Relations between Peru and Ecuador from 1919 until 1930 are the focus ofchapter 6. Peru faced foreign policy embarrassment in its territorial dispute withEcuador when Ecuador ceded to Colombia border territories over which Peru hadprevious claims. Around this time, however, Peru also experienced domestic andforeign policy failures that triggered various drastic policy changes at the nationallevel. These changes opened a bargaining space for Peru to negotiate withColombia—but surprisingly not with Ecuador—which helped it to regain most ofthe border territories that it claimed from Ecuador. Ecuador, on the contrary, failedto settle its territorial dispute with Peru, despite favourable conditions.

In conclusion, the book suggests that domestic and foreign policy failurescombine to generate conditions that lead to rivalry termination if sufficientbargaining space is opened. The book’s strong theoretical approach makes itnoteworthy. Cox pushes the reader to explore a widely ignored aspect of enduringrivalries: the domestic roots of interstate conflicts. One concern I have with thisfine book is its neglect of empirical analysis—the core of enduring rivalriesresearch. The author could have added strength to his argument by testing hishypotheses scientifically. Despite these criticisms, the high accessibility, academicrigour, in-depth analysis and balanced objectivity of Why enduring rivalries do—ordon’t—end make it a highly commendable contribution to the growing literatureon international rivalry.

References

Diehl, Paul and Gary Goertz (2000) War and peace in international rivalry (Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press)

Maoz, Zeev and Ben Mor (2002) Bound by struggle: the strategic evolution of enduringinternational rivalries (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press)

Surinder Mohan q 2012University of Delhi

Notes on contributor

Surinder Mohan (MPhil, Jawaharlal Nehru University) is a doctoral candidate atthe University of Delhi, specializing in Indo-Pakistani relations. His most recentpublications are ‘Azad JammuandKashmir andGilgit-Baltistan: a tale of economicexploitation’, Journal of Peace Studies (2010) and ‘The politics of regionalism inJammu and Kashmir’, International Journal of South Asian Studies (2011).

Readers should read again my review of Professor Lieven’s work (Nazir 2012),and his response to the review (Lieven 2012), including his quote which Ireproduced. In it he attributes all-encompassing reductionist and deterministqualities to kinship in Pakistan and hereby overstates its significance in explainingsocietal processes in that country. The reader should also read my brief strictureon kinship. I suggest that kinship is a complex and problematic concept thatneeds to be viewed in a more complicated manner and not in the simplistic way

Response to Professor Lieven

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that he does. He reifies and essentializes the concept of kinship and posits it as anindependent variable of explanation. This cannot be taken seriously. If he does notmean what he says in the quote, then he should have formulated his problematicand explanatory schema differently, rather than backtracking whenever it suitshim after positing a singular determinism for kinship. Apparently, ProfessorLieven thinks that he has succeeded where the medieval alchemists failed: whilstthe latter failed to find a formula to change base material into gold, he hasdiscovered biraderi (kinship), which has gargantuan attributes that explain mostthings in Pakistan.

Given the crucial significance of kinship for him, it is strange that there is noanalysis or even discussion of this concept to indicate the mechanisms by which itimpacts on Pakistan. He speaks vaguely of biraderi/kinship, but makes no attemptto define its extent, structure and relationship to the lineage and the clan. Had hedelved into an analysis of kinship in Pakistan, he would have noticed two things.First, he would have noted the unstable and inconsistent nature of kinship; and,second, he would have acknowledged the shallow depth of the lineage, more so inthe Punjab and with some variation in other regions of Pakistan as well. In thePunjab, for example, the Kharral clan consisted historically of five principalnamed sections: Lakhera, Upera, Rabera, Gogairah and Rausin (Nazir 1981, 281).No such named sections have existed in the Warraich clan. In spite, theoretically,of greater depth of kinship in the Kharral clan, the effective unit of the biraderi hasbeen limited to the joint or individual family in both clans (Nazir 1981).

Kinship in Pakistan is not homologous. It is highly differentiated in terms ofsocio-economic class and status and segmented in terms of kinship structures. Thevertical linkages of kinship or the agnatic core—connected by patrilinealdescent—are easily segmented into units of joint or individual families who arenot connected in any meaningful way to the lineage from which they havedescended, even when they belong to the same lineage or warisan yak jaddi (‘heirsof one ancestor’) (Nazir 1981, 283). This segmentation occurs at the time ofdivision of property and the setting up of an independent household. Whenlooked at in terms of horizontal linkages, the kin group becomes part of othersegmenting and differentiating processes such as power, class hierarchy andspatial distance (Nazir 1981; 1993). The shallow depth of biraderi/kinship is alsoindicated by the fact that pre-emption—the right to acquire property of a relativein preference to a non-relative—is restricted to near collaterals of a lineage and notto the lineage as a whole (Nazir 1981). Thus in the Punjab, and with some regionalvariations in Pakistan, the depth of the lineage is shallow and the genealogicalrelationships defining segments are less stable; therefore historically, as now, thelineage as a whole rarely, if ever, has acted as a social, military or political unit.

Throughout his book Professor Lieven flattens the concept of kinship andconfuses the local descent groups of agnates—related on the male side of thefamily—and cognates—related on the male and female side of the family—withclan and lineage, which in Punjabi are also called biraderi. His understanding of‘biraderi as a local kinship group’ (506) is extremely limited and of little analyticaluse: if the biraderi is a local structure, then its effects can only be local and limitedand his exaggerated claims for it are questionable. He does not even tell us whatkinship is: is it a patrilineal descent group, or does it include cognates from thefemale side? In fact, rather than interrogating kinship/biraderi, he takes it as a pre-packaged category and tar-brushes it on complex processes. The internal

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differentiation of kinship/biraderi in terms of depth of lineage, class, occupation,status and so on is so varied and complex that anymeaningful generalization aboutits role as determinant would be very difficult (Nazir 1981, 281–284; 1993; 2000).

If Professor Lieven wishes to show the centrality of kinship in the politics andsociety of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, he would need to explain how the MuttahidaMajlis-e-Amal (a coalition of six religious parties) won 60 seats in the 2002 generalelections in Pakistan—the vast majority in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa—but only five inthe 2008 general elections. One can assume that no great structural transformationof the kinship system took place in the space of six years and that the reasons forthis change should be sought elsewhere. The kinship structure in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa has relatively greater depth than in the Punjab, but only partly so.The howler about ‘war-like, heavily armed Pathans’ (260) indicates that ProfessorLieven is unaware of the diversity among Pathans: they comprise arms-bearingclans, trading clans, sedentary population and pastoral nomads, large land-owners, small landowners and landless peasants, tenants and artisans (Ahmed1980; Barth 1965; Asad 1972; Nazir 1977). They all have diverse kinship structuresand the depth of their lineages varies, as does the degree of power embedded inthese lineages. He needs to know that the patrilineal clans in the FederallyAdministered Tribal Areas are different from those in the ProvinciallyAdministered Tribal Areas and how these differ in turn from those in urbanareas such as Peshawar and Nowshera. In fact, the vertical and horizontal aspectsof kinship that I mentioned with regard to the Punjab apply in degrees to Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan as well. In the latter, tribe and kinship constituteone among other modalities that make the politics of that province, where‘the major sources of support for a candidate/party . . . are personal, ethnic,political/ideological and tribal’ (Kundi 2007, 85).

Professor Lieven asserts that I have misrepresented Wilder on kinship. I willquote Wilder directly:

This study challenges the common perception in Pakistan that voting decisions arelargely determined by such factors as traditional ‘feudal’ relationships, and ties offamily, faction, clan or tribe. It argues instead, that political determinants of votingbehaviour, such as party (and party leader) loyalty in urban areas and patronageorientation in rural areas, are more important than social determinants of votingbehaviour. (Wilder 1999, xvii, emphasis added)

And:

Virtually every Punjabi village is split into two or more dharas or factions. The bitterenmities that often exist between these factions frequently result in factions playinga more important role in determining voting behaviour than biraderi rivalries. (175)

Ahmad’s study in the rural areas of Sahiwal reaches similar conclusions: ‘InSahiwal the system of social stratification . . . can be more fruitfully analyzed inthe framework of social classes’ (Ahmad 1977, 77). Moreover, ‘[T]he followersaffiliated (sic) with factional (dhara) leaders is based in most cases upon economicdependency and real or perceived economic or political benefits rather thanupon kinship or caste’ (103). More recent studies support this, including Akhtar(2006, 62).

The multiplicity of factors determining political outcomes in Pakistan, ratherthan the reductionist explanatory power that Professor Lieven attributes to

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kinship, is indicated in a series of recent articles published from 10 to 22November 2011 in Dawn, one of the leading English-language newspapers inPakistan. These articles, based on case studies, show that biraderi (kinship and clanassociations), dharas (political groupings), personalities and political ideology indifferent combinations and contexts determine political outcomes. The dhara isinvariably a multiplex or extra-kin group formation in a village, or group ofvillages, as well as in urban areas.1

Further, Professor Lieven seems unaware of Dahya’s outstanding study ofkinship amongst Pakistanis in Britain. Based mainly on evidence from Bradfordand Birmingham, Dahya shows the fusion and then fission of Pakistanicommunities, including segmentation of kinship ties, leading to a situationwhere ‘the village-kin group as residential unit has very gradually begun toramify into nuclear households’ (2004, 86).

Professor Lieven’s comments on orientalism seem to suggest he is oblivious ofthe relationship between power, authoritative discourse and the construction ofthe exotic ‘other’ in a certain type of scholarship on the non-Western world, whichhas been subjected to a rigorous critique in Talal Asad’s Anthropology and theColonial Encounter (1973) and Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978). In fact ProfessorLieven’s work is reminiscent of orientalist discourse: the closed, self-evident, self-confirming character of that distinctive discourse that is reproduced again andagain through scholarly texts, travelogues, literary works of imagination and theobiter dicta of public men of affairs.

It is not only with regard to orientalism that Professor Lieven displays a‘misplaced concreteness’ by conflating or being ignorant of concepts andissues. His discussion of status and identity in Pakistan illustrates this further.He states, ‘As far as personal pride and identity are concerned, to be a Sayyidtrumps being a Punjabi or Sindhi’ (Lieven 2011, 262). But Punjabi and Sindhiare ethno-linguistic categories, whereas Sayyid (descendent of the ProphetMuhammad) is the highest abstract status label. The two are not comparable.Being a Sayyid does not tell us anything about the Sayyid’s power, authority orinfluence: a Sayyid can be anything from a faqir (a beggar or ascetic) to animpecunious preacher at a mosque, or a substantial landowner or business-man (Nazir 1993, 2900). So a Sayyid cannot trump a Punjabi or a Sindhi in theway Professor Lieven suggests.

It is a sad reflection on the intellectual depth and political predisposition ofProfessor Lieven’s text that he equates the colonized and the colonizer and theimperial and anti-imperial. These entities are not connected by an equal arroganceas he asserts; rather, their relationship is mediated by grossly unequal powerrelations. And, although colonized regions were not homogeneous, the use ofmassive power by the colonizer was common to them all and followed asequence—use of destructive power, followed by intimidation, followed bymanipulation (Nazir 2010, 66). Thus, colonial power had an enormous impacton colonial Punjab/India, but not the other way around (Stokes 1982; Nazir2000; 1981).

1 Incidentally, Professor Lieven’s dichotomizing of the different regions of Pakistan, aswell as between rural and urban areas, is untenable. Although each of these has specificity,they are better conceptualized as continuums rather than dichotomies.

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Professor Lieven’s statement equating the imperialist with the anti-imperialistthrough a common arrogance is astonishing, for the arrogance of Bush and Blairresulted in the destruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, serious damage to Pakistanand the death of hundreds of thousands of people. In contrast, the ‘arrogance’ ofthe anti-imperialist is resistance (armed and discursive) against powerful states,with meagre resources. Pakistan’s relationship with the US begins before Ayub, in1954, with the signing of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, andcontinues through Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO); Central TreatyOrganisation (CENTO); US–USSR rivalry in Afghanistan in 1978; the 2001invasion of Afghanistan; drone attacks; the Kerry–Lugar bill of 2009 whereby aidto Pakistan was conditional on increased interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs;and the Raymond Davis caper and US attacks on Pakistani military checkpoints.The relationship between Pakistan and the US included US support for Pakistanimilitary dictators and insidious policies to transform and secularize Islam inPakistan (Nazir 2010).

It is ironic that Professor Lieven accuses me of not knowing the discipline ofpolitical anthropology. For when we speak of any discipline, we mean that anyoneconcerned with its study subjects himself/herself to explicit canons of relevancewithin the framework of carefully thought-out problems. He/she literallydisciplines himself/herself. But of this kind of discipline there is, alas, little tracein Professor Lieven’s book.

References

Ahmad, Saghir (1977) Class and power in a Punjabi village (New York: Monthly Review Press)Ahmed, Akbar (1980) Pakhtun economy and society (London: Routledge)Akhtar, Aasim (2006) ‘The state as landlord in Pakistani Punjab: peasant struggles on the

Okara military farms’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 33:3, 479–501Asad, Talal (1972) ‘Market model class structure and consent: a reconsideration of Swat

political organization’, Man, 7:1, 74–94Asad, Talal (ed) (1973) Anthropology and the colonial encounter (London: Ithaca Press)Barth, Frederik (1965) Political leadership among Swat Pathans (London: Athlone Press)Dahya, Badr (2004) ‘The nature of Pakistani ethnicity in industrial cities in Britain’ in Abner

Cohen (ed) Urban ethnicity, 2nd edn (London: Routledge), 77–118Kundi, Mansoor (2007) ‘Performance of the ruling coalition in Balochistan’, National

Conference Report (Islamabad: PILDAT), 83–93Lieven, Anatol (2011) Pakistan: a hard country (London: Allen Lane)Lieven, Anatol (2012) ‘Response to Pervaiz Nazir’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs,

25:1, 185–188Nazir, Pervaiz (1977) ‘Book Review: Akbar Ahmed,Millennium and charisma among Pathans’,

Journal of Peasant Studies, 4:3, 289–291Nazir, Pervaiz (1981) ‘Transformation of property relations in the Punjab’, Economic and

Political Weekly, 16:8, 281–285Nazir, Pervaiz (1993) ‘Social structure, ideology and language: caste among Muslims’,

Economic and Political Weekly, 28:52, 2897–2900Nazir, Pervaiz (2000) ‘Origins of debt, mortgage and alienation of land in early modern

Punjab’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 27:3, 55–91Nazir, Pervaiz (2010) ‘War on terror in Pakistan and Afghanistan: discursive and political

contestations’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 3:1, 63–81Nazir, Pervaiz (2012) ‘Book review: Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: a hard country’, Cambridge

Review of International Affairs, 25:1, 180–184Stokes, Eric (1982) The English utilitarians in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press)Said, Edward (1978) Orientalism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul)

306 Book reviews

Wilder, Andrew (1999) The Pakistani voter: electoral politics and voting behaviour in the Punjab(Oxford: Oxford University Press)

Pervaiz Nazir q 2012University of Cambridge

Notes on contributor

Pervaiz Nazir (PhD, Columbia University) is a lecturer in the Department ofPolitics and International Studies (POLIS) at the University of Cambridge. Hismain research interests include North–South relations, South and West Asianpolitics, ThirdWorld development, and Islam and modernity. Recent publicationsinclude The war on terror in Pakistan and Afghanistan: discursive and politicalcontestations (2010) and articles on ‘jihad’ and ‘Islamic political thought’ in Sage’sEncyclopedia of political science (2010).

Adam Jones, Gender inclusive: essays on violence, men and feminist internationalrelations, London, Routledge, 2009, ISBN13 9780415775137 (hbk), ISBN139780415666091 (pbk), 313 pp

Gender inclusive is an annotated and expanded collection of Adam Jones’ work onviolence, men and feminist international relations (IR) over the last 20 years,including research on gender and genocide, discussion of and interaction with thedeveloping field of feminist international relations, and essays urging therecognition of male victims of gender violence in local, national and globalpolitics. The book discusses the theoretical and empirical contributions ofstudying men and masculinity in IR in a number of different situations, includingwar and genocide. The theoretical chapters engage and critique feministapproaches to IR; the empirical chapters provide cross-regional analyses tosupport the book’s general contention that there is important and ignored sexdiscrimination against men in global politics. From Kosovo (chapter 5) to CiudadJuarez (chapter 7) and from Bosnia (chapter 14) to Rwanda (chapter 12), Jonesreads gender dynamics in war and conflict in a way that pays attention to sex-based subordination of men and women.

There is value to many of these individual contributions and the compilationof them into a comprehensive book makes more than a sum of its parts. Jones iscorrect about the value and indeed crucial nature of studying men/masculinity toand in feminist research (see, for example, Heeg Maruska 2010; Hooper 2001) andhas done some stunningly important empirical research about how global politicsaffects men.

In making this argument, Jones consistently talks about ‘gender-specific’ (bywhich he usually means sex-specific) discrimination against men as caused byfeminist attention to women’s rights. While gender theorists often understand‘sex’ as biological (male/female/other) and ‘gender’ as social (masculinities andfemininities), Jones uses the two words interchangeably. Concerned with ‘gender’discrimination against men, Jones characterizes feminist attention to women’s

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