Quiz Cases 2

8/13/2019 Quiz Cases 2

1/34

[G.R. No. 112497. August 4, 1994.]

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, Petitioner, v. MAYOR ALFREDO S.

LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD

AND THE CITY OF MANILA, Respondents.

The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code reading as

follows: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The

procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this

Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided,

further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on

appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within

sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect

of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein:

Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without

the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court ofcompetent jurisdiction.

Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared

Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the

prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and

public policy. 1

In a petition for certiorarifiled by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretarys

resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More

importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in theSecretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy

mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only

the power of supervision over local governments.

The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is

constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local

Government Code has indeed not been observed.

Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for non-compliance with Circular 1-88, the Solicitor

General having failed to submit a certified true copy of the challenged decision. 3 However, on motion for

reconsideration with the required certified true copy of the decision attached, the petition was reinstated in view of the

importance of the issues raised therein.

We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this

authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding

laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts

jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, 4 even as the

accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the co institutionality of a law he is charged with

violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article


2/34

X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders

of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive

agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the

consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of

separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments,

or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this

Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body

and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion. 5

It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before

declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the

legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally

approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing

that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the requipped

majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must bestruck down.chanrobles.com : virtuallaw library

In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional

insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them. He cited

the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or

set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the

former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their

functions is accordance with law." 6 His conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of

control and not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in his

view, a violation not only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of localgovernments, 8 and the policy of local autonomy in general.

We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the provision.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and,

if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance,

he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the

measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of

what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He

did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing

the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions is accordance with law, that is, with

the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under

the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision. chanrobleslawlibrary : rednad

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion,

order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not

cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself

does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not

observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe


3/34

his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are

followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so

performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.

The case of Taule v. Santos 9 cited in the decision has no application here because the jurisdiction claimed by the

Secretary of Local Governments over election contests in the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay was held to belong to the

Commission on Elections by constitutional provision. The conflict was over jurisdiction, not supervision or control. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act, which provided in its Section 2 as

follows: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless the ordinance shall provide

otherwise: Provided, however, That the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to suspend the effectivity of any

ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, the tax or fee

therein levied or imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared national

economy policy, and when the said Secretary exercises this authority the effectivity of such ordinance shall

suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a period of thirty days within which period the local legislative body mayeither modify the tax ordinance to meet the objections thereto, or file an appeal with a court of competent

jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or the part or parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as

revoked. Thereafter, the local legislative body may not reimposed the same tax or fee until such time as the grounds

for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to exist.

That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or

fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise

of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law

had been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned

before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he ispermitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his

opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary

Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires

provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality,

not the wisdom or reasonableness of the tax measure. chanrobleslaw library : red

The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another

matter.

In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on the proposed

Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as required by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the

Local Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of a

newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a). No minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory

public hearings had been held. Neither were copies of the measure as approved posted in prominent places in the city

in accordance with Sec. 511(a) of the Local Government Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not translated

into Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated among the people for their information and guidance, conformably to Sec.

59(b) of the Code. chanrobles.com.ph: virtuallaw library

Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural requirements had been observed in the enactment


4/34

of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the

Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence

(consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court.

To get to the bottom of his question, the Court acceded to the motion of the respondents and called for the elevation

to it of the said exhibits. We have carefully examined every one of these exhibits and agree with the trial court that

the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties

as evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits

B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25,

1993, respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5 1993 issues of the Manila Standard

and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3. chanrobles.com.ph: virtuallaw library

The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity,

considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due

process. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this

requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local

government unit and not to tax ordinances.

We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila Revenue Code as their validity has not been raised in

issue in the present petition.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar

as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that the

procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. No pronouncement as to

costs.c


5/34

[G.R. No. 93252. August 5, 1991.]

RODOLFO T. GANZON, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his

capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local Government, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; LOCAL AUTONOMY, NATURE OF; LOCAL OFFICIALS REMAIN

ACCOUNTABLE TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere

decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government

in the manner the law may provide. Autonomy does not contemplate making mini-states out of local government

units. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature,

albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggests is to

wean local government units from overdependence on the central government. It is noteworthy that under the

Charter , "local autonomy" is not instantly self executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local

government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national representation law, and measures

designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places

the local governments under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allowsCongress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggests that

Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to

the President.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PRESCRIBE FEDERALISM. As the Constitution itself declares, local

autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of

decentralization." The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more that to break up the monopoly of the national

government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments

from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and

interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime offederalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to

regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-

government.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHANGED SUPERVISION CLAUSE DOES NOT EXEMPT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FROM LEGISLATIVE

REGULATION. The 1987 Constitution provides in Art. X, Sec. 4 that" [T]he President of the Philippines shall exercise

general supervision over local governments." It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution,

Art. VII, Sec. 10(1), stating that" [T]he President shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local governments as

may be provided by law." It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the

constitutional language, the Charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her

prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our

opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local

governments autonomy from Congress and to break Congress "control" over local government affairs. The

Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over

municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline. The change in constitutional language did not exempt local

governments from legislative regulation provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONAL AUTHORITY CAN DISCIPLINE LOCAL OFFICIALS. Since local governments remain

accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary


6/34

action against local officials. In the case at bar, the Secretary of Local Government, the Presidents alter ego, in

consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the existing Local Government Code, can suspend

petitioner Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and petitioner member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod

(G.R. No. 93746).

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "SUPERVISION" NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY. "Supervision" is not

incompatible with disciplinary authority. As this Court held in Ganzon v. Cayanan, 104 Phil. 484, "in administration law

supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their

duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make

them perform their duties." cralaw virtua1aw library

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO SUSPEND LOCAL OFFICIALS MUST NOT BE EXERCISED OPPRESSIVELY. While the

respondent Secretary of Interior, as alter ego of the President, under the existing Local Government Code, has the

Power to suspend the petitioner Iloilo City Mayor, such power cannot be exercised oppressively. Ten administrative

cases have been successively filed against the City Mayor. The Mayor has been made to serve a total of 120 days of

suspension for the first two cases and the respondent Secretary has issued another order preventively suspending the

former for another 60 days, the third time in twenty months. We are allowing the Mayor to suffer the duration of histhird suspension. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of Local

Government, upon finality of this decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to the Mayors usual

remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the

Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of

prima facie evidence.

The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary of Local Government),

to suspend and/or remove local officials.

The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the SangguniangPanglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him

by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave

misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary

detention. 1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador Cabaluna,

her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao,

Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pea Redondo, members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and

Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the opinion of the respondent

Court of Appeals. 2 We quote: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged

that due to political reasons, having supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa O. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor,

using as an excuse the exigency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where

her qualification are best suited and assigned her to e work that should be the function of a non-career service

employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public Services, whose duties are alien to the

complainants duties and functions, has been detailed to take her place. The petitioners act are pure harassments

aimed at luring her away from her permanent position or force her to resign.

In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked her to perform task not befitting her


7/34

position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was padlocked without any explanation or

justification; that her salary was withheld without cause since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave,

she was given the run-around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that

she was the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo

Villegas (Annex B).

On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duty elected Vice Mayor of Iloilo City and complainants Rolando Dabao,

Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Pea Redondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of

the City of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was

unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong had to hold office

at Plaza Libertad. The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants sympathized with him and decided to do the same.

However, the petitioner, together with his fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad.

Councilor Ong denounced the petitioners actuations the following day in the radio station and decided to hold office at

the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to witness the incident. However,

before the group could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck

in dozing water to the people and the bystanders.

Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed by former mayor Rosa O.

Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the benefit of charge} filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued,

Erbite was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly

mauled by other detainees thereby causing injuries. He was released only the following day. 3

The Mayor thereafter answered, 4 and the cases were set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals also set

forth the succeeding events: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office

of the Department of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L)

and the parties received them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a postponement before the scheduled

date of hearing and was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral

and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for the two-day hearings but was actually held only

on June 20, 1988 in view of the inability and unpreparedness of petitioners counsel.

The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27, 1988 in the same venue Iloilo City. Again, the petitioner

attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his

counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the parties were

notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings (Annex M).

In the said hearings, petitioners counsel cross-examined the complainants and their witnesses.

Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to

last until October 11, 1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.

Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner again asked for a postponement to

September 26, 1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their

respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied. In these hearings which were held in

Manila, the petitioner testified in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299.


8/34

The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the complainants testified including their witnesses.

On October 10, 1988, petitioners counsel, Atty. Onginalmoved for a postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing

to November 7 to 11, 1988 which was granted. However, the motion for change of venue was denied due to lack of

funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to

change venue and moved for postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition of

witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed. However, the parties failed to come to terms and

after the parties were notified of the hearing, the investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.

The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were sick or cannot attend the

investigation due to lack of transportation. The motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to December 14,

1988 to present his evidence.cralawnad

On December 14, 1988, petitioners counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and the hearing officers gave

petitioner up to December 15, 1988 to present his evidence. On December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present

evidence and the cases were considered submitted for resolution.

In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so

the respondent ordered the petitioners second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60)

days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was not enforced. 5

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent

Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining

a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the

respondent Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon

for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as

acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for

prohibition, 6 (Malabor, it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor

Ganzon ousted.)

On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990,

it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it

issued a Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent

Secretary, to this Court.

On June 26, 1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary from implementing

the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals two decisions.

In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we

gave due course thereto.

Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (G.R. No. 93252), that the Department of Local Government in hearing the ten

cases against him, had denied him due process of law and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicia


9/34

and hostile" towards him 7 arising from his (Mayor Ganzons) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong

Pilipino party 8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local elections; 9 and his

alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. 10 He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to life his

suspension since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988), 11

notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out two more suspension orders of the

aforementioned cases. 12 He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in

Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request. 13 He states that he asked

for postponement on valid and justifiable" 14 grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which

required confinement; that his "vital" 15 witness was also hospitalized 16 but that the latter unduly denied his

request.

Mayor Ganzons primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government is devoid,

in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary

Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).

As to Mayor Ganzons charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very clearly in what manner the

Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary LuisSantos were (are) political rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation and

although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take

his word for it the way we would have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore that "political feud"

has often been a good excuse in contesting complaints.

The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-sos that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce him to

join the administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his

allegations, we can not accept them at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept

them, 18 for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say-sos were never corroborated by

independent testimonies. As a responsible public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, ispresumed to be performing his duties regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed

to him.

As to Mayor Ganzons contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on account of

the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and academic

since we have in fact restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners. 19

As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any compelling reason why we

should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his

requests. Besides, postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on Mayor

Ganzons above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.

The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos actuations deprived Mayor Ganzon of due

process of law.

We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can

suspend and or remove local officials.

It is the petitioners argument that the 1987 Constitution 20 no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973


10/34

Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both

petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting

the phrase "as may be provided by law," 21 to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. It is

a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission.

The provision in question reads as follows: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with

respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays

shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. 22

It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

SECTION 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general

supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

23

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes, since:

(1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer. chanrobleslaw library

It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in

consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

SECTION 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of Local Government, or

the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within

seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days

after receipt of such answer of the Respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior toan election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said period. If preventive suspension has been

imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted. 24

SECTION 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local

Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective

municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.

(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground

to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is

strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could

influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases,

preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.

(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the

continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case

is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of

suspension.25cralaw:red

The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the


11/34

phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline,

and or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code?

(3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?

It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter

did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing

legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be

provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments autonomy from congress and to break

Congress "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local

autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.

Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal

governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared

municipal corporations euphemistically to "small republics." 26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the

guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as

the "supervision clause" itself suggest is to wean local government units from over dependence on the central

government.

It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other

things, the passage of a local government code, 27 a local tax law, 28 income distribution legislation, 29 and a

national representation law, 30 and measures 31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy

that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the

Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions

for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local

Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

SECTION 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive andaccountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of

recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities

and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and

functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local

units. 32

As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective

of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court

of Appeals, like the power of local legislation. 33 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing

legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials

administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.

The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which

supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary

authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as

this Court has held, 34 thus: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

It is true that in the case of Mondano v. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had occasion to discuss this

scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power

of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms,


12/34

control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that

case the Court has made the following digression: "In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power

or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them

the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the

other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done

in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But from this

pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government

officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as

postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code.

"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate

officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter."

36 "Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate

officers perform their duties." 37 As we held, 38 however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing",

although it is a lesser power than "altering."

The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Courts pronouncements in at least three cases, Lacson v. Roque, 39Hebron v. Reyes, 40 and Mondano v. Silvosa, 41 and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General. 42 In Lacson,

this Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be provided by law," 43 a

rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President "may not . . . suspend an elective

official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the

corresponding provincial board." 44 However, neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief

Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no

law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not

well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its

proper construction subject to constitutional limitations. 45

In Hebron, we stated:chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed

mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary which does not exist

with respect to municipal officers.

In Mondano, the Court held: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

. . . The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the

provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal

officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of mal administration of office, and conviction by final

judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges

touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by

registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by

the board, if in his opinion the charge by one effecting the official integrity of the officer in question." Section 86 of the

Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over

the administration of . . . municipalities. . . . If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same


13/34

authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such

additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(1), Article VII, of the Constitution."

In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials except on appeal from

the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative Code.

Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend remove) it was not because we did notthink that the President can not exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power

elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little

difficulty in sustaining him.

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to

defeat the Presidents powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because

although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, 50 Commissioner Blas

Ople would not.

The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, BatasBlg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other

notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite

of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. 52

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government

structure instituted through a system of decentralization." 53 The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more

than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by

political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not

meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local

government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step.

Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than

precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.

As we observed in one case, 54 decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power to

the local levels. Thus: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of

administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to

broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and

accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective

partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central

government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President

exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law."

He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local

governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own

destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,

decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes

accountable not to the central authorities but to its contituency. 55


14/34

The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the

Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the

Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie

findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of

misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to

suspend him out of office. As we held:

2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until

1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft

and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal

mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of

the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of

their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or,

as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal

action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its

continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he

were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case aninjustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They

were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice

Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bonds of reason and resulted in

sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application

that the order of suspension should be lifted.

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, 58 and so also, because

it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held,

59 is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and

authority over possible witnesses" 60 or to keep him off "the records and other evidence." 61 It is a means, and nomore, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government

Code, it can not exceed sixty days, 62 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is

otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a

shorter span.

Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his

presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until

found guilty.

Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than

sixty days. As we held, 63 a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than

tyranny.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility on Mayor Ganzon is to

all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and

purposes, his suspension permanent.

It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayors guilt has not been proven. Worse, any

absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is


15/34

reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably.

The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that justice is done in

Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the

respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor

without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so

to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent

Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power,

yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say,

with a grave abuse of discretion.

The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is in fact

premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension

and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local

Government Code) which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of hisnatural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an

arbitrary act.

As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.

We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the

purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the sever pertaining charges are concerned, we

are urging the Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the

same, subject to Mayor Ganzons usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and

meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remainingcomplaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.

In resum, the Court is laying down the following rules: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which

local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide;

2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;

3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative

control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is

consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;

4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner

set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;

5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the

President does not have);

6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended

for the offenses he was charged originally; provided: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall

not be counted in computing the time of suspension." [Supra, sec. 63(3)]


16/34

b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes

and abuses for which proper charges are fled against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension

shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local

Government Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED.

The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be

made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for

acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative

cases pending against Mayor Ganzon. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs.


17/34

[G.R. No. 102782. December 11, 1991.]

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAR. CALDERON, and

GRANDY N. TRIESTE, Petitioners, v. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF

MANDALUYONG

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROCEDURAL RULES; MAY BE RELAXED OR SUSPENDED IN THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL

JUSTICE. Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent

power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning "pleading, practice and procedure

in all courts." In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice,

which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules. The Court has taken

this step in a number of such cases, notably Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, where Justice Tuason justified the

deviation on the ground that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled

promptly and definitely brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." cralaw virtua1aw library

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; HELD VALID IN CASE AT BAR. The Metro ManilaAuthority sustains Ordinance No. 11-Series of 1991, under the specific authority conferred upon it by EO 392, while

Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodies in the Local

Government Code. It is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and convenience of the

public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic

rules. The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing

that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are: 1) the completeness of the statute making the

delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and

provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can bedelegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be

enforced. This has been done in the case at bar. As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in

accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority

and thus "prevent the delegation from running riot." This requirement has also been met. It is settled that the

"convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable

sufficient standard to delimit the delegates authority.

4. ID.; ID.; QUESTION POSED IS THE VALIDITY OF THE EXERCISE OF SUCH DELEGATED POWER; TEST TO

DETERMINE VALIDITY OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE. The measures in question are enactments of local governments

acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the

will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular

requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations. According to

Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be

unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must

not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE DOES NOT CONFORM TO EXISTING LAW. A careful study of the Gonong

decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform

to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the


18/34

confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the

provisions of Secs. 1, 3, 5 and 8 of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the

Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions. In fact, the said provisions prohibit the imposition of such

sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic

violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself.

Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the

Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the drivers license shall

not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political

subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law

explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power

from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is

conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate

legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the

will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot

prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. The self-serving language of Section 2 of thechallenged ordinance is worth nothing. Curiously, it is the measure itself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan

Manila Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the questioned sanction. The measures

in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow

and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PD 1605 APPLIES ONLY TO METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA AND AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL

AUTHORITY CONFERRED BY REPUBLIC ACT. 4136 ON THE COMMISSIONER OF LAND TRANSPORTATION. We here

emphasize the ruling in the Gonong Case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception

to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 4136 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations

of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanctions therein prescribed, including those here question. TheCourt agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest

of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and

enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public

misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such sanctions, including the illicit practices described

in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a

statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area.

8. ID.; ID.; IT IS FOR CONGRESS TO EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT TO IMPOSE THE

QUESTIONED SANCTIONS. It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to

impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local

governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues to prohibit the

confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of dr ivers

licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.

In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District v. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, G.R. No. 91023, promulgated on

July 13, 1990, 1 the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was

not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted

only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was

there also observed that even the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by


19/34

the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. No motion for reconsideration of that

decision was submitted. The judgment became final and executory on August 6, 1990, and it was duly entered in the

Book of Entries of Judgments on July 13, 1990.

Subsequently, the following developments transpired: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an

alleged traffic violation, his drivers license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City.

On December 18, 1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to the Court asking who

should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their

drivers licenses, and where they should file their complaints.

Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining against the

confiscation of his drivers license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong.

This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscationof his drivers license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police Force. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time from Grandy N. Trieste, another

lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front license plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-

Traffic Operations Center and the confiscation of his drivers license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police

Command-Western Police District.

Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of

1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of drivers licenses and the removal of license plates of motor

vehicles for traffic violations.

For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Triestes drivers license pursuant to a memorandum dated February

27, 1991, from the District Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing

such sanction under certain conditions.

Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own Comment that his

office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact

directed full compliance with the above-mentioned decision in a memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled

Removal of Motor Vehicle License Plates and dated February 28, 1991. chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of license plates

and not the confiscation of drivers licenses.

On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to

detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or

obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." cralaw virtua1aw library

On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library


20/34

The attention of the Court has been called to the enactment by the Metropolitan Manila Authority of Ordinance No. 11,

Series of 1991, providing inter alia that: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

SECTION 2. Authority to Detach Plate / Tow and Impound. The Metropolitan Manila Authority, thru the Traffic

Operations Center, is authorized to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended unattended abandoned motor

vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar (as reported in 187 SCRA 432),

where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except only under the conditions

prescribed in LOI 43. Additionally, the Court has received several complaints against the confiscation by police

authorities of drivers licenses for alleged traffic violations, which sanction is, according to the said decision, not

among those that may be imposed under PD 1605.

To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-enforcement officers and motorists, the Court Resolved to

require the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Solicitor General to submit, within ten (10) days from notice hereof,

separate COMMENTS on such sanctions in light of the said decision.

In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted

pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its

governing body) the responsibility among others of:chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination or consolidation for the Authority;

and

2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application, approval of a code of basic

services requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-making powers. (Emphasis supplied)

The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meantto supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license

plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The

Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging

its validity.

For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an

invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The fee in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically

PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of

drivers licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety

of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity. cralawnad

On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the early resolution of the questioned

sanctions, to remove once and for all the uncertainty of their validity. A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan

Manila Authority, which reiterated its contention that the incidents in question should be dismissed because there was

no actual case or controversy before the Court.

The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can be challenged

only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and

may be relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present controversy. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


21/34

The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great deal of confusion among motorists

about the state of the law on the questioned sanctions. More importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are

illegal, being violative of law and the Gonong decision, and should therefore be stopped. We also note the disturbing

report that one policeman who confiscated a drivers license dismissed the Gonong decision as "wrong" and said the

police would not stop their "habit" unless they received orders "from the top." Regrettably, not one of the

complainants has filed a formal challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto and Trieste, who are lawyers and

could have been more assertive of their rights.

Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem squarely presented to it and decide it as

categorically rather than dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical objection raised and thus, through its

inaction, allow them to fester.

The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent. Unquestionably, the Court has the power to

suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to

promulgate rules concerning "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts." 2 In proper cases, procedural rules may

be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid

and formalistic adherence to such rules.

The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notably Araneta v. Dinglasan, 3 where Justice Tuason

justified the donation on the ground that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that

they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." cralaw virtua1aw library

We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their

strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial

justice, must always be avoided. (Aznar III v. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 276.) Time and again,this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher

interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that

should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case. (Piczon v. Court of

Appeals, 190 SCRA 31) chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on other dates.

Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed

of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the

petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054 and case G.R. No. L 3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in cases G.R.

Nos. L-2044 and L2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of these procedural matters, since the

decision in the cases wherein the petitioners cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed is not in

dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these

cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.

(Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 cited in Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.)

Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor General a petition for prohibition

against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 11 -Series of 1991, of the Metropolitan Manila Authority, and Ordinance No.

7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong. Stephen A. Monsanto, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Dan R. Calderon,

and Grandy N. Trieste are considered co-petitioners and the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Municipality of


22/34

Mandaluyong are hereby impleaded as respondents. This petition is docketed as G.R. No. 102782. The comments

already submitted are duly noted and shall be taken into account by the Court in the resolution of the substantive

issues raised.

It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which the Court has recognized often

enough as necessary to the orderly administration of justice. If we are relaxing them in this particular case, it is

because of the failure of the proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of, and the

necessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the important substantive issues raised.

Now to the merits.

The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11-Series of 1991, under the specific authority conferred upon it

by EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in

the Local Government Code. 4 It is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and

convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to

violations of traffic rules. chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that

the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are: 1) the completeness of the statute making the

delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. 5

Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that

all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the

discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has

been done in the case at bar.

As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the functionof which is to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and thus "prevent the delegation from running riot."

This requirement has also been met. It is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the

motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegates authority. 6

But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is

the validity of the exercise of such delegated power. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature.

Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such

acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the

accepted principles governing municipal corporations.

According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2)

must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate

trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. 7

A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion

because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal

of license plates or the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is


23/34

nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the

Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

SECTION 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and otherwise discipline drivers

and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila

in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed. For this purpose, the powers of the Land

Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation under existing laws over such violations and punishment

thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. When the proper penalty to be imposed is

suspension or revocation of drivers license or certificate of public convenience, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or

its representatives shall suspend or revoke such license or cert ificate. The suspended or revoked drivers license or the

report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent to the Land Transportation

Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case may be, for their records update.

SECTION 3. Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed with a twelve-month period,

reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall subject the violator to graduated fines as f

Documents

Quiz Cases 2