115
» """ The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency. PERSONAL EXPERIENCE MONOGRAPH ELEGIE JUL 1 3 1995 OPERATION DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL ANTHONY R. JONES United States Army DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. USAWC CLASS OF 1992 ! DTI1 QUALITY INSPECTED 8 U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050 mm iimmniiMHiinin 19950705 093

r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

  • Upload
    others

  • View
    12

  • Download
    0

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

»■""" ■■■■■■■■■■

The views expressed in this paper are those of the

author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the

Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This

document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

PERSONAL EXPERIENCE MONOGRAPH

r® ELEGIE JUL 1 3 1995 OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

AND DESERT STORM

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ANTHONY R. JONES United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release.

Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1992

■■■■!■■■■

DTI1 QUALITY INSPECTED 8

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050 ■■■■■■mm iimmniiMHiinin

19950705 093

Page 2: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

UNCLASSIFIED

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES

Accesion For OPERATION DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

A PERSONAL MONOGRAPH

by

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony R. Jones, AV

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas V. Johnson, II

Project Advisor

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

NTIS CRA&I H DTIC TAB D Unannounced □ Justification

Availability Codes

Dist

,M

Avail and/or Special

U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

Page 3: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

INTRODUCTION

"So what did you do in the War, Daddy?"

As a Battalion Commander of an AH-64 Attack Helicopter

Battalion during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,

my experiences were many, my memories everlasting.

Rather than enumerate a chronology of events, I wl11

give the reader an insight into the views of a Battalion

Commander whose unit was detached from its normal

organization in Germany, deployed to Saudi Arabia with

initial United States (U.S.) Forces, and attached to the

CONUS-based XVIII Airborne Corps for the duration of Desert

Shield and Desert Storm. The uniqueness of this experience

lies in the cross-attachment of a new Apache Attack

Helicopter Battalion from a heavy division organization

supporting European NATO Forces, to a Corps Aviation

Brigade, then further attaching this Brigade to a U.S. Corps

under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief,

U.S. Central Command. The opportunity to demonstrate

versatility, flexibility, and mission focus was clearly

present.

In order not to overlook the historical data available

which details the experiences of this great unit, at Annex A

is an operational summary of the 3d Battalion, 227th

Page 4: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

Aviation Regiment experiences, from alert notification to

final return of forces to Germany. Annex B is an after

action summary prepared by the 12th Aviation Brigade, a V

Corps unit, and the immediate higher headquarters for the 3d

Battalion during this operation. Annex C contains my

impressions of the first 90 days of deployment and two

articles written for the soldiers back in Germany, and at

Annex D are quick reference maps of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and

the Persian Gulf Region.

To retain a personal perspective throughout this paper,

I wi11 addresss the many topics considered pertinent at the

Battalion organization level. I wi 1 1 restrict my comments

to those impressions that are foremost in my mind when

reflecting on specific subject areas. Although my

perspectives may often reinforce preconceived notions, I

hope that future commanders, who lack experience going into

combat or who share my opinions may, remember these thoughts

to better prepare themselves and take care of our soldiers.

"THE SUMMER OF 1990"

Commanders often accept risk in level of performance

while being reasonably certain of mission accomplishment.

The unit was formally activated as the 3d Battalion, 22?th

Aviation Regiment at Fort Hood, Texas, on 16 April 1989, and

subsequently deployed to Hanau, Germany, in September 1989.

Page 5: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

After a year of Intense training with the 3d Armor Division,

many leaders and staff officers within the Battalion

warranted change of position, responsibilities and mission

focus. From the early spring through July 1990, I had just

rotated all Company Commanders, all primary staff officers,

to include the Operations Officer CS-3), and my Executive

Officer. The hardened experience and cohesion of training

in the intense Apache Training Brigade program of

instruction, weathering the windstorms of Fort Hood and

Germany, and successfully completing the first year of

training with the 3d Armor Division had given leaders and

soldiers alike an aura of confidence—ready to defend NATO

and tackle any adversary. The training program for the next

year in. Germany and a new Brigade Commander favored the

actions I had just taken to provide progressive

opportunities for junior officers and further challenge

those I had mentored for the past eighteen months,

unbeknownst to me, the next year would provide the Battalion

a new environment, a new higher headquarters, a third

continent of operation, and a transition from peacetime

training to war. Enormous challenges lay ahead, many of

which career military officers and attack helicopter pilots

often dream.

PRE-COMBAT PREPARATION

Page 6: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

War and peace are similarly comprised of emotional

peaks and valleys, otherwise described as relentless periods

of boredom surrounded by sheer moments of panic, fright and

1ife-threatening uncertainty. The first emotional peak

realized by the soldiers and chain of command, was elation

that the unit had been selected to go first to the combat

zone. In addition, a certain amount of pride was sensed in

being potentially the first 3d Armor Division soldiers to

fight for our nation since World War II (WWII)—basically 45

years hence. This elation subsided with the beginning of

hard work for deployment, the anxiety of future actions, and

the demands of impending family separation. It was also

during the medical phases of preparation for combat that the

Battalion Command Sergeant Major was declared

non-deployable—thus eliminating another source of unit

leadership, cohesion, and combat experience. As the

Commander, I knew that the most Important thing for me to do

was keep my composure, set the example and ensure mission

focus. The first phase of our mission was deployment—a

task which would include rail, air and sea movement. Little

time was available for unit training. My thoughts were

often preoccupied with future situations for which I may not

have trained the soldiers, mentored the leaders or

adequately prepared the unit mentally or physically. Time

would tel1.

Page 7: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

ORGANIZATION

I suddenly found myself with an organization for

deployment almost twice the size of my battalion. My newly

assigned Brigade was the first to deploy from Europe, and at

that time, thought to be one of the few U.S. units from NATO

to be deployed. Therefore, a stand-alone, flexible

capability was assured. A Stinger-equipped Air Defense

Platoon, Physician Assistant, Chaplain and Chaplain's

Assistant, maintenance support personnel, supply and

transport personnel, and additional flight crews were

examples of attachments received. Functionally and

personnel strengthwise, the Battalion was independent,

self-sustaining and ready for our next contingency.

Although these attachments were welcomed, I sensed the

inadequacies in force structure of the Battalion and the

Corps Aviation Brigade, when required to operate

independently, across unit and organizational boundaries.

TRAINING AND READINESS

The successes of all Apache Battalions in Desert Shield

and Storm began with the Unit Training Program conducted at

the Apache Training Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas. This

experience and the mentorship received from combat veterans

such as Colonel Bob Hurley, bonded battalions into cohesive

fighting units—albeit some more than others. The 3d

Page 8: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

Battalion had gained the reputation as one of the best—able

to rise to every mission. The experiences of the unit

training at Fort Hood, deploying to Germany, and working

with the 3d Armor Division through REFORGER, Gunnery and the

Combat Maneuver Training Center <CMTC>, and the Battle

Command Training Program <BCTP) had produced a combat ready

unit. My greatest concern was the changes in leadership and

primary staff I had just conducted. The positive note was

that most of the new leaders were from within the unit, and

I retained about 75 per cent of the soldiers that had

experienced the previous 18 months of training. As time

passed, Desert Shield provided an opportunity to prepare

these new leaders for the war ahead.

Although much is done in preparing for war—the same

issues arise during training exercises—discipline, orders

process, troop leading procedures, standards, battlefield

operating systems synchronization, intelligence preparation

of the battlefield, and mission, enemy, terrain and weather,

troops and firepower available, and time (METT-T). Many

soldiers fail to realize the benefits gained from past

training until faced with the uncertainty and anticipation

of combat. It is then that all those challenges and events

become the repertoire of those preparing to fight for their

nation. The basics, battle drills at every level, must be

known. Realistic training, training as we expect to operate

Page 9: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

In combat are essential. Standards of performance did not

change, the environment, however, did, causing the need to

continually rehearse and train. A unit must master the

routine before it can expect to tackle the difficult.

Readiness never takes a day off.

Mental and physical fitness had been constantly

emphasized since the battalions' inception. These traits

were key in deployment, acclimation and throughout our seven

months of deployment. Examples of both acute and chronic

fatigue were evident in soldiers of units deployed for over

six months.

The strength of my unit had always been the ability to

work together, arise to each challenge no matter how

difficult or how small. My greatest concern remained—"What

did I know that I had not told them?" Although the soldiers

remained confident as we departed Europe, I also sensed that

they felt that either through diplomatic or military means,

the crisis would be over by Christmas. I continually

cautioned the unit against this uncertainty, and the

importance of mission focus.

I assumed that a clear mission focus would be gained

upon arrival in Saudi Arabia—this was not the case. Many

contingencies were in the planning stages. Leader focus was

on who was ready to fight, measures of relative combat

7

Page 10: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

power, and readiness. The Battalion arrived in theater with

great ambitions and readiness for battle but momemtum was

slowed by periods of waiting and many mission changes.

After three weeks in country, a mission and a tract of land

were assigned to allow focus on planning and execution of

the defense. Long range plans remained incomplete—subject

to continued diplomatic and strategic sparring. Although

impatient and anxious to 'do something'', time was best used

to train and refine unknown areas--medlcal evacuation,

communications nets, logistics, fire support, passage of

lines, and desert tactics to name a few.

Soldiers and subordinate elements espoused an aura of

confidence as uncertainties were reduced, we gained a

covering force mission (while being further attached to the

101st Air Assault Division), and mail from Germany began

arriving along with the tremendous influx of 'any soldier'

mail from the united States. One of the best things we did

to further prepare for the road ahead was nuclear biolog-

ical , and chemical CNBC) defense training, specifically

decontamination of people and equipment in potentially

traumatic conditions. The Physician Assistant attached to

the Battalion was a prior Special Forces officer, with

considerable experience in organizing for treatment of

casualties under 'dirty' or chemical exposure conditions.

We revitalized teams, rehearsed, trained, and ensured that

8

Page 11: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

every soldier was competent and confident In these

procedures. Although we had worked with medical and NBC

procedures before, we had never trained and rehearsed both

at the same time in this magnitude and environment—nor had

many (any?) others in country. We subsequently packaged,

video taped, and exported this training program for our new

brigade, the 101st Division, and the units back in the 3d

Armor Division. This experience was an unexpected boost to

soldier confidence and readiness. Although not outwardly

vocal about their concerns, the level of participation and

eagerness to learn in training was apparent. We also

trained the Division Chemical unit on our methods—thus

increasing their readiness and standardization with the

latest techniques. Likewise, we concurrently trained over

one-third of the battalion as combat lifesavers, a skill we

fortunately were not required to use, but which added

confidence within our units.

My initial thoughts on our experience in the desert

were captured at the request of the public affairs officer

in the 3d Armor Division. Although somewhat redundant to

the above, I have included a copy of the transmitted article

from the desert to Germany at Annex C.

ENVIRONMENT

Page 12: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

I must record my thoughts on the physical environment

and host nation considerations. Although deployed less than

seven months, we had an opportunity to view the harshness of

the four seasons in the desert. Heat, cold, rain,

vegetation growth, dust storms, and transformation of

terrain by natures elements. The range of temperatures

approximated 100 degrees fahrenheit. At night, all critters

move seeking prey while trying not to become another's prey.

Soldiers had steep learning curves in acclimation, learning

to sleep while sweating, using netting to avoid flies, and

keeping sand and dirt from food. Personal hygiene and field

sanitation were paramount. No water source was potable.

Exposed food and waste areas drew flies and rats, rats drew

snakes, snakes threated bedouins, sheep and soldiers—all

became carriers of dysentery. The hand washing facility in

the mess line became a significant factor of importance.

The experience of occupying and defending another

nation as a member of a coalition force, subject to customs

and cultures of the host nation was unique for our

westernized soldiers. More importantly, future wars may be

characterized by the same circumstances. Saudi Arabia is

the seat of Islam, and has a distinguished history, but

based on different principles. Government by monarchy,

deep-rooted religious cultures, and a tradition of Arab

beliefs characterize our host nation. U.S. soldiers were

10

Page 13: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

confronted with this cultural difference. Rules, policies

and education were prolific. For example:

-Pornography and alcohol prohibited -Reduced exposure of women, especially driving vehicles and doing PT

-No open religious services -Avoid camels—"All camels belong to the King" (no matter how ugly) -Avoid oil pipelines -Do not overfly Bedouin camps, camels, or built-up

areas -Do not let media orchestrate picture back drop that is contrary to host nation ideas -No sun bathing -Use cots-keep soldiers off the ground

Above all, the soldier and leaders at all levels were

forced to think before they acted. Any perceived lack of

discipline received immediate attention.

More important, the initial thrust into the desert for

European units caused many items of equipment and life

support measures to receive immediate attention—for

example, ice chests, potable ice for cooling water/soda, sun

screen, insect repellant to preclude sandfly fever, mosquito

nets, cots, showers, sanitary latrines, vacuum cleaners, and

bottled water. There were many potential hazards other than

dysentary—such as anthrax, botulism, and malaria. This

country had it all, and the desert comes alive with varmits

and bugs at night.

Field sanitation during field operations was critical.

Likewise, preventive maintenance of equipment and soldiers

11

Page 14: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

took on a high priority. The soldiers soon realized that

this would not be a short duration exercise, soldier and

equipment readiness had to be preserved.

SOLDIERS

The individual soldier and his peers, crews, teams and

basic units are the true heroes of the Desert Shield/Storm

experience. This should not be a surprise. The majority of

soldiers in an Apache Attack Helicopter Battalion were

representative of the quality of soldiers in today's Army.

Fifteen years ago, the results might not have been the same.

Examples of dedication, discipline, self-confidence,

patriotism, and acceptance of the responsibility to fight

for and represent our nation were the norm. Yet many

soldiers who were doubtful in training were also problems in

a combat zone, and should be eliminated from a smaller, more

professional Army.

Human nature in war and basic needs of the soldier or

unit were observed and are a positive learning experience

for those in our profession. Desert Shield and Desert Storm

provided a unique experience for soldiers and families,

especially those who left families behind in foreign

countries upon deployment. The real product of the efforts

of unit family support programs is the satisfaction the

soldier feels that his family is taken care of. The old

12

Page 15: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

adage that you must have the hearts and minds of the soldier

to ensure resoluteness of mission focus could not be

accomplished if his/her focus was distracted by family

problems at home—he/she may then be more of a liability

than an asset in combat. In turn, knowing families are

secure and resources available to assist their needs

provides an increased level of confidence, attention to

detail,, and efficiency for soldiers and units,

My reflections on soldiers were also given to company

and platoon leaders. I cautioned leaders that their

soldiers likely fell into one of three categories:

I—The overconfident warlord—commonly known as the John Wayne syndrome—those who espoused their impatience and thirst for combat.

II—The competent, quiet, level-performing, solid soldier—the ones who think logically through the tasks at hand, meticulously prepare themselves and are extremely proficient, disciplined, and reliable.

Ill—The fearful, dependent, unsure individual—either outward or inward fears preoccuppied thoughts, incapable of independent action, and prone to error at critical times.

Of these three categories of soldiers, the leader must

have knowledge of where each subordinate may stand. The

goal is to train, mentor and strive for all individuals to

gravitate toward Category II. A unit comprised of mostly

Category II type individuals will pull together and succeed

in tough times. These type individuals also bond units into

cohesive teams. Leaders, at all levels, must identify

13

Page 16: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

subordinates in these categories and construct teams/crews

in balance to ensure success. This process also must be

considered as risk management, as the commander/leader

analyzes the mission at hand. My battalion had soldiers in

all three of these categories.

The environment and continued stress of the anxiety,

uncertainty and boredom of Desert Shield/Storm produced

fatigue in leaders and soldiers alike. The cohesion of

units is built through realistic training, tough experiences

and reference to a common past, but during prolonged

combinations of these experiences, fatigue will cause stress

and minor incidents will become burdens to individuals and

leaders alike. Commanders must continually assess their

unit and key individuals for the consequences of acute or

chronic fatigue. Duties can be rotated, scenary changed,

chow varied, and soldier ingenuity used for entertainment,

relief of stress, and means to escape the mental burdens of

a Desert Shield/Storm experience. Commanders must see this

in their units and accept risk or diversity to overcome

depletion of a unit—often at the expense of more energy

himself in the short term.

The key distractors and influences on morale of

soldiers and units are largely the same as in peacetime

environment—communications, security, consistency of

priorities and focus, satisfaction of basic needs, and

14

Page 17: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

recognition of performance, either positive or negative.

However, three areas that had varying impacts on morale

were lack of mail, causing uncertainty of status at home;

lack of tactical knowledge, enemy and friendly; and basic

quality of life, such as shower and latrine facilities,

quality of rations, and availability of ice or sodas. Some

of these factors are controllable at or below battalion

level, others are not. It is important that soldiers share

the same perception of equal distribution of critical

resources. It is also essential to tell soldiers all that

is known, even in times of uncertainty and ambiguity.

Likewise, a commander must carefully evaluate decisions

which cause undo expenditure of energy by soldiers for no

positive gain.

A concern of commanders and soldiers is Operational

Security COPSEC). Once mail distribution is resolved,

soldier letters and pictures often reveal information that

could compromise future or current operations. This

information, in turn, spreads throughout dependent

information networks. It is often misunderstood, becomes

the source of rumors, and causes additional effort to

resolve issues. Needless waste of energy, notwithstanding

potential mission impact, is spent by the chain of command

and family support groups to correct information. This

situation is often more complicated when in an attached unit

15

Page 18: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

Status, because normal communications networks are further

limited. Guidelines must be stated early and continued

levels of release of information explained. The smallest

rumor or even correct information released in an untimely

manner can escalate to the detriment of soldiers and

families. The notice of a soldier's death, missing in

action, or injury passed through second hand information is

an example. It is human nature to seek and pass information

about loved ones, we must do the best we can to ensure that

information is releaseable and accurate. Modern commun-

ications systems facilitate information flow, accurate or

inaccurate.

Likewise, laundry services collect identification

cards, maps, tactical operations center (TOO passes,

communications data, and various items important to OPSEC

and unit security. Caution must be emphasized immediately,

especially in a potential terrorist environment.

On two different occasions, we were able to call

Germany and allow three minutes of phone conversation

between each soldier and family members. The benefits of

these calls far outweighed the expense incurred achieving

this objective.

Last, a commander must not underestimate a soldiers'

ingenuity. Given certain limits, the American soldier will

16

Page 19: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

achieve his mission, make something out of nothing, and

support his fellow soldier. Hidden talents often arise

during idle times, leaders must recognize these skills and

harness energies to the benefit of all soldiers. Quality of

life was enhanced by soldiers with carpentry skills at

forward operating bases.

MISSION AND DOCTRINE

Attack helicopter assets were deployed from Germany to

get tank-killing assets promptly into Saudi Arabia. The

missions of the Battalion can be summarily stated in five

phases:

I. Deployment II. Acclimation and Train-up

III. Defensive Operations IV. Offensive Operations V. Redeployment and Reconstitut ion

Specific missions in each phase were not part of the

unit mission essential task list CMETL). However the

flexibility, agility, and quality soldiers of the Attack

Battalion was the key to success. Deployment from Germany

was not an issue prior to Desert Shield, now units will be

better prepared. Twice during the year prior to Desert

Shield, I had suggested without success that this task be

added to facilitate future contingencies. During the

Defense, I found myself conducting covering force

operations. In Europe, the Cavalry were relied upon for

17

Page 20: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

this mission. As Desert Storm began, the Battalion was

tasked to lead, cover and secure the insertion and

extraction of long range surveillance detachments (LRSD)

deep into Iraqi territory. Contingencies were developed to

assist in security of extraction missions to recover downed

aircrews and other LRSD teams in contact. Again, this was

not a prior METL tasks, but the soldiers were more than

willing to assist in any way. Likewise, the conduct of

Corps deep attacks and continual passage of lines instilled

confidence in the soldiers that previous training and

tactical procedures work. The opportunity to work with all

Corps elements, other divisions, and French soldiers

provided invaluable experiences. The thread of continuity

was the mission and will of all soldiers to achieve success.

All units wanted to contribute.

Many times the focus of accomplishment of aviation

units is on aerial exploits. Desert Shield and Storm

reinforced the importance of the 'other' soldiers on the

Battalion team. Desert Shield was a total success, with

continued training, alert status and mission focus on

warfighting realities. Then a final preparation began for

the offense—twenty-four hour a day operations to prepare

for a combat surge. This operation included removal,

painting, and reinstalling rotor blades on all aircraft.

With the beginning of Desert Storm, the ground support

18

Page 21: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

vehicles, equipment and personnel embarked upon a 750

kilometer movement to our initial assembly area for the

offense. Subsequently, with the attack into Iraq, these

elements again convoyed over 350 kilometers into Iraq to

link-up with air assets. The Command Sergeant Major, First

Sergeants and leaders at all levels rose to the occasion and

achieved overwhelming success—losing not one soldier or

piece of equipment. This experience exemplifies the

achievements of many unsung heroes of Desert Shield and

Desert Storm.

Two other mission variables require mentioning. The

rules of engagement (ROE), from the outset, were the best I

have seen to allow freedom of action, security of forces,

and protection of noncombatants. The aircrews knew the

rules from the beginning and this eliminated any potential

concerns. Secondly, the commander must allocate assets to

the mission commensurate with the threat. The firepower and

lethality of an Attack Helicopter Battalion could easily be

demonstrated in massing all assets on a particular target.

However, preservation of aircrews, equipment and ammunition

dictates allocating numbers of aircraft equal to the

mission requirements. Ground commanders may not have

experience in the capabilities of attack assets and must be

advised on whether to employ assets sequentially,

continually or in mass. The Battalion Commander of an

19

Page 22: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

Attack Battalion must use constraint when knowing all

companies and aircrews want a piece of Iraq.

This war is also significant for future insight into

the use of attack helicopter assets. Past training

experiences, major field exercises or command post

exercises, revealed the intent of Division and Corps

Commanders to call upon attack helicopters once bogged down,

when a concentration of enemy forces was located, or

generally when ground Brigades needed help. Often, these

commanders were reluctant to send aviation units across the

forward line of troops (FLOT) or to risk these assets.

Although my experience showed that the Attack Battalions

were relied upon as quick and essential combat multipliers,

I did see a change in the warfighting techniques by senior

commanders. Basically, attack helicopters were used out

front of ground forces, used to gather info on terrain and

enemy positions, used to soften targets to ensure success of

ground unit advances, and used to exploit the offense with

stand-off killing capabilities. The ground commander fought

four dimensions in the battle—deep interdiction with Air

Force allocated sorties, deep in sector with attack

helicopters and multiple launch rocket systems <MLRS), a

close fight with tanks and infantry, and the rear fight and

flank security with all other available forces. This

perspective was a dynamic transition of commander decisions

20

Page 23: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

and the Attack Battalion proved more than able to accept the

challenge. As a result, the viability of aviation attack

assets as a combined arms team player can only be

strengthened. A major success for aviation credibility and

our great soldiers.

EQUIPMENT AND MAINTENANCE

Much has been said on the need for preventive and

sustained maintenance of equipment. The real lesson learned

for the future is designing equipment which is operable in

all environments. Older equipment, specifically wheeled

vehicles, had difficult times in the desert. Batteries,

tires, airpowered turbines, and black boxes that were not

environmentally sealed continually failed. Sand, dust, and

dirt erodes the finish and will cut through most soft

components. The sun, wind, and rain of the desert is not

blocked by man-made or artificial barriers. Humidity and

even slight moisture at night quickly erodes weapons,

ammunition and critical items of equipment—there are no

time outs for maintenance to ensure readiness. Individuals

as well as first line supervisors, must constantly check

equipment. Vacuum cleaners, commercial generators, and

water dispensing devices such as the decomtamination sonator

proved invaluable to preventive maintenance.

21

Page 24: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

Readiness of equipment remained high for many reasons.

The first was undoubtedly the intense desire of all involved

to stay combat ready and the logistics priority of the

theater. The experience level of maintenance and operator

personnel had also increased as a result of more than two

years with the Apache helicopter. Another important reason

is the ability to work around the shortfalls of the

logistics system. Of special note is the fact that

cross-attached units lose visibility in other major command

supply support activities. For example, the battalion

accounting code in Europe was obviously not visible within

the XVIII Airborne Corps system. The ability to acquire

parts through stovepipe systems and to cooperate with other

Apache battalions and support units were the only means of

readiness survival when basic parts supplies diminished.

The real lessons learned for soldiers who experienced

Desert Shield and Desert Storm are preventive maintenance

and preparation for harsh environments.

LEADERSHIP AND KEY DECISIONS

The keys to effective leadership in Desert Shield and

Desert Storm were setting the example, communicating with

soldiers, and sustained visibility during tough times.

Common sense and logical approaches to conditions of

uncertainty must prevail—resulting in mutual trust and

22

Page 25: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

confidence between soldiers and leaders. A commander must

refrain from peaking and lowering soldier's emotions at

inopportune times. Commanders and leaders must lead from

the front and set the example to be effective. Soldiers may

not understand that information is unreliable, but every

effort to tell them all that is known about the enemy and

friendly situation is key. In our case, two sources of

information were the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) and

the Voice of America over short-wave radio. Some days these

were the only sources of new information available.

Few policies and host nation agreements are decided at

Battalion level. However, a Battalion Commander must keep

his superiors advised to ensure proper consideration of his

soldiers. Conditions for evacuation of soldiers,

constrained resource and logistics priorities are decisions

retained at Division and Corps level. The Battalion

Commander must look at all mission contingencies and ensure

that details are not overlooked which may impact mission

success or soldier safety and survivabi1lty—for example,

determining aircraft weapons configuration, weighing

alternatives to mount an external fuel tank to increase

aircraft range, reviewing search and rescue (SAR)

procedures, seeking enemy disposition, and ensuring proper

allocation of mission assets. The Battalion Commander must

concentrate on executing the tactical level of warfighting.

23

Page 26: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

To become consumed by other matters over which he has no

control is to the detriment of his unit and his soldiers.

Likewise, he must anticipate and ensure that he retains

flexibility and agility to achieve mission success when

uncertainty is fostered by lack of intelligence.

Subordinate unit reports and first-hand knowledge of

equipment, personnel/aircrews, communication and logistics

are paramount to the decisionmaking process. Different

commanders will have different perspectives on what is

important, but their focus must be on warfighting and their

soldiers.

SAFETY

"Pride is a competitor to professionalism if not in

control." These words were from the Corps Commander after

several aviation accidents in the first two months of desert

night flying. The harsh desert environment was a challenge,

especially for units transitioning from the terrain of

Germany. However, standards of performance and basic

procedures did not change. Experience was gained over time,

however many variables had to be reviewed. The desert

requires additional grounding procedures to preclude static

electrical charges, aircrews and soldiers are deprived of

essential rest during hot days and nights, insects are

prevalent, and equipment performance degraded. Missions,

tactics, training, maintenance, aircrew selection, and

24

Page 27: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

soldier work periods require revision with a crawl, walk,

run approach when acclimating to a harsh desert environment.

Water consumption, the buddy system, and continual

accountability of personnel and equipment is paramount.

Some soldiers require special medication, especially if

asthmatic, and should be closely scrutinized during

predeployment screening.

Nonetheless, self-discipline and supervision are

imperatives for safety. Noncommissioned officers (NCO) are

the key to soldier safety. Their presence, their overwatch

and their foresight is invaluable. Individual soldier

discipline in doing what's right versus what's easiest when

independent of supervision is also key. Aircrews must

continually plan in detail every mission, and potential

contingencies. The war zone reinforces standards of

performance. Specificity and experience is important, for

example using lifting versus towing shackles on vehicles

during loading, vehicle identification markings, and correct

preventive maintenance and pre-combat inspections.

Safety guidelines for soldiers under the XVIII Corps

included:

-Take charge, commanders and leaders make decisions proactive and do not have soldiers doing anything their incapable of doing.

-Commanders must certify in mind and heart every mission, if the mission or tactic does not seem

25

Page 28: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

right—don't do it.

-Confidence and enthusiasm overwhelm capabilities if not in control.

-No one does anything well when intimidated.

-Pre-visualize, talk through tasks before experience.

-Rules for risk management: Accept no unnecessary risk, leaders at risk level make decisions, and accept risk only when outcomes exceed possible costs.

-Watch crew/driver selection.

-Pay attention to maintenance.

Prior to embarking upon Desert Storm, further safety

guidance was received to have multiple logistic support

plans and 'to go out like a marathoner, not a sprinter1'.

Pace is important.

For the commander, mission risk is also associated with

the categories of soldiers previously described. The

opportunity to see the results of mentoring and training

soldiers for combat is rare. Discipline, safety and

survivabi1ity, while accomplishing every mission, are

measures of how well leaders have done.

FAMILY SUPPORT PROGRAMS

My initial thought on family support programs is how

does a commander measure success in this area? The

satisfaction of one subset of dependents or a specific

family is often at the disgruntlement of others. Leaders'

dependents are not required to assume all responsibilities

26

Page 29: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

you desire of them, and achievements are the result of the

relative merit, initiative and caring of only a consistent

few. Fragile family relationships will sever during tough

times and physical separation. Other relationships will

often strengthen. A commander has little control over

relationships, but can facilitate a sound environment for

families left behind. A quote by B.H. Llddell Hart

appropriately summarizes a soldiers potential dilemma:

Man has two supreme loyalties—to country and to family — So long as their families are safe, they will defend their country, believing that by their sacrifice they are safeguarding their families also. But even the bonds of patriotism, discipline, and comradeship are loosened when the family itself is threatened.

Selection of stay-behind teams is important, especially

when only selected units deploy from an area. Deployment

from an overseas location to a combat zone is also a

different situation. Policies, rules and laws were

generally not in place to allow flexibility in caring for

families left behind. Once the deployment from Germany

escalated, the 'they' became 'we' for many communities and

positive action resulted. The stay behind team must be

reliable, ethical and hard working soldiers—to assume

non-deployables can handle these new demands is

short-sighted. This team must command the trust and

confidence of families, be responsive, and sustain law and

order. Demands will come from both the deployed unit and

27

Page 30: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

the families left behind. Time will be a precious resource.

Points of contact and working relationships within community

support groups is paramount. The leader of this team must

be a responsible, dynamic individual.

Never before in the U.S. history has the U.S. Army

attempted to solidify family support organizations more than

during Desert Storm. For many, the experience will be

expected in the future, others will envision the experience

as an unwanted task, and yet others will have a positive

remembrance of the success achieved in helping others and

helping themselves. Many units succeeded with the family

support group experience, yet failed to realize how success

was measured.

CONCLUSION

Desert Shield and Desert Storm provided a once in a

lifetime experience for many battalion commanders. These

lessons learned should not dictate a mold from which to base

all future courses of action, but rather provide an

understanding and foundation from which to apply rational

thought. Our Army has a tremendous level of experience. We

must continue to challenge these soldiers, to hone their

skills, transfer their knowledge, and prepare for future

possibi1ities.

28

Page 31: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

Those who deployed to the desert should not be

earmarked above peers for their experience. We have quality

soldiers throughout the Army, many of whom were at the right

place in time. Others could have easily met the task and

achieved success.

The significant implication for the future is that all

units must stand ready, willing and able to meet future

challenges. Desert Shield and Desert Storm proved to many

that our profession is warfighting, not just a job.

I hope my thoughts and experiences are beneficial to

future leaders at the tactical level of warfighting.

Inclosures:

Annex A—Operational Summary Annex B—12th Aviation Brigade Summary Annex C—First Impressions and Articles Annex D—Reference Maps

29

Page 32: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

//Met Xf— Cf&w/aJjL &7ft/q/fcy

/i-i

Page 33: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

01/24/1991 88:27 FROM CYPRESS INTERNAT I OWL INC TO 16028915509 P. 02

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 21, 1991

EXECUTIVE ORDER

DESIGNATION OF ARABIAN PENINSULA AREAS, AIRSPACE, AND ADJACENT WATERS AS A COMBAT ZONE

By th« authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the lavs of the United States of America, including section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 u.S.C. 112), 1 hereby designate, for purposes of that section, the following locations, including the airspace above suoh locations, at an ares in which Araed Forces of the United States are and have been engaged in combat:

the Persian Gulf

the Red Saa

the Gulf of Oman

that portion of the Arabian Saa that lies north of 10 degrees north latitude and vest of 68 degrees east longitude

the Gulf of Aden

the total land areas of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

For the purposes of this order, the date of th« commencing of oombatant activities in such zone is hereby designated as January 17, 1991.

GEORGE BUSH

THE WHITE HOUSE, January 21, 1991,

t t t

Page 34: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

CHRONOLOGY

ALERTED FOR DEPLOYMENT 16 AUGUST 1990

DEPLOYMENT FROM GERMANY 28 AUG-29 SEP 1990

EQUIPMENT DEPARTURE

RAIL 28-29 AUG 90

PORT OPS, . 2-10 SEP 90

EQUIPMENT ARRIVAL

PORT OF AD DAMMAN 22-29 SEP 90

PERSONNEL

FRANKFURT TO DHAHRAN..12-16 SEP 90

TRAIN-UP 29 SEP-10 OCT 1990

DESERT SHIELD 10 OCT 90-15 JAN 91

DESERT STORM 16 JAN-18 MAR 1991

REDEPLOYMENT

PERSONNEL 18 MAR-6 APR 1991

EQUIPMENT 3 APR-15 MAY 1991

INCLUSIVE DATES .AUGUST 1990 THRU MAY 1991

fl-S

Page 35: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

CO CO CO CM <D

CO

I- li. <

Ü

^ CO o cp JO to

i i i X I < o I

CM CM I

CM

-J CO < CC

O CO

LU z . 2 h °z DC ü

m Q.

CD

CM CM

CM CM I

CO CO

/I-V

Page 36: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

PERSONNEL AND LOGISTICS

PERSONNEL OFFICERS WARRANTS ENLISTED CIV TOTA

AUTH 21 44 197 0 £&<£

ASGN 23 47 226 0 296

ATTCH 12 23 145 "7 187

DEPLOYMENT STRENGTH

33 68 361 7 469

OPERATING STRENGTH

31 68 263 7 369

EQUIPMENT AH-64 0H-58C 0H-58D UH-60 TOTAL

AIRCRAFT 18 8 6 3 35

FLIGHT HOURS 3Y TYPE

2069 1090 744 432 4335

(NOTE—COMB AT HOURS i > 500 Tt J'TAL >

VEHICLES TRAILERS

DEPLOYED. 118 DEPLOYED . . .63

NORMAL STRENGTH.. . 79 NORMAL STRENGTH . ..56

(NOTE—MILES DRIVEN ON NORMAL VEHICLES > 170,000)

MILVANS

EQUIPMENT 16

AMMUNITI ON 44 C BASIC LOAD >

CONEX FOR SENSITIVE ITEMS 1

ft-S

Page 37: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

During the eight months of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the 3d Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment was attached to the 12th Aviation Brigade which was, in turn, attached to the XVIII Airborne Corps. This relationship was unique for a unit based in Europe to be attached to an American based unit, occupying yet a third country. Deployment of this V Corps Brigade from NATO established a historical precedent, further signifying the end of the Cold War.

During Operation Desert Shield, the 12th Brigade defended in the Corps sector from 10 October 1990 to 16 January 1991. This mission involved constant coordination with XVIII Airborne Corps, 101st Airborne Division (AASLT), the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and Eastern Province Area Command (EPAC) Forces. During this period, the 3d Battalion executed a covering force mission along the Saudi Arabian/Kuwait border. In preparation for combat, the 3d Battalion planned and reconned the area of operations in detail, conducted intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and participated in numerous communications and field exercises with adjacent units. Actual rehearsals of planned operations were conducted during day and night, to include short notice response exercises. Live fire exercises of all weapons systems were conducted to ensure equipment and soldier readiness. Throughout Desert Shield, the battalion rotated companies, maintenance support elements, and staff support personnel to the forward support base commonly known as Bastogne. By the end of Desert Shield, the 3d Battalion was a superbly trained fighting force, prepared to conduct combat operations.

During Operation Desert Storm, the 12th Brigade was assigned the mission of XVIII Corps reserve with contingencies to operate throughout the Corps sector, and lastly to destroy the Republican Guard forces once the advance had succeeded. The two Apache Attack Helicopter Battalions assigned to the 12th Brigade, the 3/227th Aviation and 5-6 Cavalry, were further assigned responsibilities for different contingency missions. Although a magnitude of planning, coordination, and rehearsal were completed, only the missions detailed below were actually conducted by the 3d Battalion. On D-Day, Cinitiation of the air campaign) the unit moved 750 kilometers to occupy and assembly area on the western flank of the XVIII Corps sector, near the town of Rahfa. Prior to G-Day (initiation of the ground war) several deep attacks and LRSU operations were conducted into IRAQ. Upon initiation of the ground offensive, amidst a violent rain

A-U

Page 38: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

and sand storm, the battalion moved by air and ground over 350 kilometer into Iraqi territory. During the evening of 2? February, the battalion attacked deep once again to cut off the Iraqi withdraw routes north of the town of Basrah, Iraq. This attack was the deepest penetration of U.S. Army forces during the ground offensive. Shortly after the cease fire was announced on 28 February 1991, the 12th Brigade was directed to withdraw from Iraq, assume the role of Corps reserve, and begin preparation for strategic redeployment to Germany.

The following is a summary of 3/22?th Battalion combat operations during Operation Desert Storm from 20 February thru 3 March 1991.

a. 20 February 1991 CG-4)

Mission: 3/227th Aviation conducted two night attacks, cross flot into Iraq under brigade control as part of the XVIII Airborne Corps efforts to 'soften' the 6th French Light Armor Division's opposition in preparation for future ground operations. The unit attacked 60 kilometers deep into Iraqi territory to strike moving targets detected by French and U.S. intelligence gathering assets. Sensor and downlink assets included J-Stars, Quicklook and the French "Hours" system (a SLAR mounted on a Puma helicopter). Nonlethal SEAD was provided by Guardrail, EF-111 Raven, and EC-130 Compass Call. Although not used, lethal SEAD (3 Artillery Battalions) was on call from the Corps artillery. The attack battalion responded quickly to real time, downlinked data to destroy targets. This mission was the first Desert Storm use of direct data downlink to support attack helicopter operations. Moving target information was sent directly to the brigade tactical command post via FM communications from Quicklook and the French "Hours" downlink station.

Time of attacks: 2041C thru 0015C

Mission results: The Iraqi 45th Infantry Division's reinforcement and resupply efforts, as well as force repositioning, were disrupted. Several enemy vehicles and two Iraqi early warning radar complexes were destroyed. Destruction of the radar sites reduced the ADA threat in an area larger than 100 square kilometers. The unit sustained no combat losses or damage.

Remarks: This operation culminated over five months of persistent work by the 12th Aviation Brigade to convince the XVIII Airborne Corps of the need for a deep operations planning and execution cell in the Corps Main Command Post. This operation was a classic execution of AirLand Battle Doctrine, possibly the first of the war.

fl-1

Page 39: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

to, 20 February i99i (G-4)

Mission: The 3d Battalion supports by leading and covering UH-60 aircraft from Task Force Warrior to insert three long range surveillance teams, at night, 230 kilometers deep into Iraqi territory. The unit penetrated Iraqi air defense systems, inserted three 6-man teams, and egressed back to friendly lines undetected. During the next 24 hours, the 3d Battalion and Task Force Warrior conducted emergency extractions of these teams and six enemy prisoners of war. Apache aircraft attacked and suppressed enemy locations along the route. All aircraft were equipped with extended range fuel tanks (two per UH-60 and one per AH-64).

Initial Times* Line of Departure 2115C Insertion 2231C Egress from Iraq 2356C

Mission Completion: 2330C on 24 February.

Mission Results: This mission proved vital to XVIII Corps preparation of the battlefield, providing intelligence on Iraqi positions and movements vicinity key ground objectives for G+l. The unit sustained no combat losses or injuries. One AH-64 sustained damage due to a hard landing when the second extraction flight encountered a sever sand and rain storm just prior to entering Iraqi airspace and were forced to momentarily land.

Remarks: This operation was one of the first Corps level LRSU insertion missions conducted in actual combat. Global positioning systems were mounted on each aircraft to enhance desert navigation capabilities at night. The aircrews and LRSU teams conducted extensive rehearsals of all contingencies prior to the mission.

c, 26 February 1991 <G+2)

Mission: Elements of the 3d Battalion, along with the 12th Aviation Brigade, entered Iraq with a 96 vehicle advance party. The battalion forward rearm and refuel assets were included in this initial convoy to facilitate link-up with air assets for continued operations. The initial forward operating base was FOB Cobra, 110 kilometers inside Iraqi territory.

Mission continuation: Enroute to FOB Cobra, the brigade received a change of mission to continue to a new FOB Viper, another 160 kilometers to the east. This advance party element, with battalion FARP assets, arrived at FOB Viper at 0930C on 28 February, after traveling more than 518 kilometers non-stop, in 49 hours. The last 90

Al-8

Page 40: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

the march was over open desert at night. The main convoy followed within twelve hours after this lead element.

Remarks: No vehicles were lost during the movement. With the arrival of the advance party, the battalion had sufficient fuel and ammunition to continue the attack to destroy the remaining Republican Guard forces. The main convoy arrived in the night of 28 February, with all assets in tact.

d. 27 February (G+3)

Mission: Along with movement to FOB Viper, the 12th Brigade was placed OPCON to the Commander, 101 Air Assault Division, and directed to attack north of the Euphrates River to sever Iraqi withdraw routes and to recon possible landing sites for air assault operations. The 3d Battalion was the first unit to close on FOB Viper and were directed to attack as soon as possible per the CG's order. Commencing at 1530C, the 3d Battalion launched 14 attack aircraft and one UH-60, designated kill zones were 70 kilometers north of Basrah, Iraq, along highway 6. This attack was conducted after the battalion had already moved over 450 kilometers in the prior six hours.

Mission results: An ammunition storage site, 20 vehicles, and two MI-8 helicopters (RGFC Infantry) were destroyed. A pontoon bridge used by withdrawing enemy forces, an MTLB, and two towed 152mm howitzers were also destroyed.

Remarks: This mission clearly showed the flexibility and agility of the Apache Attack Helicopter Battalion. No combat losses were sustained, however one aircraft flew the return flight to friendly territory after the loss of lubricant to its transmission. As the war came to a close, the 3d Battalion had penetrated Iraqi territory further than any other unit in the ground offensive.

At the time of the cease fire, the 3/227 Aviation Battalion was postured for battle 300 kilometers inside Iraq, prepared to continue interdiction of lines of communication and assist in the destruction of the Republican Guards Divisions.

Concise, detailed planning, outstanding equipment, and highly trained professional soldiers were the keys to our success. The knowledge and experience gained during both Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm are invaluable.

/M

Page 41: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

3-1

Page 42: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

Üi

CM

/}^V3 3-2-

Page 43: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

o

o

>

V t-H

CM

S 5 <

5-5

Page 44: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

Z ü LU O

O o Q- < LU o Q T"

-3-4

Page 45: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

8

E CM

CO z g CO CO

I- z LU

h a. LU Q

Z o CO CO

CO

cc O ü

Ui o < (3 2 CC £Q0 z o

I I M

1 OL LU Q

Z o < UJ CO

D z <

Ooc OLU

0.

< cc

z UJ

<

DC <

<0> a. CD oc o<

oc

Ik z o ü

•*>

I oc oc <

z o UJ o a: O z o

Q

P D UJ X

ü CM CM + o

ZD o CO <

W Ü CC <

CC cc <

z o

z O CO CO

LU Q <

<2 cc £0

z g

CM

<S <co OO D3

coz

g8

§£ UJ ~ Q 5 O

< z OLLI

OP • 5 ^ 2 S Do

x^oc HpUJ Wh5:

0-6T

Page 46: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

ss

LU Ü or o LL

f- z

§ Q. LU Q

Ü O LU

.\- (0 w £L CC O O

CO LU _l o co

1- U. o

I LU >

CC LU Q.

< CO N- CO

o r- CO r-

03

t— I

CO

V

£ /*\

X

CM

I LU O CD

O CO

I »- CD

LU CO LL

UL U_

62 >LU

5^ ~

H cr

B-6

Page 47: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

s

s CM

H Z UJ

Q-

Q

O Q O X I- UL1 2

I- z

if

CO DC UJ -J

< cc

0>CO O UJ <-J UJÜ X

< cc

<

**

UJ >

10

I I I

CM CO

I

z UJ

§ UJ Q

< s eo->. <f CO

D

UJ Ü z < cc U.

o <

LL Ü.

COQ

u. < cc Ü

< i i i

CO I

CD CO <N UJ^

D o cc I

O CM CO

O CD

CL UJ CO

lO

z o

00 cc UJ Q -J O CO

o lO

i-a. U.UJ

<3 UJ >:

UJ

2 _J CC

$ 2

A8 a. cc

CL a. <

i

"5-?

Page 48: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

(X <

Z 111

_J Q. HI Q

UJ (X D h-

& LU Q

3-8

Page 49: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

s

I

CO N CO

1- CO o lO

z 111 2 >- -J

o -J OL

CO UJ

<

LU z z o CO cc

UU Ü <r Q I o

LU CC 111 > < a.

X Q < cc z UJ

2 z 3 Q a

ISJ o UJ O X cc cc CO X z CO id 5 2 z -J Q CC u < UJ < < < 2 X CO a CO

i 1 1 i

z cc UJ K-

<

1

CO UJ z

-J CO

D UJ z cc

z < Z <

CO CO UJ cc

UJ

UJ CO <

2 X o CO * 2 1 1 1 I O O o z z § UJ

3 z X 1- H 7.

_l 111 z 0! IIJ o u. Q s*

u U.

Z UJ CO z z Q X UJ < UJ H §

< a. r> 2 :> u. CO

o I 1 i i a IL

3-9

Page 50: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

Q 5

LU <

i

H~ o CC o)

Q_ LU CO

LU CO LU Q

3-10

Page 51: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

Q Q CO CO

i CO ■■■■■

cc w CO w Q

Oil z

LUOCw > cc Hi CO

Qü <oc g

o Ü

ÜJ Q <

coco 111

oc

LU CO OC

CC o Ü LU

DC CO Cß

O LL

o z <

CO LU

0<$LU S2iuü£

Oco? uco <o 3 X CVJ

5 or LU CL O

o o < LU

o

CO H- GC LU >

O CO

5: GC LU

D Z <

-I o cc

CC LU <cc

SO > o

coo

CO

fee cc

.LU a o iUCC

O LL

H Ü LU GC ü QZ

111 O z > o cc a.

-9üCpLiJ CO LU z -J

< X

a. cc O

LL o

z LU X 5

CC LU > o< ÜLU

Z __ CC 0

LU CO

3 Q

LUOO

'°o a:1- LU Q

OL O a. LU LU D

CO

LU

CO CO

o < a: g ir 5 co LU O LU Q

LL _ <0 GC Ö

>z LU O

3^

Page 52: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

Q

c:

»1 M

f^

* Ü ^ |

^ 5 -^ - 3 "I ^ ^

Or -2 i 3

Z •* s£

A

Page 53: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

O w

cos

CC 5 UJ 2 CO

Q

3-13

Page 54: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

8

II 0

z o CO CO

2

cc o H CO

H CC W CO UJ Q

< tu er <

Z o fc

cc UJ Q

LU > cc UJ

_ CO CQ UJ

UJ CO

2

CO z o

i oc H

CO X

UJ <r

d ° CC <

a. cc O Ü

IL o UJ -J o

UJ

o z <

CO z g »- cc

UJ OC uj CO z

UJ a CO

z

cc UJ a oc O z o

UJ X

»- 3 CO JO UJ cc 2 J

3 CO

CO

co b < D Q z <

UJ Ü

OC a. CO

a z o Ü

m

CC UJ Q Ct o

Q Z <

z o

CO

5 o o <

UJ O OC

CO

Ü

a z O Ü

z o • »

>• oc UJ -J -J

J- cc <

CO a. oc O ü oc o u. CO z o

cc UJ a. O

ffi UJ ui a oc O z o

2

CO O o >

OC o u. u. UJ

z <

CO a. cc O ü UJ i H

CC o CL OL

CO

o

co

• ••

5 < o u.

>

5 >

Q

Z CO <

co

z i cc o UJ W

3 UJ

I

CO CJ a. cc O O

LL O

X h-

co h- Ü UJ

3 5 Q <

UJ X h-

co cc O a. a CO

cc Ui o oc o z o

• * UJ

X

5 2

UJ Ü

UI X

o CO H cc o CL a. D

UJ CO

cc a. o z <

9! oc

$ cc CO UJ Q

o

co

s oc UJ Q cc o z o

Q CC < UJ

5

UJ a oc o z o

CO o >-

z a >

UJ (3 z < oc o m o >

z a -J o O CO

g >

z o CO

>

Q

Ü u. (3 cc

~3-14

Page 55: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

II

8 i

E

g

N Z <

cc o CO

CO < CM

I

10 x i o

CO

Q O)

X X

Ü

2t

I v> CO

r- ^- CM >

2

coy-

HOC

i

3 CO io

I X o

>• \- cc 2 o CC

2

O

< IO

<OQCM£ 10

O ü a. O Q CO IO I

X O

2 3 3

<

3 N CM CM

I CO

S10 10 i

CO

>•

2?

o CC h- 2 O o CC <

i 10 v. Q CM

-J

3-i^ //

i

a.

o o a. O

0C w

Oco £io

cox < T- X i a. x 2^

2 2 <

S10 IO i r co

cc I LL

U> Q

CM CD

CO

Page 56: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

1

s CO

cvj

I

UJ

CO

ill CO UJ Q

2 UJ 2 UJ > O 2UJ ^° 5D ?a 3a Ooo

§£E UJ < <n—2

5 UJ CD

z O

<

o UJ CO

2 O

© I

IO

Q UJ , »UJ oo JD Off

> z O o

Q i o

CM CM

CM«

UJ oc ÜL

UJ CO < UJ o

co

.00

.N-

,<ö z it)

«DüJ

7UJ lOO

UJ u) co O UJ

> O 5 — UJ o mo

CD «O.

I- I CM O

coco

u. I-

• a «OUJ

UJ Q

CO Q

CO UJ O O

CM °C>

0 CM

CD CM

CM

co CM

o CM

CD

a i o

< -3

CO UJ LL

S-IL

Page 57: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

3-^

Page 58: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

i

v

w

w

»1 04

04

JS

Ü

w

"2-.ZS

Page 59: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

■ Z&. y-•&>£■&?.'.-jmm.T-*»-~4,ia -3-19

Page 60: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

~3-Zo

Page 61: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

-3-U

Page 62: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

rz *§ vu ~-> ^ Q ^ ^j

C\ ■^r A\ a *2

3 <x Q

<iJ <r ^P

3-es

Page 63: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

3-23

Page 64: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

w

Jf.

2 o «a 2 §

.t«»i

/

^ ^

28 h, *P

•4 »4

j

ft.

^-^

«

c 1

2 25 H M

►4

tvy

"■' 2T <

w

OS

to

s

(! -3 ' $

- 3 ^ ^ £ s 0 cc ^

o i6

Page 65: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

IS

CM

CO

b CO UJ cc

HI 2 111 Q LU

£ LU LL LU Q

HI N 2 < C5 CC o CO a

cc o D. a. D CO

cc <

a. O a. (3 2 CO o H 2 LU

CC LU > o (3

ä

a)

(5 2 OL

5 CO LU

CO LU Ü CC o LL

O < CC

CO LU CO CO O

o 2

i LU Q < g cc en

CVJ

3-*s-

Page 66: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

I— o Z z III o 2 z >■ o O 1

-j r-

CL 0)

UJ Q <

2 CC

CM

3-^

Page 67: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

8

I

o CO CO

-J

LU D LU <r

Q < -2

1X1 UJ

O

h- z LU

CO

n CO

LU

So1-'

Ml • I-UJZ

of -< QU-& cc < UJ O ff 5: Z £ Q- 0<m

^-27

Page 68: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

3-28

Page 69: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

"B-Zl

Page 70: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

z

0C HI 0

I- z vvww

1-34

Page 71: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

rH

CO

l§ CO

LU

LU Q UJ CC

w DC UJ Q -J o CO

UJ Q <

Ö CC m UJ i H X I-

OL UJ Q LU CC

O

O) O)

I

z <

z DC

h- LU CC LU

X

oo r-

I

CO DL X CO

D DC

<

UJ 0- D CO

LU H D o CC z LU CO

z N l I Ü

Z CC O o ÜI (3 DC (5 5 <

z

00 10 r-

I CO W < o

I-

Q UJ I Ü

0)

I

;•■;?• 1,-31

Page 72: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

1—I

)~H

)—(

CM

CO D

CO

LU

>- o _J Q. LU a LU C£

Q CC

g CO <

LU

£ I CC ULI

in CC m O

LU

O CC 21 ULI

UJ

D O LU

CO D.

X

o

o CC o CC

o CD 2

o Q

UJ

S

CO CC UJ H a. O ü LU I CO o

Ü o o

CD COCC

=>g z _l

CC LU

—I 0. OD CC CO

CMO) CO 10

o

<co Ö

QO <CC

CC f-' LU i 2 '

zco

2< I— X

T- CM

do ow

*£ o cocc LU < JÜ Ü cc = LU

Eu£ >*0

CVJ

SSE

Page 73: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

CO z g CO D _1 Ü Z O ü

H Z ill 2 s -J a. UJ Q

O z J

a in z <

o UJ z UJ o a: < x i- cc UJ CO UJ a UJ .j CD

OL < Q <

CC CC UJ

Q

o CC a. b -J < Z o CO

-J

UJ

a UJ

CC O

H Z

UJCQ

CC o 5

5 o o

a UJ z o

co5 o

UJ

a. 5

Sc

= o -J

u. CO 5 Ul »~o

ft I <5co

2

&

COUJ

I I-

o X CO

a O CO

I

UJ LL O CC a.

5

5 a UJ

O Q.

coy

a UJ z <

>- 5

<

cccc <co

cc UJ a < UJ -j

a z < ■

CO Q CC < a z i

i i i

2 UJ h-CO ^& >■ oc COO

z° oo hü

SI Z)CC a* UJO

u. dfc z DO °t COH

9 a<o 5 Zuj £ cc<o

1 OS o

UJ

I CO

H cc o a. a. CO

o UJ

D O UJ X UJ

UJ

z <

CO CC UJ Q. D CO

z o

N

< CC

z UJ OCO UJD O

i i

>• 5 CC <

>

5 x UJ

U.

z* o

I o z Z

UJ X h-

U. o

CC <

-J

< X I I

CC <

UJ X

CO UJ

te UJ

CC UJ a. >-

UJ U-

S5

^-33

Page 74: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

\ CO

CM CM I CO

O) r- ■

S CD l

ooooooooooo OG>CONCOU>'<frC9C\|v-

P

IO *" B

2 ü 2 z o T-

B CO Ü 2 z * to ■

h* o CO £

0. B >

<=» «J CO o

© «r OO

^-V -- --.'*i%; •*■-.-» v* V SF^.-'w;-'' - *<i >üif

Page 75: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

<o "iü

to

"i i—i—r ooooooooooo OG)C0l^<DiO<«frC9CNJ-s-

r» ■

ü

Z

o ■

€0 O

z #

■ Ü

v» «^ . °- >»_

*=* <0

3-3^

Page 76: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

\

-J < o

N< a O

CO <

CO N

CM CO

<

O) Ü

CO ■

CM

l CO

CO ■

o «D I

IO

CD

a

(O

7» rs

IO

i i—r "i—i—r

o

D

o

Ü

ooooooooo

CO o 2 z # IO ■

CM CM

o 0. a

> Hi

<=» eo (0 e

O C5

a? < a Q

"3-34

Page 77: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

222°°°ooooo

#

I ui Ü

§ z

I S 2

I o S o li_

.X CO

•2 CO IO T- I

CD 's. ffl

o u.

D

IO

O

2

O

o 2

IO ■ Ü

. °- >»_

go 5<

3-3?

Page 78: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

i !

2S2°°°ooooo OG>GON(0IO''?C9CMv-

© Ö

Ü

Ü

Q B

Q

it.

UL

o CO

c $ CO 10 I IO "V CD

o

Ü

CO Ü 2 2

* 10 ■ Ü

to 2 0. a

> ^M

«i=» (0 09 o

a> < a Q

>38

Page 79: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

\

2 ü

CO ■

CM CM

CO

CO a

s CO I

UJ

Ü

it.

ooooooooooo OOOOh-CDlO-^COCvJ-i-

©

o

Ü

z CO Ü

z

IO a

CD 5

7* go

3-3?

Page 80: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

CO

UJ

k o oo

CO CO 00

K N

O 0)

00 00

CO 05

m 8^,

(Of

<m .2

E g F (0

a

o O O IO IO lO O <5>

2 DC o I- CO

UJ X CO H oe UJ CO ui

■vF3

yj LU H

D Z LU

< o D < Ü si- 00 h* o X 00 CO IO «f CO s= IO

1 1 i 1 1 1 X X X X X X

© o

(0

g X LU >

3-4 c

Page 81: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

s

E

Q LU Z

< ÜJ

—I cc COO z o CO (f) LU

UJ >

8 ü LU LL LL LU

CO LU Q < 2 E CO LL cc co Lti co

DC O $ LU Z

cc LU

o o 2 O

a. O

LU Ü z LU

2 -J

> 3

LU Ü

ÜJ Ü 3

LU __ CC LU

Z

<

LU CC <

CO

>- CC LU >

O CO >.

LU CC

LU

O LL

CL L. Q LU «F LU LU < LU a -3 z

LU y

< cc

OCO z »i o Q<

§5

cc CO

£

o z

cc LU a. o >■

b 3 g LL LL Q

9 « I CO

• I CO ^

is

S-41

Page 82: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

s

Q LU Z cc <

LU

CO z o CO CO UJ

o

<

z o v> CO

DC

Ul IT < CO 3

o cc a CL <

(D

< CC

\

5 o -J -J <

Sc I CO I—!

CO cc LU Q o z < cc > cc LU

3 o

< cc 111 <

a UJ LU

-J

CO

-I

o Ü

CO UJ Ü z CO

=i <

g

CC LU a. o cc LU > o cc LU >

LU z <

CO

LU

co &

o Q. < LU

LU CC U.

i

Ü

CD i

10

CC o LL

OC LU CO LU a CO

CO £

o en Z LU

a. o

< cc cc HO

LJ-

O h- Ü LU CO

i LL o

I H

o

Z 3)

Q LU OC

& LU CC CL

2 CC o co a UJ

I CO

s-¥e

Page 83: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

SS

Q LU

■■■■■

<LJJ LU Z

O CO co

O CL CD CD UJ

co z <

>

UJ Q < g

Q ill

«J CL UJ D

-«■

CO -J

CO

UJ LL

Q Z <

o 5 z

Q UJ z <

H z ZD

i

Ul Q < ü er m o H h- UJ CO CO <

CO CO UJ Ü Ü

CO

Ui *

CO LL UJ

X Ü

< UI H

i

o a. Q.

CO

CO O a.

z UJ

O DC CO

UJ I-

5 CO

UJ CO a: UJ >

<

< I

> LT UJ CO

o CO

UJ o > CE UJ CO

UJ a: z> o Ü

1

UI

1

z < o tr H o 3 2 o z CO o CO

a. tr o Ü

>

I

:?-*£

Page 84: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

SS

E CM

I

IÜ z

IÜ LU

co£

o CO CO LU

O LU

z o

I Z D

O ü LU ö Z < <r o z o LL O

co

? Q LU LU Z

2 LU

I CO

o z z g

co o

< CD

2 (3

3 CC o a <z LUO

<a _|LU LU 0. oco

*£ WLU 5co LULU OCO

S.5 LU

2 LU I-

S CO

_l LU D LL

LU ö Z <

o LU Q Z LU

X LU

■»*

<0 i X < X

tu z o z

LU z O

CO D 5 < CC

m 5 O ü

z o 00

CO LU -J ü X LU >

Ü D CC J-

z o i

« CM 0>> 2£ £cc Z IM

5 LU

X£C

t **■ »" CC 5iu LUO. X

LU o z < z LU I- z

lud

Sä °£ QLU

*£ Ü3 DO CCLU HCC

8 Z o

> CC I- z o o CO CO o CC o

ÜLU

ü i

3 -1

Q Z <

CD 5 O ü

LU C0

o LU > o cc 0. LU X

<

LU X I-

&&/■

Page 85: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

8 a LU

CC D

Ü

CC

CO cö

<

LU

Oo COg cog LU

ill

<! S5 i^ tu CC CO oc CO

UJ I H

3 CO oc

Q UJ LU LU QHCC < o

LU Q. o

> o CC a. cc

<

N h-

LU -J

o 2

< Ü CC o

CO

< o

Z LU

coty £ X

Sz _|0C LU>

£ LU

I

LU CO LL

CC o LL

Q LU

LU Q <

LÜO ZE LUCQ

I-

LU

Sc D -J

2

z O

LU X

Q OC

I CC o LL

§ S

<co occc o LL

o Ü

H LU ZX

sH

== LL. ^ -

LU 2

LUS: x r

LU H

t tL Lu£

LU Q <

2 OC

9 CO CD

CO

0 a. D

i CO D

-J LU Z z o CO or LU a. z o

CO

"t CO

I X <

LU >

Ü LU Li. LL LU

> OC LU >

&4s

Page 86: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

LL CO CO LU Ü Ü

CO

UJ DC LU

UJ

X

>•

z <

DC UJ (9

OC O OL Q. ■=>

CO

ÖS

UJ o Z

CO CO CO <

LL LL

CO

CO

8

CO CL D O <r (5 H oc O a. CL

CO

>i

if H Z

D LU g § a. CO LU O > cc LU CO

>- H Z D

o Ü

LU Ü Z

CO CO CO <

cc D LU CC < CO

CO CL cc o o

o o CO o o

z LU

I Ü £ LU Q

CC < LU CC

(5 Z o cc CO

£-*2

Page 87: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

o I—I

9 3 H CM

■■■■a

!<

<

2-/7

Page 88: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

FJM&C C- lsr3*ff>*fSSTi>*(S

&1

Page 89: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

c-z

Page 90: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

td

SS

!

0>

Or 3;

O < _ CD «> OJ K GC K CO CD CO

< O T- *o w jr co oo K to O CO CO CO CM

CO oo CO CO Q 10 fcO CO

I I

Si ■

(3

5 s CO

< X

H i

CO ULI -J o LU >

at

cr o ü.

o o o

LU >

E Q

CO LU -I

m O z < z LU I- z < s

0~

o

Z LU 5

5 o LU

O

o

CO co «> K K CO

O ^ CO o to to CD l I l xxx

ii

CO LU

cc cc o

z o

1 >- h- UJ LL < CO

C-3

Page 91: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

LU

ft

o

1 < UJ

QC

<

<

f- Z UJ 5 s -J a. UJ Q

Q < o

8

«0 cc UJ Q QC o UJ £L >" H

UJ

a O

UJQ

&

>-

Eo Q UJ 07

C0

Ü EL u. ID

i u. £ JO UJ o w JJ

< z

cc <

I 1 I I I

<?./

Page 92: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

e-z

Page 93: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

£E O O O O 10 Z Oi o CO ■*+. o LU CO LU LX < Q 3 a CO 0) 1-

> CO LU LX 3 a LU o o QC £L

CO 1- QC o a.

LU o to

o 0-

LU H a. O X o

Z LU 5 LU > O

z o Ü eg >

CO z o

Ü z s 2

CO LU

2 H co LU

Li. LL <

CO < X

LU

EC LU ffl I] LU a i o

CO cc LU >

o cc

z 5 < LU

O o

co -i _J E Q

h- LX LU 5 o P CQ LU a: cc -1 5 z Ü CO Z QC Q H <

e-i

Page 94: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

1 1 1 1 1

CO i 3

< z O 1 co !

UJ i u- ! i O 1 1 i i QC

111 ! i

^

-1 m UJ X QC

K S O 1

MJ CO

Jr. ui ii

03 CO >

T-

CO QC UJ

Q UJ

z CO

MPE

N

TRO

LL

>i o ■MB

> UJ > <0 Ii

I < Z 111

X E o

0. CO

E o CO !

i K o „^ X 1— UJO i i

£2 CO QC o

Q

<

Ü

1 I

X oz

E 0. CO z *

i i

i 1 i I I

! 1

e-?

Page 95: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

£ o CO HI Q.

IS

o >

■to

Q

H £-

2 i ty Q *

i dz LU -I m < o co0 3

se § ft <Z o tM SJ z

a. Z<1J «O

S » 5 «0 § S 11 w 1- UJ .

U. -? LU UJ Z WC0 Q

ouig ttZh

UJ CO S_i<0 UJn^

i£>o£5 is? ±5 uj

co UJ oe

co z o

s CO Q OC O J QflQ UJ 3 QC a.

CO

"is Ü.CO

^>- U. Q OQ QC 3 0. OQ

i i i i i i i i i i

e-8

Page 96: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

>- QC o k oc EL co UJ OC

£E LU Q.

E < CO

Q -I LU EL

I

< -j

<

CO < o -J

5 Q LU

o ffi

g LU Q LU

CO

<

E <

<

CO CO LU z

LU

$ LU QC Ü-

CO o

z

QC H

Z o

Q ^

LU Ö

i I

*7

I

<?-?

Page 97: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

co z o

8 CO

O

CO °i LU a

■ ■

Z o 3 CD

go »83 QoTm

. w <

>i t I-

< UÜ

I

I

«5: Q Zjr uu Z

COOO < «ö CO -J ccco o a. co

a. a.

o x CO

I z LU O

CO 3 Z h- Oh co -J LU rr LU

X

to< cog -SO OQ

z 3

LU

o o

I I I I I I

fe2

t

osl Q < _l i i i

&lo

Page 98: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

CO

O Ü UJ

CO I co

o Q

s si J- 5

>- UJ

o UJ co

co O o

cocoO QUJQ SSE< CL I- CC

i i i

to — UJ« Eül UJ CC h- UJ

St m < co» dw < QC UJ UJ CO Li.

ffi5

»*° 0CU37 UJ QC A

°§z z£z UJ UJ

UJIO

ß -J o m

UJ CC

z UJ s a. 5 a UJ

o z X 2 [I

82s s z z

CO z o

Ü GO

ffi r CL fi-

ll I i i i

C-Jl

Page 99: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

s I CO

CO ÜC LU

o X

Q O o

CO UL

LI! Ü Z <

< LU o CL b < g -1

z < >"

< CO H AC QC LU o D Z -J Ü LU LU LU Q LL CO

C-12

Page 100: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

C0 o * -I

z Zi s <

cc h- co

of A0? O UJ ZCQ go -J QC

«CO uj <; *co < Hi

>L-io tܣ

°*-£ sSz

0. LU Ü QC UJ a. UJ o z

co Q

QC I- Z o Ü

o HZ

lijco io OS

> z o Ü

-J <

CO

>

O

Z CD O Ü UJ QC

QC

if

I-

< *

:s a. tn UJ LU

< co CO

_i Ü

I UJ >

QC o s z 13

Is CL z

CO*

cur I I I I I I I i

C-1S

Page 101: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

>■ i fc : J 5 <c h- Z z>

! i i i

CD z 8

! LZ <

12 tu

LL

CO

CO

o

.J E Q

IAN

DLI

NG

,

'

:* >- X

LU Z s

1

h- ■*■ LU H O O j MM

It CO

i

Zj

IS Z 3 o o

EM

EN

T LY

SIS

EA

RLY

-2

>- 5 LU Z LU

D < 5

z£*

§33 IJ

RA

NS

PO

RTA

T

-J LL1 <z 3

co£< >T ^ CO

Z Pi ft

2. O ii 1

S3I

INN

O!

5 i_ co 56<o £

► •»*.

t li

f= Z Ü- ^ LU 03 HI §

5 x LU o- z ~ a > 0- 2 1! 2 !! J i LÜ < Q tt QC $ LU

fl-2< 2 H ffiO* LLOX OC < !

1 i i 1 i i i i 1 i i i !

T— W CO ii

* P i i 1

CO CO CO CO i;

1!

C-14

Page 102: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

gTT^fc_ v> ^"Xi LU

K o 5 o

O CO

z w UJ o p 23 Z

^^■P* < o CC «Ö l__

2 CY

SA

TU

FIR

E Z

ill >

£ JND

AN

E

NC

Y

D T

AC

4L o Ü <

nDffl >

U, So« LU Z

Q; i LLO LU

5 o • ' I

CO 5 o < o -*

^-itf

Page 103: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

C'U

Page 104: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

X

Sc

i 1 8 til

-I a. 5 35

a. LU UJ

i

QC 0? LU CO CO LU LU O a Ü

ID UJ CO X

Q 1- O

cr z <

■MM >- o

z is CO

UJ

1 z

UJ

22 o LU H s z Z o a. < o o QC CO

i <* Q

o >- UJ 1 LL a. H > _J s cc o LU

UJ h- Q. o

=> Q LU CO

s CO

LU Z

X ^ z a. o Z

X < UJ

o CO

> h- -J Q

^/?

Page 105: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

o

_1 ~-

yj

1

c/0

<1

— ID

1

fi in

<3?

g CO

■ MM

E

a * • £ o - - o c

f*S or» Q.» £ 1« ° .• Jc a Q. co

en >- 2 > a m

S3 CO CO Q

C := CO • E ^ *.2o

«IS | c ** £ • > 2 • c co

73 •* ±

CO ® —

u <n CD - x:

♦* CO

£-6 A^ o

CO

O co 5

■ox? 2-c *

-•o C <° 3 C O CD

C CO >?

a» 3 a> — m rt #-\ — a» 3 ® -= ® o CD S

° a \ c* 2 f-

g a. ^ ö c «a c

> « CO 13 fc — o — "' Zr y"

^x: = E ■•- « c c O

§«25? ••" ■ *

OcscoEccBoEc 5*»- 2 - E 2 " 5= « -5 ,

■o *■ S « o c» o

co Q. CD Q. CD CO CD

•2 O TJ ~ 5 5 o § <g E c °V « §

52=s ° CD £ O.S

_§£ «-*§ «t» 2 8 c = CD _ CD O

es co -o «2 »■- > CD ffi M <» * _. S.O Q- a 3 Q.JS fD £02 $ o. • £ «5 o E|£2o g-£2 8 » 5 c3 c-2

«§§8? co « E£ co

JC •_= ° UTJ CB

-=:*..ä3*"Co« = c

CD ■»" »

o -*

ü| g co

— ■DOS*

s « a § _ a c « E .e o Q- g

-i w O CO Q

i £ CD

C7 CD = 6 C c- E E^ <D c c £ r^ - 5 -c <o i£aT2=o£_:öQ

P*-COTI£^S-C!«" 2? • S.« c co

= e s c J J. «öfl»2

3-Dfcc0Q.Ö2g»r3

x S « 3 £ = ^ 2-2 a?!

o5üOcOoEE5

5 CD c

co .c

c o CO

J8

E Q. 3 en

CD C

X >. £ CD c E CO

CO en «•- 3 O a»

c a» o o (0 ♦rf 3 Jf CO CD o CO TJ

c £ a 0 2 CO

•o • = «>E £2« £»3 co 5 o «S j 5 §£

«5 u 5

«0 O CD J jC a. > * H

O >

O

0)

3 • P c

J. CD CD CD >•

?"O»OE«

5z «^ **- CO O C CO CD O _ c o 2-E »2 § E?^

3 «* S CD •:

c S-3ä c c Q..2 2-Ö co •- "a JC o > * <

co a = — — - • o 2 ^ CD 2 "D *"

>.£ o£ £ £ fc £13(0«- ^ C» « P gtST3C-5f-0

3 O

Mri 01 a c in 2"- t c

CO ?III3^^i

«° 2 ** r- * « ££2o «5 3 5 3 > c 2 »- ö a n O « f T3 CD CO Jr (B i-

2 3i2 2 S Ö o ° S m -o _ «3 CO CO c CO « S M • 5 ?

** n " £ < * ssllf•? «SEg«5I E o o 2 ,- o «

^7 •

to CD ■*> = «8

a CD

slSiif§ gir_ $ mi» 3 2 O CO Q.J3 TJ O

a» CD >C 2

s-ST,?^i» f? «; R « a co •«•£ t 2 ä c _ a> ä >J=5 P S 3 E co • =

CD X CD CO S 2 C CD XJ £ O E

CD CD t «0 5 -C O 2 - ** Ö. J £ • §■£

2a%% c c c o 3 o ® ä

t: E o 85 2 05 -O £>J;L ** < « 2

S|£? Jo *" CO

Jua«

2 CD L. - _ -C 3 -O - o

• to -5 c "* CO > >

IQÖ

C-18

Page 106: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

SOME THOUGHTS FROM THE DESERT

(For Spearhead and Hanau)

By Lt. Col. A.nthonv R. Jones

Commander„ 3—227 AHB

TD the soldiers of the Soearhead Division, we bid you.

nothing but the best. We take great pride in reoresenti'ng

our Division and our*- country with the -Forward deployed

■forces.

I am sure from the many stories and articles you have

read and heard, you are stiii wondering what it is really

like in Saudi Arabia. From a soldier's standooint, 1 would

like to give you my initial impressions.

Beginning with our deployment through our arrival in

country, ail soldiers had many apprehensions. The unknowns

grow less important if the unit has developed cohesi\eness.

mental and physical -fitness, and focuses on the mission.

What is unknown may not be important.

Soldiers who have neglected their oersonal fitness and

lack sei f-di sei p'l ine do not ad lust weil to the desert

-c .11 m ate nor i n "mental, D r e o a r a t I o n in t r a n s i t i- o n i n o t o w a r ,

C-l<?

~l)fchfT Of (\RXICL€ SEAJT

Page 107: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

-t* **- —->" ■■■—SK* ^(^-■■,l,*.^..-l

THOUGHTS 2-2-2

Your leadership. I'm sure, has continued to refine

.andard operating orocedures. Those procedures s.rs

jutine actions or methods o-f doino business. t vour urn

has trouble with the routine, you will certainly lose your

flexibility and struggle with any new environment.

Standards of performance do not change. If you have

trained to standard, established goals and objectives, and

practice your essential mission tasks, you will -rind that

you are better prepared tor war than you realise. However.

leaders must recognize that pride is a comoetitor to

professionalism if not .in control. The benefits of

demanding training exercises such as Refarger. Gunner

Density, CMTC, and Warfighter &rs only realizes when faced

with the reality of war. I feel that our soldiers a.r^

prepared and confident because of the past IS months of

realistic training, continued challenges to meet or exceed

standards, and the cohesive teamwork built through

weather.ino the aood and the bad — all the rewards of being

a orofessionai soldier.

C-2.0

Page 108: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

NCO leadership and decisiveness bv commanders is B.

mast. When-in charge, take charge. Saldiere deserve "a

chain of command that is technically s.no cacti caliv

competent, makes decisions, communicates with soldiers.

issues mission tvee orders, ana cares -for cneir soldiers,.

Anvrhing less adversely effects the morale anc readiness of

a unit.

Training and preparation -for war does not end with

deployment. Collective and individual METL tasks take on a

new perspective -For many, -finally realizing the

connectivity of mission -focus -from individual- through unit

Ievels.

Security, maintenance, and readiness o-f individual and

unit equipment is paramount. Work hard on tne equipment

you will take to war. Don't put off till tomorrow what

should be accomplished now.

Our deployed equipment and personnel are what we will

fight with. The desert heat, wind and sand requires daily

preventive maintenance and protection o-f our equipment.

Personal hygiene and -field sanitation are also a must. For

those who per-form guard duty with live ammunition, the

reality of protecting equipment and fellow soldiers seis isn

quickly.

C-Zi

Page 109: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

THOUGHTS 4-4-4

After an intense daily schedule of training.

maintenance and other daily requirements. ez.ch soldier

looks' forward to mail call. Information and news -from hofne

have great impact on morale. In addition, many letters

from the United States addressed to "Any Soldier i-.Saudi

Arabia" strengthen the resolution of each soldier to

- represent our nation and _its strategic goals. The

patriotism of the younger and older generations of America

seem to be bonded by our deployment.

Many of these thoughts seem philosophical. However, the

reality set in after our arrival in country that we have

* trained continuously for this opportunity to represent our

country and to fight for freedom. Even though a shot may

never be fired, valuable lessons and experience have been

gained by all our soldiers.

Seek, Strike, and Destroy!

-30-

C-&

Page 110: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

^-

November 5, 1990

Dear Troops:

Over the next few days you will be receiving packages containing playing cards, lollipops, beach balls, frisbees, and Hugo Hornets. We hope these items will help make your stay in the desert a little more bearable. (Hugo is the mascot of our professional basketball team, the Charlotte Hornets. He's been a better mascot than the team has been. Maybe he'll help add a little "sting to your wing".)

We are the Operations unit for the Capital Management Group (Trust Department) at First Union National Bank. We got these things together to show our gratitude and support for the job you are doing.

Hope you're home soon!

-50Y of G'FTi 3

etie «f m^H ff* ... -fouk pmsrMioftWi»1"-0'-

C-2Z

Page 111: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

rf/tifex y> - "färtäexe* 7??/i7*>

D-l

Page 112: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

Persian Gulf Region

504822(546740) 7-81

>2

Page 113: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

Base 801701 (A05796) 3-91

>3

Page 114: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

>y

Page 115: r® ELEGIE - apps.dtic.mil

WORLDWIDE PROVEN OIL RESERVES

20% Rest of

World Soviet Union 6%

United States

Saudi \28% Arabia

3% Iraq

Persian j £ «Sner) ' KUWait

21% 22%

COUNTRIES WITH FORCES IN PLACE SUPPORTING OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

Argentina Australia Bahrain Bangladesh Belgium Canada Denmark Egypt France

Germany Pakistan Greece Qatar Italy Saudi Arabia Kuwait Senegal Morocco Spain Netherlands Syria Niger UAE Norway United Kingdom Oman

>5