Reference Materials · ※4 Machhu Ⅱdam overflowed due to flood, and failed within 2 hours. 2500 people died. ※5 Fatalities immediately after the accident only Source: New Ext

Reference Materials Content

1.Comparison of potential damages caused by different energy sources

2.Actual social impacts caused by the Fukushima accident

3.Definition of risk

4.Uniqueness of nuclear risk

Document 3 Second Meeting

Working Group on Voluntary Efforts and Continuous

Improvement of Nuclear Safety,

Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy

1

Provisional Translation

1. Comparison of potential damages caused by different energy sources

2

ExternE Project:

• Implemented from 1991 to 1999 by the European Commission (EC) in cooperation with US Dept. of

Energy

• Objective was to develop and assess a consolidated quantitative assessment method on environmental

impact and social costs of energy production & consumption

– Also assessed impact of air pollutants, radioactive materials, and global warming

• Assesses each stage of the energy chain

– Fuel collection, fuel transport, power generation, power transport, waste management ●Assessment of external costs (Since it is a consolidated quantitative assessment, it is expressed in monetary values) <Air pollutants> ・Assessment includes SO2, NOX, ammonia, and particulates ・Assessment of impact on health, agricultural products, infrastructure, forestry, and ecosystem <Global warming> ・Assesses CO2, CH4, N2O ・Assessment of sea level increase, agricultural products, ecosystem/ biodiversity, health (hot stress, cold stress, malaria), natural phenomenon (hurricanes, river floods, snow storms)

Example of assessing external cost of energy

Assessment results of externalities by power source in European countries (monetary value equivalent)

Source: ExternE, Externality of Energy, Vol. 10 National Implementation. European Commission. 1999. K. Nishimura, Denryoku –Keizai-Kenkyu, No.42, 1999.10

3

Important impact paths in fuel chain

Fuel chain Source Impact

Coal CO2 Global warming

Sulfate and nitrate due to release of SO2 and NOx

Increase in fatality rate and disease rate

Particulate material accompanying release of primary particles


Ozone created from released NOx

Possibility of increase in disease rate and fatality rate

Coal mining Disease by coal dust

Coal mining Death/injury due to coal mine accident

Coal transport by railway or trucks

Death/injury due to accident

Oil CO2 Global warming

Sulfate and nitrate due to release of SO2 and NOx






Oil import Cost to secure energy supply

Fuel chain Source Impact

Gas CO2 Global warming

Nitrate due to release of NOx Increase in fatality rate and disease rate



Leak from facility or pipeline Damage due to accident

Nuclear Possible sever accident Risk of death/injury and asset damages

Spent fuel reprocessing Increase in long-term (several thousands of years) fatality rate and disease rate

Biomass Nitrate due to release of NOx Increase in fatality rate and disease rate





Transport of plants Damage of roads and accidents

Air pollution

Hydropower Land use Changing local environment

(Source) IAEA, 2000, “IAEA Working Material, IAEA’s activities on comparative studies of health and environmental risks associated with electricity generation systems, procedures on the technical committee meeting to summarize the achievement of a five year study of impacts and risks of energy systems”

Example of assessing external cost of energy

(As assessed under the “Joint Research Program on Risk Comparison of Nuclear and other Energy Systems” (1994-1998) jointly conducted by IAEA and research institutions in 12 countries)

4

*1: For China, analysis is for

only 1994-1999 when China

coal industry yearbook was

available for coal data.

The number of fatalities due to

coal mining in China from

2002-2009 is on average about

5,000 persons/year. (Source: New Energy and

Industrial Technology

Development Organization

Commissioned Research “World

Coal Status Survey: FY2010”)

*2: Fatalities immediately after

the accident only.

Severe accidents from 1969-2000 in fossil fuel, hydro, nuclear energy chains (5 or more fatalities)

OECD member states Non-OECD member states

Energy chain No. of accidents

Fatalities (persons)

Fatalities/ production (GW-year)

No. of accidents

Fatalities (persons)

Fatalities/ production (GW-year)

Coal (China (1994-99)*1)

75 2,259 0.157 1044 (819)

18,017 (11,334)

0.597 (6.169)

Oil 165 3,713 0.132 232 16,505 0.897 Natural gas 90 1,043 0.085 45 1,000 0.111

LPG 59 1,905 1.957 46 2,016 14.896 Hydro 1 14 0.003 10 29,924 10.285

Nuclear 0 0 - 1 31*2 0.048

○According to OECD reports, accidents in the front-end such as collection, refining/converting, and transporting fuel

account for the majority of all accidents over the entire energy chain for fossil fuels.

○Damages by accidents are larger in non-OECD member states compared to OECD states.

Exploration/collection

96%

Refine/convert

1%

Transport 1%

Production/hea

t use 3%

Coal Exploration/collection

15%

Refine/convert

8%

Transport

76%

Production/hea

t use 1%

Oil Exploration/collection

6%

Transport

78%

Production/hea

t use 5%

Unknown

11%

Natural gas

Distribution of accidents over processes in energy chain

Source: Developed by ANRE based on PSI 1998* the main data source for OECD2010

*3 Severe Accidents in the Energy Sector. Hirschberg S., Spiekerman G. and Dones R., 1998 (Paul Scherrer Institute)

*Fatalities due to accidents in all production

processes for hydro and nuclear power. ○Major causes of accidents

Coal:

Accident in coal pit such as

gas explosion, fire, collapse

Oil/ natural gas:

Accident during transport such

as traffic accident, tanker

accident, pipeline failure

(Source: OECD2010 NEA No.6861 “Comparing Nuclear Accident Risks with Those from Other Energy Sources” )

Source: 10th Advisory Committee for Natural

Resources and Energy, Fundamental Issues

Subcommittee document

Severe accidents by different power sources (1)

5

(Source: New Ext (New elements for the assessment of external costs from energy technologies) Final Report to the European Commission.

IER, Germany, AARMINES/ENSMP, France, PSI, Switzerland, Universite de Paris I, France, University of Bath, United Kingdom, VITO, Belgium, 2004)

Severe accidents by different power sources (2) Sum of fatalities, injuries, evacuees*2 for severe accidents*1 between 1969 to 2000 in energy chains (standardized by

production) *1: Defined as accidents with 5 or more fatalities, 10 or more injured persons, 200 or more evacuees *2: For nuclear, fatalities only

immediately after the accident

New Ext (New elements for the assessment of external costs from energy technologies)： Project conducted by the EU to extend the methodology of evaluating external costs after the completion of the Extern E project. One of the main goals was to extend the scope to severe accidents of non-nuclear energy chain, that was not fully evaluated under the Extern E project. OECD reports mentioned above were based on the results of that data.

6

原子力以外の電源に関する主な過酷事故の概要 Severe accidents by power source (3) Ten energy-related severe accidents with the highest number of immediate fatalities in the period 1969-2000

※１

※２

※３

※４

7

Date Country Energy chain

Energy chain stage Fatalities Injured Evacuees

Costs

05.08.1975 China Hydro Power Plant 26,000 - - -

20.12.1987 Philippines Oil Transport to Refinery 4375 26 - -

01.11.1982 Afghanistan Oil Regional Distribution 2700 400 - -

11.08.1979 India Hydro Power Plant 2500 - 150,000 1260

18.09.1980 India Hydro Power Plant 1000 - - -

18.10.1998 Nigeria Oil Transport to Refinery 900 100 - -

04.06.1989 Russian Federation

ＬＰＧ Transport to Refinery 600 755 - -

02.11.1994 Egypt Oil Transport to Refinery 580 >1 20,000 160

29.06.1995 Republic of Korea Oil Transport to Refinery 577 952 - -

25.02.1984 Brazil Oil Transport to Refinery 508 150 2500 -

Date Country Energy chain

Energy chain stage Fatalities Injured Evacuees

Costs

19.11.1984 Mexico ＬＰＧ Regional Distribution 498 7231 250,000 3

11.11.1979 Canada ＬＰＧ Regional Distribution - 8 250,000 24

28.03.1979 USA Nuclear Power Plant - - 200,000 5960


14.09.1997 India LPG(OIL) Refinery 60 39 150,000 27

26.04.1986 Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant 31 370 135,000 372,300

25.05.1988 Mexico Oil Regional Distribution - 7 100,000 -

26.02.1988 USA Oil Regional Distribution >1 - 60,000 2

19.12.1982 Venezuela Oil Power Plant 160 1000 40,000 93

05.06.1976 USA Hydro Power Plant 14 800 35,000 2720

（Mio USD 2000）

19.11.1984 Mexico ＬＰＧ Regional Distribution 498 7231 250,000 3

17.01.1980 Nigeria Oil Extraction 180 3000 - -

22.04.1992 Mexico Oil Regional Distribution 252 1600 5000 370


Oil Regional Distribution 5 1020 - -

19.12.1982 Venezuela Oil Power Plant 160 1000 40,000 93

25.01.1969 USA ＬＰＧ Regional Distribution 2 976 100 14

29.06.1995 Republic of Korea Oil Regional Distribution 577 952 - -


01.07.1972 Mexico ＬＰＧ Regional Distribution 8 800 300 5


ＬＰＧ Regional Distribution 600 755 - -

26.04.1986 Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant 31 370 135,000 372,300

28.03.1979 USA Nuclear Power Plant - - 200,000 5960

24.03.1989 USA Oil Regional Distribution - - - 2780


28.01.1969 USA Oil Extraction - - - 2630

07.07.1988 UK Oil Extraction 167 - - 2180

02.01.1997 Japan Oil Regional Distribution 1 - - 1320

25.09.1998 Australia Natural Gas

Extraction 2 8 120 1296


26.07.1996 Mexico Natural Gas

Extraction 9 47 - 1100

※１ River rose due to record rainfall by a typhoon, then the Banqiao/Shimantan dam failed. 18 villages were destroyed and 26,000 people died.

※２ An oil tanker and a passenger ferry collided with each other, exploded, and sank. 4375 people (crew and passenger) died.

※３ A fuel truck crashed and burst into flames in the tunnel of overall length 2.7 km. 2700 people died by heat and noxious fumes

※４ Machhu Ⅱdam overflowed due to flood, and failed within 2 hours. 2500 people died.

※５ Fatalities immediately after the accident only Source: New Ext (New elements for the assessment of external costs from energy technologies) Final Report to the European Commission. IER, Germany, AARMINES/ENSMP, France, PSI, Switzerland, Universite de Paris I, France, University of Bath, United Kingdom, VITO, Belgium, 2004.

※４

※４

※５

※５

(Reference) Impact assessment of Chernobyl accident

Results of 20-year research after the Chernobyl accident has found that there was no health impact for the

majority of the general public excluding emergency workers and children who inhaled radioactive iodine at the

time of the accident.

Radiation exposure impact due to Chernobyl accident

Plant workers/ firefighters

Exposure related

personnel *2 Exposure dose *2

Accident cleanup workers

(1986-7)

Forced evacuees (1986)

Residents in controlled area

Residents in low level

contamination area

237 pers.

240,000 pers.

116,000 pers.

270,000 pers.

(1986-2005)

5 million pers.

(1986-2005)

Fatal exposure

50mSv or more

Number of deaths of Chernobyl accident *3

-134 were diagnosed with acute radiation illness.

-28 people died within 4 months due to heat burns by acute

radiation illness and burns due to radiation (*1)

-19 people died by 2006 due to different causes unrelated to

radiation

-Death due to thyroid cancer

More than 6,000 cases of pediatric thyroid cancer was reported

from 1991 to 2005, but deaths by 2005 is 15.

-There is no consistent evidence on health impact in the general

public caused by radiation exposure due to the accident.

*1: 3 people died during and immediately after the accident (2 were immediate deaths due to reactor explosion, and one person died due to coronary thrombosis on the bus after completing work.

*2: Source: Chernobyl Forum “Chernobyl: looking back to go forwards; towards a United Nations consensus on the effects of the accidents and the future”, Vienna 6-7 Sept. 2005, IAEA et al.

*3: Source: United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation

*4: ICRP (“International Commission on Radiological Protection” Recommends international standards on radiological protection as an advisory body to the World Health Organization (WHO) since

1956

-Estimation of excessive cancer deaths due to exposure from Chernobyl accident

Research has assessed that the excessive cancer deaths from exposure are 4,000 people, 9,000 people, or 16,000 people for Europe overall. However,

the calculation has been based on the concept of collective effective dose. Therefore, a very minute exposure dose has been multiplied by several million

or several hundred millions of people and the risk factor to obtain the estimated value. ICRP (*4) Publ.103 (2007) and UNSCEAR 2008 report clearly state

that the collective effective dose should not be used in risk predictions.

Source: Document from 2nd Meeting for New Framework Development (Jan. 14, 2011) 8

1. Based on the resident exposure dose estimate reports from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, WHO

assessed health risks and published their report. (Feb. 28, 2013)

2. There is little possibility that there will be an increase in disease incidences due to radiation from this

accident in terms of health impact on local residents. It was stated that the risks are negligible for

neighboring countries and areas other than a few areas in Fukushima Prefecture (*1). This analysis

used conservative assumptions(*2) to prevent underestimation as much as possible in estimating

maximum exposure dose.

(*1) Ex. 1: The lifetime attributable risk for a 20-year old male to develop solid cancer (by age 89) is

40.74%. This increases +0.394% in Namie-machi after the Fukushima accident.

Ex. 2: The lifetime attributable risk for a one year old female to develop thyroid cancer (by age 89) is

0.77%. This increases +0.524% in Namie-machi after the Fukushima accident.

(*2) To take account for maximum exposure, assumptions were made for calculation such as 1: people

remained in the area for four months even if it is an evacuated area, 2: people continued to eat food

only from Fukushima at the initial stage of the accident including items which were banned from

shipment.

(Reference) WHO Report: Health damage risk to the public due to

the Fukushima NPP accident

9 Source: Health risk assessment from the nuclear accident after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami based on a preliminary dose estimation. WHO, 2013.

10

(Reference) Effects of radiation in our daily-life

放射線医学総合研究所ホームページ（出典：資源エネルギー庁2000年）より作成

胸部CTスキャン1回あたり

6.9 mSv

(6900 μSv)

胸部単純エックス線1回あたり

0.06 mSv

(60 μSv)

世界平均1人あたりの1年間放射線量

2.4 mSv

(2400 μSv)

東京・ニューヨーク往復飛行機の旅

～0.19 mSv

(～190 μSv)

人工放射線

自然放射線

大地から

0.46 mSv

宇宙から

0.38 mSv

空気中のラドンから

1.3 mSv食物から

0.24 mSv

mSv：ミリシーベルト μSv：マイクロシーベルト

① In our daily-life, we are receiving natural radiation such as cosmic radiation from space, radiation emitted from uranium in the ground and radioactive radon gas in the air and radiation emitted from potassium in food.

② The average annual natural radiation in the world and in Japan is 2.4mSv and 1.5mSv, respectively.

③ In addition, we may receive artificial radiation from medical examination such as chest CT scans and X-rays, etc.

Source) Global average dose is from the UNSCEAR report (2008). Average dose in Japan is from “Living environment radiation” NSRA, 2011.

平均値ｍＳｖ／年

【出典】UNSCEAR報告書（2008年、1993年）等

ガラパリ（ブラジル）５．５

ｵﾙｳﾞｨｴｰﾄ（ｲﾀﾘｱ）４．９

ボルダー（米国）４．５

ラムサール（イラン）１７．５

日本０．６７

ケララ（インド）４．０

ドイツ０．７２

ｶﾝﾊﾟﾆｱ（イタリア）２．５

スペイン０．８２

陽江（中国）３．２

ｵﾙｳﾞｨｴｰﾄ

ﾌｨﾚﾝﾂｪ

ﾛｰﾏ

（注）日本の被ばく量は自然放射線の年間被ばく量1.48mSvのうち、食物摂取、ラドンの吸入などによる内ばく0.81mSvを除いた、外部被ばくの値。

1000 – 2000

500 – 1000

200 – 500

100 – 200

100 以下

放射線の線量（ミリシーベルト）

生活習慣因子

喫煙者大量飲酒（毎日3合以上）

大量飲酒（毎日2合以上）肥満（BMI≧30）やせ（BMI<19）

運動不足高塩分食品

野菜不足受動喫煙（非喫煙女性）

1.8

1.6

1.6

1.4

1.4

1.22

1.29

1.19

1.15 - 1.19

1.11 – 1.15

1.08

1.06

1.02 – 1.03

検出不可能

がんの相対リスク＊

In the world, there are regions where the amount of natural radiation is several times higher than Japan. However, there is no distinct evidence showing that adverse health effects have ever been reported in these regions.

Risk attributable to low-dose radiation is extremely low and cannot be distinguished from the other lifestyle related factors

Note) Risk is a measure showing the possibility that harmful effect will happen, and it is neither antonym of “safety” nor something meaning just “danger”. Source: Homepage of National Cancer Center

Regional natural radiation dose in the world (external exposure only)

Comparison of cancer risk attributable to radiation exposure and other lifestyle factors

Natural Radiation Sources

Artificial radiation sources

from space

from food

from radon gas in the air

from ground

Average annual radiation dose to a person in the world

One chest CT scan

One chest X-ray

Round trip flight between Tokyo and New York

Source: Based on http://www.nirs.go.jp

Annual dose from natural radiation (Japan) (Reference) Global average

from space

From inhalation (Mainly radon )

from ground

from food from food

From inhalation (Mainly radon )

from space

from ground

Japan average

Global average

Exte

rnal

Exte

rnal

Inte

rna

l

Inte

rnal

Average dose (mSv/year) Ramsar (Iran)

Guarapari (Brasil)

Orvieto (Italy)

Boulder (USA)

Boulder (USA)

Yangjiang (China) Campania (Italy) 2.5

Spain

Germany

Japan

Florence Orvieto Rome

(Note) Amount of radiation exposure in Japan shows the external exposure after removing the

internal exposure of 0.81mSv due to ingestion of food and inhalation of radon gas from the

annual natural radiation exposure of 1.48mSv.

Source: UNSCEAR report (2008. 1993), etc.

Radiation Dose (mSv)

Lifestyle habit factors

Relative cancer risk

Smoker Heavy drinking (more than 360cc a day)

Heavy drinking (more than 540cc a day)

Obesity（BMI≧30） Underweight（BMI＜19） Lack of exercise High-sodium intake

Lack of vegetables Secondhand smoke (non-smoking woman)

Non-detectable

http://www.nirs.go.jp/

http://www.nirs.go.jp/

2. Actual social impacts caused by the Fukushima accident

11

• Number of evacuees out of residents in Fukushima prefecture: About 148,000 people (as of August 13,

2013)

• Number of evacuees from evacuation areas: About 84,000 people (estimated by the victim support team

of Cabinet Office, Government of Japan)

• Nationwide total of disaster-related deaths is 2,688. Out of this, 1,383 deaths were in Fukushima

Prefecture (*includes deaths caused by earthquake & tsunami, as of the end of March 2013)

Impact of TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPS Accident

Monitoring results calculated for April 29, 2011 Monitoring results calculated for Nov. 16, 2012

Excerpt from “MEXT and US DOE aircraft aerial monitoring

measurement results (May 6, 2011)” Excerpt from “1. 6th aerial monitoring results and 2. Aerial monitoring measurement

results outside of 80km range from Fukushima Daiichi NPS (March 1, 2013)” 12

（Reference）Evacuation Area Conceptual Drawing

広野町

伊達市

いわき市

飯舘村（2012/7/17~）

楢葉町（2012/8/10~）

川内村（2012/4/1~）

田村市（2012/4/1~）

帰還困難区域

居住制限区域

避難指示解除準備区域

凡例

福島第一

原子力発電所

福島第二原子力発電所

大熊町（2012/12/10~）

南相馬市（2012/4/16~）

富岡町（2013/3/25~）

葛尾村（2013/3/22~）

双葉町（2013/5/28~）

20km

浪江町（2013/4/1~）

※カッコ内の日付は区域見直しの施行日

川俣町（2013/8/8~）

Legend:

Difficult-to-return area

Restricted residence area

Evacuation cancellation preparation area

Dates in parenthesis means the dates re-

defined as that type of area

Fukushima

Daiichi

NPS

Iitate

Katsurao

Date

Minami-soma

Tamura

Kawauchi

Tomioka

Namie

Naraha Fukushima

Daini NPS

Iwaki

Futaba

Hirono

Kawauchi

Ohkuma

The following is the analysis results for the 35 deaths in Fukushima Prefecture that occurred one year or more after the accident.

(1) About 50% were in their 80s at the time of death. About 80% were in their 70s or older.

(2) Gender is roughly 50-50.

(3) About 80% had previous medical condition and 10% had none.

(4) By causes (multiple choices could be selected)

About 50% were “physical and psychological fatigue due to living at evacuation shelters,” about 20% for “physical and psychological fatigue due to travel to evacuation shelters,” and about 10% were “delay in initial treatment due to functional shutdown of hospitals.”

Of the 761 disaster-related deaths in Fukushima Prefecture known as of March 31, 2012, 734 occurring in municipalities with high disaster-related deaths and municipalities where evacuation was ordered due to the nuclear accident were investigated. Results showed that about 30% were “physical and psychological fatigue due to living at evacuation shelters,” about 30% for “physical and psychological fatigue due to travel to evacuation shelters,” and about 20% was “delay in initial treatment due to functional shutdown of hospitals.”

(5) When individual cases were examined, almost all cases were gradual weakening due to fatigue, stress, lack of physical exercise, and healthcare conditions occurring during evacuation after the accident (travel) or while living in evacuation conditions. Average number of transfers (travel) was seven times.

There were some cases in which health conditions deteriorated after a temporary visit (physical strength undermined due to long-term reception tasks).

(6) One death by suicide.

(March 29, 2013 Reconstruction Agency “Report concerning the prevention of earthquake-related deaths in Fukushima Prefecture”)

Disaster-related deaths in Fukushima Prefecture

14

Prefecture Disaster-related fatalities

Iwate 389

Miyagi 862

Yamagata 2

Fukushima 1,383

Ibaraki 41

Saitama 1

Chiba 4

Tokyo 1

Kanagawa 2

Nagano 3

Total 2,688

(people)

Note1: Numbers known as of March 31, 2013

Note2: Includes those for the earthquake whose

seismic source was in the northern area of

Nagano Prefecture which occurred on March 12,

2011.

Note 3: This survey is based on inquiries to the

municipalities through prefectures and their

responses.

Note 4: Disaster-related fatalities is defined as

“Those who deceased due to degraded conditions

of injuries caused by the Great East Japan

Earthquake or similar and who were eligible to

receive disaster condolence money based on the

Act for Issuing Disaster Condolence Money.”

(includes people who did not actually receive the

condolence money)

15

Disaster related fatalities due to the Great East Japan Earthquake

(As of March 31, 2013)

Source: 21st Nuclear Damage Compensation Conflict Screening Session meeting (Jan. 27, 2012)

Change rate in regional demographics in Fukushima Prefecture (2011)

Fig.3 Annual regional demographic change rate by age group (comparison of

2010 and 2011)

Disaster related

(2011, 2010)

2010

(reference year)

2011

(disaster year)

Fig. 6 Toddler, children, students transferring out of Fukushima Prefecture (as of Sept. 1, 2011) (Units: people)

Fig. 8 Business restart of members of 11 chambers of commerce in Fukushima Prefecture that have relocated (as of Dec. 20, 2011)

Fukushima

Prefecture

Kindergarten Elementary Middle High school Special needs

schools Total

Suspended Discontinued Business restarted Members

*Source: MEXT study “Acceptance of toddlers, children, and students affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake in schools”

*Hirono, Naraha, Tomioka, Kawauchi, Ohkuma, Naraha, Namie, Katsurao, Odaka, Iitate,Miyakoji Chambers of Commerce

16

Additional decommissioning

costs

・Cost to take measures for high concentration contaminated areas ・Costs to develop intermediate storage facilities ・Costs for final disposition

(Cost is unknown)

*1: For the total damage amount, the actual conditions are unclear and cannot be estimated at this point in time according to the

TEPCO Business Management & Finance Investigation Committee Report.

・Life and physical damages

・Damages related to government orders such as setting up no-fly zones and maritime danger zones

・Asset damages for local public entities

*2: For additional decommissioning costs, it is difficult to take action with existing technology. It is difficult at this point in time to

provide a total sum estimation by aggregating specific costs for each process.

*3: For decontamination related costs, it has been marked for government budget in FY2011 second supplementary budget, 3rd

supplementary budget, and FY2012 initial budget. Subsequent decontamination related costs are not included.

Damage compensation costs*

6.4046 trillion yen

Source: Cost Review Committee Report (Dec. 2011)

Updated by National Policy Unit in August 2012 *Numbers are uncorrected for model plant

Damage value of TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPS Accident

*Approach to reviewing damage compensation costs by National Policy Office.

For the initial year, according to the actual policy of the conflict review committee, damage amounts are added for psychological damages and to compensate for lost work. For second year onward, decontamination benefits will not be considered, but assumed that it will be possible to return home through natural attenuation of radiation dose. Based on that, costs for the next 20 years have been considered and added.

・Additional decommission costs due to the accident ・Cost to maintain stability of reactors

・Psychological damage ・Loss or decline of assets ・Evacuation costs ・Inspection costs ・Temporary visit costs, returning costs ・Negative rumor costs ・Business operation damages ・Damages for inability to work etc.

Decontamination

costs

1.1117 trillion yen

1.1482 trillion yen

8.7627 trillion yen

17

Other costs

3661 trillion yen

・Policy costs etc.

3. Definition of risk

18

Depending on the context, the term risk may be used to represent a quantitative measure (as, for example, in definitions (1) and (2)) or as a qualitative concept (as often for definition (3)).

1. A multiattribute quantity expressing hazard, danger or chance of harmful or injurious

consequences associated with actual or potential exposures. R ={<Si｜pi｜Xi >}

Si：scenario i , pi：probability of that scenario, Xi：a measure of the consequence of the scenario

2. The mathematical mean (expectation value) of an appropriate measure of a specified (usually unwelcome) consequence

R=ΣpiCi I

pi：the probability of occurrence of scenario or event sequence i Ci：a measure of the consequence of that scenario or event sequence.

3. The probability of a specified health effect occurring in a person or group as a result of exposure to radiation.

--The health effect(s) in question must be stated — e.g. risk of fatal cancer, risk of serious hereditary effects or overall radiation detriment — as there is no generally accepted ‘default’.

-- Commonly expressed as the product of the probability that exposure will occur and the probability that the exposure, assuming that it occurs, will cause the specified health effect. The latter probability is sometimes termed the conditional risk.

Source: “IAEA Safety Glossary Terminology used in Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection”, 2007 Edition.

International Atomic Energy Agency（IAEA）① Definition of Risk

19

＜Definition of Risk＞

＜Acceptable risk＞ IAEA does not define the term of acceptable risk. ＜Safety Goal＞ • IAEA defines following three qualitative goals as well as quantitative target values in INSAG-

12 ”Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plant”. – Qualitative Goal 1．GENERAL NUCLEAR SAFETY OBJECTIVE To protect individuals, society and the environment by establishing and maintaining in nuclear power plants an effective

defense against radiological hazard. 2．RADIATION PROTECTION OBJECTIVE

To ensure in normal operation that radiation exposure within the plant and due to any release of radioactive material from the plant is as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account, and below prescribed limits

To ensure mitigation of the extent of radiation exposure due to accidents.

3．TECHNICAL SAFETY OBJECTIVE To prevent with high confidence accidents in nuclear plants To ensure that, for all accidents taken into account in the design of the plant, even those of very low probability,

radiological consequences, if any, would be minor to ensure that the likelihood of severe accidents with serious radiological consequences is extremely small

– Target (consistent with the technical safety objective ) • Existing plants ：Core Damage Frequency<10-4/reactor-year, Large Early Release Frequency<10-

5/reactor-year • Future plants： Core Damage Frequency<10-5/reactor-year , The practical elimination of accident

sequences that could lead to large early radioactive releases.

IAEA ② Acceptable risk, Safety Goal

Source: IAEA INSAG-12, “Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants, 75-INSAG-3 Rev. 1”, Oct. 1999. 20


• The combined answer to three questions that consider (1) what can go wrong, (2) how likely it is, and (3) what its consequences might be.

• These three questions allow the NRC to understand likely outcomes, sensitivities, areas of importance, system interactions, and areas of

uncertainty, which can be used to identify risk-significant scenarios.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission（NRC）① Definition of Risk

U. S. NRC, Glossary

21

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/risk-significant.html



＜Acceptable risk＞

An acceptable risk is the risk associated with the most acceptable alternative in a decision problem.

• Two important clarifications accompany this definition:

(a) Technically speaking, we never accept risks. We accept an alternative that has some level of risk. Whenever the decision-making process has considered benefits or other costs, as well as risks, the most acceptable alternative may not be the one with the least risk.

(b) Acceptable risk is situation specific. That is, there are no universally acceptable risks. The choice of an alternative (and its associated risk) depends on the set of alternatives, consequences, values, and facts invoked in the decision process. In different situations, different alternatives, values, and information may be relevant. Over time, errors in the analysis may be discovered, new safety devices may be invented, values may change, additional information may come to light, and so forth. Any of these changes could lead to a change in the acceptability of an alternative. Even in the same situation and at a single time, different people with different values, beliefs, objectives, or decision methods might disagree on which alternative is best. In short, the search for absolute acceptability is misguided.

NRC ② Acceptable risk

Source: NUREG/CR-1614, Approaches to Acceptable Risk: A Critical Guide, December, 1980. 22

＜Safety Goals＞

• The qualitative safety goals are as follows ： – Individual members of the public should be provided a level of protection from the consequence of

nuclear power plant operation such that individuals bear no significant additional risk to life and health.

– Societal risks to life and health from nuclear power plant operation should be comparable to or less than the risks of generating electricity by viable competing technologies and should not be a significant addition to other societal risks.

• The following quantitative objectives are to be used in determining achievement of the above safety goals:

– The risk to an average individual in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant of prompt fatalities that might result from reactor accidents should not exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1 percent) of the sum of prompt fatality risks resulting from other accidents to which members of the U.S. population are generally exposed.

– The risk to the population in the area near a nuclear power plant of cancer fatalities that might result from nuclear power plant operation should not exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1 percent) of the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all other causes.

＜General Performance Guideline＞ The following Guidelines has been used as surrogates for prompt fatality risk and latent cancer risk shown in

the quantitative objectives.

• A probability for severe core damage＜10-4 per reactor year

• A large release of radioactive materials to the environment from a reactor accident＜10-6 per reactor year

NRC ③ Safety Goals

Source: 51FR28044, “Safety Goals for the Operations of Nuclear Power Plants ;Policy Statement “ , Aug. 4 , 1986. 23

＜ Definition of Risk ＞ • Risk is defined as “the chance that someone or something that is valued will be

adversely affected in a stipulated way by the hazard.” • Hazard is defined as “the potential for harm arising from an intrinsic property or

disposition of something to cause detriment.” – HSE – as far as the health, safety and welfare of people is concerned – frequently makes use

of the above conceptual distinction in its guidance by requiring that hazards be identified, the risks they give rise to are assessed and appropriate control measures introduced to address the risks.

• Societal concerns or the risks or threats from hazards which impact on society and which, if realised, could have adverse repercussions for the institutions responsible for putting in place the provisions and arrangements for protecting people, e.g., Parliament or the Government of the day. – This type of concern is often associated with hazards that give rise to risks which, were they

to materialise, could provoke a socio-political response, eg risk of events causing widespread or large scale detriment or the occurrence of multiple fatalities in a single event. Typical examples relate to nuclear power generation, railway travel, or the genetic modification of organisms.

• Societal concerns due to the occurrence of multiple fatalities in a single event is known as societal risk. Societal risk is therefore a subset of societal concerns.

UK Health and Safety Executive（HSE）① Definition of Risk

Source: HSE, “Reducing risks, protecting people”, 2001. 24


• Risk is categorized into three regions: “broadly acceptable risk”, “tolerable risk”, and “intolerable risk”.

• “broadly acceptable risk ”: For purposes of life or work, we are prepared to take it pretty well as it is

• “Tolerable risk”:

– “Tolerability” refers to a willingness to live with a risk so as to secure certain benefits and in the confidence that it is being properly controlled.

– “To tolerate a risk” means that we do not regard it as negligible or something we might ignore, but rather as something we need to keep under review and reduce still further if and as we can.

HSE ② Acceptable risk(1)


HSE ② Acceptable risk(2)

Modified of Fig. 1 in HSE, “Reducing risks, protecting people”, 2001.

• We do not have, for this boundary, a criterion

for individual risk as widely applicable as the

one mentioned above for the boundary

between the broadly acceptable and tolerable

regions. This is because risks may be

unacceptable on grounds of a high level of risk

to an exposed individual or because of the

repercussions of an activity or event on wider

society. • However, a risk of 1 in 104 per annum to any

member of the public is the maximum that should be tolerated from any large industrial plant in any industry.※ ※HSE proposes to adopt a risk of 1 in 105 per annum as the benchmark for new nuclear power stations.

•HSE believes that an individual risk of death of

one in a million per annum for both workers and

the public corresponds to a very low level of risk

and should be used as a guideline for the

boundary between the broadly acceptable and

tolerable regions

Individual risk of death 10-4 or less

Individual risk of death 10-6 or less

Levels of fatal risk(average figures, approximated)

10-2 risk of death from five hours of solo rock climbing every weekend

10-3 risk of death due to work in high risk groups within relatively risky industries such as mining

10-4 general risk of death in a traffic accident

10-5 risk of death in an accident at work in the very safest parts of industry

10-6 general risk of death in a fire or explosion from gas at home

10-7 risk of death by lightning


＜Safety Goals＞

• Basic Safety Objective (BSO) and Basic Safety Limit (BSL) are defined as the risk targets that covers on-site (nuclear workers and other workers) and off-site (public) from normal operation to accidents.

• The BSL corresponds to the upper limit of “tolerable risk” and each facility has to achieve BSLs. On the other hand, the BSO marks the start of the “broadly acceptable risk” and those are not mandatory.

• Regarding the “societal risk” of nuclear facilities, licensee has to evaluate the case that leads to the total risk of 100 or more fatalities and has to demonstrate the probability of such accident should be less than specific level (BSL: 10-5/y, BSO: 10-7/y)

HSE ③ Safety Goals

Source: HSE, “Safety Assessment Principles”, Revision 1, February 2008.

Item Target T-7： Individual risk to people off the site from accidents

BSL：1E-4 pa BSO：1E-6 pa

T-8： Frequency dose targets for accidents on an individual facility – any person off the site

Effective dose mSv

Predicted Frequency per annum

BSL BSO

0.1～1 1 1E-2

1～10 1E-1 1E-3

10～100 1E-2 1E-4

100～1000 1E-3 1E-5

>1000 1E-4 1E-6

T-9： Total risk of 100 or more fatalities


Item Target

T-5： Individual risk of death from on-site accidents – any person on the site


T-6： Frequency dose targets for any single accident – any person on the site

Effective dose mSv

Predicted Frequency per annum

BSL BSO

2～20 1E-1 1E-3

20～200 1E-2 1E-4

200～2000 1E-3 1E-5

>2000 1E-4 1E-6

27


The probability of an adverse effect in an organism, system, or (sub)population caused under specified circumstances by exposure to an agent.

• “Adverse effects”: Change in the morphology, physiology, growth, development, reproduction, or life span of an organism, system, or (sub)population that results in an impairment of functional capacity, an impairment of the capacity to compensate for additional stress, or an increase in susceptibility to other influences.


This is a risk management term. The acceptability of the risk depends on scientific data, social, economic, and political factors, and the perceived benefits arising from exposure to an agent.

World Health Organization（WHO）① Definition of Risk, Acceptable risk

Source: WHO, International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS), “IPCS Risk Assessment Terminology”, 2004

WHO defines following terms in the report, “IPCS Risk Assessment Terminology”:

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WHO ② Acceptable risk

Source: WHO, “Acceptable risk”, Water Quality: Guidelines, Standards and Health, 2001

1. A predefined probability approach – One definition of acceptable risk that has been widely accepted in

environmental regulation, although is not relevant to microbiological parameters, is if lifetime exposure to a substance increases a person’s chance of developing cancer by one chance in a million or less. This level, which has come to be taken as ‘essentially zero’ .

– EPA typically uses a target reference risk range of 10–4 to 10–6 for carcinogens in drinking water, which is in line with WHO guidelines for drinking water quality which, where practical, base guideline values for genotoxic carcinogens on the upper bound estimate of an excess lifetime cancer risk of 10–5.

2. A ‘currently tolerated’ approach – The basic argument here is that any risk that is currently tolerated is

considered to be acceptable.

– This approach was used by the US EPA in setting the allowable bacterial indicator densities for bathing waters. It was established that previous standards had resulted in a gastrointestinal illness rate of 8/1000 bathers at freshwater sites and 19/1000 bathers at marine sites. These levels were considered to be tolerated (as people still used the bathing areas) and were therefore assumed to be acceptable. The new standards were based around this acceptable level.

3. A disease burden approach – In everyday life individual risks are rarely considered in isolation.

Similarly, it could be argued that a sensible approach would be to consider health risks in terms of the total disease burden of a community and to define acceptability in terms of it falling below an arbitrary defined level.

WHO explains various approaches to determine acceptable risks in Water Quality Guideline (2001) and conclude that “acceptable risk decisions are rarely easy”

4. A economic approach – In the strict economic sense a risk is acceptable if the

economic savings arising out of action to reduce a risk

outweigh the cost of such action.

– There are, however, many difficulties with this apparently

simple approach. In conclusion, the science of economics does

not provide society with absolute tools for determining what

risks are acceptable. Nevertheless, no assessment of

acceptable risk can afford to ignore economic imperatives.

5. The public acceptance of risk – This approach to determining acceptable risk is based on what

is acceptable to the general public. In other words, a risk is

acceptable when it is acceptable to the general public.

– For a public-based approach to acceptable risk to work, all

sections of the community must have full access to all

information required on levels of risk and have the skills to

interpret that information. There must also be an effective

means of reaching consensus within the community and

canvassing that consensus opinion. Unfortunately, each of

these preconditions are unlikely to be met in most

circumstances.

6. Political resolution of acceptable risk issues – It is clear from the discussion to this point that there are many

different ways to define acceptable risk and that each way

gives different weight to the views of different stakeholders in

the debate.

– No definition of ‘acceptable’ will be acceptable to all

stakeholders. Resolving such issues, therefore, becomes a

political (in the widest sense) rather than a strictly health

process. 29

＜Definition of Risk＞ Risk is the chance of harmful effects to human health or to ecological

systems resulting from exposure to an environmental stressor. • A stressor is any physical, chemical, or biological entity that can induce an adverse

response. Stressors may adversely affect specific natural resources or entire ecosystems, including plants and animals, as well as the environment with which they interact.

＜(Reference) National Research Council＞ • The fundamental concept of EPA’s risk assessment is based on National

Research Council report, “Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process” (1983)(a.k.a. Red Book) , while being considered in EPA. – National Research Council is the institution that consists of National Academy of

Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, and National Academies. It issues opinions of different kinds of experts in National Academies to US government and public.

• Red Book is one of the basic documents of risk assessment among the US federal agencies. It is utilized by the following agencies.

• Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Department of Agriculture (DOA), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

US Environmental Protection Agency（EPA） ① Definition of Risk

Source: EPA, “Basic Information”, http://epa.gov/riskassessment/basicinformation.htm#risk

30

EPA ② Acceptable risk

Sources: EPA/100/B-04/001, “An Examination of EPA Risk Assessment Principles and Practices”, Office of Science Advisory, EPA, March 2004. Ministry of the Environment , Factsheet of chemical substances for risk communication - benzene

＜Acceptable risk＞ • Red Book and EPA do not define acceptable risk, recognizing it

depends on the situation such as social policy, etc.

• On the other hand, EPA has been setting regulatory emission standards for air pollutants in following manner:

(Example of standards for limiting Benzene ※ emission)

–A first step, in which EPA ensures that risks are “acceptable.”

EPA generally limits the maximum individual risk (MIR) ※※ to no higher than 10-4

※※ The estimated risk that a person living near a plant would have if he or she were continuously exposed to the maximum pollutant concentrations for a life time (70 years) (Number of carcinogenesis per year )

–A second step, in which EPA establishes an “ample margin of safety.”

EPA strives to protect the greatest number of persons possible to an estimated individual excess lifetime cancer risk level no higher than 10-6

• The concept of MIR was also introduced to Japan. Emission limit of Benzene was defined according to the MIR 10-5

※ Benzene is utilized in many kinds of chemical industries as a basic chemical substance. The smoke of cigarette also contains it. It is well known that if one inhales even dilute benzene for a long time, it may cause leukemia.

31

Safety Goal in Japan (1)

Discussion at former Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC)

Source: Special Committee of Nuclear Safety Commission ”Interim Report on the Investigation and Review on Safety Goals ” Dec. 2003.

●Performance goal idea

(guide to determine whether facility complies with safety goal)

- Indicator value 1: Core damage frequency (CDF) about 10-4/yr

- Indicator value 2: Containment vessel failure frequency(CFF) about 10-5/yr

Conditions to determine application of performance goal for production reactors will be whether both are satisfied at the

same time.

Source: Special Committee of Nuclear Safety Commission “Performance goals for Light Water Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities” March 2006,

*”Vital statistics” (MHLW) from 2001 data

Figure: Concept of position of safety goal idea

●Safety goal proposed 1. Qualitative goal idea

The possibility of health damages to the general public due to radiation or

dispersion of radioactive material caused by activities utilizing nuclear power

shall be limited to levels where it does not significantly increase health risks

caused by daily life for the general public.

*The figure to the right is shown to supplement the qualitative goal.

2. Quantitative goal idea

− The individual average acute death risk of the public near the site

boundary shall not exceed 1 in 1 million/year due to radiation exposure

caused by a nuclear facility accident.

− Average death risk due to cancer of an individual of the public at a certain

distance from the facility shall not exceed 1 in 1 million/year.

個人死亡率(1/年) Individual fatality rate (1/yr) Common risk sources*)

All causes of death (7.7X10-3)

Total disease (7.1X10-3)

Malignant neoplasm (cancer)(2.4X10-3)

Heart disease(1.2X10-3)

Cerebral vascular disease(1.0X10-3)

Total unexpected accident(3.1X10-4)

Suicide(2.3X10-4)

Traffic accident(9.8X10-5)

Suffocation(6.5X10-5)

Falling/ tripping(5.1X10-5)

Drawing(4.6X10-5)

Murder(6.0X10-6)

Safety goal (about )

32

Safety Goal in Japan (2)

Discussion at former Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC)

Key points in discussing safety goals (From April 10, 2013 NRA document)

- The detailed discussion results at the former NSC safety goal expert

committee can be a foundation for discussing safety goals at NRA.

- However, considering the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi accident, safety goal

should include to minimize the environmental impact even in case of an

accident.

⇒Occurrence frequency of an accident with more than 100 TBq of Cs-

137 releases during an accident should be limited to not exceed about

once every 1 million reactor-years (10-6/reactor-years) (excluding

terrorism)

- Safety goal should be a goal to try to achieve as the NRA regulates nuclear

facilities.

*Release of radioactive material into the environment during the TEPCO Fukushima accident for Cs-137

is estimated to be 7300-13000 TBq (assessment based on JNES accident progression analysis),

10000 TBq (assessment based on TEPCO land-side measurement results). 100TBq is about 1/100 of

the Cs-137 released during the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

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4. Uniqueness of nuclear risk

34

• Low social acceptance – Anxiety about the unknown (low level exposure risk) – Dislike of nuke – Distrust of advanced scientific technology (fear that it cannot

be controlled)

• Social impact is significant if an accident occurs – Wide spread environmental contamination due to radioactive

material – Large-scale and long-term evacuation – Are “low probability, large impact” hazards acceptable? – Because of low possibility, tend to fall into safety myth – Even considering external events (earthquakes& tsunamis), is

the probability really low?

What is the Uniqueness of nuclear risk?

35

Documents

Reference Materials · ※4 Machhu Ⅱdam overflowed due to flood, and failed within 2 hours. 2500 people died. ※5 Fatalities immediately after the accident only Source: New Ext