Admin - Chapter 4 and 5 - Quasi-Legislative and Quasi-judicial

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V. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION

The rule-making power of the administrative body is intended to enable it to

implement the policy of the law and to provide for the more effective enforcement

of its provisions. Through the exercise of this power of subordinate legislation, it is

possible for the administrative body to transmit the active power of the state from

its source to the point of application that is to apply the law and so fulfill the

mandate of the legislature.

1. NATURE

The exercise of delegated legislative power, involving no discretion as to what the

law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or

enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.

Rules and regulations issued by administrative authorities pursuant to the powers

delegated to them have the force an effect of law. They are binding on all persons

subject to them, and the courts will take judicial notice of them.

It may be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be

legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the law

into effect. Thus, administrative regulations cannot extend the law or amend a

legislative enactment, for settles is the rules that administrative regulations must

be in harmony with the provisions of the law. Indeed, administrative issuances

must not override, but must retain consistent with law they seek to apply and

implement. They are intended to carry out, not to supplant nor to modify, the law.

Eastern Shipping v. CA G.R. No. 116356. June 29, 1998

Facts:

On September 25, 1989, private respondent Davao Pilots Association elevated a complaint against petitioner Eastern Shipping lines for sum of money and attorney's fees alleging that private respondent had rendered pilotage services to petitioner

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between January 14, 1987 to July 22, 1989 with total unpaid fees of P703,290.18 relying on an EO 1088 which prescribes adjusted pilotage fees. Despite repeated demands, petitioner failed to pay and prays that the latter be directed to said amount with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint; attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the principal obligation and such other relief. The trial court found for the respondents and public respondent CA affirmed said decision. Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of EO 1088 contending because (1) its interpretation and application are left to private respondent, a private person, and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of powers. Petitioner insists that it should pay pilotage fees in accordance with and on the basis of the memorandum circulars issued by the PPA, the administrative body vested under PD 857 with the power to regulate and prescribe pilotage fees.

Issue:

Whether EO 1088 is a valid delegation of power and therefore constitutional.

Held:

Yes. In Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, upheld the validity and constitutionality of EO 1088 stating among others.

E.O. NO. 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage service rates without withdrawing the power of the PPA to impose, prescribe, increase or decrease rates, charges or fees. The reason is because E.O. No. 1088 is not meant simply to fix new pilotage rates. Its legislative purpose is the "rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports.

We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease them below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088.

Moreover, the PPA circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they are void and ineffective. "Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." As stated by this Court in Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, "the conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or spirit of the law." It is axiomatic that an administrative agency, like the PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or not. Its duty is to enforce it. Unarguably, therefore, if there is any conflict between the PPA circular and a law, such as EO 1088, the latter prevails.

Based on the foregoing, petitioner has no legal basis to refuse payment of pilotage fees to private respondent, as computed

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according to the rates set by EO 1088. Private respondent cannot be faulted for relying on the clear and unmistakable provisions of EO 1088 as it leaves no room for interpretation.

Digested by: Generoso, Enrique Dan

Shell Philippines Inc. v. Central Bank of the PhilippinesG.R. No. L-51353. June 27, 1988

Facts:

On May 1, 1970, Congress approved the Act imposing a stabilization tax on consignments abroad (RA 6125), in which there shall be imposed, assessed and collected a stabilization tax on the gross F.O.B. peso proceeds, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of receipt of such proceeds.

In August, 1970, the Central Bank, through its Circular No. 309 provided that: the stabilization tax shall begin to apply on January 1st following the calendar year during which such export products shall have reached the aggregate F.O.B. value of more than US $5 million, and the applicable tax rates shall be the rates prescribed in Schedule (b) of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6125 for the fiscal year following the reaching of the said aggregate value.

During 1971, appellee Shell, Philippines, Inc. exported seria residues, a by-product of petroleum refining, to an extent reaching $5 million. On January 7, 1972, the Monetary Board issued its Resolution No. 47 "subjecting petroleum pitch and other petroleum residues" to the stabilization tax effective January 1, 1972. Under the Central Bank Circular No. 309, implemented by Resolution No. 47, appellee had to pay the stabilization tax beginning January 1, 1972, which it did under protest.

On September 14, 1972, appellee filed suit against the Central Bank before the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying that Monetary Board Resolution No. 47 be declared null and void, and that Central Bank be ordered to refund the stabilization tax it paid during the first semester of 1972. Its position was that, pursuant to the provisions of RA 6125, it had to pay the stabilization tax only from July 1, 1972.

The lower court sustained appellee, and it declared Monetary Board Resolution No. 47 as void and it ordered refund of the stabilization tax paid by appellee during the period January 1 to June 30, 1972. Central Bank has appealed from the judgment.

Issue:

Whether the Central Bank has the authority to promulgate such rules.

Held:

Yes. The Central Bank was given the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement the statutory provision in question, we reiterate the principle that this authority is limited only to carrying into effect what the law being implemented provides.

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In People v. Maceren, this Court ruled that: Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.

Digested by: Flores, Jan Jerick

Grego v. Commission on ElectionsG.R. No. 125955. June 19, 1997

Facts:

On October 31, 1981, Humberto Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sherriff by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) upon finding a serious misconduct in an administrative complaint filed against him. By virtue of such order, Basco was dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or local government, including agencies and instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations.

Subsequently, Basco ran as candidate for Councilor in the 2nd

district of the City of Manila during the January 18, 1988 local elections where he won and assumed office. After his term, he sought reelection in the May 11, 1992 synchronized national elections where he succeeded. However, his victory was challenged by his opponents, Cenon Ronquillo and Honorio Lopez II, who filed cases against Basco citing the COMELEC ruling mention earlier that dismissed Basco from public service. These challenges were sought for the third and final term where he emerged 6th in the battle for six councilor seats.

On May 13, 1995 Wilmer Grego, a registered voter of the 2nd

district of the City of Manila, filed a petition to disqualify Basco, suspend his proclamation and declare Romualdo Maranan as the 6th duly elected Councilor in replacement of Basco. On the same day, the Chairman of the Manila City Board of Canvassers (BOC) was duly furnished with a copy of the petition. The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case on May 14, 1995, where it ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

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On May 17, 1995, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor. Basco immediately took his oath of office before Honorable Ma. Ruby Bithao-Camarista of the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court.

Grego contends that pursuant to Section 6 of RA 6646, COMELEC “may” during the pendency of a disqualification case order the suspension of the proclamation of the candidate in question wherever the evidence of guilt is strong. Moreover, he cited Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that says, the candidate’s proclamation “shall” be suspended notwithstanding the fact the he received winning number of votes in such election.

Issue:

Whether the Comelec acted in accordance with the law when it promulgated its rules (Comelec Rules of Procedure) regarding disqualification cases when it used the word “shall” when RA 6466 only provided the word “may” in suspending a candidate’s proclamation.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court reiterated that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. The regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law and for the purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of the law, they are valid. The Supreme Court ruled that since Section 6 of RA 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedures seeks to implement, employed the word “may”, it is therefore, improper and highly irregular for the Comelec to have used instead the word “shall” in its rules. Further, it stated that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.

Digested by: Carino, Katrina

LATEST JURISPRUDENCE

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and WINSTON F. GARCIA v. ALBERT M.

VELASCO and MARIO I. MOLINA. G.R. No. 170463. February 2, 2011

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Facts:

Petitioners charged respondents administratively with grave misconduct and placed them under preventive suspension for 90 days. Respondents were charged for their alleged participation in the demonstration held by some GSIS employees denouncing the alleged corruption in the GSIS and calling for the ouster of its president and general manager, petitioner Winston F. Garcia.

Molina requested GSIS Senior Vice President Concepcion L. Madarang for the implementation of his step increment. Madarang denied the request citing GSIS Board Resolution No. 372 issued by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS which approved the new GSIS salary structure, its implementing rules and regulations, and the adoption of the supplemental guidelines on step increment and promotion. The pertinent provision of Resolution No. 372 provides that a step increment adjustment of an employee who is on preventive suspension shall be withheld until such time that a decision on the case has been rendered.

Respondents also asked that they be allowed to avail of the employee privileges under GSIS Board Resolution No. 306 approving Christmas raffle benefits for all GSIS officials and employees effective year 2002. Respondents’ request was again denied because of their pending administrative case.

The GSIS Board then issued Board Resolution No. 197 approving the provision in which an employee with a pending administrative case is disqualified from promotion, bonus, step-increment and other bonuses.

Respondents filed before the trial court a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. They claimed that they were denied the benefits which GSIS employees were entitled under Resolution No. 306 and sought to restrain and prohibit petitioners from implementing Resolution Nos. 197 and 372. They also claimed that the denial of the employee benefits due them on the ground of their pending administrative cases violates their right to be presumed innocent and that they are being punished without hearing. Molina also added that he had already earned his right to the step increment before Resolution No. 372 was enacted.

Petitioners filed their comment with motion to dismiss and opposition and afterwards respondents filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss.

The trial courts denied the motion to dismiss.

Issue:

Whether a Special Civil Action for Prohibition against the GSIS Board or its President and General Manager exercising quasi-legislative and administrative functions in Pasay City is outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC-Manila.

Ruling:

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Yes. Civil Case No. 03-108389 is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction/ Therefore, the trial court, not the CSC, has jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for prohibition.

Sections 2 and 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provide that when the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,...,a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Petitioners also claim that the petition for prohibition was filed in the wrong territorial jurisdiction because the acts sought to be prohibited are the acts of petitioners who hold their principal office in Pasay City, while the petition for prohibition was filed in Manila.

Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 that the Supreme Court shall be the one to define the territory over which a branch of the RTC may exercise authority. In line with Administrative Order No. 326 defining the territorial jurisdiction of the regional trial courts in the National Capital Judicial Region, as follows:

a. Branches I to LXXXII, inclusive, with seats at Manila – over the City of Manila only.

b. Branches LXXXIII to CVII, inclusive, with seats at Quezon City – over Quezon City only.

c. Branches CVIII to CXIX, inclusive, with seats at Pasay City – over Pasay City only.

The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special civil action which may be filed in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court, as the case may be. It is also a personal action because it does not affect the title to, or possession of real property, or interest therein. Thus, it may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Since respondent Velasco, plaintiff before the trial court, is a resident of the City of Manila, the petition could properly be filed in the City of Manila. The choice of venue is sanctioned by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

2. KINDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION

Administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to

interpret the law have force of law and are entitled to great respect. However,

administrative agencies are not authorized to substitute their own judgment for

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any applicable law or administrative regulation with the wisdom of which they do

not agree.

Administrative regulations are either interpretative or legislative.

Legislative rules are accorded by the courts or by express provision of statute. the

force and effect of law immediately upon going into effect. The administrative

agency is acting in a legislative capacity. A legislative rule is in the nature of

subordinate legislation.

Legislative regulations is further classified into supplementary and contingent.

Supplementary regulations are rules to fix the details in the execution and

enforcement of a policy set out in the law like the Rules and Regulations

Implementing the Labor Code. Contingent regulations are rules made by an

administrative authority on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the

enforcement of the law depends.

Interpretative legislations are those which purport to do no more than interpret the

stature being administered, to say what it means. This regulation is issued by the

administrative body as an incident of its power to enforce the law and is intended

merely to clarify its provisions for proper observance by the people.

Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc., Petitioner, v. Department of FinanceG.R. No. 108524. November 10, 1994

Facts:

Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic corporation whose members, individually or collectively, are engaged in the buying and selling of copra in Misamis Oriental. They allege that prior to the issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular 47-91 copra was classified as agricultural food product under Sec. 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and is exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution.

Under Sec. 103(a), the sale of agricultural non-food products in their original state is exempt from VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer or owner of the land from which the same are produced. The sale by any other person is not exempted from tax.

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On the other hand, under Sec.103(b) the sale of agricultural food products in their original state is exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution regardless of who the seller is.

Respondent held that petitioners are not exempted.

Issue:

Whether petitioner was denied due process because it was not heard before the ruling was made.

Held:

There is a distinction in administrative law between legislative rules and interpretative rules. Memorandum Circular 47-91 is a mere interpretative rule.

The reason for this distinction is that a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing. In addition such rule must be published.

On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.

Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries:

(i) whether the rule is within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure.

But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative judgment, has committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments.

In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to;

(i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment;

or (iii) give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight

to the interpretative rule.

The Court found no reason for holding that respondent in error in not considering copra as an "agricultural food product" within the meaning of 103(b) of the NIRC. As the Solicitor General contends, "copra per se is not food, that is, it is not intended for human consumption. Simply stated, nobody eats copra for food." The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not bound by the ruling of his

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predecessors. To the contrary, the overruling of decisions is inherent in the interpretation of laws.

Digested by: Gabato, Vinson Lance

Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. TorresG.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992

Facts:

DOLE Dept. Order No. 16 temporarily suspends the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino DH going to Hong Kong in view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for the same.

The DOLE, through POEA took over the business of deploying such HK-bound workers. Pursuant to the above order, POEA issued memorandum circular no. 30 providing guidelines on the government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to HK and the accreditation of HK recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers, and the memorandum circular No. 30, pertaining to the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for HK.

Petitioner contends that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars.

Issue:

Whether the take-over of the business deploying DH to HK by DOLE and POEA through an administrative order and circular is valid.

Held:

Yes. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. The challenge administrative issuance discloses that the same fall within the administrative and police powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon the respondents.

Digested by: Ledesma, Thea Lynn

BOIE-Takeda Chemicals v. De la SernaG.R. No. 92174. December 10, 1993

Facts:

Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. 851 promulgated in 1975 provided for the concept of 13th month pay as to mean “one-twelfth of the basic salary of an employee within a calendar year,” with the basic salary as to mean “includes all remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an employee for services rendered but may not include cost of living allowances granted, profit sharing payments, and all allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular or basic salary of the employee.” Then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon defined with particularity under Sec. 5 of PD 851 what

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remunerative items were, which were not embraced in the concept of 13th month pay, and specifically dealt with employees who are paid a fixed or guaranteed wage plus commission.In a routine inspection, the Department of Labor through respondent acting secretary De la Serna found companies BOIE-Takeda and Philippine Fuji Xerox underpaid its employees of their 13th month pay by not including commissions earned in the computation. Petitioners now asserts before this Court that under P.D. 851, the 13th month pay is based solely on basic salary and remunerations such as commissions, should not be considered in the computation of the 13th month pay. This being the case, the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law issued by then Secretary Drilon providing for the inclusion of commissions in the 13th month pay, were issued in excess of the statutory authority conferred by P.D. 851.

Issue:

Whether the act of then Secretary of Labor, by including commissions in the computation of 13th month pay is a valid.

Held:

No. In remunerative schemes consisting of a fixed or guaranteed wage plus commission, the fixed or guaranteed wage is patently the "basic salary" for this is what the employee receives for a standard work period. Commissions are given for extra efforts exerted in consummating sales or other related transactions. They are, as such, additional pay, which this Court has made clear do not form part of the "basic salary."In including commissions in the computation of the 13th month pay, the second paragraph of Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly expanded the concept of "basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851 It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to implement. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law they are intended to carry into effect. They cannot widen its scope. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.


3. REQUISITES

To be valid, the administrative regulation must comply with the following

requisites;

1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature.

2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature.

3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

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4. It must be reasonable.

i. FIRST REQUISITE

Authority to promulgate the regulation is usually conferred by the charter itself of

the administrative body or by the law it is supposed to enforce. There are many

other laws which vest in administrative officers, including even bureau directors,

the power to promulgate rules.

There are limitations on the rule-making power of administrative agencies. A rule

shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized the promulgation of

administrative rules to implement given legislation. It just needs to be not in

contravention with it.

Through the constitutional power of control, the President can exercise rule-

making power conferred by the above provisions upon his subordinates in the

executive department. The justification is that whatever is enjoyed by them should

also be deemed vested in the President, who can exercise them with more

authority and legal force.

ii. SECOND REQUISITE

Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. DrilonG.R. No. 82849. August 2, 1989

Facts:

Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees, Cebu Oxygen Acetylene and Central Visayas Employees Association (COAVEA) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the years 1986 to 1988. Pursuant thereto, the management gave salary increases:

On December 14, 1987, R.A. No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage, as follows:

Sec. 2. The Statutory minimum wage rates of workers and employees in the private sector, whether agricultural or non-agricultural, shall be increased by ten pesos (P 10.00) per day, except non-agricultural workers and employees outside Metro

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Manila who shall receive an increase of eleven pesos ((P 11.00) per day: Provided, that those already receiving above the minimum wage up to one hundred (P 100.00) shall receive an increase of ten pesos (P 10.00) per day. Excepted from the provisions of this Act are domestic helpers and persons employed in the personal service of another.

The Secretary of Labor issued the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 6640. Section 8 thereof provides:

Sec. 8. Wage Increase Under Individual/Collective Agreements – No wage increase shall be credited as compliance with the increase prescribed herein unless expressly provided under valid individual written/collective agreements; and, provided further, that such wage increase was granted in anticipation of the legislated wage increase under the act. Such increases shall not include anniversary wage increases provided on collective agreements.

In sum, Section 6 of the Implementing Rules prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary wage increases negotiated under a collective bargaining agreement against such wage increases mandated by Republic Act No. 6640.

Accordingly, petitioner credited the first year increase of P 200.00 under the CBA and added the difference of P 61.66 (rounded to P 62.00) and P 31.00 to the monthly salary and the 13th month pay, respectively, of its employees from the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640 on December 14, 1987 to February 15, 1988.

On February 22, 1988, a Labor and Employment Development Officer, commenced a routine inspection of petitioner’s establishment. Upon completion of the inspection, and based on payrolls and other records, he found that petitioner committed violations of the law; under-payment of Basic Wage per R.A. No. 6640 covering the period of two (2) months representing 208 employees who are not receiving wages above P 100/ day and under-payment of 13th month pay for the year 1987, representing 208 employees who are not receiving wages above P 100/day.

On April 7, 1988 respondent Assistant Regional Director, issued an Order instructing petitioner to pay its 208 employees the aggregate amount of P 131,248.00.

In sum, the Assistant Regional Director ordered petitioner to pay the deficiency of P200.00 in the monthly salary and P 231.00 in the 13th month pay of its employees for the period stated. Petitioner protested the Order of the Regional Director on the ground that the anniversary wage increases under the CBA can be credited against the wage increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6640. Hence, petitioner contended that inasmuch as it had credited the first year increase negotiated under the CBA, it was liable only for a salary differential of P 62.00 and a 13th month pay differential of P31.00. Petitioner argued that the payment of the differentials constitutes full compliance with R.A. No. 6640. Apparently, the protest was not

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entertained. Petitioner brought the case immediately to this Court without appealing the matter to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. This Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Assistant Regional Director from enforcing his Order. The thrust of the argument of petitioner is that Section 8 of the rules implementing the provisions of Republic Act No. 6640 particularly the provision excluding anniversary wage increases from being credited to the wage increase provided by said law is null and void on the ground that the same unduly expands the provisions of the said law.

Issue:

Whether an implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement.

Held:

This petition is impressed with merit.

As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic Act No. 6640, which prohibits the employer from crediting the anniversary wage increases provided in collective bargaining agreements, it is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance by the law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. Thus petitioner’s contention that the salary increases granted by it pursuant to the existing CBA including anniversary wage increases should be considered in determining compliance with wage increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6640, is correct. However, the amount that should only be credited to petitioner is the wage increase for 1987 under the CBA when the law took effect. The wage increase for 1986 had already accrued in favor of the employees even before the said law was enacted.

Digested by: Anonuevo, Christ Edgardo

Echegaray v. Sec. of JusticeG.R. No. 132601. January 19, 1999

Facts:

Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177. Pursuant to the provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice promulgated the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 ("implementing rules" and

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directed the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.

On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution by lethal injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules as these are unconstitutional and void for being: (a) cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment per se as well as by reason of its being (b) arbitrary, unreasonable and a violation of due process, (c) a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, (d) an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, (e) an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and (f) an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.

Issue:

Whether RA 8177 unduly delegates legislative power to respondent director.

Held:

No. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in the framing of our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. Corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. "The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest." The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;(3) Delegation to the people at large;(4) Delegation to local governments; and(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of delegation of legislative authority to administrative bodies.

The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to attend to by itself. Specialization even in legislation has become

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necessary. On many problems involving day-to-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the needed competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself - it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate - and (b) fix a standard - the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable - to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Considering the scope and the definiteness of R.A. No. 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.

R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. it indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "[t]he death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "[t]he Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict. The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, to use the words of Justice Benjamin Cardozo, canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.

Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of discretion by the Secretary of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections under delegated legislative power is proper where standards are formulated for the guidance and the exercise of limited discretion, which though general, are capable of reasonable application.

It is also noteworthy that Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code which originally provided for the death penalty by electrocution was not subjected to attack on the ground that it failed to provide for details such as the kind of chair to be used, the amount of voltage, volume of amperage or place of attachment

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of electrodes on the death convict. Hence, petitioner's analogous argument with respect to lethal injection must fail.

A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is no undue delegation of legislative power from the Secretary of Justice to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice. Further, the Department of Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of the "administration of the correctional system. Hence, the import of the phraseology of the law is that the Secretary of Justice should supervise the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation with the Department of Health.

Digested by: Rosales, Arvin

iii. THIRD REQUISITE

As in the enactment of laws, the promulgation of administrative regulations of

general application does not require previous notice and hearing, the only

exception is when the legislature itself requires it and mandates that the

regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate

investigation.

As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules

and regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.

But where the regulation is in effect a settlement of a controversy between specific

parties, it is considered an administrative adjudication and so will require notice

and hearing. Regulations fixing rates and toll charges are as a rule allowed to be

issued only after a full hearing and are based on the results of that hearing.

In Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission, the SC

explained that an administrative agency may be empowered to approve

provisionally, when demanded by urgent public need, rates of public utilities

without a hearing. However, the court clarified that the authority to issue

provisional orders of rate adjustments cannot be considered as one of the powers

that the legislature intended that the ERC to possess for. It stressed that “the

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power to fix prices and make rates cannot be conferred by implication, but must

be conferred under statutory or constitutional language that is free from doubt,

and admits of no other reasonable construction.”

The following declaration of the Supreme Court in Philippine Consumers

Foundation, Inc. v. Secretary of Education Culture and Sports is constructive- “The

function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a

legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of

prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due

process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of

its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of

such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are

meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may

partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply

exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is

quasi-judicial in character.”

The pronouncement in Tanada v Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative

rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement

existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are those issued

by administrative superiors concerning interpretative regulations, those merely

internal in nature, or those so called letters of instruction issued by administrative

superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates

in the performance of their duties. The Supreme Court requires publication of the

administrative regulation only if it is of general application and penal in nature.

De Jesus v. COAG.R. No. 109023. August 12, 1998

Facts:

Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). Prior to July 1, 1989, they were receiving honoraria as designated members.

On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (Rep. Act 6758), entitled “An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position

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Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes”, took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates. Certain additional compensations, however, were exempted from consolidation.

To implement Rep. Act 6758, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing without qualification effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary.

Pursuant to the aforesaid Law and Circular, respondent Leonardo Jamoralin, as corporate auditor, disallowed on post audit, the payment of honoraria to the herein petitioners.

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the COA, questioning the validity and enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10. More specifically, petitioners contend that DBM-CCC No. 10 is inconsistent with the provisions of Rep. Act 6758 (the law it is supposed to implement) and, therefore, void. And it is without force and effect because it was not published in the Official Gazette; petitioners stressed.

The COA upheld the validity.

Issue:

Whether DBM-CCC No. 10 is legally effective despite its lack of publication in the Official Gazette.

Held:

No. The applicable provision of law requiring publication in the Official Gazette is found in Article 2 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:

“Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.”

In Tanada v. Tuvera, it was held that "all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature."

Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions

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issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to ‘fill in the details’ of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.”

On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the affirmative. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees, starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation.


iv. FOURTH REQUISITE

Like statutes, administrative regulation promulgated thereunder must not be

unreasonable or arbitrary as to violate due process.

It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act

arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid,

such rules must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view.

The regulations must involve the public welfare and the method employed must be

reasonably related to the purposes of the rule and, as previously noted, not

arbitrarily.

Eslao v. Commission on AuditG.R. No. 108310. September 1, 1994

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Facts:

Petitioner, Rufino Eslao in his capacity as President of PSU, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the DENR for the evaluation government reforestation operations in Pangasinan. Meanwhile, PSU vice-president, per advise of the PSU Auditor-in-Charge requested the Office of the President, PSU, to have the University’s Board of Regents confirm the appointments of involved PSU personnel including the rates of honoraria and per diems corresponding to their specific roles and function. The BOR approved the MOR, but the honoraria rates was later on adjusted after finding out that the rates were somewhat higher than that provided for in the guidelines of National Compensation Circular. A Notice for Disallowance was issued by a COA resident in charge, alleging that there were excess payments as to the honoraria. According to the COA auditor CPG 80-4, which provides for lower rates should apply instead of NCC 53.

Petitioner asked for reconsideration from the respondent, stating that NCC 53 should apply since the project is foreign assisted. COA denied the motion, according to respondent, CPG 80-4 should apply according to them there is no difference between a foreign assisted project and a locally funded project. DBM, acting on the request of petitioner issued a clarification and stated that the basis of the project should be NCC 53 and not CPG 80-4. The instant petitioner prays that the issue has become moot in view of the DBM’s clarification/ruling that the evaluation project is foreign-assisted and therefore NCC No. 53, not CPG No. 80-4 which applies only to locally-funded projects, should apply; that DBM’ s position should prevail since it is vested with authority to (i) classify positions and determine appropriate salaries for specific position classes, (ii) review the compensation benefits programs of agencies and (iii) design job evaluation programs.

Issue:

Whether or not DBM’s ruling has the force and effect of law.

Held:

Yes. According to the SC, administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law have the force and effect of law and are entitled to great respect. However, administrative agencies are not authorize to substitute their own judgment for any application law or administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of which they do not agree, at least, not before such law or regulation is set aside by the authorized agency of government as unconstitutional or illegal and void. In the case at bar, since DBM already issued certifications there can be no argument that the issue has already been rendered moot, being the administrative body vested with the power to issue regulations.


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NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC. v. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS

AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSEG.R. No. 187587. June 5, 2012

Facts:

On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).

On 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.

At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which reads:

"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"

President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.

On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), praying for the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476.

COSLAP granted the petition. The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the

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latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.

MSS-PVAO filed a petition with the CA which was granted.

Issue:

Whether the handwritten portion should be taken in consideration and have full effect.

Ruling:

No. It is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.

The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides.

The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, in which we had the occasion to rule.

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

WILLIAM C. DAGAN, CARLOS H. REYES, NARCISO MORALES, BONIFACIO MANTILLA, CESAR AZURIN,

WEITONG LIM, MA. TERESA TRINIDAD, MA. CARMELITA FLORENTINO v. PHILIPPINE RACING COMMISSION,

MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC., and PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB, INC.

G.R. No. 175220, February 12, 2009

Facts:

Dagan and other petitioners are racehorse owners. The controversy stemmed from the 11 August 2004 directive issued by the Philippine Racing Commission (Philracom) directing the Manila Jockey Club, Inc. (MJCI) and Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI) to immediately come up with their respective Clubs’ House Rule to address Equine Infectious Anemia (EIA) problem

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and to rid their facilities of horses infected with EIA. Both racing cluns abided to said directive and ordered horseowners to submit their horses for blood sampling, failure of said owners to comply would the disqualify them and their horses to participate in the races.

Petitioners did not comply and questioned the said directive for being oppressive. The trial court held that it was a valid exercise of police power. The appellate court also upheld the authority of Philracom to formulate guidelines since it is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over and control of the horse-racing industry per Section 8 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 8. While other petitioners eventually complied, only Dagan was left to push through with the case and such, filed an instant cetiorari petition imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents in compelling petitioners to subject their racehorses to blood testing.

Issue:

Whether Philracom committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a directive to subject racehorses to blood testing.

Held:

No. The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed guidelines, hinges on compliance with the following requisites: 1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; 2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;4. It must be reasonable

All the prescribed requisites are met as regards the questioned issuances. Philracom’s authority is drawn from P.D. No. 420. The delegation made in the presidential decree is valid. Philracom did not exceed its authority. And the issuances are fair and reasonable.

The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated, or as expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas delegate non delegare potest. This rule is based upon the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another.

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010

Facts:

Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the party-list system of

25

representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. They submitted a list of nominees with Joel Vilanueva as their first nominee followed by petitioner Lokin, Cruz-Gonzales, Tugna and Galang. Prior to the elections, Vilanueva filed an amendment of nominees, withdrawing Lokin, Tugna and Galang and adding Borje tow which COMELEC approved in Res. No. 7804. CIBAC subsequently won and were given two seats in Congress. Lokin then sought to be proclaimed as the second-nominee but was denied because of the prior withdrawal filed by Vilanueva within his capacity as president. COMELEC then proceeded to proclaim Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee. Lokin now seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. He further assails Sec. 13 of Res. No. 7804 which approved withdrawal of CIBAC ‘s nominees.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing its amendment.

Held:

The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:

1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;

2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;

3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and

4. It must be reasonable.

The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a recall.

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In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to promulgate IRRs implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws that the COMELEC enforces and administers.

The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act. Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite.

The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804 underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the resolution itself.

Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin against Section 13 succeeds.

As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply means that the resulting IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It is basic that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress, for administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law. The administrative agency issuing the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces, and cannot engraft additional non-contradictory requirements not contemplated by the Legislature.

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned. The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the

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COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the courts should be convinced that the Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not depart. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE RULE WITH PENAL SANCTIONS

The power to define and punish crime is exclusively legislative and may not be

delegated to the administrative authorities. While administrative regulations may

have the force and effect of law, their violation cannot give rise to criminal

prosecution unless the legislature makes such violation punishable and imposes

the corresponding sanctions. The administrative authorities themselves cannot

prescribe such penalties. Also, if it is not allowed to do this for violation of its own

rules, much less is it empowered to impose punishment from violation of a statute

which is not, by its term penal in nature.

Requisites of a valid penal regulation:

(1) The law itself must make violation of the administrative regulation

punishable.

(2)The law itself must impose and specify the penalty for the violation of

the regulation.

(3)The regulation must be published.

Tayug Rural Bank v Central Bank of the PhilippinesG.R. No. L-46158. November 28, 1986

Facts:

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Plaintiff-Appellee, Tayug Rural Bank, Inc., is a banking corporation in Tayug, Pangasinan. During the period from December 28, 1962 to July 30, 1963, it obtained thirteen (13) loans from Defendant-Appellant, Central Bank of the Philippines, by way of rediscounting, at the rate of 1/2 of 1% per annum from 1962 to March 28, 1963 and thereafter at the rate of 2-1/2% per anum. The loans, amounting to P813,000.00 as of July 30, 1963, were all covered by corresponding promissory notes prescribing the terms and conditions of the aforesaid loans As of July 15, 1969, the outstanding balance was P 444,809.45.

On December 23, 1964, Appellant, issued Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8, informing all rural banks that an additional penalty interest rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum would be assessed on all past due loans beginning January 4, 1965, and enforced on all rural banks effective July 4, 1965.

On June 27, 1969, Appellee sued Appellant in the CFI of Manila, to recover the 10% penalty imposed and to restrain Appellant from continuing the imposition of the penalty asserting that Appellant had no basis to impose the penalty interest inasmuch as the promissory notes covering the loans executed by Appellee in favor of Appellants do not provide for penalty interest rate of 10% per annum on just due loans beginning January 4, 1965. The trial court ruled in favour of the Appellee.

Issue:

Whether Appellant Central Bank, exercising supervising authority, can validly impose penalty on past due loans.

Held:

No. Nowhere in any R.A. 720 nor in any other provision of R.A. 720 for that matter, is the monetary Board authorized to mete out on rural banks an additional penalty rate on their past due accounts with Appellant. As correctly stated by the trial court, while the Monetary Board possesses broad supervisory powers, nonetheless, the retroactive imposition of administrative penalties cannot be taken as a measure supervisory in character.

In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned Except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public official must locate in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it. Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute.

When promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, the rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. Conversely, the rule is likewise clear. Hence an administrative agency cannot impose a penalty not so provided

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in the law authorizing the promulgation of the rules and regulations, much less one that is applied retroactively.


Pesigan v. AngelesG.R. No. L-64279. April 30, 1984

Facts:

In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos" (78 OG 3144).

Issue:

Whether violation of Executive Order No. 626-A is punishable by penal sanction.

Held:

No. In the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial court of having violated Central Bank Circular No. 20 and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P1,000, was acquitted by this Court because the circular was published in the Official Gazette three months after his conviction. He was not bound by the circular.

That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.

Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that "every order or document which shag prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect."

Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that even bureau "regulations and orders shall become effective only when approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated".

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In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order.

It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.

Digested by: Rosales, Arvin

5. NECESSITY FOR NOTICE AND HEARING

There is no constitutional requirement for a hearing in the promulgation of a

general regulation by an administrative body. Where the rule is procedural, or

where the rules are, in effect, merely legal opinions, there is no notice required.

Neither is notice required in the preparation of substantive rules where the class to

be affected is large and the questions to be resolved involve the use of discretion

committed to the rule-making body.

However, in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA, where the

Supreme Court distinguished between administrative rules in the nature of

subordinate legislation and those which are merely interpretative rules. An

administrative rules in the nature of subordinate legislation is designed to

implement a law by providing its details, and before it is adopted there must be a

hearing under the Administrative Code of 1987. When an administrative rules

substantially adds to or increases the burden of those concerned, an

administrative agency must accord those directly affected a chance to be heard

before the issuance.

Maceda v. Energy Regulatory BoardG.R. No. 96266. July 18, 1991

Facts:

On 10 September 1990, Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and Petron Corporation preferred separate applications with the Energy Regulatory Board for permission to increase the wholesale posted prices of

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petroleum products, and meanwhile, for provisional authority to increase temporarily such wholesale posted prices pending further proceedings. On September 21, 1990, the Energy Regulatory Board, in a joint (on three applications) order granted provisional relief and authorizes said applicants a weighted average provisional increase of ONE PESO AND FFORTY-TWO CENTAVOS ( P1.42) per liter in the wholesale posted prices of their various petroleum products, refined and/or marketed by them locally.

The petitioners, Ernesto MACEDA and Atty. Oliver Lozano submits that the same was issued without proper notice and hearing in violation of Section 3, paragraph (e), of Executive Order No. 172, and has been issued with grave abuse of discretion , tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, and correctible by certiorari, Hence, this petition praying for injunctive relief to stop the Energy Regulatory Board from implementing its order, dated September 21, 1990, mandating a provisional increase in the prices and petroleum products.

Issue:

Whether or not the order of the Energy Regulatory Board mandating a provisional increase of petroleum products was issued in violation of the Constitutional right to notice and hearing.

Held:

No. Senator Maceda and Atty. Lozano, in questioning the lack of notice and hearing, have overlooked the provision s of Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172 as the order itself indicated, the authority for provisional increase falls within this provision. There is no merit in the Senator’s contention that the “applicable” provision is Section 3 paragraph (e) of said Executive Order. What must be stressed is that while under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering , ex parte a provisional increase, subject to its final disposition of whether or not (1) to make it permanent (2) to reduce or increase it further or (3) to deny the application. Section 3 paragraph (e) is akin to a temporary restraining order or a writ or preliminary attachment issued by the courts, which are given ex parte, and which are subject to the resolution of the main case.

Section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each other, or otherwise operate exclusively of the other, in that the Board may resort to one but not to both at the same time. Section 3 (e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding. The Board, of course, the better procedure- however it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one.


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Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila v. Board of Transportation

G.R. No. L-59234. September 30, 1982

Facts:

Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old on grounds that it is violative of the constitutional rights of equal protection because it is only enforced in Manila and directed solely towards the taxi industry.

Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.

Issue:

Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old is a valid exercise of police power.

Held:

No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the safety and general welfare of the people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal protection clause because it is common knowledge that taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, creating a substantial distinction from taxicabs of other places.

Digested by: Ledesma, Thea Lyn

Philippine Consumers Foundation v. Sec. of Education Culture and Sports

G.R. No. 78385. August 31, 1987

Facts:

Petitioner Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. a non-stock, non-profit corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines assailed the validity of a Department Order No. 37 in which DECS authorizes private schools to increase tuitions fees by 15% to 20% on the basis of a report of its task force concerning the matter. Petitioner on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is that the said Department Order was issued without any legal basis. They further argue that while the DECS is authorized by law to regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always include the power to increase school fees. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned Department Order was issued in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution inasmuch as the

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petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before the said Department Order.

Issue:

Whether petitioners were denied of substantive and procedural due process of law.

Held:

No. We are not convinced by the argument that the power to regulate school fees "does not always include the power to increase" such fees. Section 57 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known as The Education Act of 1982, vests the DECS with the power to regulate the educational system in the country. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law.

The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.

The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for school year 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.


Lina Jr. v. CarinoG.R. No. 100127. April 23, 1993

Facts:

Petitioner disputes the legal authority of respondent to issue DECS Order No. 30, entitled “Guidelines on Tuition and/or other School Fees in Private Schools, Colleges And Universities for School Year 1991 – 1992.” DECS Order No. 30, allows private schools to increase tuition and other school fees, subject to the guidelines therein set out. Petitioner denies the legal authority of respondent to issue the said Order, considering that the authority to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the imposition of school fees had been transferred to the State Assistance Council (SAC). Petitioner also contends that DECS

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Order No. 30 is inconsistent with Section 10. In DECS Order No. 30, respondent exempted increases in school fees other than tuition fees from application of the consultation requirement. Upon the other hand, Section 10 of R.A. No. 6728 provides that “in any proposed increase in the rate of tuition fee, there shall be appropriate consultations conducted by the school administration with the duly organized parents and teachers association and faculty associations with respect to secondary schools and with student governments or councils, alumni and faculty associations with respect to colleges x x x.” According to petitioner, Section 10 covers increases in all types of school fees, which increase must first comply with the requirement of consultation before promulgation in order that prohibitive and burdensome fees may be avoided. In fine, petitioner is praying for the declaration of DECS Order No. 30 null and void on two grounds: (1) that respondent does not have the legal authority to issue that Order, and (2) that DECS Order No. 30 violates Section 10 of R.A. No. 6728 which established a comprehensive requirement of consultation.

The Solicitor General, representing respondent maintains that the power to prescribe maximum tuition and other school fees remains vested in the DECS Secretary. He further contends that DECS Order No. 30 conforms substantially with the consultation requirement of R.A> No. 6728 except item 1 (a) which unqualifiedly allows private colleges and universities to raise the tuition fee in the tertiary level to not more than P 80.00 per unit without prior consultation. He therefore urges that DECS Order No. 30 be upheld, save only paragraph 1 (a) thereof which he considers to be inconsistent with the consultation requirement,

Issue:

Whether an increase in other fees other than tuition fees as provided for in DECS Order No, 30 requires prior consultation.

Held:

No. We have earlier pointed out that petitioner’s stand is inconsistent with the very language used in Section 10 of R.A. No. 6728 which states in relevant part that: “in any proposed increase in the rate of tuition fees, there shall be appropriate consultations –.“ Petitioner’s argument here is, however, essentially an invocation of “justice and equity”. The Court believes that petitioner’s argument – cogent though it may be as a social and economic comment – is most appropriately addressed, no to a court which must take the laws as it is actually written, but rather to the legislative authority which can, if it wishes, change the language and content of the law, As Section 10 of R.A. No. 6728 now stands, we have no authority to strike down paragraph 1 of DECS Order No. 30 as inconsistent with the requirement of Section 10.


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VI. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER

The quasi-judicial power is the power of the administrative agency to determine

questions of fact to which the legislative policy id to apply in accordance with the

standards laid down by the law itself. The administrative body exercises the quasi-

judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of

an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is

incidental or necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty

entrusted to it. There is no invalid delegation of judicial power to the

administrative body where the legislature authorizes it to resolve factual questions

in certain controversies in order to give effect to the mandate and policy of the law

it is supposed to enforce. Quasi-judicial is the term applied to the action, discretion

of officers who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts

and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action, and to exercise

discretion of a judicial nature.

The difference between quasi-judicial and judicial power is where the function of an

officer or body is primarily administrative and the power to hear and determine

controversies is granted as an incident to the administrative duty, the power is

quasi-judicial. Where, however, the duty is primarily to decide questions of legal

rights between private parties, such decision being the primary object and not

merely incidental to regulation or some other administrative function, the function

is judicial.

The proper exercise of the quasi-judicial power requires compliance with two

condition:

1. Jurisdiction must be properly acquired by the administrative body and

2. Due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.


UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, GLENDA A. VARGAS, MA. SOCORRO S. GUANHING, in their capacities as Dean and Assistant Dean, respectively, of the College of Nursing

of the University of Santo Tomas, and RODOLFO N.

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CLAVIO, in his capacity as Registrar of the University of Santo Tomas v. DANES B. SANCHEZ

G.R. No. 165569, July 29, 2010

Facts:

Danes B. Sanchez (respondent) against the University of Santo Tomas (UST) and its Board of Directors, the Dean and the Assistant Dean of the UST College of Nursing, and the University Registrar for their alleged unjustified refusal to release the respondent’s Transcript of Records (ToR).

In his Complaint, respondent alleged that he graduated from UST on April 2, 2002 with a Bachelor’s Degree of Science in Nursing. He was included in the list of candidates for graduation and attended graduation ceremonies. On April 18, 2002, respondent sought to secure a copy of his ToR with the UST Registrar’s Office, paid the required fees, but was only given a Certificate of Graduation by the Registrar. Despite repeated attempts, his TOR was not given to him thus making him impossible to take the board exams and depriving him of the opportunity to make a living.

Instead of filing an Answer, UST filed a Motion to Dismiss where they claimed he was not a registered student, as he had not been enrolled in the university for the last three semesters. They claimed that the respondent’s graduation, attendance in classes, and taking/passing of examinations were immaterial because he ceased to be a student when he failed to enroll during the second semester of school year 2000-2001.

After the parties filed their responsive pleadings, petitioners filed a Supplement to their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that respondent sought administrative recourse before the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) through a letter-complaint dated January 21, 2003. Thus, petitioners claimed that the CHED had primary jurisdiction to resolve matters pertaining to school controversies, and the filing of the instant case was premature.

Issue:

Whether CHED can exercises quasi-judicial power over controversies involving school matters and has primary jurisdiction over respondent’s demand for the release of his ToR.

Held:

No. The doctrine does not apply because petitioners failed to demonstrate that recourse to the CHED is mandatory – or even possible – in an action such as that brought by the respondent, which is essentially one for mandamus and damages. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is where the issues are purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court, as in the present case. Petitioners’ liability – if any – for damages will have to be decided by the courts, since any judgment

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inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code.

Petitioners also claim that even without any express grant of quasi-judicial power by the legislature, the CHED is authorized to adjudicate the case filed by respondent on the strength of the following provisions of the Manual of Regulations of Private Schools.

In any event, even if we were to assume that these provisions were applicable, the CHED remains without authority to adjudicate an action for damages.

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) v. FONTANA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 187972, June 29, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a government owned and controlled corporation created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.

On December 23, 1999, PAGCOR granted private respondent Fontana Development Corporation (FDC) (formerly RN Development Corporation) the authority to operate and maintain a casino inside the CSEZ under a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).

In the MOA, it was stated the "Non-exclusivity, PAGCOR and RNDC agree that the license granted to RNDC to engage in gaming and amusement operations within CSEZ shall be non-exclusive and co-terminus with the Charter of PAGCOR, or any extension thereof, and shall be for the period hereinabove defined".

Sometime in 2005, the Coconut Oil Refiners Association challenged before the Supreme Court the constitutionality, among others, of EO No. 80 on the ground that the incentives granted to SSEZ under RA No. 7227 was exclusive and cannot be made applicable to CSEZ by a mere executive order. The case was decided in favor of Coconut Oil Refiners Association and Section 5 aforequoted was declared of no legal force and effect.

On June 20, 2007, RA No. 9487 was enacted, extending PAGCOR’s franchise up to July 10, 2033 renewable for another twenty-five (25) years.

On July 18, 2008, PAGCOR informed FDC that it was extending the MOA on a month-to-month basis until the finalization of the renewal of the contract. FDC protested, claiming that the extension of PAGCOR’s franchise had automatically extended the MOA: that the SC decisions, including RA Nos. 9400 and 9399, had no effect on the authority of CDC to allow the establishment of a casino inside the CSEZ; and that in Coconut

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Oil Refiners Association, Inc., the SC did not declare void the entire EO No. 80 but only Section 5 thereof.

On October 6, 2008, after a series of dialogues and exchange of position papers, PAGCOR notified FDC that its [new] standard Authority to Operate shall now govern and regulate FDC’s casino operations in place of the previous MOA. FDC moved for the reconsideration of the said decision but the same was denied. On November 5, 2008, PAGCOR instructed FDC to remit its franchise fees in accordance with the Authority to Operate.

On the same date of November 5, 2008, FDC filed before the RTC of Manila the instant complaint for Injunction against PAGCOR, contending that it could not be covered by a month-to-month extension nor by the standard Authority to Operate since the MOA was automatically renewed and extended up to 2033; that the MOA clearly provided that the same was co-terminus with PAGCOR’s franchise including any extension thereof; that it had faithfully complied with the conditions under the MOA; that pursuant to the MOA, it had built a hotel-casino complex and put up other investments equivalent to P1 Billion; that it had adopted a marketing strategy to attract high roller casino players from Asia and had scrupulously met all its obligations to PAGCOR and other government agencies; and that the provisions invalidated in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc., principally pertained to tax and customs duty, privileges or incentives which was thereafter restored by the enactment of RA No. 9400. The complaint was docketed as the herein Civil Case No. 08-120338 and raffled to Branch 7.

Issue:

Whether PAGCOR issue the license (MOA) under PD 1869 or under Executive Order No. (EO) 80, Section 5.

Held:

None. In PAGCOR v. Viola, we ruled that PAGCOR, in the exercise of its licensing and regulatory powers, has no quasi-judicial functions, as Secs. 8 and 9 of PD 1869 do not grant quasi-judicial powers to PAGCOR. As such, direct resort to this Court is not allowed. While we allowed said recourse in Del Mar v. PAGCOR6 and Jaworski v. PAGCOR,7 that is an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts on the grounds of expediency and the importance of the issues involved. More importantly, we categorically ruled in PAGCOR v. Viola that cases involving revocation of a license falls within the original jurisdiction of the RTC.

Having settled that PAGCOR’s revocation of MONDRAGON’s authority to operate a casino was not an exercise of quasi-judicial powers then it follows that the case was properly filed before the Regional Trial Court. Hence, as the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case, petitioner’s contention that the temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction by the trial court are void must fail.

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PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION v. HONORABLE MANUEL B. GAITE, in his official capacity as Deputy

Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Office of the President, and the GAMES AND AMUSEMENT BOARD,

represented herein by its Chairman, Eduardo R. Villanueva

G.R. No. 170312. June 26, 2009

Facts:

The PBA was placed under the control the Games and Amusement Board (GAB) with the inaction of PD 871. Under this PD, the GAB was mandated the PBA to remit 3% of their gross receipts and income from television, radio, and motion pictures, if any, which shall be used to defray expenses of the GAB. On December 29, 1999, the PBA and Viva Vintage Sports, Inc. (VVSI) forged a Memorandum of Agreement granting the VVSI exclusive rights to broadcast the PBA games on television and radio for the 2000 to 2002 PBA seasons. Initially, VVSI paid the franchise fees to the PBA, and from these, the latter remitted the required 3% to the GAB.

The VVSI then began to default in the payment of the franchise fees; it took some time before it could comply with its contractual obligations in which it affected the PBA’s own ability to remit the 3% of gross receipts The GAB assessed the PBA the amount of P3,452,233.32 representing its 3% share in the PBA’s gross receipts and income from the television/radio broadcast of PBA games for the year 2002.

The GAB and the PBA submitted their dispute to the Office of the President (OP) for adjudication. In the course of their submission, the parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement (PBA-GAB MOA) where the PBA agreed to deposit the assessed amount.

In a letter dated August 17, 2004, the OP, through respondent Manuel B. Gaite (then Deputy Secretary for Legal Affairs), ruled in favor of the GAB on the grounds that PD No. 871 intended the operating association, the PBA, to pay GAB the equivalent of 3% of its gross revenue and income from television and/or radio broadcast once earned.

The PBA then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the OP decision. The CA denied the PBA’s subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether Gaite validly exercised a quasi-judicial when he interpreted 871.

Held:

Yes. The OP is essentially an administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, its decisions or resolutions may be appealed to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Section 10, PD No. 871 directs that the

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decisions, orders, and rulings of the GAB may be appealed directly to the OP.

2006 BAR EXAM QUESTION:

What is a quasi-judicial body or agency?

Suggested Answer:

A quasi-judicial body or agency is an administrative body with

the power to hear, determine or ascertain facts and decide

rights, duties and obligations of the parties by the application of

rules to the ascertained facts. By this power, quasi-judicial

agencies are enabled to interpret and pply implementing rules

and regulations promulgated by them and laws entrusted to

their administration.

1. JURISDICTION

Administrative bodies conferred with quasi-judicial power are not part of the

judicial system and are not, strictly speaking, considered as courts. They may be

an arm of the executive department or an independent body created to undertake

limited particular matters. As such, it is a commonplace that such bodies exercise

investigative, adjudicatory powers and functions though in a limited extent. The

rationale for the creation and conferring such powers to such bodies, despite the

existence of regular courts of justice, is that there is a growing need for special

competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of

questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion

recognition that the dockets if our regular courts have been crowded and clogged.

The word Jurisdiction is derived from the Latin terms “juris” and “dico” which

means “I speak of the law.” It is the power and authority of a court, a body or an

office for that matter to hear, try and decide a case. It is the power with which

justice is administered for hearing and deciding cases.

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Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or law. The Congress has the

power to define prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various bodies and

courts and may not delegate such power to confer it. As such, It cannot be fixed by

the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or

diminished by, any act or omission of the parties. Administrative bodies, in its

quasi-judicial power, can be said to have a peculiar jurisdiction conferred by

specific provisions of its charter or laws which calls upon such body to exercise

jurisdiction over certain subject matters to the exclusion of other bodies or even

regular courts. Such charters are not so uniform and vary considerably as the

discretion of the law making body to dictate. Thus, certain controversies are best

tackled by administrative agencies while certain matters are tried in regular courts

of justice. It is settled that a tribunal, board, or office exercising judicial functions

acts without jurisdiction if no authority has been conferred by law to hear and

decide the case.


CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEVARRA and ATTY. AUGUSTUS F. CEZAR

G.R. No. 176162, October 9, 2012

Facts:

Respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra) and Augustus F. Cezar (Cezar) were the Officer-in-Charge/President and the Vice President for Administration, respectively, of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) in 2005.

Honesto L. Cueva (Cueva), then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case against Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of official documents, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, being notoriously undesirable, and for violating Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713. Cueva charged Guevarra with falsification of a public document, specifically the Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and Employees of the Republic of the Philippines, in which the latter denied the existence of his pending criminal and administrative cases. This was despite the undisputed fact that, at that time, both Guevarra and Cezar admittedly had 17 pending cases for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan.

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Cezar, knowing fully well that both he and Guevarra had existing cases before the Sandiganbayan, endorsed and recommended the approval of the application.

Respondents explained that they believed "criminal or administrative records" to mean final conviction in a criminal or administrative case. Thus, because their cases had not yet been decided by the Sandiganbayan, they asserted that Guevarra responded to Question No. 11 in General Form No. 58-A correctly and in good faith.

On March 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued Resolution No. 06052110 formally charging Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service after a prima facie finding that they had committed acts punishable under the Civil Service Law and Rules.

Aggrieved, Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA essentially questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC over the administrative complaint filed against them by Cueva. The CA ruled in favor of the respondents.

Issue:

Whether the Civil Service Commission has original concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases falling under the jurisdiction of heads of agencies.

Held:

Yes. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to appoint and discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal. As PUP is government-owned, respondents are public officials and part of the Civil Service.

The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (the Uniform Rules) explicitly allows the CSC to hear and decide administrative cases directly brought before it:

Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. – The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.

Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees

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Based on all of the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the CSC may take cognizance of an administrative case filed directly with it against an official or employee of a chartered state college or university. This is regardless of whether the complainant is a private citizen or a member of the civil service and such original jurisdiction is shared with the Board of Regents of the school.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ROLSON RODRIGUEZG.R. No. 172700. July 23, 2010

Facts: On 26 August 2003, the Ombudsman in Visayas received a complaint for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty against Rolson Rodriguez, punong barangay in Brgy. Sto. Rosario, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. On 1 September 2003, the sangguniang bayan of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, through vice-mayor Jose G. Yulo, also received similar complaint.

In its 8 September 2003 notice, the municipal vice-mayor required Rodriguez to submit his answer within 15 days from receipt of the notice. Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss the case filed in the sangguniang bayan on the ground that the allegations in the complaint were without factual basis and did not constitute any violation of law. Rodriguez also alleged that complainants violated the rule against forum-shopping.

In its 10 September 2003 order, the Ombudsman required Rodriguez to file his answer. Rodriguez filed on a motion to dismiss the case filed in the Ombudsman on the grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping. He alleged that the sangguniang bayan had already acquired jurisdiction over his person as early as 8 September 2003.

In its 29 January 2004 order, the Ombudsman directed both parties to file their respective verified position papers. Rodriguez moved for reconsideration of the order citing the pendency of his motion to dismiss. In its 11 March 2004 order, the Ombudsman stated that a motion to dismiss was a prohibited pleading under Section 5 (g) Rule III of Administrative Order No. 17. The Ombudsman reiterated its order for Rodriguez to file his position paper.

In his position paper, Rodriguez insisted that the sangguniang bayan still continued to exercise jurisdiction over the complaint filed against him. He claimed he had not received any resolution or decision dismissing the complaint filed in the sangguniang bayan.

Issue:

Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction.

Held:

Yes. Clearly, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang bayan over administrative cases against

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elective barangay officials occupying positions below salary grade 27, such as private respondent in this case.

In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body in which the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In this case, since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the Ombudsman’s exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan exercising concurrent jurisdiction.

It is a hornbook rule that jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. When herein complainants first filed the complaint in the Ombudsman, jurisdiction was already vested on the latter. Jurisdiction could no longer be transferred to the sangguniang bayan by virtue of a subsequent complaint filed by the same complainants.

WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT v. ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.

G.R. No. 196232. September 4, 2012

Facts:

On April 2005, the acting deputy prosecutor of the office of the Ombudsman. Charged major General Garcia, his wife, sons and other people with plunder, money laundering before the sandigan bayan.

A backroom deal was arranged by special prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit to the Sandigang Bayan to approve a plea bargaining agreement entered into with the accused.

This outraged the House of Representatives and conducted a public hearing regarding the plea bargaining agreement. At the conclusion of the case, the committee passed and adopted a resolution recommending to the President the dismissal of special presecutor Barreras- Sulit on the groinds of violation of graft and corrupt practices and grounds for removal of office. The office of the president initiated the case. Petotioner - Sulit raised the defenses of prematurity and lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether the president has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over the deputy ombudsman and the special prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally created office of the Ombudsman.

Held:

Yes. The ombudsman's administrative disciplinary powerful over a deputy ombudsman and special prosecutor is not exclusive sec 18 of RA 6770 grants the president the power to remove

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the deputy ombudsman and the special prosecutor from office after due process.

2. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

In the exercise of its quasi-judicial power, administrative bodies are given powers

of adjudication, To “adjudicate” means to settle in the exercise of judicial

authority. The nature of a “judicial function” is to be described as the resolution of

controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison d’etre of courts. Such function is

accomplished by first, ascertainment of relevant and material facts; second,

application of the law to settle controversies.

An administrative body expressly granted with the power of adjudication is

deemed also vested with the implied power to prescribe the rules to be observed

in the conduct of proceedings. This is with accordance to administrative bodies

exercising its quasi-legislative powers in prescribing rules in its dealings with the

public. Moreover, whenever a particular law is silent with regards to any particular

manner of procedure, such agency may prescribe rules to carry out its functions.

Such rules may not enlarge the bounds of the statute conferring it in guise of

interpretation, and must not violate fundamental rights to encroach upon

constitutional prerogatives.

i. SUBPOENA POWER

Sitting to adjudicate on certain matters, administrative bodies possess the

subpoena power to determine relevant facts. The power to issue subpoena and

subpoena duces tecum is also conferred to administrative bodies but such power is

limited to matters they are authorize to investigate as provided for by law. The

Administrative Code of 1987, section 13 of chapter 3, book VII states that “in any

contested case, the agency shall have the power to require the attendance of

witnesses or the production of books, paper, documents and other pertinent data,

upon request of any party before or during any hearing upon showing of general

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relevance.” Such power is thus limited that a body cannot arbitrarily exercise it in

the absence of a clear grant of this power by the legislature.

ii. CONTEMPT POWER

Contempt power is essentially judicial and cannot be claimed as an inherent right

by the administrative body. It must be expressly conferred upon the body and

must be used in connection with its quasi-judicial function to validly exercise this.

Essential in its exercise of quasi-judicial power, administrative bodies enjoys

contempt power to reprimand The Administrative code also provides contempt

powers to such bodies that, “unless otherwise provided by law, the agency ma, in

the case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose

jurisdiction the contested case falls. The Court may punish contumacy or refusal as

contempt. As a rule, when a subpoena of an administrative body is disregarded,

the person summoned may not be directly disciplined by that body. The proper

remedy is for the administrative body to seek assistance of the courts of justice for

enforcement of its order.


On the first day of the trial of a rape-murder case where the victim was a popular TV star, over a hundred of her fans rallied at the entrance of the courthouse, each carrying a placard demanding the conviction of the accused and the imposition of the death penalty on him. The rally was peaceful and did not disturb the proceedings of the case.

a) Can the trial court order the dispersal of the rallyists under pain of being punished for contempt of court, if they fail to do so? Explain.

b) If instead of a rally, the fans of the victim wrote letters to the newspaper editors demanding the conviction of the accused, can the trial court punish them for contempt? Explain.

Suggested Answer:

a) Yes, the trial court can order the dispersal of the rally under pain of being cited for contempt. The purpose of the rally is to attempt to influence the administration of Justice. As stated in

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People vs. Flores, 239 SCRA 83, any conduct by any party which tends to directly or indirectly Impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice is subject to the contempt powers of the court.

b) No, the trial court cannot punish for contempt the fans of the victim who wrote letters to the newspaper editors asking for the conviction of the accused. Since the letters were not addressed to the Judge and the publication of the letters occurred outside the court, the fans cannot be punished in the absence of a clear and present danger to the administration of Justice. In Cabansag vs. Fernandez, 102 Phil 152, it was held that a party who wrote to the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee to complain about the delay in the disposition of his case could not be punished for contempt in the absence of a clear and present danger to the fair administration of Justice.


Squatters and vendors have put up structures in an area intended for a People’s Park, which are impeding the flow of traffic in the adjoining highway. Mayor Cruz gave notice for the structures to be removed, and the area vacated within a month, or else, face demolition and ejectment. The occupants filed a case with the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) to stop the Mayor’s move. The CHR then issued an “order to desist” against Mayor Cruz with warning that he would be held in contempt should he fail to comply with the desistance order. When the allotted time lapsed,

Mayor Cruz caused the demolition and removal of the structures. Accordingly, the CHR cited him for contempt.

(a) What is your concept of Human Rights? Does this case involve violations of human rights within the scope of the CHR’s jurisdiction?

Suggested Answer:

Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the scope of human rights includes "those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations... along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life."

In the case at bar, the land adjoins a busy national highway and the construction of the squatter shanties impedes the flow of traffic. The consequent danger to life and limb cannot be ignored. It is paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Based on the circumstances obtaining in this instance, the CHR order for demolition do not fall within the compartment of human rights violations involving civil and political rights intended by the Constitution. (Simon v.

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Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994)

(b) Can the CHR issue an “order to desist” or restraining order?

Suggested Answer:

The CHR may not issue an "order to desist" or restraining order. The constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures to those whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication. (Export Processing Zone Authority v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 101476, April 14, 1992)

(c) Is the CHR empowered to declare Mayor Cruz in contempt? Does it have contempt powers at all?

Suggested Answer:

The CHR does not possess adjudicative functions and therefore, on its own, is not empowered to declare Mayor Cruz in contempt for issuing the "order to desist." However, under the 1987 Constitution, the CHR is constitutionally authorized, in the exercise of its investigative functions, to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR, in the course of an investigation, may only cite or hold any person in contempt and impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court. (Carino v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991)

3. NOTICE AND HEARING

The right to notice and hearing is essential to due process, and its non-observance

will, as a rule, invalidate the administrative proceedings. Persons are entitled to

be notified of any pending case affecting their interest so that, if they are minded,

they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side or refute the

position of opposing parties.

The essence if due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to

explain one's side or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling

complained of.

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The general rule is that denial of the right to notice and hearing invalidates

administrative proceedings. However, there are a number of exception to this rule

namely;

1) Urgency of immediate action;

2) The tentativeness of the administrative action (which does not preclude the

enjoyment of the right at a later time without prejudice to the person

affected;

3) The fact that the right had previously been offered but not claimed;

4) Summary abatement of nuisance per se;

5) Preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges;

6) The padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies,

which are immediate threats to public health and decency;

7) The cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;

8) The summary distraint and levy of the properties of a delinquent tax payer;

and

9) The replacement of a temporary or acting appointee.


The Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued new rules and

regulations governing pilotage services and fees, and the

conduct of pilots in Philippine ports. This it did without notice,

hearing nor consultation with harbor pilots or their associations

whose rights and activities are to be substantially affected. The

harbor pilots then filed suit to have the new MARINA rules and

regulations declared unconstitutional for having been issued

without due process. Decide the case.

Suggested Answer:

The issuance of the new rules and regulations violated due process. Under Section 9, Chapter II, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987, as far as practicable, before adopting proposed rules, an administrative agency should publish or circulate notices of the proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views; and in the fixing of rates, no rule shall be valid unless the proposed rates

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shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two weeks before the first hearing on them. In accordance with this provision, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v CA, 261 SCRA 236 (1996), it was held that when an administrative rule substantially increases the burden of those directly affected, they should be accorded the chance to be heard before its issuance.

Alternative Answer:

Submission of the rule to the University of the Philippines Law Center for publication is mandatory. Unless this requirement is complied with, the rule cannot be enforced.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

While administrative determinations of contested cases are by their nature judicial,

there is no requirement for strict adherence to technical rules as are observed in

truly judicial proceedings. The atmosphere of administrative tribunals may be one

of expeditiousness, or liberally conceived remedies and, whether by provision of

statute, official rule or judicial decision, it is a general rule that they are

unrestricted by the technical and formal rules of procedure which govern trials

before a court, especially where the administrative order has the effect of only

prima facie evidence. This rule is applied to questions of evidence, pleading and

other matters.

Nevertheless, it is essential that due process must be observed, for the

requirements of fair the requirements of fair play are not applicable to judicial

proceedings only.

ANG TIBAY v. CIRG.R. No. L-46496. February 27, 1940

Facts:

On September 26, 1938, Toribio Teodoro claimed there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc. The NLU counters that the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond.

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Also pertinent is that in ANG TIBAY, there are two unions, NLU and the National Worker's Brotherhood. NWB is dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. NLU also claim that Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the NLU and unjustly favoring the NWB. Exhibits regarding that case are inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.

ISSUE: Whether there was due process.

HELD: Yes. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. It does not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103. The CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character namely:

1. The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

2. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

3. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to

support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

4. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable

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mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

6. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

7. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions

rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

Digested by: Marsado, Cristina

The Police Commission v. LoodG.R. No. L-34637. February 24, 1984

Facts:

Respondent Simplicio Ibea had been dismissed from the police service by the then Mayor Braulio Sto. Domingo pursuant to the decision of petitioner commission finding him guilty of serious irregularity in the performance of duty on complaint of Jose Lee, Jr.

Ibea thereafter filed his complaint with respondent court (CFI Rizal) seeking his reinstatement. He was sustained by respondent court which rendered its decision declaring the decision of the Police Commission as null and void and ordered the town mayor to "reinstate the plaintiff to his former position as patrolman in the Police Department of San Juan, Rizal with back salaries and remunerations pertaining to said position from the date of his suspension to the time of his reinstatement to the service."

Respondent court ruled that the decision of petitioner commission was based on incomplete records as there was no transcript of the testimonies of witnesses or minutes of the proceedings before the Board of Investigators and that the commission’s conclusion was without factual basis and was in violation of administrative due process. Respondent court also ruled that the question of the temporary status of the appointment of Ibea for lack of civil service eligibility (which was raised in the court below by the answer of Mayor Joseph Ejercito Estrada) had become moot and academic upon respondent Ibea’s subsequent acquisition of a civil service eligibility. Issues:

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(1) Whether the lower court erred in holding that respondent was deprived of due process of law because the Police Commission decided Administrative Case No. 48 even without stenographic notes taken of the proceedings of the case and;

(2) whether the lower court erred in disturbing the findings of facts of the Police Commission, an administrative agency duly vested by Republic Act No. 4864 with the power and authority to render decision in administrative cases against policemen and whose decision is final.

Held:

(1) No. Respondent court’s ruling against petitioner’s decision as falling short of the legal requirements of due process because it decided the subject administrative case without stenographic notes (which were not taken by the Board of Investigators) of the proceedings of the case, was in error. The proceeding provided for is merely administrative and summary in character, in line with the principle that "administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses."

The decision and resolution of petitioner commission amply show that both complainant and respondent were given the opportunity to be heard by the board and to adduce their respective evidence, which were duly considered and taken into account in its decision. The absence of the transcript of stenographic notes (which were not taken by the board) in the records of the case submitted by the Board of Investigators of San Juan, Rizal in the administrative proceeding cannot be claimed to have deprived respondent of due process of law. The report of investigation (which contained a summary report of what transpired during the hearing of the case), the affidavit-complaint, and respondent’s answer thereto, as well as the memoranda of the parties were sufficient basis for the decision and resolution of the commission, and substantially and essentially constituted the "records of the investigation" required in Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 4864.

(2) Yes. The record amply shows that petitioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence consisting of the affidavit-complaint (which was duly affirmed when complainant Jose Lee, Jr. appeared and testified before the board) and the documentary evidence duly marked by the board as exhibits for the complainant (and which were not questioned by respondent). As uniformly held by the Court, it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence on the record, or stated negatively, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence

The documentary evidence which convinced petitioner as to the veracity of the charges against respondent were certainly more than persuasive and substantial.

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Respondent court therefore erred in choosing to believe the theory of the defense put up by respondent Ibea on the equally erroneous ground that there was no evidence to support the findings of the Police Commission.


Bautista v. Board of EnergyG.R. No. 75016. January 13, 1989

Facts:

On May 30, 1986, MERALCO filed with BOE a verified application for an upward revision of its rates due to the losses because of the devaluation of peso, drop in sales, etc. However, consumptions up to 130 kilowatt hours per month of residential customers, and up to 70 kilowatt hours of small commercial customers, and consumptions of government-owned hospitals and public street lighting services are not affected by the increase.

On June 9, 1986, herein petitioners Perla C. Bautista and Greater Manila Federation of Jeepney Operators and Drivers Association, filed an "Opposition to the Application for the Increase in Rates" and prayed that no provisional approval should be granted by the BOE. They alleged that they, together with others similarly situated, are adversely affected by the increase in rates of MERALCO and that the increase in rates is exorbitant and unreasonable as the prices of petroleum products had already gone down.

In an Order dated June 11, 1986, the BOE provisionally approved MERALCO's revised rate schedules without hearing.

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid order on June 16, stating that they were not afforded the opportunity to be heard. Without setting for hearing, the BOE denied the motion for reconsideration in its Order dated June 18, 1986.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed this instant petition on July 10, 1986.

Petitioners argue that the authority of the BOE to grant provisional approval without hearing is not absolute, but is subject to the due process clause of the constitution and that their opposition to the grant of provisional approval — should have been set for hearing for MERALCO to present a prima facie case on the issue of urgent public need. They further contend that the BOE should wait for the resolution pending appeal involving another case before the Court of Appeals of its decision approving the last rate increase of MERALCO before it can grant the provisional relief prayed for.

Issue:

Whether the Board of Energy acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it provisionally approved ex-parte the application for increase in rates of

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MERALCO in its order dated June 11, 1986.

Held:

No. The petition is devoid of merit.

The records show that the issue has become moot and academic as MERALCO decreased its rate by 12.6 centavos per kilowatt hour in its electric, bills for August 1986, apart from a 4.2 centavo cut per kilowatt-hour for September 1986. In fact a similar petition (G.R. 75045, Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. Board of Energy et al.) raising a like issue and with the same factual backdrop was dismissed by this Court in the resolution of October 3, 1986 for having become moot and academic.Verily, where during the pendency of the case, certain events or circumstances have taken place which would render the case moot and academic, the petition for certiorari will be dismissed. Hence, the Court will neither determine an abstract proposition nor express an opinion in a case in which no practical relief may be granted in view of supervening events.Assuming that this case has not yet become moot, it is beyond dispute that when BOE provisionally authorized private respondent's application without hearing, it merely exercised a prerogative granted to it by law.Different acts and decrees even provide for this prerogative. Section 9 of PD 1206 provides the that Board has authority to grant provisional relief.Section 12 of RA 6173 states that "The Commission may, upon the filing of an application, petition or complaint or at any stage thereafter, and without prior hearing, on the basis of supporting papers duly verified or authenticated, grant provisional relief on motion of a party in the case or on its own initiative, without prejudice to a final decision after hearing, should the Commission find that the pleadings, together with such affidavits documents and other evidence which may be submitted in support of the motion, substantially support the provisional order." Section 16 of CA 146 empowers respondent board to fix and determine rates which shall be imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any public service and that the Commission may, in its discretion approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and without necessity of any hearing-, but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter, upon publication and notice to the concerns operating in the territory affected.


Civil Service Commission vs. HernandezG.R. No. 151095. August 31, 2004

Facts:

The assistant schools division superintendent of Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) sent a letter to Tomas Velasquez, informing him of the alleged infractions committed by Helen Hernandez such as soliciting, accepting and receiving sums of

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money in exchange for transfer or promotion of complaint teachers.

On November 15, 1996, the committee issued an investigation report recommending the filing of administrative and criminal complaints against Hernandez. On March 14, 1997, a formal charge for grave misconduct, abuse of authority, violation of Sec 22 (k) Omnibus Rules of Implementing Book of EO 292 and other related laws.

On March 24, 1997, Hernandez filed her answer to the charges but the decision of the court was not favourable for Hernandez.

Issue:

Whether the CSC erred in rendering judgment against Hernandez in violation of her right to due process in administrative proceeding

Held:

No. The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may have in support of his defense or simply an opportunity to be heard.

Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not even strictly applied to administrative proceedings, and administrative due process cannot fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.

Digested by: Pagsugiron, Xheena

Montemayor vs. CAG.R. No. 149335. July 1, 2003

Facts:

Edillo Montemayor was dismissed as the Regional Director of DPWH for unexplained wealth.

This allegation started when an unverified letter-complaint was addressed to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California accusing Montemayor of accumulation of unexplained wealth which is a violation of Sec8 of RA 3019. It was alleged that Montemayor and his wife purchased a house and lot in Los Angeles but he denied such allegation.

PCGC conducted its own investigation and required Montemayor to submit his SALN but he ignored these directives.The office of the President from the recommendation of PCAGC ordered or issued AO 12,4 ordering the dismissal of Montemayor.

Issue:

Whether he was denied of due process.

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Held:

No. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In this case, the parties were given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.His active participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency and satisfied due process requirement.



SOLID HOMES, INC. v. EVELINA LASERNA and GLORIA CAJIPE, represented by PROCESO F. CRUZ

G.R. No. 166051. April 8, 2008

Facts:

On 1 April 1977, respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe,represented by their attorney-in-fact, Proceso F. Cruz, as buyers, entered into a Contract to sell with petitioner Solid Homes, Inc., a corporation engaged in the development and sale of subdivision lots, as seller. The subject of the said Contract to Sell was a parcel of land located at Lot 3, Block I, Phase II, LoyolaGrand Villas, Quezon City, with a total area of 600 square meters, more or less. The total contract price agreed upon by the parties for the said parcel of land was P172,260.00, to be paid in the manner stipulated. The respondents made the down payment and several monthly installments. When the respondents had allegedly paid 90% of the purchase price, they demanded the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the subject property upon the final payment of the balance. But the petitioner did not comply with the demands of the respondents. The respondents whereupon filed against the petitioner a Complaint for Delivery of Title and Execution of Deed of Sale with Damages, dated 28 June1990, before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In their Complaint, respondents alleged that as their outstanding balance was onlyP5,928.18, they were already demanding the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the TCT of the subject property upon final payment of the said amount .The petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Answer, together with its Answer dated 17 September 1990, asserting that the respondents have no cause of action against it because the respondents failed to show that they had complied with their obligations under the Contract to Sell, since the respondent shad not yet paid in full the total purchase price of the subject property. In view of the said non-payment, the petitioner considered the Contract to Sell abandoned by the respondents and rescinded in accordance with the provisions of the same contract.

Issue:

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Whether the Court of Appeals seriously erred in not reversing the decision of the Office of the President.

Held:

No. The petition is unmeritorious. The constitutional mandate that, ―no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,‖ does not preclude the validity of―memorandum decisions,‖ which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. This Court likewise declared that ―memorandum decisions‖ comply with the constitutional mandate. It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the case a bar. Said section applies only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled ―Judiciary,‖ and all of its provisions have particular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of government. Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that decisions of executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige to meet the requirements under Section 14, Article VIII. Given the fact that the respondents have not yet paid in full the purchase price of the subject property so they have yet no right to demand the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the TCT, nevertheless, it was still within the HLURB Arbiter‘s discretion to proceed hearing the respondents‘complaint in pursuit of a judicious, speedy and inexpensive determination of the parties‘claims and defenses. Since petitioner did not rescind the Contract to Sell it executed with the respondents by a notarial act, the said Contract still stands. Both parties must comply with their obligations under the said Contract. As ruled by the HLURB Board of Commissioners, and affirmed by the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals, the respondents must first pay the balance of the purchase price of the subject property, after which, the petitioner must execute and deliver the necessary Deed of Sale and TCT of said property. Wherefore, the petition is hereby denied.

LINTANG BEDOL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSG.R. No. 179830. December 3, 2009

Facts:

As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province of Maguindanao, the respondent [petitioner] discharged his official functions and was able to ensure the PBOC’s performance of its ministerial duty to canvass the Certificates of Canvass coming from the twenty two (22) city and municipalities in the province.

At that time, respondent [petitioner] also was charged with the burdensome and gargantuan duty of being the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor for the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring province of Maguindanao.

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Respondent [petitioner] Bedol failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial Election Supervisor which was slated on May 22, 2007.

On May 25, 2007, respondent appeared before the Commission, en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) for the election of senators to submit the provincial certificate of canvass for Maguindanao, pursuant to his functions as Provincial Elections Supervisor and chair of the PBOC for Maguindanao.

Due to certain ‘observations’ on the provincial certificates of canvass by certain parties, canvassing of the certificate was held in abeyance and respondent was queried on the alleged fraud which attended the conduct of elections in his area.

He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for May 30, 2007, but failed to appear despite prior knowledge.

Respondent’s [petitioner] contention, Bedol explained before the Task Force during its June 11, 2007 fact finding activity that, while in his custody and possession, the election paraphernalia were stolen sometime on May 29, 2007, or some fifteen (15) days after the elections. This was the first time such an excuse was given by the respondent [petitioner] and no written report was ever filed with the Commission regarding the alleged loss.

Due to absences in the next scheduled investigative proceedings and due to failure and refusal to submit a written explanation of his absences, respondent [petitioner] was issued a contempt charge by COMELEC.

Petitioner was later arrested by members of the Philippine National Police on the basis of an Order of Arrest issued on June 29, 2007 by the COMELEC after petitioner repeatedly failed to appear during the fact-finding proceedings before Task Force Maguindanao.

Petitioner questioned the COMELEC’s legal basis for issuing the warrant of arrest and its assumption of jurisdiction over the contempt charges. Nevertheless, he was declared in contempt by COMELEC.

Petitioner, then, filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC in the other assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2007.

Issue:

Whether or not the initiation and issuance of contempt order is within the constitutional powers of the COMELEC.

Held:

Yes. Powers of COMELEC

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The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.

The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.

The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the performance of and administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.

The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is broad enough to allow the initiation of indirect contempt proceedings by the COMELEC motu proprio. Furthermore, the above-quoted provision of Section 52(e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly adopts the procedure and penalties provided by the Rules of Court.

Findings of guilt of indirect contemptPetitioner was found guilty of contempt on four (4) grounds.First, he repeatedly failed to attend, despite notice of the scheduled canvassing of the

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Provincial Certificates of Canvass, the hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao; and refused to submit his explanation for such absences, which he had undertaken to submit, in violation of paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.Second, he unlawfully assumed custody of accountable election documents, which were lost while in his possession, and consequently failed to deliver the same, in violation of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.Third and fourth, he publicly displayed disrespect for the authority of the COMELEC through the media (interviews on national television channels, and in newspapers and radios) by flaunting an armory of long firearms and side arms in public, and posing for the front page of a national broadsheet, with a shiny pistol tucked in a holster, in violation of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.

5. RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

This right may be invoked by the respondent at the time he is called by the

complainant as the witness; however, if he voluntarily takes the witness stand, he

can be cross-examined; but he may still invoke the right at the time the question

which calls for an answer which incriminates him of an offense other than which is

charged is asked.

Cabal v KapunanG.R. No. L-19052. December 29, 1962

Facts:

On or about August 1961, Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the Secretary of Nation Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts".

The President of the Philippines created a committee to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth contained in said letter-complaint and submit its report and recommendations as soon as possible. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory.

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Petitioner refused to be sworn to as a witness invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Hence, the Committee referred the matter to respondent City Fiscal of Manila, where the Fiscal charged petitioner with contempt under section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code before the CFI of Manila.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash before respondent Judge stating among others that: that the Committee had no power to order an require petitioner to take the witness stand and be sworn to inasmuch as said order violates petitioner's constitutional right against self-incrimination.

Issue:

Whether proceedings before the committee are criminal nature for the right of self-incrimination can be properly raised as a defense.

Held:

Yes. The purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such for forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of the nature of a penalty.

Generally speaking, information for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment against any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that where the person using the res illegally is the owner or rightful possessor of it, the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment. They have been held to be so far in the nature criminal proceedings that a general verdict on several count in an information is upheld if one count is good. According to the authorities such proceedings, where the owner of the property appears, are so far considered as quasi-criminal proceeding as to relieve the owner from being a witness against himself and to prevent the compulsory production of his books and papers.


Pascual v. Board of Medical ExaminersG.R. No. L-25018. May 26, 1969

Facts:

Arsenio Pascual Jr. filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present Pascual as his first witness, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. Pascual relied on the constitutional

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right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. The Board of Examiners, took note of such plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, Pascual would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority.

Pascual then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, which could result in forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in character. His action for prohibition was granted by the lower court which subsequently rendered judgment in his favor.

Issue:

Whether or not Pascual’s right against self-incrimination was being violated by the Board of Medical Examiners by compelling him to testify against himself.

Held:

Yes. We found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that “the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but also, to take the witness stand.”

The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to declare: “The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt.” Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, speaking through Justice Sanchez, we affirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant “to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will.”

We hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.


PBCOM v. CIRG.R. No. 112024. January 28, 1999

Facts:

Petitioner, Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), a commercial banking corporation duly organized under Philippine laws, filed its quarterly income tax returns for the first and second quarters of 1985, reported profits, and paid the total income tax of P5,016,954.00 by applying PBCom's tax credit memos for P3,401,701.00 and P1,615,253.00, respectively. Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered net loss

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of P25,317,228.00, thereby showing no income tax liability in its Annual Income Tax Returns for the year-ended December 31, 1985. For the succeeding year, ending December 31, 1986, the petitioner likewise reported a net loss of P14,129,602.00, and thus declared no tax payable for the year.

But during these two years, PBCom earned rental income from leased properties. The lessees withheld and remitted to the BIR withholding creditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and P234,077.69 in 1986. On August 7, 1987, petitioner requested the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, among others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00 representing the overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985.

Thereafter, on July 25, 1988, petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by their lessees from property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69.

Pending the investigation of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner instituted a Petition for Review on November 18, 1988 before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The petition was docketed as CTA Case No. 4309 entitled: "Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue."The CTA decided in favor of the BIR on the ground that the Petition was filed out of time as the same was filed beyond the two-year reglementary period. A motion for Reconsideration was denied and the appeal to Court of Appeals was likewise denied. Thus, this appeal to Supreme Court.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Revenue Regulations No. 7-85 which alters the reglementary period from two (2) years to ten (10) years is valid and; (2) Whether or not the petition for tax refund had already prescribed.

Held:

(1) No. RR 7-85 altering the 2-year prescriptive period imposed by law to 10-year prescriptive period is invalid. Administrative issuances are merely interpretations and not expansions of the provisions of law, thus, in case of inconsistency, the law prevails over them. Administrative agencies have no legislative power.

“When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, such circular created a clear inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress.”

“It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from time to time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is

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widely accepted that the interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement.”

“Further, fundamental is the rule that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. As pointed out by the respondent courts, the nullification of RMC No. 7-85 issued by the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue is an administrative interpretation which is not in harmony with Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC, for being contrary to the express provision of a statute. Hence, his interpretation could not be given weight for to do so would, in effect, amend the statute.”

(2) Yes. By implication of the above, claim for refund had already prescribed. Since the petition had been filed beyond the prescriptive period, the same has already prescribed. The fact that the final adjusted return show an excess tax credit does not automatically entitle taxpayer claim for refund without any express intent.


A man was shot and killed and his killer fled. Moments after the shooting, an eyewitness described to the police that the slayer wore white pants, a shirt with floral design, had boots and was about 70 kilos and 1.65 meters. Borja, who fit the description given, was seen nearby. He was taken into custody and brought to the police precinct where his pants, shirt and boots were forcibly taken and he was weighed, measured, photographed, fingerprinted and subjected to paraffin testing. At his trial, Borja objected to the admission in evidence of the apparel, his height and weight, his photographs, fingerprints comparison and the results of the paraffin test, asserting that these were taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination. Rule on the objection. Suggested Answer:

The objection of Borja is not tenable. As held in People v. Paynor, 261 SCRA 615 (1996), the rights guaranteed by Section 12, Article in of the Constitution applies only against testimonial evidence. An accused may be compelled to be photographed or measured, his garments may be removed, and his body may be examined.


Select the best answer and explain. An accused's right against self-incrimination is violated in the following cases:

(a) When he is ordered by the trial court to undergo a paraffin test to prove he is guilty of murder;

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(b) When he is compelled to produce his bankbooks to be used as evidence against his father charged with plunder;

(c) When he is ordered to produce a sample of his handwriting to be used as evidence that he is the author of a letter wherein he agreed to kill the victim;

(d) When the president of a corporation is subpoenaed to produce certain documents as proofs he is guilty of illegal recruitment.

Suggested Answer:

The best answer is c) when he is ordered to produce a sample of his handwriting to be used as evidence that he is the author of a letter wherein he agreed to kill the victim. Under Article HI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, "no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." Since the provision prohibits compulsory testimonial incrimination, it does not matter whether the testimony is taken by oral or written means as either way it involves the USE OF INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES. The purpose of the privilege is to avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction (Bermudez v. Castillo, Per Rec. No. 714-A, July 26, 1937; Beltran v. Samson, G.R. No. 32025, September 23,1929).

6. ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL AND REVIEW

Where provided by law, appeal from an administrative determination may be made

to a higher or superior administrative officer or body.

By virtue of the power of control which the President exercises over all executive

departments, the Presidents or through the department secretaries may affirm,

modify, alter, or reverse the administrative decision of subordinate official and

employees.

The appellate administrative agency may conduct additional hearings in the

appealed case, if deemed necessary.

Araneta v GatmaitanG.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191. April 30, 1957

Facts:

The President issued EO 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and the EO 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as

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a response for the general clamor among the majority of people living in the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that the said resources of the area are in danger of major depletion because of the effects of trawl fishing.

A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 24867, praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries from enforcing said executive order; to declare the same null and void, and for such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.

Issue:

Whether Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President.

Held:

Yes. As already held by this Court, the true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the conferring of authority or discretion as to the execution of law consists in that the former necessary involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, while in the latter the authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.

In the case of U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1, We also held, the power to delegate - the Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, the act is delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Philippines and b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Act was complete in itself and leaves it to the Sec. to carry into effect its legislative intent. The President did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with law.


SMGC v. Office of the PresidentG.R. No. 126999. August 30, 2000

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Facts:

On March 1994, SMGC filed before HLURB a complaint for breach of contract, violation of property rights and damages against private respondent HLURB rendered a decision dismissing the complaint as well as the counter-claim of the petitioner.

Petitioner then filed a petition for review but was dismissed by HLURB, on November 20, 1995, SMGC filed as appeal to the Office of the President but was dismissed for being out of time.

Issue:

Whether the Office of the President committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the reglementary period within which to appeal the decision of the HLURB to Office of the President is 15 days.

Held:

No. under Sec 27 of the Rules of Procedure for HLURB other party may appeal the decision of the BOC to the Office of the President within 30 days. But this is subject to the qualification that there are no other statutory periods of appeal applicable.

Under PD 957 Sec 15 provides a 15 day appeal period from the date of the receipt of the decision.

This 15 day appeal period of NHA is in conflict with the 30 day appeal period of the HLURB. But as a rule, any rule which is not consistent with the statute itself is null and void.

Therefore the decision of the HLURB became final and executor upon the lapse of 15 days from receipt of the decision.


Maxima Realty v. Parkway Realty EstateG.R. No. 136492. February 13, 2004

FACTS:

Sometime in April 1990, Parkway and petitioner Maxima Realty Management and Development Corporation (Maxima) entered into an agreement to buy and sell, on installment basis, Unit #702 in consideration of the amount of 3 Million Pesos. It was further agreed that failure to pay any of the installments on their due dates shall entitle Parkway to forfeit the amounts paid by way of liquidated damages.Maxima defaulted in the payment of the installments due but was granted several grace periods until it has paid a total of P1,180,000.00, leaving a balance of P1,820,000.00. Then, Parkway, with the consent of Segovia, executed a Deed of Assignment transferring all its rights in the condominium unit in favor of Maxima. This Deed was intended to enable Maxima to obtain title in its name and use the

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same as security for P1,820,000.00 loan with RCBC, which amount will be used by Maxima to pay its obligation to Parkway. On the other hand, Segovia and Maxima agreed to transfer title to the condominium unit directly in Maxima’s name subject to the condition that the latter shall pay Segovia the amount of P58,114.00, representing transfer fee, utility expenses, association dues and miscellaneous charges.Maxima, however, failed to pay Segovia the amount of P58, 114.00 for fees and charges. Thus, Segovia did not transfer the title of the condominium unit to Maxima. Since Parkway was not paid the balance of P1.82M, it cancelled its agreement to buy and sell and Deed of Assignment in favor of Maxima.Maxima filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs of the HLURB, a complaint for specific performance to enforce the agreement to buy and sell Unit #702. HLURB Arbiter sustained the nullification of the Deed of Assignment and ordered Parkway to refund to Maxima the amount of P1,180,000.00. Segovia was further ordered to issue the condominium certificate of title over Unit #702 in favor of Parkway upon payment by the latter of the registration fees.Both Maxima and Parkway appealed to the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB. During the pendency of the appeal, Maxima offered to pay the balance of P1.82M, which was accepted by Parkway. The Board then ordered Maxima to deliver said amount in the form of manager’s check to Parkway; and directed Segovia to transfer title over the property to Maxima. The latter, however, failed to make good its offer, which compelled Parkway to file a Manifestation that the appeal be resolved.Maxima appealed to the Office of the President which dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time. Maxima filed a petition for review with the CA. CA affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President.ISSUE: Whether the appeal before the Office of the President was filed within the reglementary period.

HELD: No. In SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the President, it was settled that the period within which to appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners of HLURB to the Office of the President is fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed decision, pursuant to Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 957 (otherwise known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protection Decree) and Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1344. The Court ruled that the thirty (30) day period to appeal to the Office of the President from decisions of the Board as provided in Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure, is not applicable, because special laws providing for the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President, such as Presidential Decree No. 597 and Presidential Decree No. 1344, must prevail over the HLURB Rules of Procedure. In the case at bar, Maxima had until May 4, 1994, the fifteenth day from receipt of the decision of the Board on April 19, 1994,to appeal to the Office of the President. The appeal which was filed on May 10, 1994 was clearly beyond the reglementary period.

Digested by: Andueza, Thea

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2009BAR EXAM QUESTION:

Maximino, an employee of the Department of Education, is administratively charged with dishonesty and gross misconduct. During the formal investigation of the charges, the Secretary of Education preventively suspended him for a period of sixty (60) days. On the 60th day of the preventive suspension, the Secretary rendered a verdict, finding Maximino guilty, and ordered his immediate dismissal from the service.

Maximino appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which affirmed the Secretary's decision. Maximino then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the CSC decision, exonerating Maximino. The Secretary of Education then petitions the Supreme Court (SC) for the review of the CA decision.

a. Is the Secretary of Education a proper party to seek the review of the CA decision exonerating Maximino? Reasons.

b. If the SC affirms the CA decision, is Maximino entitled to recover back salaries corresponding to the entire period he was out of the service? Explain your answer.


SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. GMA NETWORK, INC.

G.R. No. 164026, December 23, 2008.

Facts: On August 19, 1995, GMA, filed an application for collective approval of various amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws with SEC. The amendments applied for include, among others, the change in the corporate name of petitioner from "Republic Broadcasting System, Inc." to "GMA Network, Inc." as well as the extension of the corporate term for another fifty (50) years from and after June 16, 2000.

Upon such filing, the petitioner had been assessed by the SEC’s Corporate and Legal Department a separate filing fee for the application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of its authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof or an amount of P1,212,200.00. Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 is the basis for computing the filing fee relative to application for the amendment of its articles of incorporation for purposes of extending its corporate term.

On October 20, 1995, GMA protested the assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 for its application for extension of corporate term.

On March 19, 1996, the petitioner requested for an official opinion/ruling from the SEC on the validity and propriety of the

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assessment for application for extension of its corporate term. SEC stood by their ruling upon being questioned by GMA.In its petition for review with the Court of Appeals, GMA argued that its application for the extension of its corporate term is akin to an amendment and not to a filing of new articles of incorporation. It further averred that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994, which the SEC used as basis for assessing P1,212,200.00 as filing fee for the extension of GMA’s corporate term, is not valid.

The appellate court agreed with the SEC’s submission that an extension of the corporate term is a grant of a fresh license for a corporation to act as a juridical being endowed with the powers expressly bestowed by the State. As such, it is not an ordinary amendment but is analogous to the filing of new articles of incorporation.

However, the Court of Appeals ruled that Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is legally invalid and ineffective for not having been published in accordance with law. The challenged memorandum circular, according to the appellate court, is not merely an internal or interpretative rule, but affects the public in general. Hence, its publication is required for its effectivity.

Assuming that Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is applicable, GMA avers that the latter did not take effect and cannot be the basis for the imposition of the fees stated therein for the reasons that it was neither filed with the University of the Philippines Law Center nor published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation as required under existing laws.

Issue:

Whether the circular is in validly effective.

Held:

No. The SC agreed with the Court of Appeals that the questioned memorandum circular is invalid as it does not appear from the records that it has been published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Art. 2 of the Civil Code, provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided."

In Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court, expounding on the publication requirement, held:"We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature".

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of

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legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature, or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties."

The questioned memorandum circular, furthermore, has not been filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register of the University of the Philippines Law Center as required in the Administrative Code of 1987.

The questioned memorandum circular, it should be emphasized, cannot be construed as simply interpretative of R.A. No. 3531. This administrative issuance is an implementation of the mandate of R.A. No. 3531 and indubitably regulates and affects the public at large. It cannot, therefore, be considered a mere internal rule or regulation, nor an interpretation of the law, but a rule which must be declared ineffective as it was neither published nor filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register.

7. DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA

The decisions and orders of administrative agencies rendered pursuant to their

quasi-judicial authority have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a

final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.

Ysmael v. Deputy Executive SecretaryG.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990

Facts:

Petitioner alleged that it entered into a timber license agreement with the DENR, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990.

On August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other

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forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources.

Petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, requesting him to stop all logging operations and to pull out logging machineries and equipment in order to conserve remaining forests. After the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to forest conservation and alleging that it was not given the opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging operation, but no favorable action was taken on this letter.

The Ministry of Natural Resources issued an order denying petitioner's request.

It ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983. Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao reasoning that the Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great responsibility it bear [sic] in respect to forests. It considers itself the trustee thereof. This being the case, it has to ensure the availability of forest resources not only for the present, but also for the future generations of Filipinos.

Issue:

Whether the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory administrative orders constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Held:

No. It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.

These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction.

As gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR, requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these were already settled matters as far as petitioner was concerned.

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Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially in this country.


United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) v. Laguesma

G.R. No. 122226. March 25, 1998

Facts:

Petitioner union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership pursuant to Art. 245 of the Labor Code.

Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Its petition was dismissed by the Third Division for lack of showing that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. But petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes the constitution.

Citing the Court’s ruling in Nasipit Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission, petitioner argues that previous administrative determinations of the NLRC do not have the effect of res judicata in this case, because “labor relations proceedings” are “non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities.”

Issue:

Whether or not res judicata applies to administrative proceedings?

Held:

Yes. The doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative proceedings. As early as 1956, in Brillantes v. Castro, the Court sustained the dismissal of an action by a trial court on the basis of a prior administrative determination of the same case by the Wage Administration Service, applying the

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principle of res judicata. Recently, in Abad v. NLRC the Court applied the related doctrine of stare decisis in holding that the prior determination that certain jobs at the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. were project employments was binding in another case involving another group of employees of the same company. Indeed, in Nasipit Lumber Co., this Court clarified toward the end of its opinion that “the doctrine of res judicata applies . . . to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative powers. “ Proceedings for certification election are quasi judicial in nature and, therefore, decisions rendered in such proceedings can attain finality.

At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative determination compels respect for the finding of the Secretary of Labor that route managers are managerial employees as defined by law in the absence of anything to show that such determination is without substantial evidence to support it. Nonetheless, the Court, concerned that employees who are otherwise supervisors may wittingly or unwittingly be classified as managerial personnel and thus denied the right of self- organization, has decided to review the record of this case.


Montemayor v. BundalianG.R. No. 149335. July 1, 2003

Facts:

In this petition for review, the petitioner assailed the decision of the Office of the President which ordered his dismissal as Regional Director of the DPWH for unexplained wealth, as a result of an investigation conducted by the PCAGC which arrived at the conclusion that the real property he had acquired in California, U.S. was unlawfully acquired for it was manifestly out of proportion to his salary.

Petitioner’s dismissal originated from an unverified letter-complaint, addressed by private respondent Luis Bundalian to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. Private respondent accused petitioner, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019. Private respondent charged that in 1993, petitioner and his wife purchased a house and lot at Los Angeles, California, making a down payment of US$100,000.00. Private respondent accused petitioner of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects.

Petitioner, represented by counsel, submitted his counter-affidavit before the PCAGC alleging that the real owner of the subject property was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo. And that desiring to migrate in the US, they were advised by an immigration lawyer that it would be an advantage if they had real property in the U.S. Fajardo intimated to them that she was interested in buying a house and lot in Burbank, California, but could not do so at that time as there was a prohibition in her

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mortgage contract. Fajardo offered to buy the Burbank property and put the title in the names of petitioner.

Petitioner likewise pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of similar cases filed before the Ombudsman. He attached to his counter-affidavit the Consolidated Investigation Report of the Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of evidence.

The PCAGC noted that instead of adducing evidence, petitioner’s counsel exerted more effort in filing pleadings and motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. Thus, it recommended petitioner’s dismissal from service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019. The OP concurred with the findings and adopting the recommendation of the PCAGC.

Issue:

Whether the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the PCAGC moot and academic.

Held:

No. The SC did not cannot sustain petitioner’s stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGC’s investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar.


Documents

Admin - Chapter 4 and 5 - Quasi-Legislative and Quasi-judicial