Quasi Judicial Power Digests

8/13/2019 Quasi Judicial Power Digests

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QUASI JUDICIAL POWER

Syquia vs. Board of Power and Waterworks

FACTS:Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses filed 3 separate complaints withBoard of Power and Waterworks charging Syquia asadministrator of the South Syquia Apartments with the offenseof selling electricity without permit or franchise and alleging thatSyquia billed them for their electricity consumption in excess ofthe Meralco rates.In her answer, Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the Board,

saying that she is not engaged in the sale of electric power butmerely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users theirlegitimate electric current bills in accordance with their leasecontracts.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Board has jurisdiction

HELD:Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceededits jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating thecomplaints filed by respondents against petitioner.Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner'scontractual relations with respondents-complainants as hertenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service norin the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.Respondents' complaints against being charged he additionalcost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants (inaddition to those registered in their respective apartmentmeters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in characterthat is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of theCivil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by therespondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but bythe regular courts of general jurisdiction.Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitionerand requiring her to absorb the additional rising costs ofelectricity consumed for the common areas and elevator serviceeven at a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the

judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and mustbe set aside as null and void.

Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service CommissionPrivate respondent Antonio Arnaiz sent a message to MariaDiaz in Spain through the telegraph office of the Bureau ofTelecommunications in Dumagete and was transmitted toManila. The message, however, was not delivered to theaddressee. After being informed of said fact, Arnaiz sent acomplaint to the Public Service Commissioner a letter-complaint. In its answer, petitioner denied liability butquestioned PSCs jurisdiction over the subject matter. Afterhearing, the PSC found petitioner responsible for theunsatisfactory service complained of and ordered it to pay afine.

ISSUE:W/N PSC has jurisdiction to discipline and impose fine

upon petitioner

HELD: NO. The Public Service Act vested in the PSCjurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services andtheir franchises, equipment and other properties. However,Section 5 of RA 4630, the legislative franchise under whichpetitioner was operating, limited respondent Commissions

jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner maycharge the public. The negligence imputed to public respondenthad nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of verylimited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.

Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava

Respondent Director of the Philippine Patent Office issued acircular announcing an examination schedule for the purpose of

determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneybefore the Philippine Patent Office, the said examination cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practicbefore said office. According to said circular, members of thPhilippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficiescientific and technical training are qualified. Petitionecontend that one who has passed the bar exams and licenseby the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is duqualified to practice before the said office.On the other hand, respondent Director maintains that th

prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely thpractice of law but includes the application of scientific antechnical knowledge and training.

ISSUE:W/N the appearance before the Philippine Patent Officis included in the practice of law

HELD: YES. The practice of law includes such appearancbefore the Patent Office, the representation of applicantoppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of theapplications for patent, their oppositions thereto or thenforcement of their rights in patent cases. The practice befothe Patent Office involves the interpretation and application other laws and legal principles.Furthermore, the Director of Patents, exercising as he doe

judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold thatmember of the bar, because of his legal knowledge antraining, should be allowed to practice before the said officwithout further examination or other qualification.

GUEVARA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSFACTS:The facts which gave rise to the present contemptuous incideare: The Commission on Elections, on May 4, 1957, afteproper negotiations, awarded to the National Shipyards & SteCorporation (NASSCO), the Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ACMEand the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ASIATIC), the contracts manufacture and supply the Commission 12,000, 11,000 an11,000 ballot boxes at P17.64, P14.00 and P17.00 eac

respectively. On May 8, 1957, both the NASSCO and thASIATIC signed with the Commission on Elections thcorresponding contracts thereon. On May 13, 1957, thCommission cancelled the award to the ACME for failure of thlatter to sign the contract within the designated time anawarded to the NASSCO and the ASIATIC, one-half each, th11,000 ballot boxes originally alloted to the ACME. Thcorresponding contracts thereon were signed on May 16, 1957Then followed a series of petitions filed by the ACME for threconsideration of the resolution of the Commission of May 131957. The first of these petitions was filed on May 14, 195which, after hearing, was denied by the Commission in iresolution of May 16, 1957. The second petition was filed oMay 16, 1957 and was denied on May 17, 1957. The thirpetition was filed on May 20, 1957, and because of th

seriousness of the grounds alleged therein for the annulment its previous resolutions, the Commission resolved to conduct formal investigation on the matter ordering the NASSCO anthe ASIATIC to file their respective answers. Thereafter, aftthese corporations had filed their answers, the Commissioheld a formal hearing thereon on May 24, 1957. On May 21957, the ACME filed a memorandum on the points adduceduring the hearing, and on June 4, 1957, the Commissioissued its resolution denying the third motion freconsideration. The article signed by petitioner was publishein the June 2, 1957 issue of the Sunday Times, a newspaper nationwide circulation.

ISSUE:The question to be determined is whether the Commission o
http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/06/syquia-vs-board-of-power-and-waterworks.htmlhttp://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/06/syquia-vs-board-of-power-and-waterworks.html


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Elections has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contemptproceedings against petitioner with a view to imposing upon himthe necessary disciplinary penalty in connection with thepublication of an article in the Sunday Times issue of June 2,1957 which, according to the charge, tended to interfere withand influence said Commission in the adjudication of acontroversy then pending determination and to degrade andundermine the function of the Commission and its members inthe administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections.

HELD:It would therefore appear that the Commission on Elections notonly has the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative tothe conduct of elections but the power to try, hear and decideany controversythat may be submitted to it in connection withthe elections. And as an incident of this power, it may alsopunish for contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 ofthe Rules of Court under the same procedure and with thesame penalties provided therein. In this sense, the Commission,although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within themeaning of the Constitution (Section 13, Article VIII), for it ismerely an independent administrative body (The NacionalistaParty vs. Vera, 85 Phil., 126; 47 Off. Gaz. 2375), may howeverexercise quasi-judicial functions in so far as controversies thatby express provision of the law come under its jurisdiction. As towhat questions may come within this category, neither theConstitution nor the Revised Election Code specifies. Theformer merely provides that it shall come under its jurisdiction,saving those involving the right to vote, all administrativequestions affecting elections, including the determination of thenumber and location of polling places, and the appointment ofelection inspectors and other election officials,while the latter issilent as to what questions may be brought before it fordetermination. But it is clear that, to come under its jurisdiction,the questions should be controversial in nature and must referto the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to theconduct of election. The difficulty lies in drawing thedemarcation line between a duty which inherently isadministrative in character and a function which is justiciable

and which would therefore call for judicial action by theCommission. But this much depends upon the factors that mayintervene when a controversy should arise.RULING OF COURT:Wherefore, petition is granted. Respondent Commission ishereby enjoined from proceeding with the contempt case setforth in its resolution of June 20, 1957, without pronouncementas to costs.The preliminary injunction issued by this Court is madepermanent.

ANG TIBAY vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

FACTS:Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather

company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to allegedshortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of members ofNational Labor Union Inc. (NLU). NLU averred that Toribios actis not valid as it is not within the Collective Bargaining

Agreement. They also alleged that there are two labor unions inAng Tibay; NLU and National Workers Brotherhood (NWB).They further contend that NWB is dominated by Toribio himselfhence he favors it over NLU. NLU prays for a new trial as theywere able to come up with new evidence/documents that theywere not able to obtain before, as they were inaccessible andthey were not able to present it before in the Court of IndustrialRelations.ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.

HELD:The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whosfunctions are specifically stated in the law of its creatio(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative thaa part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It ha

jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigatdecide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputarising between, and/or affecting employers and employees laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject tand in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth ANo. 103 (Section 1). In fine, it may appeal to voluntaarbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may emplomediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the moeffective system of official investigation and compulsoarbitration in order to determine specific controversies betweelabor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in realihere a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation governmental powers.

The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may b

said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedurrequirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable casebefore it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental anessential requirements of due process in trials aninvestigations of an administrative character. There are primarights which must be respected even in proceedings of thcharacter;(1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the parinterested or affected to present his own case and submevidence in support thereof.(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to presehis case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rightwhich he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidencpresented.(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose th

obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannbe disregarded, namely, that of having something to support idecision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is nullity, a place when directly attached.(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support finding or conclusion but the evidence must be substantiaSubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla; it meansuch relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept aadequate to support a conclusion.(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidencpresented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record andisclosed to the parties affected.(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judgetherefore, must act on its or his own independent consideratioof the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply acce

the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in acontroversial questions, render its decision in such a mannethat the parties to the proceeding can know the various issueinvolved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. Thperformance of this duty is inseparable from the authoriconferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it sufficient to observe that, except as to the alleged agreemebetween the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhoothe record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factubasis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusioof law.


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The SC further held that that the interest of justice would bebetter served if the movant is given opportunity to present at thehearing the documents referred to in his motion and such otherevidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. Thus,the motion for a new trial was granted, and the entire record ofthe case was remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, withinstruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence asmay be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with therequirements set forth hereinabove.

Secretary of Ju st ice vs. Judge Lant ionFacts:On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice receivedfrom the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United Statesrequesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for variouscrimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the relatedmunicipal law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069Prescribing the Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who Havecommitted Crimes in a Foreign Country and the establishedExtradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippinesand the Government of the United States of America, thedepartment proceeded with the designation of a panel ofattorneys to conduct a technical evaluation and assessment asprovided for in the presidential decree and the treaty. Therespondent requested for a copy of the official extraditionrequest as well as the documents and papers submitted therein.The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that suchinformation is confidential in nature and that it is premature toprovide such document as the process is not a preliminaryinvestigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore, theconstitutional rights of the accused are not yet available.

Issue:1.Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez,be granted access to the official extradition request anddocuments with an opportunity to file a comment on oropposition thereto

2.Whether or not private respondents entitlement to notice andhearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedingsconstitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine

Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty

Ruling:The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent

be furnished a copy of the extradition request and its supportingpapers and to give him a reasonable period of time within whichto file his comment with supporting evidence. In this case, thereexists a clear conflict between the obligation of the PhilippineGovernment to comply with the provisions of the treaty and itsequally significant role of protection of its citizens of its right ofdue process. The processes outlined in the treaty and in thepresidential decree already pose an impending threat to aprospective extraditees liberty as early as the evaluation stage.It is not an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminentone. On the other hand, granting due process to the extraditioncase causes delay in the process.The rule of pacta sunt

servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims ofinternational law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep theiragreement therein in good faith. The doctrine of incorporation isapplied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted withsituations in which there appears to be a conflict between a ruleof international law and the provisions of the constitution orstatute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonizethem. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilableand a choice has to be made between a rule of international lawand municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal lawshould be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine ofincorporation decrees that rules of international law are givenequal standing, but are not superior to, national legislativeenactments.In this case, there is no conflict betweeninternational law and municipal law. The United States and the

Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression anpunishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At thsame time, both States accord common due process protectioto their respective citizens. In fact, neither the Treaty nor thExtradition Law precludes the rights of due process from prospective extradite.

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Quasi Judicial Power Digests