REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SANDIGANBA YAN …sb.judiciary.gov.ph/RESOLUTIONS/2017/L_Crim_SB-16-CRM-1076-107… · 10159SCRA70(1988) 11364SCRA569(2001) 12 712SCRA359 ... 22 p.339,

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGANBA YAN

QUEZON CITY

Criminal Cases Nos. SB-16-CRM-I076-1077For: Violations of Section 3 (e) and

(g)of Republic Act No. 3019

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

ADELBERTO FEDERICO YAP,et al.,

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,Chairperson,FERNANDEZ, B., J. andFERNANDEZ, S.J., J.1

For resolution is accused Ma. Venus B. Casas' ((Motion forReconsideration" dated June 16,2017.2

Accused-movant Casas prays that the Court reconsider itsResolution promulgated on May 15, 2017, (which denied her((Motion to Quash Information" dated February 17, 2017) and,consequently dismiss the present case against her.3 Shepresents the followinggrounds in support thereo~ ~

1 Associate Justice Sarah Jane T. Fernandez, now chairperson of the sixth division a~ 4~inistrativeOrder No. 314-2017 dated September 13,2017, is a signatory to the assailed resolution. !O2 pp. 329-345, Vol. III,Record3 p. 340, Vol. III,Record

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-16-CRM-I076-1077People vs. Yap, et ai.

I.THE SHEER LENGTH OF TIME IT TOOK THEOMBUDSMAN TO FILE THE INFORMATION AGAINST THEACCUSED CLEARLY CONSTITUTES INORDINATE DELAY.

II.THE PROSECUTION'S EXPLANATION IS INSUFFICIENTTO JUSTIFY THE PROTRACTED PERIOD IN THECONDUCT OF THE SECOND PRELIMINARYINVESTIGATION AGAINST THE ACCUSED.

III.THE ACCUSED'S DID NOT WAIVE HER RIGHT TOSPEEDY TRIAL AND SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES.

IV.THE ACCUSED WILL SUFFER A GRAVE PREJUDICESHOULD THIS PROTRACTED CRIMINAL CASE BEALLOWED TO CONTINUE AS IT INVOLVES APROCUREMENT CONTRACT WHICH WAS CONDUCTEDMORE THAN TEN (10) YEARS AGO.4

The accused-movant asserts that there was a delay of ten(10) years, four (4) months and twenty six (26) days in thetermination of the preliminary investigation with the Office ofthe Ombudsman, reckoned from the date of the filing the firstcomplaint;5 eight (8) years, six (6) months and two (2) days if theperiod were reckoned from the filing of the second complaint;and, four (4) years, one (1) month and nineteen (19) days if theperiod were reckoned from the receipt of the letter of theRegional Director of the Commission on Audit (COA).6Accordingto the accused-movant, there is no cogent reason to justify theprotracted investigation in these cases because as early as2006, the Office of the Ombudsman possessed all the evidenceneeded for it to file criminal charges against her.7 She likewisepoints out that the Supreme Court in the case of People v.

. Sandiganbayan8 held that the period of the determination of

~

4~4 p. 330, Vol. III, Record5 p. 332, Vol. III, Record6/d7 /d8712 SeRA 359 (2013)

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-16-CRM-1076-l077People vs. Yap, et al.

probable cause should only be ninety (90) days from the filing ofthe complaint. 9

Relying on the cases of Tatad v. Sandiganbagan,10Lopez, Jr., v. Office of the Ombudsman,l1 People v.Sandiganbagan,12 Angchangco, Jr., v. Sandiganbagan,13Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman, 14 Cervantes v.Sandiganbagan,15 Almeda v. Office of the Ombudsman,16and Coscolluela v. Sandiganbagan,17 accused-movant Casasargue that the Supreme Court found the delay of three (3), five(5) and six (6) years in the termination of the preliminaryinvestigation to be inordinate. Thus, it ordered the dismissal ofthe above-mentioned cases due to the violation of the accused'sconstitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.18

The accused-movant further avers that the prosecutionfailed to offer a reasonable explanation for the delay;19the COAhas not issued a Notice of Disallowance or a Notice of Chargeagainst her; hence, the filing of the present charges against heris premature;20 she had no intention to waive her constitutionalright to speedy disposition of cases because she was unawarethat she was placed under another investigation due to thesecond complaint filed by private complainant Saavedra in2008;21and, she will suffer grave prejudice should the presentcase against her be allowed to continue because [1] herintended witnesses had resigned or retired from Mactan CebuInternational Airport Authority (MCIAA)and [2] the original andcertified true copies of the documents in support of her casehad been archived or lost.~

9 p. 332, Vol. III, Record10 159 SCRA 70 (1988)11 364 SCRA569 (2001)12 712 SCRA359 (2013)13 268 SCRA301 (1997)14307 SCRA106 (1999)15 307 SCRA149 (1999)16 G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 201617 701 SCRA188 (2013)18 pp. 332-333, Vol. III, Record19 p. 334, Vol. III, Record20 p. 335, Vol. III, Record21 p. 338, Vol. III, Record22 p. 339, Vol. III, Record

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-16-CRM-I076-1077People vs. Yap, et al.

The prosecution was granted a period of ten (10) days fromthe date of the Order issued by the Court on June 27, 2017,within which to file its comment or opposition to the motion forreconsideration filed by the accused-movant.23 However, therecord shows that the prosecution failed to file its comment or

. opposition thereto; thus, the said motion was deemed submittedfor resolution after the lapse of the aforesaid period.

To begin with, the arguments raised by the accused-movant in her present motion are mere reiterations of thegrounds she raised in her "Motion to Quash Information" datedFebruary 17, 2017.24 These arguments were squarely passedupon by the Court in its Resolution sought to be reconsidered.

On the accused-movant's assertion that there was a delayof ten (10)years, four (4)months and twenty six (26) days in thetermination of the preliminary investigation with the Office ofthe Ombudsman, reckoned from the date of the filing of the firstcomplaint,25 the Court held in its assailed Resolutionpromulgated on May 15,2017, viz:

To begin with, the letter complaints filed bySaavedra in 2006, which were recommended fordismissal by the OMB-Visayas in the same year shouldnot be included in the computation of the period todetermine the existence of inordinate delay, since thecases currently lodged before the Court are not basedon these dismissed comPlaints-'/7

23 p. 370, Vol. III, Record24 pp. 36-166, Vol. III, Record25 p. 332, Vol. III, Record26 p. 27, Resolution; p. 280, Vol. III, Record


The inapplicability of the cases of Tatad, Lopez, Jr.,People, Angchangco, Jr., Roque, Almeda and Coscolluela tothe present cases was likewise discussed by the Court in itsquestioned resolution, to wit:

In their motions, the accused-movants invoke thecases of Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,27 Angchangco, Jr.v. Sandiganbayan,28 Roque v. Ombudsman, 29Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan,30 Coscolluela v.Sandiganbayan,31 Lopez, Jr. v. Ombudsman, 32Almeda v. Ombudsman, 33 Torres v.Sandiganbayan,34 and People v. Sandiganbayan.35

The Court finds the reliance of the accused-movants on the aforesaid cases misplaced because thefactual milieus of the present cases are different fromthe said cases.

In Tatad, the Supreme Court ruled that (politicalmotivations played a vital role in activating andpropelling the prosecutorial process. "36

Here, the present cases involve no imputation ofany political motivation in the filing of the presentInformations against accused-movants.

In Roque, the High Tribunal declared as violativeof therein petitioner's right to due process and speedydisposition of cases the delay of almost six (6)years onthe part of the Ombudsman in resolving the complaintsagainst the petitioner. The Supreme Court so ruledbecause ((no explanation was given why it took almostsix years for the {Ombudsman] to resolve thecomplaints. ''37 ~

27 159 SCRA 70 (1988) rC(28268 SCRA301 (1997)29 307 SCRA106 (1999)

30307 SCRA 149 (1999) h31 701 ~CRA 188 (2013)32 364 SCRA569 (2001)33 G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 201634 G.R. No. 221562-69, October 5, 201635 712 SCRA359 (2013)36 p. 81, Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988)37 p. 111, Roque v. Office a/the Ombudsman, 307 SCRA106 (1999)


Here, the prosecution explains the time spent in thesteps it took when it received"the second complaint: thatimmediately upon the filing of the second complaint in2008, the Assistant Ombudsman for Visayas requestedthe Regional Cluster Director of the COAto submit anaudit report on the subject matter of the secondcomplaint;38 that such recourse was made in recognitionof the accused's right to be presumed innocent and tobe accorded due process of law since the Office of theOmbudsman cannot be expected to treat the secondletter complaint as a formal complaint withoutnecessitating the conduct of preliminary investigation;39that despite repeated follow-ups from the Office of theOmbudsman-Visayas, it was only on September 20,2012, that the COA was able to submit the auditfindings on the subject matter of the second complaint;40and, that the COAreport is crucial in the developmentof the case against the respondents since the subjectmatter involvedhighly technical issues.41

In Angchangco, Jr., the Supreme Court alsodismissed the Information and held that the delay ofmore than six (6) years in resolving the complaintsagainst therein petitioner amounted to a violation of hisconstitutional right to due process and speedydisposition of cases since the petitioner's severalmotions for early resolution and motion to dismissremained unacted even at the time of the filing of thepetition for mandamus before the Supreme Court.

Here, the prosecution points out that the accused-movants did not file any motion or letter seeking theearly resolution of the case against them and signifyingthat they were not waiving their right to its speedydisposition.42 The record is also bereft of any motionfrom the accused-movants raising the issue of unduedelay vis-a-vis their right to speedy disposition of casesbefore the Officeof the Ombudsman.

It must be remembered that the constitutionalright to a speedy disposition of cases is a personal rig:n

38 p. 474, Vol. II, Record /' '

39 p. 475, Vol. II, Record 44°ld41/d42 p. 315, Record; pp. 207-208, Vol. III, Record


which is waivable. Failure to assert it with reasonablepromptitude may be considered a waiver of such right. 43

Furthermore, in Cosco Zlue la, the Supreme Courtheld that the petitioners' constitutional rights to speedydisposition of cases was violated since the record of thecase showed that the petitioners were only informed ofthe 2003 Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsmanafter the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayanon June 19, 2009. In the said case, the Supreme Courtrecognized this circumstance as a plausible reason whythe petitioners had failed to assert their right to speedydisposition of cases.

Here, the records show that in its Order dated June16, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayasdirected the accused-movants to file their counter-affidavits to the complaint-affidavit filed by the PublicAssistance & Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO).44Respondent Luz O. Cosejo, accused-movant Venus B.Casas,45 respondent Romeo Bersonda, accused VeronicaOrdonez and accused Sigfredo Dublin filed their counter-affidavits on July 8, 2014, July 10, 2014, March 26,2015 and April 8, 2015, respectively.46 Based on theOffice of the Ombudsman's Resolution dated July 16,2016, accused-movants Yap47 and Barillo did not filetheir counter-affidavits. 48

Plainly, unlike the petitioners in CoscoZluela, asearly as 2014, the accused-movants were already awarethat there was a pending case against them before theOffice of the Ombudsman. However, they conspicuouslyfailed to assert their right to speedy disposition of cases.In fact, accused-movant Barillo ignored the opportunityto answer the charges against him. Thus, they shouldbe deemed to have waived their right to speedy

~

~ "a"elana v. Tan, 724SCRA133 (2014); See also Tello v. People, 588 SCRA519 (200 au,", ~Adriano, 505 SCRA 625 (2006), Bernat v. Sandiganbayan, 428 SCRA 787 (2004), Guiani v.386 SCRA436 (2002).44 pp. 126-127, Vol. II, Record45 pp. 69-72, Vol. I, Record46 pp. 56-68, Vol. I, Record47 In its Order dated September 19, 2016, the Office of the Ombudsman noted that accused-movant Yapfiled his counter-affidavit on May 25, 2015; p. 24, Vol. I, Record48 P. 13, Vol. I, Record


disposition of cases as held In Barcelona v. Tan,49 towit:

The right to a speedy trial, as well as otherrights conferred by the Constitution or statute,may be waived except when otherwise expresslyprovided by law. One's right to the speedydisposition of his case must therefore beasserted. Due to the failure of petitioner toassert this right, he is considered to havewaived it.5o

In its Comment/Opposition to accused-movantsBarillo, Yap and Casas' motions to quash/dismiss, theprosecution explains the delay surrounding the fact-finding investigation and preliminary investigationconducted in these cases, viz:·

13. It is also important to mention thatimmediately upon the filing of Saavedra's secondcomplaint in 2008, Assistant Ombudsman forVisayas Virginia P. Santiago requested Ms.Teresita N. Coscos, Regional Cluster Director ofthe Commission on Audit (COAl, to submit anaudit report on the subject matter of Saavedra'scomplaint.

16. Such recourse was also made inrecognition of the accused-movant's rights to bepresumed innocent and to be accorded dueprocess of law. After all, the OMB-Visayas couldnot be expected to treat Saavedra's lettercomplaint as a formal complaint necessitatingthe conduct of a preliminary investigation.Neither would it be fair for the OMB-Visayas torequire respondents to respond to allegationsthat clearly lacked substantiation. In likemanner, Saavedra's letter complaint cannot besimply discarded in view of the OMB's mandateto "act promptly on complaints filed in any formor manner."51 Thus, under the circumstances,the prompt action taken was the conduct of afact-finding investigatiO~

49 724 seRA 133 (2014)' :150 Emphasis supplied" Footnote om;tted; Undemo,;ng supp!;ed by the pmsecut;on ~

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-16-CRM-1076-1077People vs. Yap, et aI.

17. Records will, however, show that despiterepeated follow ups from OMB-Visayas, it wasonly on September 20, 2012 that the COAwasable to submit the audit findings of the team onthe subject matter of Saavedra's complaint. TheCOA explained in its transmittal letter that thedelay in the audit report was due to thereshuffling of auditors and difficulty in obtainingsome of the documents, attached to its report,particularly those to be obtained from MCIAA.

18. It is relevant to point out that the COAreport is crucial in the development of the caseagainst the respondents. The purchase of theARFFV,which Saavedra claimed was illegal anddisadvantageous to the government, involvedhighly technical issues, such as:

a) the opening [of]a letter of credit in favorof the manufacturer but the cost ofopening the letter of credit in theamount of Php 6,000,000.00 was paidin advance by MClAA;

b) the CIF value of the ARFFV perCommercial Invoice No. 061148 is US$616,836.86, but in the entry ofimportation at the Bureau of Customs(BOC),the same was declared to have avalue of only Php 3,800,902.00, orroughly 10%of its import price.

19. Considering the existence of these highlytechnical matters, it was only prudent on thepart of the OMB-Visayas to wait for the report ofthe COA in order to determine accuratelywhether indeed, there are sufficient grounds tofile formal charges against the respondents andmake them undergo proper preliminaryinvestigation.

20. In sum, the period of the fact-findinginvestigation could not be considered asvexatious, capricious, arbitrary or oppressive. Itwas a process necessitated by the form, mannerand nature of the allegation as well as therequirements of due process and thoroughinvestigative work.52~

~

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-16-CRM-1076-1077People vs. Yap, et al.

Considering the above-mentioned explanation of theprosecution, the Court is of the view that the cases ofCervantes v. Sandiganbayan,53 Torres v.Sandiganbayan,54 Almeda v. Office of theOmbudsman, 55 Lopez, Jr. v. Office of theOmbudsman, 56 and People v. Sandiganbayan57 donot find application to the present cases because of thedifferences in their factual milieus.

In Cervantes, the Supreme Court found that thelapse of more than six (6) years from the filing of theinitiatory complaint to the filing of the Information beforethis Court remained unexplained; in Torres, the subjecttransactions were allegedly committed in 1991 and1992; however, the fact- finding and preliminaryinvestigation were ordered to be conducted only in2004; in Almeda, the Supreme Court found that thedelay in. the proceedings was caused solely by therepeated indorsement of the Ombudsman and the Officeof the Special Prosecutor (OSP), which was attributed tothe Ombudsman's failure to realize that the petitionerwas not under the jurisdiction of the OSP or theSandiganbayan; furthermore, the handling GraftInvestigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) went onofficial study leave and no GIPO was assigned to thecase; and, in Lopez, Jr., the High Tribunal found thatthe delay before the Office of the Ombudsman couldonly be attributed to the inaction on the part of theinvestigating officials since from the time the last replywas submitted, up to the time of the recommendation ofthe filing of the criminal charges before the court, therewere no other pending incidents for resolution.

A reading of the records of these cases, together withthe submissions of the parties, will show that thefactual antecedents of the present cases differsubstantially from those of the aforementioned casesinvoked by the accused-movants.

To begin with, the letter complaints filed by Saavedrain 2006, which were recommended for dismissal by ~

53307 SCRA 149 (1999)54 G.R. No. 221562-69, October 5, 201655 G.R. No. 204267, July 5, 201656364 SCRA569 (2001)57712 SCRA359 (2013)


OMB-Visayas in the same year should not be includedin the computation of the period to determine theexistence of inordinate delay, since the cases currentlylodged before the Court are not based on thesedismissed complaints. 58

Accused-movant Casas further submits that theprosecution's explanation in shifting the blame for the delay tothe COAis insufficient to justify the protracted length of time inthe resolution of the preliminary investigation of these cases.59

To be sure, this same issue was also resolved by the Courtin its assailed Resolution. Therein, the Court ruled that theprosecution sufficiently explained the need for the referral of theletter-complaint of private complainant Saavedra to the COA,thus:

In People v. Sandiganbayan,60 the SupremeCourt included the duration of the fact-findinginvestigation in the determination of the existence ofinordinate delay in the proceedings before the Office ofthe Ombudsman since the State miserably failed toprove that the delay in the fact-finding investigation aswell as the preliminary investigation was reasonable.61In fact, the Supreme Court held that the fact-findinginvestigation should not be deemed separate from thepreliminary investigation conducted by the Office of theOmbudsman if the aggregate time spent for bothconstitutes inordinate and oppressive delay.62

Here, the Court does not find arbitrary the delay onthe part of the Office of the Ombudsman in the conductof the fact-finding investigation of these cases. Assufficiently explained by the prosecution, it referred theletter-complaint filed by Saavedra to the COA,considering that it involved highly technical mattern

58 pp. 21-28, Resolution; pp. 274-281, Vol. III, Record59 p. 335, Vol. III, Record

60 712 SCRA2013 (2013) At61 pp. 415-416, People v. Sandiganbayan, 712 SCRA2013 (2013)~ p. 364, People v. Sandlganbayan, 712SeRA 2013 (2013); Emphasis,"pplied ,k'\)


and this was indispensably essential in determining theveracity of the said complaint.

On another point, in her "Motion to Quash Information"dated February 17, 2017, accused-movant Casas recountedthat she filed her counter-affidavit to the second complaint filedby Saavedra on July 10, 2014.63 Thereafter, or on July 20,2014, she filed her position paper pursuant to the Order datedJuly 2, 2014, of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas.64Finally, she filed her "Motion for Reconsideration" of the adverseresolution of the Office of the Ombudsman on September 13,2016.65 Given these circumstances, the accused-movant cannotseriously claim that she was unaware of the investigationconducted by the Office of the Ombudsman which pertained tothe second complaint filed by Saavedra.

Notably, accused-movant Casas never asserted herconstitutional right to speedy disposition of cases during thepreliminary investigation of the present cases with the Office ofthe Ombudsman. It is only now that she is invoking the saidright. While it is true that a respondent in a criminal case hasno obligation to follow up on his/her case, it is likewisejurisprudentially settled that the accused's assertion of his/herright to speedy disposition of cases is entitled to strongevidentiary weight in determining whether or not he/ she isbeing deprived thereof;66 hence, failure to claim such right willmake it difficult to prove that there was a denial of one's right tospeedy trial.

Moreover, accused-movant Casas' allegation that she willsuffer grave prejudice if the case against her were allowed tocontinue lacks factual basis and remains unsubstantiated.Without any conclusive factual basis, her claim of prejudicedeservesno weightin law"/!

63 p. 39, Vol. III, Record 1~64 p. 40, Vol. III, Record65 p. 40, Vol. III, Record66 See Perez v. People, 544 SCRA532 (2008) citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514 (1972), Tan v. People, 586SCRA 139 (2009), Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SCRA 135 (2008), Tilendo v. Sandiganbayan,S33 SCRA 331(2007), and Spouses Uy v. Adriano, 505 SCRA625 (2006)67 Spouses Uy v. Adriano, 505 SCRA625 (2006)


In her further bid to dismiss the present case against her,accused-movant Casas argues that the determination ofprobable cause should not have taken more than ninety (90)days.

In Raro v. Sandiganbayan,68 the Supreme Court en baneruled, thus:

Neither is there factual support to petitioner's claimthat the 4-year delay in the completion of thepreliminary investigation is unexplained. The recordclearly shows that the Ombudsman exerted utmost effortto determine the veracity of Abaiio's allegations against[the] petitioner. That it took the NBI almost two years tocomplete its report on the matter does not mean thatpetitioner's right to speedy disposition of the charge wasbrushed aside. If delay may be imputed in theproceedings, the same should be reckoned only fromOctober 25, 1991 when petitioner filed his counter-affidavit.69 Thirty-six (36) days thereafter or on November29, 1991, GIO II Caraos issued the Resolutionrecommending the filing of the information. Furtherdelay, if indeed it could be called one, was caused by thereview of GIO II Caraos' recommendation by hersuperiors. Some· seven and a half months later, or onJune 11, 1992, the information was filed with theSandiganbayan. There is thus no reason to concludethat the Ombudsman ran roughshod over thepetitioner's right to a speedy preliminary investigation. Inthe determination of whether or not that right has beenviolated, the factors that may be considered and weighedare "the length of delay, the reasons for such delay, theassertion or failure to assert such right by the accused,and the prejudice caused by the delay."70

The length of time it took before the conclusion ofthe preliminary investigation may only be attributed tothe adherence of the Ombudsman and the NBI to the

68335 seRA 581 (2000)69 Footnote omitted70 Footnote omitted


rules of procedure and the rudiments of fair play. Theallegations of Abaiio's complaint had to be verified; theOmbudsman did not believe the same hook, line andsinker. Recently, the Court held that while the Rulesof Court provides a ten-day period from submissionof the case within which an investigating officermust come out with a resolution, that period of timeis merely directory.71 Thus:

"The Court is not unmindful of the duty ofthe Ombudsman under the Constitution andRepublic Act No. 6770 to act promptly onComplaints brought before him. But such dutyshould not be mistaken with a hasty resolution ofcases at the expense of thoroughness andcorrectness. Judicial notice should be taken ofthe fact that the nature of the Office of theOmbudsman encourages individuals who clamorfor efficient government service to freely lodgetheir Complaints against wrongdoings ofgovernment personnel, thus resulting in a steadystream of cases reaching the Office of theOmbudsman."72

Lastly, accused-movant Casas points out that no formalcharges were filed by the COAagainst her with respect to thesubject transaction. She contends that the filing of the presentcases is premature and that the claim of the Office of theOmbudsman that the subject COAaudit report was vital in thedetermination of probable cause against the accused has nobasis.

While accused-movant Casas may not have been thesuqiect of any notice of disallowance or notice of charge by theCOA, it must be remembered that\ the interest of the COA ismerely administrative and its investigation does not foreclose theOffice of the Ombudsman's authority to investigate anddetermine whether or not there is a crime to be prosecut~

J71 Emphasis supplied72 Footnote omitted; pp. 607-608, Raro v. Sandiganbayan, 335 SeRA 581 (2000)


It is important to stress that the concept of the right tospeedy disposition of cases is flexible, such that a meremathematical reckoning of the time involved would not besufficient in order to determine the existence of inordinatedelay.74 The different facts and circumstances surrounding eachcase must be evaluated and taken into account.75 This isprecisely the approach adopted by the Court in these cases. TheCourt applied the ((balancing test" and did not find the delay inthese cases to be vexatious, capricious and oppressive.

In sum, the accused-movant failed to raise any new orsubstantial matter that would warrant a reconsideration of theCourt's Resolution promulgated on May 15,2017.

WHEREFORE, the accused Ma. Venus B. Casas' ((Motionfor Reconsideration" dated June 16,2017,76 is DENIED for beingpro forma and/ or lack of merit.

Set the arraignment and pre-trial of the accused onDecember 8, 2017, at 8:30 in the morning.

Quezon City, Metro Manila

J" ~Cabrera v. Marcelo, 446 SeRA 207 (2004)740mbudsman v. Jurado, 561 SCRA 135 (2008); See also Dacudao v. Gonzales, 688 SCRA 109 (2013) andEnriquez v. Office of the Ombudsman, 545 SCRA618 (2008)75Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 218040, Apri/17, 201776 pp. 329-345, Vol. III, Record

ResolutionCriminal Cases Nos. SB-16-CRM-1076-1077People vs. Yap, et al.

L TO R. FERNANDEZs ociate Justice

JANE T. FE ANDEZAssociate Justice

Documents

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SANDIGANBA YAN …sb.judiciary.gov.ph/RESOLUTIONS/2017/L_Crim_SB-16-CRM-1076-107… · 10159SCRA70(1988) 11364SCRA569(2001) 12 712SCRA359 ... 22 p.339,