REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES~an{tiganhat!an

QUEZON CITY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,

FOR: Violation of Section 3(e) ofRepublic Act No. 3019

QUINTINO S. CASPILLO, JR.,Accused.

PRESENT:Cabotaje-Tang, P.J., ChairpersonQuiroz, J.**Fernandez, J.Econg, J.Pahimna, J.***

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RESOLUTION

On January 25, 2017, the Court promulgated its judgment ACQUITTINGaccused Quintino S. Caspillo, Jr. of Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.3019.1

Subsequently, on February 9, 2017, the prosecution filed a MOTION FORRECONSIDERATION dated February 8, 2017.2 The prosecution contends thereexists sufficient evidence to support a finding that accused Caspillo's designationof Engineer Wilson M. Nimenzo as Acting Municipal Engineer was attended withevident bad faith and manifest partiality.

On March 6,2017, accused Caspillo, Jr. filed an OPPOSITION/COMMENT[RE: PROSECUTION'S RECONSIDERATION DATED 8 FEBRUARY 2017]dated March 3, 2017.3 The accused asserts that his acquittal being final andimmediately executory, the motion of the prosecution cannot be given due courselest his constitutional right against double jeopardy be violated.

1 Records, Volume II, pp. 34 - 54.2 Records, Volume II, pp. 62 - 73.3 Records, Volume II, pp. 76 - 78.

*Pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule IX of the 2002 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. 4**Pursuant to Section 2(b), Rule IX of the 2002 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan.***Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 5-C-2017 dated May 15, 2017.

RESOLUTIONPEOPLE VS. CASPILLO, JR.SB-12-CRM-0146Page 2 of 4

Arising from the constitutional protection against double jeopardy affordedan accused under the Bill of Rights4 is the FINALITY-OF-ACQUITTAL RULE.The rule provides that a judgment of acquittal meted out either by a trial court orby an appellate court is deemed final, unappealable and immediately executory.

As a direct consequence of the finality-of-acquittal rule, the acquitteddefendant is entitled to the RIGHT OF REPOSE. The interplay between thefinality-of-acquittal rule and the right of repose has been aptly explained in theoft-cited case of People v. Velasco,S viz-

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, anacquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a directconsequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying thisrule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramountimportance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of theinnocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittalrule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it isa need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. Withthis right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection toinsure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury'sleniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.

True, the finality-of-acquittal rule is not without exceptions. There have beenquite a number of cases where the Supreme Court permitted a judgment ofacquittal to be revisited. In fact, in Galman v. Sandiganbayan,6 the SupremeCourt set aside a judgment of acquittal on a second motion for reconsideration.However, it must be emphasized that in Galman, as well as in all the otherattempts to assail a judgment of acquittal, the remedy used was a Petition forCertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in Villareal v. Aliga,7 theSupreme Court was prompted to make the following pronouncement-

Petitioner also committed another procedural blunder. A petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed instead ofherein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The People mayassail a judgment of acquittal only via a petition for certiorari underRule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merelycalls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, theconstitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would beviolated. (emphasis supplied)

Be that as it may, even if it were to be supposed that this Court is at libertyto review the acquittal of the accused, the prosecution's motion finds no merit.

The position taken by the prosecution, i.e., that accused's mere act ofdesignating Engineer Wilson M. Nimenzo as Acting Municipal Engineerconstitutes sufficient proof of evident bad faith and manifest partiality, is a merereiteration of an argument presented during trial and which argument has beenpassed upon and addressed in the ponencia; hence-

4 Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. I anpunished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a ba tprosecution for the same act.G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000, 340 SCRA 207.G.R. No. 72670, September 12,1986, 144 SCRA 43.G.R. No. 166995, January 13,2014,713 SCRA 52.

RESOLUTIONPEOPLE VS. CASPILLO, JR.SB-12-CRM-0146Page 3 of4

Manifest partiality cannot be proven by the mere fact that Engr. Nimenzowas chosen by the accused instead of Engr. Esperon to be head of theMEa. There must be clear evidence of bias on the part of the accused inchoosing engr. Nimenzo over Engr. Esperon. The procedural aspect on theappointment as casual assistant engineer and the manner and timing ofdesignation of Engr. Nimenzo are likewise not sufficient proof of evidentbad faith. The designation by the accused of Engr. Nimenzo must beproven to impute patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moralobliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.

We find that the accused, had sufficiently justified that temporary relief ofEngr. Esperon as the head of the MEa. As testified to by the accused andcorroborated by witness Primodario C. Sabado, there were already oralcomplaints as early as June 2010 regarding the irregularities under theleadership of Engr. Esperon of the MEa. A fact-finding committee was lateron created and a formal investigation followed, which Engr. Esperonactively participated. Although the said investigation came later, after thedesignation of Engr. Nimenzo on July 5, 2010, the decision of the accusedwas impelled by the risk that Engr. Esperon may contaminate or hide theevidence under the custody of his office.

Precisely, accused could only temporarily relieve Engr. Esperon on July5, 2010 because suspension cannot be lawfully done, until formalinvestigation is finished to comply with the requirement of due process. Infact, after July 5, 2010, Engr. Esperon continued to report for work and toreceive his salary and benefits, except for the RATA.

It may be reasonably inferred therefore, that the temporary relief of Engr.Esperon as the head of MEa, as can be deduced from the evidence, wasnot due to the eagerness or bias on the part of the accused to designateEngr. Nimenzo.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsiderationdated March 3, 2017 filed by the prosecution is hereby DENIED.

RESOLUTIONPEOPLE vs. CASPILLO, JR.SB-12-CRM-0146Page 4 of4

~MPAROL Pr .. stice

Chairperson

~~~GERALDINE FAITH A. ECONG

Associate Justice

T. FERNAAssociate Justice