time, it preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness, “generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done,” by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interested in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him. PORTER v. SINGLETARY 49 F.3rd 1483 (11th Cir. 1995) Quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. 446 U.S. 238, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed 2nd 182 (1980).

As the Supreme Court so aptly wrote: "The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights — life, liberty, and property cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.” Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope 485 U.S. 478, 108 S. Ct 1340, 1344, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)"

Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985).

Those "constitutionally adequate procedures" require notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S. Ct. 652, 656-57, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); see also . Notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane, 1052* 1052 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S. Ct. At 657.

In order to sustain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show (i) that

she suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (ii) that the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v . Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).

The causation requirement of § 1983 is satisfied only if a plaintiff demonstrates that a defendant did an affirmative act, participated in another's affirmative act, or omitted to perform an act which he was legally required to do that caused the deprivation complained of. Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978)).

Plaintiff argues the defendants failure to provide the written notice required by RSA 508- B:2 shall operate to toll the applicable statute of limitations from the time of such advance or until such written notice is actually given.

D. Rico Claim

By placing the plaintiff's name upon the Registration Statement the defendant Mary Ellen Lembo by means of fraud knowingly and willfully transferred the plaintiff's name without lawful authority pursuant to 18 U.S. Code § 1028.

The defendant, Laurie McGrath knowingly and willfully falsified documents and or made use of all false documents knowing the same contained from a fraudulent documents pursuant to 18 USC 1001.

The defendant(s) engaged in unlawful acts through a pattern of collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain directly or indirectly an interest in the plaintiff's personal property and liberties pursuant to 18 USC 1951.

Plaintiffs claim against the Defendants for violation of RICO section 1962(b), which provides:(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 1962(b). is a claim against Defendants for violation of RICO Section 1962(c), which provides:

(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). is a claim against all Defendants for violation of RICO Section 1962(d), which provides:

(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of

subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.

18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). ia a claim against all Defendants for common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation, respectively.

E. Claim that Defendants Committed Idenity Theft

Plaintiff claims for negligent security of personal information are based on the theory that accurate personal identifying information is the key that allows access to a person's financial accounts and credit.

Plaintiff alleges the defendant(s) who maintain such information in the normal course of business have a legal duty to reasonably safeguard that information from being used for an illegitimate purpose.

This claim is analogous to a premises liability claim for negligent security resulting in criminal activity. The plaintiff claims, the defendant(s) are alleged to have failed to take reasonable precautions to protect the plaintiff from foreseeable injuries caused by the agency in which the defendant(s) work or by a third party.

All persons have a duty to exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm. See Walls v. Oxford Management Co., 137 NH 653 - NH: Supreme Court 1993 Whether a defendant's conduct creates a risk of harm to others sufficiently foreseeable to charge the defendant with a duty to avoid such conduct is a question of law, 145 N.H. 190, 193 (2000), because "the existence of a duty does not arise solely from the relationship between the parties, but also from the need for protection against reasonably foreseeable harm."143 N.H. 208, 211 (1998) (quotation omitted). Thus, in some cases, a party's actions give rise to a duty. 137 N.H. at 656. Parties owe a duty to those third parties foreseeably endangered by their conduct with respect to those risks whose likelihood and magnitude make the conduct unreasonably dangerous. 143 N.H. at 211.


Plaintiff alleges the defendant(s) acted under color of law but contrary to law, and intentionally and unreasonably deprived Leisha Tringali of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution, laws of the United States, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff alleges as a direct and proximate result of the acts and / or omissions of all defendant(s) as stated within the complaint, the plaintiff, Leisha Tringali suffered from loss of personal property and her liberties.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendant(s) omitted to perform act(s) which they was legally required to do that caused the deprivation by failing to provide notice or given the plaintiff an







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oportunity to be heard.

F. Claims that are Frivolous

A. Telephonic and Written Communications

Telephonic and written communications serves the purpose to show that the defendant(s) in their own neglegence failed in their employment duties to remedy the fraud but rather by their own neglence concealed fraud against the plaintiff in which allows the harms to continue.

B. Issues presented for review

(I). Whether Defendant(s) have and continue to violate the provisions of the U.S. constitutions in connection with enforcement of collection of child support; and, specifically, the illegal suspension of licenses and the illegal seizure and taking of private property without due process of law.

(II) Whether Defendant(s) have and continue to violate statutory requirements and standards in connection with the enforcement of collection of child support; and, specifically, the illegal suspension of licenses and the illegal seizure and taking of private property without due process of law.

(III) Whether Defendant(s) have and continue to violate the requirements and standards of applicable Court Rules in connection with enforcement of collection of child support; and, specifically, the illegal suspension of licenses and the illegal seizure and taking of private property without due process of law.

(IV) Whether Defendant(s) know, have reason to know, or, recklessly disregard applicable constitutional, statutory and rule standards, guidelines, protections, and, requirements in the course of collection of child support; and, specifically, the illegal suspension of licenses and the illegal seizure and taking of private property without due process of law.

(V) Whether Defendant(s) and their agents should be compelled to account for and disgorge illegal profits, payments and revenues generated from and / or in the course of these illegal and unconstitutional actions; and, specifically, the illegal seizure and taking of private property without due process of law.

(VI) Whether Defendant(s) and their agents should be compelled to make restitution for all private property illegally seized and taken in violation of constitutionally protected and guaranteed rights to due process of law and / or in violation of applicable standards and procedures imposed by statute and court rule.

G. State Law Claims

In order to sustain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show (i) that she suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (ii) that the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v . Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).

The defendant(s) acted under color of law but contrary to law, and intentionally and unreasonably deprived Leisha Tringali of rights , privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution, laws of the United States, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” See McKay v. Dallas Independent School District, (2009)

In order to sustain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show (i) that she suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (ii) that the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v . Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).

Those "constitutionally adequate procedures" require notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S. Ct. 652, 656-57, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); see also . Notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane, 1052* 1052 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S. Ct. At 657.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for all the reasons stated in the foregoing statement of facts and argument, and in consideration of the interests of justice and the public interest . Plaintiff request this court allow her complaint to proceed. forward. .

______________________________

Date: ______________ Leisha Tringali, Pro Se

2 Holly Lane

Londonderry, New Hampshire 03053

603-864-9785

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Leisha Tringali, hereby certify that a true copy of the above Response to Show Cause was mailed upon the following to the Attorney James A. Sweeny, Deputy Division Chief at One Ashburton Place, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 on this the __ day of ___________, 2014.

Documents

Response To Show Cause Cause