Rabadilla Bordalba Conti

7/31/2019 Rabadilla Bordalba Conti

1/14

G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,1 petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2 COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZAVILLACARLOS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PURISIMA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,3 dated December23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of theRegional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees (includingherein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392,together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla,was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyedas Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probatedand admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instanceof Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:

"FIRST

I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadillaresident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:

(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.

RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of theRegister of Deeds of Negros Occidental.

(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property andthe rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged bythe children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.

xxx

FOURTH

(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and JorgRabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of theBacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), analso at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire,Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to MariaMarlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and TwentyFive (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Bellezdies.

FIFTH

(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of theBacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shhave the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragrapof his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of Decembereach year.

SIXTH

I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the

one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgathis said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respectand deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluey Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export andTWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should thbuyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in thisaddition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize thisLot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my neardesendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONEHUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command inthis my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they wi

obey and follow that should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannotnegotiate with others than my near descendants and my sister."4

Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr.Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in hisname.

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and childrenJohnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.


2/14

On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought acomplaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional TrialCourt in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, toenforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:

1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the RepublicPlanters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or

mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100)piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff MariaMarlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of thecomplaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.

3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which providedthat in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, ormortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per cropyear to herein private respondent.

The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs toreconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, thecancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, andthe issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late

Aleja Belleza.

On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28,1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla,who filed his Answer, accordingly.

During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:

On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin,son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting asattorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered intoa Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs ofsugar, to the following effect:

"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No.44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:

75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our nameMary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar cropyear, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of the annuity asmentioned, and in the same manner will compliance of the annuity be in the nextsucceeding crop years.

That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will becomplied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and whic

is as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the composite price of sugarduring each sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVETHOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).

That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cashinstallment, payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, towit:

For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00)Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;

For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00)

Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;

For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00)Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91; and

For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00)Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1991-92."5

However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreementexcept for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop ye1988 -1989.

On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing thecomplaint and disposing as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the actiois prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose ifavor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the command asmandated exaction from them simply because they are the children of JorgeRabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of tpresent complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category a


3/14

creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestateproceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give fullmeaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.

In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed isDISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED."6

On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decisionof the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:

"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right toreceive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, JorgeRabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee'sadmitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985; and, the punitiveconsequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No.1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance,this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from

the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate,secure the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to AlejaBelleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, toreceive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392until she dies.

Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one enteredordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over LotNo. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

SO ORDERED."7

Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found hisway to this Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erredin ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on thebasis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution ofDr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the NewCivil Code.

The petition is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal inaccordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and indeviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the causof action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there wano modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. theinstituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "neardescendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondentnot complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can b

no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.

The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reasonthat the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referreto as "near descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who are the"near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 8438 and 8459 of the New CivilCode, the substitution should be deemed as not written.

The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Coof Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of thedismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there wa

no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had acause of action against the petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution waprecisely, to stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right agaithe petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruledaccordance with law.

It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights aretransmitted from the moment of death of the decedent10 and compulsory heirs arecalled to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, inrelation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsoryheirs.11 Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the

instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, withoutneed of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to themfrom the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rightsand obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whateverrights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to hisforced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by deatalso form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by t


4/14

Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to hiscompulsory heirs upon his death.

In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the hereinprivate respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsoryheirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumedhis (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private

respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the rightof private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is nowbeing demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore,private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred indismissing the complaint below.

Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions isnot applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. JorgeRabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there benoncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.

Again, the contention is without merit.

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the placeof the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator mayeither (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall passin case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or beincapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution,12 or (2) leave his/her property toone person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another orothers, as in a fideicommissary substitution.13 The Codicil sued upon contemplatesneither of the two.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir

by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.14 In the case underconsideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. JorgeRabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's neardescendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. JorgeRabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the propertyreferred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.

Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner iscorrect. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve

the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir.15 In the case underconsideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate theproperty provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of thetestatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lackingthe obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property anits transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearlyimposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution."16 Also,the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property

only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation todeliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.

Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here.Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property istransmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. Afideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by firstdegree to the second heir.17 In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants areat all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla

under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 88of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the NeCivil Code provide:

Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of theproperty left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considereda condition unless it appears that such was his intention.

That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that theinstituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testatoand for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits andinterests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.

Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the precedinarticle cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall becomplied with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known inthe law of succession as aninstitucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modalinstitution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose orapplication of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the


5/14

testator upon the heir.18 A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee butit does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.19 On the other hand, in aconditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in orderfor the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but doesnot obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.20 To some extent, it issimilar to a resolutory condition.21

From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that thetestatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It islikewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said institutedheir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the hereinprivate respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter.However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and theeffectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the saidobligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, theproperty shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner ofinstitution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in naturebecause it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting theefficacy of such institution.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligationimposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appearsfrom the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, theinstitution should be considered as modal and not conditional.22

Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the privaterespondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itselffrom the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to violationsby the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.

In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to

the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertainedfrom the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which itwas made.23 Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts mustbe adopted.24

Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver OneHundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation isimposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee,or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property

involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver tsugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turnover to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said obligatiothus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrinear descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, notonly on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposby the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to thinstituted heir and his successors-in-interest.

Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicablesettlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by thelessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee;that petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive compliance ohis obligation through the consummated settlement between the lessee and theprivate respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the petitioner, therecourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under theamicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by whichperson disposes of his property, to take effect after his death.25 Since the Willexpresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, thwishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be tsubject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose omaking a Will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court ofAppeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. Nopronouncement as to costs

SO ORDERED.

Melo, J., (Chairman), concur in the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.Vitug, J., see separate opinion.Panganiban, J., join the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.Gonzaga-Reyes, J., no part.

CODICIL

Johny Rabadilla v. Court of AppealsG.R. No, 113725; June 29, 2000Facts:


6/14

Testator Aleja Belleza appended a codicil to his last will and testament wherein heinstituted Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee of 511, 855 sq meters of a parcel of land inBacolod. Devisee herein is the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner. The codicilwas duly probated and admitted before the CFI of Negros Occidental.The codicil stated that should the devisee die ahead of the testator, the property andrights shall be inherited by his children and spouse. The codicil also requiredRabadilla to deliver 75 piculs of export sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar to MariaMarlina Cosculuella y Belleza, and should he die, his heir shall have the same

obligation. Lastly, in the event that the devisee or his heir shall later sell, lease,mortgage the said lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee shall also have the obligation todeliver the piculs.Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and children (pet).In 1989, Maria Marlena brought a complaint against the heirs to enforce theprovisions of the codicil and to revert the ownership to the heirs of the testator. TheRTC dismissed the complaint. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trialcourt..Ruling:Yes. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was nomodal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution.

Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rightsand obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whateverrights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to hisforced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by deathalso form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by theCodicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to hiscompulsory heirs upon his death.In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the hereinprivate respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsoryheirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumedhis (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein privaterespondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the rightof private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is nowbeing demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore,private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred indismissing the complaint below.Modal Institutions::*Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Codeon modal institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix intended was asubstitution - the contention is without merit. In simple substitutions, the second heir

takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predeceaserenunciation. [14] In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicilnot provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity orenunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicprovides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditionsimposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to thtestatrix's near descendants.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaFIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 112443 January 25, 2002TERESITA P. BORDALBA, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF NICANOR JAYME, namely, CANDIDA FLOREEMANNUEL JAYME, DINA JAYME DEJORAS, EVELIA JAYME, and GESILAJAYME; AND HEIRS OF ASUNCION JAYME-BACLAY,namely, ANGELO JAYMBACLAY, CARMEN JAYME-DACLAN and ELNORA JAYME

BACLAY, respondents.YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set asidethe October 20, 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419,which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court ofMandaue, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386.The instant controversy stemmed from Lot No. 1242 (Lot No. 799-C) with an area o1,853 square meters and located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City. The subject lot is pof a parcel of land situated on the corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in MandaueCity, and originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espide Jayme. In 1947, an extra-judicial partition,3 written in the Spanish language was

executed, describing said parcel of land as 2. otra parcela de terreno urbano en el barrio de Look, Mandawe, Cebu, qulinda al N. con la Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme; al E. linda conpropiodades de Fernando Antigua; al S. linda con propiodades de Lucas yVictoriano Jayme, y al O. linda con la Calle Plaridel. La propiodad descritaesta avaluada, con todas sus mejoras, en la cantidad de MIL Y CINCUENTPESOS ------------------------------------------------ P1,050.00.4

and disposing, inter alia, the same parcel of land as follows:


7/14

1) 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouseof private respondent Candida Flores and the father of private respondentsEmmanuel, Dina, Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) theirgrandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose heirs are private respondents

Agelio Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;2) 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitionerTeresita P. Bordalba; and3) 1/3 to an unidentified party.

Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jaymes house,which his family occupied since 1945.Sometime in July 1964, Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, petitioners mother, filed with theRegional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch IV, an amended application for theregistration5 of the lot described with the following boundaries:

N - Fruelana Jayme & RoadS - Felicitas de LatonioE - Agustin de JaymeW - Porfirio Jayme, Lot No. 1 and Vivencio Abellana

Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originallya part of a land owned by her late parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and

Margarita Espina de Jayme; and that 1/3 of said land was adjudicated to her in anextra-judicial partition. She further stated that a portion of the lot for which title isapplied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her permission.Consequently, Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay filed theiropposition6 contending that said application included the 1/3 portion inherited by themin the 1947 extra-judicial partition. The case was, however, dismissed for lack ofinterest of the parties.Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands of Cebu City anapplication7 dated January 10, 1979, seeking the issuance of a Free Patent over thesame lot subject of the aborted application of her mother, Elena Jayme, now knownas Lot No. 1242 (799-C), described as follows:

North: Froilan Jayme and RoadEast: Agustin JaymeSouth: Alfredo Alivio and Spouses Hilario GandecilaWest: Hilario Gandecila Porferio Jayme and Heirs of Vevencio Abellanosa 8

On April 16, 1980, petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-571 (FP) over said lot.9 Thereafter, petitionercaused the subdivision and titling of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), into 6 lots, 10 as well as thedisposition of two parcels thereof, thus:

1) Lot No. 1242-A with an area of 581 square meters covered by TransferCertificate of Title No. 22771 (FP) in the name of spouses Genaro U.Cabahug and Rita Capala, to whom petitioner sold said lot;2) Lot No. 1242-B with an area of 420 square meters covered by TCT No.22772 in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba, and which the latter mortgagedwith the Rural Bank of Mandaue;3) Lot No. 1242-C with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 2277in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba;

4) Lot No. 1242-D with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 2277in the name of Teresita Bordalba;5) Lot No. 1242-E with an area of 216 square meters covered by TCT 2277in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba;6) Lot No. 1242-F with an area of 216 square meters and covered by TCTNo. 22776 in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba.

Upon learning of the issuance in favor of petitioner of the aforesaid Free Patent andOriginal Certificate of Title over Lot No. 1242, as well as the conveyances made bypetitioner involving the lot subject of the controversy, private respondents filed withthe Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, the instant complaint againstpetitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses Genaro U. Cabahug, and Rita Capala, Rural

Bank of Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau of Lands.In the said complaint, private respondents prayed that Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), as well as TCT Nos. 22771-22776 be declared void andordered cancelled. Private respondents also prayed that they be adjudged ownersLot No. 1242 (799-C), and that spouses Genaro V. Cabahug and Rita Capala as was the Rural Bank of Mandaue be declared buyers and mortgagee in bad faith,respectively. In addition, they asked the court to award them actual, compensatory,and moral damages plus attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00.Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was acquired by hthrough purchase from her mother,11 who was in possession of the lot in the conceof an owner since 1947. In her answer, petitioner traced her mothers ownership ofthe lot partly from the 1947 deed of extra-judicial partition presented by privaterespondents,12 and claimed that Nicanor Jayme, and Candida Flores occupied aportion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) by mere tolerance of her mother. On cross-examination, petitioner admitted that the properties of the late Carmeno Jayme andMargarita Espina de Jayme were partitioned by their heirs in 1947, but claimed thatshe was not aware of the existence of said Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. She,however, identified one of the signatures in the said Deed to be the signature of hermother.13


8/14

On May 28, 1990, the trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner inobtaining Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), declared said patentand title void and ordered its cancellation. However, it declared that spouses GenaroU. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue are purchasersand mortgagee in good faith, respectively; and consequently upheld as valid the saleof Lot No. 1242-A covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22771 (FP) to spousesGenaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, and the mortgage of Lot No. 1242-B coveredby TCT No. 22772 in favor of the Rural Bank of Mandaue. The dispositive portion of

the decision reads:WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Decision is hereby renderedin favor of the plaintiffs by:1) declaring Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 as well as the Original Certificate ofTitle No. 0-57 (FP) and all subsequent certificates of title as a result of thesubdivision of Lot No. 1242 except TCT NO. 22771 (FP) as null and void andordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel them;2) declaring spouses defendants Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala asbuyers in good faith and are the legal and rightful owners of Lot No. 1242-Aas described in TCT No. 22771 (FP);3) declaring the Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. as mortgagee in good faith and

the mortgage lien in its favor be carried over to and be annotated in the newcertificate of title to be issued under the names of the plaintiffs;4) declaring the plaintiffs as the legal and rightful owners of Lot 1242 andordering the issuance of the certificate of title in their names;5) dismissing the claims of the defendant spouses Cabahug and Capala andthe defendant Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. for lack of merit;6) ordering the defendant Teresita Bordalba to pay plaintiffs the followingamounts:

(a) P5,000.00 as actual and litigation expenses;(b) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, and,

7) ordering defendant Bordalba to pay the costs.SO ORDERED.14

Both petitioner Teresita Bordalba and private respondents appealed to the Court ofAppeals, which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled thatsince private respondents are entitled only to 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C),petitioner should be ordered to reconvey 1/3 of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) to privaterespondents. The decretal portion of the respondent court's decision states:

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is MODIFIED to order thereconveyance of one-third of the subject land in favor of the plaintiff-appelleesin lieu of the cancellation of the Certificates of Title issued and their

declaration as the owners of Lot No. 1242 in its entirety. The rest isAFFIRMED in toto.SO ORDERED.15

Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, assailing the decision of the Court ofAppeals. Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for privaterespondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mothershould not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead mastatute. Likewise, petitioner questions the right of private respondents to inherit fro

the late Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as well as the identity betweethe disputed lot and the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed of Extra-judicialPartition.The contentions are without merit. It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of

Appeals upholding those of the trial court are binding upon this Court. While there aexceptions to this rule, petitioner has not convinced us that this case falls under oneof them.16The Court sees no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court that petitioneresorted to fraud and misrepresentation in obtaining a free patent and title over the lunder scrutiny. The Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that misrepresentationtainted petitioners application, insofar as her declaration that the land applied for w

not occupied or claimed by any other person. Her declaration is belied by the extra-judicial partition which she acknowledged, her mothers aborted attempt to have thelot registered, private respondents predecessors-in-interests opposition thereto, anby the occupancy of a portion of the said lot by Nicanor Jayme and his family since1945.It is a settled rule that the Land Registration Act protects only holders of title in goodfaith, and does not permit its provision to be used as a shield for the commission offraud, or as a means to enrich oneself at the expense of others. 17

As to the alleged violation of the dead mans statute,18 suffice it to state that said rulfinds no application in the present case. The dead mans statute does not operate tclose the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in another way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, orcommunication made by the deceased to the witness.19Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in thepresent case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition andother documents, and not on dealings and communications with the deceased, thequestioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legalheirs of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegatioto dispute their heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate


9/14

their allegations. Besides, in order that an heir may assert his right to the property of adeceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary. 20

Anent the issue of identity, the disparity in the boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) vis--vis the boundaries of the lot referred to in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partitioncan be explained by the fact that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is only a portion of the entireparcel of land described in the Deed, a 1/3 pro-indiviso portion of which wasadjudicated each to, first, petitioners mother, second, to the predecessors-in-interestof private respondents, and third, to an unidentified party. Logically therefore, their

boundaries will not be similar. At any rate, the records show that the parcel of landadjudicated to the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein was the lot found onthe corner of Plaridel and Mabini Streets in Looc, Mandaue City. As admitted furtherby both parties, Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the land allotted to theirpredecessors-in-interest in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. Moreover,petitioners mother acknowledged in her application for registration of Lot No. 1242that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition was the source of her claim over the lot soughtto be registered. She further admitted that the lot now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C)was part of the parcel of land inherited by her and her co-heirs, to the extent of 1/3share each. Under Section 31, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules on Evidence, whereone derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the

latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.Considering that Lot No.1242 (799-C) is part of the parcel of land over which privaterespondents predecessors-in-interest is entitled to 1/3 pro-indiviso share, which wasdisregarded by petitioner when she secured a Free Patent and Original Certificate ofTitle in her name, to the exclusion of private respondents predecessors-in-interest,the trial court and the Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in upholding the right ofprivate respondents as co-owners, and ordering the petitioner to reconvey 1/3 of thelot in question to them.Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Court is unable to determine what part ofLot No. 1242 (799-C) is within the boundaries of the parcel of land inherited in the1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition by the predecessors-in-interest of the parties

herein. This is so because private respondents did not show the extent of the saidland mentioned in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition in relation to Lot No. 1242(799-C). While they presented the boundaries of the parcel of land adjudicated in theDeed, to wit:

North: Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. JaymeEast: Propiodades de Fernando AntiguaSouth: Propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano JaymeWest: Calle Plaridel

they did not, however, show where these boundaries are found in relation to theboundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C). Absent a fixed boundary of the parcel of landadjudicated in the Deed, which they claim Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is a part of, the Cocannot determine the extent to which the lot now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) isincluded. Admittedly, the north boundary of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) (Property of FroilaJaime and Mabini Street) is similar to the north boundary of the land mentioned in tDeed. With only one reference point, however, the south, east and west boundariesLot No. 1242 (799-C) cannot be established with certainty to be within the parcel of

land described in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.In Beo v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that in order that an action for recoverypossession may prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action must fullyprove not only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed bydescribing the location, area and boundaries thereof. So that when the record doesnot show that the land subject matter of the action has been exactly determined, thaction cannot prosper, inasmuch as the plaintiff's ownership rights in the land claimdo not appear satisfactorily and conclusively proven at the trial.In the present case, while it is true that private respondents were not able to show textent of their 1/3pro indiviso right over Lot No. 1242 (799-C), they have nevertheleestablished their claim over the said lot. Hence, in line with our ruling in the case

ofLaluan v. Malpaya,22 the prudent recourse would be to remand the case to thelower court for a new trial.WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the October 20, 1992 Decision of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, and the May 28, 1990 Decision of theRegional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386, insofas it relates to the recognition of the 1/3 share of private respondents over Lot No.1242 (799-C) is AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the trial court in order todetermine what part of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is included in the parcel of landadjudicated in the 1947 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition to the predecessors-in-intereof the parties herein.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Teresita Bordalba v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 112443; January 25, 2002Facts:

A lot located in Mandaue City was originally owned by the late Carmeno Jayme andMargarita de Jayme. In 1947, an EJP was executed. Distributed as follows:1. 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of privarespondent Candida Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina,


10/14

Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose heirs are private respondents Angelo Baclay, Elnora Baclay andCarmen Jayme-Daclan;2. 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P.Bordalba; and3. 1/3 to an unidentified party.Nicanor's house stands on the land adjudicated to the heirs. Sometime in 1964, petsmother, filed with the RTC an amended application for the registration of the lot.

Nicanor and Asuncion filed their opposition contending that said application includedthe 1/3 portion inherited by them in the extra-judicial partition. The case wasdismissed.Subsequently, pet filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for a free patent. Petwas successfullly granted a free patent. Thereafter, pet caused the subdivision of thelot into 6 lots. The private respondents filed with the RTC, the instant complaintagainst the petitioner and the director of the BOL. The trial court, finding that fraudwas employed by pet, declared said patent and title void and ordered its cancellation.However, it declared that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well asthe Rural Bank of Mandaue are purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively;and consequently upheld as valid the sale of the lot. Both petitioner and private

respondents appealed to the CA which affirmed with modification the decision of thetrial court.Wills Issue:(ito lang ata)WON the PRs are the legal heirs of the deceased.Ruling:Other than their bare allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard evidence waspresented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in order that an heir mayassert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration ofheirship is necessary.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 118464 December 21, 1998HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI and ROSARIO CUARIO, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA S. REYES as Attorney-in-Fact of JOSEFINA S.REYES, BERNARDITA S. PALILIO, HERMINIA S. PALILIO, REMEDIOS A.

SAMPAYO, ILUMINADA A. SAMPAYO, ENRICO A. SAMPAYO CARLOS A.SAMPAYO, GENEROSO C. SAMPAYO, MYRNA C. SAMPAYO, ROSALINO C.SAMPAYO, MANUEL C. SAMPAYO, DELIA A. SAMPAYO, CORAZON C.SAMPAYO, NILO C. SAMPAYO, and LOLITA A. SAMPAYO in her own behalf aas Attorney-in-Fact of NORMA A. SAMPAYO, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:This petition for review on certiorariseeks to reverse the 30 March 1994. Decision

and 21 December 1994 Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals which upheld thright of private respondents as heirs of Lourdes Sampayo to demand partition unde

Art. 494 of the Civil Code.Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuado, were the co-owneof the property in litigation consisting of a 539-square meter lot at the corner ofZamora and Abellanosa Streets, Lucena City, covered by TCT No. T-15374, with ahouse erected thereon. 1 On 17 March 1986 Lourdes Sampayo died intestate withoissue. 2 Subsequently, on 1 April 1987 private respondents Josefina S. Reyes,Bernardita S. Palilio, Herminia S. Palilio, Remedios A. Sampayo, Iluminada A.Sampayo, Enrico A. SAMPAYO, Carlos A. Sampayo, Gelleroso C. Sampayo, MyrnC. Sampayo, Rosalina C. Sampayo, Manuel C. Sampayo, Delia. A. Sampayo,

Corazon C. Sampayo, Nilo C. Sampayo, Lolita A. Sampayo and Norma A. Sampayall represented by their Attorney-in-Fact Lydia S. Reyes, with Lolita A. Sampayoacting also in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of Norma A. Sampayo, allclaiming to be collateral relatives of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo, filed an actionfor partition and damages before RTC-Br. 54, Lucena City. 3The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario refused the partition on the groundthat private respondents failed to produce any document to produce that they werethe rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. 4 On 30 August 1987 Ignacio Conti died andwas substituted as party-defendant by his children Asuncion, Francisco, Milagros,Joselito, Luisito, Diego and Teresita, all surnamed Conti. 5

At the trial, private respondents presented Lydia Sampayo Reyes and Adelaida

Sampayo to prove that they were the collateral heirs of the deceased LourdesSampayo and therefore entitled to her rights as co-owner of the subject lot. Bringingwith her the original copy of her certificate of live birth showing that her father wasInocentes Reyes and her mother was Josefina Sampayo, 6 Lydia Sampayo Reyestestified that she was one of the nieces of Lourdes Sampayo, being the daughter ofJosefina Sampayo, the only living sibling of Lourdes. Lydia also testified that Lourdhad another sister named Remedios J. Sampayo who died in 1948, and two brotheManuel J. Sampayo and Luis J. Sampayo who died in 1983 and 1960, respectively.To prove that Josefina, Remedios, Luis and Manuel were siblings of Lourdes, their


11/14

baptismal certificates together with a photocopy of the birth certificate of ManuelSampayo were offered in evidence. These documents showed that their father andmother, like Lourdes Sampayo, were Antonio Sampavo and Brigida Jaraza.The certificates of baptism presented as part of the testimony of Lydia SampayoReyes were prepared by Rev. Franklin C. Rivero who duly certified that all datatherein written were in accordance with the church records, hence, the lower leftportion of the documents bearing the seal of the church with the notation as to wherethe documents were logged in particular. 7 The baptismal certificates were presented

in lieu of the birth certificates because the repository of those documents, the Office ofthe Civil Registrar of Lucena City, had been razed by fire On two separate occasions,27 November 1974 and 30 August 1983, thus all civil registration records were totallyburned. 8 On the other hand, a photocopy of Manuel's birth certificate dated 25October 1919 (Exh. "I") 9showed that it was issued by the Local Civil Registrar ofLucena, Tayabas (now Lucena City).

Adelaida Sampayo, widow of Manuel Sampayo, testified that her husband Manuelwas the brother of the deceased Lourdes, and with the death of Manuel, Luis andRemedios, the only living sibling of Lourdes was Josefina. 10To rebut whatever rights the alleged heirs of Lourdes had over the subject lot,petitioners presented Rosario Cuario Conti, Rosal Ladines Malundas and Rodolfo

Espineli. Rosario testified that the subject property was co-owned in equal shares byher husband Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo and that her family (Rosario) hadbeen staying in the subject property since 1937. 11 In fact, she said that her latehusband Ignacio Conti paid for the real estate taxes 12 and spent for the necessaryrepairs and improvements thereon 13 because by agreement Lourdes would leave hershare of the property to them. 14However, as correctly found by the trial court, no will, either testamentary orholographic, was presented by petitioners to substantiate this claim. 15 Rosario alsodisclosed that when Lourdes died her remains were taken by her-relatives from theirhouse. 16 When cross examined on who those relatives were, she replied that the onlyone she remembered was Josefina since there were many relatives who came. When

asked who Josefina's parents were, she said she could not recall. Likewise, whenasked who the parents of Lourdes were, Rosario denied having ever known them. 17

Another witness, Rosa Ladines Malundas, narrated that she used to be the neighborand hairdresser of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo who told her that upon her deathher share would go to Ignacio Conti whom she considered as her brother since bothof them were "adopted" by their foster parents Gabriel Cord and Anastacia AllareyCord, 18 although she admitted that she did not know whether Lourdes had otherrelatives. 19

According to another witness, Rodolfo Espineli, he took pictures of the tombs bearithe tombstones of Gabriel Cord and Anastacia Allarey Cord and Ignacio Conti as was that of Lourdes Sampayo who was supposed to have been interred beside her"adoptive" parents. However, as revealed by Rosario during her direct examination,Lourdes was not in fact interred there because her relatives took her remains. 20On 4 April 1991 the trial court declared private respodents as the rightful heirs ofLourdes Sampayo. It further ordered private respondents and petitioners to submitproject of partition of the residential house and lot for confirmation by the court. 21

Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial courterred in finding that private respondents were the heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and ththey were entitled to the partition of the lot and the improvements thereon. 22On 30 March 1994 the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed RTC decision andheld 23

In the instant case, plaintiffs [now private respondents] were able tprove and establish by preponderance of evidence that they are thcollateral heirs of deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore thelower court did not err in ordering herein plaintiffs [now privaterespondents] and defendants [now petitioners] to submit a projectpartition of the residential house and lot owned in common by the

deceased Lourdes Sampayo and defendant spouses Conti forconfirmation by the court . . . . Considering our earlier finding that tlower court did not err in declaring herein plaintiffs [now privaterespondents] as heirs of deceased Sampayo and therefore entitledinherit her property, the argument of the appellants [now petitionersthat the plaintiffs [now private respondents] are not entitled, topartition is devoid of merit (insertions in 11 supplied).

Respondent court also ruled, citingHernandez v. Padua 24 and Marabilles v.Quito, 25 that a prior and separate judicial declaration of heirship was notnecessary 26 and that private respondents became the co-owners of the portion of tproperty owned and registered in the name of Lourdes Sampayo upon her death an

consequently, entitled to the immediate possession thereof and all otherincidents/rights of ownership as provided for by law, including the right to demandpartition under Art. 777 of the Civil Code, 27 and Ilustre v. Alaras Frondosa 28 holdinthat the property belongs to the heirs at the moment of death of the decedent, ascompletely as if he had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same beforehis death.The appellate court subsequently denying a motion for reconsideration upheld theprobative value of the documentary and testimonial evidence of private respondentand faulted petitioners for not having subpoenaed Josefina if they believed that she


12/14

was a vital witness in the case. 29 Hence, petitioners pursued this case arguing that acomplaint for partition to claim a supposed share of the deceased co-owner cannotprosper without prior settlement of the latter's estate and compliance with all legalrequirements especially publication, and private respondents were not able to proveby competent evidence their relationship with the deceased. 30There is no merit in the petition. A prior settlement of the estate is not essential beforethe heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the deceased as weexplained in Quison v. Salud31

Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the presentplaintiffs are next of kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellants thatthey are not entitled to maintain this action because there is noevidence that any proceedings have been taken in court for thesettlement of the estate of Claro Quison; and that without suchsettlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action. There is nothing inthis point. As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of CivilProcedure, the title to the property owned by a person who diesintestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under thepresent law, subject to the claims of administration and the propertymay be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and

expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage of thetitle, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Withoutsome showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed inproceedings to settle the estate of Claro Quison, the right of the;plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.

Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494 32 ofthe Civil Code, from the death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner,incidental to which is the right to ask for partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so demanding partition privaterespondents merely exercised the right originally pertaining to the decedent, theirpredecessor-in-interest.

Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct hadthe action been for the partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we weredealing with extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and the summarysettlement of estates of small value. 33 But what private respondents are pursuing isthe mere segregation of Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited; from herthrough intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition between co-owners. The applicable law in point is Sec. 1 of Rules 69 of the Rules of Court

Sec. 1. Complaint in an action for partition of real estate. A personhaving the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as in

this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint the nature andextent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate ofwhich partition is demanded and joining as defendants all the otherpersons interested in the property.

A cursory reading of the aforecited rule shows that publication is not required aserroneously maintained by petitioners. There are two (2) simultaneous issues in anaction for partition. First, whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the propertysought to be partitioned, and second, if answered in the affirmative, the manner of t

division of the property, i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner.34

Thus, in tcase, we must determine whether private respondents, by preponderance ofevidence, have been able to establish that they are co-owners by way of successioas collateral heirs of the late Lourdes Sampayo as they claim to be, either a sister, anephew or a niece. These, private respondents were able to prove in the trial courtwell as before respondent Court of Appeals.Petitioners however insist that there was no such proof of filiation because: (a) merphotocopies of birth certificates do not prove filiation; (b) certifications on non-availability of records of birth do not prove filiation; (c) baptismal certificates do notprove filiation of alleged collateral relatives of the deceased; and, (d) the testimonieof Lydia S. Reyes, alleged daughter of Josefina Reyes, and Adelaida Sampayo,

alleged sister-in-law of Josefina and Lourdes, were incompetent as Lydia was madto testify on events which happened before her birth while Adelaida testified onmatters merely narrated to her. 35We are not persuaded. Altogether, the documentary and testimonial evidencesubmitted that private respondents are competent and adequate proofs that privaterespondents are collateral heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. Private respondents assert ththey are co-owners of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share of the subject property by waof legal or intestate succession.Succession is a mode of acquisition by vietue of which the property, rights andobligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmittedthrough his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. 36 Le

or intestate succession takes place if a person dies without a will, or with a void will,or one which has subsequently lost its validity. 37 If there are no descendants,ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spuoses, the collateral relatives shasucceed to the entire estate of the decedent. 38 It was established during the trial thLourdes died intestate and without issues. Private respondents as sister, nephewsand nieces now claim to be the collateral relatives of Lourdes.Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, 39 the filiation of ligitimate children shall be provby any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absencea record of birth or a parent's admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or


13/14

private document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of one's filiation may bea baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has beenentered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, thetestimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of theRules of Court. 40 By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be utilized inthe instant case.Public documents are the written official acts, or records of the official act of thesovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the

Philippines, or of a foreign country.41

The baptismal certificates presented inevidence by private respondents are public documents. Parish priests continue to bethe legal custodians of the parish records and are authorized to issue true copies, inthe form of certificates, of the entries contained therein. 42The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S. Reyes, absent thetestimony of the officiating priest or the official recorder, was settled in People v.Ritter, citing U.S. v. de Vera (28 Phil.105 [1914], 43 thus.

. . . the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered asentries made in the course of the business under Section 43 of Rule130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptismsadministered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise

of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book of the church duringthis course of its business.

It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the administration ofthe sacrament, but in this case, there were four (4) baptismal certificates which, whentaken together, uniformly show that Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios and Luis had thesame set of parents, as indicated therein. Corroborated by the undisputed testimonyof Adelaida Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her brothers Manuel, Luisand sister Remedios, the only sibling left was Josefina Sampayo Reyes, suchbaptismal certificates have acquired evidentiary weight to prove filiation.Petitioners' objection to the photocopy of the certificate of birth of Manuel Sampayowas properly discarded by the court a quo and respondent Court of Appeals.

According to Sec. 3, par. (1), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court, when the subject ofinquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than theoriginal document itself except when the original has been lost or destroyed or cannotbe produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror. The loss ordestruction of the original certificate of birth of Manuel T. Sampayo was dulyestablished by the certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar ofLucena City to the effect that its office was completely destroyed by fire on 27November 1974 and 30 August 1983, respectively, and as a consequence thereof, allcivil registration records were totally burned.

Apparently, there seems to be some merit in petitioners' contention that the testimoof Adelaida Sampayo cannot prove filiation for being hearsay considering that therewas no declaration ante litem motam as required by the rules, i.e., that the declaratirelating to pedigree was made before the controversy occurred. Nonetheless,petitioners made no move to dispute her testimony in open court when she wasmentioning who the brothers and sisters of Lourdes were. As correctly observed bythe trial court in explicit terms, "the documentary and testimonial evidence not werenot disputed by defendants" (now petitioners). 44Notably, when Rosario Cuario Con

took the witness stand, she admitted that she was not aware of the identities of theparents of the deceased. Clearly, this runs, counter to the relationship akin to filialbonding which she professed she had enjoyed with the decedent. As wife of IgnaciContil, she was supposedly a "sister-in-law" of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo whregarded Ignacio as a brother. However, in sum, we rule that all the pieces ofevidence adduced, taken together, clearly preponderate to the right of privaterespondents to maintain the action for partition. Absent any reversible error in theassailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, this petition for reviewon certiorariwill not lie.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 30 March 199and Resolution dated 21 December 1994 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Martinez., JJ. concur.

Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 118464; Decemebr 21, 1998Facts:Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, were the co-owneof a lot in Lucena City. Lourdes died without issue. PRs, claiming to be the collaterarelatives of the deceased Lourdes, filed an action for partition. Conti refused the

partition on the ground that PRs failed to produce any document to prove that theywere the rightful heirs of Lourdes. When Ignacio died, he was substituted as party-defendant by his kids.PR Lydia Sampayo presented an original copy of her cert. of live birth to prove thatshe was one of the nieces of Lourdes. Josefina, Remedios, Luis and Manuel tried tprove that they were the siblings of Lourdes by presenting their baptismal certstogether with the birth cert of Manuel.Rosario claimed that Lourdes agreed to leave her share of the property to them.However, no will, either testamentary of holo, was presented by pets to substantiate


14/14

this claim. The TC declared PRs as the rightful heirs of Lourdes. It further orderedPRs and pets to submit a project of partition. Pets elevated the case to the CA, whichaffirmed the assailed decision. MR denied.Issues:1. WON the settlement of the estate is a condition precedent before thecommencement of any action pertaining to hte deceased.2. WON PRs are the rightful heirs of the deceased.Ruling:

1. No. The title to the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at onceto his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the claims ofadministration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of payingdebts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage of the title,upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs.Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct hadthe action been for the partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we weredealing with extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and the summarysettlement of estates of small value. But what private respondents are pursuing is themere segregation of Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited from her throughintestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition between co-owners.

Rule 69, Sec. 1)

2. Yes. Altogether, the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted arecompetent and adequate proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs ofLourdes Sampayo.Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights andobligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmittedthrough his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. Legalor intestate succession takes place if a person dies without a will, or with a void will,or one which has subsequently lost its validity. If there are no descendants,ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall

succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. It was established during the trial thatLourdes died intestate and without issue. Private respondents as sister, nephews andnieces now claim to be the collateral relatives of Lourdes.

Documents

Rabadilla Bordalba Conti