CABOTAJE-TANG, PJ FERNANDEZ, B., andsb.judiciary.gov.ph/RESOLUTIONS/2017/K_Crim_SB-16-CRM-0780-078… · REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SANDIGANBAYAN QUEZON CITY PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGANBAYAN

QUEZON CITY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,

Criminal Cases Nos. SB-16-CRM-0780-0781For: Violation of Section 3(e) ofRepublic Act (R. A.) No. 3019and Malversation ThroughFalsification of PublicDocuments

CABOTAJE-TANG, PJFERNANDEZ, B., J. andFERNANDEZ, SJ.,l J.

For resolution are the following motions which seek areconsideration of the Court's Resolution promulgated onAugust 10, 2017, denying the accused-movants' motions toquash and dismiS~

, J. S.c,h J"e T. 'em,nde,_ now Ch,;,pe~ ~D;v;,;on pe, Adm;n;,t"t;ve O,dN No. 31+2017dated September 13,2017, is a signatory to the assailed Resolution.

ResolutionCriminal Cases No. SB-16--CRM-0780 to 0781People vs. Syjuco, et. al.X -------------------------------------------------------- ---------- x

1. Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Resolution dated 10August 2017) dated August 25, 2017 filed by accused Judy J.Syjuco;2

2. Motionfor Reconsideration (Ofthe Resolution dated 10August 2017) dated August 29, 2017 filed by accused IldefonsoT. Patdu, Jr., Rebecca S. Cacatian and Geronimo V. Quintos;3

3. Motion to Admit Documents (Re: Motion forReconsideration of the Resolution dated 1 August 2017) datedSeptember 4, 2017 filed by accused Ildefonso T. Patdu, Jr.,Rebecca S. Cacatian and Geronimo V. Quintos;4 and

4. Motion For Reconsideration dated September 4, 2017filed by accused Elmer A. Sonej a. 5

In praying for a reconsideration of the denial of her motionto dismiss anchored on violation of her constitutional right tospeedy disposition of cases, accused Syjuco raises the followingIssues:

1. Contrary to the Court's declaration, Torres vs.Sandiganbayan6 is applicable to her case. According to her, thecases need not be identical for the doctrine of stare decisis toapply as long as facts are substantially the same with respectto a particular issue. She argues that similar to Torres, theOffice of the Ombudsman conducted a fact-finding investigationand a preliminary investigation in these cases. Allegedly, thefact that two (2) preliminary investigations were conducted inTorres while only one (1) preliminary investigation wasconducted in these cases is irrelevant because the issue ininordinate delay is the length of time in disposing the case andnot the number of preliminary investigations conducted. Thus,she concludes that the Court should take into account theperiod of time the fact-finding investigation started, whichtotaled to ten (10) years, in determining whether there has b~

2 pp. 576-607, Record, Vol. III3 pp. 10-22, Record, Vol. IV4 pp. 23-56, Record, Vol. IV ~5 pp. 57-65, Record, Vol. IV ~

6805 SeRA 455 (2016) j ~\J


inordinate delay in the disposition of her cases consistent withTorres;

2. The Office of the Ombudsman failed to justify thedelay in its disposition of these cases. She takes issue with thefact that the cases involving Priority Development AssistanceFund (PDAF)were resolved in a fewyears only despite the factthat it involved numerous respondents and voluminousdocuments;

3. She did not waive her right to the speedy dispositionof cases because she raised the said issue in her motion forreconsideration of the Office of the Ombudsman's Resolutiondated August 4,2014. She claims that she did not assert herright when she filed her counter-affidavit because she wasasked to respond to the complaint of the Field InvestigationOffice(FIO)and not on the complaint of complainant Mejorada.She only learned that the complaint was filed by Mejorada onAugust 17,2006, when the Officeof the Ombudsman issued itsResolution dated August 4,2014. At any rate, accused Syjucocontends that it is the duty of the prosecutor to expedite theprosecution of a case regardless ofwhether an accused objectsto the delay;

4. She was prejudiced by the delay because the fact-finding investigation and preliminary investigation hangedsuspended over her head for ten (10) years, she will havedifficulty recalling the transactions that took place in 2004 to2005 due to her advanced age, and one of the respondents,Secretary Leandro Mendoza, who is knowledgeable of thesubject transactions, had already passed away;

5. Her motion to dismiss is not founded on sheerspeculation; hence, the people's equally important right topublic justice should yield to her constitutional right to speedydisposition of cases; an~

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6. The cases she cited, i.e., Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,7Angchangco vs. Ombudsman,8 Coscolluela vs.Sandiganbayan,9 squarely apply to her cases.

Accused Patdu, Jr., Cacatian and Quintos insist that thedelay of ten (10) years and two (2)months before the Officeofthe Ombudsman resolved these cases was unreasonable; thatthey invoked their right to speedy disposition ofcases when theyfiled their motion for reconsideration before the Office of theOmbudsman on February 9,2015; that even on the assumptionthat they belatedly raised their right to speedy disposition ofcases, still they are entitled to it because the delay was notattributable to them; that some of their witnesses may havealready retired from government service to their prejudice; and,that the Court disregarded their constitutional right to speedydisposition of cases simply because they are "high rankinggovernment officials charged with corruption and malversationof public funds."l0

In another motion, accused Patdu, Jr., et al. prays thatthe copies of their motion for reconsideration and joint-affidavitreferred to in their motion for reconsideration as Annexes 1 and2, respectively, but was not attached due to inadvertence, beadmitted. II

Invoking Coscolluela vs. SandiganbayanI2 and Peoplevs. Sandiganbayan,13 accused Soneja insists that the delay inthe resolution of these cases was vexatious, capricious andoppressive.14

The prosecution filed its consolidatedcomment/opposition to the subject motions mainly claimingthat the accused-movants raise the same issues which werepassed upon by the Court in its assailed Resolution. Itmaintains that there was no unreasonable or oppressive delay

/77159 SCRA70 (1988)8268 SCRA301 (1997)9701 SCRA 188 (2013)10 at pp. 4-10; pp. 13-19, Record, Vol. IV11 pp. 23-56, Record, Vol. IV12 supra note 913 712 SCRA359 (2013)14 at pp. 2-8; pp. 58-64, Record, Vol. IV


to speak of in the conduct ofpreliminary investigation includingthe fact-finding investigation. 15

After a re-examination of the parties' arguments, the Courtfinds the subject motions for reconsideration bereft of merit.

To begin with, the concept of speedy disposition is relativeor flexible. Amere mathematical reckoning of the time involvedis not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the factsand circumstances peculiar to each case. For this reason, abalancing test of applying societal interests and the rightsof the accused necessarily compels the court to approachspeedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.16

An examination of the cases cited by accused-movantsshows that they are inapplicable to these cases because of theirsubstantially differing attendant circumstances. Thus, theCourt gave different weight and consideration of the factors inthe balancing test based on the facts and circumstances inthese cases.

Also, the Court did not disregard the accused-movants' right tospeedy disposition of cases because they are high-ranking publicofficials charged with corruption and malversation of public funds.Tobe sure, the Court found the accused-movants' claim ofprejudicecaused by the alleged delay to be a mere speculation; hence, itdeclared that "the gravity of the charges and the government's driveagainst corruption should be given greater weight as against thesheer speculation of the accused-movants." This was clearlydiscussed in the assailed Resolution which accused-movants,however, chose not to understand: 17

Plainly, the accused-movants are engaging in bareassertion and sheer speculation. Notably, they have notexplained how this supposed delay caused themoppression. Neither have they identified who theirpotential witnesses would be nor advanced the reasonswhy they would be unable to recollect accurately theevents in these cas/7

~ pp.l04-111, Reco'd, Vol. IV 116 Almeda vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Mind n ,98 seRA 131 (2016)17 pp. 29-30, Resolution promulgated on August 10, 2017; citations omitted


The Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice JosueN. Bellosilloin People vs. Lacson is worth quoting:

These cases are imbued with public interest as theyinvolve high ranking government officials charged withcorruption and malversation ofpublic funds. The gravityof the charges and the government's drive againstcorruption should be given greater weight as against thesheer speculation of the accused-movants. Their right tospeedy disposition of cases should not work against andpreclude the people's equally important right to publicjustice.

At any rate, the issues raised by the accused-movants aremere reiteration of their arguments raised in their motion toquash and motion to dismiss. These issues have beenthoroughly considered and passed upon by the Court in itsResolution sought to be reconsidered, to wit: 18

The concept of speedy disposition is relative orflexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the timeinvolvedis not sufficient. Particular regard must be takenof the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Forthis reason, a balancing test of applying societal interestsand the rights of the accused necessarily compels thecourt to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.The conduct of both the prosecution and defendant areweighed apropos the four-foldfactors, to wit: (1)length ofthe delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant'sassertion or non-assertion of his right; and (4)prejudiceto defendant resulting from the delay. None of theseelements, however, is either a necessary or sufficientcondition. They are related and must be consideredtogether with other relevant circumstances. These factorshave no talismanic qualities as courts must still engagein a difficultand sensitivebalancingproc/?

" pp. 22-30, Re'o,,"on pmm,'g,'ed onA,g," 10, 2017; citation, omitted ~ y


Applying the balancing test, the Court finds thatthe accused's right to speedy disposition of cases was notviolated.

The preliminary investigation in these cases wasterminated after three (3) years and four (4) monthsreckoned from the time the supplemental complaint wasfiled by the Field Investigation Office (FIO)on June 13,2013, until the Informations were filedwith the Court onOctober 18,2016.

Invoking Torres, accused Syjuco maintains thatthe period of the fact-finding investigation should beincluded in the determination of whether their right tospeedy disposition of cases has been violated. She pointsto the fact that the initial complaint was filed with theOfficeof the Ombudsman -Visayas on August 17, 2006.The Informations in these cases were filedwith the Courtonly on October 18, 2016. Summing it up, it took theOmbudsman ten (10)years to terminate its investigationwhich allegedly violated their right to speedy dispositionof their cases.

The attendant circumstances in Torres are notpresent in these cases; hence, the ruling therein is notapplicable here.

In Torres, there were two (2) sets of investigationsconducted. The first preliminary investigationcommenced on December 11, 1996. The cases weredismissed against petitioner therein for lack of probablecause in a Joint Resolution dated March 8, 1999. Thesecond set of investigation started when an affidavit-complaint was filed on February 22, 2006, after theTanodbayan issued an Internal Memorandum datedOctober 11, 2004 recommending the conduct of a newfact-finding and preliminary investigation relative toother transactions in the other units and offices of thePhilippine Navy. Therein petitioner was not informed ofthe second investigation because the notice was sent tohis old address which he already vacated in 1980 and hehad retired from service in 2001. Thus, therein petitionerdid not know that eight (8)Informations were filed by theOmbudsman against him on August 5, 2011. He onlylearned of the pending cases against him sometime in2014 because of the hold departure order issued againsthim when he was about to travel to the United St/'"7

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Considering the above-circumstances, theSupreme Court declared that the prosecution failed tojustify the protracted conduct of two (2) sets ofinvestigation because even if there were a distinctionbetween the two (2) sets of investigation, the same werebased on the same COAreport. The Supreme Courtfurther noted that therein petitioner asserted hisright to a speedy disposition of cases when he filedhis counter-affidavit:

Respondents claim that the investigationconducted by the COAfrom 1993 to 1996 was a"special audit which is administrative in nature";thus, it should not be included in counting thenumber of years lapsed. They further contendthat the preliminary investigations conductedfrom 1996 to 2006 which pertain to the"overpricing of medicines" procured throughemergency purchase never included petitioner,but involved other PNofficials, employees, and aprivate individual. Respondents maintain that itwas only in 2006 that petitioner was implicatedin said questionable transactions. Moreover, thepreliminary investigations conducted from 1993to 1996 against petitioner refer to differenttransactions, specifically, for Unaccounted Drugsand Medicines (docketed as OMB-4-97-0789) andfor Conversion (docketed as OMB-4-97-0790),thus, cannot be considered in determining if hisright to speedy disposition of cases had beenviolated.

While it may be argued that there was adistinction between the two sets of investigationsconducted in 1996 and 2006, such that theypertain to distinct acts of different personalities,it cannot be denied that the basis for both sets ofinvestigations emanated from the same COASpecial Audit Report No. 92-128, which wasissued as early as June 18, 1993. Thus, theOmbudsman had more than enough time toreview the same and conduct the necessaryinvestigation while the individuals implicatedtherein, such as herein petitioner, were still inactiveservi/7

ResolutionCriminal Cases No. SB-16--CRM-0780 to 0781People vs. Syjuco, et. al.X---------------------------------- ---------------------- ---------- x

Even assuming that the COA Special AuditReport No. 92-128 was only turned over to theOmbudsman on December 11, 1996 upon thefiling of the Affidavit of the COA Auditors, still, ithad been in the Ombudsman's possession andhad been the subject of their review and scrutinyfor at least eight (8) years before TanodbayanMarcelo ordered the conduct of a preliminaryinvestigation, and at least sixteen (16) yearsbefore the Ombudsman found probable cause onFebruary 25,2010.

Nevertheless, even if we start counting fromTanodbayan Marcelo's issuance of InternalMemorandum on September 30, 2004, there wasstill at least six (6) years which lapsed before theOmbudsman issued a Resolution findingprobable cause.

We find it necessary to emphasize that thespeedy disposition of cases covers not only theperiod within which the preliminary investigationwas conducted, but also all stages to which theaccused is subjected, even including fact-findinginvestigations conducted prior to the preliminaryinvestigation proper. We explained in Dansal v.Fernandez, Sr.:

Initially embodied in Section16, Article IV of the 1,973Constitution, the aforesaidconstitutional provision is one ofthree provisions mandating speedierdispensation of justice. It guaranteesthe right of all persons to "a speedydisposition of their case"; includeswithin its contemplation the periodsbefore, during and after trial, andaffords broader protection thanSection 14(2), which guarantees justthe right to a speedy trial. It is moreembracing than the protection underArticle VII, Section 15, which coversonly the period after the submissionof the case. The presentconstitutional provision applies tocivil, criminal and administrativecases. (citations omitted; emphasis

SUPPli//

AA

ResolutionCriminal Cases No. SB-16--CRM-0780 to 0781People vs. Syjuco, et. al.X ------------------------------------------------------------------ x

Considering that the subjecttransactions were allegedly committed in1991 and 1992, and the fact-finding andpreliminary investigations were ordered to beconducted by Tanodbayan Marcelo in 2004,the length of time which lapsed before theOmbudsman was able to resolve the case andactually file the Informations againstpetitioner was undeniably long-drawn-out.

Any delay in the investigation andprosecution of cases must be duly justified.The State must prove that the delay in theprosecution was reasonable, or that the delaywas not attributable to it. Our discussion inCoscolluela v. Sandiganbayan (First Divisi0I?-)is instructive:

In the present case, respondents failedto submit any justifiable reason for theprotracted conduct of the investigations andin the issuance of the resolution findingprobable cause. Instead, respondents submitthat "the cases subject of this petition involveissues arising from complex procurementtransactions that were conducted in such away as to conceal overpricing and otherirregularities, by conniving PN officers fromdifferent PN units and private individuals."

A review of the COA Special AuditReport No. 92-128, however, shows that itclearly enumerated the scope of the audit, thetransactions involved, the scheme employedby the concerned PN officers, and the possiblebasis for the filing of a complaint against theindividuals responsible for the overpricing.Respondents' argument that the case involves"complex procurement transactions" appearsto be unsupported by the facts presented.

There is no question that petitionerasserted his right to a speedy dispositionof cases at the earliest possible time. In ~

~

ResolutionCriminal Cases No. SB-16--CRM-0780 to 0781People vs. Syjuco, et. al.X-------------------------------------------------------- ---------- x

Counter-Affidavit filed before theOmbudsmanduring the reinvestigation ofthe case in 2014, petitioner had alreadyarguedthat dismissal of the case is properbecause the long delayed proceedingsviolated his constitutional right to aspeedy disposition of cases. This showsthat petitioner wasted no time to asserthis right to have the cases against himdismissed.

In contrast, these cases underwent only one (1)fact-finding investigation and thereafter a preliminaryinvestigation. The initial complaint was filed before theOffice of the Ombudsman-Visayas on August 17, 2006.However, it had to be endorsed to the Ombudsman-Luzon which has jurisdiction over the complaint forpreliminary investigation and administrativeadjudication on September 6, 2006. Pursuant to theOmbudsman's procedure, the case was transferred to theField Investigation Office(FIO)for the conduct of the fact-finding investigation. The records were forwarded to theFIO on March 20, 2009 which submitted a Fact-FindingReport dated September 16,2010 to the Ombudsman forapproval. After the said approval, the FIO consequentlyfiled its initial complaint on April 4, 2011, and itssupplemental complaint on June 13, 2013, to includeaccused Antonio Cruz. On July 28, 2013, the recordswere then endorsed to the PAMO for preliminaryinvestigation. The Officeof the Ombudsman issued anOrder dated August 7, 2013, directing the respondents(now accused) to file their respective counter-affidavits.After receipt of the respective counter-affidavits/ answerof the respondents, the Officeof the Ombudsman issueda Resolution dated August 4, 2014, finding probablecause to charge them with violation of Section 3(e) ofR. A. No. 3019 and malversation through falsification.The accused's motions for reconsideration were denied bythe Office of the Ombudsman in its Joint Order datedMarch 17,2015.

The above chronology of events clearly shows thatthere was no unreasonable or oppressive delay to speakof in the conduct .of the preliminary investigationincluding the fact-finding investigation. The delay~

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ResolutionCriminal Cases No. SB-16--CRM-0780 to 0781People vs. Syjuco, et. al.X---------------------------------- -------------------------------- x

reasonable being part of the ordinary processes ofjustice.To be sure, the concept of speedy disposition isconsistent with delays and depends upon thecircumstances. What the Constitution prohibits areunreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays whichrender rights nugatory. Further, there is no showing thatthe prosecution deliberately delayed the proceedings togain an advantage or for other impermissible reasons.Thus, the fact that it took the Officeof the Ombudsmanseveral years to resolve the accused's case and file thecorresponding Informations does not, by itself, amountto a violation of the accused-movants' right to speedydisposition of cases.

Moreover, jurisprudence instructs that theassertion of the right to a speedy trial is entitled to strongevidentiary weight in determining whether defendant isbeing deprived thereof. Failure to claim the right willmake it difficult to prove that there was a denial of aspeedy trial. In this case, it is only now that the accused-movants are asserting their right to speedy disposition ofcases.

Concededly, the Supreme Court has also ruled thatit is not the duty of a respondent/ accused to follow-uphis or her case in a preliminary investigation proceeding.However,the High Court has similarly held that the rightto speedy disposition of cases may be considered waivedif not promptly invoked. Thus:

The right to a speedy trial, as well asother rights conferred by the Constitution orstatute, may be waived except when otherwiseexpressly provided by law. One'sright to thespeedy disposition of his case musttherefore be asserted. Due to the failure ofpetitioner to assert this right, he isconsidered to have waived it.

Indeed, the accused-movants' belated assertion ofa violation of their right to speedy disposition of theircases before the Officeofthe Ombudsman should operateagainst their claim. Otherwise, their sin of omission

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would be their very weapon to defeat their prosecution.That would be giving premium to one who sleeps on hisright which rails against the teaching of the SupremeCourt that the law helps the vigilant but not those whosleep on their rights.

In fact, the Supreme Court has observed that it isalmost a universal experience that the accused welcomesdelay as it usually operates in his favor, especially if hegreatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction.He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by whichdominant cases have been known to expire.

The accused-movants further claim that the delayincurred by the Office of the Ombudsman caused themoppression and that they fear that their witnesses maybe unable to recall accurately the events to theirprejudice.

Plainly, the accused-movants are engaging in bareassertion and sheer speculation. Notably, they have notexplained how this supposed delay caused themoppression. Neither have they identified who theirpotential witnesses would be nor advanced the reasonswhy they would be unable to recollect accurately theevents in these cases.

The Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice JosueN. Bellosillo in People vs. Lacson is worth quoting:

Needless to say, respondent was neverarrested or taken into custody, or otherwisedeprived of his liberty in any manner. Theserender the first criterion inapplicable. Thus,the only conceivable harm to respondent fromthe lapse of time may arise from anxiety andthe potential prejudice to his ability to defendhis case. Even then, the harm suffered byrespondent occasioned by the filing of thecriminal cases against him is too minimal andinsubstantial to tip the scales in his favor.

Concededly, anxiety typicallyaccompanies a criminal charge. But not everyclaim of anxiety affords the accused a groundto decry a violation of the rights to sp~

;j ~

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disposition of cases and to speedy trial. Theanxiety must be of such nature and degreethat it becomes oppressive, unnecessary andnotoriously disproportionate to the nature ofthe criminal charge. To illustrate, aprosecution for the serious crime of multiplemurder naturally generates greater degree ofanxiety, than an indictment for, say, simpleestafa. The anxiety and the tarnished"reputation and image of respondent who is,after all, presently and newly elected memberofthe Senate," does not amount to that degreethat would justify a nullification of theappropriate and regular steps that must betaken to assure that while the innocentshould go unpunished, those guilty mustexpiate for their offense. Verily, they pale inimportance to the gravity of the charges andthe paramount considerations of seekingjustice for the victims as well as redeemingthe sullied integrity and reputation of thePhilippine National Police for their allegedinvolvement in the perpetration of the ghastlycnmes.

We cannot therefore hold, on the factsbefore us, that the delay in the reinvestigationand refiling of the criminal cases weighedsufficiently in support of the view thatrespondent's right to speedy disposition ofhiscases has been violated. The delay simplydoes not justify the severe remedy ofdismissing the indictments.

These cases are imbued with public interest as theyinvolve high ranking government officials charged withcorruption and malversation of public funds. The gravityof the charges and the government's drive againstcorruption should be given greater weight as against thesheer speculation of the accused-movants. Their right tospeedy disposition of cases should not work against andpreclude the people's equally important right to publicjUstiC/7

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ResolutionCriminal Cases No. SB-16--CRM-0780 to 0781People vs. Syjuco, et. ai.X ------------------------------------------------------------------ x

Finally, the cases invoked by the accused-movantsin support of their claimed violation of their right tospeedy disposition of cases are inapplicable here becauseof their substantially differing circumstances.

In sum, the accused-movants did not raise any newargument that would warrant a reversal of the Court'sResolution promulgated on August 10, 2017. To be sure, theaccused-movants cite the same rulings to support their claimedviolation of their right to speedy disposition of cases which theCourt had squarely passed upon in its questioned Resolution.

1. DENIES the followingmotions for lack of merit andfor being pro forma: (1) Motion for Reconsideration (Re:Resolution dated 10 August 201 7) dated August 25, 2017 filedby accused Judy J. Syjuco; (2)Motion for Reconsideration (Of theResolution dated 10 August 201 7) dated August 29, 2017 filedby accused Ildefonso T. Patdu, Jr., Rebecca S. Cacatian andGeronimo V. Quintos; and (3) Motion For Reconsideration datedSeptember 4,2017 filed by accused Elmer A. Soneja; and

2. NOTES the Motion to Admit Documents (Re: Motion forReconsideration of the Resolution dated 1 August 2017) datedSeptember 4, 2017 filed by accused Ildefonso T. Patdu, Jr.,Rebecca S. Cacatian and Geronimo V. Quintos.

SO ORDERED.Quezon City, Metro Manila.

PARO M. cABOT..- E-TANGPresiding Justice

Chairperson

ResolutionCriminal Cases No. SB-16--CRM-0780 to 0781People vs. Syjuco, et. al.X---------------------------- -------------------------------------- x

TO R. FERNANDEZociate Justice