REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGANBAYAN

PEOPLE OFPHILIPPINES,

CRIM CASE NO. SB-ll-CRM-0087For: Violation of Sec. 3(g) ofR.A. No. 3019

Present:CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,ChairpersonFERNANDEZ, SJ., J.l andGOMEZ-ESTOESTA, J.2

WILFREDO SUBIDO BALAIS,ET AL.,

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For resolution IS the prosecution's Motion forReconsideration dated September 9, 20163 and the accused'sComment thereon dated October 4,2016.4

In their motion, the prosecution prays that this Courtreconsider its Decision promulgated on August 17, 2016,5acquitting accused Wilfredo Subido Balais (Balais) and Emn

1 Justice Sarah Jane T. Fernandez will sit as senior member of the Third Divisionfollowingthe appointment of Justice Samuel R. Martires to the Supreme cou~t.2 Per Administrative Order No. 010-2015 dated January 12,20153 Pp. 439-450, Vol. II, Record4 Pp. 477-479, Vol. II, Record5 Pp. 393-427, Vol. II, Record

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Balais, et al.SB-II-CRM-0087

Rose Kho Lim Chao (Chao) in the present case for violation ofSection 3(g), R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."

At the outset, the Court must deny the prosecution'smotion for reconsideration as it would place the accused indouble jeopardy. As explained by the Supreme Court inLejano v. People6:

xxx as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot bereconsidered because it places the accused underdouble jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section21, Article III, that:

"Section 21. No person shall be twiceput in jeopardy of punishment for the sameoffense. x x x"

To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places theaccused twice in jeopardy of being punished for thecrime of which he has already been absolved. There isreason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminalcases, the full power of the State is ranged against theaccused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute theaccused for the same offense after he has beenacquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the Statefor a sustained and repeated litigation would eventuallyoverwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina,and the will to fight.

As the Court said In People of the Philippines v.Sandiganbayan:

[A]tthe heart of this policy is the concernthat permitting the sovereign freely to subjectthe citizen to a second judgment for the sameoffense would arm the government with a potentinstrument of oppression. The provisiontherefore guarantees that the State shall not bepermitted to make repeated attempts to convictan individual for an alleged offense, thereby

______ Su_bJ_·e_C_tI_·n_g_himto embarrassment, expense, a/7

Lejano v. People, 639 SeRA 760, 762;64120111 4

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Balais, et al.SB-II-CRM-0087

ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuingstate of anxiety and insecurity, as well asenhancing the possibility that even thoughinnocent he may be found guilty. Society'sawareness of the heavy personal strain which acriminal trial represents for the individualdefendant is manifested in the willingness tolimit the government to a single criminalproceeding to vindicate its very vital interest inthe enforcement of criminal laws.

Of course, on occaSIOns, a motion forreconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But thegrounds are exceptional and narrow as when the courtthat absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion,resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial hasoccurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail thedecision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule65.7

Moreover, the prosecution's present motion forreconsideration merely restates the same arguments it raisedin its memorandum filed on September 26, 2014. A perusal ofthe averments in the present motion shows a virtualreproduction, word for word, of the prior memorandum. Thus,the Court agrees with the accused's argument that the presentmotion is pro forma.

At any rate, even if a review of the assailed decision wereallowed, this Court is not inclined to alter its findings. As ruledby the Court in its Decision sought to be reconsidered, theevidence relied upon by the prosecution is wholly insufficientto sustain a conviction under Section 3 (g)of R.A. No. 3019, towit:

From the above tabulation, this Court notes theutter dissimilarity of model types in the October 21,1998 Pro-Forma Invoices compared to the February 19,1999 Pro-Forma Invoice. While the general cIar

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RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Balais, et al.SB-ll-CRM-0087

vehicles IS the same, the specific model completelyvanes.

First, as to the road grader, the October 21, 1998Pro-Forma Invoices enumerate the purchase prices ofthe followingmodels: Komatsu, GD 31; GD 37; and GD40; while the February 19, 1999 Pro-Forma Invoicequotes a Mitsubishi, LG2H. Second, as to the backhoe,the October 21, 1998 Pro-Forma invoices enumerate thepurchase price of the following models: UH04, UH07,UH09, and E300, while the February 19, 1999 Pro-Forma Invoice quotes a DH052. The same can be said ofthe payloader. The October quotations are for KomatsuJH65, TCM 75 3AN, and 75 3AZ, while the Februaryquotation is for a TCM 50 B. Lastly, as to the dumptrucks, the October quotations are for 10 Wheelers, 6Wheelers (Forward/Fighter), 6 Wheelers (Elf/Canter),while the February quotation is for Isuzu ForwardDump Truck 6 Wheelers.

Except for the road grader, the models quoted inthe February 19, 1999 Pro-Forma Invoice were the unitseventually purchased by the municipality. Even if thisCourt granted full credence to the October 21, 1998Pro-forma Invoices, the same cannot be used as basisfor a conclusion of overpricing. As shown above, thequotations refer to equipment of a different model fromthose which were actually purchased.

In Caunan v. People, the Supreme Court reverseda conviction by the Sandiganbayan which relied on anaudit report that found gross overpricing based on itemsof a different specification from that actuallypurchased. The High Court ratiocinated, thus:

The reasoning of the Sandiganbayan is speciousand off tangent. The audit team reached aconclusion of gross overpricing based ondocuments which, at best, would merelyindicate the present market price of walistingting of a different specification,purchased from a non-supplier of paranarJ(

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City, and the price of walis tingting purchases inLas Pinas City. Effectively, the prosecution wasunable to demonstrate the requisite burden ofproof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt, inorder to overcome the presumption of innocencein favor of petitioners. (emphasis ours)

In the same vein, this Court cannot conclude thatthe purchase of the dump trucks, backhoe andpayloader was grossly disadvantageous based on theOctober 21, 1998 Pro-Forma Invoices which containquotations for items with different models from thoseactually purchased.

Assuming arguendo, that the prior quotationswere for identical models as those actually purchased,would the same be sufficient evidence to constituteoverpricing? This Court rules in the negative.

Prior quotations from the same supplier alone areinsufficient to prove overpricing. If anything, the priorquotations from the same supplier, which show anunwarranted escalation in prices, may be taken asevidence of irregularity or of a scheme to dupe theGovernment. They cannot per se prove that the items inthe contract were overpriced so as to be manifestly andgrossly disadvantageous to the Government. Referenceto a proper standard, such as the prevailing marketprice of the same models at the time of the contract,must be established by competent evidence. In order toshow that there was an overpricing in the subjecttransaction, a canvass of different suppliers with theircorresponding prices should have been procured whichcould readily show the differences in the pricequotations.

This Court notes that the road grader actuallypurchased was a GD 37, as admitted by the accusedduring the pre-trial and as shown in the purchaserequest and purchase order. This fact belies accusedBalais' testimony as to his non-receipt of the October21, 1998 Pro Forma Invoices. The February 19, 1999Pro Forma Invoice only provides a quotation for anLG2H road grader but the unit actually purchasedr

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a GD 37. The GD 37 model is only found in the October21, 1998 Pro-Forma Invoices. This Court further notesthat the purchase price for the GD 37 Road Grader isPhp1,910,OOO.OO,the same price quoted for the LG2HRoad Grader in the February 19, 1999 Pro FormaInvoice. This amount was substantially higher than thequotations for the same GD 37 model in the October 21,1998 Pro Forma Invoices, which were P1,400,OOO.OOand P1,680,OOO.OO.As adverted to above, however, thisdiscrepancy in price quotations from KD Surplus, perse, is insufficient to prove overpricing.

This Court notes the glaring irregularities in theconduct of the alleged bidding in this case. To be sure,the prosecution has sufficiently proved that thepurchase of heavy equipment was conducted inviolation of the appropriate procurement laws. Indeed,the documents presented lead this Court to believe thatno bidding was actually conducted. Nevertheless, thisCourt's appreciation of the evidence must be limited totheir satisfaction of the elements constituting theoffense charged.

We must emphasize, however, that the lackof a public bidding and the violation of anadministrative order do not by themselvessatisfy the third element of Republic Act No.3019, Section 3(g);namely, that the contract ortransaction entered into was manifestly andgrossly disadvantageous to the government, asseems to be stated in the Resolution of theSandiganbayan denying the Motion forReconsideration. Lack of public bidding alonedoes not result in a manifest and grossdisadvantage. Indeed, the absence of a publicbidding may mean that the government was notable to secure the lowest bargain in its favor andmay open the door to graft and corruption.Nevertheless, the law requires that thedisadvantage must be manifest and gross. Penallaws are strictly construed against thegovernment. (citations omitted, emphasisSUPPlied)/(

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The Supreme Court's pronouncement in Nava wasreiterated in Caunan:

We are not unmindful of the fact that petitionersfailed to conduct the requisite public bidding forthe questioned procurements. However, thelack of public bidding alone does notautomatically equate to a manifest and grossdisadvantage to the government. As we hadoccasion to deClare in Nava v.Sandiganbayan, the absence of a public biddingmay mean that the government was not able tosecure the lowest bargain in its favor and mayopen the door to graft and corruption. However,this does not satisfy the third element of theoffense charged, because the law requires thatthe disadvantage must be manifest and gross.After all, penal laws are strictly construedagainst the government.8

The prosecution has utterly failed to point out, much lessprove, any factual or legal error in the afore-quoted portion ofthis Court's assailed Decision that would warrant areconsideration thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the prosecution'sMotion for Reconsideration dated September 9, 2016 for (1)being violative of the principle against double jeopardy; and,(2) lack of merit and/ or for being pro forma.

Quezon City, Metro Manila

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MA. THERESA D~ C. GOMEZ-ESTOESTAXssociate Justice