1

1

PRELIMINARY CHAPTER

AND HUMAN RELATIONS

Q. What is Civil Law?

ANS. It is that branch of the law that generally treats of the

personal and family relations of an individual, his property

and successional rights, and the effects of his obligations

and contracts.

It is that mass of precepts that determine and regulate

the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among

members of a family, and those which exist among members

of a society for the protection of private interests, (1 Sanchez

Roman, Estudios de Derecho Civil, p. 70, citing Arribas),

family relations, and property rights. (1 Falcon 9; cited in

Paras, Civil Code of the Phils. Annotated, Vol. I, 1989 Ed.,

pp. 4-5).

Q. What is a Civil Code?

ANS. It is a compilation of existing civil laws, scienti

Þ

cally arranged

into books, titles, chapters, and sub-heads and promulgated

by legislative authority. (Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 334).

Q. When do laws take effect?

ANS. Laws shall take effect after

Þ

fteen days following the

completion of their publication in the Of

Þ

cial Gazette, or in

a newspaper of general circulation, unless the law otherwise

provides. (Art. 2, NCC, as amended by E.O. No. 200).

Q. A law was passed providing for its immediate effec-

tivity. Does this mean that its immediate effectivity

provision would dispense with the publication re-

quirement? Why?

CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

2

ANS. No. In the case of

Tañada vs. Tuvera

, 136 SCRA 27, the

Supreme Court said that an immediate effectivity clause

does not preclude the requirement of publication since the

clear object of the law is to give the general public adequate

notice of the various laws which are to regulate their conduct

and actions as citizens. Without such notice and publication,

there would be no cause for the application of the maxim

“ignorantia legis non excusat.”

It would be the height of

injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the

transgression of a law which he had no notice of.

Q. May the 15-day period of publication be reduced or

extended?

ANS. Yes. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the

legislature may, in its discretion, provide that the usual 15-

day period be

shortened

or

extended.

For example, the Civil

Code did not become effective after

Þ

fteen (15) days from its

publication in the Of

Þ

cial Gazette but “one year” after its

publication. (Tañada vs. Tuvera,

supra.

).

Q. May the publication of a law before its effectivity be

dispensed with? Why?

ANS. No. The publication clause cannot be dispensed with. The

omission

would offend

due process

insofar as it denies the

public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern

it. If the legislature could validly provide that a law shall

become effective immediately upon its approval even if it

is not published (or after an unreasonably short time after

publication), persons not aware of it would be prejudiced.

They could be so, not because they failed to comply with it,

but simply because they did not know that it exists. This is

true

not

only of

penal

laws but also of

non-penal

laws, like

a law on prescription which must also be communicated to

the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

(Tañada vs. Tuvera,

supra.

).

Q. What does the law requiring publication of laws com-

prehend?

ANS. The law comprehends all statutes, including those of local

application and private laws which should be published as

a condition for their effectivity and shall begin

Þ

fteen (15)

v

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The authors owe the completion of this work to the people who

unsel

fi

shly extended their much needed help in putting this book

together. We wish to thank them here, however unembellished it

may be.

Linda Joya for providing advance sheets of Supreme Court de-

cisions cited in this book.

Nova Marie M. Estabillo, my assistant in the College of Law,

for industriously proofreading the manuscript of this book.

Crystal G. Perez, my secretary in the law of

fi

ce, for tirelessly

encoding the manuscript of this book.

Anton A. Arciaga, our clerk in the College of Law, for diligently

running errands during the revision of this book.

The Authors

vi

vii

PREFACE

This book was prepared with the intention of making the sub-

ject easier for the students to understand the same. It is the author’s

belief that the reviewee must easily understand the complicated as-

pects of the law; hence, the simplicity of this work.

This book contains important provisions of the law and doctri-

nal decisions up to 2007, designed to prepare the reviewee for the

Bar Examinations.

The author wishes to convey his heartfelt thanks to all his

friends for encouraging him to write the book.

ED VINCENT S. ALBANO

viii

ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRELIMINARY CHAPTER AND

HUMAN RELATIONS ................................................... 1

Human Relations

............................................................ 24

Natural Persons .............................................................. 54

Civil Personality ............................................................. 55

FAMILY CODE ....................................................................... 59

Marriage ......................................................................... 59

Legal Separation ............................................................ 102

Rights and Obligations Between Husband

and Wife ................................................................. 112

Property Relations Between Husband and Wife .......... 114

Donations By Reason of Marriage ................................. 115

System of Absolute Community .................................... 119

Conjugal Partnership of Gains ...................................... 132

Separation of Property of the Spouses

and Administration of Common Property

by One Spouse During the Marriage .................... 144

Regime of Separation of Property

.................................. 148

Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage ............. 149

The Family ...................................................................... 155

The Family Home ........................................................... 158

Paternity and Filiation .................................................. 163

Legitimation ................................................................... 193

Adoption .......................................................................... 196

Parental Authority ......................................................... 215

Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority ........ 233

Surnames ........................................................................ 239

Presumption of Death .................................................... 242

Civil Register .................................................................. 244

PROPERTY ............................................................................. 253

Classi

fi

cation of Properties ............................................ 253

Accession ......................................................................... 259

Quieting of Title ............................................................. 284

x

Co-ownership .................................................................. 287

Possession ....................................................................... 304

Usufruct .......................................................................... 311

Easement ........................................................................ 317

Nuisance ......................................................................... 337

Donations ........................................................................ 343

WILLS AND SUCCESSION .................................................. 370

Disinheritance ................................................................ 437

Legal or Intestate Succession ........................................ 441

Right of Representation ................................................. 445

Acceptance and Repudiation of Inheritance ................. 452

Collation .......................................................................... 453

PRESCRIPTION ..................................................................... 459

Acquisitive Prescription ................................................. 464

Extinctive Prescription .................................................. 468

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS ..................................... 472

Nature and Effects of Obligations ................................. 472

Kinds of Obligations ....................................................... 488

Pure and Conditional Obligations ................................. 488

Obligations with a Period .............................................. 493

Alternative Obligations .................................................. 500

Joint and Solidary Obligations ...................................... 501

Obligations with a Penal Clause ................................... 508

Extinguishment of Obligations ...................................... 513

Payment or Performance ............................................... 514

Loss of the Thing Due .................................................... 531

Compensation ................................................................. 533

Novation .......................................................................... 534

Condonation or Remission of the Debt .......................... 548

Contracts

......................................................................... 549

Essential Requisites of Contracts .................................. 565

Object of Contracts ......................................................... 573

Cause of Contracts ......................................................... 574

Form of Contracts ........................................................... 576

Reformation of Instruments .......................................... 578

Rescissible Contracts ..................................................... 584

Voidable Contracts ......................................................... 593

Unenforceable Contracts

................................................ 596

Void Contracts ................................................................ 603

Natural Obligations ....................................................... 610

Estoppel .......................................................................... 611

Trusts .............................................................................. 616

xi

SALES ..................................................................................... 633

Obligations of the Vendee .............................................. 708

ASSIGNMENT OF CREDITS ................................................. 744

LEASE ..................................................................................... 747

COMMON CARRIERS ........................................................... 787

Safety of Passengers

....................................................... 803

PARTNERSHIP ...................................................................... 814

Dissolution and Winding Up .......................................... 829

Limited Partnership ....................................................... 834

AGENCY ................................................................................. 836

LOAN ....................................................................................... 869

Commodatum ................................................................. 870

DEPOSIT ................................................................................. 891

Necessary Deposit .......................................................... 898

Aleatory Contracts ......................................................... 903

COMPROMISES ..................................................................... 904

GAMBLING

............................................................................. 913

GUARANTY AND SURETY .................................................. 915

Effects of Guaranty ........................................................ 925

Antichresis ...................................................................... 938

NEGOTIORUM GESTIO ....................................................... 941

Solutio Indebiti ............................................................... 944

PLEDGE AND MORTGAGE

.................................................. 947

Mortgages ....................................................................... 957

QUASI-DELICTS .................................................................... 964

DAMAGES .............................................................................. 1025

Moral Damages

............................................................... 1035

Nominal Damages .......................................................... 1057

Temperate or Moderate Damages ................................. 1058

Liquidated Damages ...................................................... 1060

Exemplary Damages ...................................................... 1061

Preference and Concurrence of Credits

.......................... 1069

LAND REGISTRATION ......................................................... 1074

Torrens Title, Conveyances, and Others ....................... 1074

Procedure in Land Registration .................................... 1095ORLANDO VILLAbgbnfgnbfvbNUEVA, petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.b

 

fggfbfgbfg

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:fgbgfb

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision2 dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her

after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent’s child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.4

In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely. Private respondent also prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.

On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.6

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s fees and costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based on the following assigned errors:

I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD, INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY’S FEES, SAID AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW.7

The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent; and (b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs.

The petition is partly granted.

Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court.8 We affirm the findings of the Court of Appealsthat petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus –

To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced consent which supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which was then already pending against him. Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly decided ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the very outcome of the present case disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still pending with this Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this Court, he may yet secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable.

But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.

Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.

The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities

of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.

Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where “the sexual act was consummated, with the defendant on top” x x x.

Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted to undermining the credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died, on August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.

To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is inconsequential, as there is no controversy regarding the date of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless, during the continuation of the cross-examination of the appellee, she declared that her child was prematurely born on August 29, 1988, matching the date in the certification of the Civil Registrar x x x. The Court is not prepared to disbelieve the appellee and throw overboard her entire testimony simply on account of her confusion as to the exact date of the death of the fetus, especially when she herself had presented documentary evidence that put August 29, 1988 as the date her fetus died.

Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellee’s evidence continues in his argument that if indeed there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in December 1987, then she could not have a premature delivery on August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the trial, because the 35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that time. Whether the appellee’s impression that she had delivered prematurely is correct or not will not affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the light of appellant’s admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his failure to attribute the latter’s pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the appellee into marrying her.

Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the letters allegedly written by him to the appellee. During his cross-examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant identified the seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but denied

the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters admitted by the appellant contained expressions of love and concern for his wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under duress. During the re-direct examination, however, appellant suddenly changed mind and denied authorship of those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was forced to admit them because he was threatened with harm by the appellee. If he was laboring under duress when he made the admission, where did he find the temerity to deny his involvement with the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation can only be motivated by a hindsight realization by the appellant of the evidentiary weight of those letters against his case.

As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.9

We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code provides that attorney’s may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under the circumstances, as in the instant case.

We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal basis. There is nothing in the records or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral damages. In justifying the award, the Court of Appeals merely said thus:

It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless portrayal of her by the appellant as the perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x10

However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any testimony of private respondent detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral damages.

In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:

In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial. Indeed, respondent should have taken

the witness stand and should have testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No other person could have proven such damages except the respondent himself as they were extremely personal to him.

As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary damages. This is clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.

Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages.12 In the instant case, private respondent failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is not likewise entitled to exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage with private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.

CARLOS VS SANDOVAL

Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death, two parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos commenced an action against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo

Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

HELD: The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governingsummary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided. Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing thesummary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under theRule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on

Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application.

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate “proper interest” can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog,the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

Republic vs. CA

NOVEMBER 11, 2010  ~ VBDIAZ

Republic vs. CA

G.R. No. 100995

September 14, 1994

FACTS: On August 1988, private respondent Dolor filed an application before the RTC

of Daet, Camarines Norte, for the confirmation and registration of her title to a

residential lot located at Daet, Camarines Norte.

 

On  November 25 1988, when the case was called for initial hearing, the Fiscal entered

his appearance on behalf of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Dolor

moved that an order of general default be issued against the whole world except

petitioner which had filed an opposition.

At the hearing on 20 December 1988, respondent Dolor’s counsel marked as Exhibits

“A” to “D,” respectively, the Notice of Initial Hearing, the Certificate of Publication of the

Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette (October 17, 1988 issue), the Affidavit

of Publication of the Editor of the “Weekly Informer,” and the Certification or Return of

Posting by the Deputy Sheriff.

Satisfied that respondent Dolor had a registerable title over subject property the trial

court confirmed her title thereto and ordered its registration as her exclusive property.

ISSUE: Petitioner assailed the trial court’s decision before the CA on a purely

jurisdictional ground. Petitioner argued that it was incumbent upon respondent Dolor to

show proof that on or before the date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988, there had

been compliance with the requirements specified by Sec. 23 of P.D. 1529, otherwise

known as The Property Registration Decree, , to wit:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The court shall, within five days

from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial

hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the

date of the order…

• By publication. — Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial

hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial

hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of

general circulation in the Philippines; Provided, however, that the publication in

the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. …

The records show that while the trial court stated that the jurisdictional requirements

were complied with on 25 November 1988, they were yet to be presented on 20

December 1988 before its Branch Clerk, the designated Commissioner.

In its decision dated 16 July 1991, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the

trial court, , rationalizing thus —

We find that the requirements of Sec. 23 of PD No. 1529 have been complied with in

the instant case. The record shows that the Notice of Initial Hearing set on November

25, 1988, issued by the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration

Administration had been published in the September 10, 1988 issue of the “Weekly

Informer and in Volume 84, No. 42 of the Official Gazette issue of October 17,

1988 …

The appellant (Republic) claims that while the presiding judge of the trial court stated

that “the jurisdictional requirements have been complied with” on November 25, 1988,

the jurisdictional requirements have yet to be presented on December 20, 1988 before

the Branch Clerk of Court. Hence, appellant argues, the Order of November 25, 1988

had no basis in fact and in law; there was no notice to interested persons adjoining

owners, and the whole world; and jurisdiction to hear and decide the case has not yet

been conferred with the court on November 25, 1988. Petitioner concludes that the late

publication did not vest jurisdiction in the trial court.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of

respondent CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC is VACATED and SET ASIDE,

and the application of private respondent for the confirmation and registration of her title

over the property described therein is DENIED.

By reason of the defective notice of initial hearing, all the proceedings conducted by the

trial court which culminated in its decision granting the prayer of respondent Dolor are

declared VOID and it was error for respondent CA to have sustained the same.

The jurisdiction is not conferred by the marking of the relevant documents as exhibits,

but by the fact that all the requirements of Sec. 23, PD 1529 had been complied with as

shown by those documents proving compliance therewith. The trial court is not

precluded from taking cognizance of its own record. But,the rule is not without

exception. As borne out by the records, at the scheduled date of initial hearing on 25

November 1988 and even during the actual hearing on 20 December 1988, the

publication requirement in the Official Gazette was yet to be complied with.

Although the Notice of Initial Hearing was included for publication in the 17 October

1988 issue of the Official Gazette, specifically Vol. 84, No. 42, thereof, the same was

however released for publication only on 31 January 1989

In petitioner’s brief filed before respondent CA, we note that the issue of late publication

of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette was raised squarely. But for no

apparent reason, the issue was ignored in the questioned decision. Indeed, respondent

court could have easily resolved the issue in favor of petitioner supported as it was not

only by competent evidence but also by ample jurisprudence

The primary legal principle against which the legality of all the proceedings conducted

by the trial court should be tested is jurisdiction. In order to ascertain whether a court

has jurisdiction, the provision of the law in point should be inquired into. Section 23 of

P.D. 1529 explicitly provides that beforethe court can act on the application for land

registration, the public shall be given notice of the initial hearing thereof by means

of publication, mailing, and posting. In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,

citing Caltex v. CIR, 8, this Court ruled that in all cases where the authority of the courts

to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is

mandatory it must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly

void. So that where there is a defect of publication of petition,   such defect deprives

the court of jurisdiction. And when the court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a

case, the same lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects.

Regarding applications for land registration, the purpose of publication of the notice of

initial hearing is the same: to require all persons concerned who may have any rights or

interests in the property applied for to appear in court at a certain date and time to show

cause why the application should not be granted.

Section 23 of P.D. 1529 does not provide a period within which the notice should be

published in the Official Gazette but for reasons already obvious,the publication

should precede the date of initial hearing. While there is no dispute that the notice

was included in Vol. 84, No. 42, 17 October 1988 issue of the Official Gazette, this

particular issue was released for publication only on 31 January 1989 when the

initial hearing was already a fait accompli. The point of reference in establishing lack

of jurisdiction of the trial court was 31 January 1989 because it was only on that date

when the notice was made known to the people in general.  Verily, the late publication of

the notice defeated the purpose for its existence thereby reducing it to a mere pro

formanotice.