Resolving a Moral Conflict Warren Erench Through Discourse · Rossouw (1994, p. 11) states, "moral dissensus is a distinct feature of our times." Business decision makers increasingly

Resolving a Moral ConflictThrough Discourse

Warren ErenchDavid Allbright

ABSTRACT. Plato claimed that morality exits tocontrol conflict. Business people increasingly arecalled upon to resolve moral conflicts between variousstakeholders who maintain opposing ethical positionsor principles. Attempts to resolve these moral con-flicts within business discussions may be exacerbatedif disputants have difFerent communicative styles. Tobetter understand the communication processinvolved in attempts to resolve a moral dilemma, weinvestigate the "discourse ethics" procedure of JurgenHabermas. Habermas claims that an individual's levelof moral reasoning parallels the type of communica-tion which that individual typically uses in attemptsto resolve conflict. Our research focuses upon therelationship between the communicative style used byparticipants attempting to resolve a particular moraldilemma involving workplace safety and the level ofmoral reasoning possessed by those participants. Theresults of our study suggest that, contrary toHabermas' views, participants with "higher" levelsof moral reasoning do not use "discursive" commu-nicative tactics more frequently than participants thatpossessed "lower" moral reasoning.

Warren French is the I. W. Cousins Professor of BusinessEthics at The University of Georgia in Athens, Georgia.His current research involves the application of discourseethics. He is co-author of a text. Practical BusinessEthics, and has published articles on business ethics andresearch ethics in this journal as well as in the Journalof Advertising and t/ie Journal of Data Collection.

David Allbright is a doctoral candidate in the Departmentof Marketing and Distribution, The University ofGeorgia in Athens, Georgia. He has provided consultingservices to major corporate and government institutionsincluding NASA, Ford, General Motors, XEROX, andAmeritech. His current research focuses on organizationalcognition and organizational learning processes.

Rossouw (1994, p. 11) states, "moral dissensusis a distinct feature of our times." Businessdecision makers increasingly are challenged toresolve tough moral dilemmas in business nego-tiations vi ith various stakeholder constituencieswho hold opposing moral beliefs and ethicalstandards (Rahim et al., 1992). The nature ofconflict is perhaps obvious to all of us. KennethThomas (1976, p. 891) articulates it as follows:" . . . conflict is the process which begins whenone party perceives that the other has frustrated,or is about to frustrate some concern of his."Seemingly irreconcilable differences in opposingethical positions can make mutually acceptablesolutions to moral dilemmas an apparentlyimpossible goal. These moral conflicts may alsobe exacerbated by differences in the commu-nicative style used by each party in the dispute.For example, one disputant might utilize a com-municative approach which includes strategictactics such as intimidation, threats and thesubordination of the opponent. An alternativeapproach could include communicative actionswhich encourage all affected parties to agree toarrive at a new position that takes into accountthe welfare of all those affected by the conflict.

Jiirgen Habermas (1976) claimed that anindividual's level of moral reasoning parallels thetype of communication that individual typicallyuses in attempts to resolve conflict. If this is so,then a better understanding of how a person'slevel of moral reasoning may influence the com-municative behaviors which he or she typicallydisplays in conflict resolution efforts could assistbusiness leaders faced with the daunting task offacilitating the resolution of tough moral con-flicts in the workplace. The aim of our researchis to increase understanding of how discussants

Journal of Business Ethia 17: 177-194, 1998.© 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

178 Warren French and David Allbright

in a business setting may differ in the commu-nicative actions they use during an attempt tosettle a moral conflict. In particular, we investi-gate the relationship between the style of commu-nication used by participants involved in adiscussion to resolve a moral dilemma and thelevel of moral reasoning possessed by those par-ticipants. We will begin by reviewing literaturethat introduces the theoretical grounding under-lying the relation of moral reasoning to com-munication style. We then describe the researchmethodology designed to investigate the rela-tionship of moral reasoning to communicationstyle used during attempts to resolve moralconflict. Results of the research are offered next,followed by our conclusions. Finally, we discussthe implications of our fmdings for practitionersand offer suggestions for future research in thisarea.

Ethics and moral conflict

Since the time of the ancient Greeks, philoso-phers have theorized about ethics. However,despite centuries of debate, no one theory ofethics has won universal acceptance. Mostattempts at defining ethics do tend to have incommon some reference to the practical aspectsof morality such as the "right and wrong" and/or"good and evil" inherent in human behavior.The roots of this view of ethics reaches back atleast to Plato's dialogue "Protagoras." In a mythabout the origin of morahty it is suggested thatZeus sent morality to human beings becausewithout it there was the danger that the con-flicts between them would lead to the extermi-nation of the human race. In the twentiethcentury, a similar view was worked out in moredetail by the philosopher Ralph Barton Perrywho wrote:

Morality is man's endeavor to harmonize con-flicting interests: to prevent conflict when itthreatens, to remove conflict when it occurs, andto advance from the negative harmony of non-conflict to the positive harmony of cooperation.Morality is the solution of the problem created byconflict - conflict among the interests of the sameor of different persons. (Perry 1954, p. 373)

When focusing upon business conflicts itseems fitting to adopt an approach which empha-sizes the practical aspects of morahty. One suchaccount is provided by James Rest and hiscolleagues: "the function of morality is to providebasic guidelines for determining how conflictsin human interests are to be settled and foroptimizing mutual benefit of people livingtogether in groups" (Rest et al., 1986, p. 1). Thisdefinition follows philosopher Kurt Baier'sproposition that a meaningful treatment ofmorality must focus on conflict resolution. Baierviewed ethics as a system of guidelines forconduct which is conductive to societal well-being (Baier, 1965). These accounts of moralitymake clear the importance of mutual benefit andsocietal,well-being, and also place the resolutionof human conflict as central to the discussionof ethics.' We agree that the most pragmaticdefinitions of morality stress the connectionbetween ethics and general human well-being.Our conviction is that the study of conflict res-olution is essential to the proper understandingof ethics. This viewpoint implies that definitionsof ethics should include "basic guidelines" formoral reasoning and respect for the well-beingof others as ideal characteristics of social processesthat would facilitate a discursive resolution ofconflict.

Moral reasoning and behavior

The concept of moral reasoning emanates fromwork done at the beginning of this century bythe psychologist William McDougall (1908) whoidentified four stages of moral conduct whichlater became the crux of Jean Piaget's (1932)stages of moral judgment. Lawrence Kohlberg(1969) subsequently used the Piaget frameworkto articulate his own theory of moral develop-ment. (See Table I.) Kohlberg's six stages of moraldevelopment constitute a theory of cognitivemoral development that assumes an individual'sstage of moral judgment would be applied con-sistently in all decisions regarding issues withmoral implications (Kohlberg, 1980). AlthoughKohlberg's basic structure is sound, otherresearchers have called for a broader perspective

Resolving a Moral Conflict Through Discourse 179

TABLE IKohlberg's sequence of moral development

Level Stage Motivation for moral judgment

Obedience to authority in order to avoid punishment.

Immediate, personal reward through individual or reciprocal effort whilerecognizing that others have their interests as well.

Living up to group expectations for the sake of social recognition, concernfor others and the "golden rule."

Obedience to the law and fulfillment of duties for the sake of promoting orderin the society for self respect.

Conscience driven firee choice delivers upon a preconceived social contract tomaximize social utility.

Individual principles of conscience promote justice, equality and individualdignity.

Preconventional

Conventional

Postconventional

1

2

3

4

5

6

that would allow for the influence of emotionsand situational contexts when evaluating moraldecisions (Berkowitz et al., 1987; Kurtines,1987).

Still, Augusto Blasi (1979) found a positiverelationship between a person's moral develop-ment under Kohlberg's classification system andthat person's observed moral behavior. Alsobuilding upon Kohlberg's theory of moraldevelopment, the German social theorist JurgenHabermas believed that a person's behavior canbe influenced by that person's level of moralreasoning. Habermas (1976, 1990) asserted thereis a parallel relation between stages of moraldevelopment and the communicative behaviorspeople exhibit in attempts to resolve conflict.Modifying the basic types of communicativebehaviors discussed by Habermas, WilliamKurtines (1989) offered his own taxonomy ofcommunicative actions to be used in researchinto the types of communicative behaviors thattypically occur during conflicts centered upon amoral dilemma. Kurtines' operationalization isnow briefly outlined.

Kurtines' operationalization ofcommunicative actions

Kurtines noted that a basic assumption ofHabermas' communication theory was thatcommunication not only aims at understanding,it also presupposes a "background consensus"between communicating parties regarding thefour validity claims of comprehensibility, honesty,truth, and rightness. (These four validity claimsare described in detail by Habermas, 1976.)Conflict may arise, and background consensusmay be threatened when a participant in a socialinteraction is challenged regarding the validity ofhis(her) statements. Drawing upon the Habermasconceptualization of consensual speech, Kurtines'developed a taxonomy of definitions of commu-nicative actions that typically occur during socialinteractions revolving around the discussion of amoral dilemma. (See Table II.) Kurtines groupedhis definitions of communicative actions intothree categories corresponding with what heviewed as three general contexts of backgroundconsensus for social interactions: (1) interactionsconducted tvith background consensus, (2) inter-actions conducted without background consensus,and (3) interactions where participant(s) attemptto create a new consensus.


TABLE IIKurtines' taxonomy of communicative actions

No Significant Discussion (NSD)A speech act that contains no significant discussion of facts or principles related to the particular moral dilemmaat hand.

ORDINARY COMMUNICATIVE ACTION

Ordinary Communicative Action 1 (OCA-1):A speech act aimed at rendering explicit the speaker's own understanding of "the facts" of the dilemma. Aspeech act which refers to specified factual details pertaining to the characters and/or the situation in theparticular dilemma at hand.

Ordinary Communicative Action 2 (OCA-2):A speech act aimed at rendering explicit the speaker's own understanding of "the principles" of the dilemma;an attempt to render explicit the principle(s) implicit in the speaker's position.

STRATEGIC GOAL-ORIENTED ACTION

Strategic Goal-oriented Action (SGA):A strategic action whose purpose or aim is that of accomplishing an agreement from the listener throughmanipulation, intimidation, or deception in the absence of the listener's understanding that a lack ofconsensus exists.

DISCURSIVE COMMUNICATIVE ACTION

Reflective Communicative Action 1 (RCA-1):An action aimed at rendering explicit the listener's understanding of "the facts" or situational aspects of thedilemma. The speaker "reflects" upon the listener's factual justification of position through constructiveparaphrase or questioning. The speaker reflects upon a potential validity to the position of the listener.

Reflective Communicative Action 2 (RCA-2):A speech act aimed at rendering explicit the underlying principle(s) of the listener's position. The speaker"reflects" upon the listener's principled justification of position through constructive paraphrase orquestioning. The speaker reflects upon a potential validity to the position of the listener.

Integrative Communicative Action 1 (ICA-1):A speech act aimed at establishing a new shared mutual understanding through the integration of previousfacts for the construction of mutually acceptable new facts. Note that the actual attainment of an agreementis irrelevant to this rating.

Integrative Communicative Action 2 (ICA-2):A speech act aimed at establishing a new shared mutual understanding through the integration of previousprinciples for the construction of mutually acceptable new principles. Note that the actual attainment of anagreement is irrelevant to this rating.

Ordinary communication achieving an interaction goal while maintaininga background consensus. OCA would include a

Kurtines describes ordinary communicative action speaker simply articulating his(her) own position(OCA) as communicative behaviors that occur on the moral dilemma being discussed. Theprimarily within a context of background con- speaker may also explain the reasoning or thesensus between a speaker and a listener on the "principles" behind his(her) stated position. Thefour background validity issues. OCA is identi- listener subsequently responds by articulatingfied as a communicative action oriented towards his(her) own position and/or principles. A


speaker can offer to compromise on his(her)original position in favor of the listener'sposition, or (s)he may ask the listener to com-promise on his/her position in favor of thespeaker. Any challenges to the background con-sensus between the speaker and listener over thevalidity of their statements could conceivably beresolved within this context of consensual speech.The rebuttal of the challenged party would beaccepted by the challenger. However, if theseordinary communicative actions fail to maintainconsensus, the challenged participant may chooseto end the interaction and literally or metaphor-ically walk away from the communication. Ifparticipants choose to continue the interactionwithout consensus, Kurtines interprets Habermasto assert that the communicative actions of theparticipants in the interaction would probablyshift to one of two alternative modes of com-munication: strategic goal-oriented action or discur-sive communicative action.

Strategic communication

With the loss of background consensus, a speakermay switch to strategic goal-oriented action (SGA),and attempt to gain the listener's agreement oninteraction goals through use of intimidation,manipulation or deception, while placing littleimportance upon maintaining consensus on thefour implicit validity assumptions. Thus, thespeaker's actions are oriented primarily towardsthe achievement of a goal or outcome rather thantowards achieving understanding. The interactionstyle becomes competitive, and the speaker aimsto simply impose his/her will upon the listenerthrough threat of sanction or prospect of grati-fication. Some philosophers have referred to thistype of verbal behavior as "goading" as opposedto "guiding" (Falk, 1953).

Discursive communication

An alternative to these strategic actions is discur-sive communicative action (DCA), where the inter-action participant does not focus primarily onsimply winning the argument. Instead, the

speaker will temporarily suspend his/her originalposition regarding the conflict, and attempt tofmd a new way of approaching the problem. Bytemporarily stepping away from their originalpositions, the speaker and listener may fmd a newposition that is acceptable to both parties aswell as to all those affected by that position.Interaction participants cooperate to makeexplicit the "reasons" behind their stated posi-tions and principles in an efFort to render validitychallenges moot and look for new ways to(re)construct a genuine consensus. This processis the crux of Habermas' (1990, p. 203) discourseethics. Examples to illustrate each of Kurtines'categories of communicative actions can be seenin Table III.

Association of communication style andmoral reasoning

As mentioned previously, Habermas believesthere is a strong association between the speaker'scommunicative actions and that speaker's levelof moral development. He further claims that thedegree of higher order discursive communicationcan serve to test of the validity of that individual'smoral norms as well as to bring those norms tolight. "The discursive procedure, in fact, reflectsthe very operations Kohlberg postulates for moraljudgments at the postconventional level"(Habermas, 1990, p. 122).

An emphasis on consensus and workingtoward a just and lasting resolution of conflict isthe focus of morality in views ranging from Platoto Baier. Discourse allows us to impartiallyground our moral norms as well as to reconstruct"oughts" through a cognitive process with anemphasis on arriving at consensus (Rehg, 1994).Discourse at the highest (postconventional) levelof communicative interaction, by defmition,allows for a perspective that considers the welfareof people other than those directly afFected bythe decisions made during that discourse. Onedirect application of these views is to postulatethat, during attempts to resolve a moral dilemma,those who have risen to the postconventionalstage of moral development would be moreinclined to move from their original positions


TABLE IIISample communicative actions used by discussants

Ordinary Communicative Action 1 (Statement of position.)I think the company should implement some sort of economically feasible way to gradually reduce the amountof lead in the workplace."

"If the employee doesn't want to continue to work in an environment (where they are exposed to lead),then that is the employee's choice and she is going to have to take a lower paying job if she wants to continueto work."

Ordinary Communicative Action 2 (Statement of principle.)I believe that women have the right to choose whether or not to subject themselves to the dangers of thework place."

"I also believe strongly in the value of human life."

Strategic Goal-Oriented Action (Manipulation, intimidation, strategic tactics.)So you say, just let them die?

"Is the woman truly free to not sign the waiver, or is this a veiled threat made by the company to forcefullymove this person out of the unsafe area? What kind of company is this anyway?

Reflective Communicative Action 1 (Clarify another's position.)Are you saying that women who are mandatory removed from a job deemed as unsafe will be moved tolower paying jobs?

Reflective Communicative Action 2 (Clarify another's principle.)Do you think that the women have the right to make the free choice to decide whether or not to workunder these conditions?

Integrative Communicative Action 1 (Introduce new position.)OK, having women accept a lower paying job might not be fair. What if I were to say that women whorequest a safer environment could switch jobs and still keep their current pay?

Integrative Communicative Action 1 (Introduce new principle.)Yes, your company has a right to operate within a free market system unencumbered by government or unioninterference. But, would you also consider that your company's freedom to operate as it pleases also carrieswith it a corresponding responsibility for the safety of it's employees while they are in the workplace?

and fmd new ways to resolve a moral dilemma.Thus, parties who possess a higher (postconven-tional) level of moral reasoning would beexpected to utilize discursive communicativeactions with an emphasis on arriving at consensusdirected towards a lasting and just resolution.This gives rise to the following proposition:

PI: The higher the level of moral reasoningwhich characterizes the parties attempt-ing to resolve a moral dilemma, thegreater will be their use of discursivecommunicative actions during theirdiscussions.

What logically follows from this propositionis that discussants with a lower (preconventionalor conventional) level of moral reasoning wouldbe relatively less inclined to utilize discursivecommunicative actions. According to Habermas(1990, p. 166) authority, self-interest and groupnorms dictate communicative interactions atlower levels of moral reasoning to the sacrifice oftrue discourse. The lower the level of moralreasoning which characterizes the partiesattempting to resolve a moral dilemma, the morethey will tend to use strategic communicativetactics such as power, force, intimidation, manip-ulation or deception. Those interested solely in


successful consequences with negligible consid-eration for the other party's point of view willtypically be less inclined to move from theiroriginal positions to fmd new ways to resolve amoral dilemma, and will be more inclined toengage in strategic communicative actions(Habermas, 1990, p. 133). Thus, parties at alower stage of moral reasoning (preconventionaland conventional) would be expected to displayrelatively more strategic goal-oriented commu-nicative actions with an emphasis on "winning."This gives rise to a second proposition:

P2: The lower the level of moral reasoningwhich characterizes the parties attempt-ing to resolve a moral dilemma, thegreater will be their use of strategic goal-oriented communicative actions duringtheir discussions.

Research design and methodology

To test these propositions, we designed the fol-lowing research program. Potential discussants

were given a one-page synopsis of a moralconflict to be negotiated. (See Figure 1.) Eachsubject was then asked to make a binary choiceafter reflecting about the conflict. That choicewas to designate themselves as either an advocateof the women's position or an advocate of thefirm's position in this conflict. Next, each par-ticipant was asked to complete the three-scenarioform of James Rest's Defming Issues Test (DIT),a paper and pencil instrument designed to assessthe stage of moral reasoning possessed by thesubject (Rest, 1979b). The DIT test has beenextensively validated and has been used in over1000 research studies in many countries. (Notethat none of the participants had previously beenexposed formally to either the concept of levelsof moral judgment or to the Habermasianapproach to communication.)

In line with Habermas' assumptions, highermoral reasoning was equated to the postconven-tional level of moral judgment. To be classifiedat the postconventional level the subjects in ourstudy must have attained a modal stage score ofeither Stage 5 or Stage 6 on the DIT. In turn,lower moral reasoning was equated to the pre-

Must manufacturers make industrial work places where lead is used safe for women of childbearing age?Lead is a known cause of reproductive problems in exposed women workers. It can cause miscarriages and

stillbirths as well as enter the blood of the fetus. Lead can also cause anemia as well as damage to the brain,nerves and kidneys of exposed workers.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, though, warns that efforts to bar women from certainjobs could violate federal law. Unions, in turn, insist that women removed from hazardous jobs should notsuffer loss of either pay or seniority. The United Auto Workers union has, in fact, filed grievances against afirm which bars women of childbearing capability from holding battery plant jobs that may expose them tolead in the air. The union claimed a violation of contract clauses on nondiscrimination.

Many working women feel that it is unnecessary to impose strict safeguards because they don't intend tohave children or add to their existing family. Because of her company's work place policy one mother of fourhad herself sterilized in order to keep her job. Her alternative was to move to a safer, but lower paying job. Aunion official reacted, saying: "A worker should not have to choose between having a job and bearing a child."

With more than one million women of childbearing age employed at jobs that are potentially hazardous tothe reproductive system, the issue poses an enormous and expensive challenge to business. If the OccupationalSafety and Health Administration's proposed standards to lower lead in the workplace air to a safe level areimplemented some firms may have to shut down operations.

At this time a number of companies say they cannot make decisions until the government does. Oneexecutive stated: "We feel as if we're caught between government agencies. If any of those agencies would say,'Put those women back in the refinery' — or, 'Don't put them back' we'd obey. We're finding it difficult to finda position that's not attackable from one side or the other."

Fig. 1. A workplace dilemma.


conventional or conventional level of moraljudgment. Subjects assigned to this category musthave attained a modal stage score of Stage 2, 3or 4 on the DIT. "P" scores (from "principles")subsequently calculated from the DIT for eachsubject also marked the extent to which the testtaker used "Stage 5" and "Stage 6" moralreasoning. (See Table I.) The "P" scores wereused to corroborate the classification of indi-vidual discussants into two groups: one groupthat scored relatively high on moral reasoning andone group that scored relatively low. The fol-lowing breakpoints were used to confirm thestage score designation of lower and higher levelsof moral reasoning:

"P" Score Stage of Moral Reasoning

50 and above HIGHER stage of moralreasoning

40 and below LOWER stage moral rea-soning

Rest has reported national norms for "P" scoresin term of thirds and quartiles. The highestquartile (75th percentile) begins with a minimumscore of 47, while the lowest two-thirds (67thpercentile) begins with a maximum score of 41.Thus, a gap of at least ten percentile pointsseparated our groups who were designated aspossessing relatively higher or lower levels ofmoral reasoning. Also, Jacobs - as quoted by Rest— used the same cutoff point of 50 when using"P" scores to designate higher and lower levelsor moral reasoning (Rest, 1979b).

A total sample of thirty discussion pairingswere assembled from these two groups. Eachpairing was purposely chosen based on theiropposing positions on the moral conflict as wellas for their similar "P" scores regarding moralreasoning. Fifteen pairs of discussants with "P"scores of 40 or below were matched based ontheir contrasting views about job security andworkplace safety. Fifteen additional pairs werechosen according to their relatively higher "P"scores of 50 or above. (See Table IV and TableV for profiles of each pairing including a listingof the actual stage assessment and "P" scoresassociated with each discussant.) Each participant

was asked to read a one-page conflict scenario(See Figure 1) which described a moral dilemmainvolving safety in the workplace. All thirtydiscussion pairs were then instructed to try toreach an agreement with regard to the moraldilemma in private settings of their own choicewhile audio tape recording their uninterrupteddiscussions in full. All pairs were further advisedthat it was not essential for them to reach anagreement - that they might not find it possibleto resolve the conflict.

Assumptions

Testing of the research propositions was based onthe following major assumptions: (1) the partiesto the conflict are capable of a level of logicalthinking which would lead to a lasting resolutionof the conflict, (2) the parties to the conflictconsider the issues(s) constituting the conflict asmeaningful enough to justify serious moralreasoning, and (3) the level of moral reasoningor judgment characterizing each party can beidentified.

Each of us has emotions and it is the rareindividual who can suppress them entirely whenhe or she has a stake in the outcome of a dis-cussion with another party. Yet, can positionsbased solely on each party's emotions lead to trueconflict resolution? Is there not needed a degreeof reasoning that would allow discussants to assesshow a solution to conflict will both hold up overtime as well as affect others involved in theconflict? Some level of foresight and reasoningskill is necessary for discussants to reach a lastingresolution to a conflict. To buttress this point,Gibbs et al. (1984) have found a direct relationbetween logical thinking and the use of discur-sive communication. Granted, overt conflictmay cease when one party employs a strategiccommunicative approach to impose his or herposition on the other through subtle or not-so-subtle intimidation. But does such a solutionconstitute "true conflict resolution" in a socialsetting? Or, would such an enforced solution leadto a less than effective implementation of thesolution by the intimidated party? Using coercivepower through strategic communicative actions


TABLE IVDiscussant profiles (lower moral reasoning pairings)

Pair

LI

L2

L3

L4

L5

L6

L7

L8

L9

LIO

Lll

L12

L13

L14

L15

Advocate

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

"P" scoreand (stage)

40 (4)40 (4)

40 (4)40 (4)

40 (4)*37 (4)*

36(4)40 (4)

37(4)37 (4)*

33(3)33(4)

33(3)33(3)

30(3)36(4)

30(3)33(4)

29(4)33(4)

30(4)30(4)

30(4)30 (4)*

30(4)30(4)

20(4)13 (4)*

03 (4)*03 (4)*

Principles stressed

EquityEquity

PragmatismPragmatism

Autonomy, equityAutonomy, equity

Non-malificenceAutonomy

JusticeCompassion, equity

Non-malificence, equityNon-malificence, dignity of life


AutonomyNon-malificence, dignity of life

EquityEquity, non-malificence

Autonomy, dignity of life, equityDignity of life, autonomy

PragmatismNon-discrimination



Non-malificence, equityEquity

Non-discrimination, equityNon-discrimination

Position change

Women's originalPosition prevailed


NoMovement

Firm's originalPosition prevailed

NoMovement



NoMovement



Resolution byNew Position

Slight compromiseOnly

Resolution byNew position



* Denotes female discussant.

to force conflict resolution plays more to theemotions than it does to the reasoning power ofthe individuals afFected. Alternatively, discursivecommunicative approaches require discussants topossess logical reasoning capabilities that allowthem to identify or create mutually satisfying andlasting resolutions to conflict. To feel comfort-able that the subjects used to test our research

propositions possessed the capability to reasonwith foresight, a restricted sample was used. Thesample consisted of college graduates who, afterwork experience, returned to a university settingto pursue an MBA degree. Thus, the educationalbackground of the sample gives some evidencethat the first assumption underpinning theresearch had been met.


TABLE VDiscussant profiles (higher moral reasoning pairings)

Pair

HI

H2

H3

H4

H5

H6

H7

H8

H9

HIO

H l l

H12

H13

H14

H15

Advocate

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

BusinessWomen

"P" scoreand (stage)

77(5)77 (5)*

73(5)73 (5)*

70(5)63(5)

63(5)63(5)

70(5)53(5)

63(5)60 (5)*

70 (5)*50(5)

67 (5)*53 (5)*

60(5)57(5)

56 (5)*60(5)

60 (5)*50(5)

50(5)60(5)

53 (5)*53 (5)

50 (5)*53 (5)*

50 (5)*53(5)

Principles stressed

ObligationAutonomy, equity

AutonomyEquity, autonomy

Non-malificenceNon-malificence, non-discrimination

Non-malificenceAutonomy, non-malificence, equity


Non-malificenceEquity

Non-malificenceEquity, obligation

Obligation, non-malificenceObligation, non-malificence, equity

Non-malificence, equityNon-malificence, equity, obligation

Equity, non-malificence, dignity of lifeEquity, non-malificence

Dignity of life, autonomyNon-malificence, dignity of life

Autonomy, non-malificenceEquity, Non-malificence

Non-malificenceNon-malificence, dignity of life

No principles statedNon-malificence, equity

Non-discriminationAutonomy, non-discrimination

Position change

OnlySlight compromise

NoMovement


NoMovement


Resolution byNew position

NoMovement










The career directions of the selected sampleprovided the underpinning for the secondassumption of our research - that discussantsbelieved the issue underlying the conflict wasmeaningful or significant. Because of the natureof their chosen graduate training in business,participants could be expected to be reasonablyinterested in the issues of workplace safety and

job security. The particular moral dilemma thatwas discussed (see Figure 1) was selected because,given the extensive media attention as well as tenyears of court deliberations on this actual case,the conflict scenario could be assumed to be ofinterest to the general public.^ But, since noneof the selected sample had been personallyinvolved in the conflict, the question of how


valid their vicarious commitment to the issueswould be cannot be dismissed. Perhaps the bestsurrogate measure of that commitment would befound in the actual statements made by partici-pants during their discussions of the workplacesafety scenario. Our position is that if an issuewith moral implications is considered meaningfulto a person, statements they make about thatissue are more likely to reflect that person's moraljudgment process than if the issues are viewed asrelatively inconsequential. Thus, we chose toscreen out discussion pairings whose audio tapedstatements indicated that they were merely con-centrating on superficial attributes of the safetyissues at hand rather than concentrating on thedeeper moral issues themselves.

The third assumption behind this research isthat a person's level of moral judgment can beidentified. Moreover, it is assumed that the iden-tified level of moral judgment can be applied toissues with moral implications. As previouslymentioned, Augusto Blasi (1979) found a positiverelation between a person's observed behaviorwith moral implications and the assessment ofthat person's moral development underKohlberg's classification system. Likewise,Stephen Thoma (1986) found a positive relationbetween a person's moral behavior and their "P"scores on James Rest's DIT instrument. LindaTrevino's (1992) review of the literature, in turn,provides additional evidence of the relationbetween actual behavior and the DIT's assessmentof moral reasoning. It should be noted, though,that the positive relations cited by Blasi, Thoma,and Trevino were far from perfect correlations.Still, the Rest DIT does give an assessment ofthe moral reasoning a person is capable of, evenif that level of reasoning is not always employed.Accordingly, Rest's DIT provided the instrumentby which we measured moral reasoning for thepurposes of our study.

Coding of the discussions

Three judges evaluated audio tapes that capturedthe statements made by parties in the thirty dis-cussion pairings. Each audio taped discussion wascoded by at least two of the judges using

Kurtines' taxonomy of eight communicativeactions. Coding was facilitated by viewing theconversations between discussants as two partic-ipants "taking turns" speaking to each other.Each party's turn at speaking lasted until a sig-nificant communicative reaction was offered bythe other party. Each speaking turn could includemany sentences or simply one sentence. Eachjudge identified the gist of the overall commu-nicative approach used within each discussant'sspeaking turn in its totality. In situations wherea judge noticed that more than one of the eighttypes of communicative action was used by adiscussant in a given speaking turn, the prevailingtype of communication approach was identifiedand coded. A limitation of this research method-ology is that interpersonal communication is notonly verbal. Unspoken meanings and intentionsthat sometimes are evident through non-verbalcommunication channels are lost when observa-tions are limited to audio tape. To help ensure

. that the meaning and intent behind each discus-sant's statements would not be misconstrued,each judge would listen further into the audiotape to find additional discussant comments thatwould either verify or refute the judge's originalview of the communicative approach used in adiscussant's earlier statements.

Judges compiled coding sheets that listed theorder of communicative approaches made byeach discussant in turn. This facilitated not onlycompihng raw counts of communicative actionsdisplayed by each discussant, but also allowedanalysis of action and reaction patterns betweeneach party in a discussion pairing. Variations inthe scoring between judges were reconciled afterthe judges explained their reasoning and inter-pretation of the discussant's statements. Rawcounts of Kurtines' eight communicative actionswere parsimoniously condensed into counts ofthe following three basic groupings of commu-nicative approaches: ordinary, strategic and dis-cursive. These counts were transformed intopercentages to provide a common base uponwhich aggregations could be compiled for thetwo groups of negotiators. (See Table VI.) Thesestandardized responses could then be used asevidence to test the two previously mentionedresearch propositions.


TABLE VICommunicative.approaches used by discussants

Moralreasoningpairings

Higher:HIH2H3H4H5H6H7H8H9HIOH l lH12H13H14H15

Average H

Lower:LIL2L3L4L5L6L7L8L9LIOLl lL12L13L14L15

Average L

"P" scores and

Businessadvocate

77(5)73(5)70(5)63 (5)70(5)63(5)70 (5)*67 (5)*60(5)56 (5)*60 (5)*50(5)53 (5)*50 (5)*50(5)

40 (4)40 (4)40 (4)*37(4)37(4)33(3)33 (3)30(3)30 (3)33(4)30(4)30(4)30(4)20(4)03 (4)*

(stage)

Women'sadvocate

77 (5)*73 (5)*63(5)63(5)53 (5)60 (5)*50(5)53 (5)*57(5)60(5)50(5)60(5)53(5)53 (5)*53 (5)*

40 (4)40 (4)37 (4)*40 (4)37 (4)*33(4)33(3)36(4)33(4)29(4)30(4)30 (4)*30(4)13 (4)*03 (4)*

Percentage iof overall speaking turns whichprimarily used each communicative approach

% ordinary

656868607958264430312923172660

45.6%

205611043746662708335537194388

36.7%

% strategic

222200320400590301043801183414

16.8%

130001004400274208001404002304

12.0%

% discursive

131032081742155369653376654026

37.6%

674488961954073184673159813408

51.3%


The judges then analyzed the discussants'overall statements to determine answers to twoquestions. First, did the discussants verbalize theprinciples underlying their positions? (See columnfour in both Table IV and Table V.) This deter-

mination gives an indication about whether thesampled pairs made a good faith effort to resolvethe moraldilemma. That is, the subject matterwas considered meaningful enough to them tospend time in serious, reflective communication.


The second question to be determined by thejudges was how far, if at all, had the partiesmoved from their original positions by the endof their discussions? (See column five in bothTable IV and Table V.) In effect, was a reconcil-iation of views based only on a compromise oforiginal positions or was it built on commonlyheld principles that enabled them to construct anew mutually acceptable position? This deter-mination relates to the reasoning underlying bothresearch propositions one and two.

Research results and conjectures

The position put forward by Habermas whichrelates advanced moral development to theincreased use of discursive communication seemslogical. Yet, it was not borne out in this research.For example our results do not supportProposition One. As shown in the last twocolumns of Table VI, discussants possessinghigher moral reasoning did not use discursivecommunicative actions any more than did thosewho scored lower on a test of moral judgment.Why? One explanation for these disconfirmingresults could be found in Rest's belief that wecarry the baggage of earlier (lower) stages ofmoral development with us as subsets of possiblebehaviors that characterize later (higher) devel-opment stages. The reasoning characteristicstypical of earHer stages can show up again in laterstages under appropriate conditions. This con-trasts with the assumptions upon whichHabermas' discourse ethics is advanced - assump-tions which draw on the early work of Kohlberg.That work claimed that once a higher level ofmoral development is attained there is no back-sHding except in certain crisis situations. Wedoubt, though, that the workplace moraldilemma was one of these crisis situations. Amore intuitively acceptable explanation maycome from the high "P" scores which were usedto assign subjects to the discussion pairings.Those "P" scores indicate "highly principled"people. Such people may be unwilling to modifytheir positions, because any compromise wouldbe somehow viewed as a prostitution of theirprinciples. In effect, they may have been

unwilling to separate principles from position.Then, as these highly principled parties becamefrustrated over lack of progress towards resolu-tion of an extremely thorny issue, they may havereverted to strategic communicative tacticstypically used during earlier stages of moraldevelopment.

Proposition Two also was not supported. Thediscussion pairs designated as those operatingprimarily at the conventional (lower) level ofmoral reasoning did not use strategic commu-nicative approaches any more than pairs operatingprimarily at the postconventional (higher) level.The lower level pairings actually used slightly lessstrategic communicative tactics. Even the twonegotiating pairs with the lowest postconven-tional moral reasoning scores (see LI 4 and LI 5in Table VI) did not resort to using morestrategic versus discursive communication. Theseresults all run counter to Habermas' theory.Overall, strategic communicative actions wereused sparingly by both the higb and the lowreasoning groups. When strategic communicativeactions were used in either group it usually tookthe form of simply refuting the other party'sargument rather than as an efFort to intimidateor threaten that other party. One possibleexplanation for these findings is that the discus-sants in our sample were for the most part equalpeers and therefore may not have had manyintimidating or threatening communicativeapproaches at their disposal. Future studies ofdiscussion pairings where one party is perceivedto have some power over the other party mayrender different results. There are some aspectsof the data that do lend support to Habermas''views. For example, there are more "win-lose"results within the lower level group than thehigher level group. (See column five in bothTable IV and Table V.) In addition, the combi-nation of new positions and compromises withinthe higher group outnumbered those found inthe lower group. (See Table VII.) These findings,while in line with the theory behind the first twopropositions, still do not lift the veil of suspicionfrom those propositions.

Also of interest to us was the existence ofshared principles between participants withineach discussion. Our feeling was that explicitly


TABLE VIISummary of dilemma resolutions

Resolution

New positionSlight compromiseWoman's position prevailedFirm's position prevailedNo movement

Total pairings

Highmoralreasoning

1 (0)6(4)3(3)2(1)3(2)

15 (10)

Lowmoralreasoning

2(1)2(1)6(6)2(1)3(1)

15 (10)

Parentheses indicate the number of discussion pairingsin which both discussants shared at least one prin-ciple/value in common.

communicated shared principles could providethe foundation for conflict resolution. As shownby the principles given in column four of bothTable IV and Table V, only one person, thebusiness-side advocate in pair HI4, did not referto an underlying principle behind his arguments.The data show that the principles used by boththe lower and higher moral reasoning groupswere somewhat similar. In 20 of the 30 discus-sions the parties explicitly shared at least onecommon principle. Yet, even in those caseswhere principles were shared, there was noserious movement away from the parties' originalpositions to a new, higher evolved position.While ten of the higher level pairs and ten of thelower level pairs showed similar principles, onlythree of those twenty pairs could arrive at a newposition. (See the fourth column in Table IV andTable V and the summary Table VII.) In the caseof each of those three pairs, the new position wasbuilt upon an originally espoused position, andnot upon a shared norm or principle. This failsto support Habermas' belief that discussants, afteruncovering shared norms through discursive rea-soning, would engage in a mutual constructionof a new position.

Finally, during the process of coding theparticular patterns of communicative actionsdisplayed within each of the discussion pairs,additional questions arose. During attempts toresolve a moral dilemma, do particular commu-

nicative actions serve to amplify conflict? Woulda strategic communication stimulus tend to evokea similar strategic communication response?Similarly, would discursive communicativeactions tend to elicit the same type of discursiveresponse? If significant "stimulus-response" com-munication patterns are found, would thesetendencies of responding to communicativeactions in kind override the predominant actionsnormally associated with a particular level ofmoral reasoning? In other words, would partiesat a postconventional (high) level of moralreasoning resort to strategic communicativeactions if that is currently the predominantcommunicative approach being utilized by theiradversaries? If discussants are naturally inclinedto respond to communicative actions in kind, thiswould have important implications to businessnegotiators as a possible technique that could beutilized to encourage an opposing party to moveto a difFerent communicative approach.

To render explicit the data directly relating tothese questions, each discussant's communicative(re) action was sub-categorized according to thetype of communicative action used immediatelyprior to it by the other party. Table VIII facili-tates a comparison of the communicative reac-tions of the "higher" moral reasoning pairs versusthe "lower" pairings with a table that shows therank ordered mean frequency of communicativereactions to each of the three difFerent types ofcommunicative approaches. The table illustratesthat neither group consistently utilized its pos-tulated communicative behavior (discursive forhigher, strategic for lower) across all situations,thus further illuminating how Proposition Oneand Proposition Two could not be supported.Table VIII also compiles an overall summary ofall 30 discussion pairs across both groups andfound that ordinary communicative actions werefollowed by ordinary responses 49 percent of thetime and discursive actions were responded to inkind 57 percent of the time. These results lendsupport to a view that discussants tend to respondto ordinary and discursive actions with similarcommunicative responses. This stimulus/responsecommunication pattern, however, was not asstrong for strategic approaches. Strategic com-municative actions were followed by strategic


TABLE VIIISummary of communicative reactions to each type of communicative action

Communicativeaction

Ordinary

Strategic

Discursive

Overall

OrdinaryDiscursiveStrategic



49%31%20%

53%25%22%

57%38%

5%

Communicative reaction*

Higher moral




reasoning

52%28%20%

59%26%15%

53%40%

7%

Lower moral




reasoning

46%34%20%

45%31%24%

62%35%

3%

* Rank-ordered mean frequencies.

reactions 25 percent of the time. What is worthnoting from the subjects' observed communica-tion patterns is that when one party attemptedto resolve the conflict through a discursiveapproach, the other party tended to react in a lessadversarial manner and responded with strategictactics only five percent of the time.

Conclusions and implications

George Herbert Mead (1934) provided the the-oretical basis for implementing the discourseethics framework proposed by Jurgen Habermas.Our conclusion, based on the results reportedabove, is that Habermas' framework, as he statedit, may be best viewed as a descriptive rather thanan operational model. Proponents of Habermas'attempt to relate discourse to Kohlberg's level ofmoral development could point to possible flawsin our research design to explain these negativeresults. Certainly, the size of the sample and itsvicarious rather than personal involvement withthe ethical issues might bias the results. A futurestudy of actual business discussions would beideal. In turn, the use of capacity for moral rea-soning as a surrogate of moral development is alsoopen to question. While acknowledging the lim-itations of our approach, our findings still suggestthat Habermas' theory of discourse ethics

requires an operators' manual as well as a proac-tive implementation if it is to be of use tobusiness.

Habermas chose to match his types of com-munication directly against Kohlberg's moralstages. Kohlberg's is a theory of cognitive moraldevelopment. It assumes that people reason fromone stage of moral development. More recentresearch, though, has called into question theassumption of cognitive development and singlestage reasoning. Kurtines has advanced a strongcase for sociomoral rather than cognitive moraldevelopment. In turn. Rest makes a strong casethat we use different levels and stages of moralreasoning at difFerent times. Thus, when a personis classified by the DIT at a certain level of moralreasoning, that classification is somewhat fluid.In short, there are times when we revert to loweror earlier stages of moral reasoning even thoughwe employ higher levels on average in our moraldeliberations. For example, Trevino found thatnegotiators tend to use lower moral reasoning inattempts to resolve dilemmas that are moreclosely related to a realistic business situationrather than a non-work related situation.Kohlberg, himself, admitted this in his laterwritings. This broader perspective would allowfor the influence of emotions and situationalcontexts when evaluating moral decisions. Ourfindings indicate that still another influential


situational context would be the pattern of com-municative actions and reactions of the partici-pants themselves.

While allowing for situational pressures andpossible reversion to lower levels of moral rea-soning, can a relation between moral reasoningand communicative action still be identifiedwhen applied to resolving conflicts of ethicalissues? Perhaps so. Recall that the respectiveinvestigations of Thoma, Blasi and Trevino of therelation between actual behavior and Rest's DITscores and Kohlberg's moral development scoresall showed a positive but weak correlation. Thatweakness may indicate that while the capacityor potential for higher order (postconventional)moral reasoning is present, it may take a stimulusof some sort to activate that potential. Twoquestions arise with respect to that stimulus.What form would it take? Is it realistic to believethat such a stimulus could be present in actualbusiness discussions? One such stimulus might bethe initiation of a discursive communicativeapproach by one of the discussants.

To put Habermas' theory to a second test, andto further allow a person's capacity for highermoral reasoning to be tapped, a different com-munication process may be called for. Sequentialdiscussions would be one option. Berkowitz andGibbs (1983) found that some but not all of thedisputing parties whom they taped used morediscursive communications as they progressedthrough four sequential but unstructured dis-cussions over a two month period. Structureddiscussion presents a second option. In itssimplest form, a structured negotiation processcould follow the format arrived at by Fisher andUry (1981) in describing the success of theHarvard Negotiation Project. But, the HarvardProject confines itself to a resolution of conflictthat is satisfactory to only the parties at hand.Conflicts which contain an ethical dimensionmost likely have implications for a societybroader than just those persons directly affectedby the conflict. More promising is the discus-sion process outlined by Kurtines and Pollard intheir "Communicative Competitive Scale -Critical Discussion Manual" which provides thestimulus to resolve conflict as well as enhancesocietal well being (Kurtines and Pollard, 1989).

Kurtines, a disciple of Habermas, has describeda step by step procedure which is designed toactualize a person's potential for higher ordermoral reasoning. In that procedure one partyattempts to lead the other party to a level ofdiscursive reasoning by progressing through thecommunication actions described in Table II.The goal is a feasible resolution of conflictattained through practical reasoning - thelinchpin of discourse ethics (Rehg, 1994).

Acknowledging the existence of such a pro-cedure, however, does not provide solid enoughfooting to claim that it can or will be used inefforts to resolve moral conflicts in business. Theacceptability of such a process demands empir-ical evidence. This evidence takes the form of aproject currently being undertaken by LeviStrauss. That firm is putting its managers througha training program similar to the procedureKurtines has suggested. The Levi Strauss programis structured around a communication processadvanced by Stephen Toulmin (1956, 1964) andfleshed out by Marvin Brown (1994). TheToulmin/Brown procedure incorporates theethical goals of Habermas. In fact, part of therationale for Habermas' communication theorywas built around the work of Toulmin. Neitherthe Toulmin/Brown procedure nor the oneoutlined by Kurtines requires the parties to beat the principled level of moral reasoning (i.e..Stage 5 or 6). What /5 required is that an agree-ment be reached on a mutually acceptableposition. The objective is to change positions notprinciples. In fact, the starting point is to identifyprinciples shared by both parties to the conflictand build upon those commonalities to constructa new position. That position and the underlyingshared principles, to meet Baier's, Perry's, andHabermas' conditions, have to be ones thatwould enhance societal well-being as well asmeeting the personal needs of the negotiatingparties.

To determine if societal well-being isenhanced, thus increasing the odds of a lastingconflict resolution, some criteria could be setout. For example, the discussants would be wellserved if their resolution was deemed feasible.Then, to test whether their resolution is appro-priate it also might be beneficial to use another


Habermas criterion - one rooted in the work ofKant -that of universalizability. Both of these testsrest upon Habermas' requirements for successfulcommunication - that understanding, truthful-ness, and the availability of facts are necessary toarrive at an appropriate resolution. Theexploratory study reported here should not beread to discredit Habermas' goal. What this studydoes imply is a more realistic reading of his searchfor consensus leading to universalized norms.Consensus does not naturally arise because bothparties in a dispute show that capacity to reasonat the postconventional level of morality. It willtake an initiative of the part of one of thoseparties, or possibly the initiative of an adjudicator,to bring the discursive process to the resolutionthat Habermas hypothesizes.

Habermas places too much stock in Kohlberg'sstage theory because his final goal is the same asKohlberg. Both can be classified as neo-Kantianas they are both searching for universalizednorms. However, Habermas searches for theseuniversal norms by different means. He believesthat discourse will naturally lead negotiators touncover shared universal norms as a foundationfor consensus. Our research did not support thisview. But the current business environment, oneincreasingly marked by international transactionsand multicultural values, calls for additional testsof discourse ethics. The growth of multinationalconglomerates, with the corresponding increaseof required relationships between persons ofdifferent cultural origins across national bound-aries, introduces added conflict from differencesin the ethical standards present in different coun-tries. And, if Rossouw is correct, then theinherent assumption of post-modern rationalitythat no single correct view exists on any subjectprovides additional fuel to kindle fears aboutirreconcilable moral conflicts. In the face of theseglobal societal trends, business decision makersand government regulators increasingly are chal-lenged to resolve tough moral conflicts amongan ever widening array of constituency groups.Can a proactive application of discourse ethicsprovide a means to resolve those conflicts? Atleast one firm believes the process is worthexploring.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Dr. JohnGranrose of the Carl Jung Institute - Zurich andDr. Patricia Heil of LOMA for their help incoding communication styles.

Notes

' While it is our view that the most plausible defi-nitions do make clear the connection between ethicsand general human benefit or well-being, we notethat not all definitions of ethics or morality stress theimportance of mutual benefit or societal well-being.This is not to deny that there may also be some meta-physical or theological aspect of codes of ethics. But,even the Christian tradition holds that "the Sabbathis made for man, not man for the Sabbath." In thissame spirit, William Frankena writes, "Morality ismade for man, not man for morality" (Frankena,1963, p. 116).• The courts had not rendered a final decision untilafter the discussions had been recorded.

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University of Georgia,Department of Marketing and Distribution,

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