Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 377 April 29, 1966 CONCEPCION BOLIVAR, complainant, vs. ABELARDO SIMBOL Y MANUEL, respondent. Office of the Solicitor General for the complainant. Valentino Castro for the respondent. SANCHEZ, J.: Disbarment proceedings on moral grounds. This Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Complainant, the sole witness at said investigation, wound up her testimony on September 4, 1959. Then followed several postponements of hearing. The last was on August 4, 1960. There is a vacuum in the record as to what happened thereafter. But on October 28, 1963, the Solicitor General filed his report stating, inter alia, that complainant made a sworn withdrawal and desistance. In view of the facts found, however, he recommended that respondent be disciplined and simultaneously filed the corresponding complaint

1 asking for his suspension "for a period of at least five (5) years.

On October 31, 1963, the Clerk of this Court sent by registered mail to respondent, thru Atty. Valentino G. Castro, his counsel of record, a letter, with a copy of the foregoing complaint, requiring answer thereto in 15 days. On November 27, 1963, Castro wrote this Court: In connection with the transmittal letter dated October 31, 1963, addressed to Mr. Abelardo Simbol, c/o the undersigned, ... please be informed that since sometime in September or October, 1960, after Miss Concepcion Bolivar and Atty. Abelardo Simbol had executed a compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 01700 of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, the undersigned ceased to hear from Atty. A. Simbol. Notwithstanding this, upon receiving your said letter of transmittal, I tried to get in touch with Atty. A. Simbol at 1877-A Tayuman Street, Tondo, Manila, which is the address appearing in my files. I was, however, informed that Atty. A. Simbol reportedly resides at 232 Maria Cristina Street, Dumaguete City. It is, therefore, respectfully requested that copy of the complaint filed by the Hon. Solicitor General, against Atty. Abelardo Simbol in Adm. Case No. 377 be sent directly to said respondent at 232 Maria Cristina Street, Dumaguete City. . . . . On December 6, 1963, a copy of the complaint was sent by registered mail direct to Simbol at 232 Maria Cristina St., Dumaguete City. It was returned to this Court with the notation on the envelope that said respondent was no longer in that city. At the hearing set by this Court for February 3, 1964, Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo and Atty. Tomas Yumul for complainant appeared. They submitted the case for decision without oral argument. There was no appearance for respondent. 1. The problem that at once projects itself is: Can we proceed further on the face of the facts that: first, there is no answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General; and, second, at the hearing before this Court neither respondent nor counsel appeared? The controlling statute, Section 30, Rule 138, Rules of Court, reads: SEC. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension.—No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte. The pattern of behaviour pursued by respondent requires articulation. Complainant's testimony was completed on September 4, 1959. Then followed a series of postponements: November 13, 1959; January 15, 1960; February 24, 1960; April 4, 1960; May 9, 1960; July 1, 1960; August 4, 1960. In the interim, negotiations were had. Result — amicable settlement and complainant's withdrawal and desistance. That respondent did not take the trouble to answer the Solicitor General's complaint is now unimportant. The directive for him to answer was first served on his lawyer. Then it was sent to him personally at his address in Dumaguete City; but the registered mail was unclaimed. Neither will he profit by non-appearance on the date of hearing before this Court (February 3, 1964). Because, notice of hearing was sent to him at both his Manila and Dumaguete addresses; and he did not bother to get it from the post-office. Even his two attorneys of record, who received said notice, did not appear before this Court. Respondent knew that the disbarment proceedings were pending. His right to practice his profession was at stake. He could ill afford to just stand by and wait. It was his duty to inquire as to his fate. He was hide-bound by his obligation to inform this Court of his whereabouts, to the end that notices could reach him. In all these, he failed. On the face of the environmental facts, respondent gave this Court ample reason to believe that he purposedly stayed away.1äwphï1.ñët We, accordingly, hold that respondent has had full opportunity to defend himself, and that he has waived his right to be heard. In a previous case

2 this Court has had occasion to pass upon a similar question. There, respondent and counsel, after a series of non-appearances

and postponements at their behest, failed to finally appear before the investigating fiscal in Pangasinan. The fiscal rendered the report on the merits finding respondent guilty of malpractice and recommending that disbarment charges be filed. The Solicitor General thereafter lodged a formal complaint before this Court. Notices sent by this Court directing respondent to answer were all returned because he could not be located at his given address, San Vicente, Alcala, Pangasinan. His attorney of record was also required to answer; instead, he asked that he be relieved as counsel for respondent. Counsel, however, appeared in oral argument. This Court there held: The respondent avoided attending the hearings conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan. Even in this Court, his whereabouts are totally unknown. His knowledge that a disbarment proceeding had been filed or pending against him imposes upon the duty to make himself or his presence available to this Court for a fair trial. That he could not be located at his known address without asking his whereabouts known implies that he had chosen to waive every right and opportunity to put up his defense. 2. The next point that logically crops up is the weight to be accorded complainant's withdrawal and desistance, made long after her testimony in full had been taken down at the Solicitor General's office. Reasons given: first, they threshed out their differences; and, second, the irreconciliability of religious beliefs alleged caused the marriage plans to miscarry. The first is correct. The second is at war with the proven facts.

Religious differences never did mar the relations between the two. As the Solicitor General pointedly remarked, "It is unbelievable for a Filipino woman to refuse to marry a man she had lived with for 3 or 4 years trusting in the man's promise to marry on the ground of irreconcilable religious belief", else she "would not have complained if this were so". Indeed, settlement of the case and the consequent withdrawal obviously were part of an overall plan calculated to purge respondent from mischief and to insulate him from disciplinary action. To conform to this arrangement is to wink at wrongdoing. This Court had heretofore ruled

3 that, "Any person may bring to this Court's attention the misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually be

taken regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant, if the facts proven so warrant". The power to discipline lawyers — officers of court — may not be cut short by a compound of compromise and withdrawal of charges.

4

3. The preliminaries out of the way, we now go to the core of the case. Here are the facts5:

Concepcion Bolivar was 27 years old at the time she took the stand. Her schooling ended in sixth grade. She testified in Tagalog. She became acquainted with respondent in April, 1952. By December following, respondent started to court her. Convinced by his promise to marry, she accepted him in February, 1953. By April 7, 1953, the two lived as husband and wife. Respondent had been "telling his classmates" that she "was his wife". On April 22, 1957, they bore a child baptized Eduardo Bolivar Simbol. Came November 12, 1957. The two separated. For, complainant learned from respondent's brother-in-law, one Turing Mendoza, and others, that respondent married another girl, Lydia Lingat. Complainant investigated. At the Iglesia ni Kristo and in the Local Civil Register of Angeles, Pampanga, her worst fears were confirmed. Respondent and Lydia Lingat were really married in Angeles on January 5, 1957. When the two first met, respondent was a jobless first year law student. He remained jobless during his student days. Since June, 1953, complainant helped respondent in his studies, gave him money to buy his books and to pay his matriculation fees and for "other things he needed in his studies". At one point in her testimony complainant stated, "I had been working nights (ang gabi ay ginagawang araw) and even on Sundays and then afterwards he made me suffer all kinds of embarrassments and shame". Respondent became a member of the bar, and found work in a law office. Yet, she continued giving him money. She gave respondent a total of around P8,000.00. All along, respondent fed complainant with assurances that he would marry her. To ward off celebration of marriage respondent offered varied excuses. There was a time when they travelled to Angeles, Pampanga, ostensibly to get married. The marriage was put off, so respondent gave complainant to understand, because there was nobody to solemnize. And then, dangling a piece of paper, he told her that the license had already expired. In early 1954, respondent told complainant "to wait until he finished his studies", anyway, they were "practically husband and wife". Then he asked her to hold the marriage till after delivery, because "it was shameful to appear in church" when she was "on the family way". The child was born. Now, marriage became conditioned on his securing a job for he was ashamed as complainant "was spending for him". Came June of 1957.

6 Respondent informed complainant that he secured a job as an assistant attorney in the Fernandez Law office and that he would start

earning money. Never running out of explanations, this time it was: "cases take long to finish, but as soon as he earns thousands of pesos he was going to marry me". Again she agreed. When on cross-examination, she was quiried why she accepted all the excuses inspite of the birth of the child, she answered: "... because he told me that now [that] we have a child I can no longer deceive you because the child is more than a mere marriage". These avowals notwithstanding, respondent turned around and married another. Adding insult to injury, he concealed the fact of his marriage and continued to live with complainant for several more months until the latter discovered the bitter truth. Even then, respondent had the temerity to deny his marriage and to appease complainant with the palaver that "the woman was not his wife but the wife of his cousin". In January of 1958, respondent kept asking complainant to live with him again because he was going to marry her and "leave his wife"; that he "did not really love the girl he married". He also asked for money. This met with rebuff. Respondent got angry and threatened her. And now, to the appropriate action. We part with the premise that this Court has inherent jurisdiction to suspend or disbar an attorney for sufficient cause.

7 On this point, the Solicitor General aptly observed.

8

Undoubtedly, respondent's actuations in making a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy, are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar. The fact that complainant has withdrawn her complaint against respondent does not wipe out the grievous offense he had committed, making complainant and her child with him virtual outcasts of society. This, respondent should not be allowed to do with impunity. Respondent, we are persuaded to say, "has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar".

9 He

is, indeed, guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" within the meaning of Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court. 10

In the light of the entire record, we vote to suspend respondent Abelardo Simbol y Manuel from the practice of law for a period of five (5) years.

11 So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 997 September 10, 1979 PILAR ABAIGAR, complainant, vs. DAVID D.C. PAZ, respondent. FERNANDEZ, J.: On April 27, 1971, Pilar Abaigar filed this administrative case for disbarment against David D. C. Paz, a member of the Philippine Bar. The verified complaint alleged that sometime in March 1970, the complainant, Pilar Abaigar sought the aid of a legal counsel regarding her divorce case filed by her husband in the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, U.S.A.; that she called on the telephone the office of Congressman Bagatsing in Manila; that the respondent David D.C. Paz, answered the telephone call and volunteered his legal services; that believing that the respondent had the necessary legal experience, the complainant confided her legal problems to him: that after the termination of the divorce case, the respondent became exceedingly friendly with the complainant and started to profess his love for her; that at the start, the complainant was hesitant in continuing the cordial relations between her and the respondent but the respondent made her believe that although he was living with another woman, his relations with said woman were no impediment that the respondent convinced the complainant that he had been compelled to contract a civil marriage with the woman and that since it was not a marriage under the church laws, it was no bar for him to get married under the church laws with the complainant; that the respondent proposed marriage to the complainant; that believing in this good faith, the complainant accepted the proposal of the respondent; that sometime in the latter part of November 1970, an application for the issuance of a marriage license to the complainant and the respondent was made and executed: that thereafter, the respondent convinced the complainant that since they were going to get married anyway, they should act as husband and wife; that because of the confidence which the complainant reposed upon the respondent, she reluctantly acceded to said demands; that as a result of their being together, the complainant became pregnant but due to causes beyond her control, the pregnancy was lost; that sometime in the third week of April 1971, one Virginia Paz was introduced to the complainant by the respondent; that said Virginia Paz was the woman previously referred to by the respondent as his wife with whom he had contracted a forced civil marriage; that said Virginia Paz, in the course of the meeting, informed the complainant that there had been actually two marriages between Virginia Paz and the respondent, one under the civil law and one under the church law; that upon being confronted by the complainant, the respondent made no explanation whatsoever and merely kept silent; that since that time, the respondent had done nothing to make amends for having deceived the complainant and for having taken advantage of her; and that the complainant has no other recourse but to ask for the disbarment of the respondent who is a member of the Philippine Bar and an officer of the courts of justice.

1

In his answer filed on June 10, 1971, the respondent denied having had any illicit relations with the complainant and alleged that when the complainant called by telephone Congressman Ramon D. Bagatsing, the respondent advised complainant to come to the office; that on the next day when the complainant came to the office of Congressman Bagatsing, she was at first referred to Atty. Geronimo Flores of the Legal Assistance Service to handle the case; that two or three days thereafter, the complainant requested the respondent to personally handle her case; that on October 30, 1970, the respondent prepared a letter to complainant's husband, Samuel L. Navales, which letter was signed by Congressman Bagatsing; that sometime in the latter part of October 1970, the complainant borrowed from the respondent the sum of P200.00 to complete the payment for the hospitalization and treatment of her brother, Eric, at the Makati Medical Center: that as a act of pity, the respondent gave her the loan; that after the election for delegates to the Constitutional Convention in November 1970, the complainant called at the residence of the respondent and asked help in filing a case against the assailant of her brother who was stabbed in Olongapo City; that the wound sustained by complainant's brother was only superficial and he could not Identify his assailant, hence, no criminal case was filed; that after the trip to Olongapo, the complainant requested the help of the respondent to recommend her admission to a hospital because of abdominal and chest pains; that the respondent recommended complainant to be admitted to the Singian Clinic located at General Solano Street, San Miguel Manila; that on December 20, 1970, the complainant caged up the respondent at his residence by telephone and requested him to assist her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar to file a criminal action against her minor sister, Vilma Abaigar for disobedience; that the respondent prepares a complaint on the same night and a sworn statement of her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar that he accompanied the complainant to the Fiscal's Office at Pasig, Rizal and to the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal where Criminal Case No. 23994 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Vilma Abaigar was filed by her mother; that the respondent also helped the mother of the complainant to prepare and file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that by reason of said petition for habeas corpus, the mother of the complainant was able to take Vilma Abaigar into her custody although the petition was denied; that the respondent had never informed the complainant that he was compelled to contract a civil marriage with his wife; that the respondent never proposed marriage to the complainant; that the respondent has no recollection of the supposed application for the issuance of a marriage license in the latter part of November 1970; that respondent and complainant had never acted as husband and wife; and that the respondent had not deceived complainant nor taken advantage of her.

2

In a resolution dated August 20, 1971, this Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 3

After hearing the parties, the Solicitor General submitted on June 30, 1973 his report and recommendation containing the following findings: The complaint seeks the disbarment of respondent Paz on grounds that may properly fall under the category of deceit and grossly immoral conduct as found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Assuming for the moment that there had been sexual intercourse between complainant and respondent, the first inquiry, we respectfully submit, is whether respondent Paz practiced demotion on complainant by making her believe that notwithstanding their subsisting marriages to their respective spouses, they could legally get married to each other and based on his promise of marriage, she consented to go to bed with him. Complainant admitted that during her alleged romantic liason with respondent, she was married to a certain Samuel Navales, also a Filipino, who divorced her in the U.S.A. sometime in the middle of 1970 (par. 2, Complaint; p. 46, t.s.n., November 18, 1971). She also admitted that before she submitted herself to his sexual desires, she was informed by him that, he had a wife with whom he was civilly married but that the marriage was void because it was either fake or 'forced' (sic).

Whether there was deceit hinges on whether complainant actually believed the representation of respondent that they could legally marry. Highly intelligent that she is and with the educational background that she has, it is difficult to accept the proposition that she swallowed hook, line and sinker his supposed assurances that notwithstanding full awareness by both of the existence of each other's previous marriages, no legal impediment stood in the way of their getting married ecclesiastically. It is worthwhile repeating that complainant was a fifth placer in the Board Examinations for Chemical Engineering. She was licensed as a chemical engineer in 1964 or 1965, after which she taught at one time or another in different schools and colleges in Manila. In 1970 or 1971 when she was supposedly tricked into surrendering her body on a promise of marriage, she was already in her late twenties. It is improbable that at this age, she was still ignorant of the law regarding indissolubility of marriage. Before jumping headlong into accepting respondent's proposal that they act as husband and wife, she should have pondered upon the serious legal implications and complications of a second marriage for both of them. She could have easily asked a lawyer for advice on the matter. Complainant's own neighbor in Mandaluyong, Rizal is a lawyer by the name of Atty. Paler whose wife testified on her behalf. According to Mrs. Paler, her husband and complainant used to converse (p. 18, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). In these conversations complainant could have asked, perhaps in a casual manner, Mrs. Paler's husband as to the legal effects of a divorce obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen or the effects of a marriage brought about through the use of force and intimidation in order to settle whatever doubts she had in her mind. The truth however, of the matter is that complainant did not even have to consult a lawyer to know that she could not legally marry respondent. It is of no little significance that some persons utilized by complainant as witnesses on her behalf because of their supposed knowledge of her relations with respondent, were themselves aware that divorce is not recognized in this country. Thus Mrs. Paler categorically stated that she knew for a fact that divorce obtained abroad is not recognized in the Philippines (p. 19, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). The same admission was elicited from Fr. Troy de los Santos, another witness for the complainant. Fr. de los Santos who used to be her spiritual adviser admitted at one point of his testimony that divorce obtained abroad cannot be recognized in the Philippines insofar as state laws are concerned and complainant knew about this (pp. 33-34, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). Thus, the Jesuit priest declared under cross-examination: Q Do you know that complainant's husband is still alive? A Yes. Q Up to the present? A Yes. Q Do you know that divorce is not recognized in the Philippines? A I know, but the church does not recognize divorce. Q How about the State, do you know that the State recognize divorce? A As far as my knowledge, I do not think that our laws permit divorce. Continuing with his testimony, Fr. de los Santos stated: Q Did not the fact that complainant's husband is still have and that divorce is not recognized in ' the Philippines be considered an impediment to complainant's marriage to anyone? A Yes. Q Did you inform her so? A She knows about that. (33,34, t.s.n., Id.) Again, granting that complainant did not actually comprehend the existence of a legal bar to her remarriage, 'not being steeped in the intricacies of the law'. just the mere realization that both respondent's wife and her own husband being still have was enough to stir her mind and to impel her to make her own investigation. She could have, for instance, made discreet inquiries as to who was the woman respondent was married to and verified his claim whether he was forced into the marriage. Or, perhaps, she could simply have asked Congressman Bagatsing about respondent's personal status. After all she was competent enough to prepare, without anyone's help her own affidavit, Exhibit 'A', and resourceful enough to make research in the Supreme Court's Library on the subject of disbarment (pp. 63, 89, t.s.n., November 18, 1971). What conclusion then can a reasonable mind draw from the given premises? Either complainant was so helplessly naive as to be beguiled by respondent's blandishments or. comprehending fully the legal impossibility of the fulfillment of his marriage proposals, she unconditionally laid herself prostrate to his charms, too much enamored of him to care about anything else. For, as philosopher Blaise Pascal has so pithily stated of the profundity of human love, 'love has reasons that reason cannot explain.' Since complainant cannot hide behind the camouflage of innocence, considering her intellectual capacity and educational background, no other conclusion is possible 'except that she voluntarily submitted to sexual intimacy with respondent without entertaining any illusion or hope of sublimating the illicit relations by legal union. The question is intriguing whether respondent ever made vehement protestations of love and actually made an offer of marriage to complainant. If there was, the evidence adduced does not clearly show. Complainant asserted that she had evidence in the form of love letters and the marriage application form showing respondent's sustained courtship and offer of marriage. However, such purported documents were not presented, complainant making the excuse that respondent tricked her into giving him the envelope containing the evidence. Such explanation, however, staggers human credulity considering that the supposed documents were vital to establish the case. It is simply preposterous that she would easily Dart with the documents and give them to no other than the respondent himself . Be that as it may, if respondent had made an offer of marriage, it is not clearly established that complainant's submission to his sexual desires was not on account of the offer but for the gratification of her mundane human longings. The next question is whether there was sexual intimacy between complainant and respondent. Complainant testified that she acceded to his proposal that they live as husband and wife and as a matter of fact they had three sexual intercourses that took place in the Tower Hotel and Singian Clinic in Manila and in the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. While there is no proof that sexual intimacy took place in Singian Clinic except her testimony, her allegation that they had trysts at the Tower Hotel and Sulo Hotel was supported by the guest cards at said hotels, Exhibits 'A' and 'B'. Notwithstanding respondent's denial that the 'Mrs.' stated in the entry in said guest cards was a 'good-time' woman, not the complainant, common sense will tell us that complainant could not have known that respondent lodged in said hotels on those particular dates unless she was the woman whom respondent brought there. On this score, we are inclined to believe that evidence has been sufficiently adduced to establish that intimacy between complainant and respondent took place once in the Tower Hotel and once in the Sulo Hotel. As the Honorable Court has stated, when the lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issues and overcome the evidence for the relator and to show proof that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times he is expected of

him (Quingwa vs. Puno, Adm. Case No. 389, Feb. 28, 1967; 19 SCRA 439). Insofar as this point is concerned, the evidence of the complainant as to the trysts they had in the two hotels has not been met and overthrown by respondent.

4

Upon considering the report and recommendation filed by the Solicitor General, this Court, in a resolution dated July 29, 1972, resolved to require the Solicitor General to file the corresponding complaint against the respondent, David D.C. Paz, pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court.

5

On September 4, 1975, the Solicitor General filed the corresponding complaint against David D.C. Paz praying that the respondent be suspended for a period of at least six months from the practice of law, with a warning that similar transgressions in the future win be dealt with more severely. Meanwhile the complainant sent a verified letter-petition dated March 29, 1974 to the then Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal wherein the complainant asked this Court to look into the suspicious activities of a certain Rodolfo del Prado, who allegedly in connivance with the respondent, David D.C. Paz, made her sign an affidavit prejudicial to her interest. Among other allegations, the complainant stated in her verified complaint the following. 6. That there never is an illicit relationship between Atty. Paz and me at present because I believed all along that he was single and able to marry me. In fact, our relationship is above- board just like any engaged couple. 7. That I was made to understand by the Citizens Legal Assistant Office that the tenor of the affidavit made by Mr. Rudolfo Del Prado is such that the consideration for the illicit relationship was promissory note which to all intents and purposes is immoral and illegal. 8. That I am only after the collection of the loan which Atty. Paz got from me and not revenge for his deception.

6

The foregoing portions of her letter militate against the credibility of the complainant. In her complainant for disbarment, she pictured the respondent as morally perverse. However, in the aforementioned letter, she states that there never was an illicit relationship between her and the respondent, Atty. David D.C. Paz, and that their relationship was aboveboard just like any engaged couple. And finally, she avers that she was only after the collection of the loan which the respondent got from her and not for revenge for his deception. It has been held that the power of this Court to disbar a lawyer should be exercised with caution because of its serious consequences.

7 The burden

of proof rests upon the complainant and the case against a respondent must be established by convincing proof. 8

In Arboleda vs. Gatchalian, this Court held: The Court has held that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the charge against the lawyer must be established by convincing proof (Go vs. Candoy, A.C. No. 736, Oct. 23, 1967, 21 SCRA 439; Toquib vs. Tomol, Jr., A.C. No. 554, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 156; in re Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman, A.C. No. 838, Jan. 21. 1974, 55 SCRA 139). The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers. The corrupt character of the act done must be clearly demonstrated. Moreover' considering the serious consequences, of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, We have consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of either penalty (De Guzman vs. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554; Lim vs. Antonio, A.C. No. 848, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 44). This Court likewise held that where there is no proof that respondent lawyer was guilty of any unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice, the disbarment case against him should be dismissed (Ricafort vs. Baltazar, A.C. No. 661, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 418; Delos Santos vs. Bolanos A.C. No. 483, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 763).

9

The evidence adduced by the complainant has failed to establish any cause for disciplinary action against the respondent. As the Solicitor General said in his report, "From all indications, there is little room for doubt that she filed his disbarment case not in redress of a wrong, for there was no wrong committed. It was a voluntary act of indiscretion between two consenting adults who were fully aware of the consequences of their deed and for which they were responsible only to their own private consciences." WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991 RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents. Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf. Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner. PARAS, J.:p We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence. The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied) The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides: There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied) Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office. Black defines "practice of law" as: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.) The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: ... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852) This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied) Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours) The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service. One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312) Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law." MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement? THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Commissioner will please proceed. MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years". To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit. This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up. MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question. MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit? MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes. MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law. MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. OPLE. Thank you. ... ( Emphasis supplied) Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied) Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15). At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.). The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.). The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.). In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687). By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.). In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law. We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making. Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts. In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom. Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity. Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making. Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry. Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house. A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law. At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.) In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business. Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4). This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues. Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself. These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning. Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied) The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied) Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes. In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied) Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos: First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied) Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied) Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point. [Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus: Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made. Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work. Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions. This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4). The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo) After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared

for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied) Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member. In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied) After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13). In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied) Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied) A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265). Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said: Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied) No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated: It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied) The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200) The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides: The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised

two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent. Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined. Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers. Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President? We now proceed: The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown. Additionally, consider the following: (1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative. (2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear. (3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate. Finally, one significant legal maxim is: We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life. Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that — No blade shall touch his skin; No blood shall flow from his veins. When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement. In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007 FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Respondents. D E C I S I O N AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;

1 and the RTC’s Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued

by this Court. The antecedents: On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.

2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts

as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case. However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.

3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone. In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration. On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public respondent MeTC. After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable. On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar. Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC. On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC. On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following errors: I. the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity of granting the writ; II. THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW; III. THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; IV. THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC’S).

4

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.

5

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school. Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides: RULE 138-A LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school. Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic. However, in Resolution

6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides: Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.

7 (Emphasis

supplied) The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:

8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied) which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts. Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance. Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts. Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible. It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable. Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation.

9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil

liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

MARY JANE D. VELASCO, A. C. No. 5033 Complainant, Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, - versus - AZCUNA,* TINGA,* CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, REYES, DE CASTRO, and BRION, JJ. ATTY. CHARLIE DOROIN and Promulgated: ATTY. HECTOR CENTENO, Respondents. July 28, 2008 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x D E C I S I O N PER CURIAM: This case refers to a disbarment complaint filed by Mary Jane D. Velasco on March 31, 1999, against respondent lawyers for forgery and falsification constitutive of malpractice.

[1]

On June 21, 1999, the Court’s Second Division required the respondent lawyers to comment on the complaint within (10) days from notice.[2]

On August 24, 1999, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, counsel for respondents, filed a Motion for Extension to File Comment praying that an extension of sixty (60) days from August 16, 1999 be given to them to file their comment.

[3]

On October 4, 1999, the Court granted the Motion for Extension with a warning that the same shall be the last and no further extension will be given.

[4]

The respondent lawyers failed to file their comment. On June 20, 2001, the Court ordered respondent lawyers and their counsel to show cause why they should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure and to comply with the resolution requiring the comment. Copies of the resolution dated June 20, 2001 were returned unserved from Atty. Alcid and Atty. Centeno with notations “party out/unknown at/party moved out” and “moved out.” Atty. Doroin received the said resolution onJuly 27, 2001.

[5]

On April 17, 2002, complainant was required to submit the correct addresses of Atty. Alcid and Atty. Centeno, while Atty. Charlie Doroin was fined Php 500.00 for failure to comply with the show cause resolution dated June 20, 2001 and was ordered to submit his comment.

[6]

Complainant failed to comply with the directive of the Court. On July 23, 2003, the Court required the complainant to show cause why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with for her non-compliance with the said directive and to submit her compliance within ten (10) days from notice. In the same resolution, the fine imposed on Atty. Charlie Doroin was increased from Php 500.00 to Php 1,000.00 for his failure to file his comment on the complaint as required by the Court, or to suffer imprisonment of five (5) days in case he fails to pay and to submit his comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice.

[7]

In a report dated August 2, 2004, the Clerk of Court informed the Court that respondent Atty. Doroin paid the fine of Php 1,000.00. However, Atty. Doroin still failed to submit the comment on the administrative complaint required of him and has not complied with the show cause resolution dated April 17, 2002 by submitting the correct addresses of Atty. Quintin P. Alcid and respondent Atty. Hector Centeno.

[8]

In a Manifestation submitted June 23, 2005, the complainant submitted the addresses of Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector Centeno as well as a copy of a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Mr. Juanito C. Perez to prosecute the instant case.

[9]

On July 27, 2005, the Court issued a resolution noting the compliance of the complainant as well as the latter’s manifestation and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of the record.

[10]

On October 3, 2005, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva Maala issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing to the parties to the case scheduled on October 26, 2005 with a strict note that “*n+on-appearance by any of the parties shall be deemed a waiver of their right to participate in further proceedings.”

[11]

On October 26, 2005, only Mr. Juanito Perez, attorney-in-fact of the complainant, together with his counsel Atty. Andres Villaruel, Jr. appeared. As respondents Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector Centeno had not filed their comment, they were directed to submit it within (10) days from receipt of notice. The hearing of the case was reset on November 30, 2005.

[12]

On November 30, 2005, again, only Mr. Juanito Perez, attorney-in-fact of the complaint, together with his counsel, Atty. Villaruel, appeared. The notices sent to respondents were returned to the Commission on Bar Discipline with a notation “RTS-Moved.” As respondents had not filed their comment on the complaint, they were declared in default. In an Order dated November 30, 2005, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva Maala submitted her report and recommendation, viz.

[13]

The Commission on Bar Discipline reported that: x x x x x x x x x In her Affidavit-Complaint, complaint alleged that she was appointed as Administratrix in Special Proceedings Case No. Q-96-27628 pending consideration before the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 87, entitled “In the matter of the Settlement of the Estate of the Late Eduardo Doroin, Monina E. Doroin, petitioner.” The deceased, Eduardo Doroin, died on 21 January 1996, in Papua New Guinea. In this Special Proceedings case, respondents were collaborating counsels for Oppositor, Josephine Abarquez. On 21 March 1996, Atty. Doroin fooled complainant by deceitful means into making her sign an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Partition, allotting complainant the sum of P1,216,078.00 giving the paramour of complainant’s father, Josephine Abarquez, the share of P7,296,468.00 and also allotting complainant’s two (2) alleged illegitimate brothers and an alleged illegitimate sister, a similar sum of P1,216,075.00 each alleging that such sharing is in accordance with law. But no share was assigned to complainant’s mother, who was the legal wife of Dr. Eduardo Doroin. To partially satisfy complainant’s share of Php 1,216,078.00, Atty. Doroin required complainant to sign a paper which was an alleged Confirmation of Authority to Sell the property of complainant’s father located at Kingspoint subdivision, Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 34885, Complainant told Atty. Doroin that she will first consult a lawyer regarding the legality of the said Confirmation of Authority to Sell before she signs the same. Eventually, she was not able to sign the said Confirmation because complainant’s lawyer, Atty. Marapao, failed to confer and negotiate with Atty. Doroin regarding the same. When the complainant visited the lot situated at Kingspoint Subdivision sometime in June 1996, there was no house constructed thereon, but when she visited it again on January 1999, there was already a four-door townhouse constructed. Complainant was informed by the caretaker at the site that the owner is one Evangeline Reyes-Tonemura. Complainant also learned later on that the property, which was one of the properties submitted to the Court handling the Special Proceedings case in the Inventory of Property dated 3 April 1996, was sold by Atty. Doroin to Evangeline Reyes-Yonemura *sic+, by forging the signature of complainant’s late father. Atty. Hector B. Centeno, a Notary Public of Quezon City, knowing that complainant’s father was already dead as of 21 January 1996, made it appear in the said Deed of Absolute Sale, that complainant’s father appeared before him in Quezon City on 17 January 1997. Records show that a case for Falsification of Public Document was filed against respondent Atty. Hector Centeno before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 39, docketed as Criminal Case No. 104869. Atty. Centeno was arraigned on 12 September 2001 and pleaded “not guilty.” After the arraignment, Atty. Centeno did not anymore appeared *sic+ in court and jumped bail.

[14]

The Commission found that respondents violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when they caused “extreme and great damage to the complainant.”

[15] The Commissioner also noted that the failure of the respondents to answer the complaint for disbarment

despite due notice on several occasions and to appear on the scheduled hearing set showed “flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary sanction.”

[16] The Commissioner recommended that the

respondent lawyers be disbarred. On November 18, 2006, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline with the modification that respondent lawyers be suspended indefinitely instead of being disbarred. The Notice of Resolution and the Report and Recommendation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, were submitted to the Court, through the Director for Bar Discipline, in a transmittal letter dated January 22, 2007. The issue before us is whether Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector Centeno are guilty of violating their lawyer’s oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which would merit their disbarment. We agree with the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP, but modify the penalty to be imposed on respondent Atty. Hector Centeno. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that: “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”

[17]

Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large,

[18] and a violation

of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.

[19] In Marcelo v. Javier,

[20] we reminded the members of the legal profession that:

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession. It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law during good behaviour and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, and attorney’s right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.

[21]

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof generally rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.

[22]

In the case at bar, complainant claims that respondent lawyers forged the deed of sale and forced her to sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement by explaining to her that it was “in accordance with law.” The complained actuations of the respondent lawyers constitute a blatant violation of the lawyer’s oath to uphold the law and the basic tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility that no lawyer shall engage in dishonest conduct. Elementary it is in succession law that compulsory heirs like the widowed spouse shall have a share in the estate by way of legitimes

[23] and no extrajudicial settlement can deprive the spouse of said right

except if she gives it up for lawful consideration, but never when the spouse is not a party to the said settlement.[24]

And the Civil Code reminds us, that we must “give every man his due.”

[25]

The guilt of the respondent lawyers is beyond dispute. They failed to answer the complaint filed against them. Despite due notice, they failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. Hence, the claims and allegations of the complainant remain uncontroverted. In Ngayan v.

Tugade,[26]

we ruled that “*a lawyer’s+ failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court.”

[27]

The Court is mindful that disbarment is a grave penalty. Considering that the license to practice law, though it is not a property right, sustains a lawyer’s primary means of livelihood and to strip someone of such license amounts to stripping one of a career and a means to keep himself alive, we agree with the modification submitted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that an indefinite suspension would be the more appropriate penalty on Atty. Charlie Doroin. However, we cannot be as lenient with Atty. Hector Centeno who, aside from committing a dishonest act by depriving a person of her rightful inheritance, also committed a criminal offense when he falsificated a public document and thereafter absconded from the criminal proceeding against him after having posted bail. We also take this opportunity to remind the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and their regional and city chapters to maintain an updated record of the office and residence addresses of their members to help facilitate looking for lawyers. As officers of the court, lawyers should be readily available upon the Court’s beckoning. IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Charlie Doroin is SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY, and Atty. Hector Centeno is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and also be placed on the personal records of the respondents. SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9259 March 13, 2013 JASPER JUNNO F. RODICA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. MANUEL "LOLONG" M. LAZARO, ATTY. EDWIN M. ESPEJO, ATTY. ABEL M. ALMARIO, ATTY. MICHELLE B. LAZARO, ATTY. JOSEPH C. TAN, and JOHN DOES, Respondents. R E S O L U T I O N DEL CASTILLO, J.: For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for Inhibition

1 filed by complainant Jasper Junno F. Rodica of our August 23, 2012

Resolution2the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Complaint for disbarment against respondents Atty. Manuel "Lolong" M. Lazaro, Atty. Edwin M. Espejo, Atty. Abel M. Almario, Atty. Michelle B. Lazaro and Atty. Joseph C. Tan is DISMISSED. Atty. Edwin M. Espejo is WARNED to be more circumspect and prudent in his actuations. SO ORDERED.

3

In her Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for Inhibition, complainant argues that this Court unfairly ignored the supporting affidavits attached to the Complaint and that this Court should expressly declare whether it is lending credence to said affidavits or not and why.

4

Complainant next claims that this Court deviated from usual practice and procedure when it proceeded to resolve the disbarment Complaint after the separate Comments of the respondents have been filed without giving her the opportunity to file a Reply. She also faults the Court for deciding the case without first declaring the same to have already been submitted for resolution. To her, this constitutes denial of due process.

5

Lastly, complainant asserts that this Court’s reference to her Affidavit supposedly executed on July 21, 2011 as ‘un-notarized’ was misplaced. She also insists that the Court’s observation that the withdrawal of pending cases should not have been limited "to the RTC case,"

6 is erroneous

considering that there were no other pending cases to speak of at that time. She also maintains that the Court erroneously gave the impression that the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Kalibo had already become final.

7

Complainant also prays for the inhibition of the justices who participated in this case in the belief that they have been biased against her. Complainant’s Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for Inhibition are totally bereft of merit. The Court considered the affidavits of Brimar F. Rodica, Timothy F. Rodica and Atty. Ramon S. Diño in resolving the case. Contrary to complainant’s contention, this Court considered the afore-mentioned affidavits as corroborative evidence of the allegations in the Complaint. Nonetheless, in the proper exercise of its discretion, the Court deemed it unnecessary to restate in its August 23, 2012 Resolution the material facts contained in each affidavit as the same would only be mere reiterations of the summarized allegations in the Complaint. In other words, this Court found no necessity to mention the allegations in each affidavit because they were already spelled out in the Complaint. Besides, this Court is under no obligation to specifically mention in its Decision or Resolution each and every piece of evidence of the parties. It would suffice if the Court’s factual findings are distinctly stated and the bases for its conclusions clearly spelled out. The Court can validly determine which among the pieces of evidence it will accord credence and which it will ignore for being irrelevant and immaterial. Complainant was not denied due process. Complainant’s contention that she was denied due process because she was not allowed to file a Reply deserves scant consideration. This is equally true of complainant’s argument that this Court deviated from usual procedure when it resolved the disbarment Complaint without first declaring the case to have been submitted for resolution. The Court will outrightly dismiss a Complaint for disbarment when on its face, it is clearly wanting in merit. Thus, in International Militia of People Against Corruption & Terrorism v. Chief Justice Davide, Jr. (Ret.)

8 the Court, after finding the

Complaint insufficient in form and substance, dismissed the same outright for utter lack of merit. It took the same stand in Battad v. Senator Defensor-Santiago,

9 where the disbarment Complaint against respondent therein was motu propio dismissed by this Court after finding "no

sufficient justification for the exercise of its disciplinary power."10

In this case, the Court did not dismiss outright the disbarment Complaint. In fact, it even required the respondents to file their respective Answers. Then, after a judicious study of the records, it proceeded to resolve the same although not in complainant’s favor. Based on the Complaint and the supporting affidavits attached thereto, and the respective Comments of the respondents, the Court found that the presumption of innocence accorded to respondents was not overcome. Moreover, the Court no longer required complainant to file a Reply since it has the discretion not to require the filing of the same when it can already judiciously resolve the case based on the pleadings thus far submitted. And contrary to complainant’s mistaken notion, not all petitions or complaints reach reply or memorandum stage. Depending on the merits of the case, the Court has the discretion either to proceed with the case by first requiring the parties to file their respective responsive pleadings or to dismiss the same outright. Likewise, the Court can proceed to resolve the case without need of informing the parties that the case is already submitted for resolution. Also, contrary to complainant’s contention, this Court is not mistaken in its reference to complainant’s July 21, 2011 Affidavit as "un-notarized." The said Affidavit which was attached to the Complaint as Annex "A" consists only of nine pages with no accompanying jurat. The mention made by the complainant in page 1 of her Complaint that the July 21, 2011 was "acknowledged before Notary Public Joan Ibutnande and entered as Doc. 83, Page 18, Book No. VI, Series of 2011"

11 could not take the place of the jurat itself as written in the Affidavit. Similarly, this Court finds no merit in

complainant’s argument that the Court’s observation that "the withdrawal should not have been limited to the RTC case as it appears that there are other cases pending with other tribunals and agencies,"

12 is erroneous. She claims to be unaware of any other case pending in other tribunals

and agencies. However, this contention is belied by complainant’s own declaration in her Sworn Affidavit which was incorporated in her Complaint, viz: x x x x 1. Sometime in 2010, I filed a civil case against Hillview Marketing Corporation, Stephanie Dornau and several others, regarding recovery of possession of a certain area that was lost on my property, the illegal encroachment on my property x x x, for recovery of damages and as indemnity x x x captioned as JASPER J. F. RODICA vs. HILLVIEW MARKETING CORPORATION, et al. and docketed as Civil Case No. 8987, and assigned at the Regional Trial Court Branch VI of Kalibo Aklan; 2. Earlier on, in 2009, I have also filed a case with the HLURB against Hillview Marketing Corporation/its officers, for unfair/irregular real estate business practices, refund for the purchase price regarding the sale of the Boracay property made to me by Hillview, and some other matters.

x x x x13

Moreover, in the Answer

14 filed by Atty. Joseph Tan (Atty. Tan) and Atty. Paolo Deston relative to CBD Case No. 12-3360 pending before the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines, copy of which was attached to Atty. Tan’s Manifestation,15

several cases were mentioned.16

Thus, we wonder how complainant could claim to be unaware of them. The Motion to Inhibit is denied for lack of basis. "An inhibition must be for just and valid reason.1âwphi1 The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground x x x to inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis."

17 In this case, complainant's imputation that her Complaint was decided by the magistrates of this Court with

extreme bias and prejudice is baseless and clearly unfounded. WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for Inhibition are DENIED for lack of merit. No further pleadings or motions shall be entertained in this case. SO ORDERED.

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672 Complainant, Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO, - v e r s u s - CORONA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and BERSAMIN, JJ.

ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent. Promulgated: September 4, 2009 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x R E S O L U T I O N CORONA, J.: This is a complaint for disbarment

[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes

Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients

[2] to transfer legal representation.

Respondent promised them financial assistance[3]

and expeditious collection on their claims.[4]

To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit

[5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to

sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached “respondent’s” calling card:

[6]

Front NICOMEDES TOLENTINO LAW OFFFICE CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Fe Marie L. Labiano Paralegal 1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820 6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821 Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719 Back SERVICES OFFERED: CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT, INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS ABROAD. (emphasis supplied) Hence, this complaint. Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card.

[7]

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

[8]

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation,

[9] found that respondent had encroached on the

professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10]

and other canons[11]

of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138

[12] of the Rules

of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty. We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended penalty. The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant’s professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules. Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides: CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS. Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.

[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the

profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.

[14]

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides: RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers.

[15] Such actuation

constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.[16]

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides: RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MAN’S CAUSE. This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)

[17] as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.

[18]

Complainant presented substantial evidence

[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred

to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits. Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing. Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more favorable result. Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.

[20] Again the Court notes that respondent

never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s “referrals.” Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection to his office.

[21]Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under

Rule 8.02 of the CPR. Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04: Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client. The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client. The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected.

[22] It

seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends

money to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.

[23] Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a

settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.

[24]

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice

[25] which calls for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers.

Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.

[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers

and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession. Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings. A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.

[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their

services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards. Professional calling cards may only contain the following details: (a) lawyer’s name; (b) name of the law firm with which he is connected; (c) address; (d) telephone number and (e) special branch of law practiced.

[28]

Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase “with financial assistance.” The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling cards. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts. SO ORDERED